Spies, Wiretaps, and SECRET Operations

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ESPIONAGE

GLENN P. HASTEDT, EDITOR

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An Encyclopedia of American Espionage

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Preface

For most Americans espionage is a twentieth-century phenomenon and is closely associated with the cold war. The reality is quite different. Running spies and finding out spies has been a part of American history since the colonial times. It has produced heroes and villains, successes and failures, and periods of measured response to external threats along with periods dominated by witch hunts and scapegoating.

In *Spies, Wiretaps, and Special Operations: An Encyclopedia of American Espionage*, our goal is to provide readers with information and insight into the key individuals, organizations, and events in the history of American espionage. Selected non-American experiences have been included to provide additional context for understanding this history. So too are entries on U.S. covert action and analytic undertakings. Espionage does not take place in a vacuum and their selective inclusion is intended to help readers gain a better sense of the general makeup of U.S. foreign policy at key points in time.

Broadly speaking, seven time periods are represented. The first centers on the American Revolution and efforts to defeat the British and obtain aid from France. The second period is the early Republic and highlights the role of espionage in expanding westward and fending off foreign challenges. The Civil War is the third period and our entries include examples of both Union and Confederate espionage. The fourth period focuses on the diplomatic and military intrigues that were part of the Spanish-American War. World War I provides the focal point for espionage in the fifth time period, although our entries extend beyond it into the 1920s and 1930s as we deal with such varied aspects of American espionage as the Red Scare and the Black Chamber. After World War I we turn our attention to espionage as it relates to World War II. Next we examine cold war espionage. Not surprisingly, this is our largest section reflecting the deepened involvement of the United States in world affairs and the multifaceted nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Our last time period is labeled the post–cold war era. Here we see the growing prevalence of military and economic espionage by China against the United States and the links between terrorist groups and espionage.

Although little about the future can be said with complete certainty, the record of American espionage presented in *Spies, Wiretaps, and Special Operations* makes three points clear. First, the U.S. involvement in espionage and counterespionage in the twenty-first century will continue unabated. We will not suddenly "stop reading people's mail." Second, we will direct our efforts, both offensive and defensive, against new targets and in new ways. Third, the American historical experience with espionage will continue to be relevant for understanding its potential and limitations as an instrument of foreign policy.

Acknowledgments

Many individuals contributed to the writing of *Spies, Wiretaps, and Special Operations: An Encyclopedia of American Espionage*. The greatest contribution and thanks go to the authors who contributed their expertise in writing entries in their areas of specialization. Thanks also goes to Steve Guerrier, who organized the initial entry list and oversaw the assignment of articles. Many people at ABC-CLIO also deserve to be acknowledged and thanked for their contribution to bringing this volume to a successful conclusion.

Introduction

Understanding Espionage

Espionage is a competitive contest between spies and spy catchers. It is a contest entered into by great powers and small ones; by individuals, businesses, and terrorist groups. The entries in this volume focus on the American experience in conducting espionage against foreign targets and protecting itself from acts of espionage carried out against it. Of necessity these entries highlight the features of specific cases. In doing so it is easy to lose sight of larger issues in the conduct of espionage and counterespionage. Here we want to present a series of different but overlapping frames of reference for understanding the activities of spies and spy catchers.

Espionage and the Nature of World Politics

Two points need to be emphasized about the place of espionage in writings on world politics. First, traditionally thinking about international politics has emphasized the differences between times of war and times of peace. International law recognizes the central role played by espionage in information gathering in times of war. As far back as the *Declaration of Brussels* of 1874 espionage has been considered to be a lawful means of warfare. Its unique nature has also been recognized. Spies, for example, need to be captured in the act of spying. A spy who flees and returns to their homeland is not considered to be a spy any longer. This is different from a criminal who remains a criminal until captured. If captured in the act of spying, international law supports denying this individual certain rights and privileges that would otherwise be afforded to people charged with a crime. The peacetime status of espionage is less clear. Some international law scholars treat espionage as illegal in time of peace. It is seen as a violation of sovereignty and the political independence of states. Others see it as a morally, politically, and legally acceptable activity.

The distinction between wartime and peacetime espionage is one that is losing its theoretical and practical importance. The formal declaration of war is becoming an

anachronism. World War II was the last declared war the United States participated in. The Korean War, Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, the Iraq War, peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Lebanon, Grenada, and the war against terrorism have all been conducted without a declaration of war. In operational terms the boundary between peace and war is also fading. During the cold war the United States and Soviet Union considered themselves to be in a state of warfare short of actual combat but one that included military, political, and diplomatic competition and conflict. The foreign policies of many lesser states, especially those locked into rivalry wars such as between India and Pakistan and Israel and its Arab neighbors, also do not make a distinction between war and peace.

Nowhere is the boundary between war and peace more blurred and ill defined then in the case of terrorism. As the events of 9/11 reveal, successful antiterrorist policy making depends upon information but the collection and analysis of information that cannot wait until the terrorist act has taken place. It must precede it and take place during times of peace.

Second, espionage is valued by policy makers as a way of reducing the dangers posed by diplomatic and military surprise. In and of itself, surprise matters little in world politics. Surprise is important only when it invalidates the fundamental assumptions on which policies are based. In doing so, surprise acts as a power multiplier, dramatically increasing the amount of power possessed by the state carrying out the surprise.

Preventing surprise, however, is not an easy task because the root causes of surprise are numerous. First, states contemplating surprise will try and cloak their actions in secrecy. They will also engage in deception. Second, states struggle to identify important pieces of information from the clutter of meaningless information or noise that their intelligence agencies take in. Where deception deliberately seeks to confuse an adversary by throwing it off track, noise confuses the adversary simply by existing as extraneous information that intelligence services pick up. It is information that must be examined, evaluated, and dismissed in the search for signals of possible surprise.

Espionage is an important means of trying to avert surprise because it offers policy makers a window through which to accurately gauge an adversary's true intentions and capabilities. It can negate deception and cut through noise. For these reasons, espionage is unlikely ever to disappear. Though the risks of failure are great and the instances of failure may far outnumber the instances of success, policy makers will judge the effort worthwhile if even one Pearl Harbor or 9/11 can be averted. Espionage is not, however, a panacea or cure-all for the problem of surprise. It cannot overcome the self-generated blinders that often prevent policy makers from seeing signs of surprise and if discovered espionage may also become an instrument of deception by the target state as it allows false and misleading information to be transmitted back to its adversary's intelligence services.

Espionage and the Intelligence Cycle

Espionage does not occur in isolation. It is part of a broader set of activities that are designed to inform policy makers about the world around them. Collectively these activities are referred to as the intelligence cycle.

The first step in the intelligence cycle is tasking. It is here that policy makers and senior intelligence officials determine what information they need to help them accomplish their missions and policy objectives. The second step in the intelligence process is collection. It is here that espionage enters the intelligence cycle. It is one way of obtaining the information identified as important in the first stage. The intelligence community has a wide variety of collection strategies to choose from. A most basic choice is between open-source information and secret information. Open-source information is publicly available information. Espionage is used to obtain secret information. A fundamental choice here is between technological espionage and classic human espionage. Technological espionage relies heavily upon satellites, planes, and electronic means to map the adversary's capabilities and intercept human communications. Human espionage seeks to acquire photographs, documents, and other material of intelligence value directly by infiltrating key organizations.

The third step in the intelligence cycle is processing and evaluating the information obtained. Information becomes intelligence only after it is evaluated and assessed. The evaluation of information involves two judgments. First, how reliable is the source. Second, how good is the information. Confidence about the value of the information under review increases as multiple sources report the same information. In order to boost confidence in the information they are working with, intelligence organizations will task multiple collection platforms (spies, satellites, military attachés, etc.) with obtaining the same information.

Counterespionage enters the intelligence cycle at this point. By actively searching for spies and protecting one's own secrets, counterintelligence operations serve to increase the confidence of analysts and consumers in the information they are receiving. Paradoxically, counterespionage can also have the opposite effect. It can cripple intelligence analysis by calling loyalty of all into doubt and with it the information being provided. When the suspicions and doubts created by the conspiratorial mind-set of counterespionage are left unchecked, a "wilderness of mirrors" is created from which there is no escape.

The fourth stage in the intelligence cycle is analysis and production. Here the individual pieces of information that have been collected and assessed are now brought together and presented to policy makers as finished documents. The final stage in the intelligence cycle is a feedback stage in which policy makers respond to the intelligence they have received. In the process of the intelligence cycle begins anew. Although easily separated for purposes of discussion in the real world of intelligence, these steps do not occur in a nice, neat order but tend to overlap with one another and are often short-circuited by foreign and domestic events.

Intelligence and Its Bureaucratic Context

Whereas in the popular imagination the game of spy versus spy catcher is played by individuals, there also exists an important bureaucratic element to it. In the United States these bureaucracies are collectively referred to as the *intelligence community*. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA) and the various components of the Defense Department are its most famous members. Before

9/11, the head of the CIA, the Director of Central Intelligence, was also the head of the intelligence community. Post-9/11 intelligence reforms placed a Director of National Intelligence atop the intelligence community and created a new organization, the Department of Homeland Security.

The temptation is to view these bureaucracies as neutral machines that respond in almost automatic fashion to external directives regarding goals, missions, tactics, and procedures. Only at the most general level is this imagery correct. It belies a more complex reality in which competition between organizations and internal bureaucratic norms shape the behavior of organizations and their ability to achieve the purposes set for them. As a result, U.S. intelligence community is a community only in the loosest sense. The concept of community implies likeness and similarity. It suggests a group of organizations that share common goals and outlooks. More accurately, the members of the intelligence community constitute a federation of units that coexist and are jealous of maintaining their institutional autonomy.

The problems that bureaucracy can pose for intelligence in general and espionage in particular were present at the founding of the modern intelligence community. They are still evident five years after the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created. In May 2009 DNI Dennis Blair declared that hence forward he would select the top American spy assigned to foreign countries and not the CIA as had traditionally been the case. The next day Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta sent out a memo instructing CIA officials to disregard Blair's memo and that nothing had changed. Although for some such bureaucratic wars are par for the course in Washington and not to be regarded as crippling U.S. espionage efforts, to others they are further proof that the intelligence system operating in the United States was "flawed by design" from the outset and destined to fail.

Controlling Espionage

The enduring challenge of intelligence policy is conducting intelligence in secret and controlling it. The conventional starting place in thinking about control is passing laws and exercising legislative oversight. Yet, the reality is that congressional lawmakers have been reluctant to pass legislation detailing how espionage, counterespionage, covert action, and intelligence analysis should be conducted. Instead Congress has treated these activities as executive functions best left to the discretion of the president. What Congress does insist upon is that it be informed and briefed by the intelligence community. Since the mid-1970s each house has had a standing intelligence committee for this purpose. Prior to that the intelligence community briefed a variety of committees and congressional oversight was haphazard. A key factor prompting the creation of these committees was revelations that the CIA had been spying on American citizens. The temptation is to treat this occurrence as a contemporary and passing phenomenon, but the historical record shows it has been an enduring feature of American national security politics.

Presidential control presents its own problems. Crowded agendas, limited time, and limited interest conspire to push intelligence to the background. Even presidents who are interested in intelligence matters may not be interested in the details of espionage

operations. Furthermore, because espionage operations involve deceit and treasonous activity a case can be made that presidents should not know all the details of espionage operations. "Plausible denial" is a valued and time-honored phrase in intelligence work that allows policy makers to feign ignorance of operations gone wrong. The more intimately presidents or legislators are involved in espionage operations the more difficult it is to assert such a claim.

Why Spy

The ultimate purpose of counterespionage is to protect secrets. At base it requires an awareness of the motivations of spies, their standard operating procedures or tradecraft, and their targets. The historical record suggests that spies are motivated by a number of factors that are not unique to any country or period of time. One motivation to spy is blackmail. It is often associated with Soviet recruitment practice but others practice it as well. Sexual preference or illicit affairs are common fodder for blackmail. A second motivation is money. The amount need not be large. Often only small sums of money are sufficient to induce someone to spy or to keep them engaged as a spy. In fact, paying spies large sums of money is often dangerous because it attracts attention to them. A third motivational factor is ideology. Some spies are politically motivated. They believe in the cause they are working for and do not judge their actions as treasonous. The "ism" involved may be quite varied: Communism, capitalism, ethnic nationalism, or patriotism. Finally, some spies are motivated by a complex set of psychological needs that combine ambition, power, anger, and adventure.

The ultimate goal in any scholarly exercise is to link the past with the present and future.

Taken together these four frames provide us with such a tool. Along with the information presented in the entries to *Spies, Wiretaps, and Special Operations: An Encyclopedia of American Espionage* they establish a foundation for gaining a better appreciation of past and current acts of espionage as well as for understanding the dynamics of future ones.

A

ABEL, COLONEL RUDOLF IVANOVICH
(JULY 11, 1903–NOVEMBER 15, 1971)

Rudolf Abel, born Vilyam "William" Genrikovich Fischer on July 11, 1903, in Newcastle upon Tyne, England, was a Russian spy who worked in the United States from 1947 to 1957 and was later exchanged for American U-2 pilot Gary Francis Powers. During Abel's military service in the Red Army from 1925 to 1926, he was trained as a radio operator. He worked briefly in Soviet Military Intelligence and was then recruited by the State Political Directorate (OGPU), a predecessor to the Committee for State Security (KGB), in 1927. In 1946, Abel began to train as a spy for entry into the United States. The following year, Abel entered Canada under the alias Emil Robert Goldfus and proceeded to the United States on November 17, 1947.

Abel operated out of New York City under his assumed name, Goldfus, as an artist and photographer. His primary assignment was to recruit and supervise agents who gathered intelligence information. Abel was given control of a pre-existing group of agents, which included Lona and Morris Cohen, who are believed to have been the couriers for the Rosenberg-Greenglass-Fuchs nuclear spy ring. Fisher was captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1957 as the result of the defection of his assistant, Reino Hayhanen, in what became known as the Hollow Nickel Case. Rudolf Abel was the alias Fisher adopted on his arrest, which alerted his capture by U.S. authorities to the Soviet Union. Indicted as a Russian spy, Abel was tried in federal court in New York City in October 1957. Abel, convicted on three separate counts of conspiracy, was sentenced to 30 years in prison and a monetary fine. On February 10, 1962, Abel was exchanged for Powers, who was being held prisoner in the Soviet Union. After the exchange, Abel returned to Moscow and remained there until he died of lung cancer on November 15, 1971.

See also: Cohen, Lona and Morris; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; Greenglass, David; Powers, Francis Gary

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Lazarus F. O'Sako

ABUJIHAAD, HASSAN
(DECEMBER 24, 1976–)

Born Paul R. Hall, Hassan Abujihaad was arrested on March 7, 2007, with materially providing support and resources knowing or intending that they were to be used to kill U.S. nationals. Then age 32, Abujihaad pled not guilty. On March 6, 2008, he was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to 25 years in prison, the maximum sentence. Abujihaad converted to Islam at age 19. From 1998 to 2002, Abujihaad served in the U.S. Navy as a Signalman Second Class holding a security clearance. He served on the destroyer USS *Benfold*. Abujihaad received an honorable discharge from the navy prior to being charged with espionage.

Abujihaad began to provide information to al Qaeda and other Islamist jihadists in 2000, shortly after the attack on the USS *Cole* while he served aboard the USS *Benfold*. His point of contact was Babar Ahmad, who was based in London and ran propaganda Web sites for these groups as Azzam Publications. Abujihaad contacted Azzam Publications ordering videos that encouraged a violent jihad. He also made inquiries seeking to contact those who shared his faith and enthusiasm for terrorism. In his e-mails Abujihaad praised those who attacked the *Cole* and provided summaries of naval briefings. A December 2003 raid on Ahmad's apartment in London uncovered a computer disk that contained classified information regarding the movement of a navy battle group assigned to engage in missions against al Qaeda and information about its vulnerabilities to terrorist attack. After Ahmad was arrested in 2004, Abujihaad destroyed certain publications he has received from Azzam Publications and deleted several incriminating files on his personal computer. A second charge against Abujihaad stemmed from December 2006 tape-recorded conversations in which he sought to purchase two AR-15 assault rifles.

Information used to arrest and convict Abujihaad was also provided by a former 2004 Phoenix roommate, Derrick Shareef, who was arrested after an FBI sting operation in which he sought to obtain hand grenades in an effort to blow up a Chicago-area mall during the Christmas shopping season. It was Shareef that provided the information about Abujihaad's actions after Ahmad was arrested.

See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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ABWEHR

The Abwehr was the German agency responsible for counterespionage and other forms of intelligence activities that came into existence in 1921. The agency was created with a staff of six officers following the 1919 signing of the Treaty of Versailles. Its original function was strictly counterintelligence, the German word for which is "abwehr." In the two decades following its creation, however, the agency grew in size and significantly expanded its range of operations. By the early 1930s, the Abwehr was assigned responsibility for all military intelligence activities. The nonmilitary counterparts of the Abwehr were the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, or SD) and the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Central Security Office, or RSHA).

The activities of the Abwehr are separated into three divisions. Section I was responsible for secret intelligence activities, such as the development of invisible inks and the maintenance of contact with secret agents. Abwehr II was assigned responsibility for sabotage and other special projects, and Abwehr III, for counterespionage activities.

During World War II the Abwehr successfully penetrated the Dutch underground and in the process compromised the activities of the British Special Operations Executive. It also engaged in successful industrial espionage operations against the United States stealing aircraft blueprints and sabotaging industrial plants. On the whole, however, the Abwehr's effectiveness was compromised by what was held by higher political authorities in Nazi Germany to be its pessimistic intelligence reports as well as competition for influence with the Protective Squadron (SS). This was due in no small measure to the opposition of its head Admiral Wilhelm Canaris to Nazi rule. Abwehr agents were also known to provide information to Allied authorities and false information to Adolf Hitler. The Abwehr lost its independence in 1944 when Hitler merged it with the RSHA, making it a special division of that organization.

See also: Special Operations Executive (SOE)

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ADAMS, CHARLES FRANCIS
(1807–1886)

Charles Adams was U.S. minister to Great Britain during the Civil War. Born in Boston, Massachusetts, on August 18, 1807, Charles Francis Adams spent 8 of the first 10 years of his life in Europe with his diplomat father, John Quincy Adams. Adams' public service career began in the Massachusetts Legislature where he served from 1840 to 1845. In 1848, the Free Soil Party put him on their presidential ticket as Martin van Buren's running mate. A decade later, Adams began his life on the national stage as a U.S. Congressman.

In 1861, Secretary of State William Seward persuaded Abraham Lincoln to appoint Adams as Minister to Great Britain. With an impending civil war, Charles Francis Adams had the precarious task of acquiring Union support from Britain.

Adams arrived in England to news of the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality, which granted the Confederacy belligerent rights, but not full recognition. This partial commitment represented Britain's ambivalent attitude toward the U.S. conflict. Support for the Union fluctuated throughout Britain over the next few years, especially when their 1862 cotton famine nearly caused Europe to interfere with the Union's southern blockade.

Perhaps the greatest confrontation during Adams' tenure in Britain came in 1863. Using intelligence acquired by Union agent in Liverpool Thomas Dudley, Adams learned of the construction of two Confederate ironclads in Liverpool. The British government denied that these privately constructed ships violated neutrality. Adams wrote the foreign minister a strong letter protesting the government's inaction in ceasing their production and release, stating effectively that by violating neutrality, the United States would be forced to view Britain as an enemy nation. This letter, in conjunction with several Union military successes and Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, effectively guaranteed a British nonintervention policy toward the United States.

Adams returned home in 1868. He spent many of his final years compiling and publishing his family's manuscripts. Adams died in Boston on November 21, 1886.

See also: Civil War, Intelligence; Lincoln Administration and Intelligence

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Matthew C. Cain

ADAMS, SAM
(1933–1988)

Sam Adams was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst during the Vietnam War. A 1955 Harvard graduate, Adams joined the CIA in 1963 and in 1965 was assigned to the section that was responsible for the daily situation report on Vietnam. After a number of trips to Vietnam, where he spoke to analysts with field experience, and from his analysis on captured enemy documents, Adams came to suspect that the U.S. military officials were consistently underestimating the size of enemy forces and that U.S. troops were actually fighting a much larger enemy than was being reported. He discovered that entire categories of combatants were shifted to noncombatant status. At first Adams assumed that this was simple oversight, but soon he was convinced that this was a deliberate attempt by the military, the CIA, and the White House to hide the truth in order to convince Congress and the American public that victory was close at hand.

Outraged, Adams launched a campaign to get the real enemy numbers acknowledged. This resulted in a confrontation with military and CIA leaders in Saigon and

Washington and he soon found himself isolated and under personal attack. After being threatened with dismissal 13 times, Adams resigned from the CIA in disgust in 1973. He subsequently went public with an account of his experiences in a *Harper's* magazine cover story in May 1975. He then began to write an account of his life in the CIA. Later he set aside work on his memoir to help with a CBS television documentary, "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," which eventually resulted in a libel suit against CBS brought by General William Westmoreland. That suit was settled out of court. In 1988, Adams died suddenly of a heart attack before his could complete his memoir. His unfinished book was published by his wife in 1994.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Vietnam War and Intelligence Operations

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James H. Willbanks

AERIAL SURVEILLANCE

Aircraft have proven to be some of the best platforms for intelligence gathering since their development at the opening of the twentieth century. Aircraft are capable of carrying a variety of cameras as well as sensors that can locate and record electronic emissions from various communications sources while other equipment has permitted the aircraft to scoop air samples for analysis of such events as nuclear tests or accidents. During the cold war, aircraft were invaluable intelligence gathering platforms thanks to several factors. First, their ability to reach high altitudes permitted their cameras and sensors to peer into territory in other countries without violating international borders. Second, the new generation of post–World War II reconnaissance aircraft utilized to actually overfly the territory of other countries could often accomplish this mission at altitudes and speeds that prevented successful interception. Third, aircraft produce near real-time intelligence information. A pilot can receive his briefing, launch his plane, fly the mission, and return with the reconnaissance data for analysis in a matter of hours. However, aircraft are not invulnerable to countermeasures such as fighters and anti-aircraft missiles and intelligence gathering missions have resulted in diplomatic incidents after reconnaissance planes were downed. In recent years, satellites and unmanned drones have reduced the need for, but not replaced, manned aircraft as intelligence platforms.

Although aircraft have always been utilized for tactical intelligence gathering on the battlefield, the end of World War II heralded their application to strategic intelligence. The ideological divisions between the Soviet Union and the other Allied powers after

The U.S. Air Force Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft made its first flight in August 1955. Its most famous flight came in 1960 when a mission flown by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union. (U.S. Air Force)

the war led to a physical separation of the territory they occupied following the collapse of Germany. The Allies turned to aircraft to provide much of their initial intelligence gathering capabilities after World War II. The United States and Great Britain began sending aircraft across Soviet-occupied territory before the end of the 1945. These flights, often declared to be navigational errors, were the first intelligence overflights of the cold war. The United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies flew intelligence aircraft throughout the entire length of the cold war and into the twenty-first century.

Many types of intelligence equipment have been mounted on aircraft since World War II. However, much of this equipment can be classified into three simple categories. First, intelligence aircraft can carry various types of cameras and film including standard photographic and infrared which allows operations at night. Standard cameras can be mounted in front of the aircraft to photograph targets in the direction that the plane is flying. These targets are frequently overflown by the aircraft as it gathers intelligence. Other types of cameras produce photographs at an angle away from the left or right side of the aircraft. These cameras permit a plane to fly along a border or inside international airspace while taking pictures into the territory the pilot is attempting to avoid. For example, in 1962, American U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft utilized this type of camera over Cuba following the downing of a U-2 by a Soviet Surface to Air Missile (SAM). The cameras allowed the U-2s to avoid SAM sites while photographing targets at a steep angle away from the aircraft. Second, aircraft can also carry various types of electronic sensors during missions often referred to as ELINT (Electronic Intelligence), SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), or COMINT (Communications Intelligence). As the aircraft fly near or over hostile territory, the sensors locate and record various types of electronic signals including radar and many kinds of communications for later analysis. For example, in 1983 a South Korean airliner strayed over

Soviet territory in an incident that is still debated. After Soviet fighters downed the airliner over international waters, the United States produced recordings of the Soviet fighter pilots requesting permission to shoot down the South Korean plane. The recordings were apparently gathered by an American intelligence aircraft flying in the vicinity of the incident and gathering electronic intelligence. Third, aircraft provide platforms for the gathering of physical intelligence such as material following nuclear tests or accidents. For example, many American aircraft dating back to the 1950s have carried special "scoops" to gather air samples for analysis following the above ground nuclear tests of other countries. Intelligence gathering aircraft and their operations can be analyzed in three categories including high-altitude strategic reconnaissance; ultra high-altitude strategic reconnaissance; and low-altitude tactical reconnaissance.

High-Altitude Strategic Reconnaissance: Aircraft performing these missions tend to be modified bombers which can fly at high altitudes over great distances. American and British intelligence flights over Soviet or East European territory began within months after the conclusion of World War II. Later, the People's Republic of China and North Korea, as well as many other countries, emerged as additional areas of interest by intelligence gathering aircraft. The Royal Air Force primarily utilized Canberra and Venom bombers in the early years, whereas the United States employed reconnaissance versions of many types of bombers including the air force's Boeing RB-29 and RB-50 Superfortresses, North American RB-45 Tornados, Convair RB-36 Peacemakers, Boeing RB-47 Stratojets, Martin RB-57 Canberras, and Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joints as well as the navy's Consolidated PB4Y-2 Privateers, Douglas EA-3 Seawings, and Lockheed EP-3 Orions. These missions proved to be quite dangerous and many reconnaissance aircraft were lost to hostile action during their intelligence gathering operations. Although this entry concentrates on American intelligence aircraft, it should be noted the Soviet Union also employed its own reconnaissance planes and many ventured as far as the East Coast of the United States as they gathered information and probed American defenses. Many notable photographs have been released showing American fighters shadowing Soviet Bear and Bison bombers flying reconnaissance missions.

Ultra High-Altitude Strategic Reconnaissance: These missions involve aircraft specifically designed for intelligence gathering roles and which fly at ultra high altitudes over long distances to avoid being intercepted by other aircraft. The first American aircraft designed and developed for this type of work was the famous U-2 Dragon Lady produced by Lockheed's "Skunk Works" division. The U-2, shaped similarly to a glider, carried long but incredibly light wings which helped permit it to remain aloft at altitudes over 70,000 feet as early as 1956. The United States launched the first U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union in July 1956 and the Soviets were powerless to intercept the high flying reconnaissance aircraft. U-2 flights produced invaluable intelligence data utilized to prove that the United States did not face a supposed "bomber gap" and "missile gap" with the Soviet Union. U-2 flights continued over the Soviet Union until 1960 when Moscow managed to shoot down one of the Dragon Ladies with a series of SAM missiles. The United States did continue to fly the U-2 over the People's Republic of China (often with Taiwanese pilots) and other countries including Cuba.

In 1962, Lockheed flew the first A-12—the predecessor of the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird. The A-12s and follow-on SR-71s fly at speeds of over Mach 3. The United States initiated the employment of the SR-71 for reconnaissance duties in 1966. The Blackbird set many official and unofficial speed records during its career as the U.S. premier high-altitude intelligence-gathering aircraft. In 1990, the United States retired the SR-71 leading to considerable speculation that it had been replaced by a super-secret follow-on aircraft. However, the Blackbird returned to service in 1995 only to be retired again. Debate and speculation over the possible existence of an SR-71 replacement aircraft, popularly referred to as the "Aurora," has still not been settled.

Low-Altitude Strategic Reconnaissance: Low-altitude reconnaissance aircraft such as the McDonnell RF-101 Voodoos, McDonnell-Douglas RF-4 Phantom IIs, and Chance-Vought RF-8 Crusaders, were primarily utilized for tactical military intelligence gathering. These reconnaissance aircraft generally maintain low altitudes and high speeds as they gather intelligence photographs. However, these platforms have been employed to support strategic intelligence missions. For example, in 1962 following the discovery of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, the U.S. Air Force and Navy tactical reconnaissance aircraft flew missions over the island to locate and photograph additional missile sites and nuclear storage facilities as well as air defense systems. After 1959, the United States transferred RF-101s to the air force of the Republic of China which utilized them for missions over the People's Republic of China.

At least 40 American reconnaissance aircraft have been shot down during missions since the end of World War II resulting in the deaths of approximately 200 American airmen. Many of these events have fueled diplomatic incidents between the governments involved in the encounters. The most famous incident involved pilot Francis Gary Powers, who flew a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. Since the first overflight of the Soviet Union by a U-2 in 1956, Moscow had been unable to shoot down the ultra high-flying American reconnaissance plane with fighters or air-to-air missiles. However, a new SA-2 missile managed to bring down Powers who was captured along with the remains of his aircraft. An attempt by the United States to explain the U-2 as a National Air and Space Administration (NASA) weather plane that had accidentally strayed over Soviet territory failed and the incident ended the plans for a 1960 American-Soviet diplomatic summit before the American presidential election.

On July 1, 1960, Soviet Mig-19 fighters intercepted an American RB-47H reconnaissance bomber, carrying a crew of three, over the Barents Sea. The RB-47H's ELINT mission involved the monitoring and recording of Soviet radar emissions in the area. Cannon fire from one of the Mig-19 fighters downed the American plane over international waters with the loss of one crew member. The surviving crew members were picked up by the Soviet Union and held in custody for several months while the two governments argued over the details of the incident.

One of the deadliest incidents involving an American reconnaissance aircraft occurred on April 15, 1969, over the Sea of Japan. North Korean fighters shot down an American EC-121 carrying 31 crew members over international waters. The North Koreans claimed the aircraft had entered their territorial airspace. President Nixon refused to discontinue the reconnaissance flights as demanded by the North Koreans

and ordered American fighters to escort the intelligence gathering planes flying off the Korean peninsula. An American flotilla of 29 ships, including four aircraft carriers, sailed into the Sea of Japan to back an American warning to North Korea. A diplomatic stalemate ensued and the American vessels departed the area on April 26.

The most notable event involving an American intelligence aircraft in the first decade after the end of the cold war occurred in 2001 off the coast of the People's Republic of China. A diplomatic incident occurred in March/April 2001 following the emergency landing of a U.S. Navy EP-3E Aries II reconnaissance aircraft on Hainan Island in the People's Republic of China. The United States regularly flew reconnaissance aircraft off the coast of China to gather various types of intelligence. Frequently, Chinese fighters intercepted these flights over international water. On March 31, 2001, two Chinese F-8 fighters intercepted an American EP-3E carrying 24 crew members. The Chinese jet fighters flew too close to the American aircraft and one bumped the larger reconnaissance plane approximately 100 miles from Chinese territory. The fighter crashed into the sea and the damaged EP-3E managed to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island where the Chinese government immediately impounded the American plane and placed the crew into custody. The incident occurred during a sensitive period in American-Chinese relations. President George W. Bush had been in office for less than three months and his administration was considering the sale of weapons to Taiwan which Beijing claims as a Chinese province in rebellion. Although both sides did not want to escalate the incident, the Chinese blamed the United States and refused to release the crew and airplane until they received an apology. President Bush refused to apologize but did offer an American regret over the incident to the apparent satisfaction of China.

North Korea attempted to force an American RC-135S Cobra Bell, a modified Boeing 707 frame, to land on its territory on March 3, 2003. Four North Korean fighters, two Mig-29 and two Mig-23 aircraft, intercepted the American plane approximately 150 miles off the coast of North Korea. One of the North Korean pilots hand signaled that he wanted the American crew to follow him. The American pilot ignored the gestures and turned his plane back toward Japan. After 20 tense minutes, the North Korean jets departed the area and returned home. North Korea had recently tested a Silkworm anti-ship missile in the area and was days away from a second test. The RC-135S crew was probably in the area to monitor the second test if it occurred during their patrol period.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; American Intelligence, World War I; American Intelligence, World War II; Vietnam War and Intelligence Operations

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Terry M. Mays

AGEE, PHILIP
(JULY 19, 1935–JANUARY 7, 2008)

Philip Burnett Franklin Agee was a career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer who became disillusioned with the CIA as an organization and U.S. foreign policy in general. Resigning from the CIA in 1969 Agee went on to write a series of books and newsletters exposing CIA agents around the world. One of those he identified was Station Chief Richard Welch, in Athens, Greece, who was assassinated in 1975.

Agee joined the CIA in 1957 and did overseas tours of duty in Ecuador, Uruguay, and Mexico. He cites the Tlatelolco Massacre as the precipitating event causing him to leave the CIA. This incident occurred on the eve of the 1968 Summer Olympics and saw the Mexican military open fire on student demonstrators. Others point to a failed marriage and poor performance evaluations by superiors. In some accounts Agee is identified as the CIA's first defector because in 1973 after leaving the agency he contacted Soviet intelligence in Mexico City with an offer to work for them. Suspicious of his motives, he was turned away. Agee later developed close ties with both Russian and Cuban intelligence organizations. Reportedly they provided him with names of agents to reveal in his books and his newsletter, the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*. By 1980 he is estimated to have identified over 2,000 CIA employees. His actions led Congress to pass the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982.

Agee published his most famous book, *Inside the Company*, while residing in Great Britain. He was expelled in 1977 after MI-6 asserted that his revelations had led to the execution of two of its agents in Poland. He would also be expelled from West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and France. He lost his American passport in 1979 but ultimately gained a West German passport because of his wife's nationality. Agee lived in Cuba until his death on December 16, 2007, occasionally traveling to the United States and Great Britain.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Welch, Richard

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AIR AMERICA

Air America was a private air transportation firm secretly owned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It was particularly active in support of covert CIA operations in Southeast Asia. Air America has also been accused of participating in drug

smuggling operations while carrying out these missions. Air America helicopters participated in the final evacuation of South Vietnamese and Americans from Saigon in 1975. Air America was officially terminated in 1976. Its motto was "Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, Professionally."

Air America emerged out of a reorganization of the Civil Air Transport company. In 1951, the CIA approached its owner, Claire Lee Chennault, who had earned fame during World War II for his exploits as a member of the Flying Tigers, a volunteer air force for China from 1941 to 1942, about purchasing it. With the purchase, the firm's name was changed to Civil Air Transport, Inc. In 1959 its name was again changed to Air America. Its inventory consisted of a wide variety of aircraft including helicopters, former U.S. military aircraft, and active duty military aircraft "on loan" to it.

Air America provided support for a series of CIA operations in Laos from 1959 to 1962. From 1962 to 1975 it was particularly active in providing logistical (food and ammunition) and reconnaissance support for the Royal Lao Army and the Hmong Army. Air America also engaged in search and rescue missions for downed U.S. military pilots. Beyond its covert action and military support operations, Air America was also used to transport diplomats, doctors, spies, drug enforcement officials, and other civilians.

Much controversy surrounds the extent of its involvement in opium and heroin smuggling operations linked to Laotian Major General Vang Pao. Where some see it as an active participant in drug smuggling, others assert that Air America itself was not involved and that its employees did not have direct knowledge that it was taking place.

Although Air America was disbanded in 1976, a successor soon emerged. In 1979 one of its pilots and a former CIA officer Jim Rhyne founded Aero Contractors, a firm that identified itself as a private charter enterprise. Accounts suggest it provided weapons and food to Jonas Savimbi in Angola, flew in Colombia as part of Plan Colombia, and entered into several Central Asian Republics in an attempt to retrieve stringer missiles. After the beginning of the war on terrorism its Aero's staff grew from 48 to 79 in 2004. Flight logs document that after the arrest of key al-Qaeda leaders in 2002 and 2003 Aero aircraft quickly flew to airports near where they were captured.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Helms, Richard McGarrah

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AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE

Officially, air force intelligence came into existence with the establishment of the U.S. Air Force as an independent and coequal organization with the army and navy in 1947. The intelligence function, however, predates that point in time. At a minimum it can be traced back to the formation of an Aeronautical Section of the U.S. Signal

Corps in 1907, the organizational precursor of the Army Air Corps. Among the earliest intelligence tasks carried out by air force intelligence was the study of foreign aircraft. Under the generic title of air technical intelligence this activity began in the period following the end of World War I.

Air force intelligence operates on a strategic, operational, and tactical level. Strategic intelligence is designed to give policy makers the intelligence they needed to formulate national strategy policy and plans. Operational intelligence addresses the needs of military officials required for the successful planning and execution of theater-wide operations. Tactical intelligence focuses primarily on threat warning, mission planning, targeting, and assessment.

After World War II the first major intelligence operation of the air force was to support UN forces in the Korean War. Where at the beginning of the Korean War the U.S. Air Force Security Service, its intelligence branch, had 3,050 personnel assigned to it, at war's end it had an authorized strength of 17,143.

Air force intelligence played key roles in support of U.S. cold war foreign and defense policy. Key platforms included the B-29 Flying Super Fortress, the U-2, and the SR-71. Intelligence was gathered on the Soviet Union as well as such trouble spots as the Far East, the Middle East at various times in the 1950s and in 1973, as well as Cuba during the missile crisis. One of the significant accompaniments to this expansion in air force intelligence activities in the early cold war period was the acquisition of overseas bases and tracking stations. Numbered among them were sites in West Germany, Pakistan, Philippines, Japan, Turkey, and Taiwan.

Air force intelligence began its formal involvement in Vietnam in December 1961 with the establishment of an office at Ton Son Nhut Airport near Saigon although it had been providing intelligence on North Vietnamese and Laotian rebel movements since 1959. Throughout the war air force intelligence served both national intelligence customers and local military customers with tactical support for combat operations beginning on a regular basis in 1965. The late 1960s saw the beginnings of major conflicts with host states over the use of facilities in their countries by the air force. In 1968 Pakistan refused to renew the U.S. lease on its Peshawar site. Important basing rights ended in West Germany and Thailand in 1974 and in Turkey in 1977.

After the Vietnam War ended air force intelligence became increasingly involved in electronic warfare issues, although tactical support for U.S. military operations did not end. In 1986, for example, air force intelligence provided support for U.S. operations against Libya. By the 1990s this mission had evolved to one of helping the United States maintain a "virtual" advantage in its military operations. In concrete terms this translated into supporting ground and air operations during Desert Shield and Desert Storm from operational centers in Turkey and Saudi Arabia and later supporting U.S. operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Beginning in 2009 air force intelligence has participated in Project Liberty, providing tactical intelligence to U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In addition to its intelligence collection efforts, the air force has also been involved in several important intelligence analysis and jurisdictional debates within the intelligence community. The most prominent of these occurred early in the cold war. One involved the existence of a bomber gap in the mid-1950s. air force intelligence estimated that by mid-1959 the Soviet Union would have between 600 and 700 bombers. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with the army and navy, anticipated a smaller force.

The existence of a bomber gap became a major campaign issue in the 1960 presidential election and was later found not to exist. A repeat of sorts occurred in the mid-1960s with accusations of the existence of a missile gap. Once again the air force argued for a considerably higher number of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) than did other members of the intelligence community. Again the air force position was proven to be wrong.

The primary jurisdictional conflict was between the air force and the CIA over control over satellite reconnaissance. President Dwight Eisenhower established the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in August 1960. Both the air force and the CIA were actively involved in satellite reconnaissance programs at the time. Under terms of the agreement that led to this decision the CIA was placed in charge of developing satellites and the air force was placed in charge of launching satellites and recovering the film capsules. The director of the NRO was the undersecretary of the air force and its deputy director came from the CIA. Neither the CIA nor the air force was required to give up control over any of its reconnaissance satellite programs as part of this founding agreement. Establishing the NRO was intended in part to bring peace to the CIA–air force race to control satellite reconnaissance. It failed to do so and a truce of sorts was not reached until 1965 as a result of interagency bargaining over the CORONA program.

Organizationally, two air force intelligence organizations perform the majority of its departmental intelligence functions. They are the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACSI) and the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA). Also playing an important role in the production of air force intelligence but with a community-wide rather than departmental focus is the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC).

Chief among the responsibilities of the ACSI are to develop and implement policies and guidance for air force intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance programs as well as to meet "warfighter needs." The ACSI is also expected to interact with Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

AIA has as one of its core responsibilities the integration of all-source signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (INT), open source intelligence (OSINT) along with scientific intelligence and general military intelligence.

AFTAC is in charge of the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System, which uses space-based, aerial, ground, and hydroacoustic sensors to detect nuclear explosions as well as evidence more generally of nuclear weapons research. Its intelligence plays a central role in the monitoring of such international agreements as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Non Proliferation Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

See also: Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency; Air Force Security Agency; American Intelligence, World War I; American Intelligence, World War II; Balloons; Defense Intelligence Agency; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Powers, Francis Gary

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AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE AGENCY

The establishment of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Agency was announced in May 2007 with the renaming of the Air Intelligence Agency. The change went into effect the following month. The renaming followed nine months of study on how best to transform air force intelligence capabilities. Headquartered at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, the Air Force ISR Agency employs around 14,900 people at 72 locations around the world. Its mission is to organize, train, and equip forces for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions for combat commanders. It also is tasked with implementing and executing the expansion of Air Force ISR capabilities to meet future needs.

Organizationally the Air Force ISR Agency contains four major organizational units. The National Air and Space Intelligence Center is headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, which serves as the military's primary producer of intelligence on foreign air and space forces, systems, and weapons. The 70th Intelligence ISR Wing. stationed at Ft. Meade, Maryland, integrated air force capabilities in these areas into global cryptological operations. The 408th ISR Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, performs imagery intelligence along with cryptological, measurement, and signals intelligence. And the Air Force Technical Applications Center at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, monitors compliance with nuclear treaties as well as operating and maintaining the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System.

See also: Air Force Intelligence

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AIR FORCE SECURITY AGENCY

The Air Force Security Agency (ASA), better known as the U.S. Air Force Agency for National Security and Emergency Preparedness (AFNSEP), is responsible for all of the air force's readiness to respond to both civilian and military emergencies that require aerial support. As a result, it oversees numerous joint programs between

agencies, including the Air Force Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) and the Continuity of Operations for the Air Staff.

As required by national and Department of Defense policies, AFNSEP has developed and continues to update and modify its Continuity of Operations plans, better known as COOP plans. The objective of these plans is to keep all relevant federal agencies and federal response programs at their most efficient and effective level in case an urgent need for a response arises. Additionally, these programs must guarantee that the government continues its work without any cessation of essential activities during a given emergency and must be prepared to respond to any possible problem or hazard. For AFNSEP, these requirements have led to the creation of response processes and plans to maintain all the essential functions necessary to the proper running of the U.S. Air Force.

Specifically, these continuity plans included the Joint Emergency Evacuation Plan (JEEP), the Joint Air Transportation System (JATS), the Alternate Headquarters and Emergency Headquarters Relocation Site Management, the Residual Capabilities Assessment Program (RECA), the Airborne Reconnaissance for Damage Assessment Program (CARDA), and the Survivable Reconstitution and Recovery Plan. They all take into account the need for military and civilian defense, preparedness and response measures, as well as restoration and survivability actions.

AFNSEP also has other domestic responsibilities. These responsibilities fall under the authority of the AFNSEP's Domestic Support Operations Division, which coordinates the programs that aim to meet military and civilian defense needs. The Office of Primary Responsibility is located within this division as well, responsible for contacts with the Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA), Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA), and the National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP).

Lastly, the Issues Division of AFNSEP coordinates air force branches and plans that are not directed from within the Pentagon. It is responsible for pursuing the policies called for by the Critical Infrastructure Protection Program.

See also: Air Force Intelligence

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Arthur Holst

AJAX, OPERATION

In August 1953, after the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) removed a democratically elected prime minister from power in Iran, the United States for the first time overthrew a foreign government. Known as Operation Ajax (officially designated

TP-AJAX), this clandestine intervention, rationalized as a measure to keep the region from coming under Soviet influence, was a response to the Iranian government's cancellation of a British oil concession.

Mohammad Mossadegh ran afoul of Great Britain after he and his Nationalist Front Party made a public issue of the paltry revenues Iran received from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Although Iran had a one-fifth stake in the company, it was not permitted to review the accounting records. The controversy reached a point of no return on March 15, 1951, when the Majlis (the Iranian parliament) voted to nationalize the oil industry. On April 28 of that same year the Majlis voted Mossadegh as head of the government and announced the formation of the National Iranian Oil Company.

The British blockaded the Persian Gulf port city of Abadan to prevent Iranian oil exports, disregarded the decision of the World Court that ruled in Iran's favor, organized domestic unrest inside the country, and even designated General Fazlollah Zahedi as the next prime minister. In response, Mossadegh expelled all British citizens, both AIOC and diplomatic officials. By October 1952, diplomatic relations were severed between the two nations. The British then turned to Washington and urged that it conduct regime change in Iran, a request President Harry Truman flatly dismissed.

After Dwight Eisenhower's inauguration in January 1953, the British once again approached Washington about overthrowing Mossadegh. The idea now found favor with the brothers Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles, the new Central Intelligence Agency director and head of the State Department, respectively. Although lukewarm about the plan, Eisenhower consented because he feared that if the crisis were to continue then the Communists, the Tudeh (Masses) Party, might seize power.

Opposed to the coup was Roger Goiran, the CIA station chief in Teheran. As he saw it this put at risk his Iranian operatives who numbered about one hundred. His network, code name Bedamn and supported by an annual CIA budget of $1 million, was responsible for generating negative propaganda against the Soviet Union and laying the groundwork for an insurgency should there ever be a Communist takeover.

The American operative who directed the coup on the ground was Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and chief of the CIA's Near East and African Division. In his published account of the operation, Roosevelt claimed that as early as 1950 the Rashidian brothers (whom he identified as the Boscoes) approached the CIA about staging a coup. Scheming in coordination with the British, these Iranians allegedly met with Roosevelt as early as mid-1951. At one point the three brothers made a trip to CIA headquarters in Langley. Roosevelt also wrote that in November 1952 representatives of the AOIC approached him and said they wanted to overthrow Mossadegh. In late 1952 and early 1953 AOIC officials, he further noted, made trips to Washington to lobby for the plot.

Meeting in Cyprus near the end of May 1953, Donald N. Wilber of the CIA and Norman Darbyshire of the OSS drafted the initial plan for the coup, which the British referred to as Operation Boot. Although there were revisions by the time the plan was finalized in mid-July, the main approach did not change. The CIA would persuade Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi, the monarch whose power had been virtually reduced to a ceremonial status, to issue *firmans* (royal decrees), one to dismiss Mossadegh as prime minister and the other to appoint Zahedi in his stead. The decrees, although

lacking constitutional authority, would be enforced by troops loyal to the Shah, as well as mobs instigated by the Rashidian brothers and other collaborators. In the meantime, operatives would mount a propaganda campaign against Mossadegh in the press and among the clerics, aided by a great amount of bribery, and this would be in conjunction with staged rioting that gave the appearance that the country was lapsing into anarchy.

The initial difficulty was obtaining the Shah's approval. Princess Ashraf was bribed with a mink coat and cash payments to try to persuade her indecisive brother. Also, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who had won the Shah's respect from the time when he commanded the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie during most of the 1940s, was flown into Teheran to make a pitch. Finally, Roosevelt, using the prestige of his family name, visited the Shah and made a personal appeal. Convinced that the plot had the complete backing of Washington, the Shah agreed to issue the *firmans*.

On August 15 the coup began, but word leaked out to Mossadegh before he could be arrested. Colonel Nematollah Nasiri, the commander of the Imperial Guard sent to apprehend the prime minister, suddenly found himself behind bars. Spooked by the bad turn of events, the Shah fled to Baghdad, and finally to Rome. Meanwhile, Roosevelt chose to persist in the chaos. Photostats of the *firmans* were distributed throughout the capital and newspapers ran planted stories charging that Mossadegh was in the process of establishing a dictatorship. Eventually, the armed forces (with many key officers bribed) turned against Mossadegh and, after the deaths of over 300, Zahedi took control. On August 22 the Shah returned to Teheran, a restored monarch. To Roosevelt, he said, "I owe my throne to God, my people, my army—and to you!"

The final cost of the coup has been estimated as high as $20 million, but the loss of Iranian democracy was the biggest price. Soon thereafter the CIA established the SAVAK, the Iranian secret service, to help the Shah maintain dictatorial power. Mossadegh, after serving three years in prison, died under house arrest in 1967. Twelve years later the Islamic Revolution swept the Shah from power and militant students, remembering what happened in 1953, took over the U.S. embassy for 444 days.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Roosevelt, Kermit

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Roger Chapman

AKHMEROV, ISKHAK
(1901–1975)

Iskhak Akhmerov was a spy for the Soviet Union who operated in the United States during World War II, concealing his identity under the cover of being a clothier. Akhmerov joined the Bolshevik Party in 1919 and after graduating from college joined the OGPU/NKVD in 1930 and went to work for the People's Commissariat for State Security's (NKVD) intelligence division in 1932. Originally stationed in Turkey,

Akhmerov was assigned to China in 1934 and entered the United States under a false identity the following year. He remained in the United States until 1939 when he returned to the Soviet Union. Akhmerov then returned to the United States in 1942. After the war, in 1945 or 1946, he again returned to the Soviet Union where he became deputy chief of the KGB's covert intelligence unit.

Akhmerov's espionage activities came to light as a result of the VENONA intercepts. He operated under the code names MAYOR and ALBERT. Akhmerov is best known as the contact person used by President Franklin Roosevelt's personal assistant Harry Hopkins to communicate with Joseph Stalin. No firm evidence exists that wittingly or unwittingly Hopkins passed secret information to Stalin. He did, however, use this information channel to explain to Stain details of Roosevelt's thinking and to convey information from meetings between Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs); VENONA

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ALBANIA—U.S. OPERATIONS IN/AGAINST

The first American-sponsored covert operation to topple a foreign government during the cold war took place in Albania. During the early years of the cold war, senior American intelligence officials tried to keep pace with a perceived stronger and more aggressive Soviet Union. Frank Wisner, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) covert operation branch—the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), advanced the notion of penetrating the Soviet-controlled east Europe in the hopes of causing deep fractures. From 1949 to 1952, Wisner's OPC with British assistance pursued a failed policy of inserting Albanians abroad into Albania to overthrow Enver Hoxha's repressive regime.

Albania, although a poor and isolated country, was seen as strategically important. As early as 1946, the British had the idea of using covert actions in Albania. The Albanian polity was perceived as inimical to Hoxha; the British still continued supporting the exiled former Albanian ruler, King Zog; and most importantly, the British had hoped to maintain its strategic influence in the Mediterranean. The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) began planning for operations to contact resistance groups within Albania, but lacked the financial means to carry out the operation. As a result, the British looked to the United States for help.

By March 1949, American and British intelligence officials agreed to move forward with a plan to detach Albania from the Soviet orbit. In the formative period of the

Albanian operation, code-named BGFIEND, the Americans supplied the necessary finances, while the British provided their expertise and personnel. The main SIS liaison with the Americans was Harold "Kim" Philby. With assistance from the Albanian National Committee, the joint operation utilized willing members of the Albanian diaspora to wade, walk, or parachute into their homeland.

After several months of training at an SIS training site in Malta, during October 1949, 20 Albanians reached the coast off of Albania's Karaburun peninsula. Unfortunately, the Albanian military was prepared for the incursion, resulting in an immediate ambush. Although the initial effort was furtive, the OPC was encouraged by reports from the few Albanians that survived that it was possible to organize a resistance movement. Due to multiple incidents of sensitive information leaking from the Albanian community in Rome, the second round of Albanian insurgents was trained outside of Heidelburg. This second attempt inserted 250 Albanians by land or air. Again, Hoxha's forces were waiting for the operatives.

The continual failure of the operation led the British to believe the effort was futile and withdrew by 1951. Coinciding with the British termination was the outing of Philby as a Soviet mole. In June 1951, Philby was declared persona non grata and all OPC operations were seen as compromised. Despite this, Wisner continued operations against Albania—partly due to the outbreak of the Korean War, partly due to his belief in the ability of covert operations to fracture the Soviet Union. In 1952, 60 more operatives parachuted into Albania. By the time operations were terminated more than 200 Albanians were killed or captured with corresponding reprisals that cost an additional 1,000 lives. Although Philby informed Soviet intelligence generally about the Anglo-American operation, the Albanian fiasco failed due to leaks from Albanian émigré organizations and a general inability to foment dissent within Albania.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"; Wisner, Frank Gardiner

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Jonathan H. L'Hommedieu

ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS

Although Republican support for the French cause had long been the subject of criticism by Federalist writers and politicians, war with France made Republicans appear to be unpatriotic. As a result, in addition to taking steps to increase the size of the army and navy, Congress also sought to eliminate the perceived domestic threat posed by

"Jacobins" who sought to overthrow the American government. Into this category went not only native-born members of the Republican Party, but increasing numbers of Irish immigrants who came to this country with a healthy dose of contempt for the "aristocratic" elements of the Federalist party. These "United Irish" were said to constitute part of the growing network of French sympathizers in the United States. Irish immigrants then compounded the supposed error of their ways by tending to vote Republican.

The Federalist response to these threats was the passage, in 1798, of four different acts of Congress, which have since come to be referred to collectively as the Alien and Sedition Acts. They included the Alien Enemies Act, the Alien Friends Act, the Naturalization Act, and the Sedition Act.

The Alien Enemies Act authorized the president to arrest, detain, and deport foreign nationals from countries at war with the United States. The Alien Friends Act gave the president similar powers with respect to any alien whom he determined posed a danger to the public, regardless of whether a state of war existed between the United States and the nation of which the alien was a citizen. The alien acts were never enforced.

The Naturalization Act raised the residency requirement for citizenship from five to 14 years, after some in Congress argued that restraining immigration was necessary to prevent the American character from being polluted by foreign elements. The effect of the Naturalization Act was not merely to make it more difficult for immigrants to become citizens; it also had the additional benefit of cutting off the Republican Party's supply of new voters.

By far, however, the most famous, and in some ways most draconian, part of the Federalist's legislative package was the Sedition Act of 1798. The act made it a crime for any group of people to "unlawfully combine or conspire together" to oppose any measure of the government or to prevent any government official from carrying out his assigned duties. The second section made it unlawful for any person to "write, print, utter or publish. . . . any false, scandalous, or malicious writing" against the president or any member of Congress. Federalist supporters argued the Acts were consistent with the First Amendment because that amendment was never designed to allow for slandering one's government and dividing the people in aid of the enemy. To Republicans the passage of the Naturalization and Sedition Acts only confirmed basic suspicions that the Federalists were bent upon establishing an aristocratical, if not monarchical, government and destroying the Republican Party by denying it the ability to attract new voters. That the Sedition Act, by its own terms, was to expire shortly after the presidential election in 1800 was proof that the Alien and Sedition Acts were more about electoral politics than national security.

Between 1798 and 1800, the government sought a total of 15 indictments under the Sedition Act. Of these, ten resulted in conviction. Republican newspapers were the primary targets of these prosecutions. In response, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison collaborated to produce the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions (1798), which called for the other states to join in seeking repeal of the Alien and Sedition Acts.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

ALLEN, GENERAL LEW, JR.
(DECEMBER 30, 1925–JANUARY 6, 2010)

Air Force General Lew Allen, Jr., was Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) from August 1973 until 1977. Prior to assuming that post he briefly served as deputy director of Central Intelligence for almost half the year and after leaving the NSA he was named commander of the Air Force Systems Command. Later he would become the tenth chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, holding that position from 1978 to 1982. Allen's tour at NSA was noteworthy in that he was the first head of NSA to testify publicly before Congress.

Allen was born on December 30, 1925, in Miami, Florida, and after graduating from high school in Gainesville, Texas, in 1942 he entered the United States Military Academy. He would go on to earn a PhD in physics from the University of Illinois in 1954. From there he was assigned to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and from there he moved on to become science advisor to the Physics Division of the Air Force Special Weapons Center where he specialized in the military effects of high-altitude nuclear explosions.

In 1961 Allen's career took him to Washington where he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Space Technology Office. In 1968 he moved to the Pentagon where he took over as deputy director and then director of space systems. In April 1971 Allen became director of special projects and deputy commander for satellite programs in the Space and Missile Systems Organization.

After his retirement as air force chief of staff, Allen became director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. President Bill Clinton appointed Allen to serve on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He continued to serve in this role under President George W. Bush. Allen also served on the Intelligence Oversight Board.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Department Intelligence; National Security Agency; President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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ALLEN, MICHAEL HAHN

Michael Hahn Allen was convicted in a court martial on August 14, 1987, in San Diego on compromising U.S. classified documents. Convicted on 10 counts of espionage he was sentenced to eight years in prison and fined $10,000. Allen was 53 years old when arrested.

At the time Allen was working as a photocopy clerk at the Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, Philippines. Previously he had served for 22 years in the U.S. Navy, retiring as a senior petty officer in 1972. Upon retirement Allen ran a bar and also owned an automobile dealership and engaged in cock fighting.

He was arrested on December 4, 1986, by the Naval Investigative Service for passing confidential and secret information to Philippine intelligence officers. The material included information on the activities of Philippine rebel force movements and planned government actions against them. The Naval Investigative service had videotaped Allen's espionage activities and uncovered additional documents at his home. Faced with this evidence he confessed to having engaged in espionage between July and December 1986 in order to promote his business interests.

Allen was tried in the military justice system after the U.S. Justice Department determined that it would not prosecute him in federal court. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman cited his retired military status as justification for bringing charges forward through a court martial hearing.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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ALSOS MISSION

The Alsos Mission (1943–1945) was an Allied, almost exclusively British and American, operation conducted in Italy, France, and Germany during World War II (1939–1945). The mission assessed the nature and extent of the German atomic weapons program begun (April 1939) following the German discovery of fission (December 1938) and seized or destroyed any material, equipment, resources, facilities, and personnel that might be used by the Soviets or the French to the close the gap in the atomic weaponry developed by Britain and the United States (US) or to enhance that existing technology. Alsos, Greek for "grove," was an extension of the Manhattan Engineer District (MED), also known as the Manhattan Project, and was a play on the name of the MED's military director, Major General Leslie M. Groves (1896–1970). Albert Einstein's letter (August 2, 1939) to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, alerting him to the probability of that an extremely powerful bomb based on technology in which Nazi Germany was believed to have a two-year development advantage

prompted not only the creation of the MED, but the need for accurate intelligence on the status and potential of the German program.

The Alsos Mission was proposed (1943) by General George C. Marshall and was initially directed from London (December 1943). The Alsos Mission was prosecuted in three phases: Phase I—Italy, Phase II—France, and Phase III—Germany. Lieutenant Colonel Boris T. Pash (1900–1995), an army intelligence officer who had assisted in the security vetting of the scientific director of the MED's Los Alamos site, Robert J. Oppenheimer, was the overall commander of Alsos from its inception; Captain Horace Calvert commanded the London staff of office personnel, interpreters, and counter-intelligence; and Dr. Samuel Goudsmit led the scientific team. The London unit was responsible for liaising with the MED, field logistics, finding the 50-some German scientists thought to be engaging in atomic research, locating pertinent material and facilities, and extracting and evaluating information related to nuclear science.

The first Alsos Mission that entered Italy following the Anzio invasion (January 22, 1944) found little pertinent information. By the time of the second Alsos Mission began (August 9, 1944), Calvert had assembled dossiers detailing potential locations for all of the top German scientists as well as other persons of interest, including the French physicist Frederic Joliot-Curie. Joliot-Curie's interrogation revealed that the Germans had made no real progress in their atomic weapons program and provided the Alsos team with further information on some of the German scientists being sought, most prominently the uranium researcher Erich Schumann, the nuclear physicist Kurt Diebner, the nuclear experimentalist Walter Bothe, as well as Abraham Essau, Wolfgang Gertner, Erich Bagge, and Werner Maurer. The French phase of the Alsos Mission moved its headquarters to Paris (Fall 1944) and from there directed the hunt for the target German scientists and their research facilities, analyzed and evaluated information, and supported teams advancing with the Allied armies. It was during this phase that Alsos determined Hechingen, Germany, to be a location of interest.

Phase III began with Alsos's entry into Germany on February 24, 1945. This phase was complicated by the British and American determination to prevent any of the German atomic research personnel, material, and facilities from coming under the control of the Soviets, even if it meant the destruction of those assets. Rather than allow it to fall to the Soviets, one such research facility, the Oranienburg Auergesellschaft Works north of Berlin, was destroyed on March 15, 1944, by a flight of 612 B-17 Flying Fortresses.

Alsos's April 1945 operations met with great success. Diebner's laboratory in Frankfurt was captured on April 12 and Operation Big captured a nearly operational German atomic pile at Haigerloch in southwest Germany. Calvert located the bulk, 1,100 tons, of the German supply of uranium ore in an Industrial Research Association (*WiFo*) salt mine near Stassfurt, Germany, and Colonel John Lansdale seized the cache on April 17. Operation Harborage, designed to deny the French access to targeted nuclear assets, captured Hechingen (April 24) with its heavy water plant moved from Norway following the Allied attempts to destroy the German atomic research there, Operations Freshman and Gunnerside as well as heavy bombing. An atomic physics laboratory was also seized along with two of the three most-wanted German scientists: Otto Hahn and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, as well as Max von Laue. Information

garnered from this trio led Alsos to believe that the most prominent remaining scientist, Werner Heisenberg, who had conducted atomic pile experiments at the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute (1940) at roughly the same time as Enrico Fermi's Columbia University experiments, and perhaps other persons of interest, were in Munich or Urfeld.

During interrogation in Alsos's Forward Headquarters in Heidelberg (April 27), von Weizsäcker disclosed that the records of Germany atomic research were in a sealed metal drum secreted in a cesspool behind his home. Alsos captured Walter Gerlach, the discoverer of spin quantization, on May 1, 1945, and Diebner on May 3 with Colonel Pash personally capturing Heisenberg on May 2. Ten of the most prominent German atomic researchers (including Heisenberg, Hahn, and von Weizsäcker) were relocated to a British intelligence "safe house" in Farm Hall, Great Britain, and interrogated for six months until January 1946.

The Alsos Mission ended on October 15, 1945, after determining that the German atomic bomb project had stalled in 1942 due to underfunding and understaffing and after successfully gathering and debriefing the scientists vital to the program while preventing them and their knowledge from aiding either the Soviets or the French in the development of their atomic weapons programs. Alsos was a small unit that at the end of the war had a roster of 114 people.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Richard M. "Rich" Edwards

AMERASIA CASE

Less well known than other famous espionage cases because it was overshadowed by the tumultuous events accompanying the end of the World War II and because the Justice Department failed to bring any of the defendants to trial, the Amerasia case marked the beginning of serious concerns about the loyalty of government employees, highlighted the unwillingness of the Democratic Party to confront the issue, and contributed to the rise of postwar anti-Communism. In January 1945, *Amerasia*, a left-leaning journal devoted to east Asian affairs, contained an almost word-for-word version of a classified report on Allied activities in Thailand. A search of the magazine's offices by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed hundreds of copies of secret State Department documents scattered about on desks, tables, and chairs. Electronic surveillance of the journal's editor, self-made millionaire and self-described Communist "fellow-traveler," Philip Jaffe, recorded him stating that he would spy for the Soviet Union if given a chance and discussing his unsuccessful attempts to make contact with a Soviet intelligence agent.

The FBI arrested Jaffe; his co-editor, Kate Mitchell; journalist Mark Gayn; Navy Lieutenant Andrew Roth; and State Department officers Emmanuel Larson and John

Stewart Service on charges of theft of government documents. Roth and Larson had given Jaffe the majority of the stolen documents, but a small number had come from Service, one of the so-called "China Hands," State Department officials stationed in China who sought to influence American policy towards support of Mao Zedong. Within days of Service's arrest, Lauchlin Currie, a high-ranking State Department official, arranged for Thomas "the Cork" Corcoran, a powerful Washington influence peddler and well-known "fixer" to intervene on Service's behalf. Currie may have been motivated by his friendship with Service, by the need to conceal a document leaking campaign within the State Department designed to discredit Patrick Hurley the American ambassador to China, or by fears that his own connections to Soviet intelligence might be uncovered in the course of a wider-ranging investigation. Corcoran successfully "fixed" the case against Service and the charges against the other defendants collapsed thanks to anemic prosecution by the Justice Department and the inadmissibility of the FBI surveillance tapes in court.

In 1946, responding to charges of a cover-up, a congressional committee chaired by Alabama Congressman Sam Hobbs investigated Justice Department handling of the case and exonerated all involved. The appearance of a whitewash inspired Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy to cite the Amerasia case in 1950 as proof of his claims that the Truman administration protected Communist spies within the government. McCarthy forced another congressional investigation, this time by Maryland Senator Millard Tydings whose committee ignored the egregious breaches of security uncovered by the FBI and focused narrowly on the issue of espionage finding no wrong doing. Tainted by its association with McCarthyism the Amerasia case was dismissed by most scholars until the release of FBI documents in the 1990s revealed the full extent of the security breach and the divided loyalties of the defendants.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); McCarthy, Joseph

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AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Communist Party involvement in espionage varied with its relation to the Communist International, and the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. Espionage efforts increased in 1942, as both nations found themselves wartime allies against Nazi Germany, profoundly distrusting and absolutely depending upon each other. The secret VENONA project, decrypting Soviet communications from 1943 to 1945, was initiated during this wartime alliance. How many individual party members committed espionage, who was a party member, and how seriously their espionage compromised the security of the United States remains a matter of some controversy.

After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union had not posed a conventional military threat to any major power. Capitalist powers, notably the victorious Allies of World War I, were inclined to "strangle the infant in its cradle" as Churchill later remarked, because it offered an example to then-virulent revolutionary movements among their own people. Communist parties, in the United States as in Western Europe, were perceived as posing a danger of sedition and civil strife, possibly even insurrection, not espionage.

The American Communist Party, organized in 1919 by Charles Ruthenberg and Louis Fraina, joined by leaders of the Russian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish language federations from the former Socialist Party of America, competed for recognition from the fractious Communist International with the Communist Labor Party, organized by John Reed and Alfred Wagenknecht. By 1929 those still active constituted the Communist Party USA. As the postwar wave of revolutionary fervor receded, leaving the Soviet Union isolated, and as Stalin gained ascendancy within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Comintern apparatus become oriented toward serving the national interests of the Soviet state.

During World War II, American Communists were unusually well placed to provide useful information to Soviet agencies. Many worked in jobs where they could, incidentally, though not insignificantly, provide information to further what appeared to be the noble cause of an anti-Fascist united front. Over 15,000 Communists volunteered for the armed services; Communists worked in such key agencies as the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of Price Administration. It was not uncommon, even after the war, for Communist Party "clubs" to knock on doors inviting neighbors to forthcoming meetings. Party line emphasized buying war bonds, supporting the USO, and cooperation with employers for war production, while looking forward to a pleasant postwar cooperation between the United States and the USSR. On the other hand, many Communists viewed anti-Communists in and out of government as enemies of progress. Party leaders such as Eugene Dennis and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn were prosecuted for Smith Act violations, but never for espionage. Obtaining information for the Soviet Union was the work of specific networks that reported directly to handlers for Soviet agencies, primarily NKVD and GRU.

These agencies had residencies abroad which sought contact with "fellow countrymen"—a coded term for Communist Party members—in the country where they were assigned. VENONA decryptions for example show a Soviet vice-consul in San Francisco asking for the name of a "local fellow-countryman leader." Party Chair Earl Browder was referred to as "Helmsman." In addition to specific military information, the NKVD sought reports from agencies such as the War Production Board, via sources with code names such as "Robert"—generally identified as Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. Another group, code-named "Albert" has never been identified, which reported mostly on international trade statistics and administration plans for occupied Germany. One decrypted message mentions Rudolph Lambert, party security commission chair for northern California, but 43 unrecoverable cipher groups separate it from a brief mention of uranium deposits.

After the United States and the Soviet Union became postwar enemies and the leading powers in the world, Communists were no longer illegally providing information to an ally, but to the national enemy. The best-known spy case charged that Julius and

Ethel Rosenberg (who were undoubtedly Communist Party members); Ethel's brother, David Greenglass; his wife, Ruth; and several others obtained information for the Soviet Union on the Manhattan Project (where Greenglass was employed) and nuclear weapons technology. Forty-nine VENONA translations concern Soviet espionage to learn about U.S. research to develop the atom bomb. Many historians consider that release in 1995 of these decrypted Soviet communications has settled 40 years of bitter controversy over the defendants' guilt. Studies of the VENONA files have also suggested that Ethel Rosenberg was far less culpable than was presented at trial, perhaps not even an accomplice, and that the information obtained by Greenglass and Julius Rosenberg concerned only the proximity fuse, not uranium-235 enrichment or fission.

John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr have compiled references to 349 Americans who spied for the Soviet Union from the released files, less than half of those identified by name. Reliance on VENONA continues to be questioned by some historians. The Russian language texts from which the original coding and decoding were done have never been released. Many of the references are fragmentary, and disinformation may appear in the record as sterling truth. The high-profile case of Alger Hiss is still debated, although VENONA reports identify him with the code name "Ales." Treasury Department official Harry Dexter White, and President Franklin Roosevelt's aide, Lauchlin Currie, although referenced as sources of information, are not shown to be Communist Party members. Klaus Fuchs was known to be a German Communist before assignment to work on the nuclear bomb. Theodore Hall provided information on the Manhattan Project, but was probably not a party member—he later said that no nation should have a monopoly on such destructive capabilities. Judith Coplon appears to have been a party member before she went to work as a political analyst in the Department of Justice.

Most Communist Party members were neither willing to engage in espionage nor skilled at doing so. The Supreme Court recognized in *United States v. Robel*, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) and earlier in *Noto v. United States*, 367 U.S. 290 (1961), that an individual Communist Party member "may be a passive or inactive member of a designated organization, that he may be unaware of the organization's unlawful aims, or that he may disagree with those unlawful aims." By the mid-1960s, party membership was down from a peak of perhaps 100,000 to around 5,000, as many as one-third of those being FBI informers. The respect it once had in trade unions that party members energetically labored to build during the 1930s was nearly gone. It no longer had any members holding strategically placed government office. Public pronouncements from the party's general secretary, Gus Hall, emphasized constitutional means for bringing about socialist revolution.

See also: Amerasia Case; Atomic Spy Ring; Bentley, Elizabeth Terrill; Browder, Earl Russell; Chambers, Whittaker; Cohen, Lona (Leontina) and Morris, aka Helen and Peter Kroger; Currie, Lauchlin B.; Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; Gold, Harry; Greenglass, David; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); Hall, Theodore Alvin Alvin; Hiss, Alger; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Los Alamos; NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs); Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel; Sedition Act, 1918; Sobell, Morton; VENONA

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Charles A. Rosenberg

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, WORLD WAR I

Prior to the twentieth century, the intelligence community had not been a permanent part of the government bureaucracy, utilized only during contingencies. Upon the founding of the Republic, George Washington was highly ambivalent about establishing a permanent intelligence bureaucracy because of its secrecy and deception. However, in 1790, he prevailed upon Congress to pass a law establishing a "secret fund" of $40,000 devoted to "foreign intercourse," due to the vulnerability of the young United States. Washington established the precedent of declaring the amount of money spent on intelligence work, but not the subject of intelligence work itself.

During the Civil War, much of Union intelligence gathering was performed by Allan Pinkerton's agency of detectives. In the years following the Civil War, the Pinkerton Agency gathered data on diverse characters such as train robbers Frank and Jesse James and labor activists. However, by the Spanish-American War of 1898 the Secret Service began to play a more prominent role in intelligence gathering by expanding beyond its original anticounterfeiting duties, traced the activities of Spanish agents and potential anarchists. As the twentieth century dawned, a permanent intelligence bureaucracy was beginning to take shape.

The United States government applied the lessons learned from the war with Spain through the reorganization of its military and intelligence structures. The U.S. Army adopted the European institution of the "general staff," resulting in the creation of the Military Information Division, or G-2 (although the navy created the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882). G-2 became the army's chief source of intelligence, but its potential as a military intelligence agency was not realized during peacetime in the years leading up to World War I.

After the outbreak of World War I, a new intelligence agency arose that came to be known as U-1. In 1915, President Wilson decided that it was vital for the State Department to be involved in issues of intelligence. U-1 was an exclusive circle of Ivy League graduates. As the war progressed, the United States was in a delicate position of maintaining its neutrality and holding true to its anti-imperialist ideals while providing support for Great Britain, an imperialist power. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan was opposed to such an elitist organization because of his populist leanings. However, his objections became moot after he resigned in protest of the Wilson administration's position towards Germany after the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

Bryan's successor, Robert Lansing, established the foundations for U-1. To ensure that the president would not be connected to closely with the new intelligence agency, Lansing appointed Frank L. Polk, a distant relative of President James K. Polk, as counselor in the State Department. His role was to advise the government regarding the U.S. neutrality in the European conflict. With American involvement looming, Polk placed a higher priority on intelligence gathering by cooperating with the embassies of Britain and France on matters of counterintelligence. Polk created the "American Black Chamber," which intercepted foreign codes, as well as established a "foreign intelligence section" of the State Department that would continue intelligence-gathering activities during peacetime. By 1919, the agency was given the official designation of "U-1" after Congress created for Polk the new office of undersecretary of state. The creation of U-1, however, did not solve inherent problems within the American intelligence community, for its purview overlapped with other agencies such as the Bureau of Investigation, the forerunner of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secret Service, causing rivalry among them.

Even before the entry of the United States in the war on April 1917, intelligence gathering, the work for which U-1 was created, began in earnest. Gordon Auchincloss assisted Polk as assistant counselor in coordinating classified work. The Ivy League composition of U-1 was not representative of American society that was becoming more diverse due to immigration. As a result, it had a strong bias toward Britain's cause. One such example was Sir William Wiseman. In 1915, Wiseman was appointed by the British government to be in charge of British intelligence in the United States. Wiseman easily gained influence in official contacts through the prevailing Anglophilia in American elite circles. This gave the British government easy access in gradually eliciting official American support.

The results of the institutional Anglophilia within U-1 could be seen in American policy. When Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany, he said that he wanted to make the world safe for democracy. One of the foundations of Wilson's war aims was national self-determination, aimed at dismantling the multinational empires of the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Turks, in addition to defeating Germany. However, American concepts of anti-imperialism became inconsistent with U-1's pro-British bias. By being sympathetic to the British ruling class, the Ivy League members of U-1 were also condoning Britain's empire, and by extension, defended the continuation of colonial empires of the Allied powers, primarily Britain and France. Such inconsistencies in policy left the United States vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy. For example, as early as 1916, the United States allowed British operatives to spy on and intercept Indian revolutionaries bent on ending British rule in India, known as the

Ghadr Party meeting on American soil, as well as Irish nationalists, while allowing Polish and Czech revolutionaries who sought to end Austrian rule in their homelands to operate in the United States unmolested.

Other secret agencies of the U.S. government were engaged in domestic espionage during World War I. The Secret Service conducted raids on German spy networks designed to sabotage war materials meant to supply the British, particularly in light of an explosion on Black Tom Island in New York on July 30, 1916, which destroyed a munitions facility whose products were destined for Britain, which caused extensive damage throughout New York City and even into New Jersey. The Bureau of Investigation, the forerunner of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), investigated activities by the German government that violated American neutrality. For example, as early as 1914, the German embassy forged passports for German reservists in the United States to return to Germany by way of neutral ports. When confronted with the evidence, the German embassy promised henceforward to refrain from forging passports. The Secret Service targeted German embassy officials, such as Franz von Papen, who later served in Hitler's inner circle, who were conducting covert activities in the United States. Ultimately, the Germans succeeded in alienating American public opinion against Germany's cause. When the United States entered the war, domestic intelligence expanded, which at times conflicted with the tradition of constitutional liberties, especially against German-Americans and Communist or socialist sympathizers.

American cryptanalysis during World War I was handled by the State Department and was also practiced by Wilson, himself. Consisting of simple codes and ciphers, the American codes were vulnerable and easily broken by British intelligence, which they considered "amusing." However, it was through the efforts of British cryptanalysis that plunged the United States into war with Germany. In early 1917, British naval intelligence, known as "Room 40," had decrypted a secret telegram from the German foreign minister, Arthur Zimmermann, to the Mexican government, which passed through the German embassy in Washington en route to Mexico City. Zimmermann offered an alliance between Germany and Mexico in the event of war between the United States and Germany. In return, Germany would see to it that Mexico would reclaim its "lost territories" of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Reginald "Blinker" Hall, the British intelligence chief working on Room 40 was in a delicate situation. Throughout the war, he had been careful not to reveal the effectiveness of Room 40 in the decryption of German, as well as American codes. Otherwise, if mishandled the discovery of the Zimmermann Telegram had the potential to damage Anglo-American relations.

Before he broke the news to the Americans, Hall kept the Zimmermann Note a secret for two weeks, hoping that the United States would declare war on Germany, in reaction to the Germans' declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917. However, since that did not occur, Hall disclosed the Zimmermann Note to the Foreign Office. The British minister in Mexico was able to procure a copy of the telegram. This gave the impression that the information was acquired, not through intercepting American communication, but through an agent in Mexico, thus preserving the integrity of British intelligence as well as Anglo-American relations.

On February 19, 1917, Hall presented Edward Bell, the second secretary of the U.S. embassy in London and liaison to the British, the copy of the Zimmermann Note that was obtained in Mexico City. Bell was furious at the audacity of the Germans to conspire

with Mexico to invade the United States. Walter Hines Page, the U.S. ambassador in London drafted a telegram to Wilson. On February 24, 1917, Wilson received Page's telegram. Wilson felt personally betrayed, for he had been negotiating with the Germans in bringing an end to the war. After conferring with Lansing on how best to act, Wilson decided to release the Zimmermann Telegram on March 1, 1917, through the Associated Press. As expected the American public was indignant and lost much of its sympathy for Germany. On April 2, 1917, Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany. In addition to making the world "safe for democracy," Wilson referred to the Zimmermann Note as proof of German perfidy and served as the last straw that pushed the United States into war.

With the entry of the United States into the war, intelligence gathering became a top priority. Before 1917, G-2 was an obscure branch of the War College Division, which only had two officers and two clerks. As of November 1918, it had grown to include 282 officers, 29 noncommissioned officers, and 948 civilian employees. Major Ralph Van Deman and Lieutenant Colonel Marlborough Churchill were responsible for the transformation of G-2, which handled subversion and espionage. It became necessary to expand intelligence operations as the American Expeditionary Force depended on reliable information on the front and to lessen the reliance upon British and French intelligence agencies.

Toward the end of an intelligence gathering agency that was competitive with its foreign counterparts, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March created a new agency called MI-8 in June 1917. MI-8 was a division of the Code and Cipher section created by Van Deman. Instrumental to this agency was Herbert O. Yardley, a clerk in the State Department, whom Van Deman recruited. Yardley had the ability to solve diplomatic codes for fun, and in 1916 shocked his supervisors by cracking a coded message between Colonel House and Wilson in two hours. Over the next two years, Yardley completely reorganized the way in which intelligence was gathered.

Upon realizing and demonstrating the vulnerability of American ciphers, Yardley organized American cryptanalysis within MI-8, which created specialties and sub-specialties for all areas of cryptology. He organized the Code and Cipher Compilation Bureau to create better and more secure coding systems, which in turn set the foundations for counterintelligence. MI-8 was responsible for training army cipher clerks before their overseas assignments. Yardley continued to specialize in cryptanalysis. In the course of the war, the Code and Cipher Solution Bureau decoded over ten thousand messages from the diplomatic communications of various countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Germany, Mexico, Panama, and Spain.

By August 1918, the American intelligence community had grown from creating "amusing diversions" for British cryptanalysts to a serious and sophisticated and highly specialized network. In 1919, Yardley and a group of G-2 specialists accompanied Wilson to the Versailles Peace Conference, where they provided their services in cryptanalysis. World War I set the foundation of a modern intelligence agency that dealt with espionage and intelligence gathering. However, immediately after the war, G-2 and intelligence gathering in general were devalued once again, as the United States retreated from taking a leading role in international relations due to the disillusionment stemming from the settlements at Versailles, and it would take another world war for the country to see its value.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Army Intelligence; Black Chamber; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Office of Naval Intelligence; Pinkerton, Allan; Room 40; Secret Service; Van Deman, Ralph; Von Papen, Franz Joseph Hermann Michael Maria; Yardley, Herbert; Zimmermann Telegram

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AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, WORLD WAR II

American intelligence gathering was significantly downgraded in the years following World War I. The rapid demobilization and the reluctance of the United States to take a leading role in global affairs did not justify an extensive intelligence community. However, Herbert O. Yardley, who created the American intelligence network during World War I, advocated for the maintenance of American code-breaking capabilities. While making significant concessions toward the dismantling of various intelligence programs, Yardley proposed that there be a peacetime Cipher Bureau sponsored by the Departments of State and War. In May 1919, acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk, who coordinated intelligence activities during World War I, rewarded Yardley's efforts by creating a new agency called the "Black Chamber."

The Black Chamber was part of the Military Intelligence Division, which consisted of 25 cryptanalysts. The War Department contributed 60 percent of its funding, whereas the State Department contributed the remaining 40 percent of its annual budget of $100,000. Under Yardley, the Black Chamber made its mark in ciphering, but in doing so, broke laws regarding confidentiality, by making secret agreements with companies such Western Union and Postal Telegraph to intercept foreign diplomatic messages. The Black Chamber broke the 45,000 codes from about two dozen countries, including Argentina, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. The decryption of Japanese diplomatic codes was one of the Black Chamber's greatest achievements, which was especially useful during the Washington Naval Conference in 1922. Knowledge of the Japanese delegate's orders to prevent confrontation with the British or the Americans allowed the American delegate to stay firm in his decision to prevent Japan's demands for the raising of its naval quota. Despite this success, however, the activities of the Black Chamber were curtailed and ultimately closed by Secretary of State Henry Stimson in 1929 due to the changing priorities of the incoming Hoover administration and the Great Depression that soon followed, with Yardley leaving in disgrace after 16 years of illustrious service. A fatal setback for American intelligence was the refusal of the Hoover administration to use information gained from espionage, especially

A private prints a news bulletin concerning the capture of Sandoway by the Office of Strategic Services on a chalkboard outside the intelligence tent of Kyaukpyu Camp in Burma (present-day Myanmar) during World War II. (National Archives and Records Administration)

information intercepted from German military intelligence which attempted to gain information on the defenses of Pearl Harbor. Stimson personified this attitude, as he declared, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

After closing the Black Chamber in 1929, Stimson formed the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) to consolidate code compilation and code-breaking. William Friedman, who worked in the Black Chamber, was in charge of SIS. In 1937, he recruited Solomon Kullback, Frank Rowlett, and Abraham Sinkov, who were an asset to American cryptanalysis for the next three decades. Despite the rising tensions in Europe, the SIS continued to focus its intelligence gathering on Japanese activities. Like other countries during the 1930s, the Japanese government employed the use of rotor ciphers for their secret messages. In 1935, SIS broke one of those machines, which Friedman called the Japanese Red Machine. Two years later, the Japanese switched to a more complicated machine, which Friedman broke and designated "Purple" in 1940. Thus, all decryptions and translations of Japanese messages were to be given the name Magic. The success of Magic however, was undermined by the rivalry between SIS and OP-20-G, the Code and Signal Section of the navy. Both agencies competed over who would reach the president first, as well as quibbled over minor operations procedures. This rivalry would have serious consequences.

The proficiency of SIS in breaking Japanese diplomatic codes did not save the United States from the "day of infamy" at Pearl Harbor, when the Japanese navy launched a surprise attack on the U.S. Navy on December 7, 1941, as part of its campaign of conquest throughout Asia and the Pacific. It was not for lack of resources that

Pearl Harbor was caught completely off guard. Quite the opposite, the success of U.S. intelligence in intercepting Japanese diplomatic traffic became, in a sense, its greatest weakness. Rather, despite the argument of conspiracy theorists, the tragedy of Pearl Harbor can be traced to a series of systematic and organizational failures that prevented any kind of synthesis on the information gathered on the movements by the Japanese in the Pacific.

One of the biggest contributors to the disaster of Pearl Harbor lay in the dissemination of information. Security around Magic was restricted only to the president; the secretaries of state, navy, and war; the army chief of staff; the director of military intelligence (G-2); the chief of naval operations; the chief of the Navy War Plans Division; and the director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). There was confusion about whether Admiral Husband Kimmel, the commanding officer on the naval base at Pearl Harbor was receiving the decrypts from Magic. Additionally because of the thousands of the decrypts that came from Magic, there was no organization devoted to the analysis of the information regarding the intentions of Japan.

The U.S. intelligence agencies missed two clues that could have alerted the navy about the attack on Pearl Harbor. The first came from a low-priority code, called *J19*, intercepted on September 24, 1941. According to the J19 intercept, Takeo Yoshikawa, a spy assigned to the Japanese consulate in Honolulu, was instructed to report the placements of ships at Pearl Harbor. However, because this piece of information was not a Magic decrypt, it was not paid the proper attention. No one in the intelligence agencies, such as ONI or SIS, concluded that Pearl Harbor would be the target for any potential Japanese attack because previously intercepted messages called for information on other places such as Manila, Portland, San Diego, and the Panama Canal.

The second vital clue that the United States missed was another J19 intercept regarding Japanese "winds code." These codes were intercepted on November 19, 1941, in Bainbridge Island, Washington. The message was a list of codes indicating which countries were referred to should Japan break relations. "East wind rain" indicated a break with the United States; "north wind cloudy," with the Soviet Union; "west wind clear" with Great Britain. No one realized the importance of these codes, for in hindsight, the Hawaii strike force depended upon these codes as it was en route to Pearl Harbor while observing radio silence. In response to the final offer of the United States to induce Japan to withdraw from its occupation of China and Indochina, the Japanese government dispatched its reply in a 14-part communiqué beginning on December 6, 1941. The communiqué outlined Japan's refusal of the American offer. The 14th part declared Japanese intentions to suspend negotiations, which was to have been delivered well before the attack. However, a series of missteps prevented the timely delivery of the message. The attack on Pearl Harbor was not only a portrayal of American unpreparedness. It also highlighted Japan's success in a most unlikely undertaking while maintaining the utmost secrecy.

Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, American code-breaking was greatly restructured. Instrumental in this restructuring was Lieutenant Commander John Rochefort. Magic was expanded to include decryptions of Japanese Navy (JN) codes as well as decrypts from Purple. The number of personnel in the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, known as station Hypo, increased after the attack. These changes in operation contributed to the ultimate defeat of Japan.

The U.S. Army made similar reforms in its intelligence gathering in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. Stimson appointed Alfred McCormack to make recommendations. McCormack made the following summarizations of the factors that contributed to the U.S. unpreparedness for the attack at Pearl Harbor: limited facilities for intercepted messages; disorganization in the dissemination of information from the point of intercept to the cryptanalytic center; shortage of translators; shortage of people to analyze the translations; disorganization in the presentation of information to people in Washington; and disorganization in the dissemination of information to commanders in the field in a timely and secure manner. To remedy these shortcomings, the duties of both the Signal Corps G-2 were combined within SIS. The SUS became the Signal Security Service in 1942, and by 1945, was changed to the Army Security Agency. As with the navy, the army's intelligence grew from 331 on the eve of Pearl Harbor to 10,609 by June 1, 1945, giving cryptanalysis top priority.

Despite the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, American naval intelligence during World War II was successful in both the Pacific and the European Theaters. Despite the fact that defeating Germany first had been agreed upon by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, success in cryptanalysis allowed the United States to prosecute the war against Japan aggressively. By April 1942, the United States was able to break most of the Japanese naval codes.

There were many instances in which the interception of Japanese codes contributed to American success. Magic routinely provided information for American submarines, allowing them to destroy the Japanese merchant fleet, thus disrupting Japan's supply lines. Additionally, the United Sates employed Navajo radio talkers, who were crucial in Douglas MacArthur's island hopping strategy. At the Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942, the cracking of JN25 allowed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to keep a close eye on Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto's movements. Magic enabled Nimitz to discourage Yamamoto from attacking Port Moresby in New Guinea, as a prelude to an invasion of Australia, while leading him to believe that two aircraft carriers were destroyed, though in reality, only the Lexington was sunk.

By the time of the Battle of Midway, the United States exploited the carelessness of the Japanese in securing their communications. In assembling their fleet of one hundred ships, the Japanese communicated by radio and did not replace their codes frequently. In doing so, it provided various American intelligence agencies with a wealth of information. All that remained was the target. As at Coral Sea, misinformation was crucial in inducing Yamamoto to reveal his movements. The Battle of Midway was a turning point in the Pacific Theater, which destroyed four Japanese aircraft carriers, which signaled the beginning of the end of the Japanese empire.

As Magic was to the success of the Pacific Theater, Ultra was indispensable to the Allied war effort in the European Theater. Early in World War II, British intelligence, with Polish and French help, established a sophisticated communications network to decipher cracked the German Enigma cipher machine at Bletchley Park. During the war, the Allies took advantage of Germany's exclusive reliance on the Enigma machine. Through Ultra, the British managed to thwart Hitler's attempt at an invasion during the Battle of Britain. After its entry into the war, the United States established a network that enabled both countries to take advantage of Ultra's capabilities. Ultra was crucial in the Battle of the Atlantic, when German U-boats threatened Allied supply

lines between Britain and the United States. Finding the updated settings to Enigma in 1943 made the difference between victory and starvation. According to Ultra's creator, Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham, Ultra was equally as indispensable in several occasions, including Operation Torch in North Africa, Operation Husky in Sicily, Operation Avalanche in Italy, and Operation Overlord in France, contributing to ultimate victory of the Allies over the Axis powers.

World War II made fundamental changes in the structure of intelligence gathering. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt established the new post of coordinator of information (COI) in July 1941, which became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The attack on Pearl Harbor stimulated the need to create a central intelligence network, but critics feared the possibility that it would negate the Constitution. OSS became an umbrella organization for various services such clandestine operations, communications, secret intelligence, and research and development. The roots of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) could be traced to OSS, which was an attempt to coordinate and consolidate the intelligence network of the United States. Unlike the end of World War I, when the intelligence apparatus of the United States was rapidly dismantled, the intelligence community became a permanent part of the American landscape.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; Army Intelligence, World War I; Army Security Agency; Black Chamber; Central Intelligence Agency; MAGIC; Office of Naval Intelligence; Office of Strategic Services; PURPLE; Signals Intelligence Service; Ultra; Yardley, Herbert

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AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND INTELLIGENCE

For most observers the history of American espionage begins after World War II when the United States abandoned its staunch isolationist outlook on world affairs and entered into the cold war with the Soviet Union. A closer look reveals that a much longer legacy exits. Several notable cases of espionage occurred during the period surrounding the American Revolution. After the Boston Tea Party a group of some 30 Americans formed the Revere Gang or Mechanics to secretly gather information about British troop movements. It was their information that provided warning to the Minutemen of the pending British advance on Lexington.

In 1776 with his retreating forces threatened by superior British firepower, General George Washington enlisted the services of Nathan Hale to spy on the British. Hale is best remembered for his famous last words, "I only regret that I have but one life to lose

for my country." Hale did not fare well as a spy. His mission lasted only from September 1 to 22, 1776. Captured, he was executed without a trial. Hale joined the Continental army in 1775 and agreed to be a spy only after his commanding officer had twice failed to obtain a volunteer as requested by Washington. Hale posed as a Loyalist school-teacher and traveled on Long Island gathering information and drawing pictures of enemy fortifications. He was captured attempting to return to Washington's forces and executed the following day.

The Continental army made good use of information obtained by spies on several occasions. Washington's famous crossing of the Delaware River on Christmas night 1776 was made possible by information supplied by a Trenton butcher who serviced the British forces. General Horatio Gates' successful campaign against British General John Burgoyne that led to the capture of Saratoga was aided by an American spy posing as a tailor in Burgoyne's camp.

Two notable spy rings were organized and run by the Continental army during the Revolutionary War. One spy ring operated in Philadelphia from September 1777 until June 1778. Organized by Major John Clark, it provided Washington's forces at Valley Forge with information about British General Howe's capabilities and movements. This information is credited with preventing the destruction of Washington's forces at least three times. A second spy ring, the Culper Ring, operated in the New York City and Long Island area. Characterized as the most successful spy operation, it was organized at Washington's request by Major Benjamin Tallmadge. Consisting of a network of farmers, barmaids, merchants, fisherman, domestics, and clerks, the Culper Net played a key role in exposing General Benedict Arnold as a British spy.

Benedict Arnold was a "walk-in." Rather than being recruited as a spy he volunteered his services to the British. Arnold had a checkered military and personal career before offering to become a spy. He had developed a reputation for being an aggressive and spirited military officer but at the same time repeatedly found himself the subject of investigations by the Continental Congress for corruption and abuse of power. Arnold apparently approached British General Henry Clinton in May 1979 claiming he had become disillusioned with the revolutionary cause. In July he quoted £10,000 as the price of his services. The British identified information about the American defenses at West Point as their piece of the bargain. By August, Arnold had succeeded in being placed in command of this position. His British handler, John André, was captured with incriminating documents on the way to meeting with Arnold. With his treason disclosed, Arnold fled to New York to be with Clinton. For the remainder of the war he would serve in the British army, leading campaigns in Virginia and Connecticut.

Arnold was not the only British spy during the American Revolution. Dr. Benjamin Church, the director of hospitals for the Continental Congress and a member of the Massachusetts Congress, was a spy for British General Gage. General Howe captured Philadelphia in September 1777 with the help of information provided by a spy. And, in Paris, the British relied upon information secretly provided to them by Benjamin Franklin's personal secretary. Franklin was trying to negotiate an alliance with France against the British. The danger posed by spies was recognized by all concerned. On the American side Committees of Correspondence were established to provide secure means of communication, crack British codes, and run security checks on all members.

The colonists and British were not the only ones running spies in the United States during the Revolution. Using Havana as a base, Spain sent agents to the rebelling colonies disguised as merchants. One agent, Juan de Miralles, not only provided information about political and military events during the Revolutionary War but made contact with American officials in the hopes of bringing Spain into the war on the colonists' side in exchange for the return of Florida to Spain.

See also: Brewster, Caleb; Jay, Sir James; Rivington, James; Roe, Austin; Tallmadge, Major Benjamin; Townsend, Robert; Woodhull, Abraham

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Glenn P. Hastedt

AMES, ALDRICH HAZEN
(JUNE 16, 1941–)

Aldrich Hazen Ames, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) counterintelligence agent and one of the most notorious and damaging American traitors ever, was born on June 16, 1941, in River Falls, Wisconsin. During his early childhood, his father, Carleton Ames, was a CIA agent in Burma, acting as a college professor. It was not until after the family's return from overseas and move to Langley, Virginia, that young Rick, as he was nicknamed, learned of his father's true occupation. Later, claiming to have spying in his blood, Ames's father secured him a summer job with the CIA making fake money for use in training exercises. He did well at Langley High School, but seemed to be more concerned with theatre than his studies which led to his failure at the University of Chicago. Luckily for Ames, his father still had a lot of power within the CIA and he successfully engineered Rick's hiring in February 1962.

Ames received his first assignment in 1963 as a field officer for the Directorate of Operations in Ankara, Turkey, where he was ordered to target and recruit Turkish and Soviet agents. After just under ten years of work in Turkey, he only succeeded in recruiting a single agent and he returned to Washington in 1973 as a failure.

Thinking about leaving the CIA, Ames was soon after sent to the CIA's foreign language school where he swiftly learned Russian. This success led to a new assignment at CIA headquarters overseeing Russian diplomat Alexander D. Ogorodnik. Ames's handling of Ogorodnik and the intelligence he obtained pleased his superiors and he went on to be assigned to Sergey Fedorenko in 1977 and then to Nikolaevich Shevchenko in 1978, top-ranking Soviet UN delegates. Following Shevchenko's full defection to the United States soon after, Ames's had become one of the CIA's top agents.

Ames's personal life, however, was in shambles and he became an alcoholic. His career also began to suffer since it was finally noted by top CIA officials that Ames was not a good recruiter. He applied and was accepted for a Mexico City recruiting post in 1981.

There, he failed to make significant progress but he did manage to find a new lover, Maria del Rosario Casas Dupuy. Finally receiving a promotion to become the CIA's Soviet operations counterintelligence branch chief in September 1983, Ames returned to Washington and received top-secret access to all of the CIA's assets within the USSR and Soviet defectors in the United States and abroad.

Divorce proceedings with his first wife and Rosario's expensive living put Ames into debt. He searched for ways to make up the difference. On April 16, 1985, Ames walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and offered secrets for money. He received a first payment of $50,000 and went on to make about $2.5 million from the Soviets up until his arrest almost a decade later in 1994.

Quickly, the CIA realized that its agents everywhere were being compromised, as well as its top-secret projects. Not wanting to start another devastating mole-hunt, the CIA spent years looking for logical explanations. Finally the CIA called in the FBI who soon targeted Ames. He, however, succeeded to pass three polygraph tests. Under around-the-clock surveillance, Ames was scheduled to fly to Moscow in February 1994, but the FBI arrested him, fearing a full defection. On February 22, 1994, Ames was charged by the U.S. Department of Justice for spying for the USSR and was soon after convicted. He is currently serving a sentence of life in prison.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence

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Arthur Holst

AMIRI, SHAHRAM

On July 12, 2010, Shahram Amiri, 32, stepped out of a cab at the Iranian Interests Section in Washington, DC, and announced that he wished to return home to Iran. Rejoining his wife and child was seen as the major factor in his decision. A little over a year before, in June 2009, Amiri had disappeared while making a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. About the same time the United States announced that it had scored an important "intelligence coup" against Iran obtaining important information about its disputed nuclear program. Accounts suggest that Amiri and one other Iranian informant were brought to the United States at that time out of concerns that their actions had become known to Iranian authorities.

At the time of his disappearance Amiri was employed as a nuclear scientist at the Malek-e-Ashtar Industrial University in Iran which is thought to be associated with

Iran's Revolutionary National Guard. Amiri does not appear to have had access to the most secret information about Iran's nuclear program or its intentions but he did have the ability to confirm or refute information from other sources. U.S. intelligence officials characterized Amiri's disappearance as a defection. He was paid $5 million for the information he provided. Shortly before his re-defection Amiri charged in a series of Internet videos that he was kidnapped and tortured by U.S. intelligence officials. Upon his return to Iran, the Fars news agency announced that Amiri had provided Iran with important information about the CIA and hailed his return as a great intelligence accomplishment.

Amiri had been living under cover in Tucson. By terms of the 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act the CIA has the authority to resettle up to 100 individuals who are able to provide it with valuable intelligence information into the United States each year. Reportedly Amiri was one of six Iranians whom the CIA brought into the United States in 2009. The $5 million paid to Amiri was placed in U.S. bank accounts and is beyond his reach due to economic sanctions put in place against Iran by the United States.

Such re-defections are rare but not unprecedented. In 1985 Vitaly Yurcehnko defected from the Soviet Union and provided the CIA with information about such Soviet spies as Ronald Pelton. Apparently regretting his decision he soon changed his mind and re-defected to the Soviet Union.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Pelton, Ronald; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

ANDERSON, RYAN
(1978–)

Specialist Ryan G. Anderson, then age 26, was charged with four counts of attempting to supply information to the enemy on February 12, 2004. Anderson's career in espionage was short and ineffective.

Anderson converted to Islam in either 1995 or 1996; prior to that he identified himself as a "die-hard Christian." Anderson also considered himself an ardent patriot and strong supporter of the United States. After converting to Islam, Anderson made frequent use of the Internet and cell phone text messages to communicate with Muslim groups and to offer his services as a spy. One of his e-mail communications was read by an amateur terrorist spotter, Shannon Rossmiller, who passed along the information to the Federal Bureau of Information (FBI). It, in turn, set up a sting operation posing as a Muslim group interested in Anderson's services. Among the items he offered at

arranged meetings were drawings of M1A1 and M1A2 tanks and a computer disk that contained his military passport. FBI officials reportedly dismissed the information Anderson possessed as similar to that which could be found on the History Channel.

Anderson was arrested one month before his Washington States National Guard unit was scheduled to go to Iraq. The charges against him carried the death penalty according to the Military Code of Justice. At his court-martial his defense argued that Anderson suffered from several forms of mental illness. The Court judged that he had not realized the implications of his actions and sentenced to life imprisonment with possible parole. He was also given a dishonorable discharge and reduced in rank to private. Anderson was the second Muslim soldier at Ft. Lewis accused of mishandling classified information. The other was Captain James Yee, a one-time chaplain at Fr. Lewis, accused of illegally making information about prisoners at Guantanamo Bay public.

See also: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

ANDRÉ, MAJOR JOHN
(MAY 2, 1750–OCTOBER 2, 1780)

Major John André was a British officer and spy during the War of American Independence. André was born in London, England, on May 2, 1750, and received his early education from a tutor. He also may have attended St. Paul's School. In his teens he studied mathematics and military drawing at the University of Geneva. After a short career as a merchant, he joined the British army in early 1771, purchasing a lieutenant's commission in the 23rd Regiment. He enrolled at Göttingen in 1772 and studied mathematics for two years.

In 1774 André was ordered to Quebec. On November 3, 1775, he was captured by American forces at Sorel. Released on November 28, 1776, he was promoted in the following winter to captain of the 26th Regiment. On June 3, 1777, he was appointed aide-de-camp to Major General Charles Grey and spent the next two years campaigning with that aggressive officer. On October 23, 1779, General Sir Henry Clinton appointed him deputy adjutant. He became involved in Benedict Arnold's treasonous correspondence with Clinton, and on September 20, 1780, met Arnold behind enemy lines at Haverstraw, New York, to negotiate the surrender of West Point.

André was captured by American militiamen on September 23 and turned over to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, who notified General George Washington. Six days later, at Tappan, New York, André was convicted of spying. On October 2 he was hanged, dying with dignity, and mourned by British and American officers alike.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Tallmadge, Major Benjamin

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Paul David Nelson

ANDROPOV, YURI VLADIMIROVICH (JUNE 15, 1914–FEBRUARY 9, 1984)

Soviet leader and director of the KGB (Committee for State Security), Andropov was born in Nagutskoye, in the Caucasus region of Russia, on June 15, 1914, the son of a railway worker. At age 16, he left school, taking a variety of jobs before studying water transport engineering. After graduating in 1936, he joined the Komsomol, the Communist Youth League, working in several shipyards before assuming the leadership of the Yaroslavl Komsomol. In 1939, he joined the Communist Party, and became the head of Komsomol in the Karelo-Finnish Autonomous Republic (Karelia), territory taken from Finland after the Winter War of 1939. He stayed here during World War II fighting as a partisan against the Germans. In 1947, he became party boss of Karelia.

In 1951, Andropov began working for the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow before entering the Foreign Service. He became ambassador to Hungary in 1954, witnessing the start of Hungary's liberalizing program. In 1956, he personally told the Hungarian leader Imre Nagy that the Soviet Union would not interfere in the internal affairs of Hungary, knowing this was not true while helping to plan an invasion. After the Soviets invaded Hungary in late October 1956, Nagy sought refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. Nagy left only after Andropov assured him of his safety, only to be arrested and later executed by the Soviets.

Andropov left Hungary in 1957 for Moscow, rising through the ranks until 1967, when he became head of the KGB, the Soviet secret police and intelligence agency. While head of the KGB, he repressed dissidents including deporting the writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and forcing physicist Andrei Sakharov into internal exile. He supported policies, including invasion, to halt the liberalization process of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

In 1973, Andropov became a full member of the Politburo, and nine years later he returned to work for the Central Committee. In May 1982, he resigned from the KGB to be in a position to possibly succeed his friend Leonid I. Brezhnev, the seriously ill Soviet leader. Several days after Brezhnev's death on November 10, 1982, Andropov was elected to become the new general secretary of the Communist Party.

As Soviet leader, Andropov attempted to revive the economy, end corruption, increase worker productivity, and reduce alcoholism. In foreign affairs, he unsuccessfully attempted to work with the West, meeting with President Ronald Reagan and proposing a reduction of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. Soviet-American relations continued to decline due to the continued war in Afghanistan and the destruction of a civilian Korean airline jet that had inadvertently entered Soviet

airspace. Seriously ill since the beginning of 1983, Andropov died on February 9, 1984, in Moscow without having achieved much as Soviet leader.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Gregory C. Ference

ANGLETON, JAMES JESUS
(DECEMBER 9, 1917–MAY 12, 1987)

Legendary director of counterintelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), James Jesus Angleton is famous for obtaining a copy of Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech on Stalin's crimes only days after it was delivered and infamous for his "mole" hunt for Soviet spies that nearly paralyzed the CIA. Angleton was born on December 9, 1917, in Boise, Idaho, to Hugh Angleton and Carmen Moreno, a Mexican citizen, who gave him his distinctive middle name, pronounced Hesus in the Spanish fashion. After a childhood spent in Italy, Angleton enrolled in Yale University and graduated in 1941. While awaiting his draft notice, and attending Harvard Law school, Angelton met Cicely d'Autremont, a wealthy young woman from Duluth, Minnesota, whom he married on July 17, 1943. Within a year of entering the army Angleton joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the U.S. wartime intelligence agency, serving as the head of military counterintelligence in Italy.

After the war Angleton became a senior aide to the director of Special Operations at the newly created CIA. In 1954 CIA Chief Allen Dulles appointed him director of counterintelligence. In the late 1940s Angleton befriended Kim Philby, the MI-6 (British foreign intelligence) liaison in Washington, DC. When suspicion of espionage fell on Philby, Angleton vigorously defended him and was devastated when, in 1963, Philby, who had been a Soviet mole since the 1930s, evaded arrest and escaped to the Soviet Union. Shortly before Philby's flight, Anatoli Golitsyn a KGB (Committee for State Security) intelligence analyst posted to Finland defected to the United States. Golitsyn claimed that the KGB had launched a vast disinformation campaign, a "wilderness of mirrors" that only he could navigate. Golitsyn appears to have been a self-aggrandizing fraud and may have been mentally ill, but his timing was perfect as Angleton, in the wake of the Philby affair, was in the right frame of mind to believe Golitsyn's story. Over the next dozen years Angleton conducted a relentless hunt for Soviet moles within the CIA that damaged the careers of over 100 employees. Yuri Nosenko, a KGB agent who defected in 1964, spent three and one-half years in solitary confinement because of suspicion that he was a double agent sent to discredit Golitsyn.

Faced with the ruin of the CIA's Soviet division, wasted intelligence from untrusted but genuine sources inside the Soviet Union, and threatened with the exposure of

HT-LINGUAL, an illegal domestic spying program carried out by Angleton, CIA Director William Colby forced him to resign on Christmas Eve, 1974. Despite his forced retirement, Angleton received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, the CIA's highest honor, in 1975. Angleton continued his fight in civilian life accusing the Church committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church and charged with investigating the CIA, of being a KGB plot and suggesting that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau were Soviet agents. In the aftermath of Angleton's departure the CIA overcorrected, allowing real traitors like Aldrich Ames to operate undetected for years. Angleton died of lung cancer May 12, 1987, in Washington, DC.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Church Committee; Colby, William Egan; Cold War Intelligence; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Golitsyn, Anatoli; HTLINGUAL; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Nosenko, Yuri Ivanovich; Office of Special Operations; Office of Strategic Services; Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"

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Vernon L. Pedersen

ARAGONCILLO, LEANDRO
(1959–)

Leandro Aragoncillo was arrested for espionage on September 10, 1985. Along with Ray Michael Aquino he was convicted of espionage in July 2007. Aragoncillo was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Aquino was originally sentenced to 76 months in prison but his sentence later was reduced as on appeal the court ruled that the sentencing judge had erred in using harsher sentencing guidelines than were called for by the crimes he was convicted of.

Aragoncillo was convicted of having passed secret information to Philippine nationals interested in overthrowing the government of President Gloria Arroyo from August 2000 to August 2005. This time frame included his tour of duty as a U.S. Marine assigned to the security detail of Vice Presidents Al Gore and Dick Cheney (1999–2005) and his later work as an FBI intelligence analyst. Aragoncillo was born in the Philippines in 1958 and moved to the United States in 1984. He became a naturalized citizen in 1991.

His motives appear to include both a sense of commitment and patriotism to the Philippines and a need for cash. In 2000, Aragoncillo along with 20 other Philippino-Americans working in the White House were introduced to Philippine President Joseph Estrada during a state visit. Estrada was soon overthrown and reportedly his aides then reached out to Aragoncillo for help in restoring him to power. Aragoncillo also had large personal debts at the time, perhaps as large as $500,000. Aragoncillo provided stolen documents from the vice president's office by such simple means as faxing them from the White House and stuffing them in his gym bag. He was charged with

downloading 101 classified documents related to the Philippines, 37 of which were classified as secret.

Aragoncillo came under suspicion when U.S. Customs and Immigration officials sought to deport Aquino for overstaying his visa and Aragoncillo tried to intervene on Aquino's behalf by using his status as an FBI employee. Acquino's role remains somewhat unclear but he is presumed to be the primary conduit of information between Aragoncillo and co-conspirators in the Philippines, one of whom was identified in court papers as being Estrada.

This is the first known case of espionage originating inside the White House.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

ARCOS AFFAIR

On May 12, 1927, the headquarters of the Soviet trade delegation in London, along with the adjoining offices of Arcos (the All-Russian Cooperative Society), were raided by the London Metropolitan Police and the Special Branch of Scotland Yard. The police had obtained a warrant under the terms of the Official Secrets Act of 1911 and 1920 alleging that an offense had been or was about to be committed at the offices of the trade delegation and Arcos. The offices of the two organizations were housed together in a building on Moorgate Street known as Soviet House. The British believed that an Arcos employee was in possession of a classified document from the British War Office. Arcos was a joint stock trading company.

At least 150 police officers took part in the raid which attracted sensational attention in the British press. Despite furious Soviet protests the police searched the premises for five days. Although the missing War Office document was never recovered, the British claimed to have found a quarter of a million incriminating pieces of evidence proving conclusively that the Soviets were using the Arcos and trade delegation offices for subversive activities. Evidence included documents demonstrating unsuccessful Soviet attempts to infiltrate the British trade union movement, addresses of Communist Party members in other countries and in Britain, as well as rifles, propaganda films, secret ciphers, and even a few lifeboats. The police also found written orders and records of financial donations from Moscow to the Communist Party of Great Britain. The Arcos raid had been preceded on April 6 by a similar raid that Chinese police had undertaken against the Soviet embassy in Peking (now Beijing) during which evidence of Soviet subversion in internal Chinese affairs was uncovered.

The raid demonstrated the difficulty that many governments encountered in dealing with the new Soviet state. On the one hand the Soviets proclaimed their willingness to enter into peaceful relations with other countries, whereas on the other hand they used

diplomatic privileges to engage in attempts to spread Communist revolution. After intervening in the Russian Civil War in 1918 and 1919 against the Bolsheviks (later the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) the British reversed course and attempted to establish diplomatic and trading relations with the Soviets. In 1921 the British and Soviets signed a trade deal which resulted in the Soviets setting up trading offices in London. In 1924 the minority Labor government of Ramsay MacDonald granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet state. Ambassadors were not exchanged due to the fall of the MacDonald government, which occurred partially because of allegations that Labor was not dealing effectively with Soviet subversion in Britain. MacDonald's government was succeeded by Stanley Baldwin's more anti-Bolshevik conservative government. However, trade relations continued until the Arcos raid led Baldwin to announce on May 24, 1927, that Britain was breaking off relations with the USSR. Diplomatic relations were not restored until MacDonald's Labor Party returned to power in 1929.

See also: MI-5 (The Security Service); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Official Secrets Act; Secret Service; Special Branch

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ARISU, LIEUTENANT GENERAL SEIZO (1895–1992)

Seizo Arisu (or Seiyo Arisue) was the head of Japanese army intelligence during World War II. He had served in Italy during the 1930s where he became a friend of Benito Mussolini. Arisu never believed that the U.S. intelligence had broken the Japanese codes, and certainly did not expend much energy himself on trying to crack U.S. codes. Straight after the United States dropped an atom bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, he flew over the wrecked city, landing on the remains of the airstrip where he was greeted by Lieutenant General Hideo Baba, who had been with him at the military academy. The two realized the damage done to the city, and reported this back to Tokyo, which was expected to be the next target.

At the Japanese surrender, Arisu was urged by a subordinate to commit suicide, rather than face the dishonor of defeat, but refused in order to do whatever he could to help his country. His task was to be on hand to receive the first U.S. plane after the surrender, having to prepare Yokohama airport for Colonel Charles Tench. Arisu arrived at the airfield the day before, where the planes were being dismantled to prevent any final kamikaze mission. During the night he was woken by two officers, unable to agree on whether or not to surrender, having a duel to the death. Arisu chased them away and on the following morning greeted Tench, offering him some orange punch in the reception tent, and drinking a glass himself first to show that it was not poisoned.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; MAGIC; PURPLE

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ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY

A cryptologic organization, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was created on May 20, 1949, by the U.S. Defense Department and placed under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The decade following World War II clearly illustrated the value of coordinating the efforts of the three major military units: the army, navy, and air force. These units were all brought under the control of the newly created Department of Defense through the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. A similar realization of the value of coordinated efforts in the field of cryptology resulted in the merger of the cryptologic agencies of the three services in the formation of the AFSA. AFSA was assigned responsibility for strategic aspects of cryptology, leaving tactical functions to the individual services. It was also made responsible for coordinating cryptologic functions within the individual services.

Coordinating services and operations extended one step further in 1952 when President Harry S. Truman created the National Security Agency (NSA). It took over the responsibilities of the AFSA, as well as the cryptologic functions of the State Department and certain other government agencies. The stimulus for this change was a 1951 memo by Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith in which he argued that the existing mechanisms for controlling and coordinating the collection and processing of communications intelligence were inadequate.

See also: Army Intelligence; Defense Department Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; National Security Agency; Smith, General Walter Bedell

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ARMY INTELLIGENCE

Army intelligence activities date back to the War of Independence when on August 12, 1776, General George Washington placed Lt. Col. Thomas Knowlton in charge of an elite unit and charged them with undertaking reconnaissance missions against British and loyalist forces. With victory and independence came an end to the

army's intelligence service. It would be re-created in subsequent wars, most notably the Mexican War and the Civil War, and just as quickly disappear. Institutional permanence did not arrive until October 1885 with the establishment of the Military Information Division (MID) within the War Department.

The MID was placed in charge of collecting data not only on foreign military capabilities but also those of the United States. Largely relying upon open-source intelligence sources, reporting by military attaches and observations made by travelers going abroad, the MID concentrated on providing a stock of basic intelligence that could be used in wartime if the need arose. By 1894 it had in place a stock of 30,000 index cards. War broke out soon thereafter with the 1989 Spanish-American War. MID officials acquitted themselves well in providing information on Cuba but provided the military with very little information on the Philippines. This uneven performance led to a 1903 reorganization and the creation of a General Staff Corps of which MID became one of three divisions. A subsequent reorganization into two divisions found MID becoming subordinate to a War College Division.

On the eve of the U.S. entry into World War I, the efforts of Ralph Van Deman led to the de facto reestablishment of the MID as an independent unit and in 1918 it was officially made a coequal part of the army's general staff. By now it was also involved in more than collecting basic intelligence. One of its most important units was MI-8, a cryptological unit headed by Herbert Yardley that would form the foundation for the Black Chamber. MID also engaged in espionage and counterintelligence operations. Because General John Pershing's American Expeditionary Force carried with it a complete intelligence section, much of MID's work involved counterintelligence activities in the United States. German economic sabotage was a major concern.

The interwar period and the rush to isolationism saw the MID's budget and staff shrink as was the case with the military as a whole. The Black Chamber operation became a joint War Department-State Department operation in 1919 and was closed in 1929. MID remained actively engaged in domestic counterintelligence and antisubversive work. In doing so it worked closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the process it became involved in many of the same excesses that gripped this agency in their surveillance of Americans.

The post–World War II era brought an expansion in the size and scope of operations undertaken by army intelligence but it also brought into existence another series of bureaucratic conflicts. Army and air force intelligence competed for prestige and primacy in carrying out strategic bombing reconnaissance missions; it competed with a newly established Office of Strategic Services for collecting strategic intelligence in Europe; in the Pacific Theater General Douglas MacArthur created his own intelligence service; and in Washington a Military Intelligence Service was created to carry out the plans devised by MID.

For army intelligence the political and bureaucratic landscape of postwar intelligence operations has been shaped by three major developments. The first was the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. The second was the creation of a Department of Defense and the subsequent downgrading in status of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments in policy-making deliberations along with the creation in 1961 of a Defense Intelligence Agency. The third was the growing emphasis on technological collection systems and strategic intelligence products during the cold war. These

missions disadvantaged the army even though the need for traditional battlefield tactical intelligence was demonstrated by the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; American Revolution and Intelligence; Black Chamber; Central Intelligence Agency; Civil War Intelligence; Defense Intelligence Agency; Defense Department Intelligence; Office of Strategic Services; Van Deman, Ralph; Yardley, Herbert

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ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

The U.S. Army's unified command is responsible for the intelligence needs and requirements of the U.S. Army ground forces throughout the world. The army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) was created on January 1, 1977, with the aim of combining the army's multidimensional intelligence and security operations under a single command. Brig. Gen. William I. Royal, former commanding General of the Army Security Agency, became INSCOM's first commander.

The establishment of INSCOM as a new major command represented the most significant army intelligence reorganization since the end of World War II. Organized at Arlington Hall Station, INSCOM became a single instrument through which the army might conduct operations at the level above corps and to respond to specialized intelligence needs. The consolidation included integrating the former U.S. Army Security Agency, a signals intelligence and security organization, with the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency, a counterintelligence and human intelligence organization based at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

Also subsumed within INSCOM were various army intelligence production units that had sprung up in other commands throughout the force and under the auspices of the assistant chief of staff for intelligence and U.S. Army Forces Command. By the summer of 1977, INSCOM units were deployed on four continents including eight fixed field stations, various single discipline units, and the major production centers at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Washington, DC. Groups and units under INSCOM command included the 66th Military Intelligence Group (MIG) in Germany; the 470th MIG in Panama; the 500th MIG in Japan; and the 501st located in South Korea. At the end of the 1970s, including both military and civilian personnel, INSCOM's strength totaled about 10,000 individuals. In the 1980s the command expanded further, and by 1985, total INSCOM strength rose to approximately 15,000.

The expansion included the establishment of a new unified production element, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, on January 8, 1978. INSCOM was also placed in command of the elite Special Security Group which was responsible for the dissemination of highly classified and special compartmented information (secret classification, SCI). In the restructuring, the mission of the Special Security Group was realigned and subsequently redesignated and resubordinated to the 902d Military Intelligence Group.

In 1989, INSCOM headquarters relocated to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and in 1991 created the integrated National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) which provides deploying troops with vital threat data and analysis. In 2001, NGIC relocated to Charlottesville, Virginia.

INSCOM coordinates the movement of army intelligence specialists worldwide, deploying units and individuals in support of ground force commanders as required. For example, personnel from INSCOM's rapid response unit, the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, collocated with the Gordon Regional Security Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia, formed the core of an American-led military intelligence battalion that supported NATO forces in Bosnia during the Clinton administration.

From 1977 to 1991, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had been INSCOM's principal target. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991, American policymakers sought to reduce defense and intelligence budgets and significant changes took place with INSCOM units as the command restructured. However, while budgets decreased, tasks and requirements increased as INSCOM was ordered to support a vast array of activities including treaty verification, counterdrug operations, peace-keeping and nation-building. Simultaneously, the threats proliferated with INSCOM responsible for protecting the army against espionage threats posed by nations and group traditionally not U.S. adversaries.

The use of advanced technology and highly trained individuals makes INSCOM's tasks less daunting; providing security and dispatching real-time intelligence into the hands of the war fighter on the ground, as the United States moves into the first decades of the twenty-first century.

See also: Army Intelligence, Cold War Intelligence

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James Brian McNabb

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

The Army Security Agency (ASA) was a cryptologic organization created on September 15, 1945, by action of the U.S. War Department. During World War II, the various cryptologic functions carried out within the U.S. Army were disbursed

throughout the service and operated under the command of a variety of officers and units. This inefficient system was eliminated with the creation of the ASA; responsibilities included production of communication intelligence; research on techniques for clandestine communications, such as invisible inks, microphotographs, and open codes; technical supervision of communication security activities for the Department of the Army; and preparation, production, storage, distribution, and accounting of all materials used in army cryptosystems.

In one sense ASA was a short-lived organization as for all practical purposes it merged only four years later with the cryptologic agencies of the other military services to form the Armed Forces Security Agency. Yet, in another sense it lived on until 1976. With the outbreak of the Korean War the remaining part of ASA was enlarged to provide tactical support for troops deployed there. In 1977, ASA took possession of the electronic intelligence and electronic warfare functions that were under the control of the Signal Corps. ASA personnel entered into combat again in 1961 with the American military involvement in Vietnam. One of their number, SP4 James T. Davis, was the first American soldier to be killed in the Vietnam War in an ambush on December 22, 1961.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Army Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

ARNOLD, GENERAL BENEDICT (JANUARY 14, 1741–JUNE 14, 1801)

Benedict Arnold was an American general in the American Revolution; worked later as an agent and then general for the British. Benedict Arnold, the first great American traitor, was born in Norwich, Connecticut, on January 14, 1741. He enlisted in the army 17 years later, but served only one year before deserting in 1759 to care for his ailing mother. Instead of immediately reentering the military, Arnold struggled financially for several years, working as a druggist in New Haven. In April 1775, after hearing news of the strife at Lexington and Concord, Arnold led his group of New Haven guardsmen into war, thus beginning his illustrious military career.

In May of that year, the Massachusetts Committee of Public Safety ordered Colonel Arnold to take Fort Ticonderoga. En route to the fort, Arnold's company came into contact with Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys, a noncommissioned band of American civilians. After successfully capturing Ticonderoga, it was Allen, not Arnold whom Congress lauded for the achievement, leaving the colonel resentful of the raucous vigilante group.

In January 1776, after leading an attack on Quebec, Congress promoted Arnold to brigadier general. The following year he helped lead the Continental army to a pivotal

victory at Saratoga. Yet despite his successes there, the wounded Arnold was slighted once again, and General Gates became "the hero of Saratoga."

Arnold was formally rebuffed by Congress when they denied him another promotion in 1777. George Washington, who supported Arnold's promotion, was also upset by their snub of his protégé. Over the next two years, Arnold's leadership was under constant scrutiny by Congress, and Arnold believed that their accusations of maladministration stemmed from their disdain of his personality.

With feelings of resentment toward Congress, along with his ever-present pecuniary problems, as well as doubts of the U.S. chances of victory, Benedict Arnold met with loyalist Joseph Stansbury in May 1779. It was here that the American general offered his service to the British and declared his disdain for the Americans' cause. The British welcomed the general's assistance and decided that he would communicate to Sir Henry Clinton, commander of their New York base, through British agent John André.

André and Arnold used invisible ink as well as an elaborate cipher system based on positions of letters within prearranged books, to encode their communiqués. The first mention of a strategic location on the Hudson River, West Point, as a possible target of British attack came in a July 1779 letter from André. Arnold refused to negotiate further, though, until the British were more amenable to his financial demands.

In May 1780 Arnold demonstrated his commitment to treason when he requested command of the strategic West Point, which George Washington granted him. Satisfied with Arnold's effort to begin his betrayal, André resumed communication and promised the general £20,000 in exchange for the surrender of West Point and 3,000 rebel soldiers.

During September 1780, in addition to providing the British with secret intelligence regarding Washington's location, Arnold met André and handed over plans of West Point and notes from a confidential meeting which Washington had presided over. During André's return to his ship on September 23, a group of American bandits captured him along with the incriminating documents and turned him in to Continental forces. Suspicious of the documents, which possessed Arnold's name, Major Benjamin Tallmadge, an American spy, opted to send the information directly to General Washington.

Upon hearing of his contact's capture, Arnold fled to André's ship on September 25 and traveled up the Hudson to New York City. To his dismay he received no hero's welcome from the British there, likely due to the ultimate failure of his operation. He served the remainder of the war as a brigadier general in the British army.

In December 1781, Arnold left New York with his family and set off for England. He returned to North America only once to pursue business in Canada, but the ventures ultimately failed. In 1792 Arnold departed the Western Hemisphere, never to return again. He died in London on June 17, 1801, in virtual obscurity.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; André, Major John

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ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

The Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization of retired intelligence officials and agents, was incorporated in Virginia and founded in 1975. For the many former members of the U.S. intelligence community, it offers a means for them to not only remain in contact, but also to promote awareness about the importance of recognizing and developing the U.S. intelligence sector.

AFIO has a variety of missions, primarily raising awareness about the importance of the U.S. intelligence community in order to ultimately increase the U.S. capabilities in the sector. Not only does it aim to promote U.S. intelligence, but also to spark positive debate about U.S. diplomacy, domestic and international policy, strategy, and defense. To achieve this goal, AFIO finances a variety of programs, particularly in the area of education, in hopes of fostering a new and even smarter generation of potential intelligence agents. A stronger and smarter generation of agents will lead to a more effective intelligence community, which is another one of the major goals of AFIO.

Since AFIO's member base is filled with former top officials, certain participants still have relatively significant political clout and strong connections within Washington and abroad. Many still play significant roles within the American political scene, including George H. W. Bush, Gerald Ford, and Frank Carlucci. These AFIO members often stress the need for better and more effective intelligence and counterintelligence against not just acts of terrorism, but also economic espionage and technological advancements.

Not all members of AFIO are former members of the federal government and the intelligence community, however. Many members are accepted in light of their strong and active careers on the state and local level and for their ability to more effectively promote AFIO and its mission on the state and local level. Additionally, they are not all former officers from the public service; private sector professionals are also permitted. Without this number of members, AFIO would not have been able to construct its nationwide network, which requires the active participation of many members at meetings across the country.

Organization of the nationwide association is handled at the national headquarters in McLean, Virginia, a suburb minutes from Washington. Membership to the Association is only limited by one major constraint. All those who wish to join must have their membership request sponsored by an active member.

The nationwide chapters and their members remain in contact and up to date with AFIO by reading weekly and monthly newsletters available online, as well as from the *Intelligencer*, a periodic journal published by AFIO which contains articles about the association and unclassified intelligence developments.

Currently, AFIO supports numerous scholarships to help finance education for those who are interested in working in the intelligence field. It helps to finance over

180 professors of intelligence-related courses at universities across the nation. Typically, AFIO holds a national convention annually.

See also: Bush, George Herbert Walker; Carlucci, Frank Charles, III; Intelligence Community

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Arthur Holst

ASTOR, CAPTAIN WILLIAM VINCENT (NOVEMBER 15, 1891–FEBRUARY 3, 1959)

Captain William Vincent Astor was an American philanthropist and personal agent for President Franklin Roosevelt. Born on November 15, 1891, in New York City, Astor inherited one of the United States' largest fortunes when his father was lost on the *Titanic* in 1912. After dropping out of Harvard, Astor joined the navy in 1914, reaching the rank of lieutenant. In the early 1920s he became a close friend and frequent sailing companion of his neighbor, Franklin Roosevelt.

In 1927 Astor and a group of prominent businessmen, bankers, attorneys, and philanthropists, including many who went on to lengthy careers in intelligence such as Kermit Roosevelt, Marshall Field, and David K. E. Bruce, established an informal intelligence clearing house in a Manhattan apartment. Known as "The Room," this group met regularly to discuss their world travels and to share information collected from contacts around the world. Astor acted as the impromptu "chair" and after Roosevelt's election in 1932, he ensured that The Room's information reached the Oval Office.

In 1938 President Roosevelt asked Astor and Kermit Roosevelt to undertake an undercover mission in the Pacific. Under the guise of an oceanic exploration, Astor sailed his yacht, the *Normohal*, around the Japanese-mandated islands. His report contained detailed information regarding the lack of Japanese fortifications, location of radio installations, the nature of port facilities, and overall naval strength in the Marshall Islands.

As war approached Astor lobbied the president for an expanded intelligence role. On March 8, 1941, President Roosevelt appointed him area intelligence controller for the New York Area. In that capacity Astor coordinated information gathered by his own agents, as well as the army's Military Intelligence Division, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and other federal agencies. By the outbreak of war, however, Astor had largely been outmaneuvered by John Franklin Carter, another of Roosevelt's "unofficial" intelligence collectors, and "Wild Bill" Donovan. With little to do, Astor gracefully resigned in August 1944.

See also: Donovan, Major General William Joseph; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Roosevelt, Kermit

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Peter F. Coogan

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, also known as the McMahon Act after Senator Brien McMahon (D-Conn) who was chair of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy that held hearings on the proposed legislation. President Harry Truman signed the Act on August 1, 1946, and the AEC formally came into existence on January 1, 1947. The policy issue at the heart of its creation was whether the American nuclear program would be under the control of civilians or the military. The McMahon Act placed atomic energy firmly in the hands of civilians. Under its terms the AEC was to be a five-person commission appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. There was also a military liaison committee created that the AEC was to consult with and advise on atomic energy matters that had military applications. The Act also provided that all production facilities and nuclear reactors would be government-owned. This was done through the establishment of a National Laboratory system. The AEC was given control over the technical information involved in producing atomic power. Finally, in the area of foreign and national security policy the McMahon Act stipulated that there was to be a strict prohibition on releasing atomic information and technology to other countries including U.S. allies.

Controversy soon engulfed the AEC. In 1953, AEC consultant J. Robert Oppenheimer was suspended as a security risk in large part because of criticism from Edward Teller. Both Teller and Oppenheimer had worked at Los Alamos as scientists and played instrumental roles in the development of the atomic bomb. Oppenheimer had come to oppose the development of the hydrogen bomb on moral and technical grounds. The seeds of later controversy were sown with the passage of the Atomic Energy Act Amendments of 1954. It brought about a change in mission for the AEC which was now charged with both providing for the safety of nuclear power and encouraging its commercial use. By the 1960s the AEC was being accused of not paying sufficient attention to the environmental, power plant, and human safety issues surrounding the production and use of nuclear power for commercial purposes. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1975 effectively abolished the AEC with the creation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The AEC formally ceased operations on January 19, 1975.

The AEC was an early member of the intelligence community and acted both as a consumer and producer of intelligence. As a producer of intelligence the AEC's intelligence division gathered information on nuclear energy through the operation of a global network of monitoring sites. It also put forward estimates of the nuclear capabilities of

other states. It was the AEC that announced on February 27, 1958, that the Soviet Union had exploded two hydrogen bombs at an Arctic testing site. Since 1949 it had revealed some 31 Soviet nuclear tests while keeping information regarding others secret. It was the AEC that publicly revealed China's first nuclear explosion of October 16, 1964.

As a consumer of intelligence, the AEC was interested in obtaining information on foreign atomic energy programs and weapons developments. The two roles frequently intersected as they did in April 1947 when AEC member Admiral Lewis Strauss voiced the concern that there did not appear to exist a system in place to monitor the level of radioactivity in the atmosphere, a potent indicator of Soviet nuclear tests. As a result of deliberations within the Central Intelligence Group, the forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency, a Long Range Detection Panel was established. Opposition to creating such a collection system came from the air force which felt that such an operation was premature and a waste of funds since it believed that the Soviet Union was not on the verge of possessing such a capability. The air force also felt it would detract from their ability to carry out what it saw as its primary mission of long-range strategic bombing. President Truman approved the idea in September 1947. The system became operational in early 1949 although complaints about its cost continued to surface. Those complaints largely were silenced when on September 3, 1949, an observation bomber over the Sea of Japan brought back evidence of an atomic explosion.

Today the Department of Energy has inherited the AEC's seat in the intelligence community and its functions of providing policy makers with timely and accurate intelligence related to nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; science and technology; energy security; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency; Atomic Energy Commission

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Glenn P. Hastedt

ATOMIC SPY RING

The Manhattan Engineer District (MED), also known as the Manhattan Project, was a United States (U.S.) Army Corps of Engineers program with British participation that built the first atomic bomb. The MED was created (1942), believing that Nazi Germany had a two-year lead in the development of nuclear weapons. The MED's major facilities were: enriched uranium production through gaseous diffusion, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; plutonium production, Hanford Engineer Works, Hanford, Washington; and atomic bomb research, development, construction, and testing, Los

Alamos, New Mexico. Even though the theoretical possibility of an extremely destructive bomb had been known soon after fission was first discovered in Berlin (1938), the MED was cloaked in total secrecy so as to shield the science, technology, processes, status, and results of the project from the Germans, the French, and the Soviet Union.

The Soviets proved to be more proficient at espionage than nuclear science and technology. They penetrated the strict security of the MED at Los Alamos as well as other sites in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom (UK) and the information gathered allowed the Soviets to offset their scientific and resource disadvantage. The Soviets first learned (September 1941) of the potential for an Anglo-American atomic bomb project from John Cairncross (cryptonym: Moliere), a member of the "Cambridge Five" spies in Britain that supplied information to the Soviets into the 1950s. The MAUD Report (July 2, 1941) contained the conclusions of a British committee established (Spring 1940) to determine the feasibility of constructing an atomic bomb. The report itself favored the use of uranium over plutonium and encouraged the United States to pursue that course. The Soviets inferred from the existence of the report some level of British and American cooperation that excluded them from any project. Cairncross had learned of the Maud Report in his capacity as the private secretary to Lord Hankey, chairman of the British War Cabinet Scientific Advisory Committee. Donald Maclean, another member of the "Cambridge Five," also informed (1941) the Soviets of the potentially excluding partnership and continued spying for the Soviets (1947–1948) while he was the British liaison to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission that absorbed the MED (1946).

The Soviets had been establishing their spy network in the United States since the early 1930s and had successfully gained some access to the American scientific community through sympathetic émigrés and through the Communist Party of the United States of America, which at the time had a membership numbering in the thousands. Reflecting the importance they gave to the project, the Soviets code-named their espionage program targeting the MED Enormous. No exact number of Soviet spies working on the project will ever be known. What is known is the spies who were caught, some belatedly into the 1950s, and those about whom information remains sketchy and were never caught.

The primary responsibility for maintaining the secrets of the MED fell on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the MED's own counterintelligence officers. The Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (Rad Lab) at the University of California (UC), Berkeley, was an initial target (February 1943) and potential conduit of information because J. Robert Oppenheimer had left UC and the Rad Lab to become Los Alamos' scientific director. The Soviets attempted to contact several scientists there and in one case succeeded in gaining information (1944) from one scientist who was soon fired, as were (1944) several employees of the Metallurgical Lab (Met Lab) at the University of Chicago.

As was the case at all of the MED facilities, all of the personnel at Los Alamos were vetted, and stringent security was enforced. However, it was at Los Alamos that the Soviets had their greatest success. At least three people are known to have engaged in espionage at the facility: Klaus Fuchs, Theodore Hall, and David Greenglass. Though these spies worked at Los Alamos at the same time, they were unaware of the others' activities. Evidence gleaned (1990s) from the Soviet Union's intelligence and security

(KGB) archives and the VENONA files allude to a possible fourth spy code-named Perseus (initially code-named Fogel).

Klaus Fuchs, a German Communist and theoretical physicist, fled Nazi Germany (1933) for Britain and was interned in Canada as an Enemy Alien (1940) before being assigned (1943) to the British scientific team working on implosion problems. Fuchs had earlier spied for the Soviets in Britain and that contact was reestablished (1944) through the American chemist, Harry Gold, who served as a Soviet courier in the 1940s after intermittently spying for them beginning in 1935. Fuchs passed details of implosion and bomb design to Gold in two meetings (Boston and Santa Fe) in February 1945. Fuchs spied again for the Soviets (1947) as the head (1946) of the Theoretical Physics Division of Britain's Harwell nuclear facility. British intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were alerted (1949) to Fuchs's espionage by Soviet intelligence cables decrypted by the joint American and British VENONA Project. Fuchs confessed, was convicted of espionage, spent 14 years in prison, and moved to East Germany upon his release.

Theodore Hall, a Harvard-educated American physicist involved in the radioactive Lanthanum (RaLa) test instrumentation, volunteered to spy for the Soviets (November 1944) and passed supplemental information confirming Fuchs's espionage. VENONA uncovered (early 1950s) Hall's espionage, but he did not confess at the time; although he did confess later, he was never tried. Fuchs and Hall may have pursued their espionage in an attempt to prevent the United States from holding a nuclear monopoly over the world, a goal that the information they passed helped to accomplish.

David Greenglass, a U.S. Army draftee (April 1943) and Special Engineering Detachment machinist, was initially assigned (July 1944) to Oak Ridge and then Los Alamos (August 1944) where he worked on the shaped charges for the Fat Man implosion bomb. He passed sketches of the implosion lens to Harry Gold (1945) and also passed information through his wife, Ruth, to his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg, the husband of Greenglass's sister, Ethel. The Soviets were willing to pay his tuition at the University of Chicago, but the school did not admit him after he left the army (March 1946). Fuchs's 1950 confession implicated Harry Gold, who implicated Greenglass, who then confessed and implicated Ruth and Julius.

The Rosenbergs were ardent Communists and Julius, an American engineer, had passed industrial secrets to the Soviets prior to World War II (1939–1945) before developing a network of other engineers who did not want the United States and the United Kingdom to emerge from the war with power substantially greater than the Soviet Union. Julius (code-named Antenna and Liberal) never worked for the MED, but his espionage and that of Ethel (code-named Wasp), Greenglass (code-named Bumblebee and Caliber), and Ruth (code-named Osa) were confirmed from VENONA Project's decryption of Soviet intelligence cables. The Rosenbergs maintained their innocence and did not cooperate with the authorities when offered lighter sentences. Greenglass's plea-bargained testimony led to the Rosenberg's execution (June 19, 1953). Greenglass was imprisoned for 15 years, but his wife was never formally charged.

Allan Nunn May was part of the British scientific contingent originally assigned (1943) to work on the construction of the Chalk River, Ontario, heavy water-moderated reactor. In that capacity he visited the Met Lab on several occasions during

1944 passing what information he gathered to the Soviets in February 1945. Bruno Pontecorvo fled (1936) to France from Fascist Italy, then fled France (1940) ahead of the invading German army, and was part of the same British contingent assigned to Chalk River. He passed secrets from Canadian atomic research to the Soviets through 1949 when he returned to the United Kingdom to continue his atomic research there. Pontecorvo and his family fled to the Soviet Union when it was feared that Fuchs's confession (1950) would implicate him.

Several unnamed or unknown spies also penetrated the MED. One American, code-named Quantum, passed (Summer 1943) information about the gaseous diffusion process at the Oak Ridge facility. The Soviets also received some information from an English source code-named Eric (1943) and from an anonymous package left at the Soviet Consulate in New York City (Summer 1944). A physicist code-named Mar, who began working at the Hanford facility in October of 1943, also passed information to the Soviets.

The secrets derived from the successful Soviet penetration of the MED prevented the United States and the United Kingdom from establishing a postwar dominance and led to the cold war exemplified by the acronym MAD: mutually assured destruction.

See also: Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; Gold, Harry; Greenglass, David; Hall, Theodore Alvin; Los Alamos; Nunn May, Allan; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel; VENONA

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AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

Established in 1949, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) is Australia's domestic counterintelligence service. It is responsible for gathering security intelligence, evaluating its significance, and advising the government. It compiles dossiers on individuals and organizations deemed to endanger Australian national security through espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or politically motivated unrest, and it conducts security checks on visa applicants, immigrants, and government employees.

Although commonly assumed to be a domestic response to the growing post–World War II influence of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), the creation of ASIO was in fact a product of British and American pressure. The VENONA operation revealed in 1947 that the Soviet Union had obtained a copy of a top-secret British postwar defense document, "Security in the Western Mediterranean and Eastern Atlantic," sent to Canberra. It exposed a serious security leak in the Department of External Affairs. The United States imposed an embargo on the transmission of certain classified information to both Britain and Australia. In order to assuage American concerns

about apparently lax Australian security, the British government persuaded skeptical Australian Prime Minister J. B. Chifley to permit a small team of MI-5 officials to restructure the internal security system along MI-5 lines. On March 2, 1949, Chifley announced the creation of ASIO. It supplanted the Commonwealth Investigation Bureau, considered incapable of uncovering domestic espionage.

In 1950 the newly elected conservative, Prime Minister R. G. Menzies, appointed the director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier Charles Spry, to head ASIO. He took over at one of the chilliest moments of the cold war: the United States had just lost its atomic monopoly; North Korea had just invaded South Korea; the CPA, steadfastly loyal to the Soviet Union, controlled some powerful trade unions as well as the increasingly influential peace movement; and World War III seemed both imminent and inevitable. Spry's four-year secondment from the army extended to 19 years. Throughout this period, he remained convinced that Communism posed a dangerous threat to national security and he molded ASIO into a significant weapon in the domestic cold war.

ASIO's greatest coup came in April 1954 when two KGB officials, Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, defected from the Soviet Embassy in Canberra. They were among the most important defectors of the cold war since their intelligence enabled security services around the world to gain deeper insight into Soviet espionage methods. Although the Petrov defection established ASIO's reputation, left-wing critics constantly alleged links between ASIO and conservative politicians. Like other Western intelligence agencies throughout the 1960s, ASIO monitored the activities of Vietnam War protestors. Communist domination of the 1950s peace movement fitted comfortably into ASIO's worldview, but it did not adjust well to the emergence of a different antiwar movement and it turned dissent into disloyalty.

In December 1972, Labor won office, the first Labor administration since ASIO's establishment. Many government ministers were themselves the subject of ASIO dossiers and believed that ASIO was obsessed with perceived threats from the Left instead of actual threats from the Far Right. Consequently in March 1973 the Labor attorney general used Commonwealth police to launch a controversial raid on ASIO offices in Caberra and Melbourne. Royal Commissions into Australian intelligence from 1974 to 1977 and 1983 to 1984 resulted in structural reforms to the organization. ASIO's identification of KGB spy Valeriy Ivanov was a major success in 1983, but the post–cold war period found ASIO in search of a new raison d'étre. With the current "war on terror," it found it. From 2004 to 2005, parliamentary legislation significantly enlarged ASIO's powers of surveillance, arrest, and detention of suspects.

See also: Central Bureau; Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); MI-5 (The Security Service); Petrov, Vladimir M.

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Phillip Deery

B

B TEAM

The B Team was composed of outside experts who reviewed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates on Soviet threats in 1976. In the middle of the 1970s, some conservatives and hard-liners opposed détente, which the Nixon and Ford administrations promoted. Their attacks were also aimed at the CIA, and they accused the CIA of underestimating Soviet threats. Under such circumstances, George W. Anderson, then chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, recommended to President Gerald Ford that outside experts, using the same data as the CIA analysts', should estimate Soviet threats. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby rejected this idea, but DCI George H. W. Bush, who succeeded Colby on January 30, 1976, accepted it. The B Team is the group of outside experts thus established. The B Team and A Team (CIA analysts) were directed to produce each National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 1976 on Soviet threats and to compare these with each other.

There were three B Teams, which respectively estimated the ability of Soviet air defense, missile accuracy, and strategic objectives. What provoked controversies was the last team, which was headed by Richard Pipes, a professor of Russian history at Harvard University, and included as its members Paul Nitze and Paul Wolfowitz. As may be expected from the process of its foundation, the B Team's conclusion differed considerably from that of the A Team. For instance, the B Team inferred that the Soviet military expenditure was larger than the A Team's estimate and the B Team judged that the Soviet missiles were more accurate than the A Team had assumed.

The B Team also reviewed the NIEs of past years and criticized the method which the CIA analysts had employed. According to the B Team's critique, the CIA lapsed into mirror-imaging. The CIA assumed that both the United States and the Soviet adhered to the same criteria, that the Soviet sought for just nuclear parity, and that the Soviet followed the Mutual Assured Destruction theory. The B Team, rejecting

those assumptions, insisted that the Soviet was more aggressive, that the Soviet sought for nuclear superiority, and that the Soviet sought for the capability to fight a nuclear war.

The final version of the 1976 NIE, to a large degree, accepted the B Team standpoint. This A Team-B Team exercise was soon leaked to the media and provoked controversies in the public. Some appreciated the B Team's expertise. Others criticized it for bringing into intelligence analysis the political end of boosting military spending. This practice raised disputes on the utility of competitive analysis, and on problem of politicization of intelligence.

See also: Bush, George; Herbert Walker; Central Intelligence Agency; Colby, William Egan; Cold War Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; Ford Administration and Intelligence; National Intelligence Estimates; Nixon Administration and Intelligence; President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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Naoki Ohno

BABA, STEPHEN ANTHONY

Stephen Anthony Baba, an ensign in the U.S. Navy, was arrested on October 1, 1981, for passing military secrets to South Africa. After pleading guilty he was sentenced on January 2, 1982, to an eight-year prison term. Baba was commissioned in the navy in 1980 for Officer Candidate School and was stationed as an electronic material officer on the USS *Lang*.

In late September 1981 Baba mailed a copy of "Electronic Warfare Evaluation and Education Quarterly," (May 1980) and two microfilm indexes of key code words along with a 12-page letter to the South African Embassy in Washington, DC. He sought $50,000 in return for this information with the promise of being able to provide more intelligence. Baba stated the money was going to be used to raise money for his fiancé in the Philippines so that she could go to college.

South African officials turned the package of material over to the Naval Investigative Service on September 30, 1981. Less than one week later Baba was arrested in San Diego, where the USS *Lang* was based, for attempting to rob a jewelry store. This led officials to believe that Baba had been responsible for sending the stolen documents to the South African embassy.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BABINGTON-SMITH, CONSTANCE (OCTOBER 15, 1912–JULY 31, 2000)

Constance Babington-Smith was a renowned interpreter of air reconnaissance photography carried out by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) during World War II. She is most famous for identifying the German V-2 rocket base at Peenemünde on the Baltic coast. She also identified test sites where the Germans experimented with jet engines and sites for V-1 rocket launchers.

Babington-Smith was born on October 15, 1912, in Puttenham Surrey. She was one of nine children of Sir Henry and Lady Elizabeth Babington-Smith. Educated at private schools in London and Paris, Babington-Smith started her career by writing for popular magazines. She developed an interest in airplanes and began writing for *The Aeroplane* magazine. In December 1940 she joined the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF). After the fall of France in June 1940 the RAF placed a high priority on aerial reconnaissance. The RAF established the Allied Central Interpretation Unit at its base at Medmenham, with a special section focusing on the German air force, the Luftwaffe. In January 1941 Babington-Smith was put in charge of this section, a highly unusual appointment for a woman at that time. Her accomplishments during the war were recognized by the British government in 1945 when she was appointed an MBE (Member of the Order of the British Empire). Following the end of the war in Europe, Babington-Smith was attached to U.S. Army Air Force intelligence section at the Pentagon. The American government awarded her the Legion of Merit in 1945.

After the war she worked for *Life* magazine, writing a series of biographies on prominent British literary figures. She died in Cambridge on July 31, 2000, at the age of 87.

See also: Air Force Intelligence

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Paul W. Doerr

BAKER, JOSEPHINE (JUNE 3, 1906–APRIL 12, 1975)

Born in 1906, Josephine Baker was an Afro-American singer and actress who became a French citizen in 1937. She was active in the French resistance during World War II, recruited at its inception by Deuxième Bureau (French military intelligence) because

her touring to different performance sites and attendance at VIP arrangements provided her with a variety of contacts, especially at the Italian embassy in Paris.

Fleeing the advancing Germans in June 1940, Baker relocated to unoccupied southern France. Here she used her performance and celebrity status to help people escape the Germans and gave cover for agents setting up contacts with Allied intelligence. Her activities included travelling to Spain and Portugal, and smuggling secret messages on sheet music. At New Year 1941 her entourage moved to North Africa. From June 1941 to December 1942 she was hospitalized in Casablanca. Still, her bedside became an important spot for intelligence gathering especially in preparation for Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of Northwest Africa in November 1942.

After her recovery, Baker was made second lieutenant of the French Women's Auxiliary Air Force. Baker continued her war effort, entertaining Free French troops in North Africa and the Middle East. For her effort the French government awarded Baker the Medal of the Resistance with Rosette and appointed her Chevalier of the Legion of Honor.

After the war she continued her career in show business and also got engaged in the American civil rights movement. This concurred with the basic motivation for her wartime anti-Nazism: a devotion to the ideal of a world without racial barriers.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Frode Lindgjerdet

BAKER, LAFAYETTE
(OCTOBER 12, 1826–JULY 3, 1868)

Lafayette Baker was a Union intelligence officer during the Civil War who founded the Secret Service after serving as a spy behind Confederate lines. Baker was born in New York and moved frequently throughout the United States before the Civil War. For a time he lived in San Francisco where he worked with vigilantes in trying to bring an end of corruption and gambling there. In 1861 Baker volunteered to serve as a spy for General Winfield Scott. Posing as a photographer, Baker crossed Union lines and entered into Virginia. His efforts met with frequent failure although the information he provided Scott is considered to have been valuable. Several times he was arrested by Union and Confederate forces as a spy and was imprisoned by Confederate forces in Fredericksburg. On his return to the North, Baker was placed in charge of a counterespionage unit within the State Department. In February 1862 this organization was transferred to the War Department where it became the National Detective Bureau. In this capacity Baker investigated charges of corruption in the Treasury Department and disloyalty within the military. He provided information about Confederate troop

movements and a plot to capture Washington, DC. Baker also captured Confederate spy Belle Boyd. Following Lincoln's assassination Baker took a leading a role in the search for and capture of John Wilkes Booth. Although his accomplishments were many, Baker also operated with little regard for warrants or the constitutional rights of those he pursued. He is also reported to have employed brutal interrogation techniques in order to obtain information. Baker's fortunes declined dramatically after the end of the Civil War. Baker clashed with President Andrew Johnson, who dismissed Baker on suspicion of spying on him. At issue was Baker's attempt to gain incriminating evidence against Lucy Cobb, a pardon broker with whom Johnson was reputed to be having an affair. Baker had warned Johnson about her activities and set a trap to catch her selling documents needed to obtain a pardon. Baker testified at Johnson's impeachment hearings and provided false information against the president to the effect that he had been engaged in a correspondence with Jefferson Davis in which he expressed sympathies for the Confederate cause. He was also indicted but acquitted on charges of extortion and false imprisonment. Baker died in Philadelphia shortly after Johnson's impeachment trial ended.

See also: Boyd, Belle; Civil War Intelligence; National Detective Bureau

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BALLOONS

Balloons are a method of aerial intelligence gathering used primarily during the American Civil War and later as part of the Army Signal Corps. During World War I the use of balloons gave way to the newly invented airplane.

Balloons were used for observation and intelligence gathering purposes by both the Union and Confederate forces during the early years of the Civil War. The Union army had far more success, however, than Confederate forces. Yet, many years prior to the "War between the States," ballooning had become an established practice, particularly in Europe. During the French Revolution a regular balloon unit, the Iter Compagnie d' Aerostiers, was formed and employed for military reconnaissance during the 1794 Battle of Fleurus. In general, however, balloons accomplished very little "beyond shaking enemy morale." Aside from the problem of inflating and transporting balloons, a cumbersome task, the problem in terms of intelligence gathering was not what could be observed, but to interpret what was seen regarding strategy and tactics.

When the likelihood of civil war in America appeared imminent, several individuals approached the U.S. War Department in the early months of 1861. Known as military aeronauts, Thaddeus Lowe, John Wise, and John La Mountain encouraged the Lincoln administration to consider creating a balloon corps as part of conducting battlefield operations.

Professor Thaddeus S. Lowe observing a Civil War battle from his balloon "Intrepid" near Fair Oaks, Virginia, May–August 1862. (Library of Congress)

Of the three aeronauts, it was Thaddeus Lowe who secured the backing of noted scientists in his quest for using balloons in military intelligence operations. A noted balloonist, Lowe's adventure into the field of military observation did not get off to a good start. On April 20, 1861, shortly after war broke out, he set a distance record of more than 900 miles in nine hours. He left from Cincinnati, Ohio, and landed near Unionville, South Carolina, only to be jailed twice by Carolinians who accused him of being a Yankee spy. Luckily, some local academic admirers of his ballooning exploits aided in his release and assisted him in returning by train to Ohio.

Securing the support of Smithsonian head, Dr. Joseph Henry, Lowe traveled to Washington, DC, on June 5, 1861. The technical aspects of ballooning for military purposes, Lowe insisted, included the facts that the balloon could remain "inflated for three days, be towed by a few men over fields, be let up by ropes, and serve as a platform for telegraphic communications." The key component for intelligence gathering was the use of the telegraph to wire ground forces below regarding enemy troop movements. The major impediment was developing a device for generating gas if the balloon was to be deployed in areas where there was no "street gas." Trial runs were thus made around Falls Church, Virginia. Several engineering officers went aloft with Lowe to ascertain the balloon's usefulness for military strategy.

While Lowe was campaigning in Washington, La Mountain made several flights from Fort Monroe in his balloon, *Atlantic*. During one flight on August 10, 1861, he reported to Major General George Benjamin Butler that he spotted an enemy encampment five or six miles northwest of Hampton, consisting of a force of 4,000 to 5,000 troops. His balloon was employed primarily to observe the whereabouts of the Confederates rather than topographical planning. He also made an ascent in *Atlantic* from the

Union ship *Fanny* at Hampton Roads to observe the Confederate batteries on Sewell's Point, Virginia.

La Mountain's modest efforts were not matched by Wise, but certainly exceeded by Lowe. On August 29, flying in a balloon with 25,000 cubic feet of gas, Lowe made observations of the Confederates building earthworks on Munson's Hill and Clark's Hill. On September 7, 1861, Major General George S. McClellan accompanied Lowe on one of his aerial observations to examine the enemy's works. Later that month, he received an order for the construction of four more balloons and gas generators for use by the army of the Potomac. The new balloons were constructed from silk and coated with varnish. The larger balloons, *Intrepid* and *Union*, were filled with "coal gas" while the smaller ones, *Washington* and *Constitution*, designed for inclement weather, were filled with hydrogen.

Lowe's balloon corps made hundreds of ascensions during McClellan's Peninsula Campaign in 1862 and in the spring of 1863. As a means of intelligence gathering, a light telegraph wire was carried aloft and information was transmitted to the ground where officers analyzed the data. Specifically, in March 1862, Lowe's balloons were transferred from the Topographical Engineers to the Quartermaster Department in order to be used for making observations of the Confederate positions at Yorktown. In many cases, with Lowe aloft, the telegraph was used to relay his observations on the terrain and where enemy locations were emplaced. On May 4, 1862, for instance, Lowe telegraphed McClellan that Yorktown has been abandoned by the Confederates. The aeronaut also made numerous flights from the banks of the Chickahominy River. The Balloon Department achieved distinction during the battle of Fair Oaks. Ascending in the *Intrepid*, Lowe passed along valuable information on the whereabouts of Confederate forces. Lowe continued to play an important role at Chancellorsville in support of Major General Joseph Hooker. Along with General George Stoneman, moreover, Lowe observed Confederate lines around Richmond with a telescope.

By early 1863, Union field leaders began questioning the necessity of balloon observations. Confederate forces, seeing balloons aloft, began concealing their movements, not to mention the cumbersomeness of transporting such equipment to the battlefield. The Balloon Department was transferred to the Corps of Engineers and finally to the Signal Corps, who claimed that they did not have the necessary resources to run it. In July 1863 the Balloon Corps was officially disbanded.

The Confederacy was less successful in its attempts to use balloons for aerial observations. The balloon was made out of silk dresses. The only gas for its balloon was in Richmond, so the inflated balloon was hitched to a locomotive and carried down the York River Railroad. It was also fastened to a steamer which ran aground on the James River and later captured by a federal gunship on July 4, 1862. A second balloon was hoisted over Richmond, but eventually was lost in a storm.

Balloons were once again called into service in 1892. The Signal Corps purchased a balloon for observation purposes from a French company. The balloon was named the *General Myer* in honor of the first chief signal officer of the Civil War. Based on the foresight of Chief Signal Officer Adolphous W. Greely, and successful observations from the U.S. Army Signal Corps balloon *Santiago* in Cuba during the Spanish-American War in 1898, aerial intelligence earned an important place in the U.S. Army. Balloons managed to survive into World War I, accompanied by observation airships (Zeppelins) and the

newly invented airplane. All three forms of observation aircraft enabled the detection of any large-scale movement or massing of troops preceding an attack.

Although the advent of the airplane rendered balloons obsolete for intelligence gathering after World War I, Allied strategists used them during World War II. Balloons were used as decoys during the invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944. Inflatable dirigibles, tanks, trucks, and planes were placed in the northern part of England to mask where the Allied attack may be launched. During the actual invasion thousands of inflated dirigibles were used to confuse the Nazis as to the actual size of the invading force.

The cold war initiated new forms of intelligence-spy gathering such as the U-2, SR-71, and space satellites. High-altitude balloons were also used to gather weather data. Operation B, conducted by the air force, used balloons for photo reconnaissance over the Soviet Union in the early 1950s prior to the introduction of the U-2. The current war against terrorism in the Middle East has witnessed the introduction of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). These drones have provided battlefield commanders an "eye in the sky" without risking the use of pilots. They have also been used to launch deadly and accurate missile strikes. Yet, despite such advanced technological military systems, is the balloon a thing of the past? Presently, the air force is considering testing unmanned helium balloons in the seldom-used region of the Earth's atmosphere called "near space." The justification is that balloons are cheaper than satellites and may be able to stay aloft much longer than an airplane. If successful these balloons, flying at an altitude of 65,000 feet, may be able to provide a valuable communications or surveillance platform. Such operations would permit ground forces to communicate over vast ranges as opposed to the line-of-sight radios now in use.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; American Intelligence, World War II; Army Intelligence; Civil War Intelligence; Cold War Intelligence; Confederate Signal and Secret Service Bureau; GENETRIX; Lowe, Thaddeus; SR-71

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Charles F. Howlett

BAMFORD, JAMES
(SEPTEMBER 24, 1946–)

James Bamford is an author and journalist who served in the U.S. Navy during the Vietnam War and attended Suffolk University Law School where he received a law degree in 1975. Bamford published *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on Americas Most*

Secret Agency in 1982. Freedom of Information Act requests and combing through congressional testimony produced the first book length study of the National Security Agency (NSA) published by someone not affiliated with the NSA to that point. Although NSA did not appreciate the exposure *The Puzzle Palace* brought, the NSA it could only stand by and see the text become the standard work on the elusive agency. Of the 12 to 13 books on the NSA in the Library of Congress, four are editions of *The Puzzle Palace*.

Bamford's status after the publication of the book helped him get hired by ABC News in 1989, where he was an investigative journalist producer for Peter Jennings and *World News Tonight*. Bamford also did journalistic writing on various intelligence topics in the wake of the publication of *The Puzzle Palace*.

In the years since the publication of *The Puzzle Palace*, Bamford has published articles in the *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times* magazines, the *Washington Post* and the *Atlantic*. In 2001 Bamford published another more in-depth examination of the NSA in his book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra Secret National Security Agency: From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century*. In 2005 Bamford published his third book, titled *Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq and the Abuse of Americas Intelligence Agencies*.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Intelligence Community; National Security Agency; September 11, 2001

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Steven F. Marin

BANCROFT, DR. EDWARD
(JANUARY 9, 1744–SEPTEMBER 8, 1821)

Physician, scientist, and double agent, Edward Bancroft was born on January 9, 1744, in Westfield, Massachusetts. Bancroft was tutored by Silas Deane and in 1760 was apprenticed to a physician. Three years later he went to sea; reaching Surinam, he was employed as a doctor by plantation owner Paul Wentworth. He moved to London in 1767, studied medicine at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, and quickly established himself as a physician and scientist. Befriended by Joseph Priestly and Benjamin Franklin, he was elected to the Royal Society and the College of Physicians. During the next few years, he wrote a number of books, was appointed editor of *Monthly Review*, and became a pro-American politician.

In 1776, Bancroft accepted an offer from Silas Deane, who had been appointed by Congress to represent American interests in Paris, to become a spy for the rebel cause and feed information to Deane from London. Franklin had encouraged this appointment. Bancroft also was employed as a spy by Paul Wentworth, who then headed the British secret service. Initially remunerated and trusted by both Britons and Americans,

Bancroft lost some credibility with the former in 1777 when he became implicated in the activities of a Scotsman, John Aitken, who was hanged for sabotaging British warships at Bristol. He managed to extricate himself by turning state's evidence against Aitken, joined Deane in Paris, and continued to feed the British important information. Meantime, he and Deane used their privy positions to speculate profitably on the stock market.

In August 1778, Congress removed Deane from office because it suspected he was misusing public funds. Accused of treason, Deane moved first to Ghent, then to London; in the latter place Bancroft provided him with financial assistance. In 1784 Bancroft lost his government position, which by then was paying £1,000 annually. Five years later, Deane died mysteriously on board ship while returning to the United States. Bancroft quickly spread rumors that Deane had committed suicide. Perhaps, however, Bancroft poisoned Deane, by prescribing potentially lethal doses of laudanum. Bancroft's motive could have been fear that Deane, who knew too much about Bancroft's earlier dealings, might expose him and ruin his reputation in England. Probably, the truth will never be known.

After leaving British governmental service, Bancroft turned his attention full-time to scientific experimentation and attempts to make money. He worked with oak bark dyes, and for a time enjoyed a monopoly on the importation and manufacture of oak bark. In 1794, he published a treatise on experiments with permanent dyes. He died at Margate on September 8, 1821.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Deane, Silas; Franklin, Benjamin

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Paul David Nelson

BARBAROSSA, OPERATION

Operation Barbarossa was the greatest military operation in history. It caught Soviet forces off guard with terrible consequences. However, the attack was not a complete surprise because Stalin had been warned well in advance but had rejected the intelligence he had received. He put a great deal of faith in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed on August 23, 1939, that linked the two states together in an alliance. Operation Barbarossa (in German, Unternehmen Barbarossa) was the Nazi code name for the invasion of the Soviet Union that commenced on June 22, 1942. The operation was planned by Hitler, who changed the original code name for the operation from Fritz to Barbarossa. The name was for the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick I (1123–1190), known as "Barbarossa," which means "red beard" in Medieval Latin. He had

drowned in Asia Minor during the Third Crusade, but in a popular German myth was believed to be in a cave from where he would emerge to aid the Germans in a great battle.

Numerous sources provided Stalin with advanced warning of Barbarossa, but he had convinced himself that Hitler would finish defeating Britain before he attacked the Soviet Union, even as intelligence poured into Moscow from all over Europe and even from Japan. The last intelligence warning came from a German sergeant who deserted to the Soviet side, bringing word of the impending invasion at dawn just hours before it occurred. This last bit of intelligence was too late to undo Stalin's persistent refusal to believe that Hitler would not attack.

Stalin was also fooled by Nazi deception operations, Haifisch and Harpune, employed from April 1941 until the execution of Barbarossa. These operations sought to portray Nazi troop concentrations in Poland as a defensive measure to put them beyond British bombers. They also simulated amphibious invasion exercises to create the image of an invasion of England.

Stalin dismissed intelligence from Soviet assets. Richard Sorge, who was serving under the cover of a German military correspondent in Tokyo, supplied Soviets with very high-grade intelligence. Sorge was an agent for Glavnoye Razvedyvate'noye Upravleniye (GRU) the Soviet military intelligence service. He had gained information about Barbarossa at least four months in advance of the operation. He had transmitted the information to Moscow, but Stalin refused to believe it.

Another Soviet source was the Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra or Red Choir) which was a Nazi label for a Soviet spy ring operating in Germany and in the countries surrounding it. The master spy running the Red Orchestra ring was Leiba Domb, alias Leopold Trepper, et al. He ran two hundred agents at key bureaucratic points in the Nazi regime. These included Harro Shulze-Boysen, a grandson of Admiral von Tirpitz, at the Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin and Arvid Harnack, nephew of Adolf von Harnack, a celebrated theologian. His wife, Midred Harnack, an American, and most of the ring were captured in August of 1942 and executed.

In the Soviet Union the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKVD) Foreign Intelligence Chief Pavel Fitin gave repeated warnings as intelligence products from the intelligence data he had analyzed. He survived, but Ivan Proskurov, an air force officer and head of military intelligence from 1939 to 1940, was shot in October 1941 for telling Stalin the truth. Other Soviet intelligence officers, such as Filipp I. Golikov, who massaged intelligence data on Operation Barbarossa to make it fit Stalin's biases, flourished while Stalin lived.

Other intelligence also pointed to an impending invasion. Arne Carl-August Beurling (1905–1986) was a Swedish mathematician who deciphered a Nazi code, the Geheimfernschreiber (a "fish cipher"), used by Nazi teleprinter traffic passing through neutral Sweden to occupied Norway. His decryptions gave the Swedes advance knowledge of Operation Barbarossa. On June 11, 1942, they decrypted a teleprinter message that the commander of the Nazi occupying force in Norway had taken control of Finnish Lapland and that troops were being massed. This and other messages suggested that war was imminent. Winston Churchill sent Stalin a significant piece of intelligence of Nazi troop movements. The warning gave detailed information derived from Ultra intercepts. The British had early in the war cracked the Nazi ENIGMA code machine and

called the decoded information Ultra. Churchill told Stalin the information on the invasion came from a very reliable unnamed agent, meaning Ultra messages. The British also used Sandor Rado, a Hungarian member of the "Lucy" spy ring (Soviet) operating in Switzerland, to send detailed information to the Soviets. The information was from disguised Ultra intercepts. "Lucy" had informed Stalin on June 14, 1942, that the attack would come on June 22nd. All totaled, an estimated one hundred credible warnings, many with details of Operation Barbarossa, were sent to Stalin. He dismissed them concluding that they were propaganda, or disinformation, or some kind of trick. The goal of the trick in Stalin's mind was to spark a war between the Soviet Union and the Nazis. This would relieve the pressure on the British.

In addition the German ambassador to the Soviet Union, Count Friedrich von Schulenberg, was also providing information on Operation Barbarossa. Opposed to the war, he told his counterpart Soviet ambassador Vladimir Dekanozev that there was to be an invasion. Stalin dismissed the intelligence as disinformation.

In contrast to the intelligence that Stalin ignored was the intelligence that Hitler never obtained. He had very little direct intelligence on the Soviet Union. The German military seemed to be uninterested in intelligence work as a tool for planning military operations. And they also suffered from too many easy victories.

See also: GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs); Red Orchestra; Ultra

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Andrew J. Waskey

BARBIE, KLAUS
(OCTOBER 25, 1913–SEPTEMBER 25, 1991)

Klaus Barbie, nicknamed the "Butcher of Lyon," was a Nazi war criminal, intelligence officer, and drug trafficker. He was born in Bad Goedsberg, Germany, on October 25, 1913, and received his degree from the Friedrich-Wilhelm Institute. While at school, he had become an active member of the Hitler's youth brigade. He signed up for the SS in 1934 and was welcomed as a member of the Nazi Party in 1937.

Barbie received his first major posting in 1941 when he was sent to work with the Bureau of Jewish Affairs in The Hague and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Soon after, he was sent to Lyon, France, in May 1942, where he was charged with leading the Fourth Section of the Gestapo.

There, he became known as the "Butcher of Lyon" for his ruthless deportation of Jews, particularly the capture and transfer of 44 Jewish children hiding in the village of Izieu, France, to Auschwitz, Poland. He also presided over the torture and murder of Jean Moulin, one of the major leaders of the French Resistance. For his work, Hitler awarded Barbie one of the Third Reich's highest honors, "First Class Iron Cross with Swords." It was later estimated that Barbie's orders were responsible for roughly 7,500 deportations, 4,300 murders, and the torture of over 14,000 resistance fights.

At the end of the war, Barbie was protected by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British (Secret Intelligence Service) MI-6 in exchange for information about leftist movements throughout Western Europe and resulting counter-insurgency activities. Despite tremendous diplomatic pressure, particularly from the French government, Barbie remained under protection from arrest.

About a decade after the conclusion of the war, Barbie's intelligence skills were no longer needed by either the CIA or by MI-6. Consequently, he realized that it was in his best interest to flee from Europe. Barbie and his family settled in La Paz, Bolivia, in 1955 with U.S. assistance.

Taking the alias Klaus Altmann, Barbie worked as a translator and interrogator for the dictatorial governments in Bolivia and Peru. Meanwhile, he became a powerful drug lord, acquiring significant wealth. Nazi trackers Beate and Serge Klarsfeld had rediscovered Barbie in Bolivia as early as 1971, but were not able to successfully lobby for his extradition as a result of his connections within the Bolivian government.

When leftist Hernan Siles Suazo won the Bolivian presidential election in June 29, 1980, Barbie collaborated with Italian terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie in support of Luis Garcia Meza Tejada's "Cocaine Coup," overthrowing the democratically elected government and establishing a military regime on July 17, 1980. When a more moderate government finally retook power soon after, Barbie's extradition was arranged and he was deported to France on January 18, 1983.

His trial began at last on May 11, 1987, at the Rhone Court of Assizes in Lyon, France. He was sentenced to life in prison for crimes against humanity on July 4, 1983. Suffering from cancer, Barbie died in prison on September 25, 1991.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service)

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Arthur Holst

BARNETT, DAVID
(1940–1978)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official David Henry Barnett was indicted in 1980 for selling the details of an important CIA undercover operation, code-named Habrink, to the Soviet Union. Barnett's case was the first public case of a CIA official selling secrets to the Soviet's Committee for State Security (KGB).

A 1955 graduate of the University of Michigan, Barnett joined the CIA in 1958. He served as an analyst with U.S. Army intelligence units in South Korea and Washington, DC. From 1965 to 1967, Barnett worked at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, as a staff officer in the Directorate of Operations, the department that ran the agency's global covert activities. In 1967, Barnett was assigned to a diplomatic post in Indonesia where he recruited local Soviet officials to spy for the United States.

Barnett resigned his position in 1970 to open an antiques-exporting firm in Indonesia, but continued to do occasional contract work for the CIA. In late 1976, Barnett had debts over $100,000 and his business was on the verge of bankruptcy, at which point he offered to sell classified information to the KGB. Barnett handed over complete details of Habrink to the KGB, including CIA information on the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile and the Whiskey class diesel-powered submarine. In addition, he revealed the names of over 30 CIA intelligence officers as well as the identities of informants recruited by the CIA. The KGB paid Barnett $92,000 for his information and in 1977 persuaded him to apply for staff positions on the Senate and House Intelligence Oversight Board. Barnett was never hired to work on either board, but in January 1979 he was rehired by the CIA as a contract agent. He abruptly resigned 13 months later.

In April 1980, U.S. agents spotted Barnett meeting with KGB agents in Vienna, Austria. Upon his reentry into the United States, he was questioned by the FBI, at which time he cooperated by answering questions about other questionable agents and entered a guilty plea. Barnett received an 18-year sentence, but was paroled in 1990.

See also: Army Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Charlene T. Overturf

BARRON, JOHN
(JANUARY 26, 1930–FEBRUARY 24, 2005)

An American journalist who worked with *Reader's Digest*, John Barron wrote extensively on Communism, intelligence matters, and was an expert witness at a number of prominent trials.

John Daniel Barron was born on January 26, 1930, in Wichita, Texas, the son of a Methodist minister, and graduated from the University of Missouri in 1952, learning Russian in the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He then worked with U.S. Navy Intelligence from 1953 until 1957, initially in West Berlin. Moving to journalism, he joined the *Washington Star* in 1957. In 1965 he moved to *Reader's Digest* and wrote anti-Communist articles, many on intelligence matters. His first major book was

KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents (1974), which was followed by *Murder of a Gentle Land* (1977), co-written with Anthony Paul. The latter was the first work to cover the brutality of the rule of the Khmer Rouge, and was heavily attacked for exaggerating the nature of life there by left-wing academics, some of whom later retracted their criticisms.

In 1980 his account of the 1969 Chappaquiddick car accident helped end the presidential bid of Edward Kennedy. His other books included *MiG Pilot: The Final Escape of Lt. Belenko* (1980), *K.G.B. Today: The Hidden Hand* (1983), *Breaking the Ring: The Bizarre Case of the Walker Family Spy Ring* (1987), and *Operation Solo: The FBI's Man in the Kremlin* (1996). Some people turned up at Barron's office with stories, and KGB defectors even stayed at Barron's house. With the arrest of FBI agent Richard Miller in 1983, John Barron was an expert witness at the trial of Miller, the first FBI member to be indicted for espionage. He was also a witness at the trial of Jerry Whitworth. John Barron died on February 24, 2005.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Walker Spy Ring

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Justin Corfield

BATES, ANN
(1748–1801)

Ann Bates was a loyalist American schoolteacher from Philadelphia who acted as an agent for British forces during the American Revolutionary War. Ann Bates and her husband, a field artillery repairman for the British army, accompanied the British when it departed Philadelphia for New York City in 1778. In New York, she was asked by Major John André to spy on American forces in New York and report her findings to General Henry Clinton.

Bates, who was identified by the pseudonym "Mrs. Barnes," traveled a number of times disguised as a peddler into the American camp at White Plains, New York. Soldiers at the encampment allowed her to move about freely to sell her wares, as most military camps were populated by female peddlers. Because of her husband's artillery repair background, Bates readily identified the types of guns, cannons, ammunitions, and soldiers, and accurately relayed this information to General Clinton. On one occasion, Bates infiltrated General George Washington's headquarters, and overheard military intelligence discussions concerning troop movements and future maneuvers.

Bates typically would spend a week in the military camps, gathering any information she could. Then, traveling by way of a series of Loyalist safe houses, Bates made her way back to New York to report to General Clinton. These cunning expeditions into

the American camps ultimately led Britain to send reinforcements to Rhode Island, forcing the Americans from Newport and allowing Britain to maintain control of the coastal state.

In 1780, Bates journeyed with her husband and British troops to Charleston, South Carolina. Her missions ended here. The Bates secured permission to travel to England in March 1781. Later, abandoned by her husband, Bates appealed to the government and received a pension for her successful espionage work in the United States.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; André, Major John

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Gregory Kellerman

BAY OF PIGS

The Bay of Pigs invasion was an unsuccessful 1961 invasion of Cuba led by Cuban exiles, covertly supported by the U.S. government. Trained since May 1960 in Guatemala by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the approval of President Dwight Eisenhower with arms by the U.S. government, the rebels of Brigade 2506, as they were called, intended to foment an insurrection in Cuba and overthrow the Communist regime of Fidel Castro, who had deposed the U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959. Planning for the ill-fated operation began during the last days of the Eisenhower administration in 1960. President Eisenhower had soured on Castro after the latter nationalized a number of Cuban companies and began leaning toward the Soviet orbit of influence. There were also rumors of Cuban involvement in attempts to invade Panama, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. In 1960, the United States turned down Castro's request for economic aid and broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. After the American rejection, Castro met with Soviet Foreign Minister Anastas Mikoyan to secure a $100 million loan from the Soviet Union. U.S. policy makers thus decided that Castro was becoming too close to the Soviets and should be overthrown.

In the spring of 1960, President Eisenhower approved a covert operation to send small groups of American-trained Cuban exiles to work in the Cuban underground as insurgents to overthrow Castro. By the fall, the plan, now called Operation Pluto, had evolved into a full-fledged invasion by exiled Cubans and included U.S. air support. The invasion forces deployed to Guatemala to train for the operation.

When President John F. Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, he could have called off the invasion but chose not to do so. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy had criticized Eisenhower's handling of the Cuban situation and so did not find it politically expedient to back down from the invasion. Kennedy was also anxious to prove his hawkish stance toward the Soviets during a period of heightened cold war tensions. But the new president was not well served by the CIA or its director, Allen

Dulles, whom he inherited from the Eisenhower administration. Despite evidence that Kennedy was leery about the Bay of Pigs operation, the CIA built a convincing case in support of it that was later determined to be highly suspect. The agency grossly underestimated the effectiveness of Castro's forces and overplayed the extent to which Cubans would rally behind the invasion force.

On April 17, 1961, an armed force of approximately 1,500 Cuban exiles landed in the Bahia de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on the southern coast of Cuba, although the invasion had technically commenced two days earlier when American B-26 medium bombers with Cuban markings bombed four Cuban airfields. On April 17, the assault began at 2 A.M. when a team of frogmen went ashore with orders to set up landing lights to guide the main landing force. Between 2:30 and 3:00 A.M., two battalions of exiles armed with American weapons came ashore at Playa Giron while another battalion landed at Playa Largas. They hoped to find support from the local population, intending to cross the island to attack Havana. Cuban forces reacted quickly, and Castro ordered his air force to halt the invaders. Cuban aircraft promptly sank the invading force command-and-control ship and another supply vessel carrying an additional battalion. Two other ships loaded with supplies, weapons, and heavy equipment foundered just offshore. In the air, Cuban T-33 jets shot down 10 of the 12 slow-moving B-26 bombers that were supporting the invaders. President Kennedy, on the recommendation of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other advisors, decided against providing the faltering invasion with official U.S. air support.

Lacking supplies or effective air cover, the invaders were hammered by Cuban artillery. Within 72 hours, the invading force had been pushed back to its landing area at Playa Giron, where the troops were soon surrounded by Castro's forces. A total of 114 exiles were killed, while the remainder of the invasion force either escaped into the countryside or was taken captive. In all, 1,189 captured exiles were tried in televised trials and sentenced to prison.

Cuban exile leader José Miro Cardona, president of the U.S.-backed National Revolutionary Council, blamed the failure on the CIA and Kennedy's refusal to authorize air support for the invasion. In December 1962, Castro released 1,113 captured rebels in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine raised by private donations in the United States.

The Bay of Pigs invasion provoked anti-American demonstrations throughout Latin America and Europe and further embittered U.S.-Cuban relations. The poorly planned and executed invasion greatly embarrassed President Kennedy and subjected him to heavy criticism at home. More important, it led directly to increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the invasion, Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev exchanged messages regarding the events in Cuba. Khrushchev accused the United States of being complicit in the invasion and warned Kennedy that the Soviets would help defend Cuba if necessary. Kennedy replied with an equally strong warning against any Soviet involvement in Cuba. Although the crisis quickly passed, it set the stage for increased Soviet military aid to Cuba, which led ultimately to the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

The failure of the invasion led to the resignation of Dulles and opened the way for closer scrutiny of U.S. intelligence gathering. Some historians have speculated that the aborted operation made the White House highly suspicious of the intelligence

community and therefore more willing to question the experts, contributing to Kennedy's successful handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis that followed.

See also: Bissell, Richard Melvin, Jr.; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; JMWAVE; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; Shackley, Theodore G., Jr.

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James H. Willbanks

BEAUREGARD, GENERAL PIERRE GUSTAV TOUTANAT (1818–1893)

Pierre G. T. Beauregard was a general in both the U.S. and Confederate armies. After joining the Confederate army, Beauregard was immediately commissioned a general and placed in command of the forces in Charleston, South Carolina, where he ordered the attack on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. In June 1861, Beauregard organized and led forces to victory against Union General Irvin McDowell at the First Battle of Bull Run (Manassas). The success of the Confederate army was attributed to information Beauregard received from Confederate spy Rose Greenhow. Greenhow passed information to Beauregard regarding McDowell's campaign, including a map used by the Senate Military Affairs Committee showing how the Union army would reach Manassas. On July 16, 1861, Greenhow sent a message to Beauregard that McDowell had begun his march toward Manassas.

After Bull Run, Beauregard served at Shiloh, commanded the coastal defenses of Georgia and the Carolinas, and the defense of Petersburg.

Beauregard was born in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, on May 5, 1818. He graduated second in his class at West Point and served under Winfield Scott during the Mexican War. After the Civil War, he served as a railroad president and supervisor of the Louisiana lottery. He declined offers to command the armies of Egypt and Romania. Beauregard died on February 20, 1893, in New Orleans.

See also: Civil War, Intelligence

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Steve Roane

BECKWITH, MAJOR GEORGE
(1753–MARCH 20, 1823)

A British army officer and colonial governor, George Beckwith was the son of Major General John Beckwith and elder brother of Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Sydney Beckwith. In the War of American Independence, he distinguished himself as a soldier and in 1780 took charge of British military intelligence services in New York. A year later, while assisting Oliver DeLancey in reorganizing this service, he came to the attention of General Sir Guy Carleton. In 1786 Beckwith joined the staff of now-Governor Carleton (Lord Dorchester) in Canada. Twice, in 1787 and 1788, he was dispatched to the United States to discover American intentions regarding British posts in the Northwest Territories. A confidant of secretary of the treasury Alexander Hamilton, he was well suited to this task.

In 1790 Beckwith was again sent southward, under orders to encourage a policy of mediation with Britain. He learned from Hamilton, who did not want war, that many Americans favored conciliation. Thus, Beckwith reported to Dorchester that Britain should maintain a firm line in negotiating the Jay Treaty of 1794. Many believe that Hamilton's dealings in this affair were dishonorable.

Beckwith was appointed governor of Bermuda in 1797, St. Vincent in 1804, and Barbados in 1808. He was knighted in 1809 and promoted general in 1814. He commanded in Ireland from 1816 until 1820, and died in London on March 20, 1823.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Paul David Nelson

BELL, WILLIAM HOLDEN
(1951–)

William Holden Bell was a civilian employee of Hughes Aircraft who was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in July 1981 for passing classified documents to an agent of the Polish intelligence service. When confronted, Bell confessed and agreed to help entrap his handler, Marian Zarcharski. Bell admitted receiving $110,000 for the information he passed to Zarcharski. It included information on a U.S. "quiet radar" system, the Phoenix air-to-air missile for the F-14, a ship surveillance radar, an all-weather radar system for tanks, the Patriot air defense missile system, and new air-to-air missile. Bell was sentenced to eight years in prison and fined $10,000.

Bell knew Zarcharski socially. They were neighbors in an apartment complex in Los Angeles where Zarcharski worked under the cover of being the vice president of the Polish American Machinery Corporation (Polamco). With the apartment complex

about to be turned into condominiums, Zarcharski offered to provide Bell with the funds to purchase his unit. Without these funds Bell would have to move. In return Bell agreed to provide Zarcharski with information from a list of desired documents.

Zarcharski was sentenced to life in prison and later exchanged as part of a prison swap for 25 people being held in East Germany and Poland.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BENTLEY, ELIZABETH TERRILL (JANUARY 1, 1908–DECEMBER 3, 1963)

Elizabeth Terrill Bentley was an American who engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union from 1938 until 1945 when she defected back to the United States. Her testimony helped spark the infamous 1950s Communist hunt in U.S. public services known as McCarthyism.

Bentley was born in New Milford, Connecticut, on January 1, 1908. In 1933 she traveled to Italy as a graduate student and joined a Fascist organization. She soon became disillusioned with Fascism and upon returning to the United States from Italy in 1934, Bentley joined the American League against War and Fascism and the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). After receiving employment at the Italian Library of Information in New York in 1938—Mussolini's propaganda tool in the United States—Bentley voluntarily started reporting on Fascist activities to the American Communist Party (CPUSA). In 1940 her role deepened as she became a courier for Soviet intelligence. Her lover at the time, Jacob Galos, had been identified by U.S. authorities as an agent for the Soviet Union and could no longer serve in this capacity. Bentley also assumed the position of vice president of the U.S. Service and Shipping Corporation, a cover for Soviet espionage operation, passing on information from various spy networks.

To Bentley's dislike, Moscow took more direct control over activities from late 1943, leaving her in obscurity. In addition to falling out with her masters, who initially dubbed her "umnitza" (the clever girl), she experienced severe personal problems. In 1944 Bentley left the CPUSA and turned herself in to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the following year. The FBI investigation of 80 individuals named by Bentley did not produce enough evidence to make any arrests. The Soviets, tipped off by their double agent in the British MI-6, Kim Philby, had managed to close down her networks in time. Testimony given before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1948, however, led to the arrest and conviction of Harry Gold, David Greenglass, Ethel Rosenberg, and Julius Rosenberg. Among the persons named by Bentley were several government employees, which helped inspire the witch hunt for Communists in federal offices associated with Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy in the early 1950s.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Greenglass, David; McCarthy, Joseph; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel

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Frode Lindgjerdet

BERG, MORRIS (MOE)
(MARCH 2, 1902–MAY 29, 1972)

Moe Berg was a World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operative and major league baseball player. Born in Manhattan on March 2, 1902, Moe Berg is best remembered as an overly intelligent second-string catcher with several major league baseball teams. During World War II, Berg served with the OSS. Much of his espionage work remains clouded in legend and rumor, and thus unsubstantiated.

Berg graduated magna cum laude in foreign languages from Princeton in 1923. He was fluent in at least seven different languages. Berg later earned a law degree from Columbia, and studied at the Sorbonne. Berg traveled twice to Japan with major league baseball and learned Japanese. On his second trip, in 1934, Berg secretly took motion pictures of the Tokyo skyline. Rumor has it this film was used by the military to plan the April 1942 Jimmy Doolittle Raid.

After Berg's baseball career ended, he joined the Office of Inter-American Affairs in 1942, and traveled extensively in Latin America. In August of 1943, Berg moved to the Office of Strategic Services Balkans desk, evaluating Yugoslavia resistance groups. Berg's rumored OSS exploits include a parachute drop into Yugoslavia. In late 1944, Berg joined Project AZUSA, a part of the Alsos Mission, created to gather information on the Nazi atomic program. Berg evaluated the knowledge of Italian physicists, hoping to identify the progress of the Nazi project. He traveled to Zurich, Switzerland, in December 1944 to hear a lecture from Dr. Werner Heisenberg, head of the Nazi atomic bomb program. Legend has it Berg prepared to assassinate Heisenberg if necessary. No attempt was made when Berg determined that the Nazis were nowhere close to success. Berg actions with the OSS earned him the Medal of Freedom, an award he refused to accept.

For a short period after the war, Berg traveled under Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contract through Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe. Unemployed over the last 20 years of his life, Berg lived off the graces of his brother and sister. Berg died in Belleville, New Jersey, on May 29, 1972.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Central Intelligence Agency; Office of Strategic Services

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Thomas D. Veve

BERGERSEN, GREGG
(1956/1957–)

On March 31, 2008, former Defense Department official with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Gregg Bergersen plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage when he provided information on a planned U.S. military arms sale to Taiwan for the next five years along with information on Po Sheng, a Taiwanese armed forces communications system, to Tai Shen Kuo, a businessman of Taiwanese descent. Kuo, in turn, passed the information on to the Chinese government via an e-mail to his handlers in Beijing. Bergersen was said to have engaged in espionage from January 2006 to February 2008 when he and Kuo were arrested. Bergersen claimed that he did not know that information he provided Kuo with would be given to China.

Bergersen received money and gifts from Kuo including $3,000 in cash in an exchange that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents videotaped. A possible motive for Bergersen's actions was his reported desire to leave the Defense Department and start a private defense contracting business in which Kuo would be a partner.

Bergersen was sentenced to 57 months in prison plus three years of supervised release in July 2008. Kuo plead guilty to charges of espionage on May 13, 2008, and faced a life sentence. In August 2008 he was sentenced to 188 months in prison. Later in May, Yu Xin Kang, a citizen of the People's Republic of China and an lawful permanent resident alien in the United States, plead guilty to one count of aiding and abetting an unregistered foreign agent (Kuo). She was sentenced to 18 months in jail.

See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BERIA, LAVRENTRY PAVLOVICH
(MARCH 29, 1899–JUNE 26, 1953 OR DECEMBER 23, 1953)

Soviet politician and secret police chief, Lavrentry Beria was born into a peasant family in Merkheuli, Georgia, Russia, on March 29, 1899. While studying engineering in Baku, he joined the Bolshevik party around 1917, active in Georgia and Azerbaijan.

About 1921, he entered the ranks of the secret police (Cheka) in Georgia, working with intelligence. He quickly rose through the ranks, becoming the head of the OGPU (Georgian State Political Directorate), the successor to the Cheka in 1926, Georgian party boss in 1931, party secretary for the Transcaucasian region in 1932, and a member of the Communist Party Central Committee in 1934.

Beria supported fellow Georgian Joseph Stalin's rise to power in the late 1920s, and supervised the Great Purges in his region during the 1930s. Stalin appointed Beria as deputy head of the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) in 1938; he became its head later the same year. As NKVD chairman, Beria's responsibilities included general police work, security for officials, special forces, administering labor camps or gulags, and intelligence and counterintelligence of the Soviet Union. He purged the NKVD, putting many of his followers in the vacancies. After the Soviet Union occupied eastern Poland in 1939 and the Baltic States in 1940, he organized the deportations and executions of many "undesirables."

When the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Beria held the positions of Commissar of State Security, served on the Council of People's Commissars, and the State Defense Committee. During World War II, Beria organized war production using much slave labor, supervised the deportation of Soviet minorities accused of collaboration with the Germans, and received the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union. Stalin also appointed him head of the Soviet atomic bomb program, where he supervised its spy network in the United States which helped the Soviets develop their own bomb in 1949.

After the war, Beria resigned from the NKVD, but remained in charge of national security as a deputy prime minister. After Stalin died in March 1953 and a power struggle broke out in which Beria sided with the new Soviet leader Georgy Malenkov. He retained his post as deputy prime minister, and was reappointed the head to the successor of the NKVD. Beria promptly ended Stalin's latest purges of the Doctor's Plot and ordered many gulag prisoners released.

On June 26, 1953, Soviet leaders accused Beria of being a British secret agent and immediately arrested him and stripped him of all his posts. Some Soviet leaders also alleged that Beria had poisoned Stalin and did not allow medical treatment to reach the Soviet dictator for some time after his stroke. Tried and found guilty of working with foreign intelligence agencies and attempting to restore capitalism in a secret trial, Beria was summarily executed on December 23, 1953, in Moscow. Other accounts claim that he died in a gun battle at his home or was summarily executed on June 26, 1953.

See also: KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs)

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Gregory C. Ference

BERLIN TUNNEL

The Berlin Tunnel was a joint intelligence-gathering operation between the United States, where it was known as Operation Gold, and Great Britain, where it was known as Operation Stopwatch. The project involved digging a tunnel beneath Berlin so that underground cables carrying Soviet communications could be tapped. Berlin was an attractive location not only because of Soviet control over East Berlin but because prior to the war as the capital of Germany it was a hub point for communications from such Eastern European capitals as Warsaw, Poland, and Bucharest, Romania.

Intelligence collectors began to focus on patching into these cables in 1952 as this form of communication increasingly was replacing wireless communication as the delivery system of choice. Such a program was already in place in Vienna but Berlin's topography made the project far more difficult. The estimated cost was over $6.5 million. The project was approved by Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles on January 20, 1954, construction began the following month, and was complete in late February 1955. The volume of information intercepted was significant. Some 40,000 hours of telephone conversations were recorded, along with 6 million hours of teletype traffic. The existence of the tunnel was revealed on April 21, 1956.

As an intelligence operation, two aspects of the Berlin Tunnel project have long been controversial. The first deals with the origins of the plan. Some accounts credit Reinhard Gehlen, who was a key figure in Nazi Germany's intelligence system and was helping the United States establish a West German intelligence organization with the idea. Others reject this view, noting that Great Britain had begun tapping cables in Vienna in 1948 and the Russians had a tap in place on a cable in Potsdam that was used by the U.S. military, so it was not an entirely new idea.

The second debate is over the value of the intelligence obtained. The plan itself is known to have been compromised from the start as a U.S. briefing to British intelligence included George Blake who was found in 1961 to have been a Soviet spy and that Blake relayed this information to his superiors. One line of reasoning argues that because of this all of the information intercepted has to be suspect. It must be treated either as insignificant or disinformation. A second line of reasoning argues that Blake was such a valuable agent that the Russians were not willing to jeopardize revealing his identity by doing anything to draw attention to the fact that the tunnel was known to them. Therefore, the information obtained was probably legitimate. This line of reasoning also continues that the public revelation that the tunnel existed was an accident and not intended by the Soviet Union.

See also: Blake, George; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Gehlen, Major General Reinhard

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BIN LADEN, OSAMA
(MARCH 10, 1957–)

Osama bin Laden is recognized as the founder of al-Qaeda and held to be responsible for organizing the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Bin Laden is also linked to an earlier series of deadly bombings against American targets outside of the United States. He became the symbol of the George W. Bush administration's global war on terrorism. The State Department offered a $25 million reward for information leading to his capture or conviction. The Federal Bureau of Investigation ranked him first among 22 terrorists in its initial list of Most Wanted Terrorists in October 2001. President George W. Bush publicly called for his capture "dead or alive."

Osama bin Laden gives his birth date as March 10, 1957. He was born into a wealthy Saudi family with close ties to the royal family. His father, Muhammed Awad bin Laden, immigrated to Saudi Arabia and made his fortune in the construction industry. Conventional accounts identify Osama bin Laden as his 17th son with estimates of his total number of children reaching 54. As a child bin Laden lived with his mother and stepfather. He attended an elite high school in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where it is believed he first came into contact with members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic movement founded in Egypt in 1928 that promotes the establishment of Islamic governments, holds generally conservative views on social issues, and is hostile to vestiges of Western colonialism in the Islamic world. Bin Laden was further exposed to the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood when he went on to study engineering, business administration, economics, and public administration at the King Abdul-Aziz University, earning degrees in 1979 and 1981.

One of those that bin Laden came into contact with at King Abdul-Aziz University was Dr. Abudallah Yusuf Azzam, who went on to help organize anti-Soviet resistance to the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from a base in Peshawar, Pakistan. Bin Laden would join him there and together they would form Maktab al-Khadamat in 1984. It was an organization that provided money, arms, and personnel to the Afghan resistance. Many accounts state that in addition to bin Laden's personal wealth the anti-Soviet operations of al-Khadamat were also underwritten by American, Saudi, and Pakistani funds. Four years later bin Laden split from Azzam and created al-Qaeda. One of the main issues separating the two reportedly was bin Laden's desire to involve Arab fighters more directly in the fighting.

By all accounts the Persian Gulf War marked a pivotal turning point in bin Laden's outlook on world politics. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait he offered to help defend Saudi Arabia from attack but was turned down by the Saudi government. When it then permitted U.S. forces to be stationed there bin Laden accused it of having forfeited its right to rule and role as defender of the sacred Muslim cites of Mecca and Medina. His continued attacks on the Saudi government led them to expel bin Laden in 1991. He took up residence in the Sudan then ruled by the National Islamic Front. Bin Laden remained there until 1997 when he moved to Kandahar, a Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan. While it profited from bin Laden's presence because of his wealth and business interests, Sudan had also come under pressure from the United States and others to expel him. Sudan first offered to send him back to Saudi Arabia, but,

Osama bin Laden is seen at an undisclosed location in this television image broadcast Sunday, October 7, 2001. Bin Laden praised God for the September 11th terrorist attacks and swore America "will never dream of security" until "the infidel's armies leave the land of Muhammad," in a videotaped statement aired after the strike launched that Sunday by the United States and Britain in Afghanistan. Graphic at top right reads "Exclusive to Al-Jazeera." At bottom right is the station's logo, which reads "Al-Jazeera." At top left is "Recorded." At bottom left is "Urgent news." At bottom center is "Osama bin Laden, Leader of the al-Qaida." (AP/Wide World Photos)

fearing the domestic turmoil it might produce, the Saudis declined the offer. It then expelled him to Afghanistan in May 1996.

Bin Laden's presence had brought international pressure on Sudan because while there he helped organize a series of attacks on Americans in the Persian Gulf. A first attempt misfired in the sense that no Americans were killed. On December 29, 1992, the Gold Mihor Hotel in Aden, Yemen, was bombed. Some 100 American soldiers, part of Operation Restore Hope, had been staying at the hotel but left before the attack. He is also linked to the 1993 incident at Mogadishu, Somalia, that left 18 U.S. troops dead and the 1996 bombings of the Khobar military complex in Saudi Arabia that killed 21 American soldiers. Al-Qaeda has also been linked to the February 26, 1993, bombing of the World Trade Center that killed six and injured over 1,000 people.

Bin Laden continued his attacks on American targets from Afghanistan. On August 7, 1998, simultaneous explosions ripped through the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people including 12 Americans and injuring over 4,500. On October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda suicide attackers

struck the USS *Cole* while it sat in Aden harbor. Seventeen sailors were killed and 39 injured as a result of the assault.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did know of bin Laden's involvement with Afghan rebels in Pakistan but did not have any direct contact with him. In the division of labor between intelligence organizations, bin Laden's activities fell within the jurisdiction of Saudi intelligence. He slowly began to emerge as an American intelligence target in the early 1990s. Evidence gathered by the CIA station in Khartoum, Sudan, under the direction of Cofer Black identified him as an emerging leader but the CIA had no direct evidence linking him to terrorist attacks. He was one of some half dozen intelligence targets they observed. What particularly attracted attention was his role as a financier for Islamist and terrorist groups and his links with Sudanese intelligence, which was known to have contacts with paramilitary and terrorist operations in Egypt and in other places. In 1994 intelligence gathered in cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies in North Africa linked bin Laden to a series of terrorist training camps in Sudan. Still, bin Laden was not a primary focal point of concern in Washington. On January 23, 1995, when President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12947 imposing sanctions on terrorist groups, neither bin Laden nor al-Qaeda were on the list of 12 groups targeted.

That began to change somewhat in January 1996 when the CIA's Counterterrorist Center dedicated a special unit for bin Laden. This was the first time such a unit had been created for a single individual. The bin Laden Issue Station was seen as necessary because for some bin Laden was symbolic of a new generation of terrorists that operated internationally and thus creating problems for the CIA's country-based intelligence collection efforts. The bin Laden Issue Station's first challenge was to put together a strategic profile of bin Laden as his financial support for terrorist groups had not elevated him to the status of a major force. They had at their disposal both human intelligence reports and National Security Agency intercepts of his satellite telephone. Tentative discussions also began to take place about intelligence operations against bin Laden but he fled to Afghanistan before any plans were developed. But in the end, many at the CIA, including Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, did not consider bin Laden to be a high-priority target at the end of 1997. He was for many still only a dangerous criminal.

In 1997 the CIA dedicated a group of Afghan tribal fighters to track bin Laden and capture him. They were supported by American satellite technology to map the area around Kandahar where bin Laden was believed to be hiding. Known as TRODPINT, this approach had been used with success earlier in the capture of Mir Amal Kasi, who had fled to the Afghan-Pakistani-Iran border region after his attack on the CIA's headquarters in 1993. In the months that followed, a complex political debate developed in Washington over how good the intelligence needed to be in order to authorize a ground or air strike on a suspected bin Laden hideout; whether bin Laden could be killed or had to be captured; and the extent to which allied intelligence agencies, especially those of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, had been penetrated by supporters of bin Laden and could be relied upon.

By 1999 Tenet had now come to identify bin Laden as the second-greatest threat facing the United States after weapons of mass destruction. For Tenet the solution to the bin Laden problem lay in some form of covert paramilitary action that would result in

his capture or death. To this end he reorganized the Counterterrorist Center. His goal was to have an increased emphasis placed on human intelligence sources, especially closer working relationships with regional intelligence organizations and better contacts on the ground in Afghanistan. Plans developed included funding and training an Uzbek counterterrorism strike force that might capture bin Laden. Contacts were also made with Ahmed Shah Massoud, a northern regional military commander who had been defeated by the Taliban but continued to offer resistance and came to be seen by some in Washington as the last best hope for an ally on the ground in Afghanistan. Finally, large numbers of newly recruited agents were sent into Afghanistan. Bin Laden's security measures guaranteed that these new agents would not be able to penetrate into his inner circle and would be of limited effectiveness. Standard practice called for matching their reports and photographs with satellite images to construct a clear picture of his camps and operating areas.

By early 2000 counterterrorism experts in Washington began looking for new or alternative sources of information to find bin Laden. The answer seized upon was sending Predator drone reconnaissance aircraft into Afghanistan. Unlike satellites and U-2 aircraft, the Predator could provide images of mobile targets and individual faces. Mechanical difficulties, weather problems, and bureaucratic and legal conflicts in Washington accompanied this intelligence-gathering program, much as they had the earlier human intelligence collection efforts in Afghanistan.

After the 9/11 attacks, the United States sent military forces into Afghanistan in order to bring down the Taliban government that had provided support and protection for bin Laden and to capture or kill him. Although the first objective was realized, the second was not and bin Laden continued to elude American efforts to find him. He is believed to still be operating in the mountainous and politically volatile region along the Afghan-Pakistani border.

In July 2006 the CIA announced it was closing the bin Laden unit. CIA spokespeople indicated that bin Laden remained a high-priority target but that a change in focus was necessary to one that emphasized regional trends rather than specific individuals or terrorist groups. Other commentators noted that this change also reflects the belief that al-Qaeda no longer functions as a hierarchical organization with bin Laden as its center and that attacks are now carried out by more autonomously operating terrorist groups that are only loosely affiliated with it.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BIRCH, JOHN
(MAY 8, 1918–AUGUST 25, 1945)

John Birch, for whom the John Birch Society is named, served as a military intelligence officer and Baptist missionary in China during World War II. Birch was born on May 8, 1918, in India where his parents were on a missionary assignment. He would follow their career path by enrolling in the Bible Baptist Seminary. Following graduation he was assigned to China. After World War II broke out he evaded capture by Japanese forces by fleeing inland. There Birch was instrumental in rescuing Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle following his crash landing in China on the conclusion of his raid on Tokyo. Doolittle recommended Birch to Col. Claire Chennault, who was in charge of the Flying Tigers, who recruited him as an intelligence officer. Working in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Birch established an effective intelligence network in China that provided important information on Japanese troop movements.

Birch was killed in China on August 25, 1945, when troops he was leading on a mission to retrieve Allied soldiers in a Japanese prisoner of war camp encountered a contingent of Chinese Communist forces. Birch refused to surrender his gun as ordered and was shot and killed.

The John Birch Society was established in 1958. His name was chosen for the organization because its founding members considered Birch to be the first victim of the cold war.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Office of Strategic Services

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Richard M. "Rich" Edwards

BISSELL, RICHARD MELVIN, JR.
(SEPTEMBER 18, 1909–FEBRUARY 7, 1994)

Richard Bissell was a career intelligence officer in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Born in Hartford, Connecticut, on September 18, 1909, he obtained a PhD in economics from Yale University in 1932. Bissell first entered government service in 1941, working for the Commerce Department and later as an administrator in Germany for the Marshall Plan. Bissell joined the CIA in February 1954 as a special assistant for planning and coordination. President Dwight Eisenhower would soon approve a program to construct 20 yet-to-be-developed photographic reconnaissance aircraft. Bissell was placed in charge of bringing into existence what came to be known as the U-2 spy plane. Coming into existence only 17 months after the project was approved and $3 million under budget, it had a relatively short yet eventful existence. The U-2 provided American officials with key information on the Soviet Union on such matters as naval yards, missile test sites, weapons production facilities, and air fields. The U-2 also

was vulnerable to Soviet counteraction and in 1962 a U-2 piloted by Gary Francis Powers was shot down just prior to a summit conference between Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, causing the summit to be cancelled. Following his success with the U-2 program, Bissell was next put in charge of helping to bring online the CORONA reconnaissance satellite program.

In 1958 Bissell was promoted to Deputy deputy Director director of Plans plans, putting him in charge of clandestine operations. He was far less successful as an administrator in the area of covert operations than he was in clandestine collection. It was Bissell who organized the failed Bay of Pigs invasion that was intended to remove Fidel Castro from power. Eisenhower authorized Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles to organize the operation on March 17, 1960. The invasion's failure led President John Kennedy to request Bissell's resignation. Bissell also unsuccessfully organized assassination attempts on foreign leaders. Castro was his most conspicuous target but he also sought and failed to assassinate General Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and the Congo's Patrice Lumumba. In spite of these failures and the heavy professional price he paid for them, Bissell remained an advocate of covert action. In his memoirs published after his death he argued that it was vital that countries be able to engage in secret covert operations in order to protect their security and that authority for such operations should reside with the president and not Congress.

In resigning, Bissell turned down an offer from new DCI John McCone to head the newly created Directorate of Science and Technology. The decision was relatively easy in that Bissell was persona non grata in the eyes of the Kennedy administration and he opposed the very idea of a separate directorate dedicated to technological espionage on the grounds that all forms of espionage should remain united in one place. Bissell died on February 7, 1994.

See also: Bay of Pigs; Central Intelligence Agency; CORONA; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; McCone, John A.; Powers, Francis Gary

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BLACK CHAMBER

The American Black Chamber, also known as MI-8, which went by the cover name "The Code Compilation Company," and under the direction of a young cryptologist, Herbert O. Yardley, was based in New York City (52 Vanderbilt Avenue in Manhattan) and conducted its code-breaking intelligence operations from 1919 to 1929. The Black

Chamber was considered to be the forerunner of what is now known as the National Security Agency. During its existence, the Black Chamber was credited with having solved at least 45,000 telegrams that were coded, and involved the nations of the former Soviet Union, Spain, Mexico, and numerous countries in Europe and Central and South America.

The Black Chamber was set up in New York City in order to conceal its existence and because laws in the Washington, DC, area prevented a portion of the State Department budget from being spent for such activity in the capital. The Code Compilation Company was a commercial business, located in the bottom floor of a building where the Black Chamber had its offices. The Code Compilation Company was for all intents and purposes a cover business, and was actually a running business, producing limited income by providing cryptographic services to some business entities in the New York area.

One of the Black Chamber's greatest successes was the case of Lathar Witcke (also known as Pablo Waberski). He entered Nogales, Arizona, from Mexico in February 1918. Witcke had in his possession a note, which was sewn into his upper-left sleeve of his jacket, and which Witcke claimed he had no knowledge of. Witcke was sent to Fort Sam Houston and the note was turned over to one of Yardley's cryptanalysts. Amazingly the note was set aside for several months without it being read, even by Yardley. In April 1918, the note, which was a transposition cipher (a complex anagram), was deciphered. Addressed to Germany's ambassador in Mexico City, it identified Witcke as a German intelligence agent. In his book published years later, *The American Black Chamber*, Yardley shared the translated version of the note as follows: "To The Imperial Consular Authorities in the Republic of Mexico. Strictly Secret! The bearer of this is a subject of the Empire who travels as a Russian under the name of Pablo Waberski. He is a German secret agent. Please furnish him on request protection and assistance, and also advance him on demand up to one thousand pesos of Mexican gold and send his code telegrams to this embassy as official consular dispatches. Von Eckhardt." Von Eckhardt was the German foreign minister. Senior U.S. Army Intelligence Officer Colonel Ralph Van Deman said to Yardley, "If for no other reason, the deciphering of this document justifies your bureau."

After a trial by military court, Witcke was sentenced to death in the United States for his role in the sabotage and explosion of the Black Tom Munitions Depot in New York in 1916. Witcke was the only enemy agent during World War 1 to be sentenced to death (though his sentence was later commuted to life in prison).

Another major success came in 1921. The deciphering of numerous Japanese diplomatic messages by Yardley's staff revealed interest by Britain and Japan on a naval disarmament conference. At that time, Tokyo had been using what was referred to as an alphabet called "katakana," which consisted of roman letter equivalents and also 70 syllables. The contents of this message, between London and Tokyo, alone were considered to have a profound influence on the 1921 Washington Naval Conference's arms control treaty, which was opened by then-President Warren G. Harding. The intelligence generated prior to the conference from the Black Chamber, and provided to the State Department, allowed U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to insist that Japan accept a ship reduction ratio in the Pacific. Japan did accept the terms.

At least 70 percent funding of the Black Chamber operations came from the Department of State. This took a turn for the worse in 1929, when then-Secretary of State Henry Stimson, shocked to learn that the Black Chamber was involved in the deciphering of telegrams and encrypted correspondence of various nations, officially shut down the office. "Gentlemen do not read each others' mail" was the rationale Stimson used years later to explain his decision for shutting down the Black Chamber.

Yardley, unemployed after the closure of the Black Chamber, became disillusioned by this event, and authored *The American Black Chamber* in 1931. It was reported that Yardley's view was that since the United States shut down the Black Chamber, there was no reason to maintain further secrecy on the details of its once-secret operations. The publication became an immediate sensation and bestseller, with over 30,000 copies sold. It detailed the entire story of the Black Chamber to include the deciphering of Japanese codes, and was critical of the State Department's decision to close down the operation.

So significant was the publication of *The American Black Chamber* that the Japanese government procured many copies and ultimately changed all of their codes in government and trade. Other countries also followed a similar reaction. Interestingly, the wording in government espionage laws had a loophole that prevented Yardley from becoming prosecuted. The laws were eventually changed in 1933.

Lieutenant General (retired) William E. Odom, former director of the National Security Agency, suggested that had the Black Chamber been allowed to continue its operations into the 1940s, there would have been a high degree of probability that the War Department could have been provided with early warning of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; MI-8 (Cipher Bureau); National Security Agency; Odom, Lieutenant General William E.; Van Deman, Ralph H.; Yardley, Herbert

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David Jimenez

BLAIR, ADMIRAL DENNIS (FEBRUARY 4, 1947–)

Admiral Dennis C. Blair became the third director of National Intelligence (DNI) on January 29, 2009, at the start of the Barak Obama administration. A professional naval officer, Blair graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1968 and retired from

the navy in 2002. Earlier in his career he was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, director of the Joint Staff, and the first associate director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. Outside of government service Blair was president and chief executive office of the Institute for Defense Analysis, a private security studies center, and held the John M. Shalikashvili Chair in National Security Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research. He also participated as a deputy director in the project on National Security Reform.

At his confirmation hearings, Blair stated his opposition to a domestic intelligence agency separate from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He also promised to end harsh interrogation tactics. Blair was opposed by the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network over longstanding charges that he did not follow instructions from the Clinton administration to tell the head of the Indonesian military to shut down its pro-Indonesian militias operating in East Timor and went so far as to offer his personnel support to the official. Blair was also the subject of news accounts suggesting a conflict of interest on a defense weapons procurement decision. Blair has rejected both sets of allegations.

Blair resigned as DNI on May 28, 2010. President Barack Obama had asked for his resignation on May 10. Blair's resignation is traced to his strong support for a U.S.-French intelligence agreement which would have barred spying in each other's country that was opposed by Obama along with the occurrence of several high profile terrorist events in the U.S. during his term as DNI most notabley the Fort Hood shooting (November 5, 2009), the Times Square Car bombing plot (May 1, 2010), and the attempted Christmas Day bomb plot aboard an airliner on aroute from Amsterdam to Detroit (December 25, 2009).

See also: Director of National Intelligence; Intelligence Community; National Security Agency; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BLAKE, GEORGE
(NOVEMBER 11, 1922–)

George Blake (aka Alex de Vries, code name Diamond) was born on November 11, 1922, as Georg Behar in Rotterdam, Holland. In 1936 a cousin, Henri Curiel, convinced him to become a Communist. He joined the Dutch resistance after the Nazi invasion but soon fled to England. With special language skills he was recruited into the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and was assigned translation work at SHAEF headquarters.

After the war, Blake joined the Foreign Office. In 1950, Blake, already a secret Committee for State Security (KGB) agent, was in the employ of MI-6. With diplomatic status as a cover in Seoul, Korea, he was captured by the North Koreans. Repatriated,

he was sent to Germany where he identified over 40 Western agents to the KGB, with most of these agents soon being killed.

In 1955, the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) assigned him the mission of making the KGB believe he could be a double agent working for them. Instead, Blake successfully became a triple agent. He supplied the KGB with numerous Western secrets, including exposing the Berlin Tunnel ("Operation Gold") that was being used to tap into East German phone lines.

By 1959, Blake took a job with the Arabic Language School at Shemlan just outside of Beirut, Lebanon. However, he was identified as a KGB agent. Lured to London by a MI-6 ruse, he was arrested, tried in camera, convicted, and given a life sentence to be served at Wormwood Scrubs Prison. He escaped and was smuggled to Moscow by the KGB. Given a job with the KGB, he worked for Russian intelligence even in his retirement. He is the author of several books.

See also: Berlin Tunnel; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Special Operations Executive

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Andrew J. Waskey

BLETCHLEY PARK

In 1938 a British intelligence agency, the Code and Cipher School (GC&CS), purchased a Victorian Era mansion and estate from Sir Herbert Leon. Located about 50 miles north of London it was by the town of Bletchley in Buchinghamshire in an area that is now part of Milton Keynes.

Bletchley Park was given the code name of Station X or War Station or BP. It became the center of British code-breaking during World War II. The codes of the Axis powers were decrypted there with the most important one being the Nazi Enigma Code, which was produced by the Enigma machine. It was a typewriter device that sent an electronic signal from a typewriter key when struck to a set of rotors with the letters of the alphabet on them. The operator of the machine would first set the rotors into a position defined by a code-setting key. Then, as the message was typed, the machine would encode it. The receiver of the message would also have the code-setting key for the rotors on the receptor machine. When the encoded message was typed it was automatically decoded. The system was simple and very secure because the numbers of mathematical permutation of the letters made by the rotors were enormous.

The Nazis were unaware that the French and Poles had obtained Enigma machines. When the continent fell to the Nazis, they sent their machines and some code specialists to Britain.

In August of 1939 British code-breakers began arriving at Bletchley Park. The staff of 150 was headed by Alistair Dennison. By the end of 1942 there were 3,500 people working and by the beginning of 1945 there were 10,000. Working at Bletchley were military personnel from the British military services, civilians, and later members of the armed services of Allies—the French, Poles, Americans, and others.

A number of temporary wooden buildings were erected on the grounds of the estate. Called huts, they were assigned to work on different enemy codes. Those working in Hut 3 decrypted German army and air force codes; Hut 6 decoded German army and air force Enigma cryptanalysis. Hut 8 handled German navy Enigma cryptanalysis while Hut 4 undertook translating and processing German naval decrypted messages. Other huts worked on Italian and Japanese codes.

BP cryptanalysis built a machine they called "The Bomb." The brainchild of Alan Turing, it was fed Enigma code which was decoded. The decryptions were called Ultra to keep hidden from the Nazis that their code had been compromised. BP was able to provide the edge in the battle against the U-boats in the North Atlantic, the destruction of Italian shipping of supplies to the Afrika Corps, and to the invasions on the continent of Europe.

See also: MI-5 (The Security Service); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); MI-8 (British Radio Service); Ultra

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BLOCH, FELIX
(1935–)

Felix Bloch, a foreign service officer, was suspected of being a Soviet spy but was never formally charged with espionage. In February 1990 he was suspended without pay after the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provided the State Department with evidence that Bloch had transferred national security information to an unauthorized individual overseas, that he took countersurveillance steps in meeting with this individual, and had lied to the FBI. Federal statues allow the secretary of state to suspend an employee without pay in the interests of national security and subsequently remove that employee. Bloch initially sought a hearing on the charges but then submitted an application for voluntary retirement. On November 5 the secretary of state informed Bloch that he would be removed from the State Department, effective that day.

Bloch was born in 1935 in Vienna. He escaped Nazi-occupied Austria in 1939 and fled with his family to New York. Bloch graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1957 and subsequently joined the State Department as an intelligence research specialist. His area of expertise was international economics and trade policy. In 1980 Bloch became an economic officer in the embassy in Vienna, Austria. From 1983 to June 1985 and again from April 1986 to July 1987 he served as deputy chief of mission in Vienna. In June 1985 Bloch served as acting ambassador in Vienna. Bloch returned to Washington, DC, in 1987 after a series of run-ins with the ambassador, who suspected him of violating security procedures.

Bloch's activities were caught on film on May 14, 1989, by the French counterespionage agency. He was observed passing a briefcase to Reino Gikman, a Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) agent in Paris known to deal in technological secrets. Earlier, on April 27, 1989, the National Security Agency had intercepted a conversation between Bloch and this individual in which the Paris meeting was arranged. Bloch would also meet with this agent in Brussels and on June 22 he received a call from the agent informing him that his identity had been compromised. That same day Bloch was placed on administrative leave with pay and forced to surrender his passport.

Bloch was never tried and found guilty of espionage nor did he ever confess to being a spy. For all practical purposes the investigation into his activities ended with his December 1989 resignation. It was reactivated briefly after Robert Hanssen, who was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union, told his FBI interrogators that he had warned Bloch that he was under investigation in a phone call on June 22, 1989. When questioned about this, Bloch continued to deny that he was involved in espionage against the United States.

Bloch subsequently sued the State Department in an effort to obtain his pension. The courts rejected his suit. Bloch moved to North Carolina where he has worked in a grocery store and as a bus driver. He has been arrested several times on shoplifting charges.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Hanssen, Robert Philip; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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BLOUNT CONSPIRACY

The Blount Conspiracy took place from 1795 to 1797. Organized by Senator William Blount, it aimed at raising an armed force to seize the Spanish territories of the Floridas and Louisiana.

William Blount was born in 1749 in North Carolina to a wealthy family. He used his connections and ability to rise quickly in politics; he served in the Continental Congress and as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. In 1790, Blount was appointed as governor of U.S. territories south of the Ohio River. Blount invested heavily in real estate, and was soon one of the greatest landholders in the United States. In 1796, he was elected to the U.S. Senate from Tennessee. By the end of that year, Blount and his brothers owned nearly three million acres of Western lands. However, the market was dismal due to conflict between Britain and Spain. The boom in Western lands collapsed, and so did prices. Blount was faced with imminent bankruptcy.

While serving in the Senate, Blount began conspiring with John Chisholm, a trader and frontiersman. Chisholm planned to launch a filibuster against the Spanish Floridas and conquer them with the help of the British Royal Navy, in alliance with British loyalists and anti-American Indians such as the Choctaw. Chisholm contacted the British ambassador, who forwarded the plan on to London. Chisholm himself later traveled to Britain in order to gain the support of the British government.

This plot was not extraordinary at the time. Several plots, notably those of the French ambassador Genet in the early 1790s, had already aimed at invading Spanish territories. A number of filibustering schemes would follow Chisholm's ideas, all the way through the establishment of the Republic of Texas.

Once Chisholm revealed the plan, Blount saw the plot as a useful way of securing buyers for his land titles. He added Louisiana to the list of targets. The manpower needed to carry off simultaneous strikes against New Orleans, Pensacola, and Mobile required a large organization, and Blount launched himself into recruiting new partners.

The conspiracy's existence was soon leaked as more plotters entered it, and by the spring of 1797 it was fairly common knowledge on the frontier. The federal government was also informed, although President Washington kept the news to himself. Finally, Blount was confronted with evidence of the conspiracy on the floor of the Senate on July 4, 1797. Blount fled Philadelphia and returned to the West.

Once exposed, the conspiracy rapidly fell apart. Blount was expelled from the Senate. He was impeached by the House of Representatives, but the Senate refused to press charges in its final decision over two years later. Blount became speaker of the Tennessee House of Representatives before his death in 1800.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage

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James L. Erwin

BLUE, REAR ADMIRAL VICTOR (DECEMBER 6, 1865–JANUARY 22, 1928)

An American naval officer, Victor Blue was involved in a number of intelligence missions in Cuba during the Spanish-American War.

Victor Blue was born on December 6, 1865, in Richmond County, North Carolina, the son of John G. Blue, a lawyer, and his wife, Annie (née Evans). He grew up in Marion, South Carolina, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1887, and went to serve on the USS *Quinnebaug*. He became an assistant engineer in July 1889 and moved to Pensacola, Florida, and in 1891 was transferred to the Union Iron Works at San Francisco, moving briefly to Charleston in 1892, and then to the Navy Yard at

Norfolk, Virginia. Postings at Alliance, Charleston, Thetis, and Bennington followed, before he returned to the Naval Academy from 1896 until 1898.

During the Spanish-American War, Victor Blue was sent to Cuba after volunteering to count the number of vessels in Santiago harbor. Going ashore on the Swannee on June 11, 1898, he managed to get through Spanish lines and on the following day was able to identify that the fleet of Admiral Pascual Cervera was in the harbor—it was rumored to be elsewhere at the time. Reporting back to the Americans, this was to lead to the Battle of Santiago Bay. He was subsequently involved in the attack on Manzanillo. Blue was advanced five numbers in rank "for extraordinary heroism" and awarded a medal for meritorious service. In 1910 he was appointed to the command of Yorktown in the Pacific Station, and was chief of staff for the Pacific Fleet from 1910 to 1911. From 1913 until 1916, and again in 1919, Victor Blue was chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, with the rank of rear admiral. In World War I, from 1917 until 1918, Blue was in command of the battleship *Texas* which served with the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea, and took the surrender of the German fleet on November 21, 1918. He retired in 1919 and moved to Fort George, Florida, where he died on January 22, 1928. In 1937 the destroyer USS *Blue* was named in his honor. His brother, Rupert Blue (1868–1948), was prominent in the field of public health.

See also: Spanish-American War

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Justin Corfield

BLUNT, ANTHONY
(1907–1983)

Anthony Blunt was recruited to spy for the Soviet Union's NKVD in 1934 while a fellow at Cambridge University where he was a member of the Apostles, a Marxist secret society, and after having visited the Soviet Union the year before. At Cambridge he recruited a number of key agents for the Soviet Union including Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, John Caincross, and Guy Burgess. During World War II, Blunt first joined the British army and later the British Security Service (MI5). He reportedly quit working as a spy for the Soviet Union in 1945.

The May 1951 defections of Burgess and Maclean to the Soviet Union posed a threat to Blunt's service as a Soviet spy since both were easily linked to him. MI-5 interrogated Blunt in 1952 and throughout the 1950s but no action was taken. A little more than a decade later, in January 1964, additional accusations of espionage was leveled at Blunt, this time by Michael Straight, who stated that Blunt had sought to recruit him as a Soviet spy while Straight was studying at Cambridge. Blunt now confessed. In return for his confession, Blunt was granted full immunity and the government promised not to publicly divulge this information for 15 years. Accounts suggest that the

grant of immunity was given in the expectation that Blunt would provide important information regarding Soviet espionage activities in Great Britain but that little he said was of much value. In 1979 Blunt's activity as a Soviet spy was revealed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Queen Elizabeth II then stripped Blunt of his knighthood which he had received in 1956.

Apart from his career as a spy, Blunt established himself as an eminent art historian. He also served as Surveyor of the King's Pictures from 1945 to 1972. He continued publishing works on art history after his espionage was revealed. Born in Bournemouth, England, on September 16, 1907, Blunt died in London on March 26, 1983.

See also: Atomic Spy Ring; Burgess, Guy Francis De Moncy; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Maclean, Donald Duart; MI-5 (The Security Service); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"; Straight, Michael; Ultra

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

The Board of National Estimates (BNE) served as the organizational home for producing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) from 1950 to 1973. NIEs reflect the consensus judgment of the intelligence community about how current situations are likely to develop and unfold.

The founding document governing the production of NIEs was DCID (Director of Central Intelligence Directive) 3/1 of July 8, 1948. It stipulated that once a NIE was requested by the National Security Council the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was to inform departmental intelligence agencies of the problem, the scope of the estimate, the production schedule, what they were required to contribute, and by when. The task of producing the initial NIE draft report, arranging for departmental intelligence input, obtaining agreement on its content, and then producing the final document was given to the CIA.

Early NIEs were criticized by the Hoover Commission's 1948 study into governmental organization as being subjective and biased. It said they were made without all relevant information about American military activities and tended to treat capabilities and intentions as one and the same. To help correct this situation and improve their quality, Walter Bedell Smith, after becoming Director of Central Intelligence, created the Board of National Estimates to oversee the production and writing of NIEs and an Office of National Estimates to provide a support staff for producing them. Under this system one of the 12 members of the BNE was given responsibility for producing a draft NIE while the Board as a whole set its terms of reference. Once written, the NIE would be sent to the U.S. Intelligence Board, where final compromises and language would be determined. As head of the U.S. Intelligence Board, it was up to the Director of Central Intelligence to approve the final document before sending it to the National Security Council.

Over time criticism of the BNE became more pronounced. Concerns were expressed that the BNE was becoming a closed-minded group that was out of touch with changes in the nature of world politics. Its membership had also decreased from an average of 12 to 6 by mid-1973. Moreover, the Nixon administration was especially unhappy with NIEs that conflicted with its foreign policy agenda. In 1973, Director of Central Intelligence William Colby disbanded both the Board of National Estimates and the Office of National Estimates. In their place he established the National Intelligence Officers system. John Huizenga, chair of the BNE at the time, resigned from the CIA over the matter, arguing that the change greatly increased the possibility that the intelligence officer responsible for producing an NIE would become subject to political pressure from the White House.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Colby, William Egan; Director of Central Intelligence; Hoover Commission; National Intelligence Estimates; Nixon Administration and Intelligence; Smith, General Walter Bedell

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BOECKENHAUPT, STAFF SERGEANT HERBERT W. (NOVEMBER 26, 1942–)

Air Force Staff Sergeant Herbert W. Boeckenhaupt was arrested on espionage charges on October 31, 1966. He was found guilty on May 25, 1967, and sentenced to 30 years on June 7, 1967.

Boeckenhaupt was born on November 26, 1942, in Germany and moved with his mother to the United States in 1948. His divorced father remained in Germany. He enlisted in the air force in 1960 and obtained a secret clearance in October 1961 and then a top-secret clearance in March 1964 because of his duties as a radio operator. Boeckenhaupt was first approached by a Soviet agent, Aleksey Malinin, in a Washington, DC, clothing store where Boeckenhaupt held a part-time job. Boeckenhaupt asserts that Malinin began talking to him about the state of his father's health and claimed he was motivated to spy out of a concern for his father's health, implying that Malinin was making threats against it. This assertion seems unlikely to be true since his father resided in West Germany. In actuality it appears that money was the primary motivating factor behind Boeckenhaupt's espionage activities. On several occasions he contacted his Soviet handlers asking for more money.

Boeckenhaupt admitted to having met with Malinin on at least five or more occasions where he was given espionage paraphernalia such a pressure paper and a hollowed-out flashlight along with dead drop locations and meeting places in Washington, DC, and a London address. On October 24, 1966, Boeckenhaupt was taken into custody and arrested for having failed to report a contact with a foreign government agent. Malinin, who posed as an assistant commercial counselor in the Soviet embassy, would be declared persona non grata and forced to leave the United States after his arrest.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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BONVOULOIR ET LOYAUTÉ, JULIEN-ALEXANDRE ACHARD DE (1749–1783)

Julien-Alexandre Achard de Bonvouloir et Loyauté was a secret emissary of the French government from 1775 to 1776. A member of an aristocratic Norman family, Bonvouloir migrated to the French colony of St. Domingue, where he served as a volunteer in the elite Regiment du Cap. Becoming ill, early in 1775 he toured American cities, then traveled to London, where he conveyed information on the state of American affairs to the French ambassador, the Comte de Guines, who recommended to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Comte de Vergennes, that Bonvouloir be sent back to America to report on the state of colonial resistance and its prospects for success. He was instructed to contact Benjamin Franklin and, without compromising French neutrality, to assure the colonists of French goodwill, and to indicate that France had no designs on Canada. He sailed from England in September 1775 and reached Philadelphia in December where Francis Daymon, a French storekeeper and librarian to the Library Company of Philadelphia, introduced him to the Committee of Secret Correspondence. Four of its members, Franklin, John Jay, Benjamin Harrison, and John Dickinson, held three secret meetings with Bonvouloir at night at Carpenters Hall, each arriving by different routes, and explored the possibility of French assistance, particularly exchanging American produce for munitions and obtaining the use of experienced military engineers. Although Bonvouloir recommended against sending an envoy, his discussions encouraged the committee to send Silas Deane as its agent to France in March 1776.

Bonvouloir's optimistic report to Guines of December 28, 1775, reached Vergennes in March 1776, strengthened the arguments Vergennes and Caron de Beaumarchais were advancing to the king and council of state justifying French aid to the American cause. Twice captured and imprisoned by the British, first in Canada in 1776, and then while attempting to return to the United States as a merchant in 1777, Bonvouloir secured a French naval commission and in 1781 sailed to India where he died in 1783.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Franklin, Benjamin

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Elizabeth M. Nuxoll

BOREN-McCURDY LEGISLATION

In February 1992, Senator David Boren (D-OK) and Congressman David McCurdy (D-OK) introduced separate pieces of legislation that was intended to overhaul the structure and operation of the intelligence community. The model on which their proposals was based was the Goldwater-Nichols department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which sought to rationalize and centralize decision-making authority above the level of the military services. At the time Boren was chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and McCurdy was chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Central to their respective proposals was the creation of a Director of National Intelligence separate from the head of the Central Intelligence Agency with budgetary authority to program and reprogram intelligence funds anywhere in the intelligence community including those found in the Defense Department, the authority to direct how those funds were spent, transfer personnel from one agency to another, and the authority to task intelligence agencies. This position was needed, according to Boren and McCurdy, in order to overcome a severe shortcoming in interagency coordination within the intelligence community. Under their plan the Director of National Intelligence would be aided by two deputy directors, one for community affairs and the other for analysis and estimates.

Their legislation also called for consolidating the collection, exploitation, and analysis of imagery intelligence within the Department of Defense through the establishment of a National Imagery Agency. Under their plans the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency would also have received authority to assign collection requirements to defense intelligence agencies and move personnel from one Defense Department intelligence unit to another.

The Boren-McCurdy proposals were not adopted in part due to strong opposition from the military services and their supporters on the Armed Services Committees although some of the less controversial aspects of their reforms were later incorporated into other legislation. The position of Director of National Intelligence was not established until after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and was a central recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.

Boren retired from the Senate in 1994. McCurdy left Congress in 1995 after being defeated in the November 1994 election to replace Boren in the Senate.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Department Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; Intelligence Community; National Imagery and Mapping Agency; September 11, 2001

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BOWIE, WALTER
(1837–OCTOBER 7, 1864)

Walter Bowie was a Maryland lawyer who served the Army of Northern Virginia during the American Civil War as a spy and intelligence courier. He was killed during a raid into Maryland in 1864.

Born in 1837, Bowie was a lawyer when the Civil War broke out. He immediately went to Richmond, Virginia, and enlisted in the Confederate army. He was soon sent back into Union territory, ostensibly as a recruiter for the army. In fact, Bowie was relaying instructions and sensitive information between Confederate army headquarters and spy rings in the Washington, DC, area. He was also gathering vital intelligence on troop movements through Maryland. In October of 1862, Bowie was captured but escaped with the help of Confederate agents. He narrowly eluded escape again in July of 1863. In April of 1864, Bowie forwarded a report to General Lee detailing General Grant's plans before the Battle of the Wilderness. Shortly thereafter, Bowie joined the cavalry force of John Mosby; Colonel Mosby was assuming responsibility for coordination of espionage around Washington and so Bowie's role was becoming obsolete.

Bowie proved himself as a guerrilla and commander, and Mosby made him a lieutenant in September of 1864. Shortly afterwards, Bowie suggested a bold plan to Mosby; he would lead a small detachment of men into Maryland to capture the state's pro-Union Governor Augustus W. Bradford. Mosby agreed, and in late September Bowie and a few handpicked men crossed the Potomac into Maryland. After some reconnaissance, Bowie decided the governor was too well protected and turned back. He was killed on October 7 during a confrontation with local citizens.

There is some conjecture as to whether Bowie's raid was part of a larger scheme; Confederate agents in the area were mulling a plot to kidnap President Lincoln, and may have met with Bowie during his time in Maryland.

See also: Civil War Intelligence

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James L. Erwin

BOYCE, CHRISTOPHER JOHN
(FEBRUARY 16, 1953–)

Christopher John Boyce, popularly known as the Falcon, conspired with his longtime friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, to sell classified information on the Ryholite satellite network to the Soviet Union. Boyce, the eldest of nine children of Noreen Hollenbeck and Charles Boyce, grew up in the southern California neighborhood of Palos Verdes. His father served with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) before moving to California to provide security for the aircraft industry, and his mother considered becoming a nun before her marriage and raised all of her children as devote Catholics. From an early age Boyce stood out scoring 142 on his IQ test, excelling at history, serving as an alter boy at St. John Fisher parish, and earning a reputation as a notorious risk taker. Boyce suffered a crisis of faith during adolescence, and became a passionate outdoorsman and falconer, which earned him his nickname. After dropping out of three colleges in as many years Boyce allowed his father to use his workplace connections to obtain him a job at TRW, the corporation that operated the Ryholite system for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Inspired by a combination of offended idealism and thrill seeking, Boyce convinced Lee, who had become a successful drug dealer, to assist him in smuggling documents out of TRW and selling them to the Soviet Union through its embassy in Mexico City. Boyce and Lee maintained their partnership for almost two years before being arrested in 1977. In 1980 Boyce escaped from prison, fleeing to northern Idaho where he made his living robbing banks. After a year-and-a-half-long search, federal marshals captured him in 1981 as he was attempting to flee the country, remanding him to the federal penitentiary in Marion, Ohio, to complete his 65-year sentence.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Falcon and Snowman; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Lee, Andrew Daulton

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Vernon L. Pedersen

BOYD, BELLE
(MAY 9, 1844–JUNE 11, 1900)

Maria Isabella Boyd was a Confederate spy best known for her espionage activities during the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign. Boyd, commonly known as "Belle Boyd," was born on May 9, 1844, in Martinsburg, Virginia (now West Virginia). Her family sent her to study at Mount Washington Female College in Baltimore, Maryland, from 1856 to 1860. When she returned to Martinsburg in early 1861, the overwhelming number of people in western Virginia were Unionist in their sentiments. Boyd, however, participated in fund-raising efforts for the Confederacy. After the

Union army occupied Martinsburg in July 1861, Boyd became a spy for the Confederacy. Boyd passed on military information by messenger to Confederate military officials.

On July 4, 1861, while she was living at home an inebriated Union soldier, attempting to replace the Confederate flag flying above her home with the American flag, assaulted her mother. Boyd shot and killed the soldier. Arrested and tried for murder, she was acquitted on the defense of justifiable homicide.

In the Shenandoah Valley Campaign during March to June 1862, Boyd provided valuable military information to Major General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. Operating from the home of her aunt and uncle in Front Royal, Virginia, she frequently learned of Union army battle plans and troop deployments, which she passed on to Jackson by riding a horse, alone, at night, to Jackson's camp some 15 miles distant. The intelligence she provided about the movements of Union troops under Brigadier General James Shields was of immense benefit to Jackson, who inflicted more than 7,000 casualties on Union army troops at a cost of only 2,500 Confederates.

Following her assistance to Jackson, Boyd was betrayed by her lover and was arrested by Union officials on July 29, 1862. Held in prison for a month, she was released in a prisoner exchange. While visiting Martinsburg in June 1863, she was again arrested and sent to prison for spying. After contracting typhoid fever in prison, she was released on December 1, 1863.

On May 8, 1864, Boyd departed Virginia for North Carolina on board the blockade runner *Greyhound*, carrying letters from Confederate President Jefferson Davis to British officials. The U.S. Navy 3rd rate steamer Connecticut intercepted the Greyhound and escorted it to Boston. During the journey, Boyd seduced U.S. Navy Ensign Samuel Hardinge, who then facilitated her escape to England via Canada. After a court martial and his discharge from the Navy, Hardinge went to England, where he married Boyd in August 1864. In 1865, Boyd published an account of her spying activities in a book entitled *Belle Boyd in Camp and Prison*. In 1866, she returned to the United States and became an actress. She died, while on tour, in Wisconsin Dells, Wisconsin, on June 11, 1900.

See also: Civil War Intelligence; Confederate Signal and Secret Service Bureau

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Michael R. Hall

BRACY, ARNOLD

Arnold Bracy was charged and later cleared in the "sex for secrets" scandal in 1987. While a member of the U.S. Marine Corps, Corporal Bracy was assigned to the guard detachment at the American embassy in Moscow in 1985. Two years later, the Marine Corps charged that Bracy and Sergeant Clayton Lonetree, in exchange for sexual favors

and money, permitted Soviet agents to enter a room in the embassy where classified messages were decoded. Bracy was arrested, and after three days of interrogation, signed a confession, which he recanted almost immediately, claiming it was coerced. In exchange for his testimony against Lonetree, Bracy was offered immunity from prosecution, but he rejected the offer. The Marine Corps eventually dropped all charges against Bracy. In his book, *Moscow Station* (1989), Ronald Kessler repeated the charge that Bracy had a sexual affair with a female Committee for State Security (KGB) agent and engaged in espionage while stationed in Moscow. Bracy sued for libel, but the case was dismissed. Bracy grew up in a federal housing project, Woodside House, in Queens, New York. His mother, Freda, was the director of a center for the elderly in Manhattan and his father, Theodore, was a train conductor for the New York City Transit Authority. Bracy has two sisters, Annette and Freda. Arnold Bracy received an honorable discharge from the Marine Corps in 1987, married another marine, and worked as a guard at a computer firm in northern Virginia while attending a two-year college.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Wendell G. Johnson

BREWSTER, CALEB

Caleb Brewster was an American secret agent during the American Revolution. Having earned his living in the whaling trade, Brewster used his small boat to attack British vessels in the Long Island Sound at the beginning of the war. General Benjamin Tallmadge later asked Brewster to join the Culper Ring, an espionage faction based in New York that aided the American side during the war.

After gathering intelligence on British troops in the New York City area, a member of the Culper Ring would stash secret messages at a farm on Long Island. Brewster would pick up the confidential intelligence and sail across Long Island Sound in one of his vessels, delivering the materials to American forces in Fairfield, Connecticut.

Brewster ran several whaling crews that acted as intelligence messengers, based in both Connecticut and Long Island. These "spy boats" as they were known, operated as an open secret. The British assuredly knew of their existence, yet were unable to stop the information flowing from New York City to General Washington.

In October 1781, during a conversation with a British agent, Brewster nearly exposed the agenda of the Culper Ring. Patrick Walker, the British agent, dined with Brewster in Fairfield, Connecticut. During their meeting, Brewster discussed some secret American plans for an attack on Floyd's Neck. However, Brewster never allowed significant details concerning the Culper Ring to become known to Walker, and the espionage ring remained secret. Little is known of Brewster's postwar life.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Culper Ring; Tallmadge, Major Benjamin

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Gregory Kellerman

BRITISH SECURITY COORDINATION

The British Security Coordination (BSC) office was a multipurpose British organization that dealt with Western Hemisphere intelligence, special operations, and propaganda during World War II. A Canadian industrialist, William Samuel Stephenson arrived in New York in June 1940. His initial purpose was to head the Passport Control Office, a time-honored undercover position of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI-6) abroad. However, his duties rapidly expanded to include the protection of British properties in the United States, the scrutiny of the Axis activities in the Western Hemisphere, and the counter against the Axis propaganda to led the American public opinion to become pro-British and encourage the United States to enter the war on the British side. In order to fulfill those duties, his organization finally came to exercise control over not only the SIS, but also MI-5 (counterintelligence agency), the Special Operations Executive (SOE), and the Political Warfare Executive in the Western Hemisphere. As the organization became no longer merely the PCO, it was reorganized as the British Security Coordination in early 1941. The BSC had its headquarters at the Rockefeller Center in New York and a host of branches across the Western Hemisphere.

The BSC played a very important role in the relationship with the U.S. intelligence agencies. At first, the BSC strengthened ties with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The BSC provided the FBI with secretly gathered intelligence on the Axis espionage and sabotage activities. Such intelligence was also passed on, through the FBI, to the U.S. Army and Navy. Moreover, the BSC instructed the FBI on secret intelligence gathering methods, for example, how to open and reseal letters without trace.

Another point on which the BSC contributed to U.S. intelligence was in the foundation of the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI). Stephenson told a pro-British Wall Street lawyer, William Joseph Donovan, about the necessity for American secret intelligence and special operations organ. Stephenson worked on President Franklin Roosevelt's close aides and persuaded them to make Donovan head of an American intelligence agency. Roosevelt thus designated Donovan as the COI on July 11, 1941. Donovan's organization was followed by the Office of Strategic Services on June 13, 1942. The BSC assisted with the growth of this infant office by furnishing secret intelligence and training facilities for special operations. The BSC made such crucial contributions to the Anglo-American joint war effort that Stephenson became the first foreigner to receive the Presidential Medal of Merit. The BSC was abolished in 1946.

See also: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); MI-5 (The Security Service); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Office of Strategic Services; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Special Operations Executive; Stephenson, Sir William Samuel

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Naoki Ohno

BROWDER, EARL RUSSELL
(MAY 20, 1891–JUNE 27, 1973)

Earl Russell Browder was general secretary of the American Communist Party (CPUSA) from 1930 to 1945. He was also actively involved in running a Soviet espionage network in the United States.

Browder was born on May 20, 1891, in Wichita, Kansas. As a youth he joined the Socialist Part of America. In 1917 Browder was sentenced to two years in jail under the terms of the Espionage Act for conspiring to defeat the operation of the draft law by not registering. He then joined the American Communist Party and went to Moscow in 1921 to participate in the founding of the international confederation of Communist trade unions. Browder would spend additional time in jail in 1940 after being convicted of traveling to the Soviet Union under a false passport. He was released from prison after 14 months due to the outbreak of World War II and the pending alliance with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany and Japan.

Browder was expelled from the CPUSA in 1946 as a result of Moscow's dislike for his wartime writings in which Browder had begun to argue for the possibility of peaceful coexistence between capitalism and Communism. In 1950 Browder was called before Congress and questioned by Senator Joseph McCarthy about Communist activity in the United States. Browder refused to implicate any of his former colleagues in the CPSU and testified under oath that he had not engaged in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Browder was charged with contempt of Congress but never prosecuted on espionage charges because of irregularities in how his case was handled by Congress during their investigation.

Published accounts and evidence from the VENONA project point to Browder as having been part of a Soviet espionage group known as the secret apparatus, whose task was to control the operation of the CPSU. He is also believed to have recruited at least 18 agents for the Soviet Union and run an agent network himself. His sister also worked as an agent for the NKVD in Europe. Browder died on June 27, 1973.

See also: American Communist Party; Cold War Intelligence; McCarthy, Joseph; VENONA

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BRUCE-LOVETT REPORT

The Bruce-Lovett Report was a critical appraisal of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) proliferation of covert operations during the early years of the cold war. It was the third in a series of intelligence investigations undertaken during the Eisenhower administration. Compiled by David Bruce and Robert Lovett and submitted to President Eisenhower's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in the fall of 1956, the report condemned what Bruce and Lovett viewed as the subordination of official U.S. policy to covert policy initiatives.

Bruce and Lovett derided the CIA for over-involvement in the internal affairs of Third World countries at the expense of substantive intelligence collection on the Soviet Union. Disparaging the lack of coordination and accountability in the psychological and political warfare program implemented by National Security Council Directive 10/2, the report warned of the long-range consequences of an interventionist foreign policy. It also criticized the relationship between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles. Bruce and Lovett were concerned that the unique position of the two brothers enabled them to inappropriately influence U.S. foreign policy.

The report concluded that the United States should reevaluate its approach to covert operations, taking greater consideration of potentially harmful policy implications. It also recommended that a permanent position be created to assess the viability of covert action programs and their impact on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Because researchers have been unable to locate the report, which presumably remains classified, notes previously recorded by historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., constitute the principal source of information on the subject.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr.

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Derek A. Bentley

BRYCE REPORT

When World War I began, the British government, headed by Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, was concerned by persistent reports of German brutality towards the civilian population in invaded Belgium in 1914. To investigate these reports, the Asquith government appointed a committee, headed by Viscount James Bryce, with Sir Frederick Pollock, Sir Alfred Hopkinson, H. A. L. Fisher, and Harold Cox, to prepare an independent report based upon the appointed committee's findings, which it released in May 1915.

The Bryce Report was an attempt to verify atrocity stories, especially about the attacks against civilians by Germans invading Belgium. These stories had been in wide circulation, and there had been considerable skepticism about them. Bryce himself, who was a widely respected historian and diplomat, reported himself as skeptical.

Bryce's report consisted of a 360-page compendium of evidence that the German army had brutalized Belgian and French civilians. The information was gathered from a number of sources: refugees living in areas held by the French and British, including refugees in Britain whose depositions detailed numerous cases of rape, child murder, and mutilation; official accounts published by the Belgian government prior to the fall of their government; and accounts in diaries captured from German soldiers. The report was published in two volumes; the first was a summary of the kinds of atrocities which the report takes as credible; the second included a selection of accounts themselves, including statements from witnesses and excerpts from at least 37 German diaries. The report was important as a formal indictment of the terror campaign of the Germans.

In addition, the Bryce Report noted that conducting such a terror campaign would cause troops to act unpredictably when they should otherwise be submitted to strict discipline. This is what happened in Belgium, particularly with regard to rape, but the report acknowledged that men committing such crimes were still subject to punishment by superior officers. However, the point the Bryce Report makes is that the officers clearly and consistently lost control of their men and that this is hardly surprising given an official terror campaign against civilians.

The Bryce Report was used for propaganda purposes. Sir Gilbert Parker, a member of Wellington House, the British propaganda bureau in World War I, rushed the Bryce Report into print. Bryce's involvement heightened the report's impact, especially in the United States, where Bryce was a much respected British ambassador in the United States until 1913. After the war, none of the stories contained in the report could be substantiated and it was viewed as just another British attempt to trick the United States into joining the war.

There was no doubt that such acts happened. However the committee's tendency to dwell upon the more lurid eyewitness reports led to the report being discredited, chiefly in the immediate postwar years. More seriously, it led to a tendency by international governments to regard with suspicion similar "official" reports produced in subsequent years, including early emerging details of the Nazi treatment of Jews during World War II.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I

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Martin J. Manning

BUCHER, LLOYD MARK
(SEPTEMBER 1, 1927–JANUARY 28, 2004)

Commander Lloyd Mark "Pete" Bucher was a commander in the U.S. Navy, known for his tragic role as captain of the USS *Pueblo*. He was born in Pocatello, Iowa, on September 1, 1927. Bucher began a career in the navy and worked his way up the ranks. As commander of the USS *Pueblo*, he ordered the ship out to sea, leaving Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on January 5, 1968. Days after on January 11, the *Pueblo* directed itself to the Tsushima Straits with orders to gather intelligence about Soviet and North Korean naval activity.

Bucher and his crew began their monitoring duties, but were quickly noticed by another ship, SO-I class, which came within two miles of the *Pueblo* on January 21. The following day, two North Korean fishing ships came with 25 yards of Bucher's vessel. On the same day, North Korea made numerous assassination attempts against South Korean leadership, but Bucher was not informed. Finally, the North Koreans mounted an attack on the *Pueblo* on January 23, even though Bucher kept his ship in international waters. Even though the attack was an act of war, Bucher's ship was unprepared, too slow, and outnumbered by the enemy, who soon had six small ships and two MiG-21 fighters on the scene.

The *Pueblo* was fired upon and one member of the crew perished, but Bucher ordered maneuvers and he commanded his crew to begin destroying sensitive information. Meanwhile, he contacted the Naval Security Group in Kamiseya, Japan, and alerted Seventh Fleet Command, which promised immediate help. The North Koreans boarded and help never came. The ship was taken to Wonson, North Korea, where Bucher and his crew were starved and tortured for the next 11 months.

The United States secured Bucher and his crew's release by apologizing to North Korea for spying. Bucher was convicted by a court of inquiry for losing his ship and all the sensitive information that could not be destroyed in time. No punishment was taken against the commander. Much later, Prisoner of War medals were given to Bucher and his crew in 1989. The USS *Pueblo* is currently a tourist attraction in Pyongyang, North Korea. Bucher died on January 28, 2004, and is buried at Fort Rosecrans National Cemetery in San Diego, California.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; *Pueblo*, USS

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Arthur Holst

BUCKLEY, WILLIAM FRANK, JR. (NOVEMBER 24, 1925–FEBRUARY 27, 2008)

William Frank Buckley, Jr., a famous journalist, former CIA employee, and founder of the political magazine *National Review*, was born on November 24, 1925, in New York City. He was the son of oil magnet William F. Buckley, Sr., and Aloise S. Buckley. He moved frequently during his wealthy childhood, living in New York City, Sharon, Connecticut, Paris, France, and London, England. As a result of his schooling and travels, Buckley was fluent in Spanish, French, and English.

In 1943, he decided to study at the University of Mexico, but joined the U.S. Army soon after. Following the war's conclusion, Buckley pursued his studies at Yale University, becoming a member of the secret Skull and Bones society and leading the *Yale Daily News*. Graduating in 1950, he went on to marry Patricia Taylor from Vancouver, British Columbia.

In 1951, Buckley was hired by the CIA and was sent to Mexico City where he served under Howard Hunt. He was ordered to gather intelligence and to promote the overthrow of the Mexican government at that time.

Buckley returned to the United States from Mexico and worked as an editor for *The American Mercury* until he founded his own political magazine, *National Review*, in 1955. The magazine became a bastion of conservatism and it remained one of his passions for many years. Meanwhile, he founded Young Americans for Freedom in 1960 and later ran for mayor of New York City in 1965 as a third-party candidate. He received about 13 percent of the vote and finished third. Not long after his loss, Buckley started a political talk show, *Firing Line*, which ran from 1966 to 2000 and aired on public television.

Buckley remained connected within the Republican Party and throughout Washington, DC. As a result, he was appointed to serve as a U.S. delegate at the United Nations in 1973. Much later, President Ronald Reagan asked him to be U.S. Ambassador to Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, but Buckley refused, citing security fears.

Besides being a prominent conservative journalist and television host, Buckley authored many fiction and nonfiction books. He wrote an extensive series of fiction novels about a CIA agent and his activities. Oftentimes, Buckley expressed his opinions on American foreign policy through the agent's thoughts and actions.

In 1991, Buckley was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President George Bush, Sr. He remained very active in his various journalism ventures until he sold his majority share of *National Review* in June 2004. Yet, he wrote for the magazine and its online edition frequently. He came out against the Iraq War, claiming that it did not adhere to true conservative principles.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Skull and Bones Society

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Arthur Holst

BUNCHE, RALPH JOHNSON
(AUGUST 7, 1904–DECEMBER 9, 1971)

Ralph Johnson Bunche, African-American diplomat, intelligence agent, and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, was born on August 7, 1904, in Detroit, Michigan. His parents, who had numerous health issues, moved to Los Angeles, California, with young Bunche, but they died soon after. Consequently, Bunche was raised by his grandmother.

Bunche attended Jefferson High School in Los Angeles, where he graduated as valedictorian. He went on to the University of California, where he once again graduated valedictorian in 1927. Using money donated by his community and thanks to a scholarship, Bunche received his doctorate from Harvard University. Afterwards, he moved to Washington, DC, where he led the Department of Political Science at Howard University from 1928 to 1950. He was a prominent African-American scholar, wrote extensively about race and class relations, and supported the civil rights movement.

Upon the outbreak of World War II, Bunche was recruited into the Office of Strategic Services, the immediate predecessor to the CIA. By 1943, however, Bunche was transferred to the State Department where he became associate chief of Dependent Area Affairs and a leader of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was most influential in the postwar period, attending the San Francisco Conference of 1945, which laid the foundation for the United Nations. Then, he was appointed director of the Trusteeship Department by Secretary-General Trygve Lie. As a UN mediator, he negotiated the Arab-Israeli conflict in various postings. Following Count Folke Bernadotte's assassination in September 1948, Bunche became the lead UN mediator, concluding the 1949 Armistice Agreements soon after. During his UN career, he was sent to the Congo, Yemen, Kashmir, and Cyprus. He rose through the UN ranks to become the undersecretary general, but was finally forced from his post in 1971 as the result of worsening health.

His hard work for peace was recognized with the 1950 Nobel Peace Prize and he was the first person of color to receive the honor. He died on December 9, 1971, in New York City where he is buried.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Office of Strategic Services

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Arthur Holst

BUNDY, WILLIAM PUTNAM
(SEPTEMBER 24, 1917–OCTOBER 6, 2000)

William P. Bundy was an influential figure within the U.S. intelligence and foreign policy apparatus during World War II and the cold war era. Bundy was born on September 24, 1917, in Washington, DC. He was educated at Groton School, Yale College, and Harvard University. He enlisted in the Army Signal Corps at the outbreak of World War II. In the Signal Corps, Bundy commanded a unit assigned to assist the British at Bletchley Park in deciphering high-level German Enigma codes for Project Ultra. In June 1951, Bundy joined the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Office of National Estimates as the chief of staff and an assistant to the National Security Council staff. He remained at the CIA until 1960. From 1961 to 1964, he served first as deputy assistant secretary and then assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs. In 1964, Bundy was appointed assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, where he remained until 1969. While in the State Department, Bundy played a critical role in eliciting the escalation of American military involvement in Vietnam.

In May 1969, Bundy left government service to assume a teaching position at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was the editor of *Foreign Affairs* from 1972 to 1984 and a visiting professor at Princeton University from 1985 to 1987. In 1998, he published *A Tangled Web*, a critical history of U.S. foreign policy during the Nixon-Kissinger era. Bundy died of heart failure on October 6, 2000.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Ultra

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Derek A. Bentley

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Established in 1957, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) serves as the intelligence unit of the State Department providing the all-source intelligence support for the secretary of state, U.S. diplomats, and other professionals employed in the State Department. As the State Department puts it, "INR's primary mission is to harness intelligence to serve U.S. diplomacy." The INR is also the State Department's principal point of contact and liaison with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and acts as the State Department's representative in most of its interactions with other members of the intelligence community.

The INR's existence can be traced back to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that was created by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1942 and disbanded by President

Harry Truman in 1945 after the conclusion of World War II. In terminating the OSS Truman divided its functions among the State Department and the War Department, with the State Department receiving the Research and Analysis Branch. Staffed by academics from many different disciplines during the war, it produced important reports on the state of German military, financial, and economic affairs. Now at the State Department the Research and Analysis Branch was renamed the Interim Research and Intelligence Service. In 1957, it became the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Organizationally INR is divided into 19 offices that mirror the structure of the State Department as a whole. It employs about 300 individuals, three-quarters of whom are civil servants and the remainder are Foreign Service Officersforeign service officers. In FY 2007, they were distributed among the following regional and topical units this way: Africa (13); Inter-American Affairs (13); East Asia & Pacific (20); Economic Analysis (19); Near East & South Asia (18); Europe (17); Russia and Eurasia (23); Proliferation and Military Issues (18); Terrorism, Narcotics, and Crime (19); and Global Issues (18).

In FY 2007, 39 individuals serving in the INR worked in the Office of Research and Media Government on public opinion surveys and polls to help inform U.S. public diplomacy initiatives. To that end, in FY 2007, the INR commissioned 236 public opinion polls and surveys. In the previous three fiscal years it commissioned 256 polls and surveys in FY 2006, 267 in FY 2005, and 156 in FY 2004. Among the topics researched were demographic and attitudinal profiles of Muslin minorities in Europe (2006); nationwide surveys in Central Asia and the Caucasus on governance and democracy issues (2005); and surveys of Arab youth in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Kuwait (2004). In 2004, the INR also did extensive polling on public attitudes in Iraq to a variety of topics related to the American presence and the reconstruction of the government and society.

More traditionally the INR is responsible for producing a wide variety of reports. It is estimated that on an annual basis INR analysts examine about two million documents and produce more than 6,500 written reports. In composing these reports INR analysts rely on open-source information and information coming into the State Department from abroad through normal reporting channels. It has no specialized collection capability of its own.

Viewed in the most general terms, INR reports are directed at two different sets of consumers. The first are readers of intelligence community-wide reports and estimates to which the INR contributes its expertise. These documents are read by the president, high-ranking members of the executive branch, and members of Congress. The most important of these documents are National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). The second sets of consumers are the members of the State Department. The most important consumer here is the secretary of state and the key document is a daily brief, The Secretary's Morning Summary, which also is sent to the White House, the National Security Council, and select ambassadors. It is said to include about a dozen brief reports and three or four longer articles on current issues of importance to U.S. foreign policy. A weekend version covers issues in greater detail.

The Secretary's Morning Summary is not the only intelligence product produced primarily for in-house consumption. Another set of publications focused on analyzing past, current, and future regional and functional issues facing the United States. At

one time these publications went by the titles of Policy Assessments, Current Analysis, and Assessments and Research respectively. They are now all part of a single publication series. NIE also produces longer intelligence reports that take a journal format and includes short essays and brief analyses of intelligence reporting and chronologies. Topics covered included both regional issues and functional issues such as economic trends, peacekeeping, and humanitarian interventions.

The influence of the INR both within the State Department and the intelligence community has always been a subject of much discussion. Its influence with the State Department is said to be hindered by the attitudes of foreign service officers that place more value on their own analysis than that done by others. Within the intelligence community the INR's influence is limited by its lack of independent collection capabilities and the steady decline in stature of the secretary of state within the foreign policy decision-making process. On the positive side, congressional postmortems of the Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) intelligence estimate concluded that although it too was wrong about Saddam Hussein's possession of WMD, the INR had a better record on Iraq than other members of the intelligence community.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Intelligence Community; Office of Strategic Services; Post–Cold War Intelligence; State Department Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BURGESS, GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY (APRIL 6, 1911–AUGUST 30, 1963)

Guy Burgess, a member of the Cambridge University Group of Communist spies, was born in Devonport, England, into a wealthy family and was the son of a Royal Navy officer. He attended the naval college at Dartmouth, seeking a naval career and left because of an alleged eye problem which was probably a cover for engaging in homosexual advances to fellow students.

Burgess graduated from Eaton in 1930 and then entered Cambridge University. He was recruited as a Soviet agent in the early 1930s along with Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross, Donald Maclean, and Kim Philby. He aided Blunt in the seduction of Maclean. In 1934 with Maclean, Philby, and others Burgess took a social tour of Moscow and the Soviet Union. However, he spent most of his time in Moscow dead drunk. Their acceptance of Communism as a solution to the troubles of the times was exploited by Committee for State Security (KGB) agents Arnold Deutsch, an Austrian Communist and by Theodore Maly, a Hungarian ex–Roman Catholic priest.

In 1936 Burgess began a journalism career working for the *Times* and the BBC. During the Spanish civil war Burgess acted as a courier for Cairncross who was then in the Foreign Office and for Philby who was reporting from France and Spain.

After the outbreak of World War II he worked for the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6). He also continued to sleep with Blunt and drink too much.

In 1944 Burgess joined the Foreign Office as a press officer. For the next six years he forwarded British secrets to the KGB. This was especially true after he became the secretary of Hector McNeill. In 1947 he was appointed second secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, DC. His excessive drinking brought suspicion on the Cambridge Group while he worked in Washington. In 1951 he was sent home for his drinking problem.

In 1951 a code-breaking success led investigators to Burgess and Maclean. They were warned by Philby who contacted their Soviet handlers for extraction. On Friday, May 25, Burgess went to Maclean's home. The two men then caught a ferry for France where they were given fake identity papers. They journeyed through Vienna, crossed the Czechoslovakia border, and eventually arrived in Moscow.

Burgess's defection was a surprise to Moscow. He had left papers in his apartment that implicated Cairncross who at first he denied having been a spy. His defection also implicated Philby. In the Soviet Union Burgess adopted the name Jim Andreyevitch Eliot, which was a variation of the pen name George Sands used by Victorian novelist Marian Evans. Now a hopeless alcoholic, he died of acute liver failure in Moscow on August 30, 1963.

See also: Atomic Spy Ring; Blunt, Anthony; Cairncross, John; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Maclean, Donald Duart; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"

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Andrew J. Waskey

BURR, AARON
(FEBRUARY 6, 1756–SEPTEMBER 14, 1836)

Aaron Burr was a U.S. vice president and New York politician, tried for treason. Aaron Burr, Jr., began his life in Newark, New Jersey, on February 6, 1756. At age 13, he entered as a sophomore at what is now Princeton University. In 1775, three years after his graduation, Burr enlisted in the Continental army, serving at various times under both Benedict Arnold and George Washington. In 1779, Colonel Burr resigned to further pursue his legal studies. As an attorney in New York, he frequently worked both with, and against, another local jurist, Alexander Hamilton.

Burr started his political career with two terms in the New York legislature (1784–1785). In 1791, he was elected to serve in the U.S. Senate. After losing his seat in 1797, Burr returned to the New York Assembly and began to amass support for a possible presidential run.

In 1800, Burr was on the Republican ticket as Thomas Jefferson's running mate, but the flawed electoral system in place at the time allowed Burr and Jefferson to tie for the

presidency. With this unexpected turn, Burr refused to fully disclaim any presidential ambitions, thus transferring the ultimate decision to the House of Representatives. The presidency eventually went to Jefferson, leaving Burr as the vice president.

Despite his position in the president's administration, Burr was often slighted by the resentful Jefferson. Upon learning that he would not be selected as Jefferson's 1804 running mate, Burr ran for governor of New York. The vice president's association with, and rumored support of, New England secessionists, along with Hamilton campaigning against him, led to Burr's loss in the gubernatorial race.

It was during this campaign that Hamilton expressed a "despicable opinion" of Burr. Hamilton's refusal to retract his incendiary comment ultimately led to their infamous duel, in which Burr fatally shot Hamilton on July 11, 1804, at Weehawken, New Jersey. The vice president fled the state as a fugitive of the law.

Having been ostracized by the East, Burr moved westward. After meeting with General James Wilkinson, an old associate, the two crafted a plan to detach Louisiana and the western states of the United States, and to forcefully acquire Mexico and Florida from Spain. In 1805, Burr met with Britain's ambassador and attempted to gain assistance from their navy. Though the ambassador supported Burr's conspiracy and sent word to London, Britain's war with France took precedent over any potential conflict brewing in the United States.

On July 29, 1806, Burr sent a ciphered letter to Wilkinson explaining that he had obtained the necessary funds and had commenced operations, also writing that he supposedly had support from the British navy. In December 1806, Wilkinson, working as an agent for the Spanish, double-crossed Burr and forwarded a copy of the incriminating July cipher to President Jefferson. The president's agents pursued and arrested the conspirator in early 1807, and he was sent to Richmond to be tried for treason. Since Burr had only *conspired* to commit treason, John Marshall and the Supreme Court ultimately acquitted the former vice president in 1807.

After his trial, Burr spent time in Europe rallying support for other conquest conspiracies until his expulsion from England. He returned to the United States in 1811, and spent the remainder of his life continuing work in his legal profession. Burr died in Staten Island on September 14, 1836.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Matthew C. Cain

BURROWS, WILLIAM E.
(MARCH 27, 1937–)

William E. Burrows was born in Philadelphia on March 27, 1937; attended Columbia University; and in 1967 married Joelle Hodgson, an art historian. He is a writer on space exploration and its application to intelligence gathering.

Professor Burrows pursued a career in journalism and teaching. He has described his politics as "ultra-right-wing liberal." He is a member of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, The Association for Education in Journalism, and other professional organizations. He has been a journalist for the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, a travel writer, a professor in the Department of Journalism at New York University in New York City, and a writer.

In 1986 he published *Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security*. The book describes Soviet and American spy satellites as well as reconnaissance aircraft. One American satellite named "Keyhole," or "KH" for short, revealed Soviet construction of a large aircraft carrier in a port on the Black Sea.

In 1993 Burrows published with Robert Windrem *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World*. The book described the lives of pilots on covert missions and the threat of nuclear war between Pakistan and India. It also described the nuclear potential of North Korea, a number of Arab states, former Soviet satellite countries, and China.

Only weeks after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Burrows published *By Any Means Necessary: America's Secret Air War in the Cold War*. The book described American intelligence operations to stop Soviet expansionism in the late 1950s and the early 1960s.

See also: Aerial Surveillance; Air Force Intelligence

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Andrew J. Waskey

BUSH, GEORGE HERBERT WALKER (JUNE 12, 1924–)

George H. W. Bush was the 11th Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from January 30, 1976 to January 20, 1977. He served under President Gerald Ford. Bush was born in Milton, Massachusetts, and graduated from Yale University in 1948. He was elected to Congress from Texas' 7th District in 1966 and served in Congress until 1971 when he was made ambassador to the United Nations. After that he served as chair of the Republican National Committee and chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in China. Bush lobbied to retain the position after Jimmy Carter was elected president but Carter turned it down and he was replaced as DCI by Stansfield Turner. Bush would go on to serve two terms as vice president under Ronald Reagan (1981–1990) and one term as president (1989–1993). He was defeated in his reelection bid by Bill Clinton.

Bush's appointment had come as a surprise and he was at first reluctant to accept the position, fearing its potentially negative consequences for future electoral efforts. For similar reasons it was also viewed with suspicion by the intelligence community. Bush was seen as another political appointee who lacked experience in intelligence

and would seek to establish firmer White House control over the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There was some truth to this concern. Some read the nomination as designed to prevent Bush from campaigning for the position of vice president on a Ford ticket and it is clear that Ford placed Bush at the CIA to prevent more surprises along the lines he had received from William Colby concerning past CIA wrongdoings. These doubts were soon quieted and Bush established himself as one who respected the intelligence community and those who worked in it. Morale within the CIA improved greatly and Bush would come to describe the position of DCI as "the best job in Washington."

Two issues relating to espionage were of importance during Bush's brief tenure as DCI. In mid-1976 he announced that the CIA would no longer employ journalists to gather information. The fact that the CIA had journalists on its payroll and used journalist positions as cover for intelligence-gathering operations had proved to be a major source of controversy during the recently concluded congressional hearings chaired by Senator Frank Church and Congressperson Otis Pike. The second issue involved managerial control over technical means of intelligence collection. As part of Ford's Executive Order 11905 on U.S. intelligence activities a new Committee for Foreign Intelligence (CFI) was created to better manage the national reconnaissance program. In particular, it was charged with allocating resources for the foreign intelligence program as well as preparing its budget. The CFI met at least 19 times while Bush was DCI and reportedly resolved some 33 issues but did not fully overcome the continuing differences of opinion on the part of the DCI and the Pentagon as to how much budgetary control the DCI should be allowed to exert over intelligence collection programs such as those run by the National Reconnaissance Office.

An additional issue of controversy during his term as DCI was the A Team-B Team exercise in which Soviet experts from outside the intelligence community challenged the CIA's estimates of Soviet military strength. Advocates of the exercise assert it demonstrated the strength of competitive analysis and weaknesses in CIA estimates. Opponents argue the result was a foregone conclusion, given the ideological biases of those on the B Team and proved very little.

See also: B Team; Central Intelligence Agency; Church Committee; Colby, William Egan; Director of Central Intelligence; Ford Administration and Intelligence; Intelligence Community; National Reconnaissance Office; Pike Committee; Turner, Admiral Stansfield

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BUSH, GEORGE H. W., ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

George H. W. Bush was president from 1989 to 1993. William Webster and Robert Gates served as Directors of Central Intelligence during his administration. George H. W. Bush was perhaps the most knowledgeable president with regard to foreign policy, having served as ambassador to the United Nations (1971–1972), ambassador to China (1974–1975), and vice president (1981–1989). He was by far the most knowledgeable about intelligence. He was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) during the Ford administration (1976–1977). So knowledgeable was Bush about intelligence matters that William Casey, President Reagan's DCI, saw him as a rival and considered him to be unwelcome at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). DCI William Gates observed that of all the presidents he briefed from 1968 to 1993, Bush had the clearest understanding of the limits and potential of intelligence.

As president, George H. W. Bush interacted with intelligence analysts with great frequency. As a decision maker he relied heavily on phone contacts with key individuals and often reached out to analysts and station chiefs for input. Bush also welcomed briefings by intelligence analysts in addition to those he received from his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. The close working relationship that Bush developed with intelligence analysts also held true for his relationship with Gates but not for that with Webster. There was little rapport between Bush and Webster, who was not part of Bush's inner circle of decision makers, and often appeared in the press to be the scapegoat for intelligence shortcomings, such as the failure to provide significant advance warning of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait or information about events in Panama surrounding a U.S. supported but unsuccessful coup attempt against Manuel Noriega. Instead of Webster, Bush relied heavily on advice from Gates, who was deputy national security advisor and a former deputy of Webster. Bush nominated Gates to succeed Webster and the two formed a bond that is likened to that between President Eisenhower and DCI Allen Dulles.

Espionage provided important information to Bush several times during his presidency. Satellite imagery from Keyhole and Lacrosse satellites documented and confirmed Iraqi troop movements to and across the Kuwaiti border. Later they would document that Iraq did not have plans to invade Saudi Arabia. National Security Agency (NSA) intercepts had earlier documented the unease of senior Saudi leaders in opposing Saddam Hussein militarily. Plus, intelligence reports that documented human rights violations within Iraq and Saddam Hussein's attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction strengthened Bush's resolve that action had to be taken.

A second area in which espionage provided valuable information was with regard to the Soviet Union. NSA monitoring of the August 1991 coup attempt provided the Bush administration with conversations between coup plotters, while signals intelligence showed little military activity in support of the coup. Two years before, information from a Soviet defector provided evidence of an active Soviet biological warfare program that ran counter to public statements being made by Mikhail Gorbachev.

The fall of the Soviet Union suggested the need to rethink American national security policy. Bush formally launched such a project with National Security Review 29 three days after Gates was sworn in as DCI. It called for a "top to bottom" transformation of roles and missions of the intelligence community. The report findings were

released in March 1992. The two top intelligence collection targets were identified as the former republics of the Soviet Union and weapons of mass destruction. Four structural changes in the intelligence community came about as a result of this report. They involved efforts to strengthen the role of the DCI in relation to the rest of the intelligence community, improving the coordination of intelligence analysis, boost the coordination of human intelligence and signals intelligence collection, and bring about a closer working relationship between the intelligence community and military in regards to top support for military operations. Concrete steps taken to advance each of these objectives were providing the DCI with a new Community Management Staff, establishing a National Human Intelligence Tasking Center led by the CIA, creating a Central Imagery Office in the Defense Department, and setting up an Office of Military Affairs.

See also: Central Imagery Office; Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Gates, Robert Michael; Intelligence Community; National Security Agency; Persian Gulf War; Scowcroft, Brent; Webster, William Hedgecock

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BUSH, GEORGE W., ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

George W. Bush was president from 2001 to 2009. George Tenet and Porter J. Goss served as Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs) under him. Bush came into office with a foreign policy agenda characterized by many as "ABC": anything but Clinton. It was an agenda that sought to remove the United States from involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping undertakings and distance the United States from international treaty-making efforts such as the Kyoto Protocol on the environment and creating an international criminal court. This agenda changed dramatically after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While retaining its emphasis on the centrality of independent or unilateral action, the Bush administration found itself at the center of an immense national building and peacekeeping effort in Iraq following the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Prior to the onset of the Iraq War, the administration had also expanded the definition of those whom it opposed in the Global War on Terror by including North Korea and Iran, with Iraq as part of an "axis of evil" that threatened U.S. security. It also identified a new strategy for dealing with these threats. No longer would the United States try to deter or contain threats. It would now act in a preemptory fashion, striking first in self-defense.

The relationship between the Bush administration and the intelligence community is marked by contradictions. On the one hand the administration's expansive foreign policy agenda brought with it a reversal of budget cuts and an infusion of new resources into the intelligence community budgets along with new personnel into its offices. On the other hand it has led to a series of conflicts over the control and direction of the intelligence community and its place in the decision-making process.

The first set of conflicts involved positioning a Director of Homeland Security to sit atop the intelligence community bureaucracy. The creation of such an office was one of the main recommendations to emerge from studies of 9/11. The administration acted quickly to create such a post but placed it within the White House, out of reach of congressional overseers. Congress objected and in the end a Department of Homeland Security was created largely on the administration's terms.

This did not end the controversy because many, especially those associated with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose director had simultaneously served as head of the CIA and head of the intelligence community, saw this as a diminution of its status and power. It was also argued that the creation of a Department of Homeland Security did not provide for more cooperation among intelligence agencies or streamline cooperation among them. Instead it only added a new layer of bureaucracy. Still others criticized the scope of the new unit, arguing that the Bush administration had placed too many operating units within it and thus diluted its sense of mission and purpose. This argument received heightened attention after the administration's failure to respond to Hurricane Katrina.

A second point of controversy between the intelligence community and the Bush administration involved its handling of intelligence products. Led by strong-willed individuals such as Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Bush administration began to bypass the traditional intelligence community and become its own intelligence collectors and analysts. In the process intelligence became politicized and, from the point of view of longtime intelligence analysts, was no longer able to play its rightful role as the neutral provider of data and insights needed by policy makers to formulate decisions. Further angering many in the intelligence community was the Bush administration's structuring of highly visible intelligence inquiries such as the *9/11 Report* and the *Weapons of Mass Destruction Report* in such a way as to deflect blame from problems of how intelligence was handled to problems with how it was produced.

A third area of controversy involving the Bush administration and intelligence was its interrogation policies of suspected terrorists or those believed to be either sympathetic to terrorists or supporters of terrorism. Although it steadfastly denied the charge, critics of its policies argued that the administration was engaging in torture when it employed waterboarding and similar tactics. Along with the picture of the hooded terrorist suspect at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq, the detention facilities at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, became the very visible symbolic representations of this charge. Concern about the legality of the interrogation techniques being employed also existed within the intelligence community and led to requests by intelligence officials to the Bush administration to provide legal support for them.

A final area of controversy surrounded its policy of allowing the National Security Agency to place wiretaps on the e-mails, text messages, phone calls, and internet activity

of Americans without a warrant. The existence of this program was first reported by the *New York Times* on December 16, 2005. The Bush administration argued that these warrantless wiretaps were legal and that constitutional support for ordering them ultimately resides in the president's commander-in-chief powers. Critics argued that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act had created a court to deal with the potential need for such actions and provide a legal foundation for them.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; Goss, Porter Johnston; Homeland Security, Department of; Intelligence Community; Iraq, U.S. Operations In/Against; Post–Cold War Intelligence; Renditions; September 11, 2001; Tenet, George; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; Waterboarding

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BUTENKO, JOHN WILLIAM
(CA. 1935–)

John William Butenko is the American-born son of Russian immigrants who was convicted of trying to sell national security secrets to the Soviet Union. Arrested in 1963, he was convicted in 1964 and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Also arrested with him was Igor A. Ivanov, who was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Butenko was employed by the International Electric Company, a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph, which had a contract with the U.S. Air Force to produce the command and control system for the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Code-named 465-L, the successful completion of this contract was intended to provide SAC headquarters with an extremely rapid communication capability with its air force bases and missile sites, placing them on alert, executing plans, and developing alternative operational plans. Butenko was the control administrator for one aspect of this project. To carry out his job he was given access to top-secret and confidential information.

On six occasions in April, May, September, and October 1963, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents had Butenko under surveillance and saw him engage in meetings at out-of-the-way locations in New Jersey. At these meetings he met with Ivanov, who was an employee of the Amtorg Trading Company which was known to be a front company for Soviet espionage as well as with Gleb Pavlov, Valdimir Olenev, and Yuri Romashin who were attaches to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. These three were named as coconspirators but were not defendants at the trial.

When arrested, Butenko had in his possession a briefcase containing the specifications of important parts of the communication system under construction. Also found were electronic signaling devices and a small camera disguised as a cigarette case. In his

defense Butenko argued that he had done nothing wrong; that is was permissible for him to take key pieces of the project home with him for study; that he never saw a top secret document when in the company of these individuals; and that he only socialized with them because of information they had about relatives in Russia.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

BYWATER, HECTOR C.
(OCTOBER 21, 1884–AUGUST 16, 1940)

Hector C. Bywater was a British spy and naval journalist. Born October 21, 1884, in London, Bywater's childhood travels led to a lifelong obsession with naval affairs. His knowledge so impressed James Gordon Bennett, editor of the *New York Herald*, who by age 20 Bywater was named the *Herald's* European naval correspondent. In that capacity he established relationships with a number of British naval officials and journalists.

In 1907, Bywater moved to Dresden at the invitation of his brother, then acting as American deputy counsel general. Hector's fluency in German and his fascination with the growing Imperial German navy led him to write a number of articles for the quasi-official *Navy League Journal* and *Naval & Military Record and Royal Dockyards Gazette*. These articles eventually attracted the attention of Sir Mansfield Cumming, "C," the head of the foreign section of the British Secret Service. Bywater, masquerading as an American citizen with the help of his brother, visited German naval facilities and wrote regular reports on German fortifications, ship design, gunnery techniques, and ship location. These reports continued until he returned to London in 1910.

Bywater quickly resumed his career as a journalist specializing in naval affairs. Periodically, however, he was drawn back into the world of espionage. In 1915 he found himself working undercover for British Naval Intelligence as a German-American infiltrating a German sabotage cell in Hoboken, New Jersey.

With end of World War I, Bywater turned his attention to the growing naval rivalry in the Pacific. In 1921 he published *Sea Power in the Pacific*, which argued that Japan could win a naval war against the United States by striking quickly to destroy the American Navy in the Pacific and then conquering the unfortified positions at Guam and the Philippines. This argument apparently attracted the attention of many Japanese naval officers, including Isoroku Yamomoto. It also generated a response from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt, who disagreed strenuously with Bywater's assertion that war with Japan was inevitable. In 1925 Bywater completed *The Great Pacific War*, which was a best-selling fictional account of that conflict.

Between the wars Bywater apparently collected most of his information by overt means. He had broken with British Naval Intelligence in 1924 over an alleged leak of

classified information in one of his articles. As a result, Bywater's information on the Japanese fleet came mostly from a sophisticated reading of published sources and close questioning of journalists covering Japan. He died on August 16, 1940, amid speculation that he had been assassinated by Japanese agents seeking to silence his astute observations of imperial naval practices.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano

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Peter F. Coogan

C

CABELL, GENERAL CHARLES P. (OCTOBER 11, 1903–MAY 25, 1971)

General Charles Pearré Cabell was an important figure within the U.S. military and central intelligence establishments during World War II and the cold war. Born on October 11, 1903, in Dallas, Texas, Cabell graduated from West Point Military Academy in 1925. After completing the Army Air Corps pilot training program in 1931, he commanded the 45th Combat Wing of the 8th Air Force in Europe. Between 1943 and 1945, Cabell held several positions in air intelligence and in 1948 he was appointed Director of Intelligence for the newly created U.S. Air Force. He was assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1951, where he worked under General Omar Bradley.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Cabell Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) in 1953. Cabell retained this position for the duration of Allen Dulles' tenure as Director of Central Intelligence. As DDCI, he participated in planning and organizing the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. In 1962, Cabell was forced to resign from the CIA as a result of his role in the operation. He retired from the army in 1963 as a four-star general.

Following his retirement, Cabell worked as a consultant for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Because his brother, Earle Cabell, was the mayor of Dallas at the time of John F. Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, Cabell has also been the subject of numerous conspiracy theories proclaiming his involvement in the plot. He died in Arlington, Virginia, on May 25, 1971.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Bay of Pigs; Cold War Intelligence; Dulles, Allen Welsh

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Derek A. Bentley

CAIRNCROSS, JOHN
(1913–OCTOBER 8, 1995)

John Cairncross was born in Lesmahagow, Scotland, in 1913, the son of civil servants. In the early 1930s he entered Cambridge University to study modern languages. Shortly after arriving he was recruited into the Cambridge Group by Anthony Blunt and Guy Burgess. Converted to Communism, he was introduced to their Committee for State Security (KGB) handler, Samuel Cahon.

After leaving Cambridge, Cairncross entered the British civil service and in 1936 began working in the Foreign Office. Early in World War II he worked at Bletchley Park, where he made copies of all of the British and Allied codes and ciphers, which he then gave to the KGB. He later confessed he would fill the back seat of his car (supplied by the Soviets) with briefcases of decoded documents which he took to the Soviet Embassy in London.

Later, during the war, Cairncross moved to Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) headquarters in London. In this position he stole Allied plans for Yugoslavia after the war and gave them to the Soviets.

After the war, Cairncross again worked in the Foreign Office and later for the Treasury. Among his contacts for receiving stolen intelligence were members of the Cambridge Group. British counterintelligence (MI-5) caught Cairncross in 1967. He confessed, claiming that his spying had ended in 1952. He was offered a deal of immunity from prosecution for a full confession. Transferred to Italy, the British assigned him to a job with a UN agency.

Cairncross was exposed publicly by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1981. He was the "Fifth Man" in the Cambridge Group. He died on October 8, 1995, in the south of France.

See also: Atomic Spy Ring; Blunt, Anthony; Burgess, Guy Francis De Moncy; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Maclean, Donald Duart; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"

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Andrew J. Waskey

CAMP PEARY

Officially the Armed Forces Experimental Training Activity, Camp Peary is the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIAs) principal training facility. A second CIA training facility exists in Hertford, North Carolina. Lying in York County, Virginia, just outside of Williamsburg, Camp Peary is closed to the general public and consists of some 9,275 acres, the vast majority of which is undeveloped or underdeveloped. This land came into the possession of the U.S. government in 1942 when the navy took possession of it, turning it into a military reservation for use as a Seabee training base. In doing so the navy displaced inhabitants of two historically small African-American communities, Magruder and Bigler's Mill.

During World War II, Camp Peary served as a POW stockade for German prisoners of war, most of whom were naval personnel captured from submarines or surface ships. After the war ended, Camp Peary briefly became a Virginia forestry and game reserve before being reacquired by the navy.

The existence of Camp Peary as a CIA training facility became public knowledge in the early 1970s with the publication of anti-CIA memoirs and texts by former officials such as Philip Agee, Patrick McGarvey, and Victor Marchetti, who had become disenchanted with U.S. foreign policy and the role played by the CIA.

McGarvey describes it as the second phase of CIA training for new recruits. The first phase took place in Washington, DC. Newly hired CIA officers then headed to "the Farm." (The Hertford facility is referred to as "the Point.") Topics covered in demonstration and lecture format included agent handling, agent recruiting, and how to open locks and envelopes. Practicums were also included so that the new CIA officers could practice their trade craft off base. Attention was also given to techniques associated with paramilitary activities, such as light weapons use, demolitions, infiltration, and parachute jumps.

According to these accounts newly recruited CIA officers were not the only ones trained at Camp Peary. Cuban exiles and other foreign agents received training there. So too did the Chicago police department in the late 1960s. Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko also spent much of his three years of isolation at Camp Peary when the CIA was consumed with an internal debate over whether he was a legitimate defector or a Soviet plant.

Camp Peary may now have competitors in training clandestine operatives. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld determined that the military should not be almost totally dependent on the CIA for human intelligence. It needed to develop its own foreign clandestine intelligence collection capability. To accomplish this goal he established the Strategic Support Branch whose members would be capable of recruiting spies, mapping terrain, and interrogating prisoners. According to press reports the Defense Department proposed setting up a training facility modeled on Camp Peary to enable them to carry out these tasks.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; September 11, 2001

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CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is the security intelligence-gathering branch for Canada. This does not include an extensive overseas gathering capability, but is limited to the direct security interests of Canada. Therefore, much of the intelligence regarding foreign policy decisions must come through either diplomatic channels or through cooperation with organizations like the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain's MI-6, both designed to gather intelligence overseas. However, this reliance on allied intelligence does not cause Canada to abandon its own independent analysis of the provided intelligence, as was evinced during the prelude to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Canada was given the intelligence regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability and still chose to not be a part of the invasion force.

Before the formation of CSIS in 1984, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was responsible for intelligence and security within Canada. However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it became apparent that the Security Service branch of the RCMP was committing illegal acts in the pursuit of maintaining the security of Canada. Legislation was introduced in 1983 to disband the RCMP Security Service and replace it with a civilian agency. However, the bill was not passed until June, 1984. CSIS was officially formed on July 16, 1984. The act also formed the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) to monitor CSIS activities and ensure compliance with its mandate and Canadian law. CSIS's mandate is to collect and analyze intelligence on the activities of individuals that may pose a threat to the security of Canada. Furthermore, CSIS is charged to report any such threats to the government. The threats are classified in two categories: terrorism and espionage.

CSIS has a few liaison officers stationed abroad in Allied countries to facilitate intelligence sharing but does not actively conduct offensive intelligence operations. Also, CSIS does not have any police powers. They are not allowed to carry out arrests or detentions. In any case were a crime has been or will be committed, CSIS must bring in the RCMP to make any arrests. However, in terms of surveillance of suspects, CSIS has a wide range with few limits so long as they obtain a warrant. This surveillance can include breaching doctor-patient relationships and illegal entry into homes. This warrant granting was a particularly contentious point within Parliament but was later confirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in 1987.

Originally, CSIS was an incredibly compartmentalized service, allowing minimal access and information sharing between different sections of the service. However, CSIS is a relatively malleable organization and has undergone some overhaul to fix problems that arise. A House of Commons Committee wrote a report in 1990 entitled *In Flux but not in Crisis* and suggested that any changes to CSIS be conducted within the existing structure because the foundation of the organization was solid and working.

Although Canada was named as being one of seven target countries by al-Qaeda, Canada has not been subject to a major terrorist incident in recent years. Much of the terrorism that Canada has historically experienced comes from either domestic terrorist movements (Quebec separatists known as FLQ) or from ethnic conflicts being carried out on Canadian soil. In recent years, particularly following the September 11, 2001,

The official logo of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. (AFP/Getty Images)

terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Canada has become the focus of U.S. attention. Specifically, many within the United States perceive Canada to be a safe haven for terrorists and an easy point of entry for terrorists to then gain access to U.S. soil. The case of Ahmed Ressam (1967–present) highlights U.S. fears. Ressam entered Canada during the 1990s and was eventually recruited into al-Qaeda. He joined a group of extremists that were under surveillance by CSIS but were deemed to not be threats. Ressam eventually entered the United States with the intent to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. However, he was caught, largely through U.S./Canadian cooperation, and eventually sentenced to prison.

September 11 increased the need and amount of information sharing between CSIS and U.S. organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CIA, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). However, following the Maher Arar case (2002), in which members of the RCMP gave information to U.S. authorities that caused the United States to detain Mr. Arar and then deport him to Syria where he was allegedly tortured, caused a slight withdraw of the types of information shared. Both the United States and Canada maintain their ability to withhold information that is deemed essential to national security and they choose not to share it with their counterparts. CSIS maintains liaison officers in Washington, DC, to facilitate greater cooperation between the two countries. Canada is also concerned with the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (renewed 2006), which granted extensive powers of investigation and access to information. Due to the large amount of cross border business, U.S. intelligence organizations can obtain some Canadian citizen's records, which has been seen as a problem among some Canadians. Nevertheless, the CSIS continues to maintain a working relationship with U.S. intelligence organizations which facilitates information sharing that is vital to the security of both sovereign states.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); September 11, 2001; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; USA Patriot Act

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Michael W. Cheek

CARLUCCI, FRANK CHARLES, III (OCTOBER 18, 1930–)

Frank Charles Carlucci III, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) member and secretary of defense, was born on October 18, 1930, in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Strong academically and athletically, he attended Princeton University, where he was roommates with Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger, graduating in 1952. Afterwards, he briefly served in the U.S. Navy from 1952 to 1954, but did not see any significant military action. Returning to his studies, Carlucci went to Harvard University from 1954 to 1955, where he received a graduate degree in business administration.

Soon after his graduation from Harvard, Carlucci was hired by the State Department in 1956. Sent to the Congo on a diplomatic mission, he found himself in a country which was starting to fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. In 1961, he participated in a CIA mission there, reportedly playing a questionable role in the assassination of newly elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba on January 17, 1961, while working to save U.S. citizens living in the Congo from civil unrest.

In 1964, Carlucci was reassigned to the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Only 18 months later, he was once again suspected of having played a role in a coup attempt, leading to his expulsion from the country. Soon after, he was sent to Brazil, either by the State Department or CIA, where he helped to reinforce the powers of the dictatorial government there, while weakening the opposition.

Carlucci left the State Department in 1969 and he reconnected with his old friends from Harvard, serving as undersecretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to Caspar Weinberger during the Nixon administration. He then went on to serve in numerous top positions as ambassador to Portugal from 1974 to 1977, deputy defense secretary from 1981 to 1986, and national security advisor from 1986 to 1987, culminating in his appointment as defense secretary in 1987 by President Ronald Reagan.

His nomination was approved by a Senate vote of 91 to 1. He remained in this post until 1989 and was seen as less of a hard-liner towards the Soviet Union when compared to those in his entourage.

He remained active in politics, advising the Bush administration and retained many business and corporate interests, most notably as the head of the Carlyle Group.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence

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Arthur Holst

CARNIVORE, PROJECT

Project CARNIVORE was a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) e-mail monitoring operation. With a court order or the lawful consent of the Internet Service Provider (ISP), the FBI would attach the CARNIVORE software to the ISP and track incoming and outgoing e-mail traffic for specific information. It was able to record the addresses of senders and receivers of e-mails, the subject line as well as their content. CARNIVORE began under the code name Omnivore in February 1997 and came into existence under this name in June 1999.

The FBI championed the system as a highly targeted intelligence collection tool that was flexible and could easily be adjusted to the details of a court order. It was characterized by the FBI as similar in nature to a system for tracing the path of telephone calls. Critics argue that this analogy is mistaken because CARNIVORE also provided officials with the content of the messages. They also note that given the nature of e-mails and ISPs it is necessary for the FBI to have access to billions of packets of information in order to identify those from the desired target. This capacity places the e-mails of innocent individuals at risk of being "opened." These concerns became especially pronounced after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the passage of the USA Patriot Act.

In July 2000, the Electronic Privacy Information Network (EPIC) sued the FBI through the Freedom of Information Act to obtain information regarding the information obtained through CARNIVORE. The FBI released a set of documents in October 2000 in compliance with this request. EPIC stated that because of redactions to 400 pages and the failure to release some 200 additional pages, little of importance was contained in these documents. Further reports released in 2005 indicated that the FBI had changed the name of CARNIVORE to DCS [Digital Collection System]-1000 and had stopped using it in FY 2002 and FY 2003 in favor of other commercially available software.

The FBI's December 2003 report showed that six interceptions were carried out under court orders. None lasted more than 60 days, the normal period of the court order. Four involved providing material support to terrorists, one involved weapons of mass destruction, and one involved the sexual exploitation of children. The February 2003 report identified three intercept operations: one each for mail fraud, extortion and arson, and prohibited distribution of a controlled substance.

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CARRANZA, LIEUTENANT RAMON DE

Carranza was a Spanish naval attaché during the Spanish-American War who established a spy ring in Montreal. Carranza was connected with the Spanish Admiralty. In the outbreak of war with the United States, Carranza had hoped to have his own command, where he could take part in combat operations, but was instead assigned as a naval attaché, first in Washington, DC, and then to Canada, as part of the staff of Luis Polo y Bernabe, the Spanish ambassador to the United States.

Carranza and a small team of spies left with Bernabe, who was returning to Spain. En route, Carranza and the other spies disembarked at ports along the St. Lawrence and headed to Montreal, where they rented a house. Carranza's objective was to acquire information about the American naval strategy that could be valuable to Spanish generals and admirals. He recruited several spies to assist his efforts. One such recruit was George Downing, a petty officer on the cruiser *Brooklyn*. Carranza revealed his plans to Downing in a compromised hotel room, where an American agent was listening in the adjoining room. Downing was apprehended on May 7, 1898, in the act of mailing classified naval information. He was discovered hanged from an apparent suicide.

Carranza's other espionage activities included recruiting agents to enlist in Tampa and San Francisco in order to join American forces in Cuba and the Philippines. From there, his agents would learn about American military movements, cross over to the Spanish lines, and share the information. To achieve this goal, Carranza enlisted the aid of a Canadian detective agency, which referred him to Frank Arthur Mellor. Mellor's job was to befriend sailors, intoxicate them, and remunerate them to spy for Spain.

Ultimately, Carranza's Montreal spy ring was broken by John E. Wilkie, who headed the newly established U.S. Secret Service. With the help of the Dominion government of Canada, Wilkie's operatives intercepted Carranza's letters containing damning information. Carranza was thus forced to leave Canada and dismantle his operation, ending Spanish espionage activities in the United States.

See also: Spanish-American War

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Dino E. Buenviaje

CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Jimmy Carter was president from 1977 to 1981. Admiral Stansfield Turner served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) under Carter, although he was not his first choice for DCI. Carter initially nominated Theodore Sorenson, an aide to President John Kennedy, but his name was withdrawn due to controversy surrounding his unauthorized use of government documents in writing a biography of Kennedy and his earlier anti-Vietnam war stance. Ford's DCI, George Bush, lobbied to keep the position but was turned down by Carter. Turner's nomination was not well received by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He was viewed as an outsider with little background in intelligence that was sent to the CIA to bring the CIA under White House control. Turner's ability to accomplish that mission was undermined by his inexperience and by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who took it upon himself to deliver the daily intelligence brief to the president and more generally limit Turner's access to Carter.

Frank Church (right) talks with President Jimmy Carter on August 12, 1977. Church served as the chair of the Church Committee, established in 1975, in reaction to a *New York Times* article which outlined extensive—and illegal—domestic activities such as wiretappings, break-ins, and mail openings by the CIA. (National Archives)

In defining intelligence priorities, Carter was often at odds with the intelligence community. Where President Gerald Ford had sought to place limits on congressional efforts to involve itself in CIA oversight, Carter spoke of his interest in working closely with congressional leaders to pass charter legislation. He, along with Turner, also placed more value in technology as a tool for collecting information than he did in traditional spies. As a result a dramatic decline in the number of employees in the Operations Directorate from about 8,000 to 4,730 took place. When Carter did come to see the value of human intelligence as a result of the surprise ouster of the Shah in Iran rather than move to increase that capability, he made the CIA into a scapegoat. Finally, as with other presidents before him, Carter sought policy support from the CIA on important policy matters more than he did intelligence analysis. Turner was expected to support the administration's contention that the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II Treaty was verifiable, a major point of contention by its opponents. He also released a formerly classified CIA report on global oil supplies in an effort to build support for his energy policy.

Carter began his administration as perhaps the president least interested in covert action. While reportedly no covert operation was rejected by the president, a general atmosphere of caution governed the decision-making process. By the end of Carter's term in office, a marked change in attitude had taken place. Carter sought an active covert action campaign against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan following its invasion of that country. Often he and Turner encountered resistance from CIA professionals who judged there to be little chance of success. Carter also turned to covert action in a failed effort to rescue Americans held hostage in the American embassy in Iran following the fall of the Shah. A third region where Carter turned to covert action to advance American interests was Africa, where he sought to counter Soviet gains in Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia.

See also: Bush, George Herbert Walker; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Eagle Claw, Operation; Intelligence Community; Turner, Admiral Stansfield

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Glenn P. Hastedt

CASEY, WILLIAM
(MARCH 13, 1913–MAY 6, 1987)

William Casey was the 13th Director of Central Intelligence. He served under President Ronald Reagan from January 28, 1981 to January 29, 1987, when he resigned after being debilitated by a brain tumor. Casey was born in Queens, New York, and obtained a law degree from St. John's University in 1937. During World War II, Casey became station chief of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) station

in London. In that capacity he was responsible for running agents into Germany. After World War II ended, Casey returned to private life as an author, practicing attorney, and businessperson. He also became active in Republican Party politics. In 1966 he mounted an unsuccessful campaign for the party's nomination to run for Congress and in 1968 he actively participated in Richard Nixon's presidential campaign. Nixon appointed Casey head of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1971. From there he went to the State Department as an undersecretary of state and the Export-Import Bank as chairman. As chair of the SEC, Casey had his first run-in with Congress over perjury charges relating to testimony regarding his handling of politically sensitive files during the 1972 campaign.

Casey served as Reagan's campaign manager in the 1981 presidential contest. When victory seemed assured. he organized a bipartisan foreign policy advisory group. The most pressing foreign policy problem facing the United States, it concluded, was the spread of Communism into Latin America. By all accounts Casey hoped to become either secretary of state or secretary of defense in the Reagan administration but he was not offered either of these posts and settled for DCI with the understanding that this position would be given cabinet rank.

Casey's mission at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as both he and President Reagan saw it was quite direct and straightforward. It was to energize the agency and make it a leading instrument of American foreign policy. To that end he supervised a large expansion in its operations, hiring 2,500 new employees. He also rehired most of the 820 CIA officials let go by DCI Stansfield Turner. By 1985 the CIA was the fastest-growing unit in the government. Casey also shared with Reagan the view that the Soviet Union was a very real threat to the United States and that Central America would be a key battleground with Communist forces.

Casey brought with him an OSS view of intelligence that emphasized clandestine activity and human intelligence. Critics labeled it a "40-year-old" idea of intelligence and in many respects this was true. Casey's last significant exposure to intelligence prior to becoming DCI was his service on the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1976 to 1977. His traditionalist view of intelligence caused him to reject the Reagan transition team's recommendation to break up the CIA into three separate divisions: covert action, analysis, and one that combined FBI and CIA counterintelligence operations.

As DCI, Casey pressed hard to expand U.S. covert capabilities and contacts with foreign intelligence organizations, in particular with Eastern Europe and Israeli intelligence organizations. He also energized and expanded American covert operations undertakings. Often these became "overt" covert operations. His support for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan to force a Russian withdrawal had widespread support in the government. This was not so for covert operations in Central America. Often they were carried out without congressional knowledge or approval. The most extreme case being operations in Nicaragua and the Iran-Contra Affair, which involved an attempt to get around the Boland Amendment ban on funding for the Contras to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua by using proceeds from the sale of weapons to Iran that were also designed to bring about the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Oliver North, who ran the arms for hostages exchange out of the National Security Council, identified Casey as the driving force behind the project. Casey became incapacitated with brain cancer, and never did present his version.

The content of intelligence estimates was another controversial area during Casey's term as DCI. He expressed the view that the estimates produced by the CIA were "his estimates" and that as such he could adjust them. This led to charges that he politicized the estimating process. The major points of contention were over the Soviet estimates and judgments about the level of unrest in Mexico. Evidence also points to a willingness on Casey's part to involve the CIA in domestic spying on Americans. Early in Reagan's first term he approved a draft executive order that would have permitted the CIA to conduct covert operations in the United States and lifted the prohibition on electronic surveillance and clandestine entries in the United States.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI); Intelligence Community; Iran-Contra Affair; Office of Strategic Services; Reagan Administration and Intelligence

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CASTRO, FIDEL
(AUGUST 13, 1926–)

Fidel Castro, the Communist leader of Cuba since 1959 and the creator of the first Communist state in the Americas, was born in on August 13, 1926, in Biran, Holguin Province of Cuba, into a well-established farming family. He was educated at two Jesuit schools in Santiago de Cuba and then at the Colegio de Belen in Havana. He continued his studies in Havana, attending the University of Havana where he studied law.

While in Havana, Castro became a member of the Insurrectional Revolutionary Union, involving himself in the organization's violent means for revolution. Unsatisfied with the group's progress, Castro joined the Orthodox Party, which aimed to highlight governmental corruption. Soon after, he joined the Caribbean Legion in 1947, which failed in its attempt to overthrow the government in the Dominican Republic.

Castro traveled to the Pan-American Union Conference in Bogotá, Columbia, in 1948. While there, many speculate that Castro was involved in the assassination of Columbian liberal party leader Jorge Gaitan. Interestingly, Castro escaped Columbia on a plane supplied by the Cuban government, which he opposed. Upon his return, Castro finished his studies and began practicing law in 1950, mostly taking cases defending poor people.

He gained popularity, announcing his campaign for the upcoming election as a member of the Orthodox Party in 1951. Soon after, however, General Fulgencio

Batista overthrew the Cuban government with American help on March 10, 1951, canceling the elections. In response, Castro tried to take Batista to court for violating the Cuban constitution, but his case was refused.

Infuriated by Batista, Castro staged an armed attack on the Moncada Barracks complex near Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953. The attack failed and Castro lost just under a half of his 135 men. Castro and his men were later captured by a government patrol in the Sierra Maestra region and were put on trial in October 1953. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison, serving only two before he received amnesty from Batista and moved to Mexico on July 7, 1955.

Castro founded the July 26th Movement in Mexico and met Che Guevara. After fundraising in the United States, the group landed in Cuba on November 26, 1956. Batista sent roughly 10,000 troops to counter Castro and other rebel groups in the area. Castro, along with Guevara, staged a highly successful guerrilla campaign, thanks to surprise attacks and desertions from Batista's troops. On December 31, 1958, Batista fled Cuba and a new government was formed on January 5, 1959. Initially, Castro only acted as commander in chief, but assumed presidency within a few months. He toured the United States in April 1959, but relations between the two countries soured quickly.

Castro nationalized over $850 million worth of U.S. businesses and properties, leading to a U.S. sugar embargo and an emigration of upper-class Cubans towards the United States, particularly Florida. He aligned himself with the USSR, receiving economic and military aid.

The Bay of Pigs attack followed and Castro's forces successfully destroyed a CIA-supported Cuban exile invasion. Castro solidified his control and the United States put a full economic and travel embargo in place on February 7, 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis followed in late October 1962 as Soviet nuclear weapons were delivered to the island. Ultimately, the United States and USSR resolved the crisis peacefully, but Castro's willingness to support the USSR earned him significant economic aid.

Castro went on to support Communist movements through Latin America and Africa, often sending Cuban troops. The CIA often targeted Castro, who claims to have survived over 600 attempts on his life. With the fall of the USSR, Castro and Cuba have struggled. His proponents claim that he has developed the most advanced schools and hospitals in Latin America, whereas his detractors claim that he is a human rights violator and dictator.

Castro resigned from the presidency of Cuba in February 2008. He had held this position since 1976. He was succeeded by his brother Raul, to whom he had earlier granted significant powers when he fell ill in 2006. While stepping down from his government post, Castro retained the position as head of the Cuban Communist Party.

See also: Bay of Pigs; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Cuban Missile Crisis; Guevara, Ernesto "Che"; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence

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CAVANAGH, THOMAS
(1925–)

Thomas Cavanagh pled guilty to two counts of espionage and was sentenced on May 23, 1985, to two concurrent life terms in prison. Cavanagh, a civilian employee of Northrup Corporation, attempted to sell secret information on Stealth aircraft technology to the Soviet Union. He was thwarted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which learned of his interest and posed as Soviet officials. Three meetings were held between Cavanagh and the FBI agents. The first meeting was held on December 10, 1984, with Cavanagh expressing concern over tight security at the Northrup plant and his need for money right away and introduced himself as Mr. Peters. A second meeting was held two days later and the third meeting was held on December 18. At the last meeting Canavangh turned over documents in return for $25,000. He was immediately arrested.

Cavanagh turned to espionage in an effort to obtain enough funds to erase outstanding personal debts that he feared would prevent him from having his top-secret security clearance renewed.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Fleet Intelligence Center; Peters, J.

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CENTRAL BUREAU

The Central Bureau was a World War II Allied signals intelligence organization that came under the command of General Douglas MacArthur after he evacuated the Philippines to the Japanese in 1942 and took up position in Melbourne, Australia. Upon arriving in Australia, he found seven different signals intelligence units. They would be joined by an eighth, Station CAST, U.S. Navy SIGINT group which had also been stationed in the Philippines. MacArthur, who before the outbreak of World War II had possessed his own signals intelligence unit in the Philippines, found this situation unacceptable. Accordingly he issued orders establishing two units: an intercept organization first referred to as No. 5 Wireless Section and a research and control group to intercept and cryptanalyze Japanese intelligence that was known as the Central Bureau.

The Central Bureau was set up on April 15, 1942, as a joint U.S.-Australian organization. It employed interpreters, translators, and intercept and communication workers along with cryptographic and cryptanalytic personnel. At the outset Americans made up 50 percent of its personnel with Australian army and air force personnel each making up 25 percent. In carrying out its work, the Central Bureau was expected to work in

cooperation with other signals intelligence centers in the United States, Great Britain and India. It was mid-1943 before the Central Bureau was able to break a high-level Japanese army code, the Water Transport Code. This was the code the Japanese used for communications on troop movements. Another code was broken soon thereafter when it was discovered by Allied forces among the material left behind by retreating Japanese forces in New Guinea.

The Central Bureau was one of two Allied signals intelligence operations in the Southwest Pacific. The other was a joint Royal Navy/U.S. Navy Fleet Radio Unit that was also stationed in Melbourne. It did not report to MacArthur but to the Commander of the U.S. Navy 7th Fleet.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Coastwatchers

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CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE

The Central Imagery Office (CIO) was established within the Department of Defense on May 6, 1992, by a Defense Department directive and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) directive. Its stated mission was to provide support to the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other federal government departments and agencies on matters concerning imagery relating to national security.

The CIO was a response to growing congressional frustration and accompanying political pressure over the failure to operate a coherent system for managing the production and dissemination of imagery intelligence as well as budgetary concerns over the growing expense of imagery intelligence and duplication of effort. The need for the system was one of the central lessons that policy makers took away from the Persian Gulf War. In April 1992 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates had argued against creating a National Imagery Agency, as called for both by Congress and a study group he had established. The congressional vision of a National Imagery Agency was the more expansive of the two visions, as it called for this new agency to absorb the CIA's national Photographic Intelligence Center and the Defense Mapping Agency.

As established, the CIO did not replace any operating agency but was targeted at coordinating imagery activities at a national level. In this role it was to help set standards, engage in system development, advising on future requirements, evaluating performance, and ensuring responsiveness by existing agencies. Setting up the CIO did not calm congressional pressures for further centralization and in his 1995 confirmation hearings as DCI, John Deutch promised to centralize all imagery collection, distribution, and analysis functions.

True to his word, after confirmation Deutch established a National Imagery Agency Steering Group. Out of its recommendations emerged the idea of the National Imagery

and Mapping Agency (NIMA). In November 1995 Deutch and Secretary of Defense William Perry jointly announced their support for it. NIMA came into existence in October 1996, absorbing the Defense Mapping Agency, the Central Imagery Office, NPIC, the imagery support resources of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the resources of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program and National Reconnaissance Program.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Department of Defense Intelligence; Deutch, John Mark; Director of Central Intelligence; Gates, Robert Michael; National Imagery and Mapping Agency; National Reconnaissance Office

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is one of the United States' most internationally recognized independent intelligence sourcing agencies. With its national headquarters located in Langley, Virginia, the CIA is responsible for the collection and dissemination of intelligence that contributes directly to the national security of the country. It provides intelligence to the president, Congress, and various policy makers to assist them in making informed decisions concerning domestic and international U.S. policy.

The CIA was created under the umbrella of the National Security Act of 1947, which also established the National Security Council (NSC) and made the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) the head of the CIA. The DCI served as the head of intelligence services and functioned as presidential advisor for national security–related matters. Furthermore, the National Security Act of 1947 charged the CIA with the co-ordination of intelligence activities, including overseeing information evaluation for the sake of national security. It also placed the CIA under the auspices of the National Security Council, which could direct specific intelligence duties be undertaken.

In 1949 a new act, the Central Intelligence Agency Act, was passed to ensure that the usual budgetary restrictions applicable to agency federal funding did not affect CIA operations. This act also stipulated that the CIA's roles and functions (personnel, salaries, etc.) were beyond public reproach; that is, the CIA was exempt from the usual federal disclosures so as to protect the sensitive nature of the agency itself.

Eventually the DCI's role in the CIA increased in importance. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) was created in 1953 by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect its strategic role within both the CIA and DCI. The DDCI provided intelligence information and advice to both the president and the NSC. In 2004 the role of the DCI was further amended with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This act created a Director of National Intelligence, who took on the

community-wide roles previously prescribed to the DCI. A separate Director of Central Intelligence Agency was now created.

The United States has always employed the use of information-gathering agencies and has always engaged in information sourcing activities. Prior to the National Security Act of 1947 the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had been gathering information independently and forwarding it, as required, to the relevant organizations. Although the sharing of intelligence amongst external agencies worked in some cases, it became troublesome as the OSS did not have complete jurisdiction over nondomestic intelligence gathering. The gathering of intelligence had traditionally been shared by both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and sections of military command. In 1945, under Executive Order 9261 by President Harry Truman, the OSS was decommissioned and transferred all of its powers and functions to the State and War Departments. Extensive debate had surrounded the viability of the OSS, the FBI, and various military services in autonomous information and intelligence gathering, especially when it became clear that each agency refused to consider partial or complete mergers to provide a centralized service.

In 1946, in an effort to further centralize intelligence gathering and dissemination, Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). This group would provide added support, structure, and coordination to existing agencies without negating their importance or functions within the intelligence sector. The CIG had operated under the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), which was a conglomerate of the secretaries of state, war, and the navy and the appointed presidential representative.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 appeared to have cloaked the CIA in a shroud of secrecy. The agency was afforded protection from disclosure and in doing so increased its ability in intelligence sourcing and functions. This was also helped by the fact that funding could be directed as needed. That said, the CIA is not privy to unlimited amounts of funding and must still remain financially accountable to various committees and groups. These include the Office of Management and Budget, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as well as the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees within both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

In 1997 President Bill Clinton released the funding figures of the aggregate budget for the fiscal year for the first time to answer a Freedom of Information (FOI) request within a lawsuit. This figure included all of the U.S. intelligence agencies and their activities; it was not expressively for the CIA. At no time has the budget of the CIA been made public. It was revealed that the budget for 1997 was $26.6 billion and a further $26.7 billion the following fiscal year. The CIA requires significant amounts of funding to ensure that the role it plays within the global (and domestic) intelligence landscape is stable and uncompromising in its intent to protect the nation.

The National Security Act of 1947 was amended by Congress in 1953 to allow for a DDCI, who would be appointed by the president with full consultation and agreement by the Senate. This was a break with tradition, because until the amendment, Deputy Directors were appointed by the director. The director presides over the various directorates and divisions found within the agency. There is also an Executive Director (EXDIR) and a Directorate of Support.

The CIA is made up of Directorates and divisions that deal with intelligence of varying nature. The CIA encompasses four Directorates, one Centre, and Two Offices. The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) is considered to be the epicenter of analytical intelligence dissemination and sourcing. It is responsible for analyzing information and its perceived consequences upon national policies and international interests. The DI is responsible for the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB). Each brief contains information pertinent to interests of national security. The PDB remains a confidential presidential brief. The DI is also active in providing information to policy makers in relation to the United States. Aside from providing intelligence to policy makers and the president, the DI also disseminates information to the public in the form of the popular *World Factbook*. This book is available for free distribution and consultation on the Web; it can also be purchased for inclusion in public and private libraries around the world. The *Factbook* contains information on more than 250 countries around the world and quietly illustrates the CIA's ability for information gathering.

The CIA employs the use of technology and engineering within the global landscape and does this through the Directorate of Science and Technology (DSI). The DSI encompasses technological research and development as well as deployment of new technologies to supplement intelligence gathering in the field. The DSI is responsible for satellite technologies and as such provides active support for the National Reconnaissance Office. In an increasingly unstable world the CIA must remain at the forefront of intelligence and as such must develop and deploy technology that will ensure this is the case.

The CIA restricts public information on two Directoratesdirectorates, the Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of Support. The Directorate of Operations is where clandestine operations originate from hence a total blackout of information. It remains, by very definition, the most elusive of the Directorates. The Directorate of Support is the backbone of the CIA in that it provides the necessities required to function, such as finance and human resources.

The Centre for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) functions both as a think tank and an intelligence repository and is also in charge of historical documents and materials. Its publications include the classified journal and the unclassified journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, as well as numerous monographs and articles. The CSI encourages intelligence related academic pursuits and is actively involved within the higher education sector. The CSI is well known for the Officer in Residence Program, which sponsors officers to educate students on the validity and importance of intelligence studies in higher education. This ensures that the CIA is visible in the academic community as it recruits college-educated graduates from a diverse range of fields.

The CIA also contains several offices. The Office of Public Affairs functions much like an advisory body to the director on all communications (internal and external). Such is the breadth of the Office that it is spread into two district divisions: Media Relations and Public and Internal Communications. The Media Relations division (with the Publications and Film Industry Liaison) aims to ensure that the integrity of the CIA is upheld in print and filmic representation. The Public and Internal Communications unit provides the public with information as required on intelligence and other CIA activities. The OPA functions as the public relations vehicle of the CIA; it

also maintains the extensive external web presence which allows for a greater dissemination of nonclassified information to public users. The Office of the General Council provides legal advice to the director on all matters of intelligence gathering and the services and functions associated with it.

Despite the fact that the CIA promotes itself widely in the American community, it remains an organization that must, for the sake of its own reputation, remain somewhat impregnable to the prying eye and autonomous in the roles it plays within the wider intelligence community. For national security sake, the CIA must be allowed to gather and disseminate intelligence on an ad hoc basis, that is, when it is clear that intelligence must be utilized in order to achieve an objective. The level of transparency that the organization works within is therefore minimal, however in recent years the CIA has had to answer questions dealing with the collection and dissemination of intelligence and intelligence sourcing. This issue increased substantially when the United States became a target of terrorism and in turn went to war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The CIA is an important fixture in the contemporary intelligence community and has also managed to provide intelligence assistance to countries in need of specialist intelligence, such as Australia. It has managed to maintain a formidable presence in the domestic and international communities in an ever-changing and uncertain world.

See also: Bush, George H. W., Administration and Intelligence; Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Carter Administration and Intelligence; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Cold War Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; Family Jewels; Ford Administration and Intelligence; Intelligence Community; Johnson Administration and Intelligence; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; Nixon Administration and Intelligence; Office of Strategic Services; Post–Cold War Intelligence; Reagan Administration and Intelligence; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; Truman Administration and Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 was an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. It was adopted as Public Law 81-110 (Public Law 110) and has been codified in the United States Code (USC) at 50 USC Section 403a.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 as a part of the National Security Act. The turf battles between sections of the military, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), and others had demonstrated the need for a new unified approach to intelligence, the lack of which had been so deadly on December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 dealt with the need for secrecy in the conduct of intelligence work. An intelligence agency, which is by nature an organization with secrets, needs privacy in its operations, personnel activities, and in its financing of its activities. Some versions of democratic ideology claim that government secrecy is undemocratic and unacceptable in an open society. This position notwithstanding, the law was adopted to legally protect United States intelligence efforts from hostile powers. Otherwise, American intelligence operations would be hindered or undermined completely.

The Constitution of the United States requires publication of the expenditures of the government. However, the law permits the CIA to keep confidential its fiscal and administrative procedures. This means that the CIA's budget is not open to the public for any reason unless the agency chooses to reveal it. It has done so once (1997), but has announced that it will not do so again. The law also exempts the CIA from the normal limitations on spending that are placed on the expenditure of most other federal funds.

Public Law 110 (PL-110) also exempts the CIA from being compelled legally to disclose anything about itself. The exemption includes the organization of the CIA, any and all facts about its staff, its recruitment and training of agents, and the titles and salaries of the officials who lead the organization. The Act also exempts its functions, procedures, and practices.

PL-110 also authorizes the creation of a program for handling foreign agents or other "essential aliens." These are people who can be brought to the United States from outside of normal immigration procedures. They can be given new identities and also economic support.

Numerous hearings have been held by Congress on amending the 1949 Act. A number of amendments have been enacted.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) INFORMATION ACT

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Information Act of 1984 exempts the Agency's "operational files" (defined as any records pertaining to the sources and methods used by the Agency in conducting foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations) from the ordinary disclosure, publication, and search and review requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). However, because of the historical value of the Agency's records and the public interest that is served by making them available,

the Act also requires that records and files withheld under the exemption be reviewed by the Agency every ten years in order to determine whether any can be removed from the "operational files" category and released to the public through the FOIA. CIA records not designated as "operational files" remain subject to the FOIA's standard disclosure provisions. The CIA Information Act was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on October 15, 1984, and was the result of multiple congressional hearings and years of lobbying by the CIA and other intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

The CIA Information Act was also the result of compromise. Although the CIA had sought a total exemption from the requirements of the FOIA, Congress instead granted the Agency the more limited exemption for its highly sensitive operations files. This was done primarily to relieve the Agency of the time-consuming burden of searching and reviewing requested records that are usually classified (due to national security concerns) and therefore not releasable under the FOIA anyway. Such relief, however, came with the understanding that the CIA would, in turn, substantially increase its responsiveness to FOIA requests for regular, less sensitive files. Some contend that this has not been the case. Also, the Agency's application of the exemption has often been criticized as overly broad, being used to deny the public access to records that should, in fact, be released.

The CIA was the first agency to receive such a special exemption from the provisions of the FOIA, but since 1984 the CIA Information Act has been used by Congress as the model and rationale for granting similar "operational files" exemptions to other intelligence agencies, namely the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (1999), the National Reconnaissance Office (2002), the National Security Agency (2003), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (2006).

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial Intelligence Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; National Security Agency; Reagan Administration and Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

The Central Intelligence Group was the immediate predecessor organization of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). When President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9621 on September 20, 1945, effective on October 1 of that year, he disbanded

the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This was the World War II U.S. intelligence organization responsible for espionage, sabotage, and analytic activities. Its demise left the future structure of U.S. intelligence operations uncertain.

Many elements in the U.S. government, most notably the State, Army, and Navy Departments; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the Bureau of the Budget, disagreed over such intelligence questions as the need for a centralized intelligence organization, and if it were to come about, what tasks would be assigned to it and what coordination mechanisms would be put into place. After a number of exchanges of memoranda and meetings, President Truman, on January 22, 1946, issued an executive order that established the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), comprising the secretaries of state, war, and navy and the president's personal representative. Its duty was to plan, develop, and coordinate all federal intelligence activities. The directive also created the post of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who was designated by the president and responsible for the NIA. Rear Admiral Sidney William Souers was nominated as the first DCI. Additionally, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was founded as an intelligence organization directed by the DCI.

Although the CIG was at first just a small group of analysts, it broadened its sphere of activities to a large degree during the short period of its existence. DCI Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg, who succeeded Souers as DCI on June 10, 1946, soon created the Office of Special Operations and absorbed into it the Strategic Services Unit. It had been the operational arm of the OSS and was transferred to the War Department after the dissolution of the OSS. This new office became the nucleus of American foreign secret intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Moreover, the CIG expanded its intelligence operations into Latin America. Intelligence gathering here had been the special province of the FBI, and during World War II J. Edgar Hoover had succeeded in blocking any intrusion into Latin America by the OSS or other intelligence organizations. President Truman, however, thought that the FBI's responsibilities should be limited to within the United States and so denied Hoover's plan of replacing the FBI by the CIG.

The CIG also took over the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Originally established in 1941 within the Federal Communications Commission and turned over to the War Department after the war, the FBIS was responsible for monitoring foreign broadcasts and propaganda.

In addition to those intelligence-gathering capabilities, the CIG also formed the Office of Research and Evaluation, and began setting up intelligence analysis functions. Thus, although the CIG rapidly enlarged its scope, its standing was somewhat insecure. This was partly due to the fact that the CIG did not have any statutory mandate, its own budget, or personnel. The CIG budget and personnel were provided by the Departments of State, War, and Navy. In order to settle these issues, the National Security Act was passed and signed by President Truman on July 27, 1947. It became effective on September 18, 1947. Under its terms the CIA was founded and the CIG terminated.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Hoover, J. Edgar; Office of Strategic Intelligence

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CHALET

CHALET reconnaissance satellites were operated by the National Reconnaissance Office between 1978 and 1989. They were placed into a geosynchronous orbit by Tiran 3C and Titan 3D boosters. Each CHALET satellite weighed some 1,800 kilograms and carried a 38 meter-diameter receiving dish. It had a space life of five to seven years. The cost of the initial CHALET launch was estimated to be $125 million, with later launches costing from $250 to $300 million each. CHALET's existence was made public in a 1979 *New York Times* article and the program's name was changed to Vortex.

CHALET was a multiple mission reconnaissance satellite responsible for collecting ground and in-flight signals intelligence (SIGINT), radio communications intelligence (COMINT), radar emissions intelligence (RADINT), and missile test telemetry intelligence (TELINT). Although its primary mission was to monitor Soviet missile flight telemetry emissions, CHALET was also used to monitor activity in the Middle East during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield.

A total of seven CHALET/VORTEX launches took place. The first came on June 10, 1978, and the last on May 10, 1989. Other launches took place on October 1, 1979; October 31, 1981; January 31, 1984; and September 2, 1988. The first three launches bore the CHALET designator and the last three were VORTEX satellites.

CHALET satellites were successors to the Rhyolite satellites. As originally designed, the CHALET reconnaissance satellite appears to originally have lacked the telemetry collection capability possessed by them. This capability was added to CHALET reconnaissance satellites after it was discovered that Christopher Boyce and Andrew Daulton Lee had sold the Soviet Union information about the Rhyolite satellites, thus compromising their effectiveness. It is believed that the first reconfigured CHALET satellite was the one launched on October 1, 1979.

In the 1990s, CHALET/VORTEX reconnaissance satellites were replaced by a newer generation of satellites known as MERCURY, or Advanced VORTEX. Three launches were attempted, only two of which were successful. MERCURY 1 and II were sent into near-geosynchronous orbit on August 27, 1994, and April 24, 1996, respectively. The launch of MERCURY III on August 12, 1998, failed.

See also: National Reconnaissance Office; Satellites

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CHAMBERS, WHITTAKER
(APRIL 1, 1901–JULY 9, 1961)

Born Jay Vivian Chambers on April Fool's Day, 1901, Chambers hated his name and experimented with several variations before settling on Whittaker, his mother Laha's maiden name. Possessed of a dynamic and mercurial personality, Chambers was obsessed all his life with finding the big answers to life's questions and immersing himself in a worthy cause. As a student at Columbia University, Chambers studied literature and adopted a sloppy bohemian style that he maintained most of his life. Disenchanted with college, Chambers dropped out and joined the Communist Party (CPUSA), writing for the *Daily Worker* and serving briefly as editor of the Communist Party's literary magazine, the *New Masses*. In 1931 Chambers married Esther Shemitz a left-wing New York artist of Russian descent who became his lifelong companion. The next year Chambers entered the Communist Party's underground apparatus, working first in New York; then for Josef Peters in Washington, DC; and finally for Boris Bykov, head of Soviet Military Intelligence in the United States. In 1934 Chambers became the main contact for the "Ware Group" a collection of idealistic young men recruited into the underground by veteran Communist Hal Ware. Ware hoped to influence the policies of the New Deal in a progressive pro-socialist direction, but after his death in an auto accident Peters reorganized the group to engage in espionage.

Chambers serviced dozens of sources during his underground career, most prominently State Department official Official Alger Hiss, with whom he developed a close friendship. Increasingly concerned he would be consumed in the purges sweeping the Soviet Union, Chambers began hording documents and in 1938 severed his ties with the underground. After his defection, Chambers tried to alert the government to the existence of the Soviet espionage network but an interview with Assistant Secretary of State Adoph Berle produced no results. Chambers worked as an editor at *Time* magazine until 1948, when he confessed the full extent of his underground activities to the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Alger Hiss vigorously denied Chambers' allegations, triggering one of the most controversial legal battles in American history. In response to Hiss' denials, Chambers produced the documents he had hidden years previously, dubbed the Pumpkin papers because Chambers hide them overnight in a hollowed-out pumpkin on his farm. The documents helped convict Hiss of perjury but the trial ruined Chambers. Although Hiss served five years in prison, public opinion was on his side and many saw the attack on Hiss as an attack on the legacy

of the New Deal. Chambers resigned from *Time* and, nearly destitute, wrote his powerful memoir *Witness*. The book insured Chambers' place in literary history, secured his finances, and earned him fast friends, such as conservative writer William F. Buckley and ex-Communist Arthur Koestler, but did not rescue his public image. Chambers died on July 9, 1961, of a heart attack, widely believed to have been a neurotic liar. He was vindicated in the 1990s when documents released from the Soviet archives and the VENONA project confirmed his claims.

See also: Buckley, William Frank, Jr.; Cold War Intelligence; Hiss, Alger; McCarthy, Joseph; VENONA

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CHAOS

CHAOS was a covert operation conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), involving surveillance of domestic dissidents during the Vietnam War. During a 15-year period (1959–1974) the CIA, assisted by other government organizations, undertook a large-scale illegal domestic covert operation known as CHAOS. It was one of the largest and most pervasive domestic surveillance programs in American history. Though given the code name CHAOS during the Vietnam War, CIA spying on domestic citizens had its origins dating back to the Cuban Revolution of the late 1950s.

The operation, later known as CHAOS, began in 1959 when President Eisenhower used the CIA to reach out to Cuban exiles following Fidel Castro's Communist revolution. The majority of these exiles were wealthy educated professionals seeking sympathy from the United States. Many were recruited by the CIA for future operations against Castro. The result was the establishment of "proprietary companies, fronts, and covers for its domestic operations."

In 1964, following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the American military buildup in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson permitted then-CIA director, John McCone, to establish a new super-secret branch called the Domestic Operations Division (DOD). Despite the explicit intent of Congress to prohibit CIA operations inside the country, DOD was to "exercise centralized responsibility for the direction, support, and coordination of clandestine operational activities within the United States." The CIA also expanded the role of its Domestic Contact Service (DCS), which had been designed to brief and debrief "selected American citizens" traveling abroad in sensitive areas of intelligence interest to the agency. The service also assisted with the monitoring of arrivals and departures of U.S. nationals and foreigners.

In 1965, Johnson instructed McCone to provide an independent analysis of the growing student anti-Vietnam War protest movement. Many "Teach-Ins" questioning U.S. military action in Vietnam were taking place on college campuses throughout the nation. Previously, the president had relied on J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI) for such information. What prompted Johnson to undertake this course of action was Hoover's insistence that international Communism was manipulating student protests for its own purposes. Johnson wanted the CIA, whose primary responsibility was overseas surveillance, to confirm or deny Hoover's assertion. The CIA's Office of Security, the Counterintelligence division, and the newly established DOD, were put in charge.

In June 1966, Richard Helms was appointed the new Director of Central Intelligence. He slowly expanded the CIA's domestic intelligence operations by conducting covert surveillance intelligence gathering on college and university campuses. As campus antiwar protests spread across the nation in 1966 and 1967, the CIA implemented two new domestic operations. The first, Project RESISTANCE, was set up to provide security to CIA recruiters on college campuses. The program sought active cooperation from college administrators, campus security, and local police to assist in identifying antiwar activists, political dissenters, and "radicals." Information on thousands of students and dozens of groups was given to DOD and government recruiters on campus. The second project, MERRIMAC, was designed to provide warnings about demonstrations around CIA facilities or personnel in and around the nation's capitol. Prompting such moves was the weekend of October 21–22, 1967, when approximately 100,000 Americans went to Washington, DC, to protest their opposition to the Indochina war. It was the largest antiwar protest organized to that time in the history of any capital city of a warring nation. The fear that the movement would move from dissent to resistance and disrupt the machinery of government had created a sense of urgency within Johnson's inner circle.

In July 1968, Helms consolidated all CIA domestic intelligence operations under one program—CHAOS. Richard Ober, head of the Special Operations Group (SOG), was put in charge in order to compare the CIA's domestic intelligence gathering to that provided by the FBI. Johnson pressed Helms to find out if foreign intelligence agencies were in any way connected to the domestic antiwar protests. In response, some 50 CHAOS agents, many currently working overseas, received "several weeks of assignment and training positions to establish their covers as radicals." When they returned to the United States they enrolled in colleges and universities working under cover. By 1970, new efforts were under way including, "black bag operations" (planting false, but incriminating evidence and infiltrators), wiretappings, and mail-openings investigating all types of actions including antiwar protests, travel to international peace conferences, and movements of members of various dissident groups.

An agency document, "International Connections of the U.S. Peace Movement," revealed that the surveillance of domestic dissidents had burgeoned into matters regarding the financing of different antiwar groups, the day-to-day activities and itineraries of "the most prominent peace movement leaders," and the operations of "radical peace movement groups" on U.S. college campuses. It also looked into the activities of women and African-American groups as well. Some of the more noted organizations spied on were Students for a Democratic Society; Women Strike for Peace; American Indian Movement; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee; Grove Press, Inc.; Nation of Islam; Youth International Party; Women's Liberation Movement; Black Panther Party; and Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam.

By the early 1970s deteriorating relations between the FBI and other intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, began to surface. A group of young executives within the CIA, known as the Management Advisory Group (MAG), objected to domestic spying operations. The group claimed that such actions were in violation of the U.S. Constitution. In the summer of 1972, when Helms was informed that two former CIA officers, E. Howard Hunt and James McCord, had been involved in the Watergate capper, the program quickly unraveled. In July 1973 newly appointed CIA Director William Colby promptly terminated Operation CHAOS.

In 1975, two congressional committees, Church and Pike, conducted an extensive investigation of CIA activities during the previous decade. During the course of the hearings it was revealed that approximately 300,000 names of American citizens and organizations were stored in the CHAOS computer system. The CIA had compiled personality files on over 13,000 individuals, including 7,200 U.S. citizens as well as files on over 1,000 domestic organizations. The program is considered one of the most egregious violations of constitutional rights in American history. No link was ever made regarding Communist manipulation of the antiwar movement.

See also: Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Helms, Richard McGarrah; Hoover, J. Edgar; Johnson Administration and Intelligence; McCone, John A.

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Charles F. Howlett

CHERTOFF, MICHAEL (NOVEMBER 28, 1953–)

Michael Chertoff became the second secretary of Homeland Security on February 15, 2005. He was born in Elizabeth, New Jersey, on November 28, 1953, and received his law degree from Harvard University in 1978. After completing a clerkship with Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, Chertoff entered private practice before becoming a prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney Office in New York City in 1983. There

he worked on mafia and political corruption cases. In the following years Chertoff held a number of positions in the U.S. Attorney Office and the Justice Department. In 1990 President George W. Bush appointment him as U.S. attorney for New Jersey. He was reappointed by President Bill Clinton and was the only Bush holdover. From 2001 to 2003 Chertoff was in charge of the Department of Justice's criminal division, where he led the prosecution against Zacarias Moussaoui, a suspect in the 9/11 bombings. Prior to taking the position as secretary of Homeland Security, Chertoff served as a federal judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The only negative vote on his nomination came from Senator Hilary Clinton (D-NY), as a protest for the manner in which junior White House staff was treated by Chertoff when he served as the Republican special counsel on the Senate Judiciary Committee in its Whitewater investigations.

Chertoff was not President George W. Bush's first choice for this position. He nominated New York Police Chief Bernard B. Kerik, but this nomination was withdrawn as legal and ethical questions quickly surfaced concerning his taxes and other matters. Chertoff's reputation as a tough-minded prosecutor and independent thinker, plus the fact he had been approved by the Senate on three occasions, attracted him to Bush.

Although Chertoff was easily confirmed (98–0), his appointment was not without controversy. At issue was the role he played in fashioning the George W. Bush administration's domestic response in the War on Terror. Chertoff was the prime architect of the administration's policy of identifying terrorist suspects as "material witnesses" and jailing them without charging them with a crime. This was a tactic he had successfully employed in prosecuting mafia figures. A 2004 Justice Department report indicated that more than 700 illegal immigrants had been detained and that many encountered physical and verbal abuse while incarcerated.

Chertoff's first major act as secretary of Homeland Security was to announce a six-point agenda for the department in July 2005. The stated goals were (1) to increase overall preparedness, especially for catastrophic events; (2) create better transportation security systems; (3) strengthen border security and interior enforcement; (4) enhance information sharing with partners; (5) improve the department's financial management and human resource systems; and (6) realign the department's organization to maximize mission performance.

Chertoff was replaced by Janet Napolitano, who was selected by President Barack Obama to head the Department of Homeland Security. She was sworn in on January 21, 2009.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Homeland Security, Department of; Intelligence Community; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

CHILD, JULIA McWILLIAMS
(AUGUST 15, 1912–AUGUST 13, 2004)

Julia McWilliams Child was a cooking expert and author and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) employee. She was born on August 15, 1912, in Pasadena, California, as Julia Carolyn McWilliams. She graduated from Smith College in 1934, and then worked in the advertising department of W. & J. Sloane, a prestigious New York–based furniture store. When World War II broke out, Child moved to Washington, DC, and accepted a job as a typist in the Research Unit, Office of War Information, in August 1942, but left the following December, for a job as a research assistant in the office of William J. Donovan, the director of the OSS.

At OSS, Child was also a clerk and administrative assistant before she volunteered for service in the India-Burma-Ceylon region. Child liked the whole adventure of wartime service, sailing on troopships, sleeping on army cots, and wearing military fatigues. She was then reassigned to Ceylon (modern Sri Lanka), as head of the Registry, which processed all classified papers for the invasion of the Malay Peninsula, although Child considered herself no more than a "file clerk." While in Ceylon, she met her future husband, Paul Cushing Child, an OSS mapmaker. In March 1945, the couple transferred to China, which was then the focus of the war. Child continued her work processing classified documents in Kunming, the mountain headquarters for General Claire Chennault's Flying Tigers.

It was during her time overseas in the OSS that Child developed an interest in the culinary arts. In later interviews, Child commented on how bland she found army food. Although the cooking was considered sanitary, Child remembered that many of her colleagues suffered from dysentery anyway.

When the war ended, Child's husband, whom she married on September 1, 1946, was assigned to the U.S. Information Service (then part of the U.S. Department of State) at the U.S. embassy in Paris. There, Child began her cooking career by taking classes at the famous Cordon Bleu, exploring the kitchens and food markets of Europe. Eventually, Child opened L'Ecole des Trois Gourmandes, a cooking school, with chefs Simone Beck and Louisette Bertholle. In 1961, Child's now classic work, *Mastering the Art of French Cooking*, was published.

In early 1963, *The French Chef*, Child's first televised cooking program, aired on public television in Boston. This was first of a series of successful cooking programs for Child that featured contemporary American cuisine. Along with the programs, Child published a number of cookbooks and cooking-related books and won several awards for her work, including a Peabody and an Emmy. Child died on August 13, 2004, in Pasadena, California.

Her classic programs still appear on the Food Network and the bulk of her Cambridge kitchen, where many of her shows were filmed, was meticulously reassembled and transferred, for display, to the National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC. For her OSS service, the CIA Museum, in Langley, Virginia, tried unsuccessfully to get Child to donate memorabilia for the museum's section on the OSS; to date, nothing more has been done on this.

See also: Office of Strategic Services

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Martin J. Manning

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CHILE, CIA OPERATIONS IN

In the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, the U.S. government supported anti-Communist forces in Latin America. From 1963 to 1973, in an effort to limit the influence and appeal of Marxism and socialism, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spent more than $10 million on covert activities in Chile. By 1962, the U.S. government, which wanted to avoid the emergence of a second Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, had become increasingly alarmed by the growing strength of the Chilean Left and the fragmentation of centrist and conservative forces in Chile. The primary objective of CIA activities in Chile from 1963 to 1973, therefore, was to discredit Marxist politicians, especially Salvador Allende, and to encourage Allende's civilian and military opponents to prevent Marxists from assuming power. After Allende won a plurality of the vote in the presidential election on September 4, 1970, the consensus of most U.S. government officials in the Nixon administration and at the CIA was that an Allende presidency would be damaging to U.S. interests. Revelations that President Richard Nixon ordered the CIA to "make the Chilean economy scream" and prevent Allende from coming to power led to a major investigation of U.S. covert activities in the U.S. Congress in 1975.

In 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, more commonly known as the Church Report since it was chaired by Idaho Senator Frank Church, conducted a thorough review of U.S. covert activities in Chile from 1963 to 1973. The Church Committee revealed that CIA covert activities in Chile between 1963 and 1973 were extensive and continuous. Specifically, the CIA sought to influence the outcome of presidential elections in Chile in 1964 and 1970. The CIA employed a variety of clandestine activities, such as funding anti-Allende propaganda and supporting anti-Allende political parties. The Church Report, however, ruled that the CIA was not directly involved in the overthrow and death of Allende in 1973. The main CIA effort against Allende was the failed CIA attempt to block Allende's accession to the presidency in 1970.

In 2000, the U.S. government declassified over 16,000 government documents, including 1,550 from the CIA that detailed U.S. relations with Chile from 1963 to 1990. These documents, although they support the contention that the CIA was heavily involved in influencing the Chilean political system, do not confirm that the CIA assisted in the 1973 coup. The documents do reveal, however, that U.S. military aid to Chile increased from $800,000 in 1970 to almost $11 million in 1972. The documents also reveal that the CIA actively supported the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet once it came to power after the September 11, 1973, coup. Even Peter Kornbluh, a Chile specialist at the National Security Archive, a nonprofit institution that fought for the release of the classified documents concerning U.S. relations with

Soldiers led by General Augusto Pinochet take cover as bombs are dropped on the presidential palace in Santiago on September 11, 1973. The United States secretly supported the overthrow of the democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. (AP/Wide World Photos)

Chile from 1963 to 1990, has been unable to directly link the CIA to the 1973 military coup. In 1962, anticipating the popularity of Allende at the polls in the 1964 presidential election, the Kennedy administration authorized the CIA to implement covert activities in support of two anti-Allende Chilean political parties—the Chilean Radical Party and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC)—led by Eduardo Frei Montalva. In 1963, therefore, the CIA unveiled programs aimed at assisting the anti-Allende parties in attracting more followers, improving their organization and campaign strategies, and portraying a pro-U.S. policy. Various propaganda activities, such as distributing posters and pamphlets, were also employed. The CIA, concerned that Allende's support had increased since his narrow defeat in the 1958 presidential elections against conservative Jorge Allesandri, spent $2.6 million to ensure Frei's victory. Although documents reveal that Frei was unaware of the CIA funding to help his victory, many historians contend that the CIA funding and propaganda was crucial to Frei's victory.

In February 1965, the CIA developed a covert action campaign to support pro-U.S., anti-Allende candidates in the Chilean congressional elections scheduled for March 1965. This covert action, which cost $175,000, targeted a group of moderate and conservative congressmen that would receive preferential treatment in the Chilean mass media. A large portion of the propaganda portrayed Allende's supporters as proponents of an ideology that would be detrimental to Chile. Notwithstanding the covert operations, the politicians of the Chilean Left made significant gains during the 1965 congressional elections. During the 1969 congressional elections, CIA covert activities, specifically the placement of anti-Allende information in Chile's mass media, actually served to polarize the Chilean political system. The moderates lost support in the 1969 congressional elections, whereas the Left and the Right increased their strength.

As the 1970 presidential election approached, it became apparent that Allende's left-wing coalition, Unidad Popular (UP), was gaining strength. In addition, the Christian Democrat candidate, Radomiro Tomic, was emphasizing a more liberal platform than out-going leader Frei. The CIA, therefore, initiated a plan that called for political action and propaganda designed to divide and discredit the Left without supporting any specific candidate. The main thrust of the propaganda campaign was to convince the Chilean people of the dangers inherent in electing a Marxist regime. In early 1970, a CIA agent in Chile was contacted by a representative of International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), which owned the Chilean telephone system. John McCone, the director of the CIA from 1961 to 1965, was a member of the Board of Directors of ITT in 1970. The ITT representative wanted to donate money to the campaign of conservative Alessandri. The CIA agent placed him in touch with a Chilean who helped him funnel ITT funds to Alessandri's election campaign. A few months later, McCone offered to donate $1 million to the Alessandri campaign. The offer, however, was refused by CIA Director Richard Helms.

By August 1970, it was obvious that the CIA campaign was a failure and that Allende was the leading candidate. The Nixon administration, without consulting the U.S. ambassador in Chile nor the secretary of state, authorized the creation of two new CIA plans—Track I (political action) and Track II (a military coup)—to prevent Allende from coming to power. Both plans ran simultaneously until October 24, 1970, when the Chilean Congress confirmed Allende as the president of Chile. Between 1970 and 1973, the CIA spent $8 million in covert activities in Chile to influence the political system.

Track I was an attempt to influence the Chilean Congress to vote for Alessandri, the conservative candidate. Even though Allende won 36.3 percent of the vote in the September 4 presidential elections, he had only won a plurality, not a majority, of the vote. As such, Congress was to decide which of the two leading candidates would be appointed president. The CIA urged Frei to encourage the non-Leftist members of the Congress to vote for Alessandri. The plan called for the election of Alessandri, followed by his resignation and a new presidential election that would allow Frei to run against Allende. Anti-Allende articles were placed in the nation's leading newspaper, El Mercurio. By the end of September, it was apparent that Frei was unwilling to cooperate and the CIA placed greater emphasis on Track II.

Track II was an attempt to convince Chilean military officers of the need to intervene in the Chilean political system to prevent Allende's confirmation as president. Army Commander Rene Schneider, however, was a strong supporter of the Chilean Constitution and refused to entertain the notion of the military intervening in the political system. The CIA, therefore, contacted three different groups of coup plotters. All three groups held that Schneider had to be kidnapped before a military coup could be brought to fruition. CIA agents contacted retired General Roberto Viaux, the leader of one of the coup groups. Acting independently of the CIA, on October 22, 1970, Viaux's henchmen abducted Schneider. Schneider, however, was killed in the botched kidnapping, which shocked other coup supporters. Plans for military intervention, therefore, were terminated. Senior CIA analysts in Washington, DC, however, had previously warned the Nixon administration that a military coup in 1970 was unlikely. The Nixon administration, however, insisted that the CIA attempt to implement Track II.

Following Allende's inauguration on November 3, 1970, the CIA funded groups opposed to Allenge's regime. A large portion of CIA funding went to supporting anti-Allende articles in El Mercurio. The CIA encouraged Chilean and American businesses in Chile to carry out a program of economic disruption in Chile. By 1972, U.S. government agents were aware that elements within the Chilean military were plotting a coup against the Allende government. The CIA, however, reported that U.S. assistance would not be needed for a successful coup. Nevertheless, on August 21, 1973, just two weeks before the coup that overthrew Allende, the United States approved an extra $1 million to fund support for anti-Allende political parties and propaganda. After Pinochet took control of Chile, the CIA discontinued its new covert action funding, but redirected existing funding to try to portray a positive image of the military dictatorship in the mass media. Allegations that the CIA was involved in the death of American citizen Charles Horman, Jr., in the aftermath of the military coup are undocumented.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Church Committee; Cold War Intelligence; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Nixon Administration and Intelligence

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Michael R. Hall

CHIN, LARRY WU-TAI
(1922–FEBRUARY 22, 1986)

Larry Wu-Tai Chin was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1952 until his retirement in 1981. On November 22, 1985, he was arrested for being a Communist Chinese spy. It is estimated that he spied for China for 33 years and was paid as much as $1 million for the information he provided. This information is believed to have included documents relating to President Richard Nixon's trip to China two years before it took place, the conduct of the Vietnam War, national intelligence estimates, and the identity of U.S. agents in China. At his trial in November 1986, Chin admitted to spying for 11 years but claimed he acted in the hopes of improving U.S.-Chinese relations. On February 8, 1986, he was convicted on 17 counts of espionage-related and income tax violations. On February 21, a few weeks prior to his sentencing, Chin committed suicide in his prison cell.

Chin was born in Beijing, China, and was recruited to be a spy while in college. He began working as a translator and interpreter for the U.S. Army Liaison Office during World War II. In 1948 Chin was employed by the U.S. Consulate Office in Shanghai and also began his career in espionage. During the Korean War Chin interviewed Chinese prisoners of war and reportedly sold the names of anti-Communist prisoners

to the Chinese government. In 1952 he started his career with the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). At first Chin was stationed in Japan but later was transferred by FBIS to California. While in Japan he met regularly with his Chinese handler in Hong Kong. While in California he met with his courier in Canada. He would end his CIA career in Washington, DC. Chin became a naturalized American citizen in 1965. The CIA honored him for distinguished service and kept him on as a consultant after his retirement.

Suspicion was first directed toward Chin as a result of a tip from a Chinese source who proved to be Yu Qiangsheng. In 1985 Qiangsheng defected to the United States and brought with him Chin's file. Faced with this evidence, Chin confessed.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

CHINA, INTELLIGENCE OF

The foundations for China's intelligence organizations were laid during the revolutionary period in which the Chinese Communist Party sought to establish its rule. In the early 1930s two intelligence organizations existed. One was centered in Shanghai and the Communist Party, while the other was in the Chinese Communist government that existed in Kiangsi province where Mao Zedong ruled. This later intelligence unit proved to be the stronger of the two. By the late 1930s it was replaced by a newly created Social Affairs Department (SAD) within the Communist Party that was headed by a political ally of Mao. With the Communist Party's victory over Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist forces in 1949, a full array of government intelligence organizations were created to supplement party-based intelligence units such as SAD. The Ministry of Public Security was given jurisdiction over counter subversion, counter-intelligence, monitoring Chinese who returned from abroad, running the labor reform camps, and conducting espionage in Macao, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

In 1962 The Ministry of Public Service's counterespionage functions were given to a newly established Central Investigation Department. They were later assigned to a newly created Ministry of State Security (MSS) in 1983. The 1960s were a volatile time for Chinese intelligence units as with the all political and military institutions in China it became involved in the power struggles that gripped the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution. The Central Investigation Department was abolished for a time, with the People's Liberation Army's (PLAs) general staff taking over its duties. The unit was reestablished following the death of Lin Biao and then became entangled in yet another power struggle as Hua Kuo-feng and Deng Xiaoping vied for control of the party. One reason for transferring counterespionage to the MSS in 1983 was the apparent frustration with the high volume of secret information being leaked to the West. This was particularly true with regard to information about debates occurring within the Communist Party and reports of poor economic and social

conditions within China. Students, both in China and abroad, have been a major concern of the MSS, as Chinese leaders have struggled to deal with the fallout from the Tiananmen Square protests. That year Chinese authorities announced that some 200 Chinese had been accused of spying for the Soviet Union. The 1983 reorganization left the Ministry of Public Service with only traditional police functions.

Organizationally the MSS is divided into a series of bureaus with responsibility for such tasks as domestic intelligence, foreign operations, Taiwan, counterintelligence, intelligence research and analysis, scientific and technological intelligence, electronic or computer intelligence, and liaison with foreign intelligence organizations. Existing alongside the MSS is the Military Intelligence Department of the PLA General Staff. It collects tactical intelligence, order-of-battle intelligence, and general information on the capabilities and strategic outlooks of China's adversaries. A variety of traditional collection systems are used for this purpose including military attachés, recruiting spies, examining the open-source literature, and establishing dummy economic enterprises to purchase technology on the open market.

Chinese intelligence organizations are engaged in both classical human intelligence activities and technological espionage activities. Human intelligence has increasingly been directed at economic targets as well as obtaining high-tech military information. An additional external target of Chinese intelligence identified in contemporary accounts is the Falun Gong. Adherents to this movement, which surfaced in China in the early 1990s, reject the modernization agenda of the Communist Party, favoring instead a return to more traditional humanistic principles. In the technological field China has conducted photographic reconnaissance since 1970. By 1987, 21 satellites had been launched. Ten of these are assumed to be military missions. China also maintains a series of signals intelligence stations, many of which are directed at Soviet and Taiwanese targets.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Industrial Espionage; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

CHINA AND U.S. INTELLIGENCE/ESPIONAGE TO 1949

The United States has long had an interest in events in China, and embarked on collecting information beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. U.S. soldiers were involved in the establishment of the International Settlement in Shanghai, and U.S. Marines served in the defense of American property throughout China. There were many Americans working in China from the 1850s, with Americans fighting at the Battle of Muddy Flat in Shanghai on April 3, 1854, and also some serving in the Ever Victorious Army of General "Chinese" Gordon in 1863. As a result, the U.S. government

kept a close eye on developments in China, and started to build up intelligence information on the Chinese army, and also the political and economic scene in China.

Having a large number of U.S. soldiers in the Philippines, due to the Spanish-American War, it was possible for the United States to contribute 15,500 men to the international force sent to China in 1899 to end the Boxer Uprising. These were placed under the command of General Adna Chaffee, a veteran of the American Civil War and the Indian Plains Wars. It was the first time that the United States needed a large amount of military intelligence on the Chinese army, and much of it was provided by Americans who were working in that part of China. Herbert Hoover, later president of the United States, was a mining engineer at Tientsin during the Boxer Uprising, and was able to help, as were a number of U.S.-born missionaries. For the most part, however, they relied on information gleaned by the British and the French who had a far larger network in northern China. When the U.S. forces attacked Peking, in the east, south of the Tung-Chow Canal, they faced no resistance, as the Chinese soldiers were trying to repel the Russian attack at the Canal. This allowed the American soldiers to enter Peking largely unopposed.

Straight after the Boxer Uprising, the U.S. authorities saw that they may not be able to rely on the other powers in case of war in China again, so they continued to collect military intelligence information on the deployment and the arming of the Chinese forces. Ralph Van Deman, later prominent in U.S. intelligence, had as one of his first important missions in 1906 the recording of the new defenses that had been built to protect Beijing after the Boxer Uprising. When he returned there a few years later, the Japanese protested at his actions and he was withdrawn, but U.S. spying continued more discretely.

In 1911 the Chinese Revolution broke out, and Sun Yat-sen, living in Hawaii, returned quickly to China to become its first president. However, his term in office did not last long, and a succession of presidents took over until 1928 when the end of the Northern Expedition led to Chiang Kai-shek becoming the unchallenged president of China. During the intervening 17 years, the United States had established a large network of intelligence informers, many connected with U.S.-supported Christian missions throughout the country. With so many changes in the political situation throughout the late 1910s and the 1920s, much of the information collected became rapidly out of date. Interest in China remained high. Henry Luce, the founder of *Time* and *Life* magazines, was born in China where his parents were missionaries; and many other prominent Americans had connections with the country, urging that the United States play a more active part in reducing or preventing conflict.

However, the U.S. intelligence was concerned about the growing power of Japan. For this reason, when Chiang took Peking from Chang Tso-lin in 1928, the United States welcomed this as it quickly diminished the overt role of Japan in the administration of China. The need to collect information on the Japanese and their agents throughout China became one of the highest priorities of U.S. and also British intelligence. The Americans also cooperated with the Chinese secret service run by Tai Li, but it is thought that it was a very much one-sided arrangement, with the Chinese gaining more than they gave.

The Office of Strategic Services' (OSS) agents posted to China during this period included Oliver J. Caldwell, who was attached to the Secret Military Police but was also

involved in collecting, often quite openly, intelligence for the Americans. During this period, the U.S. intelligence efforts were also focused on helping with the British war effort in Burma. They made some unexpected discoveries such as about Japanese maneuvers prior to their occupation of Shanghai just after the attack on Pearl Harbor. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and the United States joined the Pacific War, the need for intelligence was quickly realized and the U.S. government promised full cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek. The formation of the OSS saw many agents sent to work in the China-India-Burma Sector, but there were many early problems, with the U.S. armed forces being reluctant to cooperate with the OSS. When Caldwell, now a high-ranking U.S. intelligence agent, went to New Delhi in India, he found himself "cold-shouldered" by the staff in General Stilwell's headquarters, many of whom refused to recognize him. He was posted back to China, to Chungking, the Nationalist capital, after it was realized that he was not only fluent in Mandarin, Foochow, and a number of other dialects, but also spoke perfect unaccented Japanese.

The U.S. naval attaché in Chungking, Commander James McHugh, was the original head of the U.S. intelligence effort in Nationalist China. He was later replaced by Commodore Milton Miles of U.S. naval intelligence, who was also involved in China during this period, managing to establish close links with Tai Li. Miles, however, was suspicious of William Donovan and OSS, preferring to remain independent of the new U.S. intelligence networks, which led to further problems. Some Americans seem to have, surprisingly, remained free in Japanese-occupied east China, especially in Shanghai where many collected intelligence on troop deployments and Japanese military strategy. The major problem the OSS faced was a lack of cooperation with the British. The British were worried should the United States interfere in India, and eventually the China-India-Burma sector was divided up with U.S. intelligence having "free reign" in the former in return for allowing the British to control the latter two areas.

By 1945 the U.S. intelligence were regularly listening in to Japanese military communications, managing to gain vital military information. An agent who worked on this, and who later wrote his memoirs was Byron Winbourn, who was involved in collecting technical information in southeast China. One of the most successful U.S. agents in China during this period was Marine Captain Frank Farrell, who was originally a reporter but in China was posted to Kunming, and from there was involved in operations in southern China. His efforts led to putting much pressure on the Germans, who after May 8, had been ordered to cease any military activity by their own High Command which had surrendered in Europe. Some of the Germans in Canton were keen on cooperating with the Japanese but Farrell was able to dissuade some from this course of action. In addition, after the war, he was able to help in the rounding up of Germans from Canton to Shanghai, collect information on "downed" U.S. planes, and help arrest Japanese spies and collaborators. Mention has also to be made of the OSS men in Kunming, China, and nearby who met up with Ho Chi Minh, and went to Vietnam where they were present at his declaration of independence in Hanoi on September 2, 1945. The end of the war saw many U.S. agents trying to locate details on Americans who were reported missing during the war.

At the end of World War II, the U.S. intelligence continued cooperating with the Nationalist Chinese in the Chinese Civil War against the Chinese Communists which lasted from 1945 until 1949. This resulted in extremely strong links being established

between the United States and the Nationalists but apart from supplying military hardware and collecting information on Communists positions, U.S. intelligence was unable to play a major role in the conflict.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Donovan, Major General William Joseph; Office of Strategic Services; Van Deman, Ralph

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Justin Corfield

CHOISEUL, DUC DE
(JUNE 28, 1719–MAY 8, 1785)

Following the French and Indian War (Seven Years War), Foreign Minister of France Etienne-Francois Duc de Choiseul dispatched secret agents to the British North American colonies. Born in Lorraine, France, Choiseul served in the French military and later as a diplomat before Louis XV appointed him as Foreign Minister. The 1763 Peace of Paris had reduced the mighty French empire, through the significant loss of Canada to Great Britain and Louisiana territory to Spain.

Immediately after the war, however, Choiseul prepared to strike Great Britain again. He predicted the British colonies would eventually revolt, and France intended to benefit from British humiliation. In 1764 Choiseul began sending French agents to the United States to report on the political, military, and economic strength of the British. Agents Pontleroy, Baron de Kalb, and others transmitted the location of garrisons and arsenals, as well as plans for a possible French invasion. They reported some colonial discontent and attempted to spread it.

Choiseul's interest in the United States had faded just as his standing at the king's court in Versailles had waned. In 1768 the king replaced Choiseul as foreign minister, but his policies continued to be implemented. By 1776, France secretly assisted the revolting British colonies, which resulted in the 1778 alliance. Choiseul later died in 1785.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Cynthia A. Boyle

CHUNG, DONGFAN
(1936–)

Dongfan Chung was indicted and arrested on February 11, 2008, for allegedly giving the People's Republic of China classified information. He was indicted on eight counts of economic espionage, one count of conspiracy to commit economic espionage, one count or acting as an unregistered agent, and additional charges of obstruction of justice and making false statements to Federal Bureau of Investigation agents. Combined, the charges carry a maximum punishment of over 100 years in prison. His trial is scheduled for May 2009.

Aged 72 when arrested, Chung was born in China in 1936 and is a naturalized U.S. citizen. Chung worked as an engineer in the aerospace industry for over years, first for Rockwell International (1973–1996) and then for Boeing which bought Rockwell's space unit (1996–2002). After his retirement in 2002 he continued to work for Boeing as a private contractor (2003–2006). His primary area of specialization was the space shuttle program. Chung is accused of having provided China with trade secrets from the space shuttle program, the Delta IV rocket, and the C-17 military transport aircraft through a variety of methods including personal meetings with Chinese officials on his many official trips to China, letters, memos, and other messages. Evidence cited in the indictment dated back to 1979 and included secret information, as well as recommended methods for passing information and cover stories from his travel to China such as arranging a visit for his wife who is an artist.

Chung's primary motivation was a love for China and not financial gain. In a letter thought to be written in 1970, he wrote to a colleague at a Chinese university "I don't know what I can do for the country . . . I am regretful for not contributing anything . . . I would like to make an effort to contribute to the Four Modernizations of China."

Information about Chung's espionage emerged as part of the investigation into another Chinese spy, Chi Mak. Chung's handlers had suggested to him that he use Mak to transmit information back to China.

See also: China, Intelligence Organizations of; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Industrial Espionage; Mak, Chi; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

CHURCH, DR. BENJAMIN
(AUGUST 24, 1734–1778)

Physician, poet, and British agent during the War of American Independence. Church was born on August 24, 1734, in Newport, Rhode Island, and graduated from Harvard College in 1754. He studied medicine, served as surgeon on the Massachusetts warship Prince of Wales, and settled in Boston. In the early 1770s he emerged as an American patriot, entering politics, writing pro-American poetry, making patriotic speeches, and serving in the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. In 1774, Paul Revere began to suspect that Church was a British spy; a year later Church joined the British in Boston. Although he claimed that he had been captured and brought before General Thomas Gage, he voluntarily made the visit.

Outwardly, Church continued to work for the rebel cause. In 1775 he was sent by the Massachusetts government to consult with Congress on various matters, and was appointed director of the Continental army hospital in Cambridge. He neglected his medical duties, but was retained in his position. On September 29 he was arrested for sending a coded letter to the British in Rhode Island. He was tried by a court martial presided over by General George Washington and found guilty of spying. Turned over to Massachusetts authorities for punishment, he was ordered into exile in January 1778 aboard the sloop *Welcome*, bound for Martinique. Shortly after sailing, the ship foundered in a violent storm with the loss of all on board.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Paul David Nelson

CHURCH COMMITTEE

The Church Committee, also known as the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, was formed in 1975 in the wake of revelations of wrongdoings by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Its work represents a watershed in the way in which CIA oversight is conducted.

The Committee took its name from its chair, Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), and was established following a December 1974 article in the *New York Times* that outlined extensive—and illegal—domestic activities such as wire tappings, break-ins, and mail openings by the CIA. Although many of these actions were related to Vietnam, others preceded it dating back to the 1950s. The list originated within the CIA as a result of a directive by Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger to determine the extent of the CIA's involvement in illegal activities. His action was taken in response to revelations of CIA involvement in the Watergate burglary.

Both the Senate Armed Forces and Appropriations Committees responded to these revelations by holding hearings. President Gerald Ford also established a committee

chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to investigate CIA behavior in hopes of avoiding lengthy congressional hearings. These hopes were dashed as both houses of Congress established special committees to investigate the CIA. The counterpart committee in the House to the Church Committee became the Pike Committee after its second chair, Rep. Otis Pike (D-NY).

The Church Committee concluded operations in April 1976 after 15 months of work. Most of its hearings were held in private and the committee worked closely with executive branch officials, including representatives from the CIA. The committee concentrated its efforts on uncovering questionable activities that the CIA had carried out. Among its most stunning revelations was the existence of the Track II program designed to remove Salvadore Allende from power in Chile, and assassination plots against Fidel Castro in Cuba and other foreign leaders. With regard to assassinations, the Church Committee reached the conclusion that "no foreign leaders were killed as a result of assassination plots initiated by officials of the United States."

One of the starting assumptions of the Church committee was that the CIA had been, in the words of its chair, "a rogue elephant" running around the world out of control. In fact, the opposite proved to be the case. The committee concluded that "presidents and administrations have made excessive . . . use of covert action." It documented that 81 projects were approved by the Director of Central Intelligence from 1949 to 1952 and that this number grew to 163 in the Kennedy administration and 142 in the Johnson administration.

To tighten oversight of the CIA the Church committee recommended that two steps be taken. First, each house should establish permanent intelligence oversight committees rather than rely upon the current system of oversight by subcommittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services committees. Second, a legislative charter should be written, clearly establishing what type of behavior was permissible and what was not. Without such a charter, the intelligence community would continue to be governed solely by largely secret orders and directives coming from the executive branch. The first goal was quickly realized as each house set up permanent Select Committees on Intelligence. The second has never been done. Efforts in this direction were made during the Carter administration but stalemated and were not resurrected.

See also: Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Chile, CIA Operations in; Family Jewels; Ford Administration and Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; National Security Agency; Pike Committee; Rockefeller Commission; Schlesinger, James Rodney; Watergate

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<div align="right">*Glenn P. Hastedt*</div>

CIVIL WAR INTELLIGENCE

Many historians and authors of publications who focused on the use of espionage, spies, and intelligence methods document the use of intelligence during the Civil War. Intelligence produced during the Civil War consisted of reporting in newspapers by their correspondents, information derived from the interrogation of prisoners, cavalry reconnaissance, the use of aerial balloons for observation and surveillance of battlefields and strategic locations, personal conversations, photographs, spies (both male and female) for the Union and Confederacy, secret organizations in the North and South, Black soldiers who played significant roles related to espionage, and encrypted communications (such as the telegraph and coded letters). Interestingly, according to Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Michael Lee Lanning, author of *Honorable Treachery*, "not a single major Civil War battle was won or lost strictly because of intelligence or the lack of it."

The concept of "all-source" intelligence, that of integrating information from various sources (spies, interrogation, surveillance, newspapers, captured documents, etc), was relatively unheard of, and not taken advantage of by most military commanders during the Civil War. General Joseph "Fightin' Joe" Hooker, who had established the Bureau of Military Information in early 1863, was among the first military officers of the Civil War to develop the processes necessary to integrate multiple sources of information. In his book, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*, Christopher Andrew wrote that even with this formidable capability, General Hooker himself was considered a poor user of the intelligence that was produced through analysis of all-source information, as was demonstrated during the battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863. This indifference to the significance of intelligence analysis by a major consumer of intelligence eventually led to General Hooker's dismissal by President Lincoln.

Among some of the more noteworthy intelligence achievements of the Civil War included the establishment of what is considered the United States' first national military intelligence organization, the Pinkerton Detective Agency, headed by Allan Pinkerton (also given the rank of major and the pseudonym of E. J. Allen in the Union army, serving for General McClellan as his chief of intelligence). Pinkerton himself had no experience in military matters and did not fully understand or appreciate the significance of information and intelligence gathered and produced by his staff of detectives and military scouts. His major failures in the intelligence arena revolved around the consistent overestimation of order of battle (identification, organization, and troop strength in particular). Those who had been consumers of the intelligence/information Pinkerton provided did not fault the raw data provided by Pinkerton, but rather the absence of any analytical process needed to convert his estimates of troop strength into accurate intelligence. One of the earliest intelligence successes experienced by Pinkerton and his staff involved the discovery and eventual dismantlement of the Rose Greenhow spy ring. Nevertheless, Pinkerton

Allan Pinkerton (in black hat, seated in front of porch), chief of McClellan's secret service during the Civil War, sits among his men near Cumberland Landing, Virginia, on May 14, 1862. (National Archives)

is recognized as having created the first organized intelligence collection agency for the U.S. Army.

Col. George Sharpe is credited with directing the first real intelligence unit in the American army and was able to "integrate information from a variety of sources, reconciled factual differences, prepared an analysis, and then presented it in a format readily usable by senior Union commanders." He is commonly viewed as the first to use all-source intelligence in the American army during war.

The use of secret organizations during the Civil War, on both sides of the conflict, was another resource that was ideal for both spies and saboteurs as a safe haven and to operate from. Such organizations include the Order of the Heroes, Knights of the Golden Circle, Knights of Liberty, and the Peace Society.

An excellent resource on the use of spies and espionage during the Civil War is the book *Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War* by Donald Markle. The names of more than 300 spies who performed espionage activity during the Civil War are included in this publication. Also included is a glossary of Civil War terms used by individuals during various intelligence and espionage activities during the war.

The use of female spies is also discussed in Markle's publication, and includes women who spied for both the Confederacy and the Union. Among them, Belle Boyd (Confederate), Elizabeth Van Lew (Union), Rose O'Neal Greenhow (Confederate), Pauline Cushman (Union), Nancy Hart (Confederate), Mrs. E. H. Baker (Union), Sara Slater (Confederate), Emma Edmonds (Union), Augusta Morris (Confederate), Dr. Mary E. Walker (Union), and Jeanette Laurimer Mabry (Confederate).

Black Dispatches was a common term used among Union military men in the Civil War for intelligence on Confederate forces provided by Negroes. This source of information represented a prolific and productive category of intelligence obtained and acted on by Union forces throughout the Civil War. As Frederick Douglas observed at the time, the true history of the Civil War will document their loyalty to the North and a willingness to risk their lives to provide information for the North. Prominent Black Soldiers in the Civil War include George Scott, a runaway slave who provided intelligence-related Confederate fortifications and troop movements on behalf of General Benjamin Butler, who commanded Fort Monroe in Virginia. John Scobell is another prominent Black American soldier who made major contributions to the activity of Civil War intelligence. Scobell, also a former slave, became a prolific Pinkerton agent, and is best remembered for providing useful and perishable intelligence on Confederate order of battle, the status of supplies, and the morale of troops and their movements.

There were also Black American women who contributed to the intelligence apparatus of the Civil War, most notably Harriet Tubman, also known as "Black Moses," "Grandma Moses," or "Moses of Her People." Harriet Tubman worked as a spy for the North during the Civil War. She was the first American woman to plan and lead a military operation, the raid at Combahee Ferry, in 1863. This raid freed 750 slaves.

The use of aerial "hot air" balloons for surveillance and reconnaissance yielded visual results that were communicated back to decision makers in the battlefield via telegraphy. James Allen was among the first who pioneered the use of balloons. Another aeronaut, Thaddeus Lowe, employed the use of hydrogen gas, with sulfuric acid poured on iron fillings. Lowe's balloon designs enabled him to achieve altitudes of more than 5,000 feet. Disadvantages in military use of these balloons included fog, wind, and terrain and associated logistical problems (transportation of associated vehicles).

Much of the military intelligence and information gleaned against each side was accomplished, not through spies or espionage, but simply by acquiring newspapers (considered as open source). Northern newspapers were considered an important source of military and political intelligence, though not always reliable. However, newspapers did not in and of themselves have a great impact on the war.

Codes and ciphers were used extensively through the Civil War on both sides of the conflict and are briefly discussed in *Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War*. The Union army, during the course of the Civil War, transmitted over 6 million encrypted messages by telegraph, with few, if any, that were decrypted.

Major Albert James Myer, a U.S. Army officer, developed a cipher disk that was used during the Civil War. These disks were used exclusively for high-priority messages. Messages would be initiated and transmitted at one location by employing what was referred to as "wig-wagging" the cipher combination. The location that receives the encrypted message would in turn decipher the message using the same device, which typically consisted of two concentric disks.

Edwin C. Fishel, who in 1996 published *The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War*, wrote one of the most definitive works on Civil War intelligence. Based on previously unknown sources that were made available from the National Archives in Washington, DC, Fishel meticulously researched through hundreds of previously unviewed documents that were created by the Army Bureau of Military Information during the Civil War. Fishel also integrated findings

from General McClellan's papers, which included intelligence reports by Allan Pinkerton.

See also: Balloons; Boyd, Belle; Confederate Signal and Secret Service Bureau; Greenhow, Rose O'Neal; Knights of the Golden Circle; Lowe, Thadius; Pinkerton, Allan; Tubman, Harriott; Van Lew, Elizabeth

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David Jimenez

CLAIBORNE, WILLIAM C. C. (1775–NOVEMBER 23, 1817)

William Claiborne was Governor of the Louisiana Territory. Claiborne and President James Madison created a clandestine plan to annex Spanish West Florida to the United States in 1810. Claiborne first served as governor of the Mississippi Territory and later of Louisiana after the 1803 purchase from France. The United States had long desired to annex Florida and secure its southern border. In April 1809, Vicente Foch, west Florida's governor, informed Claiborne that he would seek help from either Great Britain or the United States if Napoleon defeated Spain. To avoid British involvement, Claiborne promised U.S. support if they rebelled. In 1810 Claiborne visited President Madison, and together they devised a plan. If the colony rebelled, the United States planned to intervene to maintain stability. That summer, citizens in Baton Rouge declared independence, with U.S. encouragement and the Spanish fort at Baton Rouge soon fell. On October 27, 1810, Madison ordered Claiborne to take over the territory for the United States, and so by a controversial executive order, Madison annexed west Florida. Claiborne continued to serve successfully as governor of Louisiana. He later died in New Orleans in 1817, shortly after being elected to the U.S. Senate.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage

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Cynthia A. Boyle

CLANDESTINE SERVICES, CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) houses the Directorate of Operations (DO), which is responsible for clandestine operations and services. Clandestine Services are highly covert international operations which are designed to ensure the national security of the United States through the gathering of intelligence that is actionable by the president and other informed policy makers. The DO is the espionage arm of the CIA organization which provides the intelligence to the Directorate of Information (DI) for analysis.

Clandestine services are traditionally at the forefront of any information-gathering and intelligence specific encounters between the United States and other entities. This means that the identities and actions of covert operations members are classified and highly secretive. They can be posted anywhere in the world to gain intelligence and thus spend the majority of their time in the job in foreign locations that could be politically, socially, and economically unstable. It is notoriously difficult to obtain official information on the group and their specific actions unless it has been declassified.

Clandestine Operation members fall into three categories of officers: Operations or Case Officer, Collection Management Officer, and Staff Operations Officer. The Operations or Case Officer is responsible for the entire undercover intelligence gathering. The Collection Management Officer acts as the medium between the Operations Officer and the wider Clandestine Services community. They ensure the correct dissemination of the intelligence, and to whom, and work closely with policy makers. The Staff Operations Officer functions as a manager and is responsible for providing support to those dealing with officers within the field. The DI is not involved with covert operations by the DO, instead the DI relies upon the passing of intelligence to its directorate which then starts to analyze it. This is to further ensure the integrity of both the intelligence and the covert officer's identity.

The initial clandestine training traditionally takes place on a CIA-owned ranch, commonly referred to as "the Farm" in Virginia. The entire process is usually broken into distinct sections; spotting, assessing, developing, and delivering. Tradecraft methods are taught which includes the various initial intelligence-gathering techniques and information evaluation. Those working within the clandestine division are usually college graduates who are bi- or even multilingual. The Operations or Case Officers work either in cover for status (legitimate employment) or in cover for action (covert). To encourage intelligence gathering, officers are assigned such things as passports, citizenship records, and official employment. All cover can be verified by employers and other

interested persons. In effect, officers become different people with a history that appears solid and uneventful.

Without intelligence supplied through covert means, the United States would have difficulty formulating the appropriate foreign and domestic policies. Intelligence gathered in clandestine operations is usually called human source intelligence collection (HUMINT) and is considered the domain of the CIA, as opposed to electronics intelligence (ELINT) which is viewed as the National Security Agency (NSA) domain. HUMINT is considered to be one of the most direct and efficient ways of obtaining intelligence.

Clandestine operations and services have been used by the CIA to gather information in the field that is not otherwise obtainable through traditional diplomatic relations. It is global in scope.

See also: Camp Peary; Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency

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Samaya L. Sukha

CLARK REPORT (SECOND HOOVER COMMISSION)

The Clark Report on the operation of intelligence organizations was issued as part of the report of the Second Hoover Commission. In spring 1953 Senator Homer Furguson and Congressman Clarence Brown, who had served on the First Hoover Commission, proposed and Congress passed legislation to establish a new Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch. Three days after signing the legislation President Dwight Eisenhower named Hoover to the commission. Hoover appointed all of the task force members and selected the areas of inquiry. The Second Hoover Commission's mandate was also much greater than that of the First Hoover Commission. Where the first commission concerned itself with how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations, the second commission was empowered to examine the question of what government should be doing. Nonessential services were to be eliminated as well as those activities that competed with private enterprise.

Eisenhower had invited Hoover to create an intelligence task force, hoping to short-circuit any investigation by Senator Joseph McCarthy into this area. Once the danger of a McCarthyite investigation had passed, the Eisenhower White House indicated it was no longer interested in an intelligence task force and that the inquiry could be called off.

Hoover, however, continued with the inquiry now being carried out under the direction of General Mark Clark.

The Clark Task Force began its operations on October 1, 1954. Its report was submitted to the Second Hoover Commission on May 25, 1955. In its introduction it stated that "we discovered no valid ground for the suspicion that the CIA or any other element of the intelligence family was being effectively contaminated by any organized subversive or community clique." It held the Director of Central Intelligence to be "industrious, objective, selfless, enthusiastic and imaginative." On the negative side the Task Force was concerned with the lack of adequate intelligence coming from behind the Iron Curtain.

In the end the Clark Task Force made nine recommendations. Most dealt with routine administrative issues such as salaries, the employment of retired military personnel, and security clearances. Three spoke to fundamental changes in the manner in which the intelligence function was carried out. First, it recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence concentrate on the coordination of community-level intelligence efforts and leave the day-to-day administration of the CIA to an executive officer or chief of staff. Second, it called upon the president to construct a committee of private citizens to periodically examine the work of the government's foreign intelligence activities. Third, Congress should consider creating a Joint Committee on Intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

See also: Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Hoover Commission; McCarthy, Joseph

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CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

William (Bill) Jefferson Clinton served as president from 1993 to 2000. In his eight-year term in office there were three Directors of Central Intelligence (DCI): R. James Woolsey, John Deutch, and George Tenet. Clinton entered office with little foreign policy experience and ran on a platform that stressed domestic policy initiatives. World events, however, often intruded on his agenda as during his administration U.S. troops were sent to Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans as peacekeepers and peacemakers. Each of these operations encountered difficulties and placed the administration on the defensive. Clinton also was faced with the need to respond to North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons, a problem that was temporarily solved by a 1994 agreement. On the economic front the administration concluded the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and obtained congressional approval for Most Favored Nation status for China and the establishment of the World Trade Organization.

Clinton's relationship with the intelligence community was often strained. He did not establish a particularly close working relationship with any of his three DCIs. Woolsey left under a cloud of controversy over the Aldrich Ames espionage case. Deutch became DCI after Air Force General Michael Carns, Clinton's initial choice to follow Woolsey, was forced to withdraw. Coming over from the Defense Department where he was a deputy secretary led to concerns about the CIA's influence being undercut by his close association with that organization. Tenet had also not been Clinton's first choice. Anthony Lake who had been his national security advisor during the first term was nominated but like Carns was forced to withdraw his name due to congressional opposition.

Clinton's relationship with the intelligence community was further strained by his pursuit of a peace dividend. With the cold war over, a general expectation existed that the amount of money devoted to national security could be reduced. The intelligence community budget was not exempt from these expectations. With its clandestine service heavily focused on the Soviet Union it became a natural place to look for savings. Intelligence analysis capabilities were similarly vulnerable since Soviet-oriented products were a staple of the intelligence community. It was not just espionage directed at Soviet targets that would be cut. Press accounts identify Africa and Cuba as additional areas where human intelligence efforts were reduced.

In looking for a peace dividend, Clinton was following a path laid out in the George H. W. Bush administration. It had already instituted a series of budget cuts, lowering the overall budget of the intelligence community. Clinton's cuts were deeper as he placed a freeze on CIA recruitment and cut staff levels by some 24 percent. When combined with resignations, the overall staffing of the CIA in 1997 approximated that which existed in 1977. An important contributing factor to this reduction in staffing levels was a widely shared perception which was held by DCIs Woolsey and Deutch that technology could replace human intelligence. Funds would be directed at technological innovations in espionage and information gathering instead of running agents.

The second change that provoked controversy in some quarters was the increased priority given to economic intelligence. This change followed logically from the Clinton administration's general foreign policy emphasis on globalization as a driver in U.S. prosperity. Here, too, he was not so much blazing a new path as following in the footsteps of his predecessor. Where during the cold war 50 to 60 percent of the intelligence budget was targeted on the Soviet Union, by 1993 it had dropped to 13 percent. In stark contrast economic intelligence, which represented 10 percent of the cold war intelligence budget, jumped to 40 percent under Clinton. In keeping with this newfound emphasis, the CIA instituted a Daily Economic Intelligence Brief under Clinton. It also pursued instances of unfair economic competition, more closely identifying 72 such cases in the first 17 months of the Clinton administration compared to 250 cases between 1986 and 1992. As the CIA became more aggressive in this area it also was accused by foreign governments of engaging in economic espionage on behalf of American firms.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Clinton's intelligence policy on terrorism came in for close scrutiny. The administration's position on terrorism was laid out in Presidential Decision Directive 35 of March 2, 1995. It assigned the highest intelligence priority to supporting military operations. The second priority was given to providing military,

economic, and political intelligence on countries hostile to the United States. The third priority was identified as drug traffickers, terrorists, organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction. Thus, while terrorism was a concern for the administration, it was not its highest, a position that mirrored the view held by most observers. Administration officials note that this ranking was higher than that implicitly found in the agenda of earlier administrations.

A related point of controversy centered on the intensity of its pursuit of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Starting in 1996, the Clinton administration did begin pressuring allies to break up al-Qaeda groups by arresting its members and rendering them to third countries. As many as 50 members of al-Qaeda may have been relocated in this fashion. Bin Laden became a significant intelligence target after the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Although the intelligence community aggressively tracked his whereabouts, this did not lead to an effort to capture him. This failing was attributed to a combination of logistical difficulties, legal prohibitions on assassination, and the weakened political position of the Clinton administration as its second term in office was coming to an end.

See also: Bin Laden, Osama; Bush, George, H. W., Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Deutch, John Mark; Intelligence Community; Post–Cold War Intelligence; Tenet, George; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; Woolsey, R. James, Jr.

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COASTWATCHERS

The Coastwatchers were a World War II organization composed of some 400 individuals, most of whom were Australian and New Zealand military personnel, Pacific Islanders, or escaped Allied prisoners of war. More formally it was Section C of the Allied Intelligence Bureau. This organization was created in 1942 as a joint U.S., Australian, British, and Dutch intelligence unit. Its mission was to distribute propaganda, serve as an early learning system of possible offensive Japanese military action in the southwest Pacific, and to engage in espionage behind enemy lines in order to destroy morale and support local resistance movements.

The Coastwatchers were charged with monitoring Japanese activity in and around the Solomon Islands. They are credited with having alerted Admiral William Halsey, Jr., of a

pending attack on U.S. naval forces that was central to the victory at Guadalcanal. Coastwatchers also helped save the life of President John Kennedy in 1943. His ship, PT-109, sank after it was struck by a Japanese destroyer. This incident was observed by Coastwatchers who located the survivors and helped arrange for their rescue. The navy had previously determined that no one had survived.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Central Bureau

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James H. Willbanks

CODE TALKERS

The code talkers were Indian soldiers who transmitted secret messages over radio or telephone using their native languages during World War I and World War II. Ironically, the failure of the U.S. federal government to eradicate Indian languages and completely assimilate Indians during the nineteenth century helped the United States win both world wars. Although the Navajo Code Talkers involved in the Pacific campaign of World War II, specifically with the marines, are undoubtedly the most famous code talkers, they were not the only Indian code talkers. Members of the Cheyenne, Comanche, Cherokee, Choctaw, Osage, and Yankton Sioux tribes served as code talkers in World War I, whereas members of the Chippewa, Choctaw, Comanche, Creek, Hopi, Kiowa, Menominee, Muscogee-Seminole, Oneida, Pawnee, Sac & Fox, Dakota Sioux, and Lakota Sioux tribes served in World War II.

There were two types of Indian code talking: informal use of everyday noncoded Indian languages and formally developed coded-encoded vocabularies based on Indian languages. In all instances, the enemies of the United States were foiled in their attempt to decipher U.S. Armed Forces communications. The U.S. government has only officially recognized, albeit recently, the contributions of the Choctaws and Navajos.

During World War I, 14 members of the Choctaw tribe served with the U.S. Army in Europe. The use of everyday Choctaw language to communicate was a spur-of-the-moment decision of a U.S. Army captain who overheard two soldiers—Solomon Lewis and Mitchell Bobb—speaking Choctaw. Since the Germans had broken the U.S. Army codes, tapped into the phone lines, and were capturing messengers carrying messages between the various companies, the U.S. Army captain suggested to his commanding officer that the Choctaw-speaking soldiers transmit orders over the telephone to Choctaw speakers at field headquarters. The Choctaw-speaking soldiers were immediately reassigned so that each company had a Choctaw speaker. The result was a German retreat after the Mousse-Argonne campaign in 1918.

In 1942, Philip Johnston, a World War I veteran who knew of the Choctaw contribution as code talkers, convinced the U.S. Marine Corps to use Navajo Indians as code talkers. Johnston, the son of a missionary to the Navajo who spoke Navajo fluently, argued that less than 30 non-Navajo people could speak the language, none of them

being Japanese. Since Navajo is an unwritten language of great complexity, he argued that it could be the basis of a code that could not be deciphered by the Japanese. Eventually, 379 Navajo code talkers served with the U.S. Marines in World War II. The Navajo code talkers used a coded-encoded vocabulary based on 411 terms. For example, when a Navajo code talker received a message, what he heard was a string of seemingly unrelated Navajo words. The code talker had to translate each Navajo word into its English equivalent, then use the first letter of the English equivalent in spelling an English word. The Navajo code talkers sent and received over 800 messages, all without error.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; American Intelligence, World War II; Marine Corps Intelligence

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Michael R. Hall

COHEN, LONA (LEONTINA) AND MORRIS, AKA HELEN AND PETER KROGER (LONA: JANUARY 11, 1913–DECEMBER 23, 1992; MORRIS: JULY 2, 1910–JUNE 23, 1995)

Lona and Morris Cohen were Soviet spies who operated in the United States under their true identities and then in Great Britain as Helen and Peter Kroger. They were arrested for espionage in Great Britain on January 7, 1961, on the basis of information provided by a Polish defector. They each received 15-year prison sentences. After serving eight years of their term in 1969 they were released in a spy exchange with the Soviet Union in return for British lecturer Gerald Brooke who was being held by the Soviets. The Cohens moved to Moscow where they were awdarded the Order of the Red banner and the Order of the Friendship of Nations. Lona died on December 23, 1992. Morris died on June 23, 1995.

Lona was born in Adams, Massachusetts, on January 11, 1913, and Morris was born in New York on July 2, 1910. Morris fought in the Spanish civil war where he became a Soviet spy. He returned to the United States, marrying Lona who also then became a Soviet spy. While Morris was drafted into the U.S. Army in World War II, Lona ran a network of Soviet agents employed in munitions and aviation plants around New York City. After World War II she acted as a courier of nuclear secrets being taken from Los Alamos. Their careers as spies ended in the United States with the defections of Elizabeth Bentley and Igor Gouzenko, and the arrest and conviction of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

The Cohens fled to Mexico where they received new identities as New Zealand citizens Helen and Peter Kroger. They arrived in London in 1954 under the cover of being antiquarian book dealers. The Krogers would become central figures specializing in

radio transmission in the Portland spy group that penetrated the British navy and was led by Gordon Arthur Lonsdale. In 1959 Michael Goleniewski, a Polish intelligence officer, told the Central Intelligence Agency about a Soviet agent in Great Britain who was working at the Underwater Weapons Establishment in Portland. The British Security Service (MI-5) concluded that this person was Harry Houghton. By following him they came upon the Krogers.

In 1983 their life became the subject of a British and Broadway play, *Pack of Lies*, and then an American TV movie.

See also: Bentley, Elizabeth; Gouzenko, Igor; Lonsdale, Gordon; Los Alamos; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel

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COINTELPRO

A staple of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) secret domestic espionage for more than 15 years, COINTELPRO (counter intelligence program) combined programs of surveillance, sabotage, and provocations that were intended to disrupt and neutralize domestic groups considered by the FBI to be national security threats to the United States. COINTELPRO was established in 1956 in order to circumvent Supreme Court decisions that limited the government's power to act directly against domestic groups opposed to the U.S. government. These decisions culminated in a 1957 ruling that the 1940 Smith Act (also known as the Alien Registration Act), which made it a crime to "knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or tech the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing the Government of the United States or of any State by force or violence, or for anyone to organize any association which teaches, advises, or encourages such an overthrow or for anyone to become a member or to affiliate with any such organization," was unconstitutional. Some 2,370 separate actions were carried out as part of COINTELPRO. Evidence points to the fact that while originating within the FBI COINTELPRO activities were known by presidents, presidential advisors, attorney generals, and key members of Congress.

Six different sets of groups were targeted by COINTELPRO. The first COINTELPRO operations were directed against the American Communist Party. Authorized in 1956, from 1957 to 1960 more than 266 campaigns were carried out against the American Communist Party and its members. In 1960 they resulted in 114 illegal wiretaps, 74 warrantless bugs, and 2,342 illegal mail openings. Puerto Rican nationalist groups that sought to make Puerto Rico an independent country became a second COINTELPRO target in 1960. Among the goals identified by the FBI were confusing

the pro-independence leadership, and exploiting rivalries and jealousies in order to eliminate the possibility of pro-independence unity. The third COINTELPRO target was the Socialist Worker's Party. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover formally identified it was a target in 1961 but in fact the FBI had been engaged in wiretapping their phones and bugging their offices since 1943. From 1943 to 1963, the FBI conducted 208 break-ins into Socialist Worker's Party offices and stole some 9,800 documents. The Ku Klux Klan was the fourth COINTELPRO target. Operations were conducted against it from 1964 to 1971. Compared to the other COINTELPRO campaigns, this one was small in nature, only 287 separate operations were carried out with many amounting to little more than nuisance harassments. Still, in September 1965, the FBI could identify 2,000 Klansman on its payroll as informants. The fifth COINTELPRO campaign was directed at "Black Nationalist Hate Groups." Its objective was similar to earlier operations: disrupt, discredit, misdirect, or otherwise neutralize their activities. Among the groups targeted in this campaign were the Congress of Racial Equality, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Nation of Islam, and the Black Panthers. Among the most infamous COINTELPRO activities were those directed against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Among other actions, it hid microphones in Dr. Martin Luther King's hotel rooms for nearly two years. The practical objective was not only to determine if he was under the influence of Communist advisors but to get information about his private life that could be used to discredit him. The New Left, with its anti-Vietnam War activities, was the target of the final COINTELPRO campaign. Among the groups identified by the FBI as falling under the New Left banner were the Students for a Democratic Society and the Interuniversity Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy. Particularly controversial in its New Left campaign were the actions of agent-provocateurs.

COINTELPRO was officially terminated by Hoover in April 1971. The month before, the Citizens Committee to Investigate the FBI had broken into an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, and stole several thousand secret files that detailed these operations and released them to the press. Hoover's announcement did not signal an end to domestic espionage or covert action against Americans. From 1972 to 1974 the FBI installed over 400 wiretaps, placed over 500 bugs without a warrant, and opened over 2,000 pieces of personal mail. Targets included the American Indian Movement, Earth First, and the Committee in Solidarity with the People in El Salvador.

Assessments of why COINTELPRO occurred tend to stress four points. The first is the personality and political views of J. Edgar Hoover. The second was the existence of an "action-oriented" group of individuals within the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division and upper administration who were responding to a broadly felt mandate to take action to protect the United States. Third, there was lax oversight from political figures who often benefited politically from the information provided to them by Hoover and who did not move aggressively to control the FBI. For example, until 1965 the attorney general was required to approve wiretaps but the FBI could continue conducting them as long as it wanted to. Finally, the espionage and covert action activities that were the hallmark of COINTELPRO were in existence and used by the FBI prior to 1956. They were not invented in order to carry out COINTELPRO but had become part of the FBI's standard policy for dealing with domestic groups it considered to be dangerous.

See also: Church Committee; Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Hoover, J. Edgar

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COLBY, WILLIAM EGAN
(JANUARY 4, 1920–APRIL 27, 1996)

William Colby was an American intelligence officer who served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1973 to 1975. Born in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1920, Colby graduated with honors from Princeton in 1940. He entered Columbia Law School but volunteered for the army in 1941. During World War II, he served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and fought behind enemy lines in German-occupied Norway and France, where he commanded saboteur squads as part of Operation Jedburgh.

After the war, he returned to Columbia Law School, receiving his degree in 1947. After practicing law for three years, he joined the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1950. After serving in U.S. embassies in Stockholm and Rome, in 1959 he was posted to South Vietnam where he became CIA station chief in Saigon where he served until 1962. During that time, Colby and other CIA officials experimented with various forms of security and rural development programs for the Republic of Vietnam. From these efforts, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups and the Strategic Hamlet program emerged.

In 1962, Colby returned to Washington to become chief of the CIA's Far East Division. In 1968, Colby returned to Vietnam with ambassadorial rank and replaced Robert Komer as deputy to the commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development. As head of the pacification program, Colby directed the controversial Phoenix program, which was designed to identify and eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure.

Colby returned to Washington in 1971 and became executive director of the CIA. In 1973, President Richard Nixon appointed him director to replace James Schlesinger, who became Nixon's secretary of defense. Colby assumed his new duties during a turbulent time in which two congressional committees conducted investigations into U.S. intelligence misdeeds. Called to testify before Senator Frank Church's (D-Idaho) committee in 1975, Colby revealed the so-called "Family Jewels," detailed reports of a number of questionable activities, including involvement in domestic spying and assassination attempts on foreign leaders. Although many credited him with saving the agency, which was brought under greater governmental control, numerous conservatives criticized Colby for his candor and cooperation. Having become a political liability to the administration, he was forced into retirement by President Gerald Ford, who replaced him with George H. W. Bush on January 30, 1976. Colby resumed his law practice and became an advocate for the reduction of nuclear arms.

On April 27, 1996, Colby died in an apparent boating accident near his home in Rock Point, Maryland. He was laid to rest in Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors on May 13, 1996.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Church Committee; Director of Central Intelligence; Family Jewels; Ford Administration and Intelligence; Nixon Administration and Intelligence; Office of Strategic Services; Vietnam War and Intelligence Operations

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COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE

The United States entered into the post–World War II having shed its policy of isolationism for one of global leadership. This change was not only one of mind-set but also one of capabilities and organization. The British had worked with the United States during World War II to lay the organizational foundations for a greater leadership role but the initial U.S. reaction to peace was to fall back on prewar habits of action. Centralization was to be avoided and decentralization embraced. Nowhere was this more evident with the disbanding of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) by President Harry Truman. Its various functions distributed among existing intelligence agencies spread through the foreign affairs and military bureaucracy.

It was not until 1947 that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established. Even this centralization of intelligence was incomplete. While the head of the CIA, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was also the head of the intelligence community and he possessed only limited budgetary powers over other bureaucracies. Furthermore, different agencies took different approaches to intelligence issues. For the CIA, counterespionage involved protecting secrets. For the FBI it entailed catching spies so they could be prosecuted for violating the law. This difference in perspective would become a major source of friction between the two of them throughout the Cold War.

Improving intelligence capabilities meant both adding human intelligence capabilities and technological ones. Quantum leaps were made in the area of espionage through technological means during the cold war. The launching point for many of these efforts was the 1954 report of the Killian Committee. Charged with suggesting ways for monitoring Soviet military capabilities, it recommended the development of a high-speed plane equipped with a high-definition camera. Seventeen months after approval was given, the U-2 was operational and nine months later the first U-2 flight was taking pictures of targets in the Soviet Union. U-2 flights ended after the May 1960 downing of

the plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers. At first the United States denied Soviet accusations that it was spying. President Dwight Eisenhower was forced to acknowledge U.S. actions after the Soviets produced Powers. The accompanying diplomatic fallout caused the collapse of a scheduled summit meeting between Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in Paris. The Gary Francis Powers incident heightened ongoing interest in space surveillance as an alternative to overhead reconnaissance. Responsibility for managing satellite reconnaissance was given to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Created in 1960 by an executive order, it remains one of the most secret U.S. intelligence organizations. Its existence was not even acknowledged until 1973 (Andrew, 1995).

A second area of technological espionage centered on the acquisition of signals intelligence. The lead intelligence organization here is the National Security Agency (NSA). Secretly created in 1952, its existence was not officially acknowledged until 1957. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) involves several different types of activities. One form of signals intelligence involves eavesdropping on secure conversations between diplomats, military officials, and political leaders. A second form involves intercepting data being relayed by weapons during tests or spy satellites. Finally, it can refer to electronic emissions given off by weapons and tracking systems. One of the most successful SIGINT satellites was Rhyolite. Its primary mission was intercepting telemetry from Soviet missile tests. It was also capable of simultaneously transmitting 11,000 two-way telephone conversations. The Rhyolite program was compromised in 1975 when Christopher Boyce and Andrew Lee provided the Soviet Union with information about its technological capabilities.

Improving human intelligence capabilities meant recruiting spies. With World War II over and the cold war beginning to heat up, the realization gripped American officials that they had little intelligence information on the Soviet Union. Gaps in their knowledge extended down to the most basic features such as distribution and state of repair of road and railroad systems and the location of bridges, factories, and airports. Information from diplomats and military attachés in the U.S. embassy was of little value due to the secrecy of Soviet society and the travel and living restrictions placed on them by Soviet authorities.

As the United States tried to fill in the missing pieces, the initial source of their information was refugees and prisoners of war. By 1948 these sources of information were drying up and the CIA faced the challenge of replacing them. The fear of war over Berlin gave an urgency to the search for new sources of information. The answer hit upon was to secretly drop agents by plane into the Soviet Union. The first mission took place on September 5, 1949. It took off from an airfield in the American zone of Germany and dropped two Ukrainian nationals into the Soviet Union. In the tradition of the OSS, their mission was to collect information and to work with Ukrainian resistance groups. Their primary intelligence charge was to provide early warning of a Soviet attack.

For the next five years these intelligence drops became a key element of the American espionage program. Agents were recruited from defectors, refugees, and Soviet citizens living in the West. Preparation for these missions was time consuming. Proper documents had to be forged in order to legitimize these agents to the police and other officials. The individuals had to learn the details of their legend, or fictional life, in the

smallest detail. They had to learn key features of their new career such as being able to correctly identify planes; learn how to send secret and receive radio messages as well as put together, repair, and dismantle a transceiver; and take photographs with cameras that were disguised as a cigarette lighter. The effectiveness of these agents was greatly compromised virtually from the outset by the ability of the Soviet Union to infiltrate partisan resistance groups. U-2 overflights began two years after the last agent was dropped into the Soviet Union.

Beyond trying to penetrate the Soviet Union itself, the CIA and American intelligence has sought to penetrate the second and third circles of Communist power. The second circle consisted of the Soviet's allies in Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea. The third circle consisted of its Third World allies. Before the Berlin Wall went up in 1961 a common stratagem was to provide an agent with false documentation and a railway ticket into East Germany. A principal target for penetration in third circle countries was the Communist Party. Two methods were followed in recruiting someone to spy within the party. The first was by "seeding" a young person into a party cell and guiding their career upward. The second approach was to recruit an individual who already held a high-ranking position. Of the two approaches the first is the easiest but also ends up being nonproductive because the person's career never develops as hoped for or the individual changes his mind. The information produced by spies in the third circle covered a wide variety of political matters. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech to the Twentieth Party Congress reportedly came to light this way, as did information about the Sino-Soviet split.

As part of their effort to obtain intelligence on Soviet plans, the United States also actively sought to recruit Soviet military, diplomatic, and intelligence personnel as spies or to defect. A particularly valuable spy was Oleg Penkovsky, a GRU officer, who is said to have passed more than 5,000 photographs to the United States before being arrested during the Cuban Missile Crisis. A key issue in dealing with spies or defectors is determining the veracity of their information. In one instance the debate over who was telling the truth virtually crippled the CIA's counterintelligence operation. James Angleton was head of the CIA's counterintelligence operation for much of the cold war. His principal source of information was Anatoliy Golitsyn who was a walk-in defector to the United States in 1961 when he literally appeared unannounced at the doorstep of the CIA station chief in Helsinki. Golitsyn contended that the KGB had deeply penetrated most Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA. Although many doubted Golitsyn, Angleton was a firm believer in the accuracy of his information. No one was above suspicion. Possible spies were dismissed or isolated within the CIA and for a time the Soviet bloc division was cut off from sensitive information. No mole was found but the CIA was wracked with self-doubt, something Golitsyn's detractors claimed was one of his true goals.

But, spies did exist in the U.S. national security bureaucracy. No agency seemed to be immune. The CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Agency (NSA), as well as the armed services all fell victim to penetration. Those who engaged in spying held a variety of positions from secretaries to military police to intelligence analysts to spymasters and contract employees. Although they most frequently were found to have engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union, some spied for China and even for U.S. allies such as Israel. The incidence of spying against the United States

erupted into a storm of controversy over the failure of the intelligence community to police itself in 1985 as the cold war was ending in what has been dubbed "the Year of the Spy."

Among the most famous spies of the later cold war period were Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, Jonathan Pollard, Ronald Pelton, and John Walker. Earlier generations of spies were more likely to be identified with the State Department and the pursuit of secrets regarding the atomic bomb. These spy cases were pursued in a highly visible and politically charged atmosphere often referred to as McCarthyism, named for Wisconsin Senator McCarthy who gave a speech in which he claimed to have a list of 205 names "that were known to the secretary of state as being members of the communist party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department."

McCarthy's charges were never documented but his speech set off a nationwide search for Communists and Communist sympathizers within the government and in positions of influence throughout American society. The most politically charged investigation was into the activities of former State Department employee Alger Hiss. Two weeks before this speech, Hiss was convicted of perjury for having denied that he passed secret material to Whitaker Chambers, a Communist agent. In 1953 McCarthy became chair of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of Government Operations. He demanded positive loyalty oaths from State Department personnel and ran background checks on them that involved the use of lie detectors and phone taps. Almost two hundred individuals were identified as security risks and fired as a result of these investigations. In 1954 he turned his attention on the U.S. Army. McCarthy's attack on the army proved to be his undoing as a coalition of political forces mobilized against him.

The first major cold war espionage case involved the Atomic Spy Ring. Its most notable members were Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, who were executed after being convicted of passing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union from the Los Alamos Laboratories where work on the American atomic bomb was being conducted. Important information on the scope of early cold war espionage emerged late in the cold war from the VENONA project. It involved an effort to break the Soviet code used in early World War II communications. Made public in the early 1990s the VENONA intercepts established the guilt of many who were charged and often convicted of being spies but who had maintained their innocence. Among them were the Rosenbergs.

The search for Communist agents took an excessive turn during the cold war as the FBI, CIA, and NSA often targeted individuals and groups for surveillance. In many cases their only true crime was to oppose government policy on Vietnam or its civil rights agenda, as was the case with the Black Panthers. The most notable programs were COINTELPRO and CHAOS. All totaled, between 1955 and 1975 the FBI conducted 740,000 investigations into subversive matters and 190,000 investigations into extremist matters. Over the course of five years 3,000 files and a computerized index list of more than 300,000 people and organizations were created. These excesses, known by some as the "Family Jewels," became the centerpiece of the Church Committee investigations of the intelligence community that laid the foundation for contemporary congressional oversight policies.

The cold war also saw the United States employ its intelligence assets in an offensive posture through the development of Covert Action programs that circled the globe.

In Europe they tended to be oriented toward propaganda activities and underwriting pro-U.S. political parties, political and labor leaders, and publications. In the Third World they also often took the form of organizing and/or carrying out attempts to overthrow governments. Iran, Indonesia, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Panama are the best-known examples. On occasion covert action extended to assassination. Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Rafael Trujillo, General Rene Schneider, and Ngo Dnh Diem all were targets of assassination attempts linked in some fashion to the CIA.

See also: Bush, George H. W., Administration and Intelligence; Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Carter Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Ford Administration and Intelligence; Intelligence Community; Johnson Administration and Intelligence; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); McCarthy, Joseph; National Security Agency; Nixon Administration and Intelligence; Reagan Administration and Intelligence; Truman Administration and Intelligence

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COLDFEET, PROJECT

The Arctic was an underappreciated theater of the cold war. Fear of attack over the North Pole led to various defensive and monitoring projects by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Additionally, the arctic ice was utilized as a platform for intelligence gathering (especially acoustic submarine detection) and oceanographic and meteorological research. The "ice stations," also called "drift stations," moved around the Arctic with the currents. Establishing and abandoning these clandestine stations were carried out by plane, but if a runway was destroyed or compromised, the personnel were at risk and had to quickly abandon the station.

During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union abandoned ice stations when the structural integrity of the station was compromised, but both nations tried to anticipate evacuation and take everything of value with them. In 1962, Soviet Station North Pole 8 (NP8) was quickly vacated after its runway was ruined by a pressure ridge. Hoping that the hasty departure meant the Soviets left behind evidence

of their intelligence and scientific capabilities, the U.S. Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with funding from the Defense Intelligence Agency and Intermountain Aviation, dispatched intelligence officers, Lt. Leonard LeSchack (USNR) and Major James Smith (USAF), to the deserted island for a 72-hour inspection. As no plane could land on the disintegrating ice island, which was inaccessible by icebreaker or helicopter, the men parachuted on to the island. Getting them off presented a unique challenge and a unique solution.

The Fulton Skyhook, a new experimental device, would, quite literally, lift the men off the ice by way of a line and hook descending from a specially equipped B-17 bomber. Attached to a 500-foot line, the men would be caught by the skyhook and reeled into the plane as it traveled at 125 knots. While completed after a three-day delay, the mission was not without risk and difficulty with the weather (whiteout, fierce arctic 30-knot winds). It was successful thanks to both luck and skilled flying. NP8's cache of documents, equipment, and photos yielded proof to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) that the Soviets were further ahead of the Americans in both meteorology and arctic oceanography. The Skyhook came to the public's attention when it was used in the James Bond film, *Thunderball*.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Office of Naval Intelligence

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Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel

COLEPAUGH, WILLIAM C., JR. (MARCH 25, 1918–MARCH 16, 2005)

William C. Colepaugh was an American who became a spy for the Germans during World War II and was subsequently convicted of treason. He was born on March 25, 1918, in Niantic, Connecticut. His father, William Senior, a plumber, died when Billy was eight, and his mother, born in New York, was the daughter of German migrants. He went to Admiral Farragut Academy, New Jersey, and applied for the Naval College at Annapolis, but was turned down and enrolled at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He dropped out and served in the U.S. Naval Reserve, being discharged in 1943, by which time he had already come to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for his interest in Nazi Germany. He traveled to Lisbon and offered his services to the German consulate in the Portuguese capital. The Germans

took him to The Hague, in Nazi-occupied Holland, and there he was given extensive espionage and firearms training, before being taken back to the United States by submarine, along with fellow agent Erich Gimpel. The U-boat, U-1230, left them at Hancock Point in the Gulf of Maine.

Their landing was not secret, with a Canadian ship sunk nearby, indicating the presence of a German submarine, and locals reported seeing two people acting suspiciously. By this time Colepaugh and Gimpel had made their way to Boston, and then caught the train to New York. There Colepaugh visited an old school friend and decided to abandon the mission. Caught by the FBI, Colepaugh provided enough information for them to catch Gimpel. The two were tried before a Military Commission in February 1945 and found guilty. Both were sentenced to be hanged but this was commuted to life imprisonment by President Roosevelt. Colepaugh was paroled in 1960 and went to live in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, where he ran a printing business and turned down several offers to write a book, including one by the radio operator on the U-boat that took him to America, and who had migrated to Indianapolis after the war. William Colepaugh died on March 16, 2005.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Justin Corfield

COLWELL, LIEUTENANT JOHN C.
(1856–JANUARY 9, 1936)

Lieutenant John C. Colwell was the U.S. naval attaché at the U.S. embassy in London who ran the U.S. spy network in Europe during the Spanish-American War. John Charles Colwell was born in 1856 in Pennsylvania, and graduated from the Naval College, Annapolis, in 1874, joining the U.S. Navy. In 1888 in New York, he married Sarah Benton Brant of St. Louis. Colwell was in London from April 21, 1897, until June 5, 1900, and during his time there was instructed by Theodore Roosevelt, assistant secretary to the navy, to establish an intelligence network based in London; William S. Sims had the task of doing the same in Paris, France. Their task was to get political intelligence and military information on Spain—especially ship and troop movements—as well as try to "plant" stories in European newspapers.

Colwell spent some $27,000 on spies, anxious not to be upstaged by Sims. The reports were sent directly to Roosevelt, and it is doubted whether either the navy secretary, or even the president, knew about the money being spent from the Secret Service Emergency Fund. Although Colwell was described as temperamental, he was an excellent intriguer and managed to establish a spy network in London, Madrid, Antwerp, Paris, and also in Egypt. He and Sims were particularly successful in locating Admiral Manuel de la Cámara's fleet bound for Manila. Colwell, promoted to lieutenant commander, retired from the Navy on June 30, 1907, and lived in Morristown, New Jersey,

until his death on January 9, 1936. He was buried at the Arlington National Cemetery. His son, also called John Charles Colwell (1895–1951), served in the U.S. Army.

See also: Spanish-American War

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

The Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) was created by President Gerald Ford via Executive Order 11905 issued on February 18, 1976. The CFI was chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community staff serviced it. The CFI was to "control budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program." A prime concern behind creating the CFI was the belief that as the Department of Defense created new intelligence collection platforms, the danger existed that they would displace national intelligence programs unless a single coherent system for allocating resources among tactical and strategic intelligence systems could be established. At the center of the dispute was the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which had collection responsibility in both areas.

The CFI replaced the National Security Council Intelligence Committee and the Director of Central Intelligence-Department of Defense executive committee that managed national reconnaissance matters. As part of the agreement establishing the CFI, the secretary of defense was authorized to "direct, fund, and operate" intelligence agencies such as the National Security Agency. Executive Order 11905 also called for the creation of an Operations Advisory Group, which was given responsibility for supervising covert operations.

Discussions leading to the creation of the CFI can be traced back to a report written by presidential counselor Jack Marsh for Ford and presented to him in December 1975. The year 1975 has been dubbed "the year of intelligence" because of the investigations being undertaken by the Church and Pike Committees and Ford felt pressure to take action to bring greater coherence and leadership to the intelligence community. The fundamental problem identified by Marsh was the ambiguous relationship between intelligence officials in the Department of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Marsh offered four different plans for Ford's consideration. DCI William Colby viewed three as unacceptable because they would involve legislative action by Congress. He suggested a revision of the fourth option which, among other suggestions, proposed creating a resource executive committee that would be chaired by the DCI to review signals intelligence programs. Colby proposed the creation of a new National Security Council executive committee chaired by the DCI that would make resource decisions. Upon becoming DCI, George H. W. Bush endorsed Colby's proposal.

See also: Bush, George Herbert Walker; Central Intelligence Agency; Church Committee; Colby, William Egan; Defense Department Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; Ford Administration and Intelligence; National Reconnaissance Office; National Security Agency; Pike Committee

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Glenn P. Hastedt

COMMITTEE OF SECRET CORRESPONDENCE

The initial impetus for Congress's Committee of Secret Correspondence came from French Foreign Minister Charles Gravier, the comte de Vergennes, who believed that both French and American interests could best be served by circumspect joint action against their mutual enemy, Great Britain. In 1775, Vergennes sent an agent, Julien-Alexandre Achard de Bonvouloir, to Philadelphia to encourage the colonists' rebellion against Great Britain and to determine whether the colonists might settle their differences with Britain or pursue their grievances to independence.

Congress, angered by King George III's rude rejection of its Olive Branch Petition of July 1775, abandoned its resistance to seeking foreign assistance and established its Committee of Secret Correspondence on November 29, 1775. The committee's task was to develop foreign intelligence and explore the possibilities of foreign alliances. It soon opened discussions with Bonvouloir and then became involved in the clandestine purchase of arms and other war supplies, primarily from France, but the nature of these actions was carefully kept from the public. Congress's initial resolutions stated that the committee's sole purpose was to correspond with its friends in Great Britain and in other countries and submit their correspondence to the full Congress when appropriate. But Congress did pledge to defray any costs that might arise as a result of the committee's work, including payments to agents in its service.

Congress named Benjamin Franklin to chair the committee, assisted by Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, Thomas Johnson of Maryland, Arthur Lee of Virginia and London, Silas Deane of Connecticut, and James Lovell of Massachusetts. Early in the war, Lovell had been arrested for spying by the British, and after his release he became the committee's expert on codes and ciphers. As chairman, Franklin provided the committee with credibility. He was known throughout Europe and was thought capable of guiding American interests in various European capitals. Soon, however, the committee's membership began to change as delegates headed off for European missions.

In March 1776, Deane traveled to Paris to purchase munitions and to determine the extent of French cooperation and assistance. Prior to Deane's arrival, Vergennes had convinced King Louis XVI that it was in France's interest to surreptitiously support the drive for colonial independence. Vergennes conceived of this support as a means to an eventual alliance with the United States that could lead to reacquiring French territory lost to Britain by the Treaty of Paris of 1763, neutralizing the British navy,

seizing control of the trade routes that France had lost to Britain, and changing the balance of power in Europe. On May 2, 1776, 2 million livres, half of which was contributed by Spain, was deposited with a dummy trading corporation, Rodrigue, Hortalez et Cie, to send material aid to the United States. The Americans were expected to pay for this aid with shipments of tobacco to France. The company's director was the noted playwright, political operative, and spy Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais.

Congress, however, had not yet requested this aid. Many delegates still hoped for reconciliation with Britain, and not until June 7 did Congress, on the motion of Richard Henry Lee, appoint a committee to prepare a plan for treaties with foreign powers. With the approval of independence, however, the membership of the Committee of Secret Correspondence changed again. Franklin left for Paris in the fall, where he joined Deane and Arthur Lee, who was already in Europe, in a three-man commission entrusted to build a closer relationship with France. Their work culminated in the Franco-American Alliance of February 1778.

From its creation, Congress's Committee of Secret Correspondence was given a broad mandate to foster American interests overseas. Once Congress had approved the Declaration of Independence, the need for secrecy began to diminish, both in the committee's work and in its title (although French aid continued under the cover of Rodrigue, Hortalez et Cie for some time). On April 17, 1777, Congress renamed its Committee of Secret Correspondence the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The new board, on which Lovell continued to play a key role as a correspondent with American diplomats (writing both in plain text and in often confusing ciphers), may be considered a forerunner of the U.S. State Department.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Deane, Silas; Franklin, Benjamin; Lee, Arthur

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Arthur K. Steinberg

COMMITTEE ON SPIES

The Committee on Spies was established by the Second Continental Congress on June 5, 1776. Congress appointed John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Edward Rutledge, James Wilson, and Robert Livingston to the committee. The committee was tasked "to consider what is proper to be done with persons giving intelligence to the enemy or supplying them with provisions" and revising the Articles of War, regulations, and rules of discipline for the army, especially in regard to espionage against the Continental

army. Congress created the original Articles of War in the summer of 1775. John Adams recommended using the British Articles of War with a few modifications.

The espionage problem was urgent as the surgeon general of the Continental army, Dr. Benjamin Church, had been arrested as a British spy. Church had sent a cipher message to British Major Maurice Cane in July 1775 that was intercepted and sent to George Washington. Washington brought Church before a court martial in October 1775. At this time there was no civilian espionage act; and, in the judgment of George Washington and other American leaders, military law did not provide punishment severe enough to act as a deterrent. In his report to Congress, Washington wrote "The army and country are exceedingly irritated." On November 7, 1775, the Continental Congress added the death penalty to the Articles of War. The death penalty was not applied retroactively so Dr. Church remained in jail.

On August 21, 1776, the Continental Congress acted on the Committee's report by passing the first espionage act:

RESOLVED, That all persons not members of, nor owing allegiance to, any of the United States, as described in a resolution to the Congress of the 29th of June last, who shall be found lurking as spies in or about the fortification or encampments of the armies of the United States, or of any of them, shall suffer death, according to the law and usage of nations, by sentence of a court martial, or such ether punishment as such court martial may direct.

It was resolved further that the act "be printed at the end of the rules and articles of war." On February 27, 1778, the Continental Congress broadened the law to include any "inhabitants of these states" whose intelligence activities aided the enemy in capturing or killing Patriots.

See also: Committee of Secret Correspondence

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Steve Roane

CONFEDERATE SIGNAL AND SECRET SERVICE BUREAU

Confederate secret service operations have been difficult for historians to establish, as the Confederacy had no single coordinating agency. Documentation is scarce, particularly because the confederate government burned Richmond prior to its capture. Many key operatives (e.g., Colonel Thomas Jordan and Major William Norris) published no memoirs, carrying their secrets to the grave many years after the Civil War. By the end

of the war, the confederacy had extensive covert operations running from Canada and in the northern states, in England and France, as well as along the border and in active areas of military combat.

What can collectively be termed the *confederate secret service* encompassed 10 or more independently organized components, including secret services in the State and War Departments, the War Department Signal Bureau and Signal Corps, the Provost Marshall of Richmond, the Torpedo Bureau, Strategy Bureau, confederate field offices in Canada, and various scouting units. Many individuals carried assignments from more than one of these organizations at various times. Names can be confusing. The military had a General Intelligence Office organized by Chaplain William A. Crocker; its original function was obtaining and providing information on sick and wounded soldiers. There was a Safety Committee, headed by Gen. John Henry Winder in Richmond, charged with identifying and intercepting union spies; many spies (posing as confederate civilians) obtained travel passes in exchange for $100 contributions to Winder.

Major William Norris, commander of the War Department Signal Corps, organized at least 60 personnel maintaining courier links to the North, incorporating clandestine networks along the border organized by the state of Virginia. These evolved into the Secret Line, providing regular delivery of messages and reports by courier, and escort services for confederate agents between Richmond and Washington. The Doctor's Line in southern Maryland and Washington employed real and bogus physicians, carrying black bags, able to travel at all hours without arousing suspicion. The Postmaster Line employed postmasters in southern Maryland with confederate sympathies, many of whom were arrested, but replaced by their wives. The Secret Line remained in operation for at least two weeks after Lee's surrender at Appomattox. By 1863, Norris' corps was sometimes referred to as the Signal and Secret Service Bureau, but did not encompass all, or even most, confederate secret service work.

After Norris was reassigned to South Carolina in 1864, Capt. William N. Barker became acting chief, confining his work to communications and signal functions. Thus, some historians cite that this corps/bureau limited its role to keeping open lines of communication "by which Agents, Scouts, etc. can forward letters, papers, and light packages," not furnishing information. Obtaining information was considered "voluntary and incidental" on the part of civilian sympathizers. These voluntary and incidental activities would include spy rings organized by Colonel Thomas Jordan (using the name Thomas J. Rayford) and Rose O'Neal Greenhow, even before Lincoln's inauguration.

Many Southern sympathizers retained employment inside the federal War Department and other agencies, providing such rings with open access to information. A courier from Canada to Richmond, Richard Montgomery, was a double agent, who stopped off in Washington while federal authorities made copies of his dispatches. Norris clearly collected military intelligence as well. Dispatches known to federal military telegraph operators revealed timely communication from Norris to Secretary of War James A. Seddon concerning the transfer of two federal army corps by rail in September 1863 from Washington to Chattanooga, Tennessee, to reinforce General Rosecrans' army.

Lieutenant Edward Porter Alexander headed confederate signal operations. He had served in the prewar U.S. Army under that army's only signal officer, Major Albert J. Myer.

Observation posts on high ground were supplemented by observers posted on rooftops, courthouse cupolas, and church steeples. Timely communication to commanders required the use of signal flags during the day, waved to imitate the dot/dash pattern of telegraphy. Torches burning with turpentine were used at night. A signal corps station at Mathias Point in King George County, Virginia, commanded by Lt. Cawood, also served to move agents and reports across the Potomac River. Where available, telegraphic facilities were used to forward information. Attempted interception by federal observers required the use of codes and ciphers. The most frequently used confederate cipher was the Vicksburg Square, also known as the "Vigenere Table," named after its sixteenth-century inventor. The cipher requires a key phrase, and only three were used throughout the entire war—"Manchester Bluff," "Complete Victory," and for a small number of messages at the very end, "Come Retribution." All three were broken quickly by the "Sacred Three" in the federal War Department telegraph office.

Following the principle "look for the money," Tidwell has compiled figures to show that $1.5 million in gold was withdrawn from the confederate treasury for secret service activities, all of it personally approved by Jefferson Davis, and generally disbursed through the State Department. About $300,000 was allocated from 1861 to 1863, primarily to secure European recognition of the Confederacy, and to obtain warships from European shipyards. (Up to $2 million more were made available by the Confederate Navy for actual purchase of ships.) About $1.2 million was spent in 1864 and 1865, primarily to finance antiwar activity by northern copperheads, sabotage in the northern states, and uprisings which were never consummated. Congressional appropriations for clandestine activity were generally referred to as "for necessities and exigencies," and these appear as early as March 1861.

The confederacy did not establish an official Special and Secret Service Bureau until November 30, 1864, referenced in the language of the Secret Service Act of February 15, 1864. Appropriations for "secret service" first appear in January and February 1864, in appropriations bills and in SB194, which authorized "organizing bodies for the capture and destruction of the enemy's property by land or by sea" (Tidwell, 100, 106). The purpose was to organize clandestine use of explosive devices to destroy union supply dumps, fortifications, and gun boats, and obstruct or destroy shipping, along the lines advocated by Bernard Janin Sage, a planter and lawyer from Louisiana.

James Bulloch, who did write a detailed memoir, was asked May 7–9, 1861, by Confederate Attorney General Judah P. Benjamin (later Secretary of War) and Navy Secretary Stephen R. Mallory, to arrange for construction of ships in British and French shipyards. There was simply no private shipyard anywhere in the Confederate states capable of building and outfitting a ship. The mission was secret in the sense that Bulloch had to carefully sidestep neutrality laws, although he was not hard to locate, and was in regular communication with the official confederate mission to London. England had in force a statute known as the Foreign Enlistment Act, which prohibited either of two nations at war from equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming any vessel in England to make war on the other.

Accordingly, Bulloch had to arrange to buy ships, without military equipment, hiding his ultimate purpose. He obtained guns, carriages, shot and shells, small arms,

and ammunition from distinct sources, stores, clothing, and hammocks from still others. Bulloch arranged for all of these to be brought as cargo to a tender, and coordinated departure of his intended ship and the tender from separate ports, to meet at sea, transfer cargo, and outfit the purchased ship to prey on Yankee shipping. Bulloch's memoir is full of detailed legal analysis that each individual manufacturer and supplier he contracted with, as well as the British government, were in full technical compliance of the law, as he claims to have been himself.

CSS *Florida* and CSS *Alabama* were built in Liverpool, and equipped in this manner. Despite protests from U.S. Ambassador Charles F. Adams, Sr., both ships were taken out of port for "sea trials," then embarked upon careers costing 37 union ships (CSS *Florida*) and 65 ships (CSS *Alabama*). British Solicitor General Sir Roundel Palmer informed the House of Commons on March 27, 1863, that the *Alabama* did not depart from the shores of Great Britain as a ship of war—having received stores, arms, and papers, and hoisted the Confederate flag only after reaching Terceira in the Azores islands.

In September 1861 Bulloch purchased the screw-steamship *Fingal* in Scotland, to carry supplies to the Caribbean for transfer to blockade runners. The cargo included 14,000 muzzle-loading Enfield rifles, 1 million ball cartridges, 2 million percussion caps, 3,000 cavalry sabers, 1,000 short rifles with cutlass bayonets for the Navy, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition for each, and other military stores, running the blockade at Savannah. *Fingal* was subsequently refitted as the ironclad *Atlanta*, which was intercepted by two federal ironclads on its first run out of Savannah. Bulloch's attempt to contract for two ironclads from the Laird Brothers shipyard in Birkenhead was successfully blocked by Adams, but only after the British government had allowed the contracted work to begin. Contracts with a private individual for ships that clearly had a formidable military design was too much for the British navy to blink at. They would have been delivered in March and May 1863, used to break up the blockade, and possibly for surprise attacks on cities such as Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Philadelphia. Union diplomatic pressure also forced France to back off from an agreement to build four clipper corvettes for the Confederate navy.

Secret operations existed in Canada from the earliest days of war. Although slaves fleeing from capture under the Fugitive Slave Act had found safe haven in Canada, governing authorities turned a blind eye to confederate initiatives and agents. A common motive for both policies may have been to embarrass or weaken the United States. An early reason for the confederate presence in Canada was to secure a safe haven for prisoners of war escaping northward from federal custody. Agents in Canada also served to relay communications with England.

On or around April 7, 1864, Jefferson Davis initiated a new mission and sent new agents to Canada to lead it. Colonel Jacob Thompson was a former aide to Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard, U.S. congressman from Mississippi, and secretary of the interior. Clement C. Clay had been a U.S. senator from Alabama. James P. Holcombe, a one-time University of Virginia law professor, had already worked to arrange the return of escaped prisoners of war from Canada to the confederacy. These three commissioners were assisted by Capt. Thomas H. Hines, a cavalry officer who would handle military action, and George N. Sanders, a U.S. consul in England during the 1850s.

Clay and Sanders settled in Montreal, while Thompson went on to Toronto, and Holcombe soon went home.

There were five overall objectives: influencing the presidential election of November 1864, freeing confederate prisoners of war, sabotage to distract federal military operations (and disrupt the comforts of civilian life in the North—a response to the deprivation inflicted on civilian life in the confederate states), an attempt to capture Abraham Lincoln, and securing a negotiated peace agreement. All reflected the unfavorable situation on the battlefields, where the confederacy was clearly losing the war.

The most significant attempt to release prisoners of war began on September 19, when Captain John Yates Beall, acting on orders from Thompson, seized control of the *Philo Parsons*, a steamer operating in civilian traffic between Sandusky, Ohio, and Detroit. He intended to transport confederate volunteers to seize the federal naval vessel *Michigan*, stationed off Johnson's Island, and use it to free prisoners held on the island. The Confederate agent who was expected to get the officers drunk had been arrested, so the *Michigan*'s crew was on alert. Beall had to disperse his crew and scuttle the ship. He was later captured after an unsuccessful attempt to derail a train between Buffalo and Erie, seeking a train transferring seven captured Confederate generals from Johnson's Island to Fort Lafayette in New York. Beall was tried by court martial and hanged.

Canada became somewhat less hospitable to Confederate secret service operations after Lt. Bennett H. Young led 20 confederate soldiers who infiltrated St. Albans, Vermont, from Canada on October 19, 1864, robbed three banks, killed one citizen, wounded another, and stole as many horses as they could, unsuccessfully attempting to set fire to the town. After retreating into Canada, they were arrested, housed in rooms equal to any hotel, released, some rearrested, allowed to keep the money they had taken, then released again. A similar raid was attempted in Calais, Maine, on July 18, 1864, but three men were captured and no money taken.

Of many plans to set fire to northern cities, only one came close to succeeding, on November 25, 1864. Colonel Robert M. Martin of Kentucky was commissioned by Thompson to lead a team of eight, who in civilian clothes caught a train from Toronto to New York. Two dropped out, the rest set fires in multiple motels, each having engaged rooms in several buildings for the purpose. Hopes that copperheads in the city would seize federal and municipal buildings; free prisoners of war held in Ft. Lafayette; and convene a convention of delegates from New York, New Jersey, and New England to form a northeastern confederacy came to nothing. The fires were put out before fully destroying a single building, because windows and doors were left closed in each room splashed with phosphorous, cutting off the plentiful supply of oxygen needed for anything more than a slow smoldering mess. City residents were horrified by what might have been, and ready to hang any conspirator from the nearest lamp post.

All escaped by train to Canada; Robert Cobb Kennedy was caught trying to make his way south through Michigan, and hanged for espionage, including a charge that he "undertook to carry on irregular and unlawful warfare in the city and State of New York by setting fire thereto." As an escaped prisoner traveling through enemy territory in disguise, Kennedy had committed no crime under the laws of war. He would merely be reconfined in a prisoner of war camp. For carrying out a military assignment out of uniform, he could be hanged.

Although John Wilkes Booth's relation to Confederate secret service operations remains controversial, Tidwell has traced evidence of Booth's employment in clandestine operations from Canada, as well as in a plan to kidnap Lincoln, and to blow up federal government buildings, in 1865. It appears that the plot to assassinate the president and several cabinet members was conceived by Booth after being cut off from his chain of command, as the Confederate armies and government collapsed.

Plans for an uprising in the North relied heavily on copperheads, who proved to be hot in rhetoric, but not motivated to action. Federal authorities successfully infiltrated copperhead circles. Felix Stidger, a Union soldier assigned to intelligence operations in Indiana, rose to secretary general of the Knights of the Golden Circle, Grand Council of Indiana, submitting regular reports to Brig. Gen. Henry Carrington. Captain Hines, with 60 confederate operatives, tried to foment an uprising in Chicago at the time of the Democratic convention, or at least stir up enough distraction that he could free 5,000 Confederate soldiers imprisoned at Camp Douglas, and 7,000 at Rock Island. The copperheads would not fight, and Hines took his men back to Canada.

See also: Beauregard, General Pierre Gustav Toutanat; Boyd, Belle; Civil War Intelligence; Greenhow, Rose O'Neal; Huse, Caleb; Jordan, Thomas; Northwest Conspiracy; Pinkerton, Allan; Sacred Three; Sons of Liberty (Civil War); St. Alban's Raid; Webster, Timothy

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Charles A. Rosenberg

CONRAD, SERGEANT 1ST CLASS CLYDE LEE
(1948–JANUARY 8, 1998)

Clyde Lee Conrad was an American noncommissioned officer who ran a spy ring and sold top-secret information to the Hungarian military intelligence service. Included in this information were North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war plans detailing how many of its units would respond in case of war. Conrad was caught as part of U.S. Army counterintelligence's CANASTA PLAYER investigations. He was convicted of high treason on June 6, 1990, by a West German court and sentenced to life in prison plus two years and fined $2 million DM. He died of a heart attack in prison on January 8, 1998.

Conrad was recruited as a spy by Zoltan Szabo, a Hungarian national who served in the U.S. Army. Szabo turned management of the spy ring over to Conrad when he retired from the military. It is believed that the Szabo spy ring operated for several decades and focused largely on recruiting army personnel who needed money. By all accounts this was Conrad's primary motivation. Reportedly he received over $1 million from Hungary for spying.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

Founded in 1979, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence is a project organized and controlled by the National Strategy Information Center, a conservative Washington, DC–based think tank which was founded in 1962. Now, it has over 20 years of experience in analyzing the latest security and intelligence data, making recommendations to the federal government and to the private sector. According to its own mission statement, it acts as a forum for experts from the sector to propose and to debate intelligence policies and practices in order to promote a more efficient and effective American intelligence community. In this way, it also acts as a center of intelligence know-how, not just for the government, but also for the private sector, the media, and academics.

The formation of the Consortium in 1979 brought together some of the best government, nongovernment, and academic minds. Founders include faculty members of Columbia, Georgetown, Harvard, Yale, Virginia, and Chicago universities, as well as analysts from the Foreign Policy Research Institute, American Enterprise Institute, and the Hoover Institution. Going forward from its founding, the Consortium has assisted with the creation of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association, the Security and Intelligence Studies Group of the UK Political

Studies Association, and the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies. Funding for the Consortium comes from a variety of U.S.-based foundations.

In the post-9/11 world, intelligence needs, as well as intelligence reform, have become central political and security issues throughout the world. In light of this new need, the Consortium has been working recently to redefine traditional organization and structures in order to find new arrangements better calibrated for today's world. Legal boundaries are be reexamined, as well as the type and amount of resources needed by each intelligence domain and agency. The Consortium advocates a reform which does not just restructure the intelligence sector, but also investigates and reforms entire governments, laws, cultures, and societies in hopes of preventing future acts of terrorism and promoting a more secure world.

To achieve all of these goals, the Consortium undertakes its own research, making its findings and reports accessible to all those who are interested. Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., the Consortium's most recent director, outlined the objectives, which includes evaluating the strengths and the weaknesses of the U.S. intelligence community, determining the ideal model of the U.S. intelligence community, looking for new and updated intelligence indicators, and the improvement of policy reports in this domain.

The Consortium holds meetings and supports conferences to promote its findings. Additionally, it publishes an extensive collection of intelligence works which are available at stores worldwide and online.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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Arthur Holst

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1986

Continuing a long tradition in a U.S. ally and former colony, U.S. Embassy Political Section staff engaged in intelligence gathering in the midst of committee hearings and plenary sessions of the June–October 1986 Constitutional Commission of the Philippines. This time, however, their activities attracted counterproductive attention in the news media.

Earlier in 1986, West Point graduate General Fidel V. Ramos and Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile mutinied against President Ferdinand E. Marcos (1965–1986). Their revolt triggered the four-day People Power Revolution, driving Marcos from Malcañang Palace into exile in Honolulu. Ramos and Enrile were intimately connected to U.S. intelligence communities through the U.S.-Philippines Joint Military Assistance Advisory Group and other contacts. Following a nomination process open to individuals and civil society organizations, in May 1986 President Corazon C. Aquino (1986–1992) appointed 47 commissioners to write a new constitution.

At the time, three military treaties between the United States and the Philippines were in force. One of these was the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA). Depending on

contested interpretations, the MBA would expire either in 1991 or in 1992. Although evidence pointed to warming of ties between the United States and the Soviet Union, U.S. President Ronald W. Reagan (1981–1989) was concerned with constitutional provisions affecting a renegotiated MBA in 1991 and especially a ban on nuclear weapons in the Philippines. In that mind-set, Richard Holmes and Sylvia Alejandro of the U.S. Embassy Political Section reportedly attended every session of the Constitutional Commission's proceedings in the Batasan Building in Quezon City. Their noticeably aggressive tactics (once incongruously denying their U.S. employment!) attracted attention from reporters for *New Day* and the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. Ten years later, farm workers' leader and former Constitutional Commissioner Jaime Tadeo recalled Holmes' "100% attendance." Over the objections of the Reagan Administration, the draft of the Constitution submitted to voters included a weakened ban on nuclear weapons, a unilateral declaration that the MBA expired in 1991, and a provision for Senate ratification of any future MBA.

Eight hundred pages of declassified U.S. embassy cablegrams concerning the 1986 Constitutional Commission do not discuss the embarrassing media revelations of the identities of staff gathering intelligence for the Political Section, although the unflattering news reports did attract the attention of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. In any case, the declassified documents reveal an admitted intelligence failure: The size of the anti-MBA minority among the Constitutional Commissioners was half as large as the Political Section's estimate. The source of the error appears to lie in two closely related developments. On the one hand, perhaps because Political Section staff were communicating primarily with pro-MBA contacts, they underestimated the depth of anti-MBA sentiment among non-Communist activists in the Philippines. On the other hand, only belatedly did the Political Section recognize the skill with which those activists participated in Aquino's open nomination process. Covert State Department research on the Constitutional Commission also involved secret conversations with President Aquino's advisors like the Rev. Joaquin Bernas, S. J. who once reassured them that MBA-related issues were under control.

Although former President Aquino and several of her close aides favored constitutional clauses that would facilitate renewing the Military Bases Agreement, persistent challenges to Aquino's legitimacy left the ranking of that preference lower than ratification of the new constitution by a large majority. And for that, Aquino believed that she needed the enthusiastic support of anti-MBA Constitutional Commissioners. On February 7, 1987, voters ratified the document by a four-to-one margin. Four and a half years later, the Senate of the Philippines rejected a new Military Bases Agreement.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Reagan Administration and Intelligence

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Vincent Kelly Pollard

COOPER, JAMES FENIMORE
(SEPTEMBER 15, 1789–SEPTEMBER 14, 1851)

James Fenimore Cooper was author of *The Spy: A Tale of Neutral Ground*, the first American espionage novel. James Fenimore Cooper was born on September 15, 1789, in Burlington, New Jersey. Cooper is principally known for his "Leather Stocking" novels such as *The Last of the Mohicans* (1826), *The Pathfinder* (1840), and *The Deerslayer* (1841). But in 1812, drawn from the Revolutionary War espionage activities of Nathan Hale, Benedict Arnold, and John André, Cooper published *The Spy* and, for the first time, cast a spy as the protagonist of a novel.

The Spy was a major literary gamble. Prior to Cooper, writers, philosophers, the military, and people in general, although they certainly knew otherwise, simply chose not to admit that spies existed or that they were in any way beneficial to the aims of "great nations." In their minds, spies and their activities were dangerous, morally tarnished, and prone to scandal, illegality, or both. As a result, until Cooper's publication of *The Spy*, espionage remained a political nether region and an unsavory arena in which to develop heroes, fictional or otherwise.

To salvage the notion of the spy's nobility, Cooper employed George Washington, the symbolic "Father of the American Revolution," to sum up the fate of a spy when he states, "Remember that the veil which conceals your true character cannot be raised in years—perhaps never." And herein lies perhaps the most singular of Cooper's accomplishments in the novel. With Washington's words, Cooper established the fundamental premise that continues to run through espionage fiction: the ambiguity of a neutral ground wherein secret men do secret things. Secondly, and notwithstanding the entrenched social diagram of his time, Cooper shifted public opinion so as to view espionage as a patriotic duty, and to consider the spy in an entirely new light: the unsung hero. Copper died of dropsy in Cooperstown, New York, on September 14, 1851.

See also: Fiction, Spy Novels

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Brett F. Woods

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

As Europe edged closer to World War II, World War I hero and Medal of Honor winner William J. Donovan was working from 1940 to 1941 with senior analysts in the British Secret Intelligence Service, including Sir William Stephenson, who helped Donovan develop a relationship with British intelligence that would frustrate Axis operations in the Western Hemisphere to help bring the United States into World

War II and ensure Allied victory. The foundation of an official U.S. intelligence service originated from this Anglo-American liaison as President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to improve the quality of intelligence that he was receiving from experienced American diplomats who were themselves lacking good intelligence sources. Roosevelt required a more accurate forecast of events in Europe instead of the dispatches and cables, heavy with rumor and short on analysis, that were sent to Washington.

Donovan passed on the ideas from his experience with British intelligence to Roosevelt who established the Office of the Coordinator of Information on July 11, 1941, with Donovan at its coordinator. Earlier drafts of the presidential order mentioned a Coordinator of Strategic Information and a Coordinator of Defense Information (COI). The COI was established over the strong objections of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover and officials in the U.S. Department of State, the Army, and the Navy who were fearful of losing power. After a bitter dispute with Coordinator of Inter American affairs director Nelson Rockefeller Latin America was eliminated from Donovan's propaganda responsibility.

The new agency was "to collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data; and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine."

Many of Donovan's ideas greatly influenced U.S. intelligence policy for decades to income, including a Research and Analysis (R+A) Division, which he staffed with Ivy League talent; R+A staff eventually included prominent economists, psychologists, geographers, and anthropologists. The most secret COI branches were known as SA/B and SA/G. They were designed as training branches that would become active in the event that the United States entered the war in Europe. In structuring COI, and later OSS, "SA" meant Special Activities and the letter after the slash indicated the last initial of the man in charge. SA/B was an intelligence branch under David K. E. Bruce and SA/G was a sabotage branch under M. P. Goodfellow.

Propaganda functions were performed through its Foreign Information Service (FIS) Branch, under the direction of Robert E. Sherwood, the playwright and presidential speech writer, who set up shortwave monitoring stations to listen to German propaganda broadcasts. The FIS quickly issued responses to anti-American propaganda.

The COI was abolished with the creation of the Office of Strategic Services, which became official on June 13, 1942.

See also: Donovan, Major General William Joseph; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Hoover, J. Edgar; Office of Strategic Services; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Stephenson, Sir William Samuel

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Martin J. Manning

COPLON, JUDITH
(1922–)

Judith Coplon was a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) employee who spied for the Soviet Union. She was convicted of espionage twice, once in 1949 and the other time in 1950. Both of her convictions were overturned. The first conviction was overturned because the FBI had placed a wiretap on her conversations with her lawyer. The second conviction was overturned because she had been arrested without a warrant. She was not tried again and in 1967 the government officially dropped the case.

Coplon was born in 1922 and became a Communist in 1944 while attending Barnard College. She began work as a political analyst in the Department of Justice's New York Foreign Agents Registration Section and soon earned a promotion to the Washington office. Coplon came to the attention of the FBI as a result of information obtained through the VENONA intercepts. They revealed that the Soviet Union was obtaining information from someone recently transferred from New York to Washington.

She was put under a counterintelligence surveillance program that included phone wiretaps, mail openings, and photographic surveillance. The FBI also provided her with access to falsely labeled secret information in the hopes of entrapping her. They observed Coplon taking this information to her Soviet handler Valentine Gubitchev who was employed under cover in the UN Architectural Department. This pattern was repeated several times before Coplon and Gubitcehev were arrested in March 1949.

The arrest was mishandled. Not only did the FBI fail to obtain an arrest warrant but when Coplon was arrested she had not yet passed any secrets to Gubitchev. Both claimed unsuccessfully that the FBI had planted the documents. She was convicted and he was declared *persona non grata*. Also complicating the government's case was the fact that crucial information on Coplon was obtained through the secret VENONA intercepts. At her trial FBI Special Agent Robert Lamphere, who handled the case, could only state that he had become suspicious of Coplon because of information from a reliable "confidential informant" who was not a wiretap.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); VENONA

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CORONA

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assigned the code name CORONA to the first and primary family of photoreconnaissance satellites used by the United States during the height of the cold war to collect photographic and mapping intelligence on the Soviet Union and Communist countries.

The CORONA program evolved out of the U.S. Air Force's initial interest in the use of man-made satellites in the immediate years after World War II to assess the growing strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union. Engineers and scientists from the Rand Corporation supported the air force's interest in the use of satellites for intelligence gathering. In 1951, RAND issued Project FEEDBACK, which recommended building a reconnaissance satellite. With support from Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining, Commander of Strategic Air Command General Curtis E. LeMay, and Air Force Science Advisory Committee Chairman Jimmy Doolittle, the air force assigned the satellite program to the Western Development Division of the Air Research and Development Command. Brigadier General Bernard Schriever took command of the new program.

While also working on building missiles for the air force, Schriever and his WDD staff linked the reconnaissance satellite program to the development of the ATLAS and TITAN intercontinental ballistic missile programs. They designed the program Weapons Systems-117 L (WS-117L). Between 1954 and 1956, the air force refined its program and worked toward employing satellites to collect valuable photographic and mapping intelligence. In October 1956, the air force satellite program officially commenced.

The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation received the initial contract to build the WS-117L system. While the Eisenhower administration approved the satellite program, concerns from members of the Technologies Capability Panel (TCP) emerged as to the need for consistent peacetime intelligence of the Soviet Union. As a result of this concern two members of the TCP, James Killian and Edward Land, persuaded Eisenhower that the CIA would be a better organization to direct the reconnaissance satellite program. Eisenhower agreed and appointed Richard Bissell as the director of the program. Bissell and his deputy, Air Force Brigadier General Osmand Ritland, presided over a mixed organization of CIA and USAF officers. The Eisenhower administration had devised a similar arrangement to support the U-2 project early in the 1950s. With the increased vulnerability of the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union to surface-to-air missiles, the Eisenhower administration searched for a better intelligence-gathering platform.

After 12 unsuccessful attempts to place a CORONA satellite into orbit, the Eisenhower administration finally achieved its objective on August 10, 1960. Although this feat represented a great technological triumph, the satellite did not contain film (Day, Logsdon, and Latell, 1998, 38). On August 18, 1960, the 14th CORONA satellite orbited the Soviet Union and ejected its film capsule, which specially designed USAF C-119s aircraft retrieved in midair. The 16 pounds of film retrieved from this flight provided the United States with more photographic intelligence of the Soviet Union than all previous U-2 flights combined.

After demonstrating its initial capabilities to gather photographic and mapping intelligence to the Eisenhower administration, the CORONA program would have a robust future in the national security of the United States. From 1959 to 1972, the CORONA satellite underwent a series of improvements in its camera and operational systems that resulted in four specific versions of the satellite and camera systems.

The first CORONA satellite, designated KEYHOLE-1 (KH-1) by the CIA and USAF (KEYHOLE was the code for intelligence collected by a satellite), had a resolution of 40 feet and flew from 1959 to 1960. The second and third versions of the satellite, KH-2 and KH-3, had improved cameras with a resolution of approximately 10 feet and flew from 1960 to 1962. The United States used the final versions of the satellite, KH-4, KH-4A, and KH-4B, respectively, from 1962 to 1963, 1964 to 1969, and 1967 to 1972. These CORONA variants provide improved photographic quality by using stereoscopic imagery and providing resolutions of approximately five feet.

The intelligence gathered between the 1960 and 1972 by the successive CORONA satellites provide the United States with unfettered strategic and economic information on the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and China. Successive presidents, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard M. Nixon, deemed these valuable technological assets vital to the national security of the United States. During their lifespan, the United States launched 147 CORONA satellites and captured over two million feet of film behind the iron curtain.

For the duration of CORONA's operational lifespan the CIA and the U.S. government kept the program and its images shrouded behind a veil of tight security classifications. However, in 1992 former Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates began to work toward releasing information and photographs associated with the CORONA satellite program. From 1993 to 1994, Vice President Al Gore pressed the CIA to release the CORONA photographs for environmental studies. The result of this activity led the CIA to lift the veil of secrecy on the CORONA program on February 24, 1995, when it presented CORONA photographs to the press and public for the first time.

See also: Aerial Surveillance; Bissell, Richard Melvin, Jr.; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Johnson Administration and Intelligence; KEYHOLE—SIGINT Satellites; Killian, Dr. James R., Jr.; National Reconnaissance Office; OVERFLIGHT, Operation; Satellites; Truman Administration and Intelligence; U-2 Incident

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Sean N. Kalic

COSTELLO, JOHN
(AUGUST 3, 1943–AUGUST 26, 1995)

John Edward Costello was an historian and author who, having gained access to national security archives in the United States and Russia, wrote several controversial books on international espionage. Born in Scotland on May 3, 1943, Costello is best known for writing about World War II and the cold war. Costello died on August 26, 1995.

In *Days of Infamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill—The Shocking Truth Revealed*, Costello contends that the disaster at Pearl Harbor was the result of a failure in military strategy by the Roosevelt administration. Until 1941, the first line of defense in the Pacific had been Hawaii, but in the fall of 1941, Roosevelt made the Philippines, which were unprepared for such a task, the first line of defense. In addition, Philippine-based General Douglas MacArthur, who exaggerated the strength of U.S. forces in the Philippines, failed to implement a preemptive strike against Japan in the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. Therefore, Hawaii-based Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Scott, who were forced to retire in disgrace, should not be blamed for the debacle at Pearl Harbor.

In *Deadly Illusions: The KGB Orlov Dossier Reveals Stalin's Master Spy*, Costello provides the reader with an historical study based on declassified Russian and American intelligence community documents that read like a spy novel. Costello contends that Alexander Orlov (1895–1973), who defected to the United States in 1952, was actually spreading disinformation within the U.S. and British intelligence communities while organizing one of the most notorious spy networks in British history, the Cambridge group, which included Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, and Donald Maclean.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Atomic Spy Ring; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Orlov, Alexander; Pearl Harbor; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano

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Michael R. Hall

COUNTERTERRORIST CENTER, CIA AND NATIONAL

The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) Counterterrorist Center (CTC) was established in January 1986 to coordinate the U.S. intelligence community's collection, analysis, and operations against terror group's intent on harming the interests of the United States. After the terror attacks on the American homeland on September 11, 2001, an independent commission examined the U.S. intelligence and enforcement communities and made recommendations that eventually led President George W. Bush to consolidate federal counterterror efforts in one location. As a result, the National Counterterrorism

Center (NCTC) was established in August 2004 in McLean, Virginia, pooling federal agencies involved in counterterrorism activities, including the newly created Department of Homeland Security.

After a series of high-profile terrorist acts in the 1980s, including the suicide bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, and the bombing of a Pan Am civilian jet liner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, the Reagan administration created a task force to examine how best the U.S. government might organize itself and conduct operations against this emerging and growing threat. Part of the task force's conclusions was that while the United States was collecting information on the activities of terror groups there existed scant capabilities within the intelligence community in which intelligence could be exploited and used in preemptive and proactive operations on a global basis.

As President Reagan sought to seize the initiative against the enemies of the United States utilizing terror tactics he turned to his Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI) William Casey to spearhead the effort. Casey envisioned "action teams" that the CIA could deploy in preemptive operations and enlisted CIA Directorate of Operations veteran, Duane R. "Dewey" Claridge, who served in Nepal and India in the first years of the cold war running anti-Soviet operations on remote frontiers. Casey directed Claridge to interview terrorist specialists in the Washington, DC, area and write up a proposal for the establishment of a new covert CIA counterterrorist strategy. Claridge was quartered in an office down the hall from the DCI in early January 1986 and by month's end had drafted a concise and brief nine-page, double-spaced memo to Casey laying the foundation for a new CIA Counterterrorist Center.

A guiding principle inherent in Claridge's blueprints was that the U.S. government needed to be increasingly proactive in going after terrorist groups, including the concepts of penetration and preemption. A second finding in Claridge's work was that although the terrorist groups were oftentimes transnational (i.e., operating across borders and regions), the U.S. government's intelligence community and foreign relations apparatus was set up as country and region specific. The CT Center would have to be imbued with the ability to collect information and conduct missions which transcended the traditional boundaries and parameters of the U.S. national bureaucracies.

Additionally, the CT Center was designed to incorporate personnel from other government agencies and eventually individuals were detailed from a variety of agencies including the FBI; the Departments of Defense, Treasury, and Energy; and the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), among others. The CIA was the lead agency with the Director of the CTC also serving as Special Assistant for Counter-Terrorism to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Accordingly, the CT Center was to aid the DCI in coordinating and focusing the U.S. intelligence community's resources with two overriding objectives. First, produce and implement a comprehensive counterterror strategy to collect intelligence and convert that to actionable insight in order to preempt, disrupt, and defeat international terrorist groups. And second, to include in the comprehensive planning, a strategy which significantly reduced the capabilities of state sponsors of terrorism.

As the Center moved forward in the early stages, it faced friction in achieving its mission statement goals. The Near East section of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, as a whole, did not readily accept the concept that a new entity would have new authority

in their region and traditional area of responsibility. Furthermore, the desired sharing of intelligence between agencies such as the FBI and CIA or units within the Department of Defense and other entities remained problematic.

Just as significant were events during the Reagan administration which served to severely impede the successful development of the CT Center. DCI Casey and the agency became entangled in controversy regarding activities in Nicaragua and allegations regarding the provision of arms to Iran in exchange for aid in freeing hostages in Lebanon. The Iran-Contra scandal and the congressional uproar and the subsequent investigations served to limit the ability to encourage and foster a culture of preemptive and proactive action within the CT Center. Consequently, a cautious and increasingly analytic orientation permeated the Center's environment and the original hope of creating a forward-leaning and risk-acceptant culture faltered in the face of risk-averse tendencies.

Although these developments slowed the efforts of those working to achieve an effective counterterror force within the CIA, the development of the center continued and adjustments were made. In 1990, a DCI Directive established the Interagency Committee on Terrorism (IICT), to improve cooperation and the effective use of intelligence community resources in regard to international terrorism. The membership of the IICT consists of individuals from across the federal government, including elements from the intelligence, security, law enforcement, regulatory, and defense communities.

Also contributing to increased cooperation within the CT Center were terror attacks on U.S. interests that continued in the 1990s including the 1993 bombing attack in the basement of the World Trade Center and the killing of U.S. service personnel being quartered in Saudi Arabia's Khobar Towers in 1996. These events, coupled with the beginning of the hunt for exiled Saudi terrorist, Osama bin Laden, began a significant buildup of the CT Center.

Also in 1996, CTC and the FBI began exchanging senior-level officers to help manage the counterterrorist offices at both agencies. And, in the late 1990s, the Center began a buildup of a much larger paramilitary force that drew upon the Defense Department's special operations community and dozens of special DoD operators were temporarily detailed to the Center. By the beginning of 2001, CIA's CT Center had evolved from the original three-man operation confined to one room and a single television set to a joint center with nearly three hundred personnel.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the CT Center spearheaded the initial U.S. response as the first armed personnel on the ground in Afghanistan were under the Center's direction. These units successful led the charge, which eliminated Afghanistan as a base and safe harbor for the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies.

An independent commission review of the 9/11 attacks argued that too many barriers to effective communication remained between federal agencies. In order to overcome these barriers and to facilitate the counterterrorism community's access to terrorism information, President Bush ordered the FBI and CIA to combine their respective counterterrorism operations in a new center, overseen by the DCI and initially called the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. This entity eventually became the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) located in McLean, Virginia.

The NCTC was established to serve as the main unit in the federal government for coordinating, integrating, and analyzing all intelligence related to terrorist activities including counterterrorism activities. NCTC was also tasked with conducting strategic

operational planning which included the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving U.S. goals and objectives. The NCTC has become the primary advisor to the newly established post of Director of National Intelligence on both analysis and operations. It serves as the principal forum for interagency cooperation throughout the U.S. government.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Post–Cold War Intelligence; September 11, 2001; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence

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James Brian McNabb

COUNTRY TEAM

The concept of a country team can be traced back to the Harry S. Truman administration and the challenge posed by the task of rebuilding West European societies after World War II. A primary element of the U.S. strategy to accomplish this objective was the transfer to large amounts of economic and military aid. By 1951 it had become clear that the ad hoc manner in which U.S. embassies were tasked to disperse these funds needed to be regularized. At the direction of President Truman, General Lucius Clay mediated negotiations among the State and Defense Departments and the Economic Cooperation Administration that led to the concept of a country team under the leadership of the Ambassador who had responsibility for coordination, general direction, and leadership of all elements of the embassy's operation. Subsequent presidents have endorsed the concept of a country team but implementing it remains an illusive goal. President John Kennedy sought to bring a measure of balance to the country team concept by allowing agencies to appeal to Washington if they found themselves in disagreement with the ambassador.

Two particularly problematic areas of coordination within the country team have been the reluctance of the military and covert operations officers to submit to the direction of the ambassador, much less keep the ambassador fully informed of their operations. More so than with other members of the country team, officials representing these organizations look to their home institutions in Washington, DC, for policy direction. Both organizations also place great importance upon secrecy and speed in implementing orders, two features which frustrate ambassadorial oversight. In the case of the military Kennedy' solution was to give the ambassador authority to request a decision form a "higher authority" in cases where disagreement exists. The military, however, is not enjoined to work with the ambassador. Ambassadorial interactions with covert action programs remain a grey area with permission for large-scale covert action programs residing in presidential findings.

Ambassadorial control problems are compounded by two trends that place significant coordination and control challenges on the country team concept. One is the growing presence in U.S. embassies of non–State Department personnel. By the end of the cold war only about 38 percent of those employed in U.S. embassies worked for the State Department; 36 percent worked for the Defense Department. Other agencies represented included Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, and Transportation. The second trend is the growing agenda of U.S. foreign policy. This means that no longer does an embassy just focus on politico-military issues, nor does it focus solely on the host government.

Compounding these problems is the reality that many ambassadors do not wish to exercise control or may not be able to do so by virtue of their backgrounds and experiences. Many ambassadors, for example, are political appointees with no experience in foreign affairs. Presidents routinely reward campaign contributors with ambassadorships. In 2007, in the George W. Bush administration 50 members of the "Pioneers," individuals who raised at least $100,000 for one of his presidential campaigns, had become ambassadors.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Department Intelligence; Intelligence Community; State Department Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN

Founded in 1978 by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defector, Philip Agee, and several cohorts, *Covert Action Information Bulletin* (CAIB) was a publication aimed at promoting "a worldwide campaign to destabilize the CIA through exposure of its operations and personnel" (Agee, 1987, 280). CAIB was the successor of *CounterSpy Magazine*, another anti-CIA publication of the mid-1970s. According to documents retrieved from Soviet archives, the CAIB enterprise had direct links to both the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Cuban intelligence agency (DGI).

The inaugural issue of the *Bulletin* was published in July of 1978 and first distributed at the World Festival of Youth and Students in Havana, Cuba. The *Bulletin* soon became known for its harsh criticism of the CIA and, more importantly, its efforts to expose secret agents working undercover in various parts of the world. The latter of these objectives was particularly evident in the "Naming Names" section of the *Bulletin*, a regular column in which the names, positions, and whereabouts of covert CIA personnel were revealed. The *Bulletin* encouraged its readers to send any leads, tips, or other information such as U.S. diplomatic lists or embassy staff directories (Agee et al., 1978, 3).

In 1982, largely in attempt to curb the proliferation of CAIB and other anti-CIA literature, President Ronald Reagan signed the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. The passing of this legislation made it illegal for the *Bulletin* to continue its practice

of disclosing confidential information pertaining to American intelligence workers. Despite this roadblock, CAIB continued publishing critical reviews of American intelligence practices with its main focus stuck on the CIA.

Beginning with issue 43, in 1992, the *Bulletin* assumed the new title: *Covert Action Quarterly* (CAQ). The new publication covered a wider range of topics while staying true to its roots as a staunch provider of CIA watchdog information.

See also: Agee, Philip; Central Intelligence Agency; Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Todd J. Wiebe

COVERT MISSION PROTOCOLS

The Covert Mission Protocols were the provisions designating the types of covert operations that the United States would undertake in prosecuting the cold war. With National Security Council Directive 10/2 (NSC 10/2), issued on June 18, 1948, the U.S. government incorporated a broad range of covert activities into its foreign policy machinery. Specifically, the directive prescribed the use of covert political and psychological warfare; preventative direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; economic warfare; and subversion against hostile states. Covert operations were to be handled in such a way as to permit government officials to "plausibly disclaim" responsibility for them.

For the purpose of implementing and administering these functions, the directive established the Office of Special Projects, which was soon renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). Frank G. Wisner was appointed its first director. While lodging it within the organizational structure of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for administrative purposes, NSC 10/2 placed effective control of the OPC with officials in the State and Defense Departments. At the time of NSC 10/2, espionage-related activities were conducted by a separate branch within the CIA and were not included in the covert mission protocols.

NSC 10/2 replaced a previous National Security Council directive, NSC 4-A, which had assigned responsibility for covert operations relating to psychological warfare, to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). In 1952, Director Walter Bedell Smith reconsolidated all peacetime covert activities under the control of the DCI. Thereafter, they remained the responsibility of the CIA.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; National Security Council; Office of Policy Coordination; Smith, Walter Bedell; Wisner, Frank

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Derek A. Bentley

CUBAN FIVE

The Cuban Five, Geraldo Hernandez, Ramon Labanino (aka Louis Medina), Antonio Guerrero, Fernando Gonzalez (aka Ruben Campa), and Rene Gonzalez, were arrested along with five others as part of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counterintelligence operation against La Red Avispa, a Cuban espionage organization operating in south Florida in 1998. While the others pled guilty, the Cuban five all pled not guilty to being spies. They spent almost three years in jail before going on trial. They were all found guilty of using false identification, espionage, and conspiracy to commit murder. This last charge was a result of Hernandez's infiltration of the Cuban American National Foundation and his providing the Cuban government with information about the flight plan of two planes operated by the anti-Cuban organization Brothers in Resistance. Four members of that group died when their planes were attacked by Cuban MIG fighters. He received two life sentences. Guerrero and Labanino each received a life sentence while Fernando Gonzalez was sentenced to 19 years in prison and Rene Gonzalez received a 15-year prison term.

In maintaining their innocence the Cuban Five argued that they had been sent to Florida by the Cuban government to monitor and report on the activity of anti-Cuban terrorist groups and that they had not taken any action against the U.S. government. After their convictions, the Cuban government mounted a major international campaign to secure their freedom. In the United States it has been spearheaded by the National Committee to Free the Cuban Five. Amnesty International has criticized the treatment that the Cuban Five have received in prison and the UN Commission on Human Rights criticized what it saw as the harsh sentences handed out and the lack of objectivity and fairness in the court proceedings which began eight months after would-be refugee Elian Gonzalez was taken away from his Miami relatives and returned to Cuba. Eight Nobel Prize winners, including Desmond Tutu (1984), Rigoberta Menchu (1992), and Adolfo Perez Esquivel (1980), have contacted the U.S. government calling for their release from custody.

In August 2005, a U.S. Appeals Court ordered a retrial for the Cuban Five, citing the biased atmosphere that existed in Miami due to the presence of a large anti-Cuban exile community. In November this decision was reversed by a full panel of the 11th Circuit Court, reinstating the original convictions.

In August 2008 a federal appeals court once again rejected an appeal by the Cuban Five, upholding their convictions. In its ruling the three-judge panel rejected their

arguments concerning the prosecution's use of information obtained under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, discovery procedures, sovereign immunity, jury selection, and lack of evidence to support conviction. The appeals court did, however, vacate the life sentences of Lambiano, Guerrero, and Fernando Gonzalez's 19-year prison sentence, finding that there was no evidence that they had obtained "secret" information. These individuals were to be resentenced. Geraldo Hernandez's life sentence was upheld.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world closer to nuclear war than any other event in history. For American intelligence, it represented both a failure and a success in the discovery of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba, the timing of that discovery, and the contribution intelligence made to the resolution of the crisis.

The decision of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to install intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs and MRBMs) in Cuba resulted from several factors. Due to the U-2, the Americans knew and had revealed in October 1961 that the United States had more numerous and technologically advanced nuclear forces than the Soviets. This revelation led to increasing pressure on Khrushchev from the Soviet Presidium and military leadership, as well as the Chinese, to stand up to the Americans. Second, the Americans had openly deployed short-range missiles throughout Europe and Asia, including installations in Turkey. Third, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was conducting Operation Mongoose, the systematic harassment of the government of Fidel Castro in Cuba, which included attempts to assassinate Castro. The Americans conducted a number of training exercises in the Caribbean from 1961 to 1962 that seemed to be preparations for invading Cuba. In May 1962, Khrushchev decided that he could solve these problems with a secret deployment of missiles to Cuba. The deployment conducted by the Soviet military involved the building of missile bases along with the deployment of 50,000 Soviet troops, fighter and bomber aircraft, torpedo boats, tactical nuclear weapons, and antiaircraft missiles to protect the missile bases.

As the amount of shipping to Cuba increased, American intelligence agencies began receiving reports of the expanded presence of Soviet forces, including the installation of SA-2 antiaircraft missiles. However, despite the opinion of CIA Director John McCone that the SA-2s must be guarding something important, most CIA analysts believed the Soviets would never deploy missiles outside of their own country due to their distrust of the satellite nations. On September 19, 1962, the CIA issued a Special National Intelligence Estimate (85-3-62) titled "The Military Buildup in Cuba" that reasserted the belief that any such deployment would be "incompatible with Soviet

View from U.S. reconnaissance aircraft of Mariel Bay, Cuba. In October 1962, Soviet missile equipment and transport ships were photographed by U.S. U-2 spy planes, leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Library of Congress)

practice to date and with Soviet policy as we estimate it." With the CIA's assurance that the Soviet buildup in Cuba was similar to conventional buildups elsewhere in the Third World, President Kennedy warned that although the United States would tolerate the deployment of conventional forces, the installation of offensive missiles would require an American response. The Soviets denied such a deployment both publicly and through private assurances to the president.

The belief that the Soviets were not deploying nuclear weapons was not the only factor that prevented the Americans from learning the truth. Hindering the discovery of the Soviets' missile bases were the weather, domestic politics, and change in the operational control of the U-2. During much of the month of September, flights over

Cuba were put on hold due to the weather and the desire to avoid an incident during the midterm congressional election campaign. In order to obtain usable photographs there had to be clear visibility from the ground to the U-2's operational altitude of 70,000 feet, a standard difficult to obtain during hurricane season. Politically, Kennedy assured the American people several times during September that there was no danger from Cuba. Since the CIA had discovered SA-2 antiaircraft missiles on the island, the potential of a U-2 being shot down was politically dangerous. Therefore, it was not until late in the month as questions about the size of the Soviets military shipments persisted (and CIA Director McCone returned from his honeymoon) that Kennedy approved intelligence flights as soon as the weather was clear.

Complicating matters further, the CIA and the Pentagon were engaged in a debate over who should have operational control over any U-2 flights over Cuba. The CIA argued that for reasons of plausible denial they should maintain control; the Pentagon argued that the U-2 would better serve U.S. interests by being controlled by the Strategic Air Command (SAC). President Kennedy sided with the Pentagon, so after the training of a number of air force pilots to fly the intelligence aircraft, operational control was transferred from the CIA to SAC on October 12, 1962. On October 14, 1962, a U-2 photographed new construction around San Cristobal and Los Palacios, Cuba. That evening into the next day, analysts at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) determined that the Soviets had in fact deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba. On October 15, 1962, the NPIC informed the CIA, who informed National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. Bundy informed President Kennedy, who returned from a campaign trip that night, the following morning.

On October 16, 1962, Kennedy called into existence the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Excom) to serve as his primary source of advice on what to do about the Soviets' missiles. To help the Excom formulate that advice, SAC and the CIA would continue U-2 flights on a daily basis, discovering other Soviet missile bases on the island. In addition, Kennedy authorized reconnaissance by low-level air force jets to further monitor the Soviets' progress. Despite the increased aerial reconnaissance, the Americans were unable to determine if the Soviets had also delivered the nuclear warheads to the island, and if they had where they were. Nevertheless, on October 20, 1962, CIA analysts opined that the Soviets had at least eight MRBMs that were operational, and that the IRBMs would be ready for launch within one to two weeks.

During the week of October 16–22, Kennedy and Excom kept the presence of the missiles secret in order to give the president time to decide on a course of action. He decided to pursue a policy of gradual escalation by imposing a blockade (or quarantine) of Cuba and demanding the Soviets withdraw their missiles. To prepare his Allies for this policy, Kennedy dispatched emissaries to London and Paris equipped with the latest U-2 photographs of the Soviet bases.

During the public phase of the Crisis from October 22–28 U-2 and low-level reconnaissance of Cuba continued. In response to Soviet denials, Kennedy authorized the display of U-2 photographs of the Soviets' missiles at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. The images, coupled with Soviet secrecy, convinced the Organization of American States (OAS) to unanimously support the Americans' policy throughout the crisis. By October 27, the CIA informed the Excom that all of the MRBMs on the island were operational.

There were two negative incidents involving American intelligence. Due to a bureaucratic oversight, a U-2 flight over East Asia was not cancelled. The plane accidentally strayed into Soviet airspace, causing both countries' air forces to scramble fighter planes for action. The U-2 left Soviet airspace before a confrontation could occur.

The second incident was considerably more dangerous. A Soviet antiaircraft missile shot down a U-2 flown by Major Rudolf Anderson on October 27, 1962. It would later be determined that the local commander had acted against orders from Moscow to avoid an incident with the Americans. At the time, the destruction of a reconnaissance plane nearly triggered a military response by the United States. In the aftermath of the destruction of the U-2, both Kennedy and Khrushchev redoubled their efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, which they did on October 28. Publicly, Khrushchev offered to withdraw the Soviets' offensive weapons from Cuba, subject to onsite verification, in return for an American promise not to invade Cuba. Privately, Kennedy agreed to withdraw American missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet silence on the matter.

Intelligence would play one final role in the crisis. Despite the Soviets' promise to allow onsite verification of the withdrawal of their offensive weapons, Castro refused to admit weapons inspectors into his country. It was left to U-2 flights over the island to supervise the dismantling of the Soviet bases. Additionally, low-level reconnaissance aircraft flew over Soviet transport ships to confirm that they were carrying missiles and bombers. The Soviets cooperated with the Americans' reconnaissance efforts by bringing the missiles and planes onto the decks of the cargo ships and allowing the Americans to photograph them.

See also: Bay of Pigs; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; MONGOOSE, Operation; National Intelligence Estimate; National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC); National Security Agency; U-2 Incident

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CULPER RING

The Culper Ring was an important American spy network that operated in New York City and on Long Island during the War of American Independence. In November 1778 General George Washington, commander in chief of the American army in

New York, appointed Major Benjamin Tallmadge to direct his military intelligence service. He admonished Tallmadge and the people who would work for him to be critical in their observations and not retell mere hearsay. Quickly Tallmadge organized a spy network in New York City, where the British army was headquartered, and began reporting directly to Washington. The Culper Ring, or the Culper Spy Ring, as it came to be known, was the most successful American intelligence operation of the war. For five years it operated under the very noses of the British in New York City and on Long Island without a single member ever being found out. During that time it provided Washington with considerable information, more or less important. It consisted of childhood friends of Tallmadge from Setauket, on Long Island Sound, 55 miles from the city and remained so secret that even Washington did not know the names of its members. Participants besides Tallmadge were Abraham Woodhull, Robert Townsend, Austin Roe, Anna Strong, and Caleb Brewster.

In 1779, Tallmadge established secret code names for use in conducting operations. Tallmadge was "John Bolton," Woodhull was "Culper Senior," and Robert Townsend "Culper Junior." Additionally, he established a system of numbers to identify various individuals involved. Finally, he and his friends began using an invisible ink invented by Sir James Jay, brother of John Jay, to inscribe their messages. Townsend (Culper Junior) was the key figure in New York City. A suave, well-educated young man, he posed as a loyalist merchant and coffee shop owner, in partnership with James Rivington. Also, he was a society reporter for Rivington's newspaper, *Rivington's New-York Gazeteer* (later *Rivington's New York Loyal Gazette* or *Royal Gazette*). Using these positions, he garnered information from British soldiers and civilians in day-to-day contacts and at various social functions.

Over time, the Culper spies perfected an elaborate system for conveying this information to General Washington at New Windsor, New York, through territory that teemed with British troops. Austin Roe, a store- and tavern-keeper in Setauket, was a courier. Riding the 55 miles from Setauket to New York, he entered Townsend's mercantile establishment and placed an order in writing from Tallmadge (John Bolton). Embedded in the message were prearranged code words from Washington to Townsend, to which Townsend responded in coded documents. These then were secreted in goods which Roe carried the 55 miles back to Setauket. There, on the farm of Abraham Woodhull (Culper Senior), Roe had leased a pasture and barn, where he kept cattle. Under the pretense of tending his livestock, he dropped the dispatches into a secret hiding place and left. Woodhull then retrieved the papers from Roe's cache.

At this point, another courier, Caleb Brewster, entered the picture. An ex-whaler in Fairfield, Connecticut, Brewster rowed across Long Island Sound and collected the documents from Woodhull. According to some accounts, Brewster would be apprised of the need make a retrieval trip by Anna Strong, whose farm was near Woodhull's place. When Brewster's services were needed, Strong would hang a black petticoat on her clothesline as a signal. To inform the courier of the time and place of the turnover, she would display a number of handkerchiefs. Once Brewster had successfully conveyed his important burden across the sound to Fairfield, Tallmadge would take charge of the dispatches. He would send them by mounted dragoons, who were posted every 15 miles, to Washington in New Windsor.

Only once did the Culper spies come close to being exposed. On a night in 1779, Tallmadge himself was conveying secret information to Washington when he was accosted by a British patrol. He managed to escape but lost both his horse and his dispatches. One of the seized documents was a letter from Washington to Townsend, dated June 27, 1779, naming George Higday, who was being recruited by the Culper group. The British raided and thoroughly searched Higday's home, but found no incriminating materials and did not arrest him. Washington and Tallmadge, shaken by this incident and remembering the death of the young American spy Nathan Hale on September 22, 1776, tightened their security.

Over the years, the Culper spies provided Washington with information on British troop movements by water and by land. They informed him of the amounts of supplies available to the enemy, locations and types of fortifications, and morale among various British forces. Probably their most significant service was performed in the summer of 1780. At that time they played a particularly important role in warning Washington of impending British naval operations against French forces at Newport, Rhode Island. Due to furious activity by Townsend, Roe, Brewster, and Tallmadge, Washington got word on July 21 that a British fleet and army commanded by Sir Henry Clinton had just departed New York City to attack the French. Thus forewarned, Washington resorted to guile. Although his army was too weak to attempt anything against the enemy, he devised a scheme to trick Clinton into believing that he was about to assault British lines around New York. The British general, falling for the ruse, recalled his forces to New York, and probably saved the French at Newport from destruction.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Brewster, Caleb; Jay, Sir James; Rivington, James; Roe, Austin; Tallmadge, Major Benjamin; Townsend, Robert; Woodhull, Abraham

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Paul David Nelson

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

The Current Intelligence Bulletin was the daily intelligence brief for the president from 1951 to 1958. In January 1946, President Harry S. Truman directed the newly established Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the immediate predecessor organization

of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to submit all important intelligence for his use daily. The Central Reports Staff of the CIG delivered the first intelligence summary on February 12, 1946. This was called the Daily Summary, and became the prototype of the Current Intelligence Bulletin.

Daily briefing for the president thus began, and the duty was taken over by the CIA in 1947. The summary, however, had a flaw; it did not include such sensitive information as communications intelligence and human intelligence. In order to rectify that weakness, a new report, named the Current Intelligence Bulletin, was brought forward to the president on February 28, 1951. The Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) at the CIA drew up this bulletin, and a publication board, comprised of division chiefs of the OCI, edited the document.

In March 1957, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, a precursor of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, reviewed the dearth of intelligence before the Suez Crisis and recommended that the bulletin should be a more comprehensive one, and that it should include the opinions of other intelligence agencies. As a result of this advice, a new bulletin, named the Central Intelligence Bulletin, was published on January 14, 1958. An interagency panel that was held every day checked this bulletin, and all differences of opinion were written in the footnotes.

It was the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 that changed the role of the bulletin. President John F. Kennedy stopped reading the bulletin after that failure. A new brief paper, named the President's Intelligence Checklist, was published on June 17, 1961, to respond to the president's needs. It included more confidential information that was withdrawn from the bulletin. It was renamed the President's Daily Brief in 1964 and is still published today. Appearance of this daily brief made the Central Intelligence Bulletin no longer necessary for the president. Instead, it came to serve other high-ranking policy makers. The bulletin, going through some changes of format, became the National Intelligence Daily in 1974, which was published until 1999 and replaced by today's Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.

See also: Bay of Pigs; Central Intelligence Agency; Central Intelligence Group; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; National Intelligence Estimates; President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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Naoki Ohno

CURRIE, LAUCHLIN B.
(OCTOBER 8, 1902–DECEMBER 23, 1993)

Lauchlin Currie was an aide to Franklin Roosevelt and alleged Soviet agent. Born October 8, 1902, in Canada, Currie studied economics at the London School of Economics and at Harvard, where he completed a dissertation on "Bank Assets and Banking Theory" in 1931. He taught at Harvard until 1934, when he became an American citizen and began a series of jobs for the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board.

In 1939 Currie became administrative assistant to President Roosevelt, with primary responsibility for economic issues, including increasing military production. In January 1941 he undertook a mission to China, where he discussed American aid with both Chiang Kai-shek and Zhou Enlai. He played a critical role in establishing support for the American Volunteer Group in China, known as Claire Chennault's "Flying Tigers." He returned to China in 1942 to attempt to smooth relations between General Joseph W. Stillwell, commander of American forces in China, and the government of Chiang Kai-shek. Criticism of the American commander from Currie and others finally resulted in Stillwell's recall in October 1944.

In 1943 Currie took over the newly created Foreign Economic Administration, which coordinated lend-lease activities, foreign loans, and international efforts to block German trade. For the final years of World War II, Currie concentrated on planning for the Bretton Woods Conference and the reestablishment of a postwar economic system. Although not a delegate to that conference, Currie worked closely with Harry Dexter White, the chief American representative, in conceptualizing what would later become the International Monetary System and the World Bank.

After the war Currie spent many years defending himself against accusations by Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley that he had willingly provided intelligence information to Soviet spies. Chambers and Bentley testified that Currie had provided Soviet spymaster Gregory Silvermaster with information on Roosevelt's relations with the Polish government in exile and American efforts to break Soviet codes, among other topics. In August 1948, Currie appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. At that time he testified that he had never knowingly provided information to Soviet agents, but admitted possible indiscretions with classified information. Although never indicted, Currie's apparent code name, PAGE, appears numerous times in VENONA decryptions of Soviet intelligence communications.

In 1949 Currie accepted an appointment to head a World Bank survey of Colombia. Following that report, he remained in Bogota as an economic advisor to the Colombian government, with full Colombian citizenship, off and on until his death in 1993.

See also: Chambers, Whittaker; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; White, Harry Dexter

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Peter F. Coogan

D

DANILOFF, NICHOLAS (1934–)

Nicholas Daniloff was a *U.S. News & World Report* correspondent in Moscow who became a pawn in an exchange of dissidents and spies in 1986 between the United States and Soviet Union. The international crisis surrounding his arrest on August 30, 1986, was set in motion by the earlier arrest in New York City of UN official Gennardi Zakharov, as a Soviet spy. One of the themes stressed repeatedly by the Reagan administration was that the UN had become a source of massive Soviet espionage. It culminated in his being exchanged for Zakharov. Soviet officials also let Yuri Orlov and his wife leave the Soviet Union. President Ronald Regan denied that a trade had been arranged.

Daniloff became an active target of Soviet intelligence agents in January 1985 when he received a letter from a dissident Roman Catholic priest addressed to Central Intelligence Agency head William Casey. Unknown to Daniloff was the fact that the priest was a KGB plant. Daniloff took the letter to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. After Zakharov's arrest on August 23, 1986, Daniloff was leaving a meeting with a news source when a van approached him. Eight men jumped out and placed Daniloff in handcuffs and took him away. He spent two weeks in a Soviet prison. The Reagan administration claimed that Daniloff was arrested without cause, whereas the Soviets claimed that he was in possession of secret government documents when arrested. Zakharov was caught with secret material in his possession and because he worked under UN cover he lacked full diplomatic immunity and could have been tried for espionage.

Daniloff went on to write a book about his experience in Russia, *Two Lives, One Russia*. He left the field of news reporting to enter into academia. In 1992 he became Director of Northeastern University's School of Journalism.

See also: Casey, William; Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

DANSEY, LIEUTENANT COLONEL CLAUDE (1876–JUNE 11, 1947)

Lieutenant Colonel Sir Claude Edward Marjoribanks Dansey was the deputy chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (S.I.S.), working in British intelligence from 1900 until his death. He was born in 1876 near London, United Kingdom, the son of Lt. Col. Edward M. Dansey, Life Guards. Dansey attended Wellington College for a year, and then went to a school in Belgium. He then served in the British army in the Matabele Rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, in Borneo, South Africa, and Somaliland; spent some time with Anglo-American business ventures; and was in the Monmouth Regiment and attached to the general staff during World War I.

Having become connected with intelligence during the Anglo-Boer War, he was involved in the surveillance of civilian passengers during World War I, and then worked in Anglo-American intelligence liaison, before moving to Switzerland and the Balkans. After the war, Dansey returned to the business world, establishing good contacts, many of which he would later draw into intelligence work. In 1929, following the death of a business associate, Dansey took up an appointment as Passport Control Officer (P.C.O.) in Rome. Three years later he created the Z Organisation, to parallel the P.C.O. operations which he felt had been compromised. Much of the success of this was because of Dansey's extensive business contacts, especially with film producer Alexander Korda; Solly and Jack Joel, South African diamond millionaires; and others including Sigismund Payne Best, who ran a pharmaceutical and chemical agency in the Netherlands.

In September 1939, Best, by this time Head of Z in the Netherlands, and Major Richard Stevens, the Head of the SIS Station, were enticed to meet German agents at Venlo, on the Dutch-German border. Although in Netherlands territory, they passed through the Dutch customs post and were abducted by the Germans causing the entire Z Organisation to be compromised. It was reabsorbed into S.I.S., and Dansey was appointed deputy chief of MI-6. He died on June 11, 1947.

See also: MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service)

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Justin Corfield

DARRAGH, WILLIAM AND LYDIA
(LYDIA: 1729–1789)

William and Lydia Darragh were Quakers who spied for the United States during the Revolutionary War. They resided in Philadelphia across the street from General William Howe, commander of all British forces in the United States.

Being in such close proximity to General Howe, Lydia gathered any intelligence she could and William then wrote up her accounts in code. The reports were then hidden within cloth buttons and attached to the clothing of their son, John. John Darragh then traveled to the nearby American encampment at Whitemarsh, where John's brother, Lt. Charles Darragh, collected the coded messages and rewrote them for General George Washington.

In December 1777, British officers ordered the Darraghs to surrender their home for use by the army. Lydia protested, and managed to secure permission for her family to remain in exchange for the use of a room by the officers. When the British arrived, Lydia and the rest of the family presumably retired to bed. However, Lydia hid in an adjacent closet to the room where the British officers had convened. Here she eavesdropped on the meeting and learned of British plans to attack General Washington's forces on December 4.

The next day, Lydia (using a pass given to her by General Howe) slipped by the British lines into land controlled by American forces. She warned a number of American soldiers of the British plans before making her way back to Philadelphia. Because of her spying, the Americans were able to ward off the British attack and send the enemy troops back to Philadelphia.

William and Lydia returned to Quaker life after the war; some sources claim Lydia was asked to leave the Society of Friends because of her clandestine endeavors to aid the Americans.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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DAVILA, RAFAEL

Rafael Davila and his ex-wife, Deborah Cummings, were arrested on espionage-related charges on February 4, 2003. He was charged with the unauthorized possession of some 300 top-secret documents and she with selling them to white supremacist and radical right-wing militia groups in the United States in several different batches for $2,000 per batch, although only a single payment of $2,000 has been confirmed. The missing documents have not been found, with Cummings asserting that they were shredded by Davila. At least one of the documents is said to involve information pertaining to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. No foreign governments or groups

have been linked to the stolen documents. Cummings was also charged with lying about her knowledge of Kirk Lyons, a lawyer associated with legal defense activities of the Ku Klux Klan.

Davila obtained the documents during his service in the Washington National Guard from 1990 to 1999. He accumulated them over several years, telling investigators he just wished to read them. Although he held a top-secret clearance permitting him to see these documents, he was not permitted to remove them from the work premises. Davila stored the stolen documents in boxes first kept in the basement of his home and then in a rented storage locker. It was Cummings who reported the stolen material to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1999 after their marriage failed.

See also: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Post-Cold War Intelligence

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DEANE, SILAS
(DECEMBER 24, 1737–SEPTEMBER 23, 1789)

Silas Dean was an American agent and diplomat during the War of American Independence. Deane was born on December 24, 1737, in Groton, Connecticut. He graduated from Yale College in 1758 and moved to Wethersfield, where he taught school and studied law. In 1763 he began a legal practice. Over the next decade, he became established as a provincial politician by cultivating the support of the Saltonstall family and opposing England's governance of the United States. From 1774 to 1775 he served in the First Continental Congress. A year later Congress sent him to France to seek French military assistance for the colonies. He was received in Paris by the foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes, who yearned to revenge past French defeats at British hands and was receptive to Deane's pleas.

Therefore, Vergennes chose a playwright, Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais, to act as agent in supplying the American rebels with arms through the conduit of Hortalez and Company. The company, financed by royal loans, purchased worn-out equipment from French government arsenals, which was then sold to Deane on credit. By March 1777 Deane and Beaumarchais were chartering merchant ships and dispatching desperately needed war materials to the United States. Although these arms were decisive for patriot victories in 1777, Congress later claimed they were gifts and withheld payment. Meantime, Deane exceeded his congressional instructions, recruiting French army officers for American service and employing a British agent to burn naval stores at Portsmouth. Taking advantage of his knowledge of international events, Deane entered into schemes with Dr. Edward Bancroft, his secretary (who unbeknownst to him was a double agent), to manipulate the London stock and insurance markets for personal gain. Deane was reputed to have made 60,000 pounds in these ventures.

In late 1776 Deane was appointed by Congress to work with Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee in negotiating treaties of recognition and alliance with France. By February 6, 1778, the trio had succeeded, but Deane's political reputation was suffering a downturn in Congress. Charged with profiteering, he was recalled to the United States on November 21, 1777. For the rest of his life, he worked without success for vindication. In 1780 he went back to Europe, where Dr. Bancroft provided him with financial assistance. He died on September 23, 1789, while returning to the United States on board ship. It was rumored that Bancroft, fearing that Deane might reveal his earlier espionage activities to Congress, murdered Deane by prescribing lethal doses of laudanum.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Bancroft, Dr. Edward; Franklin, Benjamin; Hortalez and Company; Lee, Arthur

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DEFENSE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE

The U.S. intelligence community is composed of 16 organizations. All but the Central Intelligence Agency are embedded to some degree or another in larger bureaucratic units. Eight can be found within the Department of Defense (DOD). They can be placed into three groups. The first set consists of intelligence units generally acknowledged to participate in the National Intelligence Program. They are the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

The National Space Agency (NSA) was established on October 24, 1952, when President Harry Truman terminated the Armed Forces Security Agency and transferred its mission to the National Security Agency, which had been created that same day by National Security Council through National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9. Created in secret, its existence did not become known until 1957.

NSA is headquartered at Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland. NSA's director is recommended by the U.S. secretary of defense and approved by the president of the United States. It has an estimated 30,000 employees worldwide. Approximately 505 of its employees are military and 505 civilian. NSA's budget is classified but is estimated to be some $7 billion. According to NSA's own information, if NSA were a Fortune 500 firm it would rank in the top 10 percent. An important component of NSA's

workforce is the Central Security Service (CSS), which was established by a presidential directive in 1972 to promote full partnership between the NSA and the cryptologic elements of the forces. The CSS is an interservice organization charged with the day-to-day task of capturing enemy radar, telemetry, and radio and satellite communications through such means as submarines, reconnaissance aircraft, and ground-based intercept stations.

Contributing greatly to the size of its budget is the technology-intensive nature of its mission. According to Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, NSA is tasked with two national intelligence missions. The first is information assurance. This entails providing the intelligence community with solutions, products, services, and defensive information operations to assure the security of the information infrastructure that is critical to U.S. national security interests. Simply put, NSA is assigned the mission of making sure that all classified and sensitive information is securely stored and that U.S. intelligence communications are impenetrable. The second mission is foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT). This entails establishing an effective, unified organization and control of all foreign signals collection and processing activities.

NSA's charter directs that its SIGINT collection program be directed at "foreign governments." It was permitted to collect SIGINT within the United States only under highly restrictive conditions involving foreign nationals. President George W. Bush signed a secret order in 2002 which changed that, authorizing the NSA to eavesdrop on U.S. citizens and foreign nationals in the United States without first obtaining a warrant. Examples of data that NSA was permitted to examine included e-mail exchanges, Internet sites visited, financial transactions, airline passenger information, and incoming and outgoing land line and cell phone numbers. The administration argued that this authorization was necessary in order to ensure that highly sensitive information would be captured in time to be useful to analysts and policy makers trying to prevent another terrorist attack in the United States. Opponents argued that a mechanism for obtaining this information and protecting the privacy of Americans existed through a special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. In 2008 Congress and the president agreed on the content of legislation protecting U.S. telecommunications from lawsuits for participating in NSA's Terrorist Surveillance Program.

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was established on September 6, 1961, as a joint Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-air force organization to coordinate satellite reconnaissance activities within the intelligence community. Prior to that the CIA and Air Force had operated separate programs. The air force program began operating in 1955 as a result of General Operations Requirement No. 80. The CIA program came into existence in 1958 as a result of a presidential directive issued by President Dwight Eisenhower.

Located in Chantilly, Virginia, the NRO's existence remained officially secret until 1992 and the first publicly acknowledged satellite launch occurred in 1996. NRO employs some 3,000 people, the majority of whom are air force employees. About 25 percent are CIA employees, with the remainder coming from the National Security Agency (15%), the navy (8%), and other Defense Department intelligence agencies. Its budget is estimated to be about $9 billion. The director of the NRO is appointed by the secretary of defense with concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence and reports to the secretary of defense.

The NRO designs, builds, and operates U.S. reconnaissance satellites. Collection requirements and priorities for these satellites are determined by the Director of National Intelligence. Among those priorities are warnings about potential acts of aggression by foreign powers, monitoring weapons of mass destruction programs, enforcing arms control treaties, and assessing the impact of environmental disasters.

A major stimulus to the development of reconnaissance satellites was the Soviet shoot down of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and the capture of its pilot, Gary Francis Powers, on May 1, 1960. NRO's first imagery satellite launch was CORONA on February 28, 1959. The first successful recoveries of photographs taken by CORONA were in August of that year. The final CORONA launch was on May 25, 1972. A total of 145 missions were flown by CORONA satellites. Eight hundred thousand CORONA images were declassified and transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in February 1995. Subsequent imagery reconnaissance satellite programs operated by NRO were ARGON (7 successful launches; May 1962–August 1964) and LANYARD (1 launch; 1963). Both ARGON and LANYARD were mapping missions. From 1960 to 1962 the NRO also operated a signals intelligence satellite system targeted on Soviet radars known as GRAB. It was succeeded by the POPPY system from 1962 to 1977.

The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) formally came into existence on November 24, 2003, when President George W. Bush signed the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill. This decision followed a congressionally mandated 1999 review of the operations of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The 2004 Defense Authorization Bill officially changed NIMA into NGA. The name change was said to better reflect centrality of geospatial intelligence in constructing mapping and imagery data. The review followed two highly visible intelligence failures by NIMA. In 1998 it failed to provide policy makers with warning of India's nuclear test because not enough analysts were assigned to the task. In 1999 it provided the military with incorrect maps leading to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

NGA combines the activities of several agencies. The operations of the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), Central Imagery Office (CIO), and the Defense Dissemination Program Office (DDPO) were completely absorbed into NGA, while those of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) were taken over in part. NGA traces its roots back to the exploration and mapping of the West by Lewis and Clark in 1803. Its immediate organizational predecessors were the Defense Mapping Agency created in 1972, the National Photographic Interpretation Center created in 1961, and NIMA created in 1996. The number of employees and budget of NGA are classified. Public estimates place the number of employees at about 9,000. It is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, and has other major facilities in Northern Virginia; Washington, DC; and St. Louis. As a result of recommendations made by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, NGA is scheduled to consolidate many of its operations to a site near Fr. Belvoir, Virginia.

Its core mission is to provide imagery, maps, and data sets to support U.S. national security operations by bringing into a single organization the imagery tasking, production, exploitation, and dissemination responsibilities and mapping functions of the

defense and intelligence community. In carrying out this mission set, NGA and its predecessors have constantly struggled between adequately meeting the demands for national imagery intelligence and tactical imagery intelligence. NGA has also actively participated in a number of nonmilitary security efforts such as providing support for the Winter 2002 and 2006 Olympics and the 2004 Summer Olympics, Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts as well as those in Pakistan following an earthquake in 2006 and in Asia following the 2004 tsunami, and the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster.

The second group of Defense Department Intelligence Organizations consists of one principal organization, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It was created on July 5, 1961, by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara through a Department of Defense Directive. The DIA reports to the secretary of defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director of DIA is a three-star military officer who serves as principal adviser to the secretary of defense and to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of military intelligence.

In creating the DIA McNamara went against the recommendations of a Joint Study Group, which President Dwight Eisenhower had established, that grappled with the question of how to best reduce the overlap and duplication of defense intelligence activities. That study rejected the idea of a single intelligence unit so long as the three military services continued to have their own intelligence organizations. In 1986 DIA was designated as a Department of Defense combat support agency by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.

The DIA is headquartered in the Pentagon and has more than 12,000 civilian (30%) and military employees (70%) worldwide. According to a Defense Department Directive of March 2008, the DIA is charged with being the Defense Department lead for coordinating intelligence support to meet Combat Command requirements; lead efforts to align analysis, collection, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities with all operations; and link and synchronize military, defense, and national intelligence capabilities. To accomplish this mission, the DIA is organized into five directorates. The Directorate for Human Intelligence manages the Defense Attaché System and conducts worldwide human intelligence (HUMINT) collection activities in support of national and tactical intelligence requirements. The Directorate for MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) and Technical Collection collects radar, biological, chemical, nuclear, acoustic, and similar intelligence. The Directorate for Analysis is responsible for analyzing and disseminating finished intelligence products for the Department of Defense and other intelligence community members. The Directorate for Intelligence Joint Staff supports the foreign military intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center fused tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence in support of combat command requirements.

Controversy has often surrounded DIA's intelligence products. Often the CIA and DIA were at odds over intelligence estimates. During Vietnam, DIA analysts were accused of producing "intelligence to please." In the 1980s the DIA produced a much talked about and debated volume, *Soviet Military Power*, an annual report that chronicled Soviet military capabilities. After 9/11, the DIA and CIA often came into conflict over the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Most recently controversy has centered on the development of a clandestine human intelligence collection capability within the DIA known as Strategic Support Branch. Set up by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2004, it is authorized to conduct intelligence-gathering operations as well as to support antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts. These operations are defended as not being new but long-standing DIA programs and needed by the military in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Critics charge it brings about unneeded duplication with the CIA in the area of clandestine intelligence collection and concentrates too much power within the Defense Department.

The third set of military intelligence organizations have as their primary function providing intelligence for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations. One group of these exists within the four services that comprise the U.S. military establishment. They are the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance Agency, and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.

In many respects they share a common history in spite of representing different services. Military intelligence units tended to be underfunded and understaffed in times of peace only to surge in size in wartime and then contract again. This was as true for the beginning of the post—cold war years as it was for early periods in American history. Military intelligence was not looked upon as a good career path. They also each experienced a series of reorganizations. A major reorganization took place in 1990 when a Defense Department directive instructed each military service to consolidate all existing intelligence commands, agencies, and elements into a single intelligence command within each service. This goal has not been met but the directive did have the effect of reducing the number of military intelligence units.

Each also has a different history. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is the oldest military intelligence unit, having existed since 1882, whereas the Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance Agency only came into existence in 2007, replacing the Air Intelligence Agency. Prior to World War II each was assigned responsibility for different parts of the world. By a 1940 agreement, ONI took responsibility for the Pacific with army intelligence having responsibility for Europe, Africa, and the Canal Zone. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had jurisdiction over the remainder of the Western Hemisphere. army intelligence was involved in the domestic spying incidents that surfaced in the Church Committee hearings. It also came into conflict with the CIA during the Vietnam War on the size of enemy forces in the Order of Battle controversy that raged for several years. Air force intelligence came into conflict with the CIA and the other military intelligence units in their estimates of the size of Soviet air power first in the "bomber gap" and then in the "missile gap" controversies of the early cold war years.

Finally, each of the unified commands also possesses intelligence organizations whose mission it is to conduct intelligence analysis and supervise national intelligence reconnaissance missions and sensitive collection tasks within their area of operation. There are six regional commands: Central, European, Northern, Pacific, Southern, and African. There are also three commands with global responsibilities: U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; Army Intelligence; Central Imagery Office; Central Intelligence Agency; CORONA; Defense Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; Intelligence Community; Marine Corps Intelligence; National Geospatial Intelligence Agency; National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC); National Reconnaissance Office; National Security Agency; Office of Naval Intelligence

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) came into existence on October 1, 1961, through a departmental directive issued by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that was issued on August 1, 1961. Its formation was an attempt to solve a long-standing problem within the Defense Department. Historically the three military services, the army, navy, and air force, individually collected, produced, and disseminated information for their respective military commanders. Coordination of military intelligence was relatively new. It came about out of necessity in World War II when in 1942 the Joint Intelligence Committee was established to better realize interdepartmental intelligence requirements. After the war this body was rechristened the Joint Intelligence Group.

With the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, the position of Secretary of Defense was created to bring about further unity of effort on the part of the military services. With the 1949 amendments to the Act, the Department of Defense was created. Robert McNamara felt, as had other Secretaries of Defense before him, that this situation of separate service intelligence organizations only loosely coordinated at the top was expensive and wasteful. It also left him in the untenable position of being held accountable by the president for intelligence collected by the military without having any authority over what intelligence was being collected or produced by the three services. Particularly troubling to McNamara was the intelligence being produced by the air force which tended to take alarmist positions regarding the buildup of Soviet air and missile forces.

An effort had been made to correct this situation with the passage of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act. It addressed the need for coordinated intelligence support by the military but failed to clarify the Department of Defense intelligence roles and missions. Before leaving office, President Dwight Eisenhower established a Joint Study Group to examine the organization of military intelligence. It was on the basis of its recommendations that McNamara instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a plan for integrating military intelligence in what would be the Defense Intelligence Agency.

A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) photograph of Iraqi military headquarters.
The DIA is the primary producer of strategic intelligence within the Department of Defense.
(U.S. Department of Defense)

Service opposition to the DIA was largely muted by the political fallout from the failed Bay of Pigs operation.

The new DIA was tasked with more effectively managing all Department of Defense intelligence resources. Specifically it was to (1) organize, direct, manage, and control all Defense Department intelligence resources assigned to it; (2) review and coordinate all Defense Department intelligence functions retained or assigned to the military services; (3) supervise the execution of all approved intelligence functions, policies, and plans not assigned to it; (4) obtain the maximum economy and efficiency possible; (5) respond directly to all U.S. Intelligence Board requests place on it; and (6) satisfy the intelligence requirements of the major components of the Department of Defense.

Although the DIA was given an impressive new set of missions, it did not get new personnel to accomplish these goals. DIA drew its staff from the existing services and in the process created an immediate conflict of interest: even though they were assigned to the DIA, they would return to their home services at some point where promotion decisions would be made. The result was, in the words of one former DIA official, "the DIA was born old."

One indication of the continued ability of the military services to retain their place of prominence within the intelligence community was the manner in which the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) conducted its business. It was not until 1963 that the

membership of the three military intelligence services on the USIB was terminated in favor of the single military intelligence voice of the DIA. Even then implementation was delayed and in the end the military intelligence services were invited and encouraged to attend as observers. Furthermore, they were permitted to continue to serve on USIB subcommittees and have the right of dissent on National Intelligence Estimates.

DIA grew quickly from an organization with 25 employees housed in borrowed office space. In November 1962 it created a Defense Intelligence School and was placed in charge of Pentagon mapping, geodesy, and vulnerability calculations. The next month it was identified as the central point at which the technical findings of the military services would be reviewed and evaluated in relation to such key areas as missiles, space, and submarine warfare. In 1963 DIA would add an Automated Data Processing Center, a Dissemination Center, and a Scientific and Technical Directorate as well as take over the staff support duties of the Joint Intelligence Group. Two years later it took charge of the Defense Attaché System. As a consequence of such additions in FY 1965, the DIA's budget rose to $43 million.

DIA has encountered a series of challenges and changes in priorities as it has developed. Not surprisingly the first challenge came from the military services who looked with suspicion upon a new bureaucratic unit in their midst that competed with them for resources and prestige. The Vietnam War presented the DIA with a very different challenge. Its estimates of enemy troop strength and overall prognosis of how the war was going frequently put it at odds with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates. Far more optimistic about the prospects for victory and downplaying the size of the enemy's forces, the DIA was frequently accused of providing "intelligence to please" rather than telling the truth to policy makers in the Johnson and Nixon administrations.

The 1970s brought forward the challenge of bureaucratic reorganization. In 1970 the Defense Department established an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) to supervise defense intelligence programs and serve as the main point of contact with the CIA and other non-Defense Department intelligence bodies. A 1979 Executive Order (12036) led to the DIA being reorganized around five programs: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and joint intelligence support.

In the 1980s the substantive focus of the DIA shifted to a greater emphasis on the tactical and national intelligence needs of military commanders and U.S. allies. DIA became deeply involved in intelligence support operations in Central America and the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Asia. Controversy continued to surround its intelligence products, most notably the annual volume *Soviet Military Power*. Although hailed by some as a definitive public statement of the growing strength of the Soviet military, others saw it as propaganda designed to further the Reagan administration's military buildup.

Next, the DIA again faced the challenge of organizational restructuring that involved rebuilding DIA from the bottom up. The goal was to increase flexibility and cooperation among the intelligence organizations of the military services while reducing managerial overhead costs. Two key structural innovations of the 1990s were the establishment of a Defense HUMINT (human intelligence) Service that consolidated the HUMINT activities of the military services in a single location and placing the

DIA in charge of Measurement and Signals Intelligence for the entire intelligence community.

Most recently the DIA has become intertwined in the controversy over domestic spying that erupted in December 2005 with revelations over warrantless wiretaps. Even before that story broke, the George W. Bush administration had sought legislation that would ease rules governing the Pentagon's ability to spy on Americans inside the United States. A waiver to existing rules would allow a DIA representative to covertly approach and recruit "U.S." persons without revealing their identity. Revelations of the domestic spying program included references to the National Security Agency sharing its information with other intelligence organizations including the DIA for use in carrying out their own surveillance programs on Americans.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; Army Intelligence, Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Department Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; National Security Agency

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DEL CAMPO, FERNANDEZ

Fernandez del Campo was an American agent who gained the trust of Spanish officers and gathered valuable intelligence at the beginning of the Spanish-American War. Under the name Fernandez del Campo, an American agent was sent by the army's Military Intelligence Division to Spain. The real identity of Fernandez del Campo was never revealed, although some scholars suggest that he was Lieutenant Colonel Aristides Moreno, an American officer of Spanish ancestry who served as General Pershing's chief of counterintelligence during World War I.

At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the military attaché to the U.S. embassy in Madrid sent back a number of newspaper clippings and other intelligence. Despite the accuracy and wealth of this information, there was little intelligence on the location and intentions of the Spanish navy. This information was critical to planning the naval operations of the war and the Military Intelligence Division ordered Fernandez del Campo to uncover it. He installed himself at Madrid's finest hotel and befriended Spanish officers who frequented the establishment. He posed as a Mexican

of anti-American sympathies, and won the friendship of a number of Spanish officers by losing to them at gambling.

Very soon, Fernandez del Campo had the trust of the officers and received an invitation to visit the Spanish port of Cadiz. There, he met Spain's Admiral Camara. Fernandez expressed the hope that the fleet would soon sail to stop the Americans from invading Spanish colonial possessions. Admiral Camara revealed that his fleet was not seaworthy, and would not be launched for six weeks. After the meeting, Fernandez del Campo disappeared and reported this intelligence back to Washington by telegraph. Armed with this intelligence, the U.S. Navy was able to position itself to win victories in the Caribbean and Pacific. Fernandez del Campo returned to the United States and disappeared; the secret identity was retired.

See also: Spanish-American War

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DESOTO, OPERATION

Operation DESOTO was an electronic intelligence-gathering operation in the Pacific that began in April 1962. DESOTO was designed to obtain short-range intelligence. Among its targets were voice communications via walkie-talkie and coast communications signals intelligence. The purpose of this intelligence was twofold: to provide military commanders with current and warning intelligence, and to provide information on naval activities for later reports. To accomplish this mission the National Security Agency constructed portable listening posts in boxlike units that could be put on the deck of destroyers. The ships would then cruise along the coastline picking up intelligence. The first missions were along the Chinese and North Korean coasts in April 1962.

Operation DESOTO is most associated with the Vietnam War. In January 1964 DESOTO patrols off the North Vietnamese coast were ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in anticipation of hit-and-run raids to be conducted against North Vietnam as OPLAN 34A. The first mission was carried out by the USS *Craig* in February 1964. It produced little intelligence as the North Vietnamese cut off nonessential communications and radar systems when the ship was spotted. A second mission was set for July 1964 and was to coincide with a military raid in hopes of increasing the amount of electronic intelligence it would obtain. The USS *Maddox* was chosen to conduct this mission. In order to further increase its chances of success the *Maddox* was ordered to approach within eight miles of the north Vietnamese coast (and even closer to offshore islands) instead of 13 miles, which had been standard operating procedure.

In the early morning hours of July 31, 1964, a joint south Vietnamese-U.S. raiding party attacked two islands off the north Vietnamese coast not far from where the USS *Maddox* was positioned. On August 2, the USS *Maddox* came under attack from north Vietnamese vessels. It suffered minor damage in what was characterized as an unprovoked attack. On August 4, the USS *Maddox* and the USS *C. Turner Joy* began another DESOTO patrol. Again they reported being under attack. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, as it became known was used by President Lyndon Johnson to launch massive retaliatory attacks against North Vietnam. In the wake of the incident Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing the president to "take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force to assist any member or protocol state of the South East Asia Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was treated by Johnson and Richard Nixon as equivalent to a declaration of war. Subsequent investigations cast doubt upon the second attack, either that it was unprovoked or that it occurred at all.

The overall value of the DESOTO intelligence-gathering missions was questioned even at the time they were being conducted. Dedicated electronic intelligence ships were more effective than the DESOTO ships, where intelligence-gathering equipment was added on to destroyers via the "box." Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was said to feel that the missions were "useless."

See also: Johnson Administration and Intelligence; National Security Agency; Vietnam War and Intelligence Operations

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Glenn P. Hastedt

DEUTCH, JOHN MARK
(JULY 27, 1938–)

John Mark Deutch was the 17th Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). He held that position from May 10, 1995 to December 15, 1996. Deutch was born in Brussels, Belgium, and came to the United States with his parents in 1940. He became an American citizen in 1945. Deutch received a PhD in Chemistry from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1965. Upon graduation, Deutch became a systems analyst in the Defense Department, making him part of the group of young academics referred to as the "whiz kids" that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara brought to Washington in the early 1960s. From there Deutch went into academia, holding faculty positions at Princeton and MIT before taking on administrative duties and rising to the post of Provost at MIT. Deutch left MIT in 1993 to become undersecretary of defense. He was serving as deputy secretary of defense when President Bill Clinton nominated him to be DCI. He was Clinton's third choice for the position. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake had been the first choice but was forced to withdraw his name due to

heavy Republican opposition. Deutch had not sought the position. He had hoped to become secretary of defense.

As DCI, Deutch was a strong advocate of technologically based espionage and was deeply suspicious of the value of human intelligence and felt that covert operations management needed to be reformed. During his tenure the number of clandestine officers dipped below 800, a 25 percent decline from its top level of staffing and only 25 trainees became clandestine officers in 1995. For this he was viewed with suspicion and distrust by intelligence professionals within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). At his confirmation hearings Deutch indicated that a top priority would be consolidating the management of the analysis, collection, and distribution of imagery intelligence. He held up the National Reconnaissance Office's management of signals intelligence as a model. As DCI, Deutch set up a National Imagery Agency (NIA) steering group to begin this process. He indicated to this group that the core membership of this new organization was to be made up of the Central Imagery Office, Defense Mapping Agency, National Photographic Interpretation Center, and relevant portions of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the various military services. In November 1995 Deutch, along with Secretary of Defense William Perry, announced their intention to create a National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). Along with the offices noted above, NIMA also took control over the CIA's Office of Imagery Analysis. The plan brought forward opposition from some within the intelligence community who objected to moving all of these functions into the Department of Defense, thereby reducing the DCI's control over them. In spite of these objections, NIMA came into existence on schedule on October 1, 1996.

Deutch left the agency under a cloud of controversy. Two days after resigning, it was discovered that he had on his personal computer at home many secret, top-secret, and special access documents that included details of covert action operations and budgetary information from the National Reconnaissance Office. Compounding matters further was the lack of security surrounding online and physical access to the computer. At first Deutch denied any wrongdoing but then admitted his actions had violated government regulations. As a result of these transgressions, his successor as DCI, George Tenet, suspended Deutch's security clearance at the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

See also: Central Imagery Office; Central Intelligence Agency; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; National Imagery and Mapping Agency; National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)

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DIAZ, LIEUTENANT COMMANDER MATTHEW

On July 28, 2006, Lieutenant Commander Matthew Diaz was charged with improperly mailing classified information to an unauthorized individual in February 2005. The material was mailed from Guantanamo Bay, where he was completing a six-month tour of duty as the staff judge advocate in the U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate General's Corps. The list contained the names of some 550 individuals being held as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay. It was mailed to Barbara Olshansky, a lawyer at the Center for Constitutional Rights. On May 18, 2007, Diaz was convicted in a court martial on four of five counts and sentenced to six months in prison and discharged from the navy.

Diaz, then age 41, volunteered for service in Guantanamo Bay in 2004. He had enlisted in the army as a 17-year-old high school dropout. Diaz left the army in 1991, earned his law degree, and then joined the navy's Judge Advocate General's Corps. Just one week before going to Guantanamo Bay the Supreme Court ruled in *Rasul vs. Bush* that the detainees held there did have a constitutional right to challenge the government's right to hold them there in U.S. courts. The Bush administration, however, continued to withhold their names, making it virtually impossible for them to obtain legal counsel. The Center for Constitutional Law had sought to obtain this list of names, which is why Diaz mailed the list to them. Once in possession of the list they contacted a federal judge who then contacted the FBI who identified Diaz as the source of the information.

Diaz was said to feel strongly that the government should release the names of the enemy combatants so that they could obtain counsel. Diaz's father was convicted of murder and has maintained his innocence, arguing in part that he received inadequate legal counsel. By some accounts Diaz was deeply affected by the manner in which his father had been treated by the legal system and this influenced his decision to release the names.

By the time of his court martial, all of the names on the list had been made public as a response to a 2006 Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. The prosecution argued that the material was classified when it was mailed and that Diaz was aware of this when he downloaded the information. Additionally, the printout mailed to the Center for Constitutional Rights contained information identifying secret intelligence-gathering sources and methods.

The National Lawyers Guild denounced Diaz's conviction, asserting that "he exercised sound legal and moral judgment." In April 2007, Diaz was honored at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, with the Ridenhour Award named after Ron Ridenhour, who revealed the 1969 My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War.

See also: Post—Cold War Intelligence; Renditions; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; Waterboarding

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Glenn P. Hastedt

DICKINSON, VELVALEE
(OCTOBER 12, 1893–CA. 1980)

Velvalee Dickinson was an American who spied for Japan during World War II. Known as the "Doll Woman," she used a New York City doll shop as a cover for her espionage activities. Dickinson was arrested on January 21, 1944. On July 28 a plea agreement was reached. In return for her information about Japanese espionage activities, charges of espionage were dropped and Dickinson was only charged with wartime censorship violations. Subsequent charges of espionage were filed on May 5, 1944, to which she pled not guilty. Convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison, Dickinson was released on April 23, 1951.

Dickinson was born in 1893 and went to work in a brokerage house owned by Lee Dickinson, whom she married. In the course of doing business there she came into repeated contact with Japanese diplomatic and military officials. The business closed during the Great Depression and the Dickinsons moved to New York City where she sold dolls for Bloomingdales and then opened her own business.

In New York she reestablished contacts with Japanese officials and joined several Japanese organizations. At some point before Pearl Harbor she was approached about spying for Japan and agreed to do so. Under the pretext of searching for dolls to sell, the Dickinsons traveled extensively across the United States. Their travel was funded by the Japanese and used to obtain information about U.S. naval ships. This information was passed on to her Japanese contact in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in the form of letters describing dolls she had come across.

Unbeknownst to her, Dickinson's contact in Buenos Aires had been exposed and fled. Her letters now were returned to the United States to the addresses of different customers whose identities she had used to write the letters. Several of them gave these letters to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, leading to Dickinson's arrest. When arrested, Dickinson unsuccessfully claimed that the money found in her possession belonged to her husband who had passed away in March 1943.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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DICKSTEIN, SAMUEL
(FEBRUARY 5, 1885–APRIL 22, 1954)

Samuel Dickstein represented New York congressional districts in the House of Representatives from 1923 to 1945. There he was the longtime chair of Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. In this position he launched investigations into Nazi and Fascist anti-immigration and related activities in the United States. He would

go on to call for setting up a special committee to investigate them. The result of his efforts was the establishment in 1934 of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities. Later this committee would become the standing House Committee on Un-American Activities, which in 1945 began sensationalist hearings into Communist organizations operating in the United States.

After resigning from Congress, Dickstein went on to become a justice on the New York State Supreme Court, a position he held until his death on April 22, 1954.

Evidence came to light in the 1990s that in 1937 Dickstein had approached the Soviet ambassador to the United States with an offer to sell them information obtained by the Committee on Un-American Activities. He sought $2,500 per month for this information. The Soviets refused and Dickstein settled for $1,250 per month. With the passage of time, his value to the Soviet Union decreased and in early 1940 they removed him from their payroll as a result of his leaving the committee.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; McCarthy, Joseph

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was created by President Harry Truman's executive order. Issued on January 22, 1946, it established a National Intelligence Authority that was tasked with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and developing all federal foreign intelligence activities. His memorandum also established a Central Intelligence Group that would serve under the National Intelligence Authority and be headed by a Director of Central Intelligence. From Truman's Executive Order it is clear that the DCI would provide intelligence to policy makers, but it was not clear to what extent the DCI would guide or direct the activities of intelligence-producing organizations. With the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, the DCI became the principal advisor to the president and the National Security Council on national intelligence. Until the position of Director of National intelligence was created following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the DCI served simultaneously as the head of the CIA and the head of the intelligence community.

Early DCIs were military figures who succeeded or failed in their efforts to promote a unified intelligence establishment largely on the basis of their personalities and military rank. The first DCI was Rear Admiral Sidney Souers. Successive executive orders issued by presidents granted the DCI the power and authority to exercise authority over the budgetary, analytic, and collection efforts of the intelligence community, but few DCIs sought, and none achieved, real managerial control over the intelligence community. It was this failure that led to calls for establishing the separate and superior

position of Director of National Intelligence, although critics assert that the language of the legislation bringing the Director of National Intelligence into existence did not provide this individual with sufficient powers to succeed.

The initial point of criticism regarding the DCIs' management of the intelligence community lay in the quality of the national intelligence estimates being produced. They were to reflect the considered judgment and inputs of the entire intelligence community but they were often found to be subjective and biased and made without all relevant information including information about American military activities. Of particular concern was the feeling that capabilities were being interpreted as intentions. The reforms instituted by DCI Bedell Smith, such as creating an Office of National Estimates, went far in addressing these concerns.

Attention now shifted to problems with intelligence gaps in the collection system. Singled out for particular criticism were failures to obtain information from behind the Iron Curtain on Soviet military secrets. Human intelligence, espionage, was the main vehicle for gathering this information. It soon became overtaken by aerial and later space-based reconnaissance. The development of the U-2 aircraft and space satellites required coordination between the CIA and other members of the intelligence community, most notably the air force, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency.

At first DCIs preferred to try and achieve community-wide management control of these new collective platforms through informal working agreements rather than by directly supervising them. This changed with DCI John McCone, who took an interest in controlling the internal operations of defense intelligence agencies involved in reconnaissance activities. To aid him in this endeavor, McCone also took the first steps toward creating a National Intelligence Program Evaluations staff so that he could move from a coordination role into one more consistent with that of an activist chief executive officer.

Beginning with President Richard Nixon and continuing through President Jimmy Carter, the managerial role of DCIs changed from a focus on achieving internal community-wide coordination to increasing the intelligence community's responsiveness to presidential policy preferences and priorities. It was during this time that the Church and Pike Committees held hearings on illegal CIA activities and permanent oversight committees were formed in the House and Senate. The net result of these developments was to increase the number of policy makers to whom the intelligence community and DCI were responsible.

The arrival of the Reagan administration, the renewal of cold war tensions, and the aggressive style of DCI William Casey into this new political context proved to be explosive. Angered by the administration's policies in Nicaragua and El Salvador and its refusal to provide forthright answers to its questions or inform Congress of CIA actions, Congress passed a series of Boland Amendments that prohibited the use of government funds to overthrow the Contras in Nicaragua. Refusing to accept this decision, the Reagan administration embarked on a scheme to obtain private funding to achieve this end that involved selling missiles to Iran. Once exposed, the Iran-Contra affair led to a series of congressional-executive branch clashes over charges of politicizing intelligence. At the center of the firestorm was the nomination of Robert Gates, who had served as Casey's top assistant to be DCI.

As Casey's stormy tenure receded into history, pre-9/11 DCIs returned to focusing on community-wide intelligence matters. Problem solving steadily became routinized and based on consensus. In the process the identities of individual DCIs became less important for how coordination was achieved. From a post-9/11 perspective this stability and collegiality was purchased at a price. A common critique found in 9/11 post-mortems was that the intelligence community had become complacent. A suffocating attachment to the conventional wisdom and a continued attachment to high-tech espionage systems had led the intelligence community to allow its human intelligence capabilities to wither away and prevented it from "connecting the dots" in order to warn policy makers.

A series of DCIs followed Casey in rapid-fire fashion: William Webster (1987–1991), Robert Gates (1991–1993), R. James Woolsey (1993–1995), and John Deutch (1995–1996). George Tenet, who was next in line, served from 1997 to 2004. Tenet's initial focus as DCI was trying to restore morale in an organization that had fallen on hard times due to the downsizing of its personnel and presidential disinterest in its mission. With the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, however, Tenet's mission changed dramatically and he took the lead in orchestrating the plan for going into Afghanistan. The success that came with this mission was soon overshadowed both for Tenet and the CIA by strong criticism both from inside the Bush administration and by the public of its intelligence products in the lead-up to the Iraq War. Those inside the administration saw the intelligence community as disloyal and those outside it saw intelligence as politicized or incompetent. The Bush administration also became critical of the intelligence communities for leaks that called into question its handling of the war.

The response the administration settled upon was to replace Tenet, who was not without a power base in either the intelligence community or the White House, with Porter Goss in an effort to bring the agency under control. As a result of the creation of the Director of National Intelligence in 2004, Goss became the last Director of Central Intelligence. Those succeeding him as DCI would only head the CIA and technically be Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Goss was a former CIA professional who as congressman and head of the House Intelligence Committee had been a longtime defender of the CIA. After 9/11 he had become the Bush administration's point man in criticizing the agency within Congress. His brief and stormy tenure as head of the CIA was marked by the retirement and resignation of a host of long-term intelligence professionals.

Reportedly Goss had ambitions of being named Director of National Intelligence when that post was created but he was not nominated for the position. Instead it went to John Negroponte, who assumed that position on April 21, 2005. At that time Goss became Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

See also: Bush, George Herbert Walker; Casey, William; Central Intelligence Agency; Central Intelligence Group; Director of National Intelligence; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Goss, Porter Johnston; Helms, Richard McGarrah; Intelligence Community; McCone, John A.; National Security Council; Office of National Estimates; Smith, General Walter Bedell; Souers, Admiral Sidney William; Tenet, George; Turner, Admiral Stansfield; U-2 Incident

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Glenn P. Hastedt

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created in 2004 as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. It is the key organizational response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The DNI serves as the principal advisor to the president, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security. The DNI is also designated as the head of the intelligence community and oversees and directs the National Intelligence Program. In February 2005 President George W. Bush nominated John Negroponte to become the first DNI. He was confirmed by the Senate in April and served in that position until January 2007. Admiral John McConnell succeeded him as DCI. He was replaced by Admiral Dennis C. Blair when the Obama administration took office in January 2009. Blair resigned on May 28, 2010.

Upon assuming the position of DNI, McConnell put in place 100- and 500-day plans to foster integration and collaboration in the intelligence community. The 100 Day Plan, released in April 2007, had as its goals: (1) creating a culture of collaboration, (2) fostering collection and analytic transformation, (3) building acquisition excellence and technological leadership, (4) modernizing business practices, (5) accelerating information sharing, and (6) clarifying and aligning the DNI's authorities. On September 13, 2007, McConnell announced that these goals had been realized. The 500 Day Plan was released on July 16, 2007, and was intended to continue work in those six areas.

Prior to creating the position of DNI, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) also served as the head of the intelligence community. This dual-hatting was a perennial point of bureaucratic conflict within the intelligence community and the repeated subject of presidential commissions and others charged with studying the organization of U.S. intelligence. The principal issues centered on DCI's control over budgets and personnel for non-CIA agencies, the DCI's ability to produce coordinated and coherent intelligence estimates, the neutrality of the DCI in intelligence community deliberations, and the fact that the DCI was often outranked by other department heads who report directly to the president while he reports to the National Security Council. A major contributing factor to these disputes is the fact that some 80 percent of the intelligence community's total budget is controlled by agencies within the Department of Defense.

The merits of creating a DNI-type position had been debated for many years. An early advocate of this solution to the intelligence community's leadership and managerial problems was the 1971 Schlesinger Report set up by President Richard Nixon.

It concluded that the main hope for realizing improvements in the operation of the intelligence community lay in a "fundamental reform" of its decision-making bodies and procedures. What was needed were "governing institutions." The Schlesinger Report identified three fundamental approaches to solving this leadership problem. The option it favored was creating a Director of National Intelligence who would control all major collection assets as well as research and development. The Director of National Intelligence would also direct the government's principal intelligence production and national estimating center. The CIA would retain responsibility for covert action. The 2005 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission's Report described the intelligence community as "fragmented, loosely managed, and poorly coordinated." As a corrective it supported the notion of a powerful Director of National Intelligence.

Aligned against these intelligence oversight commissions were others that rejected a Director of National Intelligence. The 1975 Murphy Commission concluded "it was neither possible nor desirable to give the DCI line authority over that very large fraction of the intelligence community which lies outside the CIA." Instead, it recommended increasing the DCI's political clout by placing this office "in close proximity to the White House and be accorded regular and direct contact with the President." The 1996 Aspin-Brown Commission's Report endorsed a similar conclusion decades later.

The George W. Bush administration resisted early pressures to create an independent commission and acceded only under public pressure from the families of 9/11 victims. A similar pattern of resistance and then bending to public pressure generated by these families characterized its pattern of cooperation with the commission and endorsement of the commission's proposal for a DNI. In fall 2004 the Senate and House each passed legislation establishing a DNI but differed on the powers to be given to that person. Under the Senate bill the CIA director "shall be under the authority, direction, and control" of the National Intelligence Director. In the House version the CIA director would only "report" to the National Intelligence Director. The House bill also only gave the National Intelligence Director the power to "develop" budgets and give "guidance" to intelligence community members. The Senate bill stated that he or she would "determine" the budget. The Senate bill would also make the intelligence budget public, require that most of the National Intelligence Director's high-ranking assistants be confirmed by the Senate, and create a civil liberties panel to prevent privacy abuses.

Deadlock ensued that was finally broken by behind-the-scenes negotiations and a bill emerged that was acceptable to House Republicans and the White House. Title One of the Act stipulated that the DNI not be located in the Executive Office of the president. It gave the DNI the power to "develop and determine" an annual budget for the national intelligence program based on budget proposals provided by the heads of intelligence agencies and departments. The DNI is to ensure the "effective execution" of the annual budget and "monitor the implementation and execution of the National Intelligence Program." After consulting with department heads the DNI is authorized to transform or reprogram a maximum of $150 million and no more than 5 percent of an intelligence unit's budget in any one fiscal year but he or she may not terminate an acquisition program. Larger transfers may take place if the affected department head agrees. In addition the DNI "establishes objectives and priorities for the intelligence community and manages and directs tasking of collection, analysis, production and

dissemination of national intelligence." He or she is also given the power to develop personnel policies and programs in consultation with the heads of other agencies and elements of the intelligence community.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence contains an intelligence staff supporting the DNI and, as of May 2007, four major organizational components each headed by a Deputy Director of National Intelligence. They are the Directorates of Collection, Analysis, Acquisition, and Policy, Plans, and Requirements. In addition following the recommendations of the WMD Commission, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence also has "mission managers" whose task it is to integrate collection and analysis on specific intelligence priority areas as well as identifying intelligence gaps and overseeing the planning and implementation of intelligence strategies. In 2008 Mission Managers existed for North Korea, Iran, and Cuba/Venezuela. Specific offices were also assigned specific responsibility for counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and counterintelligence.

Controversy surrounds a number of aspects of the DNI's position in the intelligence community. One major concern is that the political compromises needed to pass the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act weakened the budgetary and managerial powers of the DNI to the point where the problems which long plagued efforts by the DCI to effectively manage intelligence community remain in place. Second, there is concern that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has grown so large in size that it now presents another barrier to the free flow of intelligence which was one of the main problems identified in the 9/11 Commission's report.

See also: Blair, Admiral Dennis; Director of Central Intelligence; McConnell, Vice Admiral John; Negroponte, John; Schlesinger Report; September 11, 2001

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Glenn P. Hastedt

DODD, MARTHA
(1908–1990)

Born in 1908, the daughter of U.S. Ambassador to Germany (1933–1937) William Dodd, Martha Dodd engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union, along with her husband and brother, in the period leading up to World War II and in the cold war that followed.

While living in Germany, Dodd initially supported the Nazi government but gradually turned against it, embracing Communism instead. In doing so she turned from romantic involvement with Nazi leader Rudolf Diels, who headed the Gestapo, to one with Soviet intelligence officer Boris Vinogradov. In the course of this affair she became a Soviet agent. She continued in this role in spite of the fact that Vinogradov

was recalled to Moscow by the NKVD and killed in the purges of the intelligence services. While in Germany she provided the Soviet Union with information about correspondences between her father and President Franklin Roosevelt, along with internal State Department and Embassy matters.

Upon returning to New York City in 1938 after her father's tenure as ambassador ended, Dodd married New York millionaire Alfred Stern, whom she convinced to spy for the Soviet Union. Although neither Dodd nor Stern had access to sensitive material, their business dealings did provide the Soviet Union with a cover from which to operate. Dodd also is believed to have recruited several Office of Strategic Service (OSS) employees to spy for the Soviet Union.

In 1957 Dodd and Stern were exposed as Soviet spies by Boris Morros, who operated out of the Soble spy network. Indicted for espionage, they used false passports to flee to Prague, Czechoslovakia. From 1963 to 1970 they lived in Cuba. Dodd unsuccessfully tried to arrange for immunity from prosecution and a return to the United States. She lived in Prague until her death in 1990.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del— Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs); Office of Strategic Services; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano

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Glenn P. Hastedt

DODER, DUSKO

Dusko Doder is a Yugoslavian-born U.S. journalist for the *Washington Post* who was falsely accused by *Time* magazine of having disseminated KGB propaganda in return for cash. After three-and-a-half years of litigation, the magazine apologized, paid Doder $270,000 plus legal costs, and expunged the original story from its electronic archives.

In its December 28, 1992, issue, *Time* published an article by Jay Peterzell titled "A Cold War Tale," suggesting that Doder, while the *Post*'s Moscow bureau chief from 1981 to 1985, had accepted $1,000 from Soviet intelligence and, in return, become a pawn of the KGB. The allegation against Doder originated with Vitaly Yurchenko, a U.S.-based KGB officer who'd defected in 1985, only to mysteriously redefect to Moscow three months later. Peterzell's article also quoted an unnamed "former top FBI official" as saying "it was clear [Doder] was being fed information by KGB."

Doder denounced the allegation as "a lie" and charged he was the victim of a vendetta by U.S. intelligence officials who resented his ability to get information before they did. Forty-one of his colleagues wrote an open letter to *Time*, protesting the story, and Anthony Lewis of the *New York Times* wrote a column labeling it "a classic smear, a concoction of innuendo and sensationalism." The *Washington Post* said it had investigated the charges when Yurchenko first made them and given Doder "a clean bill of health."

But *Time* refused to retract the story, calling its reporting "thorough and responsible," and so Doder, now a freelance journalist, sued the magazine for libel. In 1996, the suit was settled with a payment, plus legal fees, and a statement from *Time* that "any reflection" on Doder's "good reputation and professional integrity . . . is unreservedly withdrawn." However, the magazine insisted that its original story was only "intended to be a critical examination of the difficulties in which even the very best journalists . . . may find themselves [while] operating in a dictatorial system." In response, Doder declared, "this nightmare is over."

See also: Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Eric Fettmann

DONOVAN, MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM JOSEPH (JANUARY 1, 1883–FEBRUARY 8, 1959)

William Joseph Donovan was an American lawyer, military officer, and director of the Office of Strategic Services. Born January 1, 1883, in Buffalo, New York, Donovan completed both his undergraduate degree and his legal training at Columbia University. His approach to the game as member of the Columbia football team, earned him the nickname "Wild Bill," which stuck for the remainder of his life. He interrupted his career as a Wall Street attorney in 1912 to help form and command a group of New York volunteers chasing Pancho Villa on the border between Texas and Mexico. In 1916 he transferred to the "Fighting 69th" New York Volunteers. Major Donovan embarked for France in 1917, where his leadership under fire earned the Distinguished Service Cross, the Congressional Medal of Honor, and three Purple Hearts.

His first foray into intelligence work began in 1919 when he traveled extensively in Russia and Europe to investigate investment opportunities for wealthy potential clients including J. P. Morgan. In 1922 he was named U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York and in 1925 moved to head the Justice Department's Antitrust Division.

He returned to intelligence work in July 1940, when he accompanied William Stephenson, the Canadian head of British Security Co-ordination, on a trip to survey British preparations for a possible Nazi invasion. The trip had been arranged by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and approved by Donovan's former Columbia Law School classmate, President Franklin Roosevelt. Donovan not only visited British defense installations, but met with a variety of British politicians, including King

George V and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in order to gauge the nation's political will to resist. He also received a thorough briefing from the leaders of Britain's intelligence service, MI-6. Donovan's report, delivered verbally to the president on August 9–10, emphasized not only Britain's total commitment to continued struggle, but also the need for a centralized intelligence service similar to MI-6.

Donovan repeated that trip to England in December 1940, but this time accompanied Stephenson on an extended journey through the Mediterranean from Spain to Egypt. Again he observed Allied defense preparations, local attitudes toward the war and toward the Allies, and the capabilities of local political leaders. The day after his return to the United States on March 18, 1941, he met with Knox and the president to deliver another verbal report. This time, however, according to notes taken by Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt did most of the talking.

Donovan's first proposal for a centralized intelligence agency came in a memorandum to Knox on April 26. He followed that draft up by sending a longer proposal, "Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information," based largely on the British model, directly to the president on June 10. Eight days later Roosevelt met with Donovan to offer him the position as the head of the United States' first central intelligence organization, with the title of Coordinator of Information and with vague lines of command that went through military channels. Donovan's initial responsibilities involved not only intelligence coordination, but also espionage, propaganda, and long-range strategic planning.

On June 13, 1942, however, Roosevelt transferred control of propaganda to the new Office of War Information and restructured COI as the Office of Strategic Services, with Donovan at its head with the rank of colonel. From June 1942 to September 1945, Donovan directed the work of thousands of employees engaged in research, analysis, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and psychological warfare in all areas of the globe except Latin America. He ended the war with the rank of major general.

Despite Donovan's attempts to make the OSS a permanent part of nation's national security apparatus, President Harry Truman terminated its existence and Donovan's role in intelligence, on September 20, 1945. After leaving the OSS, he briefly assisted the prosecution during the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal before returning to private practice.

After the war Donovan returned to his Wall Street law firm of Donovan, Leisure, Newton, and Irvine, although he continued to advise the Republican Party on matters related to intelligence and foreign affairs. He served briefly as ambassador to Thailand from 1953 to 1954. He died on February 8, 1959, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Coordinator of Information; Office of Strategic Services; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Stephenson, Sir William Samuel

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Peter F. Coogan

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DOOLITTLE REPORT

The 69-page Doolittle Report was presented to President Dwight Eisenhower on September 30, 1954. It was declassified in 1967. Written by Air Force Lt. General James Doolittle, who had earned fame during World War II for leading the first U.S. aerial attack on Japan, the report focused exclusively on covert action. Eisenhower recruited Doolittle to conduct the study following the Second Hoover Commission's establishment of an intelligence task force that was headed by General Mark Clark. Clark's Task Force examined all areas of intelligence activity and was in some measure designed to blunt the criticisms of the intelligence community being leveled by Senator Joseph McCarthy. Eisenhower also sought to sidetrack efforts by Senator Mike Mansfield to establish a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to examine the intelligence community. In their own ways Eisenhower saw both the McCarthy and Mansfield initiatives as threatening the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and harming America's covert action capabilities. Joining Doolittle in writing the report were William Franke, Morris Hadley, and William Pawley.

The Study Group received its first briefing from the CIA on July 14, 1954, from Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, and Richard Helms. It also received briefings from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the three military services, FBI, Bureau of the Budget, National Security Council, Atomic Energy Commission, and State Department. In addition to its briefings the last of which was held on September 28, the Study Group took a number of field trips including one to a CIA station in Western Europe.

The Doolittle Report pictured the threat facing the United States in stark terms but in terms that were consistent with Eisenhower's own views of U.S. national security challenges. The United States was pictured as facing an implacable enemy in a contest where there were no rules. Survival for the United States required rethinking the rules of fair play and developing espionage and counterespionage services capable of engaging in subversion and sabotage. In judging the present state of this struggle, the Doolittle Report concluded that the amount of usable information that the United States was in possession of about the Soviet Union was far short of its needs.

The Doolittle Report contained 42 recommendations divided into five areas: personnel, security, coordination and operations, organization and administration, and cost. It concluded that the closed nature of Communist societies made human intelligence gathering prohibitively expensive in terms of lives lost and money. Consequently, he called for attention to be given to "every possible scientific and technical approach to the intelligence problem." In looking at the structure and organizational placement of covert action Doolittle concluded that it was properly placed within the CIA and that the laws governing covert operation were reasonable. Among the recommendations it made were calls for greater cooperation between the analytical and operational sides of the CIA and a more efficient recruitment and training program. The Doolittle Report also warned against the tendency to overclassify CIA-produced documents.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Helms, Richard McGarrah; McCarthy, Joseph; Wisner, Frank Gardiner

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Glenn P. Hastedt

DORCHESTER, GUY CARLETON, LORD (SEPTEMBER 23, 1724–NOVEMBER 10, 1808)

Lord Guy Carleton Dorchester was Governor of Canada and head of the British intelligence network in the United States from 1786 to 1796. Carleton was born in Strabane, County Tyrone, Ireland, on September 23, 1724. Educated by tutors, he entered the British army on May 21, 1742, as an ensign in the 25th Regiment. He served with General James Wolfe at Quebec in 1759, and in 1763 was appointed governor of Canada. In 1775 and 1776, he fought off American invaders of Quebec, and was knighted. After unsuccessfully assaulting upstate New York, he was recalled in 1778. As Britain's last commander in chief in the United States from 1782 to 1783, he presided over the withdrawal of the army from New York.

In 1786, Carleton (recently made Baron Dorchester) returned to Canada as governor. During the next decade, in his dealings with the United States on matters relating to the Northwest Territories, Lord Dorchester relied on British agents to the south. Particularly useful to him was an aide, Major George Beckwith, who knew Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. In 1787 and 1788, Beckwith negotiated with Hamilton, urging the British point of view regarding Indian policy and the fur trade. Into the 1790s, Beckwith continued to provide Dorchester with information that was useful to British negotiators in finalizing the Jay Treaty of 1794. Dorchester resigned as governor in 1796. He died on November 10, 1808, at Stubbings, his estate in Berkshire.

See also: Hamilton, Alexander

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Paul David Nelson

DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM

The Double-Cross System was a disinformation program of British Security Service (MI-5) during World War II that fooled the Nazis and made significant contributions to the war effort. British intelligence had identified all active Nazi agents in Great Britain before the start of the war. When the war began it was a simple matter of rounding them up. The old hands were eager to execute them; however, new recruits from the English universities and business developed a better idea. Turn the spies into double agents. The XX ("Twenty") Committee was put in charge of the work.

Instead of executing them each one was given a psychological evaluation. The fanatics, those motivated by ideology and other means were identified and soon quietly executed with burial in an obscure place. Those who were motivated by adventure, self-interest, or by money were given a choice. Either become controlled double agents or be summarily executed. A number of these accepted the offer and began the process of feeding the Abwehr false information.

Several agents in the "Double-Cross System" were volunteers. Dusko Popov was a wealthy Serbian businessman who had been educated in Germany. He had settled in London to pursue his career as an international business lawyer. Fluent in several languages, with international contacts he was a natural for recruitment. When old college classmates approached him about spying for Germany, he agreed but then went straight to the British.

In the summer of 1941 Popov went to Portugal where the Abwehr gave him a piece of microfilm containing an intelligence shopping list. Believing that they would soon be at war with the United States, German intelligence wanted to know about the strength of the United States. Popov was then sent to the United States by MI-5 with an introduction to Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover, who was charged with responsibility for counterintelligence. Hoover, intensely puritanical, rejected Popov, did not evaluate his list, and failed to ask why part of the list included a request by Japanese intelligence on details of Pearl Harbor.

Popov's double-cross code name, TRICYCLE, was for his practice of taking two women to bed at one time. Code-named IVAN by the Abwehr, his greatest achievement was to convince the Nazis that the military strength of England was much greater than they had imagined. The carefully cooked intelligence led to Hitler's abandonment of the invasion of Britain.

Another volunteer was Eddy Chapman who was code-named Zigzag by the British. A burglar by trade, Chapman was in a prison on a channel island that was taken by the Germans. He agreed to spy for them to keep from being shot. After training he was parachuted into England (code name Fritzchen), whereupon he immediately gave himself up to the British authorities who then recruited him as a counterspy. After sabotage work that created more of an impression of damage than actual damage, MI-5 returned him to Germany where he was able to spy on the Germans while receiving an Iron Cross.

One very useful captured agent was Wulf Schmidt (A3725) who was code-named TATE by his handlers. Parachuted into England he was captured almost immediately. He was horrified to discover that the British knew about him and when he was coming.

Unbeknownst to the Nazis their code had been broken. While the British were having significant success with decoding German Enigma broadcasts (decoded as Ultra), they found that agents were not parachuted or debarked from a submarine into England with an Enigma machine so they concluded the agents were using a codebook. A newly recruited Oxford academic, Hugh Trevor-Roper soon broke the code and concluded that the code-book was the popular *novel Our Hearts Were Young and Gay*.

TATE was evaluated and was seen as a man in love with the thrill of adventure. His political ideology was paper thin. He agreed to be turned and to be a disinformation agent. He was able to provide cooked information that was of little real value. When he informed his Nazi handlers that General Dwight David Eisenhower had arrived to take supreme command 48 hours before the news was public in Britain, his worth was increased in the eyes of the Abwehr. When they asked for coordinates to improve the destructive impact of the V-2, rockets fed them cooked numbers that produced little damage.

One very successful operation was Operation Bodyguard. Using intelligence sent to Germany by a turned Spanish Nazi spy, Luis Calvo, code-named "GARBO." His false intelligence convinced the Nazis that the cross channel invasion was going to be from the coast of southeast England to Pas de Calais. In 1944 Calvo reported on the phony army that General George Patton was organizing for the attack on Calais. From the air it looked like there was a vast array of tanks, trucks, planes, and other equipment. However, the equipment was composed of cutout of tanks, or rubber and cardboard vehicles. Since Patton was held in high regard by the German army this trick worked very well.

The agents would broadcast back to Germany so that their handlers could identify their "fist" on the shortwave. They were however, closely supervised with death as the penalty for any attempt to tip off the Nazis.

Thirty-nine agents were turned in the double-cross system. Some were given code names such as MUTT, JEFF, and LIPSTICK. Some operations were conducted overseas. The double-cross completely captured and ran the Nazi spy system in Great Britain during World War II. The disinformation it persuaded the Nazis to take made numerous contributions to the war effort.

See also: Hoover, J. Edgar; MI-5 (The Security Service); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Pearl Harbor; Masterman, Sir John; Popov, Pyotr Semyonovich; Ultra

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Andrew J. Waskey

DOWNEY, JOHN THOMAS "JACK"
(1930–)

John Downey was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer captured in the People's Republic of China on his first tour of duty in 1952 and released in 1973 after 21 years in prison.

On November 29, 1952, Downey and fellow officer Richard Fecteau were assigned to a Civil Air Transport C-47 on a mission to pick up an ethnic Chinese agent in northwest China, but the agent and his team had been doubled. Chinese forces downed the plane, killing pilots Norman Schwartz and Robert Snoddy, and capturing Downey and Fecteau. Presuming no survivors, Washington was surprised in 1954 when Beijing announced Downey's life sentence for espionage; Fecteau received 20 years. After the initial harsh interrogations, both men faced dismal living conditions for most of their incarceration but learned to cope through patience, faith in eventual release, humor, and physical exercise.

The lack of official relations and Washington's continued insistence that the men were Department of the Army civilians, ensured stalemate on the men's fate, but throughout the CIA continued their pay and benefits, promoted them periodically, invested their savings, and assisted their families. With President Richard Nixon's opening up to China, Fecteau was released in 1971. Downey's life sentence was commuted and he was released in 1973 after Nixon publicly admitted Downey's CIA affiliation. Downey returned home to Connecticut and became a respected judge; a New Haven courthouse is named for him.

See also: China, Intelligence of; Cold War Intelligence

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Nicholas Dujmovic

DRUMMOND, YEOMAN 1ST NELSON C.
(1929–)

The first African-American to be convicted of espionage-related activities, Yeoman 1st Class Nelson Cornelius "Bulldog" Drummond, was born in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1929. He was arrested on September 28, 1962, for trying to pass six classified documents to Soviet agents Evgeni Y. Pohkorov and Ivan Y. Vyrodov. The agents were also taken into custody but released shortly afterward due to their diplomatic immunity. Over a period of five years Drummond had smuggled documents to the Russians in return for more than $24,000. A career navy officer with over 17 years of experience, Drummond used his position as administrative assistant to Lieutenant Lawrence H. Carter to steal

the classified information from the naval base in Newport, Rhode Island. When he originally made contact with the Soviets, he had been working as a clerk at USN Headquarters in London in 1957. At the time of his arrest, Drummond was found to have possession of the six documents, a spy camera, and other spying tools in his car. The stolen documents were reportedly manuals to navy radar detection equipment, anti-submarine weapons systems, and aircraft bombs. Drummond was convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage and received life in prison on August 15, 1963, despite two hung juries. In both trials, the jury did not convict on the more serious espionage charge due to the vote of a single African-American jury member. Some reverse racism was alleged, though denied by the jury member.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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Peter C. Jones

DUGGAN, LAWRENCE (1905–DECEMBER 12, 1948)

On December 12, 1948, Lawrence Duggan was found dead in New York City, apparently having committed suicide by jumping out of a 16th-floor window in his Manhattan office. Duggan was the head of Division of American Republics which oversaw U.S. diplomatic relations with Central and South America during World War II. After the war he had become the target of Joseph McCarthy's anti-Communist witch hunt into uncovering Communist spies in the State Department. The interpretation given at the time to Duggan's death was that he had killed himself over the trauma produced by these hearings.

Evidence uncovered through the VENONA Project decades later, however, reveals that Duggan was a Soviet spy who went by the code-name "Frank." Recruited in the mid-1930s by journalist Hede Massing during World War II, he provided his Soviet handlers with confidential diplomatic cables and information about U.S. and British plans for invading Italy.

Some 9 or 10 days before his death, Duggan was questioned by Federal Bureau of Investigation officials. During his questioning Duggan admitted having been approached by Soviet intelligence officials to spy for them but that he refused. Duggan gave no explanation for why he had not reported this attempted recruitment. His primary motivation appears to have been dissatisfaction with his job.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); McCarthy, Joseph; VENONA

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Glenn P. Hastedt

DULLES, ALLEN WELSH
(APRIL 7, 1893–JANUARY 29, 1969)

Allen Welsh Dulles was the fifth Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Born in Watertown, New York, on April 7, 1893, he graduated from Princeton University and received a law degree from George Washington University. Dulles served as DCI from February 10, 1953 to November 29, 1961. Prior to holding this position, Dulles held several important positions within the foreign affairs and national security bureaucracy. He spent 10 years in the diplomatic service, from 1916 to 1926; three years as Head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Berne, Switzerland, from 1942 to 1945; and was Deputy Director of Plans and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the CIA. In these later positions he oversaw the merger of the Office of Policy Coordination and Office of Special Operations into a single bureaucratic unit charged with clandestine and covert action. He served in the Eisenhower administration with John Foster Dulles, who served as secretary of state from 1953 to 1959.

Often described within the CIA by his contemporaries as "the Great White Case Officer," Dulles did much to help create the mystique of omnipotence that surrounded the CIA in the 1950s. By virtue of personal interest and career experience, Dulles was far more interested in clandestine and covert operations than he was in intelligence analysis and estimates or managing an intelligence organization. Accounts of his tenure as DCI identify him as spending as much as 75 percent of his time and energy on clandestine and covert operations. Dulles routinely did not involve himself in writing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) until the final draft, as they neared the point where they would be presented to the National Security Council (NSC) although he was known to raise questions about its content. His disinterest in intelligence analysis and general management tasks was the subject of repeated critiques by such bodies as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Affairs. Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy, under whom Dulles served, urged him to redirect his efforts. Both recognized they had little chance of changing Dulles on this score. Interestingly, Dulles, himself, recognized the need for greater managerial control within the CIA and the importance of improved intelligence analysis. In 1948 he coauthored the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report for the NSC that leveled these very critiques against the CIA. Many observers see Dulles' failure to embrace a managerial role as a missed opportunity to strengthen the position of the CIA in its relationship with members of the intelligence community.

Dulles' personal involvement in clandestine operations and covert action dates back to World War I when he served as an American agent in Switzerland. While there

Allen Dulles played a major role in the creation and organization of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and served as the first civilian director from 1953 to 1961. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library)

he received a message from V. I. Lenin requesting a meeting. Dulles often recounted that he was too busy to see Lenin. Evidence suggests that Lenin wished to talk with Dulles about the fact that he had been approached by German agents with an offer of return to Russia where he was to start a revolution, release German prisoners of war, and enter a peace agreement with Germany. During World War II, as head of the OSS office in Switzerland, Dulles established a network of agents in Nazi Germany. His prize agent was a walk-in, Fritz Koble, a German high-ranking diplomat, who provided him with some 1,600 copies of incoming and outgoing telegrams and letters.

During Dulles, tenure as DCI the CIA pursued a wide-ranging covert action program that was designed to bring down governments perceived to be hostile to the United States. Among the most significant were those in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1958), Tibet (1958), and Cuba (1960–1961). The CIA also attempted to assassinate foreign leaders such as Cuba's Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba in the Congo during this period. The failure of the April 17, 1961, Bay of Pigs invasion to remove Castro from power precipitated Dulles' removal from office later that year by President Kennedy.

After leaving the CIA Dulles returned to private life and authored several books, including one of the first systematic accounts of intelligence, *The Craft of Intelligence* (1963). Dulles, last major act of public service was as a member of the Warren Commission that investigated the assassination of President John Kennedy and shooting of his assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald.

See also: Bay of Pigs; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; Kennedy Assassination; National Intelligence Estimates; National Security Council; Office of Strategic Services

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Glenn P. Hastedt

DULLES-JACKSON-CORREA REPORT

Commissioned by the National Security Council in 1948 and presented in 1949, this report evaluated the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) effectiveness in carrying out its intelligence and operational missions. It concluded that the principle of authoritative and coordinated National Intelligence Estimates had not yet been established within the intelligence community and that intelligence organizations continued to produce their own estimates and establish their own intelligence priorities. The Report did not break entirely new ground in its critiques. A report written by the CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates critically noted that its intelligence reporting had shifted from long-range predictive estimates to short-term studies that were nonpredictive in nature. The two principal authors of the report were Allen Dulles and William Jackson. Soon after the report was issued, Dulles, who had served in the Office of Strategic Services, joined the CIA as Deputy Director of Plans. He would later become Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Jackson was an investment attorney who had served in army intelligence. After the Report was issued he joined the CIA as Deputy Director of Intelligence where he worked with the new DCI, General Walter Bedell Smith, to implement its recommendations. Matthias Correa, a lawyer who had served as an assistant to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, was not an active participant in drafting the report.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Dulles, Allen Welsh; National Security Council

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Glenn P. Hastedt

DU PONT, ALFRED
(MAY 12, 1846–APRIL 29, 1935)

Alfred Irénée du Pont was born on May 12, 1846, in Wilmington, Delaware, the great grandson Pierre-Samuel du Pont De Nemours (1739–1817) and the grandson of Éleutere Irénée (E.I.) du Pont (1771–1834) who, after fleeing to the United States

(1799–1800) from France at the end of the French Revolution (1789–1799), began (1802) the gunpowder manufacturing mill that eventually evolved into E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (NYSE: DD), the world's second-largest chemical company. Alfred, the son of E.I. du Pont II (1829–1877), attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for two years before entering the family business (1884).

Alfred secured the secrets of smokeless gunpowder for the United States (US) when the U.S. Army Chief of Ordnance assigned him the task (1889) of purchasing the French patent rights to their brown prismatic and smokeless gunpowder. Eugene Du Pont was assigned the task of learning how to manufacture the improved gunpowder. When the French government refused to sell those rights, Alfred tried and failed to obtain the secrets by bribing the French officers overseeing its manufacture. He then posed as a factory worker, gained employment in the production facility, and stole the process.

Alfred returned to the United States, becoming the assistant superintendent of Dupont's Hagley and Lower Yards and then a director/partner in the company (1899). Alfred bought the company (1902) in partnership with his cousins T. Coleman and Pierre S. du Pont and oversaw the company's gunpowder manufacturing and research program. The company was forced to divest itself of the manufacture of explosives in 1912. Alfred was forced to resign after failing in a shareholder battle with Pierre (1915) and died on April 29, 1935, in Jacksonville, Florida.

See also: Industrial espionage

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Richard M. "Rich" Edwards

DUQUESNE SPY RING

The Duquesne Spy Ring was composed of 33 members, all of whom were convicted of espionage. The ring was established during World War II by Nazi Germany and operated out of the metropolitan New York City area. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) knew of its operations from the start because one of its members was a double agent.

The lead figure in the spy ring was Frederick Joubert Duquesne, who was born in South Africa in 1877 and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1913. In 1940 he established a business operation in New York City that served as a front for the spy ring. Other members of the ring operated restaurants and worked for delivery firms and airlines.

The key FBI informant in the Duquesne Spy Ring was William Sebold. He had served in the German army during World War I and emigrated to the United States where he became a naturalized citizen in 1936. He returned for a visit to Germany in 1939 where he was recruited by German intelligence as a spy. Fearful of what might happen to family members still living in Germany, Sebold agreed but then told U.S. consulate officials who informed the FBI.

Because of Sebold's help, the Duquesne ring communicated with German intelligence by way of a radio transmitting station on Long Island that was under the control of FBI agents. Its communications were monitored for 16 months with over 500 messages being intercepted. After their arrest, nineteen members of the Duquesne ring pled guilty and 14 pled not guilty. All were convicted. All combined, their sentences totaled over 300 years in prison.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Sebold, William

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Glenn P. Hastedt

E

EAGLE CLAW, OPERATION

After the November 4, 1979, revolutionary student takeover of the U.S. embassy in Teheran, Iran, Pentagon planners immediately tasked Delta Force, the elite U.S. Army special operations unit (now counterterrorism force), to plan a rescue. The major problem was that the CIA did not have any intelligence operatives on the ground because they, too, had been taken hostage in the embassy crisis. But by the time of the ill-fated rescue mission (officially called Operation Eagle Claw) of April 24–25, 1980, at least seven American clandestine operatives had helped prepare the way.

The primary point man, code-named "Esquire," was Richard H. Meadows, a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer and newly hired consultant to Delta Force. The CIA rated him unqualified for the assignment, but reluctantly approved of his selection after Colonel Charles Beckwith, leader of Delta Force and Operation Eagle Claw's ground-force commander, made it clear that he would not conduct the mission until one of his men went in first.

Meadows went to Iran under the alias of Richard J. Keith, posing as an Irish citizen affiliated with a European automobile company. His mission was to secure a hideout for the first stage of the mission, scout out a helicopter landing site, conduct a reconnaissance of the area surrounding the 27-acre embassy compound, and if possible learn of the exact location of the 53 hostages. He also had to purchase trucks and vans to transport the 106-man assault team the 50 miles from the "Desert Two" initial staging site to the embassy.

The mission was aborted in the middle of the night at "Desert One," a desolate refueling site 265 miles southeast of the capital, after three of eight RH-53D helicopters experienced mechanical failure, two from the ill effects of a dust storm. During the packing up to leave, a helicopter blade sliced through the skin of a refueling aircraft, causing a fiery explosion that left eight Americans dead. Meadows came close to being compromised because helicopters abandoned in the desert were not stripped of mission

papers, including a map revealing the location of the Desert Two site. Fortunately, two days afterwards Meadows was able to depart Teheran without incident on a commercial Swiss Air jet.

See also: AJAX, Operation; Carter Administration and Intelligence

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Roger Chapman

EARHART, AMELIA
(JULY 24, 1897–CA. JULY 2, 1937)

A pioneering aviator, Amelia Earhart became a symbol of both women's growing independence and the rising prominence and importance of the airplane in American life. Born in Atchison, Kansas, on July 24, 1897, Amelia Mary Earhart was an independent child and something of a daredevil, even from an early age. Sometime before 1921, Earhart flew as a passenger in an airplane for the first time, probably at a local air show. In January 1921, she met Neta Snook, a woman pilot, and began taking flying lessons from her. In 1922, Earhart bought her first plane, a yellow Kinner Canary biplane and quickly set about breaking her first record. She was the first woman to fly higher than 14,000 feet.

After Charles Lindbergh completed the first solo flight across the Atlantic on May 20–21, 1927, she became even more dedicated to aviation. In 1928, Captain H. H. Railey asked her to join a publicity flight across the Atlantic, making her the first woman to make the flight, although she was only a passenger. She accepted, and the flight on June 17–18, 1928, propelled her to stardom. Although her duties during the flight were limited to keeping the flight log, in the public's mind, she had become the female version of Lindbergh and the most famous woman aviator in the world. After her Atlantic flight, Earhart devoted herself full time to aviation. She served as the aviation editor for *Cosmopolitan* magazine and published a book about her transatlantic flight, *20 Hrs., 40 Min.*, in 1928. She continued to break records, setting a women's speed record of 181 miles per hour in 1929 and an altitude record of 18,451 feet in 1931. She also served as a founder and president of the Ninety-Nines, a club for woman pilots.

In 1932, exactly five years after Lindbergh's historic flight, Earhart became the first woman to fly solo across the Atlantic. In her single-engine Lockheed Vega, she flew from Newfoundland to Ireland in the record-breaking time of 14 hours and 56 minutes. Earhart set her sights on even greater glory. She became the first person to complete solo flights from Hawaii to California (which covered more distance than her Atlantic flight had) and from Los Angeles to Mexico City and to make nonstop flights between Mexico City and Newark, New Jersey. For her pioneering aviation efforts, she received the Distinguished Flying Cross at a joint session of Congress.

In 1937, Earhart concentrated all of her energy on completing a round-the-world flight. In 1924, a group of army pilots had completed a series of such flights, but they

had taken a circuitous route that had allowed them to remain close to land. Earhart planned to follow the much more dangerous equatorial route, which would cover more than 29,000 miles. She recognized that such a trip would be impossible to complete alone, so she hired a navigator, Fred Noonan, to accompany her. They set out from Oakland, California, on March 17, heading west for Hawaii, but after completing this first leg of the trip, the plane crashed upon takeoff from Hawaii. On June 1, Earhart and Noonan set out again, this time traveling east from Oakland to Miami, Florida. By June 30, they reached New Guinea, having nearly completed their journey and traveling over the Caribbean, South America, Africa, India, the Dutch East Indies, and Australia (a trip covering 22,000 miles). This next leg of the trip was the most dangerous and would require expert navigation and flying. From New Guinea, the flight was scheduled to go to Howland Island, a tiny island near the equator that was not much more than an airstrip. The trip from New Guinea was more than 2,500 miles over the Pacific Ocean, with no landmarks to guide them. Earhart and Noonan left New Guinea in mid-morning on July 1 and disappeared, never reaching Howland Island.

The last radio contact made with Earhart was at 8:44 A.M. on July 2. Earhart stated that overcast weather conditions and strong winds had contributed to them missing Howland Island and they were running out of fuel. The U.S. Navy made an extensive search for Earhart and the plane that ultimately covered more than 25,000 miles in the Pacific, but no trace of the plane or its crew was ever found.

Since her disappearance, theories as to her fate have abounded, including speculation that she had secretly been flying a surveillance mission for the U.S. government and was then captured by the Japanese. Most experts agree, however, that the most likely theory is that her plane crashed into the Pacific after running out of fuel, killing both her and Noonan. This interpretation was highlighted in a popular 1943 film, *Flight for Freedom*.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Glenn P. Hastedt

EARLY REPUBLIC AND ESPIONAGE

The first decades of the American Republic saw espionage move from a wartime setting to peacetime. The transition brought out a theme that would be repeated time and again in the history of American espionage. The public's attention became riveted on the dangers posed by domestic spies who came from groups outside the mainstream of American society. Caught up in a battle for their political survival, the Federalists depicted immigrants as spies and supported the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The Alien Laws were directed largely at French and Irish immigrants who had emerged as strong supporters of Thomas Jefferson and his Republican Party. The three

alien laws extended the period required to obtain citizenship from five to 14 years, permitted detention of aliens without cause, and allowed the president to expel aliens.

The clandestine collection of information to further national security interests continued at a measured pace up until the Civil War. One area it made a significant contribution to was the exploration of the trans-Mississippi West. Captain Meriwether Lewis and Lieutenant William Clark undertook their famous expedition to the Pacific. Officially described as a commercial expedition, President Thomas Jefferson also entrusted it with the task of bringing back basic intelligence about the region, including the economic and military activities of the Indians they encountered along the way.

Two wars punctuated this time period. Espionage played a minimal role in each. The War of 1812 saw no organized American effort directed at secretly collecting information on the British. American intelligence was as unprepared for war as the rest of the country. The United States possessed little intelligence of merit on the state of British forces in Canada and little basic intelligence about Canada itself. The most notable espionage activities during the War of 1812 were carried out by pirates who were allied with the United States. They reported on British naval movements throughout the Gulf coast and West Indies. This general lack of American intelligence preparedness stood in contrast to British capabilities. The British had continued their intelligence collection efforts in the United States after the American Revolution. Organized spying also played only a minor role in the Mexican War. In part this was due to the absence of any concrete war plans. Without such plans military intelligence could not be effectively tasked to collect information. General Zachary Taylor also did not value intelligence. During the war, intelligence was collected on an ad hoc basis with American military officials relying upon non-Americans to conduct espionage. Bands of outlaws were recruited at a base pay of $2 per day. Although their loyalty was suspect, as many as two hundred bandits were recruited.

See also: Blount Conspiracy; Claiborne, William C. C.; Genet, Edmund Charles; Hamilton, Alexander; Hitchcock, Ethan Allen; Jackson, Andrew; Lewis, Meriwether; Lafitte, Jean and Pierre; Mexican Spy Company; Spanish Conspiracy; Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de; Tub Plot Conspiracy; XYZ Affair

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EBERSTADT REPORT

The Eberstadt Report was highly influential in the establishment of a post–World War II intelligence system in the United States. Its recommendations largely were followed by President Harry Truman in creating the Central Intelligence Group (CIG),

the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency CIA), and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The principal author of the intelligence section of the Eberstadt Report was Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers who became the first DCI.

Ferdinand Eberstadt, a businessperson and friend of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, was commissioned by Forrestal in 1945 to produce a report on the proposed merger of the War and Navy Departments. The issue of military unification was the most highly charged national security policy question coming out of World War II. A key component of this debate was the fate of the intelligence units of the two services along with that of the State Department and the future of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Forrestal was an advocate of greater centralization of intelligence analysis within the national security bureaucracy but he was also a fierce defender of the navy's organizational prerogatives. After three months, on September 27, 1945, Eberstadt submitted his report. It rejected merging the War and Navy Departments. In place of a single defense organization, Eberstadt recommended the creation of a National Security Council (NSC), which played an advisory role and would have representation from the army, navy, State Department, and a newly independent air force. The NSC was to be supported by a central intelligence agency that would provide the military with "authoritative information on conditions and developments in the outside world." In making this proposal, the Eberstadt Report also argued against a centralized intelligence system. The Report maintained that each of these departments has specific and unique intelligence needs. Meeting these requirements was best accomplished through the continued existence of separate intelligence organizations. The new central intelligence agency should restrict itself to synthesizing departmental intelligence on strategic issues and play the role of a coordinator.

In response to the Eberstadt Report the War Department undertook its own study led by Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett. Its recommendations were put forward in November. It endorsed the idea of a civilian central intelligence agency but recommended that in addition an Intelligence Advisory Board made up of representatives from the military intelligence agencies be created to advise it. Lovett also suggested that this intelligence agency should "operate as the sole collection agency for all departments . . . in the foreign espionage and counter-espionage fields."

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Central Intelligence Group; Cold War Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; National Security Council; Office of Strategic Services

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ECHELON

ECHELON is a global eavesdropping system that allows the United States and several of its Allies to intercept and analyze radio and satellite communications, telephone calls, faxes, and e-mails from virtually all corners of the world. Run by the National

Radomes holding ECHELON antennae near Blenheim, New Zealand. ECHELON is a global surveillance network used by the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on phone, fax, e-mail, and telex communications. (iStockPhoto.com)

Security Agency (NSA), it originally focused on communications to and from the Soviet Union. ECHELON is now believed to be targeted on terrorists and it is credited with aiding in the capture of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Pakistan in 2003 through the monitoring of mobile phones. ECHELON has come in for periodic criticism for its involvement in domestic spying and commercial espionage.

ECHELON has its roots in the UKUSA Agreement of 1945. At about the same time he was terminated, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) President Harry Truman approved a proposal to continue communications intelligence collaboration between the United States and Great Britain. A March 1946 meeting in London finalized an agreement that would establish a working relationship between these two states as well as bring Canada, New Zealand, and Australia into the alliance.

As originally structured, only two stations were necessary to intercept global communications, one at Morwentstow in Cornwell, UK, that had one satellite dish for the Atlantic Ocean and one for the Indian Ocean and an NSA installation in the western United States focused on the Pacific Ocean. A far more extensive set of communication intercepting and ground information processing stations now exist. Reportedly they include or have included Pine Gap, Australia; Misawa Air Base, Japan; Waihopai, New Zealand; Menweth Hill, UK; Sugar Grove, West Virginia; Yakima, Washington; Alert, Canada; Griesheim, Germany; Osan Air Base, South Korea; Diego Garcia; Gibraltar; Guam; Karamursel, Turkey; and Agios Niklolaos, Cyprus. In addition to

these sites a July 6, 2000, BBC report stated that 120 American satellites in geostationary orbit were part of the ECHELON system.

At the heart of ECHELON's collection and analysis system are a series of "dictionaries" that contain key words, telephone numbers, and e-mail addresses of interest to the participating countries. ECHELON's computers search through intercepted messages using these dictionaries.

A central element to the debate over ECHELON is its ability to circumvent prohibitions on domestic spying by having another member of the alliance gather intelligence on its citizens and then pass that information back to it. Several cases have received notoriety in this regard. In 1988 a software manager responsible for managing computers at Menwith Hill, UK, revealed that she heard real-time intercepted phone calls involving Senator Strom Thurmond. In 1992 former British intelligence officials told the *London Observer* that they had targeted communications from Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and Christian Aid. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was reported to have asked British intelligence to collect intelligence on two ministers that she suspected of disloyalty. In order to get around legal prohibitions on domestic spying, British intelligence asked Canadian intelligence to carry out the assignment. Most recently ECHELON was linked to the George W. Bush administration's warrantless domestic spying program begun after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Allegations of commercial espionage also have become highly sensitive issues today. In 1990 the German media asserted that NSA had intercepted messages about a proposed $200 million deal between Indonesia and a Japanese satellite manufacturer. President George H. W. Bush intervened and the contract was split between the Japanese firm and an American firm. In 1994 NSA intercepted phone calls between Brazil and a French firm regarding the purchase of a radar system. This information was passed on to a U.S. competitor. Economic-oriented espionage can also be carried out in support of diplomatic purposes. From 1992 to 1993, a Canadian intelligence official reported seeing intercepts of conversations from Mexican trade representatives involving NAFTA negotiations. It is also reported that President Bill Clinton ordered a large-scale surveillance program at the 1993 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference held in Seattle.

Concerns about the broadened use of ECHELON's capabilities outside the traditional national security area led the European Parliament to examine ECHELON in 2001 and recommend that citizens of the European Union routinely use cryptography in their communications in order to protect their privacy. In 2004 the European Union made the decision to develop a secure communication system at the cost of $11 million.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; National Security Agency; UKUSA

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EDEN, WILLIAM
(APRIL 3, 1744–MAY 18, 1814)

William Eden was head of the British secret service during the War of American Independence. Born on April 3, 1744, at Windlestone Hall, Durham, England, Eden was educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. He studied law at Lincoln's Inn and was called to the bar in 1768. He was appointed undersecretary of state in 1772 and two years later was elected to Parliament. In 1776 he was appointed to the Board of Trade. During the War of American Independence, he took a special interest in colonial affairs, perhaps because his elder brother, Robert Eden, was governor of Maryland. He was put in charge of British espionage during the war.

Working through the American loyalist agent Paul Wentworth, Eden organized a small spy ring in the United States to monitor political and military developments. He also made use of the Reverend John Vardill. Eden employed Dr. Edward Bancroft, secretary to the American commissioners in Paris, to learn about rebel diplomatic activities there. But Bancroft, a double agent, gave the Americans information about his British employers at the same time. Eden's brother-in-law, Hugh Elliot, British ambassador at Berlin, got access to intelligence about the American mission to the Prussian court.

After the American war, Eden was a prominent politician and diplomat. In 1789, he was made an Irish peer as Baron Auckland and four years later a British peer as Baron Auckland of West Auckland. He died at Eden Farm, Beckenham, Kent, on May 18, 1814.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Paul David Nelson

EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Dwight Eisenhower was president from 1953 to 1961. During his presidency General Walter Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles served as Directors of Central Intelligence (DCI). Eisenhower came to the White House more familiar with intelligence than perhaps any president before or after him. His view of intelligence, however, was skewed. On the one hand he was particularly taken by imagery intelligence (IMINT) from his wartime experience. On the other hand rather than seeing them as two different clandestine undertakings he tended to equate human intelligence (HUMINT) and paramilitary covert action.

The National Security Agency (NSA) had been set up by President Harry Truman on election day 1952 to be in charge of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and Eisenhower supported it wholeheartedly. Of even greater consequence was his support of a series of rapid advances in aerial reconnaissance. The first breakthrough was the U-2 program.

Although its main target was the Soviet Union, the U-2 also provided valuable intelligence to the United States in the run up to the 1956 Arab-Israeli war in the Middle East that saw Great Britain and France try to reestablish themselves as major powers in the region. Eisenhower personally reviewed and approved all of its missions from the first flight on August 1, 1955 to the May 1, 1960, flight of Francis Gary Powers who was shot down and captured just prior to the Paris Summit with Nikita Khrushchev. The U-2 program was followed by the launching of *Discoverer* space satellites. *Discoverer* satellites, although initially producing inferior photographs compared to the U-2, were able to cover far more territory more safely. One capsule recovered from a *Discoverer* outproduced four years of U-2 coverage. Information on the Soviet Union was also obtained through less revolutionary technological means. Phone taps in Vienna and Berlin provided temporary insight into Soviet military and political thinking in Europe. And from 1953 until 1958 when he was caught Soviet military intelligence, Major Pyotr Semyonovich Popov volunteered his services to the United States as a spy.

Eisenhower was a strong advocate of covert action as a surrogate for conventional military action. The first such operation undertaken by his administration was in Iran where a joint British-American venture (Operation Ajax) brought down the government of Mohammad Mossadeq and placed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in power where he would remain until overthrown in 1979. This was followed by a successful action against Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala and a failure in Indonesia. It was also under Eisenhower that Richard Bissell began planning for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion as well as a series of assassination attempts against Fidel Castro and others.

Eisenhower's relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and J. Edgar Hoover mirrored that of other presidents. Although not personally close, Eisenhower willingly accepted damaging information on his political rivals from Hoover. His attorney general, Herbert Brownell, provided Hoover with the authority to engage in the "unrestricted" use of microphone surveillance when it was in "the national interest" in a 1954 memorandum. That the definition of espionage on Americans in the name of national interest had been stretched by Hoover to pursue his own agenda without any supervision from the Eisenhower White House became fully evident in 1956 when he instituted a new surveillance program, COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence Program). In theory it was directed against members of the American Communist Party, whose membership had now decreased to some 5,000 from a high of 80,000. In reality it was directed at political extremists on both ends of the political spectrum: the Ku Klux Klan, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Black Panthers.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; COINTELPRO; Cold War Intelligence; Dulles, Allen Welsh; National Security Agency; Powers, Francis Gary; Smith, General Walter Bedell; U-2 Incident

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EITAN, RAFAEL
(1929–NOVEMBER 23, 2004)

Rafael Eitan was a war hero and dominating figure in the Israeli Defense Forces where he rose to the rank of chief of staff and Israeli politics where he founded the Tzomet Party and was a member of the Kinesset where he served on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Eitan also served as Minister of Agriculture and the Environment in 1996. He opposed concessions to the Palestinians and was identified with the right wing of Israeli politics. Eitan drowned on November 23, 2004, when he was swept into the Mediterranean Sea when the pier he was standing on was hit by a huge wave.

Eitan was born in 1929 in the Jezre'el Valley and joined the Israeli Defense Forces at its founding in 1948. He served as a paratrooper in the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Six Day War. He went on to serve as a divisional commander in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Eitan retired from the army in 1983 under a cloud of controversy. An investigation into the massacre of Palestinian refugees by Christian militia during the 1983 invasion of Lebanon concluded that Eitan should have anticipated this eventuality and taken steps to prevent it.

Eitan also helped recruit Jonathan Pollard to spy for Israel. He was appointed head of the Israeli intelligence agency, the Bureau of Scientific Liaison (LAKAM), in 1981 by Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon. As its head, Eitan played a central role in recruiting Pollard, a civilian U.S. navy intelligence analyst, as a walk-in volunteer spy in 1984. This recruitment ended 18 months later in a major political controversy and embarrassment for the Israeli government when Pollard was arrested. He was convicted and received a life sentence in 1987.

See also: Pollard, Jonathan Jay

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Glenn P. Hastedt

EL SALVADOR

The Republic of El Salvador is a small Central American country. It borders the Pacific Ocean on the west and Guatemala and Honduras on the north and south. Most of the country lies on a volcanic plateau that is about 2,000 feet above sea level. It has a

tropical climate with a rapidly growing population, close to seven million people, living in an area about the size of Massachusetts. Its capital city is San Salvador with a population over two million people.

Military dictators ruled El Salvador from 1931 until 1979. The social inequalities and poverty have been a constant problem in Salvadorian history with the poor open to leftist agitation and the wealthy and their clients supportive of rightist policies and practices. Tensions reached a peak in the civil war that occurred between 1980 and 1992.

Between 1979 and 1981 over 30,000 people were killed by right-wing death squads supporting the National Conciliation Party (PCN) and the leftist guerrillas led by the Farbundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The rising violence drew the United States into civil war on the side of the PCN even though it was a military dictatorship. Military and civilian aid was provided by the Carter and Reagan administrations which feared a Communist takeover.

During the war Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated. His death touched of significant political challenges to the government. Additionally, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) field reports from the CIA station in San Salvador contained volumes of information on the murder of U.S. Marines, the El Mozote massacre, the 1989 murder of Jesuit priests, and other human rights violations. These incidents occurred despite demands by the United States that the Duarte government control the right-wing death squads.

In 1992 the government signed a peace treaty with the leftists. The treaty ended the war which had killed over 75,000 people. Among the changes agreed to in the treaty were changes in the Salvadorian intelligence and security community.

Reforms instituted after 1992 included the abolition of secret police units, anti-dissident units, death squads, and demilitarization of the intelligence community. However, some political espionage has continued. The Direccion Nacional Civil (DNI, National Directorate of Intelligence) is the chief intelligence agency in El Salvador today.

The DNI gathers intelligence and produces intelligence products on both domestic and foreign subjects. Other intelligence units focus on narcotics, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and paramilitary forces.

The Anti-Riot Unit (UMO) is a special operations unit in the Salvadorian intelligence community. The Political Reaction Group (GRP) conducts operations to gather intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of antigovernment forces and hostile paramilitary groups.

Military intelligence is conducted by the Ministry of Defense and Public Security. It also manages security forces. Its main military intelligence group is the C-2, which conducts large-scale surveillance operations.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Reagan Administration and Intelligence

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Andrew J. Waskey

ELLIS, LIEUTENANT COLONEL EARL H. (PETE) (DECEMBER 19, 1880–CA. 1923)

An eccentric marine officer whose superb skills as a planner helped him establish the modern Marine Corps and its Fleet Marine Force, Ellis was born in Iuka, Kansas, on December 19, 1880, and enlisted in the United States Marine Corps (USMC) in 1900. Although not having graduated from college his talents earned him a commission just over a year later.

In 1901, Lieutenant Ellis arrived at Cavite in the Philippine Islands. In the years preceding World War I, Captain Ellis was sent out on special terrain study and intelligence service in the West Indies and at the Naval Station in Guam. On May 22, 1918, Major Ellis was detached to foreign shore expeditionary service in France. During the war, he received a temporary promotion to lieutenant colonel while serving as a principal staff officer to Major General John A. Lejeune when the latter commanded the 4th Marine Brigade and then the 2nd Division in France. After the war, Ellis served in Santo Domingo as Brigade Intelligence Officer, before being transferred to Headquarters Marine Corps in December 1920.

Before the war, Ellis, serving as a student and faculty member at the Naval War College, had participated in the development of War Plan Orange, which grew out of the need to defend the recently acquired Philippines and from the perception that Japan was the most likely enemy in any future war in the Pacific. As part of this planning process, Ellis wrote a ground-breaking paper on the theory and doctrine of defending advance bases.

After World War I, the naval services again turned their attention to War Plan Orange and the problems of a naval campaign against Japan. Japan, which had fought on the side of the Allies in World War I, had captured a number of islands previously occupied by Germany. These islands provided Japan with bases suitable for launching attacks on the Philippines and other American possessions in the Pacific. This meant that any war with Japan would have to include amphibious assaults for capturing island bases for subsequent U.S. fleet actions. Upon his reassignment to Marine Corps Headquarters, Ellis was tasked to analyze the requirements of amphibious operations across the central Pacific. Working virtually around the clock for seven months in 1921, developed Operation Plan 712, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia. Major General Lejeune, by this time Marine Corps Commandant, endorsed Ellis' study as the basis for future training and wartime mobilization planning.

After completing the plan, Ellis traveled to Japanese-held Micronesia in the guise of a civilian on an intelligence-gathering mission to survey Japanese defenses in the islands. When Ellis reached Micronesia, he was under close Japanese surveillance. In May 1923, the Japanese authorities announced that Ellis had died on the Micronesian island of Korror. While there was some speculation that the Japanese had killed him because they had caught him spying, the most likely cause of death was alcohol poisoning and nephritis, a disease of the kidneys, since Ellis had long suffered from alcoholism.

Ellis accurately predicted the bloody Pacific War and his Plan 712 stood the test of time; 20 years later, during World War II, the actual American campaign for Micronesia diverged very little from the plan that Ellis had drawn up in 1921. Ellis' writings and plans

made him a major architect of the development of amphibious warfare and the modern Marine Corps.

See also: Marine Corps Intelligence

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James H. Willbanks

ELLSBERG, DANIEL
(APRIL 7, 1931–)

Born in Detroit and a former Marine Corps officer and Harvard-trained PhD in economics, Daniel Ellsberg served as a military analyst during the Vietnam War. He participated in producing the Pentagon Papers, a 47-volume, 7,000-page classified document that detailed the history of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1945 through 1968. During a career that saw him work in the Rand Corporation, the State Department, and Defense Department, Ellsberg had come to possess a strongly held belief that presidents and other senior officials often misled the American public about the reasons for using military force, giving more weight to political considerations than security ones. In particular he came to see the Vietnam War as unwinnable. In the Pentagon Papers Ellsberg felt he had evidence that supported his views. After failing to get Senators J. William Fulbright and George McGovern to read this still-secret material into the Senate record, he approached the *New York Times* about printing it.

Publication of the "Pentagon Papers" in June 13, 1971, set off a legal battle that went to the Supreme Court. The case centered on the Nixon administration's efforts to block the continued publication of the "Pentagon Papers" on national security grounds. On June 30, 1971, the Supreme Court rejected the administration's arguments and the *New York Times* and other newspapers that by now had received copies of it were permitted to resume printing it. Much of the content of the "Pentagon Papers" was later read into the Congressional Record by Senator Mike Gravel. Ellsberg was arrested and charged with 12 felonies with a potential jail time of 115 years.

The publication of the "Pentagon Papers" fueled fears within the Nixon administration that leaking of classified information would now become more common and that Ellsberg might have more politically embarrassing information. In response to these fears, the "White House Plumbers" was created. On September 3, 1971, Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office was broken into in a failed attempt to secretly obtain his medical files. John Ehrlichman, President Nixon's Assistant for Domestic Affairs, approved the operation on the condition that it could not be traced back to the White House. Conceived of and carried out by H. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, the break-in went undetected until Ellsberg went on trial in April 1973 for breaking the 1917 Espionage Act in providing the *New York Times* with the Pentagon Papers. Partly as a result of the break-in, all charges against Ellsberg and his codefendant

Anthony Russo were dismissed. The White House Plumbers would again gain notoriety due to the Watergate break-ins.

Ellsberg continues to speak out against U.S. military involvements, particularly the Iraq War, and call upon those within the government to release information they have which contradicts official administration policy.

See also: Nixon Administration and Intelligence; Watergate

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ENERGY DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE

The Department of Energy was established in 1977 in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. James Schlesinger was appointed by President Jimmy Carter to be the first secretary of energy. The Department of Energy's participation in the intelligence community dates back to the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission, which was given responsibility for protecting nuclear weapons secrets along with the scientific efforts that go into developing them. These intelligence responsibilities moved to the Energy Research and Development Administration as a result of the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act and then to the Department of Energy when it was created.

In 1990 the Energy Department began a reorganization and consolidation of its intelligence functions. That year, an Office of Intelligence was established, which united the Office of Foreign Intelligence, the Office of Threat Assessment, and the Office of Counterintelligence. Further reorganizations followed in 1994, 1998, and 2006. This last reorganization created an Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

The Counterintelligence Directorate is responsible for risk assessment analyses of the vulnerability of the Energy Department to economic espionage. The Intelligence Directorate within the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is divided into five units. The Nuclear Intelligence Analysis Division is responsible for assessing foreign nuclear weapons programs for their intelligence, military, diplomatic, and treaty monitoring purposes. The Counterterrorism Division monitors and assesses the ability of terrorists to obtain or produce nuclear devices. Other divisions examine scientific and technological developments and social-political developments that could affect the supply of energy to the United States and the ability of other states and nonstate actors to obtain a nuclear capability. The third directorate in the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is a Management Directorate.

Another unit within the Energy Department with responsibilities in the intelligence field is the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). It was created in 1990 after Wen Ho Lee was arrested for espionage at the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory. NNSA maintains a data base on some 37,000 people who are involved in the design and maintenance of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal as part of its mission to ensure

the safety of the U.S. nuclear inventory and reduce the global danger of weapons of mass destruction. After 9/11, NNSA has focused additional resources on security missions ranging from protecting critical facilities from vehicle bombs to establishing more secure and reliable cyber communications networks. NNSA suffered an embarrassing setback in 2006 when the *New York Times* reported that sensitive information had been stolen by workers and was not reported for nine months.

The Energy Department is also tasked with the job of providing intelligence support activities for the Nevada nuclear test site and the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. The Energy Department is a partner with the Central Intelligence Agency in the Z Division at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Established in 1965 to analyze the Soviet nuclear weapons program, it now also assesses the Chinese program as well as those of smaller states. It has also expanded its agenda to include chemical and biological weapons.

See also: Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency; Atomic Energy Commission; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; Intelligence Community

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ENGLISH, GEORGE BETHUNE (MARCH 7, 1787–SEPTEMBER 20, 1828)

George Bethune English was a theologian and author who later served in the U.S. Marines as an officer in the Egyptian army, and then in the U.S. Department of State. English was born in Massachusetts and enrolled at Harvard. He obtained an M.A. in theology in 1811. After graduation, English supported himself as an author and newspaper editor. He stirred up some controversy by writing a critique of Christianity. In 1815, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marines, assigned to the Mediterranean. A skilled linguist, English taught himself Arabic. He resigned his commission in 1820 and joined an expedition under Ismail Pasha, where his military expertise gained him a high rank in the Egyptian army. He served with distinction as the commander of an artillery unit, and published a work describing the geography and ethnic groups of southern Egypt and Sudan.

English's skill in Arabic and his knowledge of Islam (he claimed to have converted while in the service of Ismail Pasha) made him extremely valuable as a diplomatic agent. He was central to trade negotiations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire. These negotiations were conducted in secret, due to American public opinion's strongly pro-Greek and thus anti-Turkish feeling. English's skill helped to preserve a trade worth nearly a million dollars annually.

Ill, English returned to the United States in 1827. He died the following year.

See also: Marine Corps Intelligence

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ESPIONAGE ACT, 1917

The 1917 Espionage Act was a law passed by Congress during World War I, providing fines and imprisonment for the obstruction or attempted obstruction of the military and its efforts to draft men into the armed forces.

Shortly after the United States entered World War I in April of 1917, Congress passed the Selective Service Act on May 18th. The act was the first compulsory military draft law since the controversial Civil War conscription laws. In an effort to further bolster loyalty to the war effort and to curb criticisms of President Wilson's conduct of the war, Congress passed the Espionage Act. The law, which was enacted on June 15, 1917, actually had little to do with espionage. The law made it a felony to make "false statements" or remarks that might cause "insubordination" or "disloyalty" in the armed forces or statements that could "obstruct" enlistment into the military. The Espionage Act resulted in a number of notable constitutional challenges regarding the First Amendment and free speech. In *U.S. vs. Debs* (1919), 1912 Socialist Party presidential candidate and head of the Railway Car Men's Union, Eugene V. Debs, was tried and convicted for giving an antiwar speech to workers assembled in Canton, Ohio. The most famous case was that of *U.S. vs. Schenck* (1919) in which Justice Holmes penned his famous "clear and present danger" thesis. The Supreme Court noted that free speech was not absolute.

The initial purpose of the act was to quiet pacifist and radical groups who encouraged young men to avoid the draft. Not only did the law institute financial penalties, along with imprisonment, it also called for $5,000 fines and up to five years in jail for use of the mails in violation of the statute. What prompted passage of the bill was the antiwar resolution passed by the Socialist Party at a special convention held in St. Louis and the radical, anarchist activities of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Members of the Socialist Party and World War I leaders were vigorously prosecuted under this law. To a significant extent, the political effectiveness of both the socialists and wobblies (IWW) was severely diminished.

Under the law Postmaster General Albert Burleson was given the authority to go after groups dependent on the mails to circulate news among its members, including radical labor organizations and political dissidents. Burleson was authorized to ban from the mails any material violating the act or advocating "treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States." The Espionage Act made possible the prosecution of socialists, radical labor groups, pacifists, and others guilty of injudicious comments regarding the federal government's conduct of the war. Civil libertarians were highly critical of the act while patriots strongly endorsed its enforcement. A year

later the act was amended by the Sedition Act (1918) which increased the length of imprisonment and the amount of fines to \$20,000 if convicted of hampering the war effort.

See also: Palmer Raids; Sedition Act, 1918

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EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Executive Orders orders are directives from the president that carry the force of law. The first Executive order was issued by President George Washington. Since 1900, a numbering system has been in place to catalog their existence. Numbers were assigned to executive orders dating back to the Lincoln administration and currently number over 13,000. Although executive orders often have been largely ceremonial in nature, taking the form of congratulatory proclamations, they also can be of great importance. For example, President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation as an executive order. President Harry Truman used an executive order to integrate the military and President Dwight Eisenhower did likewise to integrate schools.

Since the end of World War II, presidents have frequently used executive orders (EOs) to issue policy directives to the intelligence community as well as detailing organizations and mechanisms for managing it. Truman terminated the Office of Strategic Services and dispersed its functions through EO 9621. Issued on September 21, 1945, it transferred the functions of its Research and Analysis Branch and its Presentation Branch to an Interim Research and Intelligence Service set up in the State Department. Other functions were transferred to the War Department.

On January 4, 1975, President Gerald Ford established a Commission on CIA Activities within the United States through EO 11828. The Commission was chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and presented its findings to Ford on June 6, 1975. The Rockefeller Commission was an attempt to forestall or at least blunt the impact of congressional investigations into the CIA. This effort failed on January 27, 1975, when the Senate established the Church Committee and the House followed

suit on February 19 creating its own investigative committee first under the chairmanship of Lucien Nedzi and then Otis Pike.

President Ford issued another executive order governing the conduct of the intelligence community on February 23, 1976. EO 11905 was promulgated in the aftermath of the Church Committee investigations and revelations about CIA attempts to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro. EO 11905 reorganized the oversight and management of the intelligence community by creating two committees within the National Security Council system. One, the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, was chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and charged with preparing the intelligence community budget and managing the resources of the intelligence community. The second, the Operations Advisory Group, was charged with supervising covert action. Additionally, EO 11905 created an Intelligence Oversight Board consisting of three individuals from outside the government appointed by the president who were to review and consider reports from the Inspectors General of the intelligence community to in order to ensure that it is operating in a legal manner. Notable operational limitations placed on the intelligence committee by EO 11905 included barring political assassination and prohibiting experimentation with drugs on human subjects without their permission.

Shortly after becoming president, on January 24, 1978, Jimmy Carter issued EO 12036 which officially superseded Ford's EO 11905. Carter's order continued the ban on political assassination and the prohibition on domestic spying. EO 12036 strengthened the DCI's role in formulating the intelligence community budget. The DCI was now defined as having full and exclusive responsibility for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget.

Carter's executive order was revoked by President Ronald Reagan when he issued EO 12333 on December 4, 1981. No complete rewriting of this executive order took place through the George W. Bush administration and as such it has remained largely in effect for over 20 years. A principal purpose of EO 112333 was to shift the language of the Carter administration's EO 12036 from restraining CIA activity to putting it on a positive footing. EO 12333 accordingly stresses what is permissible and not what is prohibited. It permits the CIA to secretly collect "significant" foreign intelligence within the United States if the collection activities are not directed at the domestic activities of U.S. persons and corporations. It also gives the CIA the authority to conduct "special activities" within the United States if they are approved by the president and are not intended to influence the political process, public opinion, or the media. A behind-the-scenes battle involved the extent of the DCI's power over the intelligence community budget. The military lobbied for restricting this power and in the end language was adopted that defined the DCI's role somewhat differently from that employed in EO 12306 but still gave him a leading role in the development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, its implementation, and the reprogramming of funds.

President Bill Clinton signed two EOs dealing with intelligence matters. The first, EO 12958, established a new uniform set of guidelines for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information. As a result of its promulgation, a wave of heretofore classified documents came into the public realm. By some estimates more than 800 million pages have been declassified. President George W. Bush issued EO 13292 on March 25, 2003, that effectively reversed this policy. Clinton also issued

EO 12968 on August 4, 1995, that established a uniform federal personnel security program for employees who will be considered for initial or continued access to classified information.

Executive orders are often controversial because they do not require congressional approval in order to take effect. Presidents may use them to block congressional action or to undertake actions that are opposed by Congress. In issuing executive orders, presidents cite Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution which grants to the president the "executive Power." Section 3 of Article II further directs the president to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Congress has two means at its disposal to block such unilateral presidential action. First, it may pass legislation that negates or amends the content of the executive order. Second, individual members of Congress may pursue legal action on the grounds that the executive order deviated from "congressional intent" or exceeded the president's constitutional powers.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Intelligence Community; Nixon Administration and Intelligence; Reagan Administration and Intelligence; Rockefeller Commission

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FALCON AND THE SNOWMAN

Falcon and the Snowman are the popular names for Christopher John Boyce (Falcon) and Andrew Daulton Lee (Snowman), two longtime friends who passed information on American satellite surveillance systems to the Soviet Union during the mid-1970s. Boyce and Lee grew up in the wealthy California neighborhood of Palos Verdes, south of Santa Monica. Lee began using drugs in high school and established a profitable career as a drug dealer, moving from marijuana to cocaine which earned him his nickname of Snowman. Boyce, dubbed Falcon because of his devotion to the sport of falconering, dropped out of several colleges before going to work for the Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge Corporation (TRW) in 1974. TRW contracted with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to operate Project Rhyolite, a satellite system that intercepted telephone calls and satellite transmissions and could pinpoint the location of radar stations and air defense units.

Boyce operated the encryption machines in the "black vault," the ultra-secure communications hub that exchanged messages between CIA headquarters and the satellite receiving station in Australia. In the course of his duties Boyce discovered that the CIA was concealing information about an improved version of Project Rhyolite, code-named Argus, from the Australians and was attempting to manipulate the Australian elections. Boyce later claimed that such revelations, combined with disillusionment over the Vietnam War, inspired him to become a spy. However, Boyce, a notorious risk taker, may have been partially inspired by a fellow employee who entertained him with fantasies about ways to smuggle secrets out of TRW and sell them to the highest bidder. In late January 1975, Boyce encountered Lee at a party in Palos Verdes and made his old friend a business proposition, outlining a scheme to sell secrets to the Russians for as much as $50,000 a month. Boyce provided Lee with encryption cards used to encode communications routed through the "black vault," instructed him to fly to Mexico City, and give the material to the guards at the Soviet Embassy. The guards

passed Lee on to KGB officer Vasily Ivanovich Okana who, excited at the chance to have access to the U.S. electronic surveillance network, trained Lee in basic espionage techniques.

Although at first very nervous about becoming a spy, Lee became enchanted by his new profession, living lavishly at Mexican resorts, reading espionage novels, and bragging to fellow drug dealers that he worked for the CIA. He also began to distrust Boyce, fearing he was holding back information and costing him potential revenue. Boyce distrusted Lee as well, convinced, correctly, that Lee was not splitting the money he got from the Russians equally. Notwithstanding their growing concerns about each other, Boyce and Lee maintained their espionage partnership for a year and a half, providing the Soviets with messages from CIA stations around the world, photographs of satellites awaiting launch, and operational details of the Rhyolite and Argus systems. However, despite repeated urging from the Russians, Boyce refused to betray the broadcast frequencies of the Rhyolite satellites. The material supplied by Boyce alerted the Soviets to the extent of American surveillance, allowing them to block military transmissions during a critical phase in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, which may have contributed to the collapse of negotiations in March of 1977.

Although reluctant to have any direct contact with the Soviets, Boyce eventually agreed to a face-to-face meeting in Mexico City with KGB officer Boris Alexei Grishen. Boyce told Grishen that he feared exposure and wished to leave TRW. Grishen suggested that Boyce, at Soviet expense, return to college, pursue a degree in political science or history, and seek a job with the U.S. government. Boyce understood that Grishen was proposing that he become a deep-cover agent or "mole" and accepted the proposition, along with five thousand dollars. Distressed at the thought of losing his profitable business, Lee convinced Boyce to smuggle out one last batch of documents. Boyce chose the plans for the Pyramider satellite network, a global communication system designed by TRW but never developed.

In his greed to make a final score, Lee egregiously violated his contact protocol and was arrested by Mexican police, who discovered the Pyramider papers on his person and deported him. Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested him at the border and on January 16, 1977, arrested Boyce as well. Tried separately, Boyce and Lee were both convicted of espionage and sentenced to 40 years in prison at the Lompoc Federal Penitentiary. Lee adapted to prison life easily, becoming a chaplain's assistant and a member of the tennis team. Boyce had no intention of adjusting and escaped on January 21, 1980. The U.S. Marshals launched a worldwide manhunt for him that spread from South America to Australia and South Africa without result, as Boyce had gone to northern Idaho where he assumed a false identity and concealed himself among the dislocated, causally employed population around the town of Bonner's Ferry.

Boyce divided his time between raising marijuana plants in the mountains and robbing banks in Washington, Idaho, and Montana. For a brief time he obtained employment in a greenhouse, since renamed Falcon Floral in his honor. Boyce's thrill seeking and risk taking eventually betrayed him; eager for notoriety he revealed his true identity to others, even showing off his picture in a copy of the Robert Lindsey book *The Falcon and the Snowman*. Fearing capture, Boyce decided to flee to the Soviet Union. He moved to Washington State, bought a boat, and began taking flying lessons, apparently planning

to sail to Alaska and then fly to Siberia. Before he could complete his plans, one of his bank robbing accomplices betrayed him to the U.S. Marshals who arrested him in Port Angeles, Washington, on August 21, 1981. He received three additional years for escaping from prison and 25 additional years for bank robbery. Because of fears that he would attempt escape again or be harmed by other prisoners, Boyce was sent to the maximum security prison in Marion, Illinois, to serve out his 65-year sentence.

See also: Boyce, Christopher John; Central Intelligence Agency, Cold War Intelligence; Lee, Andrew Daulton

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FAMILY JEWELS

The "Family Jewels" was a list of potential Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) illegalities. The list would become involved in congressional oversight hearings in the wake of the Watergate scandal in the mid-1970s.

James Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from February to May 1973, ordered in May the compilation of a list of CIA actions which may have been improper or have been outside the CIA's charter. This list consisted of 693 pages describing potential violations.

Schlesinger's immediate motive for ordering the creation of "Family Jewels" was Howard Hunt's break-in of the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, psychoanalyst of Daniel Ellsberg. Ellsberg had leaked the "Pentagon Papers," leading to increasing controversy over the Vietnam War. Hunt had used CIA equipment in the break-in with the intention of collecting materials to be contributed to a CIA file on Ellsberg for the White House. Anxious that he not be surprised by further revelations of CIA impropriety, Schlesinger created "Family Jewels."

Watergate burglar and former CIA worker James McCord hinted to the CIA that the Agency had organized the Watergate break-in, and agents were told by the CIA's General Counsel that they were not obligated to volunteer information to the FBI or to the Justice Department. This "distancing" strategy had helped steer the CIA clear of the Watergate mess.

The information in "Family Jewels" relieved Schlesinger's successor, William Colby. He had anticipated more damning indiscretions than the collection outlined. In an interview with *New York Times* reporter Seymour Hersh, Colby discovered that some of the items on the "Family Jewels" list were known to the reporter. Colby later wrote that he tried to convince Hersh that the items he was aware of were unrelated to one another. The primary conclusion that Hersh drew from the article was that his leads had been confirmed. Hersh's December 22, 1974, article announced "Huge C.I.A. Operation," targeting domestic dissidents.

Congress, eager after Watergate to extend the reach of its investigative oversight, formed the Senate Church Committee and the House Pike Committee. An earlier investigative commission, chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, had been limited in its scope to the CIA's domestic activities. Future President Ronald Reagan sat on the Rockefeller Commission, and future Vice President Walter Mondale was a member of the Church Committee.

The Rockefeller Commission, with its domestic jurisdiction, examined Operation CHAOS. CHAOS, included in "Family Jewels," spanned from 1967 to 1974. It was a domestic spying program seeking to determine whether and what connection the antiwar movement had to foreign entities. Handled by the Counterintelligence Staff section of the CIA, CHAOS was effectively compartmentalized so as to isolate much of the CIA itself from being aware of the program.

While CHAOS dealt with the possibility of foreign influence, the domestic spying involved made it highly controversial and led to its compartmentalization. CHAOS did not find evidence of foreign influence on the anti–Vietnam War movements within the United States, and in its last two years, CHAOS shrank and it turned from analyzing the antiwar movement toward combating international terrorism.

"Family Jewels" mentioned the National Security Agency (NSA) twice. One of these references was that the CIA had requested that the NSA observe the communications of U.S. citizens who were active in the antiwar movement.

Operations MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE were found by congressional investigations to have studied activist groups and their "leadership, funding and activities." It was also found that these operations provided information to the CHAOS project. Information was organized in a computer system known as "Hydra." Although 300,000 Americans were indexed in the system, files were kept for less than 3 percent of this number. Colby ended CHAOS in March 1974.

Also within the Rockefeller Commission's authority was study of a series of mail-intercept operations conducted by the CIA. Mail destined for the USSR was subject to scrutiny. As with CHAOS, this was surveillance done domestically that had a connection to the foreign realm. Most notable was Project HUNTER, which, from 1958 until 1973, examined mail through New York. When the CIA closed HUNTER, the FBI, to which the CIA had passed disseminated information, declined to assume responsibility for the project.

Another jewel studied by the Rockefeller Commission was the death of CIA agent Frank Olsen. Without his knowledge, Olsen was given LSD in a cooperative CIA-army program named MKULTRA, intended to discover if the drug might have some use by enemy forces. In 1953 Olsen committed suicide, and his death was dealt with as a line-of-duty death. The Commission's report was the first that Olsen's family learned of the peculiar circumstances of his death.

Beyond the information leaked to Hersh was that "family jewels" also catalogued assassination attempts against Cuba's Communist ruler Fidel Castro. When asked by CBS Journalist Daniel Schorr if the CIA had committed assassinations within the United States, Colby replied that no CIA assassinations had been conducted in the United States Colby's answer inadvertently further enflamed controversy because it implied that the CIA had assassinated figures abroad. Colby wrote in his memoirs that the CIA never succeeded in its attempts, such as those on Castro. Nevertheless, the implication,

coupled with the presence of the attempts on Castro's life, listed among "Family Jewels" contributed to an atmosphere of mistrust between Congress and the CIA. Colby's past involvement in Operation PHOENIX, which targeted Viet Cong leaders for assassination during the Vietnam conflict, undercut the credibility of his denying the existence of assassination projects.

The "Family Jewels" project was the indirect result of Richard Nixon's desire to consolidate U.S. intelligence activities. He made a directive that the DCI have "an enhanced leadership role." As DCI, Richard Helms tried, unsuccessfully, to establish the DCI's authority over all intelligence branches. This had led to conflict with the Defense Department. Schlesinger's effort to assert control over the intelligence community included the creation of the "Family Jewels" list. Another aspect of his efforts was a 7 percent reduction of CIA staff, accomplished through officers being fired, retired, or forced to resign.

Although "family jewels" did not offer a flattering image of the CIA, it did indicate that improprieties may have been more limited than public imagination of them. The list included domestic wiretapping, but the list also indicated that this had been stopped when President Lyndon Johnson ordered its end in 1965. The CIA's program of intercepting mail was mostly limited to contemporary and former CIA employees. Nixon's creation of the "plumbers" could suggest that the CIA was perhaps unwilling to cooperate in those illegal activities.

In its investigations, the Church Committee largely examined issues, such as assassination programs and mail searches, with ramifications to civil liberties. The Pike Committee's focus was on the quality of the intelligence being collected and examined. The Pike Committee emerged after a committee, headed by Democratic Representative Lucien Nedzi of Michigan, was scuttled. Nedzi was on the Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and other House Democrats suggested that he was therefore too closely connected to intelligence issues.

Colby vowed to cooperate fully with the investigations, but they were nonetheless marked by contention between the Congress and CIA. Pike insisted on, and received, access to the complete "Family Jewels" collection after his staff had been given a sanitized version. Pike's motive in demanding the full list was, according to CIA agent Scott Breckinridge, to assert his authority. A flap occurred when the Pike Committee released information including the phrase "and greater communications security," which the CIA believed compromised its intelligence in Egypt. Although the average reader would not notice anything significant in the phrase, the CIA asserted that trained and alert security agents would.

In his memoirs, Colby wrote that as DCI he sought to cooperate and provide information to investigators but that he wanted the CIA to be able to excise potentially sensitive portions of the committee reports before the reports became public. This, too, caused friction between Pike and the CIA.

In the wake of Watergate, the CIA had organized the "Family Jewels" as a means of determining how much wrongdoing lay in the CIA's past. Colby tried to convince the committee chairmen that the CIA would respect its proper boundaries in the future. However, Watergate had created an investigative impulse in Congress that caused it not to accept mere reassurances of future propriety without increased congressional oversight.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; CHAOS, Operation; Church Committee; Colby, William Egan; Helms, Richard McGarrah; HTLINGUAL; Olson, Dr. Frank R.; Pike Committee; Rockefeller Commission; Schlesinger, James Rodney; SHAMROCK, Project

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FARNSWORTH, JOHN
(AUGUST 13, 1893–NOVEMBER 10, 1952)

John Semer Farnsworth was a one-time U.S. naval officer who spied for Japan in the interwar period. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Farnsworth was court-martialed in 1927 for scandalous behavior that impaired the morale of the service. Heavily in debt, he had borrowed money from an enlisted man that he refused to repay. Farnsworth's financial situation did not improve after he left the navy and in search of money, he offered his services as an aviation expert (he had trained as a naval aviator) to a number of foreign countries. Eventually Japan expressed interest in his services as a spy. Farnsworth agreed, at a reported salary of $100 per week plus expenses.

Farnsworth obtained much of his information through social contacts he continued to have with former colleagues who were still in the navy. He became suspected of espionage after he "accidentally" removed a highly restricted circulation document, *The Service of Information and Security*, from the office of a friend whom he was visiting. The incident was duly reported and Farnsworth was placed under surveillance. It was found that in spite of known financial problems he appeared always to have large sums of cash in his possession. Farnsworth career as a spy took a decided turn for the worse when his contact, Commander Arika Yamaki, was recalled to Japan and his successor placed tighter financial controls on Farnsworth. In need of cash, Farnsworth contacted

a journalist in 1936 and, for a fee, offered to write a series on spying for Japan under the guise of being a double agent.

He was arrested in 1936 and sentenced to a 4- to 12-year prison term in 1937. Farnsworth served 11 years in prison.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; American Intelligence, World War II

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)

From the intelligence standpoint, the responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the FBI, include both domestic counterterrorism and domestic counterintelligence activities. The Bureau is also concerned about WMD proliferation and attempts to acquire proprietary information and trade secrets. Founded in 1908 by Attorney General Charles Bonaparte, with the support of President Theodore Roosevelt, the original Bureau of Investigation was organized to investigate criminal violations of federal law.

The Bureau first dealt with national security issues during World War I when President Wilson charged the agency with enforcing the Espionage Act, Sabotage Act, and Selective Service Act. The agency also assisted the Department of Labor in the investigation of enemy aliens. In order to carry out its duties in these areas, the Bureau often relied on special agents who not only had general investigative experience, but who also spoke foreign languages. After the war, the Bureau returned to its primary responsibility of investigating federal crimes, but it did conduct investigations of domestic terrorist groups like the Ku Klux Klan.

The Great Depression and World War II would revive the FBI's responsibilities in guarding the nation's security. Radical groups abounded during the Depression, and the Bureau was authorized to monitor and investigate such groups in 1936. Organizations such as the German-American Bund and the Silver Shirts were closely watched by FBI agents. At the same time, concerns that the American Communist Party might be recruiting disaffected workers, victims of racial strife, and supporters of the Soviet-backed loyalists in the Spanish civil war led the Bureau to pay close attention to that party's activities. President Franklin D. Roosevelt expanded the Bureau's authority to investigate potential subversives in 1939. Passage of the Smith Act in the following year further broadened the Bureau's role in this regard by making support for the violent overthrow of the government a federal crime.

The outbreak of war in Europe increased the Bureau's national security concerns. The FBI now had to deal with sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities. Agents trained in the protection of defense plants began to appear in the Bureau's field offices around the country, supplementing those agents who were trained in general

A pair of unidentified FBI agents check the identification of a postal worker seeking to enter the Federal Building, left-rear, 2001. Authorities went on alert from coast to coast, halting all air traffic, evacuating high-profile buildings, and tightening security at strategic facilities following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. (AP/Wide World Photos)

intelligence operations. The Bureau also cultivated sources within various fraternal and veteran's organizations to provide information and intelligence on potential national security threats. Until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Bureau continued to monitor the American Communist Party as it worked to keep the United States neutral in regard to the war in Europe. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the FBI turned its attention to potentially dangerous German, Italian, and Japanese nationals as well as Axis sympathizers. The Bureau also investigated sabotage plots and spy rings. A major sabotage operation was broken up in 1942, while 33 German spies were apprehended and convicted with the break-up of the Duquesne Spy Ring in 1941. With American entry into World War II in December 1941, the FBI arrested a number of aliens who had been previously identified as potential threats to national security and turned them over to military or immigration authorities.

Besides its domestic national security responsibilities, the Bureau took on an intelligence function outside of the United States. In 1939, President Roosevelt authorized the FBI to begin collecting intelligence in the Western Hemisphere. To perform this function, a Special Intelligence Service (SIS) was created. Made up of about 360 agents, the SIS operated primarily in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, working to collect information on enemy activities in the region and to disrupt their intelligence and propaganda networks. At war's end, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover urged President Truman to expand the Bureau's intelligence activities to the rest of the globe. However, the FBI was relieved of its foreign intelligence function and returned to its primary task of investigating violations of federal law.

Although it no longer had a formal intelligence function abroad, the FBI maintained legal attachés in 20 American embassies. Officially these attachés were to act as liaisons with the national police forces of these countries and to deal with Americans who were in trouble with local authorities. In 1970 these agents were directed to begin collecting foreign intelligence. Following Director J. Edgar Hoover's death and the revelation of these activities, the program was discontinued, although the Bureau kept legal attachés in 15 countries. The program has expanded over time and today the Bureau maintains 61 legal attachés around the world, who are supported by more than 200 special agents. This program allows closer cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies, particularly in regard to investigating international terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. Today the LEGAT program, as it is known, is concerned primarily with foreign intelligence, terrorism, and any other potential threats to the national security of the United States.

Domestically, the FBI can collect foreign intelligence, having been authorized to do so by Executive Order 12333. The Bureau may, when requested to do so, support intelligence-gathering activities of other federal intelligence agencies or collect foreign intelligence itself. These activities have included break-ins and wiretapping. Wiretapping of foreign embassies has occurred regularly. The phones of Communist officials in Washington, DC, were commonly monitored during the cold war and even phones in the offices of friendly governments were monitored when major developments were taking place or when those governments were involved in negotiations with the United States.

The end of the cold war brought changes in how the FBI addressed national security threats. The National Security Threat List reflected this process. Rather than focus entirely on defending the nation from foreign intelligence agencies, the Bureau added the responsibility of guarding American technology and information systems. The FBI has identified all nations, hostile and friendly alike, that pose an intelligence threat to the United States. Potential threats such as the proliferation of weapons (chemical, biological, radiological) of mass destruction are now routinely monitored. Attention is also paid to efforts of foreign governments or other organizations to acquire proprietary information or trade secrets from American companies or research institutions such as colleges and universities.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the FBI participated in the massive investigations that ensued in partnership with the nation's other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The USA Patriot Act, signed into law in October 2001, placed new initiatives for combating terrorism into effect, and the Bureau assumed the responsibility for shielding the country from future terrorist attacks. In 2002 revised guidelines regarding investigative practices were approved by the attorney general in order to assist the FBI's counterterrorism activities.

The events of 9/11 led to significant changes within the structure of the FBI. Concerns had already been expressed about the ability of the Bureau to keep tabs on enemy agents or terrorists, given its historic focus on law enforcement and apprehending criminals. The investigation that followed the attack on 9/11 indicated that the Bureau's offices in Phoenix and Minneapolis had issued warnings that might have led to uncovering the plot but FBI headquarters had failed to follow up on them. Some critics argued that a new agency for counterterrorism and counterintelligence should be created.

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Ultimately, in March 2005, it was recommended that a National Security Service be created within the FBI. The plan called for placing the FBI's counterintelligence and counterterrorism divisions under an executive assistant director who would assure that FBI responded to the new Director of National Intelligence. An Office of National Intelligence had been created after 9/11 to oversee intelligence collection, sharing of information, and recruitment of analysts. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 changed the Office of Intelligence into the Directorate of Intelligence and charged its director with the responsibility of overseeing all of the Bureau's programs and activities related to national intelligence.

On September 12, 2005, the Bureau formally created a National Security Branch (NSB), led by an executive assistant director. This individual is responsible for the counterterrorism and counterintelligence division within the FBI as well as the Directorate of Intelligence. The counterintelligence division consists of an operations branch and a support branch, whereas the counterterrorism division is made up of two operational branches, an analytical department, and a branch for operations and support. Within the Directorate of Intelligence is a branch for intelligence cycle management and intelligence program management. In July 2006 a Weapons of Mass Destruction division was added to the National Security Branch. The function of this branch is to examine the consequences of an attack using WMDs, increase the nation's preparedness in the event of such an attack, and to coordinate the government's response should a WMD attack take place.

The Bureau has also worked to increase involvement on the part of private citizens and the business community. Through its Citizen's Academy, the FBI has worked to create a sense of teamwork between law enforcement and citizens, while dispelling myths about the FBI. The Infragard initiative has linked the Bureau to the private sector in an effort to improve information sharing between private industry and the government. Focusing on critical national infrastructure, these industries include agriculture and chemical sectors, computer security, energy, food processing and distribution, telecommunications, and transportation. Infragard members have access to a website where they can alert authorities to pending or potential threats. Currently there are about 15,000 members of Infragard across the country.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Hoover, J. Edgar; Intelligence Community; MINARET; Office of Strategic Services; September 11, 2001; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; USA Patriot Act

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FEKLISOV, ALEXANDRE
(1914–2007)

Alexandre Feklisov, a KGB officer from 1939 to 1974, continued to work for Soviet intelligence until retiring in 1986. He was a master spy involved with the Rosenbergs during the 1940s and the Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s. Feklisov, born into a working-class family in 1914, was initially trained as a radio technician. The People's Commissariat recruited him for Internal Affairs (NKVD) in 1939 as part of the agency's attempt to replace intellectuals with workers from technical schools. In 1940, he was assigned to the Soviet consulate in New York City under the name Alexander Fomin. During this two-year apprenticeship, Feklisov improved his English skills and monitored Soviet citizens living abroad.

Feklisov began to develop and to run his own agents in the summer of 1943, eventually managing 13 sources. Most have never been publicly identified and are referred to only by their code names. During this period he recruited and handled Julius Rosenberg and his network of spies. Although he claimed to have had over 50 meetings with Rosenberg from 1943 to 1946, he asserted that Ethel Rosenberg never met with any Soviet agents and did not directly participate in her husband's activities. Feklisov also briefly handled Klaus Fuchs, the German-born physicist who helped the Soviets produce the nuclear bomb by sharing secrets he learned at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Later in his career, Feklisov, still operating under the name of Fomin, became the chief of the KGB resdientura, or resident, in Washington from 1960 to 1964 and played a crucial role in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Feklisov served as the back channel to Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis and was the person who communicated with ABC News reporter John Scali. Feklisov also proposed the idea for resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis whereby the Soviets would remove their missiles in return for a U.S. promise not to invade the island.

See also: Cuban Missile Crisis; Fuchs, Emil Jullius Klaus; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Los Alamos; NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs); Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel

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Lazarus F. O'Sako

FELLERS, BRIGADIER GENERAL BONNER FRANK (FEBRUARY 7, 1896–1973)

Bonner Frank Fellers was born on February 7, 1896, in Ridge Farm, Illinois. Fellers graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1918. He attended both the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College, finally reaching the rank of brigadier general in December 1942.

From 1935 to 1938 Fellers served on the staff of General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines. In December 1941, as military attaché in Cairo, Fellers unwittingly provided the German army with invaluable intelligence on British operations in the Mediterranean through the use of an American code compromised by an Italian espionage operation in the American embassy in Rome.

In 1942 Fellers was reassigned to MacArthur's staff as chief of psychological warfare operations in the Southwest Pacific area. In August 1944 he drafted a comprehensive plan for such operations against Japan. In that capacity, Fellers directed the production and distribution of leaflets and phony currency designed to weaken the morale of Japanese troops in the field and civilians on the home islands.

Following the Japanese surrender, Fellers remained with MacArthur as secretary general of the Allied Control Council in Tokyo until his retirement from the army in November 1946.

See also: Central Bureau; Willoughby, Major General Charles A.

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FERRET

A ferret is an electronic intelligence-gathering platform targeted that was targeted on Soviet air defense and missile defense radar systems for the purpose of establishing their signal characteristics and detection range. This information was vital in determining attack routes for U.S. bombers and for designing ICBM warheads so that they would be capable of penetrating Soviet antiballistic missile defense systems. This information would also be valuable for jamming Soviet radar systems in times of war.

Since a radar system's operating frequencies may change intelligence, surveillance must be continuous if the information it produces is to be reliable. A ferret satellite operating in an almost circular orbit and at a height of about three hundred miles would be within receiving range of all Soviet and Chinese radars in a single day. Ferret satellites positioned in this manner are also able to stay in orbit for longer periods of time than photo reconnaissance satellites. For example, the second ferret satellite stayed in orbit for 498 days, whereas the typical photo reconnaissance satellite has a life span of three weeks or less. To maximize coverage, ferret satellites are often placed in clusters of four.

During the cold war two different generations of reconnaissance ferret existed: planes and satellites. These reconnaissance platforms were dubbed "ferrets" in honor of the unrelenting and tenacious hunting habits of this creature. The first ferret aircraft flew against Soviet border targets on the Chukotski Peninsula in December 1947 for the purpose of gathering information on airfields and radar installations located there. Deeper penetrations into Soviet Siberian airspace began taking place in August 1948. Two years later ferreting missions flew from bases in Great Britain into Eastern Europe and European Russia. Other flights mapped out border areas in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Ferreting was a high-risk enterprise. By the end of the 1940s an estimated 40 aircraft were lost.

The principal targets of ferreting aircraft were early-warning radar and military posts along the Soviet border. To assess the characteristics of installations located deeper inside Soviet territory, a different platform was needed. The U-2 spy plane provided some information of this type on its photoreconnaissance missions but, as the Gary Francis Powers incident illustrated, there were significant risks associated with this solution. Powers' U-2 was shot down in Soviet air space on the eve of a U.S.-Soviet summit conference and created an international crisis, the severity of which was compounded when President Dwight Eisenhower denied that a spy plane had been involved in the incident.

The first ferret satellite was launched on February 21, 1962. By 1971 a total of sixteen ferrets had been put into Earth's orbit. During this time period three different generations of ferret satellites existed. The first generation was used in 1962 and early 1963. It consisted of three launches. The second generation consisted of six satellites and was launched between 1963 and 1968. The third generation came into service 1971. Beginning with the second generation, ferret satellites were launched "piggyback" with imaging satellite rather than by themselves. Known launches of ferret satellites continued through April 25, 1992.

The United States was not alone during the cold war in using ferret reconnaissance platforms. Cosmos 389, launched in December 1970, was the first in a series of Soviet ferret satellites. Like their U.S. counterparts, Soviet ferrets identified air defense installations and command and control centers for use in war planning.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; Cold War Intelligence; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Powers, Francis Gary; Satellites; U-2 Incident

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FICTION—SPY NOVELS

The first recorded appearance of spies in literature is in Odysseus' *The Iliad*. Since *The Iliad*, spy fiction has developed robustly. Spy fiction includes literature with plotlines centered on spying or espionage activities. This literature typically follows the

adventures and travels of one spy. Occasionally a group of spies working together are the central characters in a piece of spy fiction. Spy fiction pretends take the reader behind the scenes of world events through the eyes of a spy who has access to secret information. The appeal of clandestine activities is displayed in modern spy fiction and folktales such as the Trojan horse folktales.

Generally spy novels involve extremely high risks that hold the potential to reap high rewards. Several common elements are found in many spy genre novels and stories. Often a chase occurs where the spy attempts to evade capture. If the spy or spies are caught, they are interrogated and may possibly endure torture. Frequently the spy's goal is to obtain sensitive information and return home. Spy novels regularly include tales of narrow escapes. Adam Hall's *Quiller Memorandum*, published in 1975, exemplifies these common elements present in spy novels.

One key element in spy fiction is clandestine activities. Clandestine activities are performed undercover or while hidden. These clandestine activities usually include the following three elements: development of a purpose requiring extraordinary actions average citizens are unable to perform, forming a group or identifying an individual to perform the task, and isolation from society for the agent or agents to remain unnoticed and perform the task.

Stories involving disguises and psychological deception are common aspects present in spy novels. A noted attraction of spy fiction is that moral and legal boundaries are questioned within the plots of this literature. Spies often hold morals in contrast with the general population of the society. For example, although murder is considered acceptable for most occupations, often it is necessary for the spy to complete a mission and survive. An additional feature that attracts readers to spy fiction is excitement, especially when compared to the reader's everyday life. Spy fiction generally does not include descriptions of clerical tasks real spies are responsible for daily. Instead, spy fiction focuses on travels and adventures, which allows readers to escape their ordinary lives.

Modern spy novels have grown in popularity in the nineteenth century through World War II. J. F. Cooper's *The Spy* is a seminal work in the spy novel genre. Following the release of *The Spy*, numerous other similar works were published. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, enemies within became a prominent theme. William LeQueux's *The Invasion of 1910* helped popularize the theme of enemies hidden within.

Additionally, in nineteenth-century British literature, spy novels often incorporated fictional invasions while the plot of the novel focused on espionage activities during the imagined military activities. Sir George Blackwell's "The Battle of Dorking," published in *Blackwood's Magazine*, was one of the first pieces of spy literature that used a fictional invasion. Soon after Blackwell's publication other similar pieces were published by other authors.

As these trends demonstrate throughout the history of spy fiction, current events have impacted themes in spy novels. During the economic depression in the 1930s spy novels were increasingly realistic, and flamboyant characters were abandoned by writers. With the development of robust intelligence agencies in the United States, former USSR, and many European nations, spy fiction became increasingly relevant to the readers' lives. Additionally, twentieth-century spy fiction increasingly focused on clandestine activities.

Later, during the cold war, spy fiction focused on illusion and information-gathering activities. Additionally, as a result of the atrocities of World War II, spy fiction written afterward became noticeably more brutal. In this era of spy literature, torture acts are generally described in detail, as opposed to earlier literature that omitted graphic details. In comparison to fictional invasions, which were popular in nineteenth-century British literature, spy novels written during the cold war focused on gathering information and spies playing key roles in preventing military conflict, both conventional and nuclear. During the cold war, often main characters traveled to exotic destinations to gather information. These destinations added a new appeal to traditional spy fiction.

The characters of James Bond, created by Ian Fleming, and Peter Ward, created by E. Howard Hunt, exemplify typical spy fiction during the 1950s and 1960s. Bond and Ward were easily recognized as good and they fought clearly identifiable evil antagonists. These novels focused on the adventures of the spy and not on the political justification or motivation for their assignments and actions. Although these novels reinforced the idea of good and evil, they also focused on entertaining the reading audience.

However, a small portion of spy fiction during this time period deviated from the good-versus-evil framework. These works tended to feature a point in the plot where the main character reached a crossroads and is forced to make a critical decision. This theme is evident in several of Graham Greene's novels.

As the cold war progressed, spy literature responded. In the 1980s American spy fiction became more closely tied to actual events and situations occurring with more realistic plots. The espionage activities included in spy fiction during this time period are highly serious and information gained is extremely important to the government for which the spy is working.

Another new twist to the spy novel that became popular in the 1970s and 1980s is including real characters, such as leaders, and historical events. Former CIA employees, such as Charles McCarry and William F. Buckley, writing spy fiction also added realism to the genre. These highly realistic spy novels written by experts in the field have the ability to inform their reading audience. Novels written by former CIA employees have allowed readers to learn more about the internal operations of the CIA. For example, William F. Buckley described the training he received in Mexico when working for the CIA in his book *Saving the Queen*. Even though the description of training in the book is not clearly labeled as the specific training he received, it is accurately described. This adds an element of realism to the novels and educates readers about experiences of real-life spies.

Spy novels have taken yet another new direction in response to changes in the political and economic landscape. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, have left a significant impact on spy fiction. Novels such as Alex Berenson's *The Faithful Spy* and Robert Baer's *Blow the House Down* feature plotlines focused on terrorism and antiterrorism efforts. Although prior to the World Trade Center attacks some spy fiction featured plots involving terrorist activities, after September 11, 2001, the topic has increasingly saturated spy fiction. Loyalty to the spy's nation is no longer the primary motivation for their espionage activities. Instead, a greater good or idea is the motivation for the spy's action.

In addition to realistic settings and characters, spy fiction commonly includes terms regularly used in the spy trade and descriptions of characters performing common tasks of the trade. In fact, spy fiction lacking this detailed information of the trade risks losing credibility in the eyes of genre followers.

In general, spy novels reflect concerns held by society including fears, suspicions, sources of mistrust, and obsessions. By reflecting the population's general concerns, spy fiction has the potential to reinforce beliefs and prejudices.

Several types of spy characters are commonly used in spy fiction. The first common spy character developed in nineteenth-century spy novels is a heroic spy who protects those in power. This type of spy character is closely related to Gothic fantasy literature characters. The spy's role is similar to that of the Gothic innocent hero who fights a supervillain. Actions taken by the spy character preserve order and protect the status quo. An example of a heroic spy character is Sherlock Holmes, in the series by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Opposed to detective novels, spy fiction is unique because the spy is the only source of truth in the novel and the novel focuses on the spy's quest to gather information.

Villains have also evolved throughout the history of spy fiction. As opposed to evil nations as seen in earlier spy fiction, villains from the mid-twentieth century generally are quite intriguing. Ian Fleming's Dr. No, Goldfinger, and Sir Hugo Drax are examples of the colorful villains that began to be incorporated in spy fiction. However, with disillusionment of the cold war and the recent focus on terrorist threats, villains in recent spy literature have become more realistic and less outlandish. Additionally, the appeal of spies has grown as their importance in real-world events has also increased in both government and business activities.

The spy fiction genre is closely tied to several other genres. The suspense genre focuses on creating tension and suspense shares many characteristics with spy novels. However, only a fraction of suspense novels feature spies and espionage as in their plotlines. Spy fiction is essentially a combination of a mystery and suspense story that features a spy.

Spy characters have changed as the spy fiction in general has evolved. Spies generally are portrayed as men, although a fraction of spy fiction does feature women spies. Spies featured in nineteenth-century British literature generally feature a well-mannered and refined gentleman who is a spy. However, with novels like the James Bond novels by Ian Fleming, spies became debonair playboys in the mid-twentieth century. Although the playboy James Bond remains popular, most late twentieth century and early twenty-first-century spy fiction features highly intelligent and clever individuals as their main characters.

Moreover, the recent spy novels draw upon characters such as James Bond in portraying the technological skills of spies. Often, spies featured in spy fiction are extremely technologically skilled and flashy gadgets are often incorporated into plotlines.

Moreover, modern characters are more ambiguous. Enemies and allies are usually not clear and betrayals are common. In contrast to earlier characters in spy fiction, these ambiguous characters often have critical vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities make the characters more realistic and human for modern readers.

Spy fiction has received little academic attention and study. However, during the 1960s and 1970s several colleges and universities began to offer spy fiction courses. At the same time courses were also added, focusing on the thriller and mystery genres.

However, spy fiction has been and continues to be largely ignored by scholars. Scholars largely deemed the spy genre literature unworthy of academic study. This is because spy fiction was commonly viewed as badly written, with plotlines that often follow unoriginal formulas.

Currently, spy fiction includes serious fiction, inexpensive or dime novels, and general popular writers. Fans of the genre commonly refer to spy fiction as Spy-Fi. The appeal of spy fiction has caused spy plotlines to reach television, movies, and video games. Spy fiction combined with mystery fiction has the largest book sales totals in Western Europe and the United States. The popularity of James Bond films is also notable evidence of the strong appeal of spy fiction.

Focusing on what is often considered the world's second-oldest profession, spy fiction has a long history beginning in folktales. Characters and plotlines in spy fiction respond to trends in society and reflect feelings in the populace at large.

See also: Furst, Alan; Greene, Graham; Le Carre, John; Marquand, John P.; Masterman, Sir John; West, Nigel

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Kristin Whitehair

FITZGERALD, DESMOND
(1910–JULY 23, 1967)

Desmond Fitzgerald was born in 1910 and began his studies at St. Mark's Private School in Southborough, Massachusetts. Later, he graduated from Harvard University before joining the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the outbreak of World War II. During the war, he served in the Pacific theatre, fighting alongside General Joe Stilwell and his troops during the Burmese campaign.

Following the war, Fitzgerald became a lawyer, establishing himself in New York City. While there, he briefly led a citywide fight against political corruption, but was soon after hired by the CIA to lead its counterintelligence branch in East Asia.

Fitzgerald was ordered to disrupt and to overthrow the Communist power on the Chinese mainland, but he struggled to make any progress. He sent over 200 agents into China by parachute, as well as over $150 million worth of military aid, but most of the agents were quickly killed and the arms were captured.

In spite of these failures, Fitzgerald continued his work and was promoted to head the CIA's Far Eastern Division in 1957. He often based himself in Taiwan, overseeing operations in China, Korea, the Philippines, and Japan.

In 1962, Fitzgerald was called back to Washington, named by John F. Kennedy to lead the Cuban task force, which was charged with assassinating Fidel Castro. He was heavily pressured by the president and his brother, Robert Kennedy, to quickly arrange an assassination plan. This pressure and different perspectives led to disagreements.

He went to organize three different plots, but his strongest proposal relied upon a Cuban official named Rolando Cubela, who was feared to be a double agent. Fitzgerald and Cubela met secretly in Paris on October 29, 1963. Cubela demanded a high-powered rifle for the assassination, but Fitzgerald denied his request and insisted upon the use of Black Leaf poison. At the end of the meeting, both became aware of Kennedy's assassination.

President Lyndon Johnson was not as keen on killing Castro and Fitzgerald terminated contact with Cubela on June 17, 1965. Remaining with the CIA, Fitzgerald later failed to prevent *Ramparts* magazine from publishing an article exposing the National Student Association as a CIA-funded anti-Communist front. Soon after, Fitzgerald suffered a heart attack while playing tennis and died on July 23, 1967, near his home in northern Virginia.

See also: Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency

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Arthur Holst

5412 COMMITTEE

The 5412 Committee was established by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955 to review and approve covert action programs. He did so by issuing National Security Council Directives 5412/1 and 5412/2, from which the committee took its name. It operated during the Eisenhower administration and into the early Kennedy administration. By the end of the Eisenhower administration the 5412 Committee was often referred to as the Special Group.

The 5412 Committee was composed of "designated representatives of the president," along with the Director of Central Intelligence, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense. Other individuals attended the meetings, depending upon the topic. Under Eisenhower it was chaired by Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray. No set criteria were used to determine when a covert action project required the approval of the 5412 Committee. This was left up to the CIA. Until 1959 the 5412 Committee did not meet very often and when it did it rarely challenged the CIA's plans.

One of the major targets of covert action plans brought to the 5412 Committee was Cuba and its leader Fidel Castro. On January 13, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence

Allen Dulles brought proposals for covert action programs against Castro to the 5412 Committee. The topic of anti-Castro covert action was again discussed in a February meeting of the committee. Eisenhower personally convened the 5412 Committee in March to review and approve a four-point covert action plan against Castro that called for infiltrating Cuban exiles back into Cuba to organize and support domestic dissident groups, creating a paramilitary force outside of Cuba and beginning a major propaganda offensive. In December of that year the 5412 Committee would discuss plans for an amphibious landing of 600 to 750 men into Cuba, supported by air strikes. This would become the Bay of Pigs operation. Following the failed Bay of Pigs operation against Cuba, President Kennedy restructured the review and approval process, re-structured the 5412 Committee, and more formally designated it as the Special Group.

The existence of the 5412 Committee and its successors has been viewed in two very different fashions. Supporters assert that it has enhanced the management of covert operations, ensuring that they are reviewed and brought to the attention of the senior most policy makers including the president in a systematic fashion. Critics argue that the primary purpose of these approval bodies has been to provide presidents with convenient political sacrificial lambs on whom to blame failed covert operations on and direct responsibility away from the presidency.

See also: Bay of Pigs; Castro, Fidel; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; National Security Council

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FLEET INTELLIGENCE CENTER

The United States Navy Fleet Intelligence Center (FIC) was composed of shore-based intelligence installations that provided the U.S. Navy with intelligence support, tailored to the needs of its operational forces, from the mid-1950s until 1991 when FIC was disestablished and its functions were absorbed by the National Military Joint Intelligence Center.

The most famous predecessor of FIC was Admiral Chester Nimitz's JICPOA (Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas). Established in July of 1942 as ICPOA (Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas), Nimitz reorganized it on September 7, 1943, to provide intelligence support for his expanding operations in the Pacific war. To emphasize the multiservice nature of the POA command, Nimitz named Army Brigadier General Joseph J. Twitty as JICPOA's first chief.

The Navy Department took steps toward establishing the first post–World War II FIC on July 24, 1950, when commander in chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic,

and Mediterranean (CINC-NELM) directed that emergency intelligence files for his command be kept at Naval Air Activities, Port Lyautrey (now Kinitra), Morocco. The secretary of the navy officially designated this facility as Fleet Intelligence Center, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (FICELM) in April of 1954. In October of 1960 FICELM became Fleet Intelligence Center, Europe (FICEUR) and, in January of 1964, it moved to Jacksonville, Florida, after Morocco refused to renew U.S. basing rights. It was FICEUR's responsibility to gather intelligence on the following: all of Europe, including Turkey; the USSR west of longitude 100°E; Jordan, Syria, Israel, and Lebanon in the Middle East; and Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco in North Africa. The Joint Chiefs of Staff added Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula to this list after March 1972.

The navy established the Mobile Intelligence Production Unit, Atlantic Fleet (MIPULANT) at Norfolk, Virginia, on March 3, 1955. MIPULANT became the Atlantic Intelligence Center (LANTINTCEN) on May 1, 1961, and, on April 13, 1968, it became Fleet Intelligence Center, Atlantic (FICLANT). Its area of concern included the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Reflecting changes in U.S. force structure and the overlapping of intelligence responsibilities, FICEUR and FICLANT merged together in 1974 to create Fleet Intelligence Center, Europe–Atlantic (FICEURLANT).

Pacific Fleet intelligence was a shadow of its wartime self by 1950. The Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC) did not have any direct ties to Nimitz's JICPOA. It evolved from an entity with ties to postwar Japan, the Mobile Intelligence Production Unit, Pacific (MIPUPAC) at Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Officially established on May 27, 1955, FICPAC provided most of the intelligence support for U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces engaged in land and sea operations during the Vietnam War.

The 1980s witnessed the establishment of unified or area commanders in chief who commanded all American air, military, and naval assets within a specified geographic area. These joint commands required more broadly based intelligence than could be provided by FIC, so the navy disestablished both FICEURLANT and FICPAC in 1991 and gave their functions over to the National Military Joint Intelligence Center.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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FORD ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Gerald Ford was president from 1974 to 1977. During his presidency, William Colby and George H. W. Bush served as Directors of Central Intelligence (DCI). Although Ford was only vice president for eight months prior to becoming president

upon the resignation of Richard Nixon, Ford did have some experience with intelligence matters, having served on the House Appropriations Intelligence subcommittee. Throughout his career in Congress he had been supportive of the intelligence community and upon becoming president he read the President's Daily Brief closely.

This supportive attitude toward intelligence was maintained throughout Ford's presidency and it was severely put to test by a string of revelations of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) wrongdoings and two sets of congressional hearings. Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) led the Senate investigation. Congressperson Otis Pike (D-NY) led the House investigation. Church's committee focused on allegations of illegal CIA activity both in the United States and abroad. Its final report ran six volumes and referred to the CIA as a "rogue elephant." Much of the information it brought to light was generated by an in-house CIA study ordered by DCI James Schlesinger and completed under Colby known as the "family jewels." Through a bureaucratic oversight, this study had not been shared with Ford. Pike's committee focused more on intelligence failures and did not issue a final report, due to partisan political infighting, although one was leaked to the press. Ford unsuccessfully sought to short-circuit these investigations or at least limit their political impact by establishing his own investigation into illegal domestic activities of the CIA chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.

Ford also did not succeed in shielding the intelligence community from conservative critics who argued its analysis of Soviet military strength was fundamentally flawed. In June 1976 he authorized the creation of a "B Team" to produce an independent assessment of Soviet military strength. Not surprisingly, given the B Team's starting assumptions that the Soviet Union was a military threat to the United States, its conclusions were quite different from the CIA's analysis. Domestic politics played a major role in Ford's decision to authorize the B Team study. He had decided to seek the Republican nomination for the presidency and was engaged in a tight primary race with Ronald Reagan, who shared these views and regularly attacked the Nixon-Ford policy of détente as misguided and flawed.

The single major intelligence collection initiative taken by Ford occurred on the second day of his presidency. He approved Project Jennifer. The goal was to raise a Soviet nuclear submarine that was sitting on the ocean floor at a depth of 17,000 feet, having sunk on April 11, 1968. The vehicle chosen for the mission was the *Glomar Explorer*, a vessel built in 1973 by a firm owned by Howard Hughes. On August 12, 1974, the *Glomar Explorer* began to raise a portion of the submarine's hull. As it rose, the hull broke apart. Published accounts suggested that although some key information such as its cryptological codes was lost as a result of this accident, much was recovered including three nuclear missiles and two nuclear torpedoes, as well as code books and code machines. A ship from the Soviet navy observed Project Jennifer but did not try to interfere. The CIA has steadfastly refused to confirm or deny any aspect of Project Jennifer.

See also: B Team; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Church Committee; Colby, William Egan; Director of Central Intelligence; Family Jewels; *Glomar Explorer*; Pike Committee; Rockefeller Commission; Schlesinger, James Rodney

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, U.S. (FBIS)

The U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) was initially organized in February 1941 as the "Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service," an element of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The Service was designed to provide intelligence information available from open radio broadcasts transmitted by foreign countries' radio stations. At first the Service focused on the Axis powers' shortwave broadcasts aimed at the United States, but in the postwar period the Service expanded its coverage. FBIS employees recorded, translated, transcribed, and analyzed broadcasts by target stations, and also developed records detailing the language, timing, and signal strength of each broadcast.

After World War II the Service was briefly relocated from the FCC to the U.S. Army's Office of Special Services (OSS), which in 1947 was renamed the "Central Intelligence Group" and finally the "Central Intelligence Agency" (CIA). The title of the Service was also changed, first to the "Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service" and then to the "Foreign Broadcast Information Service."

During the early postwar years the FBIS, along with its British counterpart, the Monitoring Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), developed a program of cooperation under which the work and expense of monitoring foreign broadcasts was divided, and the resulting output was shared. Each organization monitored broadcasts originating in different regions. The BBC focused on Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, while the FBIS covered Central and South America, the Soviet Union, and the Far East. The FBIS grew in the late 1940s in response to the U.S. government's cold war–driven increased intelligence requirements. Budgetary constraints limited the BBC's monitoring output, and the FBIS quickly established its own monitoring capabilities to cover some of the BBC's geographic areas, particularly the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

FBIS began issuing a daily report of monitored broadcasts in 1947; at that time these reports were available only to government agencies with appropriate security clearances. In 1974 a declassified version of FBIS output was publicly disseminated, both in hard copy and on microfiche; copies were provided to all Federal Depository Library institutions. The amount and range of material monitored by the FBIS has grown exponentially since the late 1970s, when the agency began monitoring hundreds of hours of foreign television broadcasts. In the early 1990s FBIS was also following over 3,500 hard-copy publications in 55 languages.

FBIS offices are connected to the U.S. government's "Diplomatic Telecommunication Services" system, through which approved government agencies and U.S. diplomatic, military, and commercial offices overseas can obtain immediate access to FBIS monitoring output. Both classified and unclassified analyses are also generated by the FBIS, and unclassified output is available to commercial and academic subscribers.

FBIS remains the U.S. government's primary provider of open-source intelligence information.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Office of Strategic Services; State Department Intelligence

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FSIA) of 1978 provides a legal framework within which the federal government can gather intelligence on foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Amended on several occasions and modified by the USA Patriot Act, the terms of the FSIA came into the public spotlight in December 2005 when press accounts revealed that the George W. Bush administration had authorized warrantless wiretaps on its own authority, bypassing the terms of FSIA following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Revelations of illegal domestic activities by U.S. intelligence agencies came to light during the Watergate investigations into the activities of the Nixon administration. Along with information on illegal programs such as Project SHAMROCK and COINTELPRO that surfaced during the Church Committee investigations into the Central Intelligence Agency these revelations triggered passage of the FSIA.

Changes in communication technologies have led to repeated modifications of the FSIA. In 1998 it was altered to allow the government to collect outgoing and incoming telephone numbers to a specific location. Significant modifications also occurred as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Under the USA Patriot Act it was no longer necessary that the foreign intelligence gathering effort be "the sole or primary" purpose of the investigation. It now only had to be a "significant purpose." FSIA originally required separate authorizations for each phone number targeted. Under the USA Patriot Act "roving wiretap" authority came into existence. It was now also possible to share information gathered for criminal investigations and to allow the collecting of phone numbers in any investigation "to gather foreign intelligence," dropping the requirement that the phone in question will be used by "an agent of a foreign power."

Little attention was public paid to the FSIA until December 2005 when it was revealed that the National Security Agency had been conducting electronic surveillance operations without obtaining court-ordered warrants since 9/11. The Bush administration asserted that it did not need warrants for several reasons. First, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales maintained that the authority to conduct warrantless wiretaps in the United States was inherent in the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed by Congress on September 18, 2001. Democratic Senators rejected this

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argument. Then Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) noted that the Senate explicitly left out language that gave the president such broad powers.

Second, the administration cited *Hamdi vs. Rumsfeld*, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the government had the right to detain Hamdi even though he was a U.S. citizen because he was an "unlawful combatant" captured on the battlefield. The Supreme Court had ruled that capturing individuals was a "fundamental incident" of war and the administration maintained so too was wiretapping. Critics noted Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion that the Hamdi case does not extend to wiretapping.

Finally, the Bush administration maintained the power to undertake warrantless wiretaps was inherent in a president's commander in chief powers to which critics cited the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. General Michael Hayden, who headed the National Security Council at the time, countered that warrantless wiretaps were not unreasonable.

See also: Bush, George H. W., Administration and Intelligence; Church Committee; COINTELPRO; September 11, 2001; SHAMROCK, Project; USA Patriot Act

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was established by the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as a mechanism for obtaining secret warrants to engage in domestic intelligence gathering. It is the responsibility of the Federal Surveillance Court to ensure that the rights of American citizens are protected under the Fourth Amendment guarantee that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."

The Court was originally made up of seven district judges drawn from different circuits around the country with one designated as the presiding judge. The Court began operating on May 18, 1979. All of its proceedings are held in secret. After 9/11 and the increased number of cases before it, the number of judges was increased to 11. Under the FSIA all requests for electronic eavesdropping must be reviewed by the Justice Department, approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, certified by the attorney general, and then reported to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. FSIA also provided a mechanism that allowed the attorney general to act unilaterally in an emergency if needed and in times of declared war. Originally the attorney general had 24 hours to inform the Foreign Intelligence Court if he or she acted unilaterally. After 9/11 the grace period was extended to 72 hours.

The Bush administration's failure to bypass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court became a major area of public controversy when in December 2005 the *New York Times* revealed the existence of its domestic surveillance program. The

administration argued it was necessary to do so because of the urgency of the matter. Critics argued that this was not the case since in the post-9/11 era the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has not seriously challenged the Bush administration's surveillance requests. In 2003 more secret surveillance warrants were granted than federal wiretap warrants. Although a small number of surveillance warrant requests were denied that year, none were denied in 2004 or 2005. In those years 1,758 and 2,072 surveillance warrants were issued. In 2005 the federal government also issued 9,254 National Security Letters that can be used to obtain information about individuals and do not require a court-reviewed warrant.

See also: Bush, George H. W., Administration and Intelligence; Church Committee; COINTELPRO; September 11, 2001; SHAMROCK, Project; USA Patriot Act

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FORTITUDE, OPERATION

Operation FORTITUDE was the main deceptive effort enabling the Allied Cross-Channel invasion of Nazi-occupied Europe on June 6, 1944.

In the fourth century B.C. Sun Tzu observed, "All warfare is based on deception. By this he meant that the object in war is the psychological dislocation of the enemy, a view later espoused by such noted military theorists as Basil H. Liddell-Hart during the last century. "There are three goals in any deception. The immediate aim is to condition the target's beliefs; the intermediate aim is to influence the target's action; and the ultimate aim is for the deceiver to benefit from the target's action."

Perhaps the most successful deceptive efforts since the Trojan Horse are those associated with Plan Bodyguard. Plan Bodyguard encompassed the umbrella of deceptive plans associated with Operations Overlord and Dragoon (Anvil).

The major components of Operation Bodyguard were: FORTITUDE North, which threatened an invasion of Norway: FORTITUDE South, directed across the Dover narrows against the French Pas de Calais; Zeppelin, in the Balkans; Vendetta and Ferdinand, in the western Mediterranean; and Ironside, on the French Biscayan coast. These were complemented by several other operations, principally Graffham and Royal Flush, diplomatic initiatives directed at the Scandinavian governments and Copperhead which featured the much-publicized visit to Gibraltar and Algiers of Field Marshall Montgomery's "double." Finally, there were several ancillary tactical deceptions in support of the actual D-Day landings. These included Quicksilver I-IV, Titanic I-IV, Big-Drum, and Taxable and Glimmer.

Stage center, of course, was reserved for Operation FORTITUDE South, which portrayed the five division Normandy landings as only a feint to mask a later decent

on the Pas de Calais by the massive forces of the First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG), a fictitious force created to cause the Germans to believe that it would be the Pas de Calais invasion force, "concentrated" in southeast England. At the outset the Allied effort was directed at ambiguity deception. With the purpose of tying down as many German divisions as possible, false troop concentrations and locations, as well as the ability to transport them to the continent was the focus of early deceptive efforts. As the deception matured into FORTITUDE, the effort became a misdirection deception aimed at convincing the Germans that the D-Day Cross-Channel invasion would occur at Pas de Calais on the French coast northeast of Normandy.

To impart the deception, the Allies had three advantages—two of them tremendous and one major. The first has come to be known as the "Ultra Secret." Thanks to the efforts of an astute Polish mechanic working in a German cipher factory in 1938, a mockup of the electrically operated Enigma cipher machine was constructed in France and a fully operational machine was subsequently smuggled out of Poland by British agents. By February 1940, enough machines existed in Britain to begin operator training. By early 1944, the Allies were substantially able to read the Germans' coded wireless signal traffic at will. With respect to deception, this gave them not only the ability to determine if the Germans had received the elements of deception employed, but also how they had been interpreted and the degree to which they had been convinced. In terms of risk, this gave the Allies a huge advantage, particularly when conducting a five-division operation against a potentially much superior enemy force arrayed in well-fortified defensive positions.

Although Ultra provided mainly a comfort zone for Overlord, the British Double Cross network (so named after the British XX Committee established to control turned German spies) proved a decisive advantage. A total of 14 double agents—some turned after capture by the British but most offering their services after recruitment by the German Abwehr, or military security and intelligence service—were selected for participation in the FORTITUDE deception plan. Of these, two agents, GARBO and BRUTUS, practically carried out the whole deception plan. The last advantage was the almost complete control of airspace over Britain enjoyed by the Allies between April of 1943, when the FORTITUDE plan was implemented, until the June 6, 1944, Normandy invasion. This advantage severely limited German aerial reconnaissance and furthered their reliance on their turned spy network, foremost of which in evaluated reliability were the Double Cross agents associated with FORTITUDE.

Visual means, fake radio transmissions, lighting schemes, etc., were used to perpetrate the deception. Owing to the lack of German aerial reconnaissance capability, however, the British double agents—GARBO in particular—became critically important. His offer to work as an agent for the British in 1940 having been refused, the Spaniard Juan Pujol set out to affiliate himself with the Abwehr. Once successful and posted to London, he again offered his services to the British and was this time much more attractive to them. By February 1944, GARBO had created no fewer than 24 fictitious subagents, each clothed with a character and a story of his own. Aside from establishing his own credibility, GARBO's network added credence to information passed that could not have been gathered by a single agent. It also served essentially as a multiple conduit which reinforced its own accuracy.

So important was GARBO to the German intelligence effort that the decision was reluctantly taken and approved by General Eisenhower to have him transmit at

about 3:00 A.M. on June 6, 1944—approximately three and a half hours before the first Allied wave hit Normandy at 0630—that the invasion was under way. So incompetent was the German Abwehr, or at least the Madrid station at which the radio transmission was directed, that GARBO's message was not acknowledged until the net was activated at eight o'clock in the morning, or two hours after the first troops landed at Normandy. While a three-and-a-half-hour warning would not have provided the Germans sufficient time to react, it did firmly establish GARBO's credibility subsequent to attaining an Allied foothold in France.

In his report to the combined chiefs of staff on the operations of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe, General Eisenhower remarked that he could not overstate the value of the deception provided by GARBO to the success of the Normandy landing and its ability to pin down the German Fifteenth Army, thus preventing Germany from sending reinforcements to Normandy.

GARBO's post D-Day credibility having been preserved, his transmission of the evening of June 8, 1944 (and reinforced thereafter), relating that the vast majority of Allied troops remained in Britain indicating that Normandy was probably a diversion for a larger operation aimed at Pas de Calais should receive major credit for the "decisive" situation outlined by Eisenhower above.

Although German intelligence was unable to determine the place of the Overlord beachhead, it was just as surely deceived as to its time and strength. Their faulty analysis predicated July rather than June 6, 1944; the Pas de Calais rather than Normandy; and credited the Allies with 42 quite mythical divisions. From the time the first German spy (Caroli/control 3726) was apprehended in the early hours of September 6, 1940—less than one day after he arrived near Oxford—until FORTITUDE was executed in 1944, the entire German spy network in Britain had been turned to British advantage. The FORTITUDE array of agents, mainly the wireless operator BRUTUS, sustained this advantage. The purported First United States Army Group, supposedly under General Patton's command, deceptively was composed of 42 mythical divisions.

Even the strategic bombing campaign was structured to support the FORTITUDE deception. Quicksilver IV and V were, respectively, the bombing of the Pas de Calais beaches and German communications in the area. The overall effort, including purposefully refraining from striking militarily significant targets in the Normandy area, was intended to indicate that a seaborne landing was imminent. Activity in the Dover area, including the setting up of new radio circuits, was increased to support the deception. Hence the entire FORTITUDE effort was constructed to play on German preconceptions and thus structure the battlefield in terms of time, space, style, and magnitude of effort.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; GARBO; Ultra

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FORTY (40) COMMITTEE

The Forty (40) Committee was established by President Richard Nixon to review and approve covert actions. The 40 Committee took its name from the number of Nixon's presidential directive creating it. Its immediate predecessor was the Johnson administration's 303 Committee. Membership on the 40 Committee was the same as on the 303 Committee: the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the deputy secretary of defense, and a White House representative of the National Security Council. Representatives of other agencies might also attend. For example, in discussion about covert operations in Chile, Attorney General John Mitchell was present. By all accounts, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger dominated the 40 Committee's decision-making process under both Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.

The 40 Committee gave its approval to several of the most controversial covert action projects undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency. In March and June 1970 it approved covert propaganda campaigns in Chile designed to turn the public against Marxist presidential candidate Salvadore Allende. In the September election Allende failed to win the presidency outright but did win enough votes to be designated president by the Chilean Congress the next month. The Nixon administration then launched a covert two-track policy in an effort to block his selection. The 40 Committee approved Track I, which put in place another anti-Allende propaganda campaign, but was not informed about Track II, which centered on engineering an anti-Allende coup.

The second controversial covert action program approved by the 40 Committee involved covert U.S. intervention into the Angolan civil war. By September 1975 the 40 Committee had approved covert support of two groups, UNITA (National Union for the Independence of Angola) and the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) against the Soviet-supported MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) totaling $24.7 million. In November President Ford tasked the CIA with developing a plan to overthrow the MPLA should it win the civil war. Before the 40 Committee acted on the CIA's proposals, the existence of CIA involvement in Angola became public as a result of an article by Seymour Hersh in the *New York Times*. Congress responded by prohibiting any U.S. funds from being spent on covert operations in Angola, a move Ford phrased "a deep tragedy for all countries whose security depends upon the United States."

Under its original operating procedures, the 40 Committee restricted itself to only examining a covert action plan at the time initial approval was requested. This changed after it became public in 1967 that the CIA had covertly funded the National Student Association. From that point forward it regularly reviewed all ongoing covert operations.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Chile, CIA Operations in; Ford Administration and Intelligence; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; National Security Council; Nixon Administration and Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN
(JANUARY 17, 1706–APRIL 17, 1790)

Benjamin Franklin was an American statesman, inventor, and diplomat responsible for securing French support during the American Revolution. Born in Boston on January 17, 1706, Benjamin Franklin began a printing apprenticeship at age 12 under his brother James. In 1723, after five years of servitude, he cunningly escaped his indenture and ran away to Philadelphia.

Benjamin Franklin at the Court of France. Franklin was a principal member of the commission sent to France to gain support after the United States declared independence from England. He is credited with securing war loans, official recognition, and ultimately, a French declaration of war against the British. (National Archives)

Over the next three decades Franklin's pursuits ranged from publishing editorials and literature, such as *Poor Richard's Almanack*, to inventing and experimenting with new technology. He supplemented his scientific and literary pursuits with intellectual discussion and philosophy, which ranged from sessions with his Junto, to formulating religious and political philosophies.

Dr. Franklin's political reputation grew during the Seven Years War when in 1754 he put forth a proposal to unite the colonies. His Albany Plan for an American Union would have organized and united the colonies under a federalized provincial government. The colonial assemblies rejected the plan though, believing that it usurped too much power from them. Two decades later, he proposed a similar model for the Articles of Confederation, as his original Albany Plan could still have operated independent of Crown control.

Working for the Patriots' cause during the American Revolution, Franklin brought with him a transatlantic reputation of sagacity and intellect, characteristics that those in the Second Continental Congress did not hesitate to utilize. In March 1776 Congress sent Franklin to entice Quebec to join their revolution against Great Britain. The Continental military situation was bleak upon his arrival though, and Franklin made no attempt to persuade the Canadians, writing that until the Americans could offer money, it was inappropriate to ask the Canadians to join their union, "as the few friends we have here will scarce venture to exert themselves in promoting it until they see our credit recovered and a sufficient army arrived."

The Continental Congress also used Franklin's revered reputation in France to the new nation's benefit. In October 1776, as a member of the Committee of Secret Correspondence, Congress sent Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee overseas with the pivotal task of acquiring a treaty of alliance from France. Franklin's personal contacts in Europe allowed him to serve as a hub for the information network he quickly established there. Upon his warmly welcomed arrival in Paris, the famous American statesman began gathering intelligence and rallying French support for the Continentals' cause.

Franklin's first meeting with the Comte de Vergennes, France's foreign minister, came just days after the American's arrival in December 1776. The result of the meeting, however, was tepid; the French were, like the Canadians had been, hesitant to ally with the unproven nation in their revolutionary endeavors. Franklin accepted their cautious demeanor, and set about on a quiet public relations campaign to gain popular support within France.

Over the next months, Franklin translated and published American documents and rhetoric that echoed the Colonial cause, and had them propagated throughout France. His efforts were a success, and the French populace convened against tyranny and around the Americans' pursuit of liberty. The potential for government support expanded also with the growing French desire for revenge after their losses in the Seven Years' War.

Franklin was a shrewd negotiator as well. While conferring with other parties, he adeptly played opposing sides off of each other, therefore manipulating the situation to his advantage. An important example of this occurred in 1778. Franklin knew that with his reputation he was constantly surrounded by spies throughout his time in Europe, but he quickly used this for his own gain.

After the Continental army's success at Saratoga, the British were willing to concede all but independence to the Americans, and thus sent Paul Wentworth, British

spymaster, to Paris for peace talks with Franklin. Realizing that negotiations with the British would force the hesitant French into swift action to prevent it, Franklin leaked word to the press that he would meet with Wentworth. The plan succeeded; along with the Saratoga victory, the French, fearing that the warring parties were close to a resolution, readily agreed to the terms of two treaties of friendship and alliance on February 6, 1778. Without French intervention into the American crisis, the British would have had the clear and steady advantage, and therefore greater potential for victory.

In 1782, Franklin served as a member of the peace commission that negotiated the Treaty of Paris of 1783, which ended the American Revolution and recognized the U.S. independence. After his return to Philadelphia in 1785, he served as president of Pennsylvania until 1788. During that time he also attended the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787 and played the role of the aged and wise overseer, though rarely partook in debate. Franklin spent his final years continuing work on his *Autobiography*, which was left unfinished after his death in Philadelphia on April 17, 1790.

See also: Bancroft, Dr. Edward; Committee of Secret Correspondence; Deane, Silas; Jay, John; Laurens, Henry; Lee, Arthur

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FRANKLIN, LAWRENCE

In January 2006, then aged 59, Defense Department analyst Lawrence Franklin was sentenced to 12 years and seven months in prison and fined $10,000 for passing classified information to two members of the American-Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC), Steven Rosen and Keith Weismann, and to Naor Gilon, a political officer in the Israeli Embassy in Washington, DC. Franklin pleaded guilty to three felony counts of improperly retaining and disclosing classified information and agreed to cooperate with the prosecution in return for the government's dropping of three other charges against him. This sentence is at the low end of federal sentencing guidelines.

Franklin, a South Asian specialist, had held a variety of different national security positions in his professional career. Early in his career Franklin served as a military attaché in the U.S. embassy in Israel. Later he worked at the Iran desk in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Office. When CBS News broke the spy story he was working as a policy analyst for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith in the office of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

Reportedly Franklin, who favored a more hard-line approach than was being adopted by the Clinton administration, began passing information to Israel in 1999. The indictment charged that in a June 26, 2003, lunch meeting with Rosen and Weismann Franklin "disclosed classified information related to potential attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq. He was also charged with disclosing classified information to a "foreign official

and member of the media." Press reports indicate that other information given to Rosen, Weismann, and Gilon related to U.S. policy toward Iran, toward terrorism in Central Asia, and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. A search of Franklin's apartment uncovered over 80 classified documents.

Franklin was arrested on May 3, 2005. Rosen and Weissman were charged in August 2005 and were fired by AIPAC. Gilon was recalled to Israel. Franklin stated that his frustration with U.S. policy toward Iran led him to pass this information along in hopes that his contacts would pass it through back channels to the National Security Council.

Israel denied that espionage was involved and the Defense Department denied that Franklin has succeeded in influencing U.S. policy. Allegations of espionage by Israel against the United States became a sensitive issue after the Jonathan Pollard espionage episode.

See also: Pollard, Jonathan Jay; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

FREEH, LOUIS JOSEPH
(JANUARY 6, 1950–)

Louis Freeh was the ninth Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), serving from September 1, 1993 to June 25, 2001. Born in Jersey City, New Jersey, he received a law degree from Rutgers University. Earlier in his career Freeh was an FBI Special Agent serving in New York City and Washington. He also worked in the U.S. Attorney's Office where he held the positions of chief of the Organized Crime Unit, deputy U.S. attorney, and associate U.S. attorney. Highlights of his career, prior to assuming the position of director, include being the lead prosecutor in the "Pizza Connection" in which Sicilian-organized crime organizations used pizza parlors as fronts for drug trafficking operations and serving as special prosecutor for investigations into the mail bomb murders of Federal Judge Robert Vance and civil rights leader Robert Robinson.

Freeh's tenure as director of the FBI was marked by a number of high-profile domestic cases. These included the Atlanta Olympic bombings, Oklahoma City bombings, the apprehension of Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski, and the deadly encounter with the Branch Davidians at Ruby Ridge. Significant espionage cases involved the investigation of Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee and the arrest of Soviet spy Robert Hanssen. His stewardship of the FBI was also marked by controversy, stemming in large part from his administrative style. Three concerns stand out. First, Freeh saw the main function of the FBI in terms of investigating cases and not law enforcement and placed himself at the center of major cases. Often, as with the Olympic bombing and Oklahoma City

bombings, the results reflected negatively on the FBI as Freeh made legal and strategic mistakes in pursuing leads and dealing with suspects. In other cases it produced widely differing judgments about his effectiveness. For example, Freeh took direct control of the investigations into the 1996 Khobar Tower bombings in Saudi Arabia. In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, Freeh spoke of the unprecedented and invaluable cooperation he received from the Saudis. Other testimony said the Saudis had been uncooperative. Second, Freeh surrounded himself with colleagues and friends, bringing forward charges of cronyism. Moreover he was intolerant of criticism from senior administrators and preferred to interact directly with field agents. Third, Freeh was not well versed in technology nor did he value it. He is reported never to have used e-mail. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the FBI's computer system was obsolete when it was installed in 1995 because it used 1980s technology. Because of this the Commission stated that the FBI did not have the ability to "know what it knew."

See also: Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Hanssen, Robert Philip; Lee, Wen Ho; September 11, 2001; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

FUCHS, EMIL JULIUS KLAUS (DECEMBER 29, 1911–JANUARY 28, 1988)

Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs was a German-born British citizen who committed espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union from 1942 to 1949. Whilst working as a theoretical physicist on the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, New Mexico, Fuchs passed atomic secrets of considerable importance to the Russians, which accelerated the development of a Soviet atomic bomb.

Born in Rüsselheim, Germany, on December 29, 1911, Klaus Fuchs was the third of four children to Emil Fuchs, a socialist and theologian, and Else Wagner. He was educated at Leipzig University, where he joined the Social Democratic Party in 1930, and Kiel University, where he joined the German Communist Party (KPD) in 1932. After Hitler's election, he narrowly escaped arrest, followed KPD orders to leave Germany, fled to Bristol via Paris, and arrived on September 21, 1933. That year a British security file on Fuchs was opened. He gained a PhD in physics from the University of Bristol under Nevill Mott in December 1936 and then worked in Max Born's laboratory at Edinburgh University. Throughout this period he remained active in socialist causes: the Friends of the Soviet Union, the Spanish Civil War Relief Fund, and KPD anti-Nazi activities in Scotland.

At the outbreak of World War II, Fuchs was classified as an enemy alien and from June to December 1940 was placed in internment camps on the Isle of Man and in Quebec. By mid-1941, however, stigma was transmogrified into respectability: Fuchs

began to play a key role in the British scientific intelligence effort and became a nuclear physicist of immense value. Under the aegis of Rudolf Peierls, Fuchs commenced work on Tube Alloys project, the British atomic bomb research program. Because of Fuchs' expertise, the British government decided that the security risk was worth taking and he was naturalized in June 1942. He signed the Official Secrets Act, all access restrictions were lifted and, soon after, began transmitting secrets to the Soviet Union. His Soviet handler was Ursula Kuczynski, code-named "Sonia." His rationale for espionage was that the Russians—now pitted against the Wehrmacht on the eastern front—were entitled to know what its ally, Great Britain, was working on in secret.

In December 1943, Fuchs left for the United States to work on the Manhattan Project. After initially working with the Peierls team at Columbia University, Fuchs was transferred to the Theoretical Physics Division, under Hans Bethe, at Los Alamos in August 1944. He had already established the mechanism of espionage and conducted seven meetings in New York with Harry Gold, his American courier, whom he knew only as "Raymond" but whose code name was "Guss." At Los Alamos, Fuchs remained quiet, unassuming, and industrious; he avoided political discussions. His specific role was the development of mathematical calculations for the yield and efficiency of an atomic bomb, for which there were two alternatives: the gun-type uranium bomb later dropped on Hiroshima and the implosion-type plutonium bomb used at Nakasaki. So Fuchs was at the epicenter of thermonuclear weapons research: for a spy, this was a remarkable opportunity, and Fuchs exploited it to the full. The package of information he passed to Gold at one meeting in early June 1945, for example, included precise descriptions of the design, components, and dimensions of the implosion plutonium bomb; the date and site of the Trinity test (which Fuchs attended); and the American intention to use the bomb against Japan. Unknown to Fuchs, David Greenglass was also passing information, albeit of a different order, from Los Alamos to the same courier, Harry Gold.

Fuchs returned to England in June 1946 and, notwithstanding his KPD membership in the 1930s and three security checks by MI-5 from 1946 to 1947, Fuchs was cleared for top-secret work and quickly assumed a pivotal role at Harwell, the British atomic energy research establishment. Hubristically, he later claimed "I am Harwell." From September 1947 until April 1949, Fuchs had six meetings with his new Soviet handler, Alexander Feklisov—also Julius Rosenberg's case officer—and handed over, inter alia, theoretical and developmental draft outlines of the hydrogen bomb. Primarily as a result of the American deciphering of the VENONA cables, which led the Federal Bureau of Investigation to notify the British Security Service (MI-5) Fuchs was interrogated several times between December 21, 1949, and January 24, 1950, by the MI-5's William Skardon. Fuchs confessed and was arrested on February 2, 1950. One month later he was convicted for violating the Official Secrets Act and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment; Fuchs believed he would be executed. He was released on June 23, 1959, and immigrated to Dresden where he lived with his father until he married Margarete Keilson. In East Germany, he continued his scientific career and gained numerous accolades: deputy director of the Institute of Nuclear Research, election to the Academy of Sciences, and the Karl Marx Order. He died near Dresden on January 28, 1988.

See also: Atomic Spy Ring; Feklisov, Alexandre; Gold, Harry; Greenglass, David; MI-5 (The Security Service); Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel; VENONA

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Phillip Deery

FURST, ALAN
(FEBRUARY 20, 1941–)

Born in New York City on February 20, 1941, Alan Furst received a master's degree from Pennsylvania State University in 1967 and began a successful career as a freelance journalist and travel writer. While visiting Moscow in 1980 he experienced the fear of American retaliation that gripped the city in the aftermath of the downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 and witnessed the repressive measures implemented by Soviet authorities to quell unrest. The incident inspired Furst, the author of several crime novels, to write *Night Soldiers*, his first work of what has been dubbed "historical spy fiction." Furst's novels all take place in the period from 1933 to 1945, utilize to the fullest the plot potentials of the era's rapidly shifting political landscape, are meticulously researched and notable for their well-drawn characters and moody film noir–style atmosphere. Every book features a visit to the Brasserie Heininger, a bustling Paris nightspot famous for bullet holes left in a wall by Bulgarian Comintern agent Khristo Stoianev, the hero of *Night Soldiers*. Furst's characters are not super spies but realistic people drawn into secret work by circumstance and facing difficult moral choices. Jean-Claude Casson, a maker of French "B" movies, who appears in both *The World at Night* and *Red Gold*, struggles with the temptation to collaborate with the Nazis before being recruited by British intelligence and becoming a courier for the French Resistance. Eric DeHaan, the captain of a Dutch tramp streamer, is driven by patriotism to risk his ship and crew on covert missions in the Baltic Sea. Although Furst's characters generally survive their adventures, their missions rarely go according to plan, are often only partially successful, and are frequently outright failures, mirroring the fate of most of the actual covert operations launched in the 1930s and 1940s.

See also: Fiction—Spy Novels

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Vernon L. Pedersen

G

GARBO

Juan Pujol Garcia was a master of espionage and deception in World War II and was credited by General Dwight D. Eisenhower with pinning down the German 15th Army, helping to ensure the success of the Allied return to Europe at Normandy. In modern history perhaps no deception has been more complete or of greater significance than that perpetrated on Nazi Germany by the Spaniard, Juan Pujol, code name GARBO, in the days leading to the Allied Cross-Channel invasion of Europe in June of 1944.

Juan Pujol was born in Barcelona, Spain, and grew up in a family of liberal political persuasion. Spain was thrust into civil war in 1936 when members of the Falange Party, founded by the son of Generalissimo Primo de Rivera who was military dictator of Spain from 1923 to 1931, clashed with Republicans, Socialists, Anarchists, Syndicalists, and Communists of the left-wing Popular Front. During this conflict Pujol was compelled against his will to fight for Generalissimo Francisco Franco's Fascist Nationalist Army against Popular Front leader Leon Blum's Republican Army. Emanating from this experience was a deep and abiding hatred for Fascist and Nazi political agendas. Thus, as war in Europe became a reality in 1938 Pujol committed himself to oppose actively the totalitarian regimes they represented.

Pujol first approached the British at their consulates in Madrid and Lisbon, Portugal. He was rebuffed in his attempt to spy for them. Undeterred, Pujol turned to the Germans in Madrid with a similar offer. Though initially cool to the idea, the Germans were impressed with Pujol's seeming fanatic adherence to Nazi ideals and likely reliability since he could demonstrate conclusively that he had fought for Franco's Fascist army during the Spanish civil war. Pujol was tasked to proceed to Britain to conduct his espionage efforts, which included setting up a network of German agents, but elected to go covertly to Portugal instead. There, armed with recent magazines and newspapers, a tourists' "Blue Guide" to England and a book he had purchased on British ships,

he concocted largely fictitious but seemingly impressive reports of troop and ship movements that he sent by letter, via Britain to enhance their perceived authenticity, to the German Abwehr, or intelligence service, Madrid office.

Once his credibility had been firmly established with the Germans, Pujol once again offered his services, this time as a double agent, to the British in 1942. Juan Pujol was this time seen as of sufficient value for the British to accept his offer. Moving his operation to London and assuming the code name GARBO, he worked with his "handler" from the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6), Thomás (Tommy) Harris, to create 24 totally fictitious spies in a network designed to reinforce its own credibility through self-reinforcing information provided by its operatives. For instance, in November of 1942 the GARBO network sent dispatches to German intelligence, indicating that a troop convoy in camouflage colors had been seen departing the Clyde estuary just before the Allied Operation Torch was leveled against North Africa. Though sent too late to be of any intelligence value, this and other such ploys validated GARBO's credibility. The concocted network kept the Abwehr so busy with pieces of a complex espionage puzzle structured to reinforce the authenticity of the fictitious intelligence providers that the Germans failed to establish alternative intelligence sources in Britain to verify GARBO's products.

Thus the stage was set for one of the greatest deceptions of all time. As Allied momentum was building for a cross-Channel invasion of continental Europe the GARBO network set about establishing the legitimacy of the fictitious First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) under the command of General George Smith Patton as the main force the Germans would have to defend against along the Western Wall. GARBO established the Pas de Calais as the object of FUSAG, maintaining that Normandy was merely a ruse to draw German troops from the real invasion site. So complete was the deceptive effort that, with the approval of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, GARBO transmitted to the Madrid station of the Abwehr at about 0300 on June 6, 1944 that the Allied invasion was underway. That station, however, failed to recognize GARBO's transmission until it was far too late to move forces to counter the Allies. However, GARBO's total reliability as a source of accurate strategic information having been established in the eyes of the German leadership, they held in reserve the critical Fifteenth Army "which," in Eisenhower's words, "if committed to battle in June or July might possibly have defeated us by sheer weight of numbers, [but instead] remained inoperative throughout the critical period of the campaign, and only when the breakthrough had been achieved were its infantry divisions brought west across the Seine—too late to have any effect upon the course of victory." Obviously the Germans felt likewise. Juan Pujol was in July of 1944 awarded the Iron Cross in absentia by Adolf Hitler himself for his extraordinary services to the German intelligence effort. GARBO's master stroke of espionage had been totally successful.

The importance of deception is greatly enhanced when one's opponent has an equal or greater force relationship in prepared defensive positions. Potential force relationships were definitely against the Allies, particularly at the outset, on their return to continental Europe in France. The GARBO deception against a stronger German foe was thus critical to redress force imbalances considering the limited five-division invasion force. Espionage was essential to the Allied effort against the Fascist regimes.

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Douglas V. Smith

GATES, ROBERT MICHAEL
(SEPTEMBER 25, 1943–)

Robert Gates was the 15th Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), serving from November 6, 1991, to January 20, 1993, under President George H. W. Bush. Born in Wichita, Kansas, he received a PhD from Georgetown University in 1974. Gates is the first career intelligence officer to rise to the rank of DCI. He began working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an analyst upon graduating from the College of William and Mary in 1965. After obtaining his PhD, Gates went to work for the National Security Council, where he stayed until 1980. In 1982 Gates was appointed Deputy Director for Intelligence and in 1986 President Ronald Reagan appointed him Deputy Director of the CIA. There he worked under DCI William Casey.

Upon Casey's incapacitation and resignation due to failing health in 1987, President Reagan nominated Gates to become DCI. His nomination ran into intense opposition in Congress. Several CIA analysts stepped forward and accused Gates of having joined with Casey to politicize intelligence analysis, especially as it related to the Soviet Union and issues involving the spread of Communism to Latin America. Gates' nomination was also opposed by his previously undisclosed association with the Iran-Contra Affair. Faced with this opposition, Gates withdrew his name from consideration and continued to serve as Deputy Director of Intelligence.

George H. W. Bush appointed Gates to the position of deputy national security advisor upon taking office as president in January 1989. In that position he developed a closer working relationship with the president than DCI William Webster was able to establish. Gates was part of the inner circle that managed the Persian Gulf War in the White House and was sent by the president on a secret mission to Pakistan and India in 1990 to try and calm relations between those two states after each had detonated nuclear devices.

Citing his contribution to Operation Desert Storm President George H. W. Bush nominated Gates to become DCI in May 1991. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was known to be unhappy with the nomination due to Gates' conservative views regarding Communism and the prospects for success of his reform efforts. Once again the hearings into his nomination were contentious, with charges of politicizing intelligence being aired. This time Gates did not withdraw his name and he was confirmed by the Senate.

As DCI, Gates continued his close working relationship with the president and together they embarked upon a series of reforms. One of the key areas of reform dealt with espionage. Gates set up a National HUMINT (human intelligence) Requirements Tasking Center (NHRTC) to bring about increased coordination between the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Gates also reorganized the National Reconnaissance Office. Instead of being organized around bureaucratic lines (air force, navy, and CIA programs) Gates had it structured along functional lines. The two divisions were imagery intelligence and signals intelligence. As part of this reorganization, the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office was publicly acknowledged for the first time on September 8, 1992. Imagery intelligence was of special concern to Gates and he worked with the Defense Department to try and centralize its management. Problems arose because neither the CIA nor the Defense Department was willing to give up complete control over the National Photographic Intelligence Center or Defense Mapping Agency, respectively. In the end a compromise was reached whereby a Central Imaging Office was created in the Pentagon to improve coordination.

See also: Bush, George H. W., Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Department Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

GEHLEN, MAJOR GENERAL REINHARD (APRIL 3, 1902–JUNE 8, 1979)

Reinhard Gehlen was the major general who headed the Nazi eastern front intelligence effort, was creator of the Gehlen Organization, and headed the West German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND).

Born April 3, 1902, in Erfurt, Germany, Reinhard Gehlen joined the Reichswehr in 1920. During World War II, Adolf Hitler named Gehlen to command the intelligence structure on the Russian front (FHO-Foreign Armies East) in April 1942. Smersh, the Soviet counterespionage organization, effectively limited high-level penetrations by FHO. When the outcome of the war became clear in late 1944, Gehlen began plotting his surrender to the West. He copied his FHO secret files on the Red Army, in hopes of gaining favor with the Allies. When Hitler fired Gehlen on April 9, 1945, over Gehlen's repeated warnings of the Red Army's ability to launch continuing attacks,

Gehlen began to move. When the British proved uninterested, Gehlen surrendered to American forces on May 22, 1945.

The army secretly moved Gehlen to the United States in August 1945, where Gehlen sold the Americans on his ability to infiltrate Eastern Europe and spy on the Soviets. The Americans agreed not to ask Gehlen to spy on fellow Germans, and to eventually transfer his organization to a new German government. The CIA assumed the secret role of supporting the Gehlen Organization in 1948, a role which went unacknowledged until September 2000. Gehlen gave the United States what it needed most, a credible intelligence collection effort directed against the Soviets in the early years of the cold war.

In April 1956, Gehlen's organization was transferred to the West German government, where it served as the foundation of the BND, with Gehlen at the helm. Soviet security measures hampered Gehlen's ability to achieve high-level penetrations. Gehlen's tenure at the BND was deeply wounded when Heinz Felfe, head of the BND Soviet Section, was exposed as a longtime KGB operative. Penetration of the BND by a Soviet double agent led to Gehlen's forced retirement on April 30, 1968.

Gehlen is not without his critics. He hired former Nazis and other wartime cronies for his organization after promising he would not. His analyses of the Soviet threat were believed to be overinflated, which both the Gehlen Organization and the CIA used to boost their budgetary requirements. Critics even claimed that Gehlen's last success, his prediction of a Red Army response to Czechoslovakia's "Prague Spring," was an attempt to stave off his forced retirement.

Gehlen died on June 8, 1979, in Bern am Starnberger See.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Gehlen Organization; German Democratic Republic and U.S. Intelligence; STASI

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Thomas D. Veve

GEHLEN ORGANIZATION

The Gehlen Organization was a U.S.-sponsored intelligence organization consisting of former Nazi intelligence officers working against the Soviet Union during the cold war. Near the end of World War II, General Major Reinhard Gehlen, chief of the German military intelligence division dealing with the Soviet Union, ordered his staff to transfer its files to secret locations and await surrender to U.S. forces. Once in American custody, Gehlen informed U.S. Army interrogator Captain John R. Boker, Jr., that if permitted he could locate his files on the Soviet Union and reconstitute his

intelligence network under U.S. direction. Recognizing the potential value of such a group, in July 1945 Boker arranged for the release of Gehlen's staff and retrieved most of the hidden documents. Code-named Operation Rusty, Gehlen's organization began operating in U.S.-occupied Germany under the guidance of the Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) in July 1946.

Lacking sufficient human intelligence from within Soviet-controlled areas, the United States relied heavily on the Gehlen Organization during the early years of the cold war. Under the sponsorship of the CIC, it grew from a small cadre of a few hundred German General Staff officers to encompass over four thousand agents and staff members. During this time Gehlen's group provided the bulk of U.S. tactical intelligence on Soviet military capabilities and intentions. The expanding budget requirements of the organization, however, prompted the army to seek a surrogate sponsor for the network within the American intelligence establishment. Due to concerns over its cost-effectiveness, controllability, and security, officials within the incipient U.S. central intelligence structure were disinclined to absorb the Gehlen Organization. Nevertheless, in July 1949 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reluctantly assumed responsibility for the operation.

Officials in the CIA soon realized that the highly nationalistic Gehlen could not be effectively controlled by his American handlers and began to restrict funding for the organization, sharply curtailing its activities outside of Germany. It also became apparent that the Gehlen Organization was unreliable in the field of strategic political and economic intelligence. In addition, Gehlen's widespread employment of war criminals fueled an extensive Soviet propaganda campaign that indicted the United States as the successor to Fascist Germany. Realizing that the network would likely emerge as the official foreign intelligence organization of an independent West Germany, however, the CIA maintained a close relationship with Gehlen's group.

Events during the period of CIA sponsorship revealed that Soviet agents had penetrated the German network. U.S. officials were unaware of the extent of this penetration, which had exposed every Gehlen operation within the Soviet bloc, until 1961. In the meantime, in 1956 the Federal Republic of Germany became a sovereign nation. In April of that year, the West German government formally legalized the Gehlen Organization as its official foreign intelligence service. Thereafter, it became the Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Gehlen, Reinhard; German Democratic Republic and U.S. Intelligence; STASI

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Derek A. Bentley

GENERAL DIRECTORATE FOR EXTERNAL SECURITY (DGSE)

Established on April 2, 1982, replacing the Service for External Documentation and Counter Espionage (SDECE) Organization, DGSE was tasked with collecting intelligence for France as well as conducting counterespionage against adversaries. DGSE is headquartered in Paris on Boulevard Mortier and is called "La Piscine," or the pool, because of its proximity to the French swimming federation pools.

DGSE is organized in to six divisions or directorates. Directorate of Administration, Strategy, Intelligence, Technology, Operations, and Action Divisions. With the election of Francois Metterrand as president of France in 1981, SDECE re-structured and a serious reorganization was mandated by President Metterand. As the first head of the new agency, the French president appointed the former head of Air France and SNAS Aerospace Pierre Marion as the head of the DGSE. Marion was given a mandate by Mitterrand to clean up the remnants of the SDECE and reorient operations. The DGSE saw centralized organization introduced; the command structure was tightened; and collection capabilities in economic, financial, industrial, and scientific intelligence were strengthened. Even with all of the changes introduced by Marion, the DGSE still failed to provide the French government with timely intelligence in several cases. The French failed to predict the Israeli move into Lebanon in 1982; DGSE also failed to predict a wave of terrorist attacks in France. At one point Mitterrand dismissed DGSE reports as no better than articles in newspapers. Marion was finally replaced by French Admiral Pierre Lacoste. Admiral Lacoste was the first French admiral to be appointed to run a French intelligence agency. Like Marion, Lacoste's tenure at DGSE was cut short in the wake of the revelations of the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing in New Zealand and the disclosure that DGSE had been involved in the planning and execution of the attack on the Greenpeace ship docked in Auckland Harbor, New Zealand, in November 1984. The *Rainbow Warrior* was to escort a flotilla of ships to protest French nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific. Two bombs were detonated on board that destroyed the propulsion plant of the ship, causing it to sink dockside and killing a photo-journalist who had tried to retrieve his camera equipment after the first explosion.

Finally under Lacoste, the French had pulled their forces back in Chad during the conflict there, after the Libyans had agreed to pull their forces out of the area. The Libyans, although agreeing to pull forces back, had in fact misled the French. The U.S. provision of satellite photography, illustrating the Libyans true position, was provided to French President Metterrand. Not only had the DGSE failed to correctly demonstrate the disposition of Libyan forces but the proof came from American satellite assets. DGSE teams staged two attempts in 1984 to overthrow the Libyan government by arming and training Libyan exiles. Trained in Sudan and infiltrated though Tunisia, the attempts failed to bring down the Libyan regime.

Claude Silberzhan was appointed head of DGSE in 1989 after Lacoste resigned in the wake of the *Rainbow Warrior* revelations. Silberzhan was forced to reorient DGSE's focus from a cold war mind-set to a post–cold war mind-set. The primary focus of DGSE's operations and planning would focus on industrial espionage. In the

wake of the Gulf War in 1991 the DGSE underwent massive reorganization and technological upgrades. The agency saw a 15 percent increase in its budget in 1991. Information technology networking equipment was introduced at DGSE. In 1994 the technology division established a new signals intelligence unit that was dedicated to intercepting cellular telephone traffic, fax, and Internet traffic.

The appointment of Jean-Claude Cousseran in April 2000 saw more changes to the DGSE. The Intelligence directorate was divided in to two divisions. Political Intelligence and Security intelligence were instated to again reform the DGSE. A new anti-crime service was also founded in the DGSE; the new unit dealt with banking and financial links between foreign organizations and or individuals and French nationals. Cousseran's dismissal as head of DGSE resulted in the dissemination of information that could have been politically damaging to French President Jacques Chirac. Cousseran was replaced with Pierre Brochand in August 2002.

The directors of DGSE from its inception until 2003 include Pierre Marion, who served from 1981 to 1982. Admiral Pierre Lacoste served from 1982 until 1985; General Rene Imbot served from 1985 to 1987. General François Mermet served as DGSE director from 1987 to 1989. Claude Silberzhan, who was the first civilian picked to lead DGSE, served from 1989 to 1993, followed by Jacques Dewathe from 1993 to 1999. Jean Claude Cousseran served as director from 1999 until 2002; he was replaced by Pierre Brochand who has been serving as DGSE director since 2002.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence

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Steven F. Marin

GENET, EDMUND CHARLES
(JANUARY 8, 1763–JULY 14, 1834)

Edmund Charles Genet was the French ambassador to the United States during the French Revolution. His actions in the United States endangered American neutrality in the conflict between Great Britain and France.

After working for the French embassy in St. Petersburg, Russia, France appointed Genet ambassador to the United States in 1792. In 1793, he arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, aiming to garner American support for France's dual wars with Spain and Britain. Rather than proceeding immediately to Philadelphia to meet with President George Washington for accreditation, Genet remained in Charleston enjoying the many parties thrown for him by the city's residents. Genet began to recruit Americans to man privateering ships that would help the French navy attack British

vessels in the Atlantic Ocean. In addition, Genet helped organize Americans willing to fight the Spanish in Florida. Genet then sailed for Philadelphia, periodically stopping along the East Coast to gather more support for French action against Britain and Spain. The subsequent rift between Genet and the United States is known as the Citizen Genet affair. His actions jeopardized the neutral position of the United States stated in Washington's proclamation of April 22, 1793.

Despite Washington and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson asking Genet to cease recruiting privateers and volunteer soldiers, he continued. The Jacobins took power in France, and in 1794 reversed policy, asking Genet to return to Paris. Genet understood a return would have meant certain death, and asked Washington for asylum. Washington granted asylum, and Genet spent the remainder of his life as a farmer in New York.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage

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Gregory Kellerman

GENETRIX

GENETRIX is the code name assigned to a U.S. Air Force program of sending unmanned surveillance balloons over the Soviet Union for the purpose of taking pictures and collecting intelligence more generally. The program was authorized by President Dwight Eisenhower on December 27, 1955, after the Soviet Union rejected his Open Skies proposal that would have allowed free and unfettered photographic overflights through territorial airspace.

In the immediate period after the conclusion of World War II and the onset of the cold war, U.S. defense planners faced an enemy in the Soviet Union whose defenses they knew little about. Balloons had been used with limited effectiveness by the British and Japanese during World War II and with the development of stronger, lightweight polyethylene plastics, it was believed that balloons could fly much higher and obtain intelligence with less than could manned surveillance aircraft missions. In 1950 the air force moved forward and began testing a balloon reconnaissance system under the code name Project GOPHER, building upon the navy's 1947 Project Skyhook which used balloons for high-altitude research. By 1954 work on the project had reached the point where it was ready to go operational and it was rechristened GENETRIX.

The first launch of GENETRIX was set for January 10, 1956. To provide cover for the GENETRIX balloon launches, the United States launched a series of balloons from Alaska, Hawaii, and Okinawa. Japan, as part of an international meteorological program dubbed MOBEY DICK, would obtain information on the jet stream and high-altitude wind circulation patterns. Some 124 MOBEY DICK balloons would be launched between January and July of that year as cover for GENETRIX.

On January 10, 1956, eight GENETRIX balloons were launched from Turkey and one from Germany. In theory the GENETRIX balloons would rise to an altitude of 72,000, far beyond the reach of Soviet defenses, stay over the Soviet Union for five to seven days, and then a coded radio signal would cut loose the gondola containing the cameras and other intelligence equipment that would fall by parachute and be intercepted in midair by U.S. aircraft. In practice, however, the GENETRIX balloons proved to be highly vulnerable. The air force had restricted their operational ceiling to 55,000 feet, making it relatively easy for Soviet planes to intercept them. Their lowered height also made them more visible and on occasion they self-destructed because they sank below a safe altitude of 30,000 feet. Moreover, the amount of time programmed into the timer set to release the gondola was not always sufficient for the balloons to exit Soviet territory. As a result few missions succeeded. A total of 516 balloons were launched with 399 beccoming operational. Only about 380 reached Soviet airspace and only 44 gondolas were successfully recovered.

It was not long before the Soviet Union protested the sending of reconnaissance balloons over its territory as a "gross violation of Soviet air space." The State Department's claim that they were scientific research balloons was soon made null and void by a Soviet displace of radio and intelligence equipment from 50 balloons. Faced with this embarrassment, Eisenhower suspended GENETRIX balloon flights on February 7. The air force officially terminated the operational phase of GENETRIX on March 1, 1956. Balloon overflights were resumed again in 1957 and continued into 1958 under the code name MELTING POT without any greater measure of success. Again, the Soviets managed to shoot down the balloons and produce them for a public relations coup. Soon balloon reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union would be replaced by U-2 overflights.

The ultimate value of the GENETRIX program is a subject of debate. Recovered photos depicted about 8 percent of Soviet-Chinese territory. The official judgment was that these photos were an excelled source of "pioneer reconnaissance." Herbert Scoville, a leading CIA expert, reportedly referred to the results as "useless." On a side note, many credit the GENETRIX balloon launchings as being responsible for the many UFO sightings of the period.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; Balloons

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Glenn P. Hastedt

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC—AND U.S. INTELLIGENCE

From the very beginning of its existence, East Germany—since October 7, 1949, officially named German Democratic Republic or GDR—was an area of extraordinary intelligence activities between the East and West. Located along the cold war

East German VOPO, a quasi-military border policeman using binoculars, standing guard on one of the bridges linking East and West Berlin, 1961. (Library of Congress)

borderline, the G.D.R. was a hub for Soviet spying on the West and the target of keen observation by U.S. intelligence agencies. However, the most intense period of intelligence activities fell into the period between 1949 and August 1961, when the Berlin Wall was erected and effectively reduced Western intelligence capabilities in East Germany.

Several factors determined East Germany's significance to cold war espionage. First, the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950 was interpreted by the United States as a blueprint for a similar approach by the Soviet leadership for an invasion of West Germany. Second, the existence of West Berlin as a unique enclave within East Germany from which high-quality intelligence operations could be carried out aided in understanding Soviet tactics and preventing Eastern Bloc plans from being implemented.

During the immediate postwar period, the Soviet secret services were alone in charge of intelligence work in the Soviet Occupied Zone. These services were, after several years of bureaucratic renaming, the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). However, shortly after the foundation of the GDR, the Ministry of State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS), colloquially known as the STASI, began taking over local and foreign intelligence tasks. These included the infamous Main Department Reconnaissance (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, HVA) headed by Markus Wolf.

On the Western side, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played the main role in conducting intelligence work in postwar Germany. The CIA's activities were complemented by the various branch intelligence units of the Department of Defense

(Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Army Security Agency, etc.), as well as the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Despite efforts to coordinate their work in Germany, these agencies acted independently. However, there were a number of operations conducted jointly by American intelligence and allied agencies such as the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) and the newly created West German secret services such as the Gehlen Organization and, after 1956, the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND).

On July 4, 1945, the first day American troops were allowed into Berlin, the Office of Strategic Services—predecessor to the CIA—set up shop on Főhrenweg in Berlin-Dahlem. The Berlin Operations Base (BOB) was initially headed by Allen Dulles, who would later become CIA's Director of Central Intelligence. (His successor at BOB, Richard Helms, shares the same distinction.) With the increasing danger of Soviet military aggression against West Germany, the CIA sought to develop agent networks with the possibility of using their members as paramilitary forces. The most notable of these groups was the Investigating Committee of Free Jurists (i.e., lawyers), which provided legal services to East German citizens since summer 1950; the CIA used that group to collect information on the East German regime until July 1958.

The United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM), located near Potsdam and officially attached as an American military unit to the Soviet Army headquarters in East Germany, was established as a result of an agreement signed on April 5, 1947, by U.S. Lieutenant General Huebner and Soviet Colonel General Malinin (the Soviet Army had its counterpart mission in Frankfurt/Main). The USMLM estate, located in Neu-Fahrland, near Potsdam, enjoyed full rights of extra-territoriality. It was allowed a maximum of 14 military personnel—conspicuously far fewer than the British and French counterparts—although the real number was always higher, up to 65. Its task was the surveillance, usually by car, of Soviet and East German military operations on those areas that were not restricted for USMLM. The question of whether a certain area belonged to the Permanent Restricted Area (PRA) led to frictions and even clashes with Soviet forces since the maps used by both sides did not always coincide.

A major intelligence requirement during this period was determining the location and disposition of Soviet troops and their East German allies. In terms of size, the Soviet Army maintained an average of 350,000 military personnel in GDR territory, whereas the East German National People's Army (NVA) had 105,000 troops. To monitor these troop movements, the Army Security Agency (ASA) established a listening post at Teufelsberg, West Germany, in 1951.

On June 17, 1953, a dramatic uprising caused by deteriorating living conditions and increased work quotas unfolded throughout the GDR. This was misinterpreted by the Soviet leadership to be the result of Western intelligence operations, although documentary evidence shows that this was not the case. The gross misjudgment of the causes of the uprising could have had disastrous consequences as the Soviet and American armed forces began to escalate in readiness, reflecting their heightened suspiciousness and hostility.

As a result, BOB increased its espionage activities. Its most spectacular operation was the building of the Berlin Tunnel, an effort to tap telecommunications lines in East Berlin. Code-named "Operation Gold," the construction began on September 2, 1954, at a U.S. Army radar station in Rudow under the leadership of the new BOB

chief William Harvey. The tunnel descended 16.5 feet below the ground and proceeded 1,476 feet underneath the border to the cable tap point in East Berlin. Recordings of communications began in August 1955 and lasted until the Soviets "discovered" the tunnel on April 22, 1956. Indeed, the success of the operation was tainted when it became clear that a Soviet mole within British intelligence, George Blake, had been briefed on the plan and informed the KGB before the tunnel was even completed.

The remainder of the 1950s was spent in a constant competition between American and Soviet/East German forces to recruit each other's citizens as agents. One such spy was Petr Semenovich Popov, a colonel in the GRU, who provided highly valuable information on Soviet illegals (foreign spies operating without diplomatic cover) in West Germany, Austria, and Great Britain, as well as the state of military readiness in the GDR (Popov eventually came under suspicion, was recalled to Moscow, arrested on February 18, 1959, and executed in June 1960).

The erection of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, caused the most dramatic shift in U.S. intelligence operations in Germany. As a matter of fact, the CIA had envisioned the possibility of a border closure as early as 1948. BOB had been taking active measures in 1960/61 to maintain communication with its agents in the event that travel was cut off. Nonetheless, the Wall soon accomplished what the East German regime had hoped for: halting the flood of escapees to the West and interrupting the U.S. agencies' easy access to their agents. Moreover, the STASI gained momentum in expanding its network of informants which increasingly complicated the work of Western agents in the GDR. Although the CIA gradually adapted to the new rules of espionage in East Germany, Berlin lost its role as the center of cold war intelligence and instead became a training ground for new recruits learning the ropes of fighting Communist intelligence, earning the nickname "Brandenburg's School for Boys." In 1973, a CIA station was established in East Berlin, but, similar to its West Berlin counterpart, it was never able to gather significant amounts of human intelligence due to the overwhelming control of the STASI. The CIA instead chose to focus on technical operations such as installing sensors to monitor traffic going to military bases, or radiation detectors to ensure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements.

Until 1974, the United States Military Liaison Mission was the only official U.S. representation in the GDR. That year, when in the course of détente the United States recognized East Germany diplomatically, the existence of USMLM was under threat. But since the Soviet government had a vital interest in continuing its Military Liaison Mission in Frankfurt, the USMLM's continuing work was quietly accepted. The cars of the USMLM liaison officers were constantly engaged in cat-and-mouse games with Soviet and East German intelligence and army personnel. In times of heightened political tensions between the superpowers, the typical car chase, ramming, and detention incidents became more violent. Thus, in 1985, a tour officer, U.S. Major Arthur Nicholson, was shot by a Soviet sentry and died of his wounds since timely medical help was denied.

In the late 1980s, the situation of Western intelligence began to change profoundly. As a result of liberalization trends in the USSR and some of its allies, the number of defectors began to rise. Officers of the STASI began to volunteer information to the West, and although some turned out to be double agents, those who were genuine provided valuable insight into an organization that had successfully resisted penetration for

decades. Still, none of the CIA's newly acquired assets could have predicted the events of November 9, 1989. After the Berlin Wall was unexpectedly opened, U.S. intelligence was soon in a race with CNN to keep the President Bush informed of events in the GDR. This irritated the White House, and soon the case officers grew bolder, beginning a massive program of locating STASI officers and bluntly offering cash in exchange for intelligence on the collapsing regime. However, the successful program eventually backfired, as the number of East Germans and Soviets wishing money and/or relocation to the West in exchange for information (which was steadily decreasing in value) began to skyrocket. A year earlier, U.S. intelligence was struggling to recruit East German sources. Now they were turning them away.

The story of the U.S. involvement with East German intelligence did not end with Germany's reunification on October 3, 1990. Following the White House's complaints that it was getting better intelligence from CNN, the CIA orchestrated Operation Rosewood, which involved recruiting STASI officers to raid the MfS headquarters and steal records relating to the foreign intelligence branch of the MfS (the HVA). These documents, later named the Rosenholz Files, were compiled onto 381 CD-ROMs. The German government repeatedly requested the return of the Rosenholz Files. In 1999, it was announced that the files would be returned to Germany, which took place in 2003.

See also: Berlin Tunnel; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Gehlen Organization; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); STASI

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GERMAN LIBRARY OF INFORMATION

The German Library of Information (GLI), in New York City, was one of the principal agencies of Axis propaganda which operated openly in the United States prior to the existence of that country into World War II. The library was an information center located in the same building as the German consulate, at 17 Battery Place, New York; it printed and distributed a wide variety of printed material, including books, pamphlets, and periodicals, all devoted to a vast propaganda campaign to extol Nazism. All of this funding came from Germany, principally the German Foreign Office and its propaganda ministry (Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda).

Nazi Germany's uses of propaganda during the 1930s and its recognition that such activities could help win the war led to the creation of wartime propaganda and

psychological warfare agencies. The total impact of Nazi propaganda in Germany was the creation of an image of reality shaped according to the wishes of the leaders of the movement. Hitler's conception was based on control of the reins of government, a point he emphatically stated in *Mein Kampf*. Paul Josef Goebbel's task as Nazi propaganda minister was to see that this power was maintained. An important target was the United States.

The GLI was established in May 1936 with Heinz Beller as its director; he was succeeded by Matthias Schmitz under whose direction the library continued until its expulsion from the United States in June 1941. From its inception until its investigation by the House's Special Committee on Un-American Activities in August 1940, the GLI spent an approximate total of $341,694 in the dissemination of Nazi propaganda. These costs greatly increased after September 1939 when propaganda activities were devoted completely to support the Nazi war in Europe. The GLI mailing list, with over 70,000 names, was used principally for weekly mailings of the library's publication, *Facts in Review*, edited by George Sylvester Viereck, a German-born American citizen who was a paid agent of the German government in World War I. There was also an extensive archive of phonograph records of speeches, lectures, and announcements originally broadcast over Nazi short-wave radio from Germany that were circulated among clubs, singing societies, and any other group that would accept and use them. These broadcasts were listed weekly in another bulletin, *Germany Calling*.

In September 1940, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities subpoenaed GLI's files and records then issued a report, two months later, that exposed the library's propaganda activities (*A Preliminary Digest and Report on the Un-American Activities of Various Nazi Organizations and Individuals in the United States, Including Diplomatic and Consular Agents of the German Government*). In January 1941, the committee published a report which dealt with the use of the mails, by GLI among others, for the dissemination of Nazi propaganda by GLI (*Preliminary Report on Totalitarian Propaganda in the United States*).

Following the committee's disclosures about the library, Mr. Sumner Welles, acting under the direction of President Franklin Roosevelt, ordered the library to leave the United States.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Martin J. Manning

GIMPEL, ERICH
(MARCH 25, 1910–1996)

Erich Gimpel was a German agent who arrived in the United States in 1944 and was captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a month later. Born on March 25, 1910, he worked for the German radio corporation in South America, spending most of the time in Lima, Peru. He was interned there in 1942, brought to the United States, and then repatriated to Germany. Gimpel then operated as a German agent, couriering information from Berlin to Madrid, Spain, and was trained as a spy at the German espionage school in The Hague, Holland. There he met an American drifter called William Colepaugh, and the two were taken by the German U-boat, U-1230, to the United States, with both of them left at Hancock Point, in the Gulf of Maine, on November 29, 1944. The plan was for Gimpel to build an 80-watt radio which would be able to transmit information back to Germany on U.S. atomic secrets. However the submarine was forced to sink a nearby Canadian ship, and some locals reported seeing two men acting suspiciously near the coast.

Gimpel and Colepaugh made for Boston and then went by train to New York where Colepaugh decided not to take part in operations and was taken into custody by the FBI. He identified Gimpel, who was quickly arrested and the two were arraigned before a Military Commission in February 1945. Both were found guilty and sentenced to be hanged, but the sentences were commuted to life imprisonment by President Roosevelt.

In 1955, Gimpel was released and returned to Germany. Two years later he wrote his autobiography, *Spy for Germany*. It was published in 2003 in the United States under the title *Agent 146*, and Gimpel was interviewed by Oliver North for his Fox News Channel program.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Justin Corfield

GISEVIUS, HANS BERND
(JULY 14, 1904–FEBRUARY 23, 1974)

Hans Bernd Gisevius was a German diplomat and intelligence officer who later liaised with the OSS, and was involved in the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944. Born on July 14, 1904, Hans Gisevius studied law and then joined the police at the Prussian Interior Ministry and transferred to the Reich Ministry of the Interior. He quickly came to dislike the Nazi predilection for violence against their opponents, and their immunity from any actions by the police, especially at *Kristallnacht*, and started building up a dossier of Nazi crimes which he would, in fact, use at the Nuremberg Trials. When Heinrich Himmler took over the police functions of the German state, Gisevius was removed from the police.

In 1939 Gisevius joined the Abwehr, the German intelligence service of Admiral Canaris. Canaris was also opposed to Hitler and sent Gisevius to Zurich, Switzerland, as the vice consul in the German Consulate General. There Gisevius had to collect information for German military intelligence. However his real role was to establish and maintain contact with the Allies on behalf of Canaris. Gisevius approached British intelligence and the U.S. Embassy but was turned away. He then made contact with Allen Dulles, and this allowed Canaris to keep in contact with the Americans. After the failure of the July 20, 1944, assassination attempt on Hitler, Gisevius fled to Switzerland where he spent the rest of the war.

After the end of World War II, Gisevius returned to Germany and was a prosecution witness against Hermann Göring at the Nuremberg Trial. He later wrote his memoirs, *Bis zum Bitteren Ende* ("To the Bitter End"), which was published in 1946. He lived in the United States and West Berlin, moving to Switzerland, but returning to West Germany before his death on February 23, 1974.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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GLOMAR EXPLORER

Glomar Explorer is a large, specially configured ship, launched in November 1972 as a U.S. Navy civilian-manned ship to support a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) secret operation, known as Project Jennifer. The purpose of this project was to recover the Soviet Golf II diesel-electric ballistic missile submarine, K-129, lost in the Pacific approximately 750 miles northwest of Hawaii. Secretly salvaging such a submarine with missiles intact would be a significant intelligence coup. Since the K-129 was known to carry three of the new Serb-class ballistic missiles, their recovery intact would greatly enhance U.S. knowledge of Soviet ballistic missile technology. That and the potential recovery of the missiles' surface-to-surface (SS-N-5) launch system,

embarked torpedoes and associated launch system, navigational equipment, code machines, and other materials would clearly justify costs incurred. K-129 had been lost at such a great depth that no existing system could accomplish recovery, thus necessitating construction of a specially designed recovery ship. To avoid raising Soviet intelligence interest, all aspects of the ship's planned mission, related capabilities, operational planning, and conduct of operations were placed under the tightest of security controls. Consistent with such security, the CIA successfully approached businessman Howard Hughes, whose companies already provided support to various highly classified government contracts. Planning then started for constructing the *Glomar Explorer*.

On April 11, 1968, the Soviet Golf II class submarine K-129 suffered a catastrophic explosion and sank with all hands in over three miles of water approximately 750 miles northwest of Hawaii. The U.S. Navy's underwater listening network "Sea Spider" recorded the event. Through the use of sound recordings and computerized calculations, the navy was able to pinpoint the disaster area. The navy then maintained the site under surveillance, expecting a Soviet recovery operation which, however, did not materialize, the Soviets apparently concluding by late June 1968 that K-129 had been lost at sea. The U.S. Navy then dispatched the deep-sea reconnaissance ship USS *Mizar* to the area, which obtained an accurate picture of the site by late August. The size of such a recovery operation and the need for secrecy forced the navy to approach the CIA for assistance. The CIA soon emerged as the controlling entity on the project and subsequently obtained U.S. government approval for a covert effort to recover the wreckage of K-129 for the study of Soviet technology.

In January and February of 1970, the CIA surreptitiously contracted Howard Hughes' Global Marine for the recovery operation. Global Marine had extensive experience in undersea engineering and several ships mounting oil drilling rigs. Due to the complexity of the operation and the technologies involved, other companies, notably Hughes Tools and Lockheed, participated in construction of the ship, accompanying barge, and onboard equipment. This equipment included a large mechanical grapple which was to be used to lift K-129 to the *Glomar Explorer*. Launched in December of 1972, the ship is estimated to have cost over $40 million. Hughes informed the media that it would be used for recovering manganese nodules from the seafloor, thus implementing the agreed-upon cover story.

The ship reached the accident site in mid-1974 and attempted to recover the submarine. Due to a mechanical failure in the grapple, the submarine's stern broke away and fell back to the ocean floor, permitting recovery of only a portion of the bow. This contained two nuclear-tipped torpedoes, coding equipment, and the remains of several Soviet sailors subsequently buried at sea. The *Los Angeles Times* broke a story on the operation in 1975, thus exposing aspects of Project Jennifer to the public. The *Glomar Explorer* had been intended for subsequent use in similar operations, but this exposure led to her being mothballed in Suison Bay until the 1990s, when refitted for use in deep-sea drilling operations.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency

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Richard M. Mickle

GOLD, HARRY
(1910–1974)

Harry Gold confessed to being a spy in May 1950, convicted of espionage and was given a 30-year prison sentence in 1951. He was paroled in 1965 and died in 1974. Gold was a courier in the Atomic Spy Ring that provided the Soviet Union with secrets about the atomic bomb. His confession led to the arrest of David Greenglass, Morton Sobel, and Ethel and Julius Rosenberg.

Gold was born Heinrich Golodnitsky in Bern, Switzerland, in 1910. His parents had fled from Kiev, Russia, in 1907, and in 1914 the family immigrated to the United States where they changed their name to Gold. He changed his first name to Harry in 1922. Gold graduated from high school in Philadelphia and went on to work in the Pennsylvania Sugar Company's chemistry department. He was recruited to work as a spy in 1935 by Thomas Lessing Black. Gold worked for three different Soviet handlers: Jacob Golos, Semon Semonov, and Anatoli Yakovlev. As courier in the Atomic Spy Ring, Gold transported information collected by Klaus Fuchs, Morton Sobell, and David Greenglass.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed Gold under surveillance in 1946 and in 1947 brought him before a grand jury on charges of espionage. Due to insufficient evidence no charges were forthcoming. This changed in 1950 when Klaus Fuchs was arrested in Great Britain and confessed to being a spy for the Soviet Union. He identified Gold from a photograph as his contact.

See also: Atomic Spy Ring; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Fuchs, Emil Jullius Klaus; Greenglass, David; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel; Sobell, Morton

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Glenn P. Hastedt

GOLDBERG, ARTHUR JOSEPH
(AUGUST 8, 1908–JANUARY 19, 1990)

Arthur Goldberg was a lawyer, Supreme Court judge, and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. He worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II and was in charge of U.S. intelligence relations with the labor movement in occupied Europe.

Goldberg established himself as a renowned labor lawyer in the 1930s. As preparation to the 1943 Allied invasion of North Africa, Goldberg, through his position in the OSS, was involved in a failed attempt to build a partisan movement on the remnants of the left-winged Republicans who fought Franco in the 1936–1939 Spanish civil war. The Spanish government delivered a strong diplomatic protest but Goldberg and his superiors denied any knowledge of the operation.

In mid-1944 the OSS launched the FAUST Plan to establish intelligence networks in Nazi Germany itself. The London office, which Goldberg had joined in 1943, was tasked with recruiting German-born agents willing to be airdropped into hostile territory with little hope of assistance from friendly civilians. These individuals were sought amongst left-winged exiles in Britain—the Free Germany Committee of Great Britain. Chief of the London station, William Casey (CIA director 1980–1986) opposed their recruitment because they were predominantly Communists and pro-Soviet, but Goldberg successfully convinced OSS Director General William J. Donovan to support it. Through the remainder of the war, German OSS agents provided vital military intelligence from within the Third Reich itself.

See also: Office of Strategic Services

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Frode Lindgjerdet

GOLENIEWSKI, MICHAEL
(1922–1993)

Michael Goleniewski was a senior Polish intelligence officer who defected to the West in 1961. On his own initiative he began providing information to the United States anonymously in 1958 via a series of 27 letters. He fled to the West, fearing that he had been discovered by Soviet intelligence.

Goleniewski was a particularly valuable source of intelligence because he was working in Polish intelligence simultaneously as a KGB spy. In his debriefings with British intelligence officials, Goleniewski identified George Blake as a Soviet spy, ending the career of one of the Soviet Union's most valuable assets. He also identified Harry Houghton as

head of the Portland spy ring that operated at the Royal Navy's Underwater Weapons Research Establishment along with many other Polish and Soviet intelligence officers.

Over time Goleniewsksi's eccentricities and accusations lessened the perceived value of his information. He stated that at least since 1959 Henry Kissinger was a Soviet spy and he wanted to be referred to as Prince Alexei Romanov, the son of Tsar Nicholas II.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

GOLITSYN, ANATOLI
(1926–)

Anatoli Golitsyn is among the most controversial Soviet defectors to the United States. His accusations concerning Soviet infiltration of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) set off a prolonged search for KGB agents that many argue crippled the agency and led to more self-inflicted harm than any KGB agent could have accomplished.

Golitsyn defected to the United States in Helsinki, Finland, in 1961, apparently to avoid a demotion for poor performance. In addition to identifying several low-level Soviet agents operating in the West and some new information on Kim Philby, Golitsyn argued that the CIA had been infiltrated by Soviet agents. Moreover, he asserted that false defectors would appear in an attempt to discredit him and protect Soviet moles. The head of the CIA's counterintelligence unit, James Angleton, became a strong believer in Golitsyn's story and gave him access to CIA operational files in an attempt to uncover these individuals. Angelton's faith in Golitysn led him to reject the legitimacy of Yuri Nosenko, a high-ranking Soviet defector who asserted that no such mole existed. Angleton treated him as a double agent when others believed his argument and saw Golitysn as the provocateur. A similar split befell British intelligence as a result of his assertion that British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was a KGB agent.

Over time Golitsyn's adherence to conspiracy theories directed at him personally and to the West more generally took on an extreme character. He maintained that the Sino-Soviet split, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union's conflict with Josip Tito of Yugoslavia were little more than disinformation campaigns. In 1994 Golitsyn asserted that perestroika was little more than a myth to keep the KGB in power and to lull the West into a new and false sense of security.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"

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GORDIEVSKY, OLEG
(1938–)

Oleg Gordievsky was a KGB official who defected to Great Britain in 1985. He provided valuable information about the identities of key Soviet agents in the West. During his years of service to the British Intelligence Service, some 316 espionage suspects were removed from 43 countries. He also provided information to the effect that John Cairncross and not Sir Roger Hillis was the famed missing fifth man in the Cambridge 5 spy ring.

Gordievesky was born in Moscow. His father was an official in the NKVD. After graduating from the Moscow Institute of International Relations in 1956, Gordievsky entered the KGB with the planned cover of being a diplomat. His early career saw him shuttle back and forth from the West, principally Copenhagen and Moscow. It was while serving in Copenhagen during the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that Gordievesky became thoroughly disillusioned with the Soviet system.

In 1972 Gordievesky was approached about being a spy and began engaging in espionage in 1974. In 1982 Gordievesky was promoted to the position of KGB resident in London, a position that made him responsible for all intelligence gathering and espionage activities in Great Britain. Gordievesky's identity as a spy became known to Soviet authorities and in 1985 he was recalled to the Soviet Union. It is speculated that one possible source to identify him as a spy was Aldrich Ames, a Central Intelligence Agency official who was a Soviet spy.

Gordievesky returned and was subjected to an interrogation process that included the use of drugs. After his release, but still under surveillance, Gordievesky made contact with his British handler and arranged to escape from the Soviet Union by car through Finland. His wife and children remained in Russia and were only able to join him in Great Britain after the cold war ended and the Soviet Union had collapsed.

After his defection Gordievesky became a prominent author of books on Soviet intelligence, many of which are coauthored with Christopher Andrew. In November 2007 Gordievesky claimed to be the victim of a Soviet assassination attempt. The instrument used was a tainted sedative.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service)

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GOSS, PORTER JOHNSTON
(NOVEMBER 26, 1938–)

Porter J. Goss became the 19th Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on September 24, 2004. He held that position until April 21, 2005, when the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was established. At that point he became Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Goss was born on November 26, 1938, in Waterbury, Connecticut, and he received a BA degree from Yale University. While at Yale he was recruited by the CIA and worked in the Directorate of Operations in Latin America and Europe during the 1960s. While working in Latin America he helped to recruit Cuban exiles for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion. Upon leaving the CIA, Goss went into business and politics in Florida as a Republican. In 1988 he was elected to the House of Representatives and became chair of the House Intelligence Committee in 1997. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Goss co-chaired the joint 9/11 congressional intelligence investigation. That report was largely silent on White House policies leading up to the attack and focused instead on the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation. Goss's nomination to the post of DCI was opposed by some Democrats in Congress, who felt he had been overly partisan while serving as chair of the House Intelligence Committee. Others were concerned with his co-sponsorship of the USA PATRIOT Act. He was approved by a vote of 77–17, with all negative votes coming from Democrats.

While serving as chair of the House Intelligence Committee Goss had been highly critical of the CIA for inattention to human intelligence and its failure to place agents within Islamic extremist groups. Goss also angered Democrats on the committee with his highly partisan behavior after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by, among other actions, his public attacks on Senator and Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry's voting record on intelligence. Upon taking over as DCI, Goss moved vigorously to address this state of affairs by replacing several top-ranking officials in charge of covert action. The swiftness and extent of these personnel changes brought forward charges of politicalization on the part of several current and former CIA officials. Although Goss survived this initial political storm over his stewardship of the CIA in September 2005, he came under attack both from within the CIA and in Congress for his lack of vision. He responded by promising to expand CIA spying operations overseas even while cutting back on CIA headquarters' staffing. The criticism stemmed from the resignation in protest of Robert Richer, the clandestine service's second-ranking official whom Goss had appointed to that position.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; September 11, 2001; USA Patriot Act

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GOTTLIEB, SIDNEY
(AUGUST 3, 1918–MARCH 7, 1999)

Born Joseph Scheider on August 3, 1918, Sidney Gottlieb was the controversial head of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) Technical Services Staff (TSS). During his career he played a leading role in CIA plans to experiment with drugs as a way of obtaining information and to assassinate foreign leaders.

Gottlieb received a PhD in Chemistry from the California Technical Institute in 1951, the same year he began to work for the CIA. Within the CIA he described himself as "Dr. Strangelove" and was referred to by others as the "Black Sorcerer" and the "Dirty Trickster." In 1953 Gottlieb took charge of Project MKULTRA, which experimented with hallucinogenic drugs such as LSD on unknowing subjects. One victim of MKULTRA was Dr. Frank Olson, who fell to his death from a 10th-floor window on November 28, 1953. A civilian employee of the U.S. Army, Olson ingested some 70 micrograms of LSD that had been secretly mixed in a drink on the night of November 19, 1953. Soon thereafter he began to exhibit signs of paranoia and schizophrenia. In congressional testimony, Gottlieb admitted to using LSD on as many as 40 people without their knowledge.

Gottlieb played a central role in several assassination CIA plots. He is linked to assassination plans against Cuban Leader Fidel Castro that included spraying a television study Castro planned to use with LSD, contaminating his shoes with thallium, lacing Castro's cigars with poison, poisoning his wet suit, rigging a conch shell with explosives, and developing a poisonous fountain pen that would be given to Castro. Gottlieb was also involved in plans to assassinate Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba. In this case he proposed inserting poison into Lumumba's toothpaste.

Gottlieb's activities became public knowledge as a result of the Church Committee's investigation into CIA wrongdoings. They had become known within the CIA in 1963 after an internal investigation of TSS by the CIA's Inspector General's Office that led to a termination of his mind-control programs. Assassinations were banned by an Executive Order issued by President Ford. Gottlieb retired from the CIA in 1972. He had served as the head of TSS from 1967 until his retirement. Gottlieb destroyed an overwhelming majority of the files associated with his career in the CIA. He died on March 7, 1999.

See also: Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Olson, Dr. Frank R.

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GOUZENKO, IGOR
(JANUARY 13, 1919–1982)

The defection of Igor Gouzenko in 1945 alerted the West to the existence of significant Soviet espionage networks in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. He identified agents by both their real names and their code names, pointed to the reality of Soviet attempts to steal the secret of the atom bomb, and seriously damaged the intelligence offensive of the Soviet Union.

Born in Russia on January 13, 1919, Gouzenko joined the Young Communist League and was educated at the Moscow Architectural Institute. In 1941 he was transferred to the Military Engineering Academy, where he trained as a cipher specialist and was assigned to the Foreign Military Directorate of the Soviet military's General Staff (GRU) in Moscow. As a lieutenant in the Red Army, Gouzenko was sent to Canada in 1943. He began his perilous journey from cipher clerk to cold war icon in the autumn of 1945, when about to be recalled to Moscow.

On the evening of September 5, 1945, Gouzenko secretly stuffed 109 classified documents under his shirt and attempted to defect. It was not an easy defection. Neither the Ministry of Justice nor the *Ottawa Journal* newspaper, both of which he approached, showed any interest. It was only after a Soviet security unit responded to Gouzenko's disappearance by breaking down his door and searching his apartment that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police took him seriously and political asylum was granted. He was debriefed by the British Security Service (MI-5) in September 1945 and early 1946. The director of MI-5's Protective Security Division (and later director general), Roger Hollis, was responsible and a MI-5 counterespionage officer, Robert Hemblys-Scales, used Gouzenko's intelligence to compile an appreciation of Soviet espionage activities.

Gouzenko's defection had major repercussions for both Soviet and Western intelligence services. He identified a major GRU spy ring controlled by the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. He also provided information on the clandestine activities of the Soviet security and intelligence service (NKGB). His stolen documents pointed to an elaborate network of espionage that included Canadian civil servants, politicians, and scientists. Consequently dozens of local and Russian agents were arrested and Soviet espionage activities in Canada were paralyzed. Moscow monitored Gouzenko's betrayal through Kim Philby (head of MI-6's Soviet Counterintelligence), who received regular briefings on the Gouzenko revelations. Gouzenko's evidence also led MI-5 to the espionage activities of British physicists Allan Nunn May and, ultimately, Klaus Fuchs. The Gouzenko affair thereby became closely entwined with the politics of the atom bomb.

His testimony to the Royal Commission was the first significant "inside" exposure of the methods and motivations of Soviet agents and was sufficiently authoritative to convince the commissioners of the conspiratorial character of Communism. By focusing international attention on issues of loyalty, subversion, national security, and atomic espionage, Gouzenko helped ignite the cold war and exacerbated anxieties within the United States. Until his death in 1982, Gouzenko lived under police protection in Mississauga, Ontario, and occasionally appeared in public with his trademark hood to conceal his identity.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); MI-5 (The Security Service); Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"

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Phillip Deery

GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEADQUARTERS

The Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) officially came into existence on April 1, 1946, replacing, in name only, the Government Code and Cypher School. GCHQ is the British intelligence organization responsible for signals intelligence and during World War II was housed at Bletchley Park. In 2003 GCHQ moved to new offices in Cheltenham, nicknamed "the doughnut" for its circular layout.

GCHQ was preceded by a number of organizations dating back to World War I when both the British army (as MI 1b) and navy (as NID25 or Room 40) had such units. In 1919 the British Cabinet's Secret Service Committee recommended creating a peacetime code-breaking agency. This body created on November 1, 1919, through a merger of MI 1b and NID25 and christened the Government Code and Cypher School. It employed 25 cryptologists. Officially it was charged with advising on the security of codes and ciphers used by the British government. A secret directive tasked it with studying the cipher communication methods used by foreign powers. On October 19 it had deciphered its first communication. The GCHQ's secret charter was not acknowledged publicly until 1983. The 1994 Intelligence Service Act made it a fully autonomous agency.

The interwar period saw GCHQ direct its efforts at diplomatic codes and in the 1920s it was successfully reading Soviet diplomatic ciphers until 1927, when public remarks by Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin alerted Soviet officials to a break in security and led them to take counteraction. This emphasis on diplomatic communications saw it removed from the jurisdiction of the admiralty and placed under the control of the Foreign Office. This emphasis on diplomatic traffic continued through World War II and saw GCHQ break the German Enigma cipher machine. German diplomatic messages were not the only GCHQ target. It worked on the diplomatic communications of 26 countries, employing over 150 cryptosystems.

Unwanted publicity fell on the GCHQ in 2003 when one of its employees, Katherine Gun, made public a National Security Agency document sent to it identifying a U.S. wiretapping project against diplomats assigned to the United Nations on the eve of Security Council's vote on support for the Iraq War. Additional publicity has fallen upon GCHQ for its participation in international collaborative intelligence-gathering efforts, such as the UKUSA agreement that carried out ECHELON in which international telephone calls, e-mails, faxes, and radio transmissions were intercepted and listened to. Beginning in 2007 the GCHQ began to make publicly available some

of its intelligence reports on Soviet bloc military and paramilitary activity from the 1950s.

See also: Bletchley Park; Cold War Intelligence; ECHELON

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Glenn P. Hastedt

GRAY, L. PATRICK, III
(JULY 18, 1916–JULY 6, 2005)

L. Patrick Gray III served as acting director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from May 3, 1972 to April 27, 1973. He was born in St. Louis, Missouri, and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1940, whereupon he went into the Navy and served in World War II and the Korean War. While in the Navy he obtained a law degree from George Washington University. Before retiring Gray worked briefly as military assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as special assistant to the secretary of defense for legal and legislative affairs. He entered private practice in 1961. A staunch supporter of Richard Nixon, Gray worked briefly in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and later would become assistant attorney general. With his nomination for the position of deputy attorney general still before Congress, President Nixon appointed him as acting director of the FBI following J. Edgar Hoover's death on May 2, 1972, even though Gray had no law enforcement experience. Day-to-day operational supervision of the FBI remained with Hoover's Associate Director W. Mark Felt. It was Felt who, in May 2005 only weeks before Gray's death, would be revealed as "Deep Throat," the source of key inside information to reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein during the Watergate scandal.

The 1968 Omnibus Crime Bill required that all future FBI directors receive congressional approval. Accordingly on February 28, 1973, Gray's confirmation hearings began. With the Watergate scandal already under way, the Senate Judiciary Committee used the hearings not only to ascertain Gray's credentials but to examine the policies of the Nixon administration more broadly. In his testimony Gray revealed that in the months he had been acting director he had given White House Counsel John Dean copies of FBI reports on Watergate and destroyed two files of documents. Gray also contradicted White House assertions that the Committee to Re-Elect the President had been engaging in dirty tricks. In early March, confronted with heavy political fallout from his testimony, President Nixon decided to withdraw his nomination. White House Counsel John Ehrlichman suggested that Gray be allowed to "twist slowly, slowly in the wind." Confronted with mass resignations by his assistant directors, Gray resigned on April 27, 1973.

In 1978 Gray was indicted for having approved illegal break-ins that were part of Nixon's overall policy of targeting his political enemies. President Ronald Reagan pardoned him in 1980.

See also: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Hoover, J. Edgar; Watergate

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Glenn P. Hastedt

GREENE, GRAHAM
(OCTOBER 2, 1904–APRIL 4, 1991)

Graham Greene is well known for his numerous literary works and his espionage activities. He served in the British Intelligence during the 1920s, 1930s, and early 1940s. His literary works are noted for their exciting plots and focus on characters' internal struggles.

Greene was born in Berkhamsted, England. After a melancholy childhood that included several suicide attempts he attended Balliol College (1922–1925) in Oxford. After graduation he became a journalist for the *Nottingham Journal* in England. Then in 1926 he became a subeditor for the *London Times*.

Additionally, while at Oxford Greene first became involved with espionage and was hired to work in Ireland and French-occupied Germany. Prior to Greene's station in West Africa with the British Colonial Service in 1941, the MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service of England) was slow to accept him due to his brother's involvement with Japanese intelligence. In 1943 Greene returned to England at St. Albans where he worked spreading false information. In June of 1944 Greene left the MI-6 to avoid an unwanted promotion.

Greene was an active writer who wrote during his entire adult life. His first successful novel was published in 1929, *The Man Within*. Following this success he accepted a contract to write full-time. Heavily influenced by Franz Kafka, most of Greene's novels include elements of political tension. Greene's experiences in espionage activities inspired several of his novels, including *The Ministry of Fear*, *Our Man in Havana*, and *The Human Factor*.

See also: Fiction—Spy Novels

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Kristin Whitehair

GREENGLASS, DAVID
(MARCH 2, 1922–)

David Greenglass was recruited into Soviet espionage by his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg, against whom he testified in one of the most controversial trials in U.S. history. Greenglass was imprisoned in Lewisburg Penitentiary for his role in passing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union.

Born on March 2, 1922, to Jewish immigrant parents, David Greenglass lived in the Lower East Side, New York, and was educated at Manhattan's Haaren High School where he acquired skills as a machinist. At the age of 16 he joined the Young Communist League (YCL), but rarely attended its meetings and never joined the Communist Party. He worked as a machinist at different companies until inducted into the army on March 23, 1943. With the Communist Party ardent in its support of the war effort, Greenglass' faith in Communism was fortified.

In September 1944, Greenglass was granted a full security clearance after lying about his membership of the YCL, and the following month was transferred to Los Alamos, New Mexico, one week before Klaus Fuchs arrived. He worked in the Explosives Division, making models of bomb parts. Soon after Julius Rosenberg recruited Ruth, David's young wife, Greenglass agreed in December 1944 to obtain classified information on the Manhattan Project. In January and September 1945, whilst on leave in New York, Greenglass supplied Rosenberg with several technical sketches concerning the atom bomb.

David Greenglass was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on June 16, 1950, after confessing, during a lengthy interrogation, to espionage. His attorney, O. John Rogge, persuaded him to implicate his brother-in-law. In exchange for Ruth's immunity, he turned prosecution witness against Ethel and Julius and this mitigated his sentence. He expected five years, received 15. and served 10. After his release in 1960, Greenglass adopted a pseudonym and lived in obscurity. In 1996 he told a journalist, Sam Roberts, that he had committed perjury in 1951 when he exaggerated the extent of Ethel's involvement in espionage.

See also: Atomic Spy Ring; Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; Los Alamos; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel

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Phillip Deery

GREENHOW, ROSE O'NEAL
(1817–1864)

Rose O'Neal Greenhow was born in Maryland and during her early teens she lived with her aunt who owned the Old Capitol Borderinghouse. Located near Capitol Hill, it served as home for many prominent political figures including Senator John C. Calhoun.

She married Robert Greenhow, a linguist in the State Department, in 1835. Rose Greenhow soon became immersed in a series of diplomatic intrigues that often placed her in the role of spy or provocateur. She became a confidant of then secretary of state and later President James Buchanan. During his administration Greenhow would become an outspoken advocate of succession. Earlier she was suspected of spying for Great Britain during negotiations over the Oregon Territory and in 1849 Greenhow was associated with a plan to annex Cuba and bring it into the United States as a slave state. Widowed in 1854, Greenhow agreed to serve as a spy for the Confederacy shortly after the Civil War began. Her place in Washington society provided her with a vast network of social and political contacts to obtain intelligence from. The established mythology of the Civil War has Greenhow's greatest intelligence coup as that of providing information to General P. G. T. Beauregard prior to the First Battle of Bull Run. Other research suggests that this account is unlikely to be true or the role played in the Confederate victory to be greatly exaggerated. Greenhow was unschooled in the techniques of espionage tradecraft and made little secret of her Southern sympathies. It came as no surprise then that she was arrested by Thomas Pinkerton for spying along with many of the members of the espionage ring she belonged to. First placed under house arrest before being imprisoned in the Old Capitol Boardinghouse that her aunt had owned, Greenhow was permitted go to Richmond in June 1862. The following year Greenhow went to Europe and published her memoirs. In August 1864 she sailed back to the Confederacy with messages from Confederate agents. She drowned off the coast of North Carolina as the ship she was on sank while trying to run a Union blockade.

See also: Civil War Intelligence; Confederate Signal and Secret Service Bureau; Pinkerton, Allan

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Glenn P. Hastedt

GRU (MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE)

The Foreign Military Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federal Republic is best known in the West by the acronym GRU. It was created on October 21, 1918, by Leon Trotsky as the Registration Department of the Red Army, which he led. It was charged with the task of the collection of military and political intelligence relevant to the mission of the Red Army. To accomplish this mission, it collected signals intelligence and set up residencies abroad where it stationed the equivalent of military attachés and recruited agents.

Although its existence was long known, the GRU largely operated in obscurity during Stalin's rule. Its first head, Janis Karlovich Berzin, was a victim of Stalin's purges. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the GRU became the primary intelligence arm of the Main Command of the Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces. Subsequently, in 1992, it became the military intelligence arm of the Russian Federal Republic. Its basic structure remains rooted in its Stalinist past: a first directorate is responsible for agent intelligence; a second directorate is responsible for front intelligence; a third directorate deals with operational intelligence collection and dissemination in Asia; a fourth directorate does the same for the Middle East; a fifth directorate is responsible for operational intelligence within fleets, fronts, and military districts; and a sixth directorate is responsible for electronic intelligence. To this list has been added a Cosmic Intelligence Directorate that is responsible for space-based intelligence collection along with other directorates responsible for military intelligence related to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), nuclear weapons, and the transfer of military technology.

In the realm of espionage the GRU has had both spectacular successes and failures. During World War II one of the Soviet Union's most important spies, Richard Sorge, worked for the GRU. One of the most famous cold war spies in the United States, Whitaker Chambers, also worked for the GRU. In the cold war several GRU officers spied for the United States. Numbered among them are Peter Popov, Oleg Penkovsky, Walter Krivitsky, Viktor Suvorov, and Igor Gouzenko. In the post–cold war period public attention has been drawn to it by way of its participation in the Chechen conflict with Chechen officials charging that GRU officers participated in sabotage and terrorist acts.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Gouzenko, Igor; Krivitsky, Walter; Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich; Suvorov, Victor

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Glenn P. Hastedt

GUEVARA, ERNESTO "CHE"
(1928–1967)

Ernesto "Che" Guevara was a Marxist revolutionary leader who, in 1959, fought alongside Fidel Castro to overthrow the government of Fulgencio Batista who was supported by the United States. Guevara became the most visible and charismatic spokesperson for Communist revolution in Latin America during the cold war. He was killed with the aid of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Bolivia where he was trying to bring about a Marxist revolution.

Guevara is generally believed to have been born on June 14, 1928, in Rosario, Argentina. As a student he studied medicine and received his medical degree in 1953. The most formative events in his young adult life were a series of trips through Latin America that exposed him to poverty and political oppression. He emerged from these trips convinced of U.S. responsibility for many of the conditions he had seen and that revolutionary violence was the solution. The 1954 U.S.-sponsored overthrow of Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenz, which he witnessed firsthand and fought against, reinforced these beliefs.

Guevara fled to Mexico after the Arbenz ouster where he met Fidel Castro and joined their July 26th Movement that would overthrow Batista in 1959. Guevara played a key role in the rebel's successful military campaign, emerging as the second-most powerful force in the Cuban Communist Party behind Castro.

Both as a way of consolidating power and in a failed attempt to distance himself from Guevara's anti-U.S. rhetoric, Castro sent Guevara on a 14-country speaking tour in mid-1959. This trip and subsequent ones cemented Guevara's persona as the embodiment of Marxist revolutionary fervor for a generation of Third World youth. Originally a supporter of Soviet Marxism, Guevara became disillusioned with Russian leadership of the international Communist movement following the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which he felt Russia had abandoned Cuba. Increasingly Guevara came to embrace Maoism, a position that Castro did not endorse.

By the mid-1960s Guevara had now also fallen out of favor with Castro, although publicly they presented a united front to the world. By the end of 1965 Guevara had all but disappeared from public view. He would go on to resign from his party and government positions and renounce his honorary Cuban citizenship. That same year Guevara reappeared in the Congo in a failed effort to incite a Communist revolution there as the CIA, in an alliance with South African mercenaries and anti-Castro Cuban exiles, worked to defeat him. Guevara would go on to Bolivia in hopes of fomenting revolution there. Again he encountered opposition led by the CIA. He was captured and executed on October 9, 1967.

See also: Castro, Fidel; Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

GUN, KATHARINE
(1974–)

Born and raised in Taiwan, Katharine Gun worked as a Chinese-to-English translator for the British signals agency, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). This organization in many respects is equivalent in its mission to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and partners with it on international intelligence-gathering projects such as those run under the auspices of the UKUSA agreement.

In 2003, in the period leading up to the Iraq War which found the United States and Great Britain united behind the need for war and many states opposed to it,

Gun received a communication from NSA dated January 31 that sought GCHQ's help in an espionage operation being run against diplomats assigned to the United Nations. Those states targeted were: Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, and Pakistan. All held seats on the Security Council where the United States hoped to receive endorsement for the Iraq War and all were considered to be on the fence in terms of their final vote. Secretary of State Colin Powell made his presentation to the Security Council, asking for support on February 5. Gun leaked this information to *The Observer* in hopes of preventing the war. It was published two weeks later.

As a result of this action, she was fired from the GCHQ and arrested on November 13, 2003, for violating the Official Secrets Act. Her actions were defended by antiwar activists and likened to Daniel Ellsberg's leak of the "Pentagon Papers" to the *New York Times* during the Vietnam War. Ellsberg, in fact, spoke out in her defense. He case came to trial on February 25, 2004. With the British government presenting no evidence to support its case, the charges were dropped. It is generally believed that the British government determined not to go forward with the case for fear of having to produce additional documents related to the decision to go to war with Iraq.

See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

H

HALE, NATHAN
(JUNE 6, 1755–SEPTEMBER 22, 1776)

Born on June 6, 1755, in Coventry, Connecticut, Nathan Hale attended Yale College from 1769 to 1773. Upon graduation, Hale was employed as a school teacher in East Haddam and then worked as schoolmaster at the Union School of New London. The events of April 19, 1775, at Lexington and Concord called Hale to the American patriot cause. The state's general assembly commissioned him as a first lieutenant in July, 1775, with the 7th Connecticut Regiment. In September 1775, the regiment was ordered to join Washington's Continental army, then besieging Boston. Hale was promoted to captain in January 1776.

When the British evacuated Boston in March 1776, Washington moved the Continental army to defend New York City. Hale, now assigned to the 19th Connecticut Regiment, reached New York at the end of March. He played an unverified role in the capture of war supplies from of the British vessel Asia, in June. Though stationed for a time in Brooklyn, Hale saw no action at the Battle of Long Island. When the Continental Army withdrew to northern Manhattan, Hale transferred to the newly created Ranger unit, commanded by Thomas Knowlton, and began reconnaissance for defendable positions in Harlem. Hale, believing he had yet to perform any important service, reluctantly agreed to spy behind British lines, in hopes of gathering intelligence concerning enemy plans to cross the East River. On the night of September 16, Hale secretly crossed over Long Island Sound from Connecticut, landing at Huntington. When the British crossed over to Manhattan and attacked Washington at Harlem Heights on September 16, Hale's mission became irrelevant.

Little is known about Hale's precise movements in the last week of his life. During the course of his mission, the British captured Hale on the evening of September 21. Theories suggest Hale may have been betrayed by a loyalist cousin, or by his open and obvious spying. Once captured with his documents, Hale acknowledged that he

was a spy. British General William Howe ordered Hale to hang on September 22, 1776, without trial.

Hale's supposed last words, "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country" were overheard by a British officer, Captain John Montresor. Montresor met with American officers several days later, concerning a possible exchange of prisoners, and repeated Hale's final words, which became part of American folklore.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Thomas D. Veve

HALL, THEODORE ALVIN
(OCTOBER 20, 1925–NOVEMBER 1, 1999)

Theodore Alvin Hall was an American physicist who gave a detailed description of the plutonium bomb and of the processes for purifying plutonium to the Soviet Union while working with the Manhattan Project on the construction of the first atomic bombs at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Hall was born on October 20, 1925, in New York City and attended Harvard University, where he studied physics. In 1944, the U.S. government recruited Hall to work on the atomic bomb project. He developed strong feelings about the possibility of a militarized United States holding a monopoly on nuclear information and knowledge. In late 1944, Hall and his college friend, Saville Sax, a known Communist sympathizer, met with a Soviet diplomat in New York City where Hall gave the diplomat a detailed sketch of the Fat Man nuclear device, which involved the implosion principle and the information on how to ignite the atomic bomb. The sketch was then transmitted to the Soviet Union's Department of State Affairs (NKVD) using a one-time pad cipher.

Until 1995, when a Soviet cable declassified by the National Security Agency identified Hall and Sax as Soviet informants, it was believed that the secrets of Los Alamos were leaked by another Manhattan Project colleague, Klaus Fuchs. The FBI questioned Hall in 1951, but due to lack of evidence, never pressed charges. After the scrutiny he received in the 1950s, Hall became active in obtaining signatures for the Stockholm Peace Pledge, a global attempt to outlaw the use of the atomic bomb.

In 1952, Hall left the Los Alamos lab for the University of Chicago, where he taught biology and pioneered important techniques in X-ray microanalysis. In 1962, Hall went to teach biological science at Cambridge University in England. Although he suffered from Parkinson's disease, he died of kidney cancer on November 1, 1999.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Los Alamos; NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs)

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Charlene T. Overturf

HAMBLETON, HUGH
(1922–)

Hugh Hambleton is often described as the Soviet Union's most important Canadian spy. He was arrested on a visit to Great Britain in 1982 for violating the Official Secrets Act and sentenced to 10 years in jail but served less than eight.

Hambleton was born in Ottawa, Canada, in 1922 and held dual British and Canadian citizenship because his father was born in Great Britain. During World War II he served with the Free French Army in Algeria and then served as a French liaison office with the U.S. Army in Europe. After the war Hambleton joined the Canadian Army's Intelligence Section. This led to a tour with NATO intelligence from 1956 to1961. After leaving the military Hambleton obtained a PhD in economics from the London School of Economics and joined the faculty at Laval University.

The date of his recruitment as a Soviet agent is alternately given as 1945 and 1952. Hambleton was not fully engaged as a Soviet spy during his life. It is his period of service with NATO that he was most active. Hambelton's downfall began in 1977 when his Soviet handler was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and identified Hambleton as one of his agents. The KGB alerted Hambleton to his danger in 1979 but he chose not to flee Canada and not enough evidence was available to bring him to trial although his name was made public. This changed in 1981 when another Soviet agent, Anatoli Golitsyn, also identified Hambleton as an agent.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

HAMILTON, ALEXANDER
(JANUARY 11, 1757–JULY 12, 1804)

Alexander Hamilton was secretary of the treasury during George Washington's terms as president who negotiated with British minister to the United States, George Hammond, during the French crisis of 1793 and the British crisis of 1794. Hamilton

endeavored to keep the United States at peace during a time when Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson desired the United States to go to war to aid France during the wars of the French Revolution. Following the American Revolution, relations with Britain had been strained over closure of the British West Indies to American trade, British occupation of forts in the Ohio Valley, and their aid to the Indians in violation of the Treaty of 1783, while the British complained of nonpayment of American debts and the failure to restore Loyalist properties. Hammond arrived in the United States in November 1791 and British West Indies–born and King's College (later Columbia)–educated Hamilton befriended him while Jefferson treated him as an adversary.

Although Jefferson's treatment of the ambassador was confrontational and truculent, Hamilton secretly engaged in diplomacy of finesse and won Hammond's confidence and numerous British concessions. Hamilton advocated commercial policies favorable to both the United States and Britain, and sought to heal the breech between the two countries. Hamilton convinced Hammond of the wisdom of a demilitarized Canadian border and the removal of trade barriers to mutual benefit. Hamilton's elegant manner and common sense persuaded Hammond of his goodwill and astute diplomatic intentions. The Hamilton-Hammond negotiations created a feeling of mutual trust that laid the foundation for the negotiation of the Jay Treaty. Hamilton's diplomacy cleared the table of troublesome issues like the American confiscation of Loyalists' property and the demand for return of slaves confiscated by the British. They agreed that private debts should be collected through private court judgments. Hamilton pressed successfully for British evacuation of the Ohio forts, and the abolition of Britain's plan to create an Indian buffer state in the American west. They agreed to seek mutual navigation rights on the Mississippi River and right of deposit at New Orleans. Washington was convinced by Hamilton of the wisdom of neutrality. Both Hamilton and Hammond ensured peace and mutual trade benefits. Hamilton resigned from Washington's cabinet in 1795 but advised the president on his Farewell Address. Hamilton died in New York following his duel with Aaron Burr.

See also: Burr, Aaron; Early Republic and Espionage; Hammond, George

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Barbara Bennett Peterson

HAMMER, ARMAND
(MAY 21, 1898–DECEMBER 10, 1990)

An American businessman with ties to the Soviet Union, Armand Hammer was born in Manhattan on May 21, 1898, the son of the Russian immigrants Julius and Rose Lipshitz Hammer. The father, a physician and owner of the pharmaceutical

company Allied Drug, was a committed Marxist, naming his son after the arm-and-hammer symbol of the socialist movement.

In 1915 Armand enrolled at the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons, planning to afterwards join the staff at Bellevue Hospital. While completing his medical studies he helped his father run the family clinic and drug business, but brought about a crisis after performing an abortion in which the woman died. Rather than have his son face prosecution for practicing medicine without a license, Julius took the blame for the illegal operation and in 1920 went to Sing Sing Prison. Already at this time the father, well acquainted with Vladimir Lenin, had been using his business as a conduit to illegally ship equipment and spare parts to the fledgling Bolshevik regime.

As a result of the father's incarceration, Armand took up the task of coordinating with the Soviets. In October 1921 he traveled to Moscow, where he met with Lenin and secured the rights to a Soviet asbestos mine. More significantly, Allied Drug (later Allied American Corporation) was made the financial conduit for Soviet activities in the United States. This concession was overseen by Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinski, the head of the Cheka. Armand returned to New York with $75,000 (today's equivalent of $600,000) to distribute to Soviet secret agents. Later, for laundering purposes, he established a bank in New York City with branches in a number of Soviet cities. He also arranged for American companies to export products to the Soviet Union, including Fordson tractors. Other business dealings with Moscow included pencils, furs, and Tsarist artwork.

From these ties with Moscow (and marriage to a wealthy widow) grew a business empire, which culminated in the 1956 acquisition of the Occidental Petroleum Company. Hammer was convicted for making an illegal contribution to Richard Nixon's 1972 "Watergate" fund, but received a pardon from President George H. W. Bush. In 1978 Leonid Brezhnev presented him with the Lenin Order of Friendship. The FBI monitored his activities from 1921 up until the time of his death, but considered its evidence as lacking prosecutorial power. Armand Hammer died in Los Angeles on December 10, 1990.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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Roger Chapman

HAMMOND, GEORGE
(1763–APRIL 23, 1853)

George Hammond was the first British minister to the United States, involved in diplomacy leading to the Jay Treaty of 1794. Hammond was born in 1763 at Kirkella, Yorkshire, England. He was educated at Merton College, Oxford, graduating with an AB degree in 1784 and an MA in 1787. He entered the British diplomatic service in

1783. In the next seven years he served in Paris, Copenhagen, and Madrid. On October 23, 1791, he assumed his duties in Philadelphia as minister to the United States.

Hammond's tenure was difficult. Britain demanded that the United States return confiscated Loyalist property. Wishing to retain the fur trade in the Northwest, it refused to abandon frontier posts there. Also, Britain urged that Americans not sell arms to revolutionary France. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson was just as insistent that Britain honor its treaty commitment to evacuate the posts. Making no concessions about U.S. relations with France, he wanted favorable trade concessions from Britain. Partly because of Hammond's good relations with Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, the two countries managed to negotiate the Jay Treaty of 1794, which resolved some difficulties. Hammond returned to England in 1795 and, after a distinguished diplomatic career, died in London on April 23, 1853.

See also: Hamilton, Alexander

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Paul David Nelson

HANSSEN, ROBERT PHILIP
(APRIL 18, 1944–)

Robert Hanssen was born in Chicago, Illinois, and began working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1976 after working two years for the Chicago Police Department in its Internal Affairs division. His father was a career Chicago policeman who concentrated on anti-Communist activities. Hanssen graduated from Knox College with a degree in chemistry and earned an MBA degree from Northwestern University in 1973. While in school he also began studying Russian. Hanssen began spying for the Soviet Union in 1979 and continued until his arrest on February 18, 2001, on his way to making a "dead drop" delivery of secrets to his Soviet handler. He confessed to having been a spy and pled guilty to 13 counts of espionage. On May 9, 2002, he was sentenced to life without parole.

Hanssen's initial posting with the FBI was with its Indiana white collar crime unit. After two years there, in 1978 he transferred to New York City. Skilled in the use of computers for information searches in his new position, Hanssen had access to names of FBI sources and the location of electronic listening devices there. Reportedly frustrated with the FBI for its failure to vigorously pursue Soviet agents, Hanssen approached Soviet military intelligence in 1979 about becoming a spy and was paid

Portrait of Robert Philip Hanssen, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent and Russian spy. Hanssen was arrested on February 19, 2001, in Vienna, Virginia, after FBI agents witnessed him leaving a package of confidential information at a drop-off point for Russian agents. (AP/Wide World Photos)

$20,000 for the information he gave them. Among the secrets he disclosed was the identity of Soviet double agent Dmitri Polyakov. Another Soviet spy, Aldrich Ames, would also reveal his identity to the Soviet Union and Polyakov was executed in 1988.

In 1981 Hanssen was transferred to FBI headquarters in Washington, DC, and in 1983 began work in its Soviet Analytical Unit. Once again this position offered him access to highly sensitive information regarding foreign intelligence activities in the United States and counterintelligence operations to thwart them. He returned to New York City in 1985 as a supervisor. Shortly after arriving, in October 1985, using the pseudonym "B," he made contact with Viktor Charkashin, a KGB colonel and head of its counterespionage unit in the Soviet embassy, with an offer to sell secrets to the Soviet Union. To establish his credibility he provided the names of three KGB agents working for the FBI. He received $100,000 for this information. Two of the three agents were executed.

After leaving New York City in 1985, Hanssen became deputy chief of the FBI's Soviet Analysis Unit (1987–1990) and from 1995 to 2001 he was on assignment as the FBI representative to the State Department's Office of Foreign Missions which is responsible for monitoring foreign diplomats believed to be working with international terrorists. In between these positions Hanssen also worked in the FBI's domestic spying program which monitored Americans thought to be Soviet spies. Before his capture Hanssen would provide the Soviet Union with some 26 computer disks and 6,000 pages of secrets. For his efforts he was given some $600,000 in cash, diamonds, and reportedly had $800,000 placed in a Russian bank account in his name. Included in this information were details of how the United States intercepted Soviet satellite transmissions.

Periodically Hanssen came under suspicion or escaped detection. Early in his career as a spy, his wife found him writing letters to his Soviet handler. He confessed to her but continued spying. His brother-in-law, a Chicago FBI agent, reported his suspicions to his superiors in 1990 but no action was taken. The FBI began a search for him in 2000 when a Soviet double agent revealed the existence of the 1985 letter from "B."

By process of elimination Hanssen was identified as the spy. One reason that Hanssen escaped detection for so long was that the FBI did not require its agents to take polygraph tests.

Hanssen's motives are unclear. Anger with the FBI is one. An overbearing father and the desire for money are often cited as additional factors. Personality also appears to have played a role. While outwardly a professional family man, religious, and a member of the Catholic Church's Opus Dei Movement, he was also secretly involved with a stripper and often visited adult sex Web sites. Hanssen, himself, claims to have been heavily influenced by the exploits of Soviet spy Kim Philby whom he read about as a teenager.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Polyakov, Dimitri

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Glenn P. Hastedt

HAYDEN, GENERAL MICHAEL
(MARCH 17, 1945–)

General Michael Hayden became the 18th Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI) on May 30, 2006, replacing Porter J. Goss who resigned earlier that month. At the time of his appointment as DCI, Hayden was serving as the first Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

Hayden was born in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, on March 17, 1945. He received a BA in history in 1967 and MA in modern American history in 1969 from Duquesne University. A graduate of that school's ROTC program, Hayden's first military assignment was a briefer and analyst at the Headquarters of the Strategic Air Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Later in his career, Hayden served as chief of intelligence for the 51st Tactical Fighter Wing stationed in South Korea; Air Attaché, U.S. Embassy Sofia, Bulgaria; Director of the Intelligence Directorate, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; special assistant to the Commanders, Headquarters Air Force Intelligence Agency; director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council; deputy chief of staff UN Command and U.S. Forces, Korea; and director of the National Security Agency among other positions.

Hayden was confirmed by the Senate Intelligence Committee by a vote of 12–3. He was then confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 78–15. Hayden's nomination was controversial because it came in the wake of revelations that while he was in charge of the National Security Agency it had engaged in warrantless surveillance of Americans as part of the George W. Bush administration's war on terrorism. Hayden vigorously defended the legality and necessity of the administration's actions. A secondary issue that arose was the appropriateness of having an active duty professional military officer

serving as DCI at a time when more and more the Defense Department was playing a dominant role in intelligence analysis and collection. Although many early DCIs were military officers, the last to hold that position was Admiral Stansfield Turner who served under President Jimmy Carter more than 25 years earlier.

Among those who voted against Hayden's nomination was Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Specter (R-PA). He echoed the observations made by others who voted against Hayden such as Senator Russ Feingold (D-WISC) when he noted that he had little quarrel with General Hayden as a nominee but objected to the administration's assertions about the legality of the program. Hayden had, in fact, won praise from many quarters in Congress as head of NSA for instituting reforms that promised to overcome past leadership problems, revitalize its organizational culture, and streamline its organizational procedures to allow for more effective internal communication.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

HAYDEN, STERLING
(MARCH 26, 1916–MAY 23, 1986)

Sterling Hayden was an accomplished film actor and author who also served in the OSS during World War II. Hayden, a New Jersey native, grew up in New England and became a skilled sailor and navigator. At the age of 19, he became the captain of a fishing boat. Hayden began an acting career in the late 1930s, but left after he was recruited to work for William Donovan. In this capacity, Hayden began training to enter the British armed forces. When the United States entered World War II Hayden enlisted in the Marine Corps but continued to work with Donovan as an OSS operative. Hayden's largest mission involved running guns from U.S.-occupied Italy to Yugoslav partisans; he coordinated a fleet of 15 armed smuggling vessels. He also participated in several missions behind German lines. For his actions in this theater, Hayden won the Silver Star and a commendation from Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito. After the end of the war, Hayden's unit reconnoitered German and Baltic ports in preparation for a possible conflict with the USSR.

Hayden returned to acting after his term of service in the OSS ended. He briefly joined the Communist Party but left after six months. He testified as a friendly witness before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1951 about his experiences within the Party. Hayden regretted this bitterly in later life, and defenders have noted that he only named people who had already been identified as Party members. After a successful career in Hollywood, Hayden retired to his first love, travel. He died in California of cancer at the age of 70.

See also: Movies, Spies in; Office of Strategic Services

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<div align="right">*James Erwin*</div>

HELMS, RICHARD McGARRAH
(MARCH 30, 1913–OCTOBER 22, 2002)

Richard Helms was the eighth Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), holding that position from June 30, 1966, to February 2, 1973, under Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. He was born in St. Davids, Pennsylvania, and received his BA degree from Williams College in 1935. After graduation Helms undertook a career in journalism, going to Europe as a correspondent for United Press International and then joining the staff of the *Indianapolis Times*. In 1942 he switched careers and was commissioned in the U.S. Navy after having completed a reserve officers training course. In August 1943 Helms moved from the Navy to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) where he went to work for future DCI Allen Dulles. Operating out of Washington, London, Paris, and Luxembourg, Helms ran agents into Nazi Germany. Helms was an excellent choice for OSS' Secret Intelligence branch because he had gone to school in Europe and was fluent in German and French. After the war ended Helms continued to work in intelligence and stayed on in Germany. The OSS was dissolved in September 1945 and Helms began to work for its successor organization, the Strategic Services Unit. Not long after, it too was reorganized and became part of the newly established Central Intelligence Group that would in time become the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Upon being discharged from the navy, Helms became a civilian employee of the Central Intelligence Group and, along with others employed there, he moved to join the CIA on its founding in 1947.

At the CIA Helms quickly moved into leadership positions. In postwar Germany he worked with Reinhard Gehlen, one of Hitler's senior intelligence officers, to establish a West German espionage capability. In November 1951 he became the deputy assistant director for operations. Less than a year later, in August 1952, when Lyman Kirkpatrick fell ill to the effects of polio, Helms became assistant director of operations. When Richard Bissell was forced to resign in 1962 after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion Helms replaced him as deputy director of plans. Helms held that position until his appointment to the post of DCI in 1966. It was a position to which he was appointed without having been consulted by Lyndon Johnson. This scenario would repeat itself in 1973 when he was removed from the position by Richard Nixon without prior consultation.

Helms developed a reputation as an institutional man and one loyal to the CIA. He also established a track record as an effective manager responsible for running agents around the world. A staunch advocate of human intelligence gathering over technological intelligence collection, he nonetheless was able to recognize the limits of what covert action could accomplish, distancing himself from the Bay of Pigs invasion and expressing doubts over the campaign to stop Salvadore Allende from being elected in Chile. He also recognized the need for technological espionage. A case in point is Operation

Black Shied in which Oxcart, the follow-on spy plane to the U-2, was used in Vietnam to establish that there were no surface-to-air missile sites in North Vietnam.

These qualities led to a series of decisions on often placed him in the center of controversy. Where former DCI John McCone, for example, opposed assassinations on moral grounds, Helms did not. His objection was that assassination plans were ineffective. Yet under his tenure the CIA engaged in several assassination attempts, most notably against Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba. Helms also held back from pushing the CIA's analytic positions when confronted by administration officials who held opposing views. This happened often on Vietnam estimates as well as on the question of Soviet MIRV technology. It was under Helms that Project CHAOS, a program of domestic espionage aimed at the anti-Vietnam War movement, was begun. Helms recognized that the program raised serious legal issues but rather than terminate it he directed it be redefined as a campaign against terrorists. Finally, Helms lied to a the Church Committee investigating the activities of American multinational corporations in Chile and the fall of Allende in 1973 when he stated there was no CIA involvement in that affair. Helms pleaded no contest to misdemeanor charges in 1977. He received a suspended sentence and was fined $2,000 which was immediately paid for by CIA acquaintances.

At the same time it should be noted that Helms' loyalty to the CIA also led him to stand up to and reject attempts by President Nixon to use the CIA and national security interests as a vehicle for stopping investigations into the Watergate break-ins. Helms recognized that he would be fired for his defiance. In replacing him as DCI with James Schlesinger, Nixon appointed Helms to be ambassador to Iran, a post he held from 1973 to 1976.

See also: Bay of Pigs; Castro, Fidel; Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr.; Central Intelligence Agency; CHAOS, Operation; Director of Central Intelligence; Gehlen, Major General Reinhard; Johnson Administration and Intelligence; McCone, John A.; Nixon Administration and Intelligence; Office of Strategic Services; Watergate

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Glenn P. Hastedt

HERRMANN, RUDOLPH ALBERT

Originally known as Dalibar Valoushek, code name Douglas, Rudolph Herrmann was a colonel in the KGB who was subsequently doubled by the FBI while living in the United States. He was the first KGB illegal resident agent to be publicly identified by the U.S. government without being prosecuted. Herrmann entered the United

States in 1968 using the cover of being a professional filmmaker, having previously run agents in Canada. Herrmann became a member of the New York Press Club and was tasked by the KGB to infiltrate the Hudson Institute. Herrmann's activities came to the attention of the FBI after he was observed visiting a dead drop utilized by another agent under diplomatic cover. Herrmann recruited his son, Peter, in 1972 and Peter ultimately collected information on the children of government officials attending Georgetown University. Rudolph Herrmann was arrested by the FBI in May 1977 and was offered an opportunity to serve as a double agent or be charged with espionage. His service as a double agent for the United States lasted from 1977 to 1980. On March 3, 1980, the FBI revealed Herrmann as in a press conference in which he claimed his primary activity involved passing communications from other agents in the United States. He and his family were subsequently moved and given alternate identities.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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William T. Thornhill

HICKEY CONSPIRACY

The Hickey Conspiracy was a scheme masterminded by Governor William Tryon, royal governor of New York, in June 1776 to murder General George Washington or to blow up an American powder magazine and resume control of New York City. Washington arrived there on April 13, to take command of American forces. Tryon had taken refuge on a British ship in the harbor. The conspiracy was discovered by the patriots when two Continental soldiers, Thomas Hickey and Michael Lynch, were arrested and jailed for passing forged bank notes. While in jail, they attempted to enlist a fellow prisoner, William Green, into a Loyalist military force that was being recruited within the Continental army. Gilbert Forbes, a gunsmith who boasted to friends about the plot, was also implicated.

This corps, which was to number seven hundred men, was being organized and paid for by Governor Tryon, through the conduit of Mayor David Matthews. Matthews, Hickey, Green, Forbes, and several others were arrested and tried. Although there was no evidence against Matthews, he was condemned to death; finally he was sent to prison in Connecticut. Green and Forbes confessed and, along with Hickey, were sentenced to die on the gallows for mutiny and sedition. They were hanged in a Bowery field, under the scrutiny of 20,000 irate spectators. Tryon could only look on with impotent fury as the latest of his many plots to weaken the rebel cause collapsed.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Paul David Nelson

HILLENKOETTER, REAR ADMIRAL ROSCOE HENRY (MAY 8, 1897–JUNE 18, 1982)

Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter was the third Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the first to hold that position after the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created by terms of the 1947 National Security Act. Born in St. Louis, Missouri, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1919. His term as DCI ran from April 30, 1947 to October 7, 1950. A newly promoted rear admiral, Hillenkoetter did not have the rank or prestige of his predecessor, Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, or that of his contemporaries in the State Department (Dean Acheson and George Marshall) or the Defense Department (James Forrestal) and as a result his effectiveness as DCI is considered to have been limited. Hillenkoetter's effectiveness was further limited because he lacked a strong bureaucratic or administrative bent. The structure of the CIA is often referred to as haphazard during his tenure and it was heavily criticized for its failure to provide warning to policy makers on the outbreak of the Korean War and other world events such as the fall of Czechoslovakia and the defeat of the Nationalist forces in China. Hillenkoetter's tenure as DCI ended shortly after the Korean War began. He returned to active duty, serving as commander of the Naval Task Force in the Korean War.

Hillenkoetter's defenders assert that he fully recognized the problems plaguing the newly created CIA and was working to address them. Defending the CIA's record, he noted in a memo to President Harry Truman, "the [military] services withhold planning and operational information from the CIA and this hampers the CIA in fulfilling its mission." They credit him with maintaining the CIA's independence and with obtaining firm legal approval for the CIA to engage in covert operations. He was concerned with the legality of NSC4A that authorized the CIA to conduct such operations and sought, and received, additional legal confirmation that the CIA could legally engage in covert action if directed by the president.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Intelligence Community; Vandenberg, Lieutenant General Hoyt Sanford

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Glenn P. Hastedt

HISS, ALGER
(NOVEMBER 11, 1904–NOVEMBER 15, 1996)

American administrator and enigmatic cold war icon, Alger Hiss was accused of espionage in 1948 and convicted of perjury in 1950. When Senator Joe McCarthy brandished his apocryphal list of Communists in the State Department in February 1950, the trial of Alger Hiss had already raised the explosive issue of Communists in government. The Hiss case was a defining episode not only in the cold war but also in modern American politics. It rallied conservatives and enabled Hiss's nemesis, the little-known Richard Nixon, to take those first critical steps on the twisted road to the White House. By splitting American liberalism it permitted a sturdier platform for McCarthy. And it blurred the line between radical activism and involvement in espionage, thereby mandating the cold war assault on civil liberties in the 1950s.

Alger Hiss was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on November 11, 1904, educated at Johns Hopkins and Harvard universities, and joined the U.S. State Department in 1936. Among other important assignments, he was private secretary to Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (1930); assistant to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr.; executive secretary to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944), which drafted plans for the future United Nations; a senior advisor to President Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference (1945); secretary-general of the UN organizing conference in San Francisco (1945–1946); director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (1945); and in February 1947, with support from John Foster Dulles, he was appointed president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a position he held until May 5, 1949.

He was first named as an undercover member of the Communist Party during a meeting between Whittaker Chambers and Adolf Berle, an assistant secretary of state, in 1939, and in two interviews between Chambers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in May 1942 and May 1945. But it was not until August 3, 1948, that the Hiss-Chambers relationship exploded into one of the most dramatic episodes in American political history.

In 1948, the elegant and articulate Alger Hiss was accused of having been part of a Communist underground organization during the 1930s. His accuser, Chambers, was a *Time* magazine editor and a nervy, pudgy, and unprepossessing man regarded even by his allies as obsessive and unreliable. He was a self-confessed former Communist agent who had abandoned his creed to become a Christian convert and an anti-Soviet polemicist. Hiss appeared before the House Un-American Activities Committee, vehemently denied the allegations, confronted Chambers in a dramatic scene famously captured by newsreel cameras, dared him to repeat the charges outside the Committee and, when Chambers did, sued him for slander.

Hiss's action prompted Chambers to escalate his charge to one of espionage. He produced a cache of classified State Department documents that, he claimed, Hiss had

given him in 1938 as well as microfilm hidden in a hollowed-out pumpkin on his Maryland farm. At this point an obscure but ambitious congressman from California, Richard Nixon, emerged from the shadows. He gave the "Pumpkin Papers" maximum publicity and zealously pursued Alger Hiss. At this stage Hiss was supported by the "Ivy League" liberal establishment, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Even President Truman dismissed HUAC's investigation into Hiss as "a red herring." In December 1948, Hiss appeared before the New York Grand Jury, which indicted him not for high treason (since the statute of limitations had expired on espionage charges) but for perjury. The first trial, from May to July 1949, ended in a hung jury; the second, from November 1949 to January 1950, in a conviction. All appeals failed, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case and, in March 1951, Hiss was imprisoned. For conservatives, Hiss' conviction confirmed New Deal disloyalty, Roosevelt's betrayal at Yalta of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, and Truman's "softness" on Communism at home and abroad.

Upon his release from Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary in November 1954, after serving 44 months, Hiss found it impossible to rebuild his career, and by 1960 he was selling office stationery. Until his death on November 15, 1996, at the age of 92, he continued, unrelentingly, to protest his innocence. So did a large and influential body of supporters, which precipitated one of the most intense, divisive debates that swirled through the second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, if constant denial of guilt for nearly five decades could be regarded as proof of innocence, Hiss would have long been exonerated. In 1992, exoneration came—it seemed—when Russian historian and chairman of the Supreme Council commission on KGB archives, General Dimitri A. Volkogonov, announced that he had examined the archives of Soviet intelligence agencies and found no mention of Hiss. The jubilation of Hiss's lionizers was short-lived. Volkogonov later admitted his search through KGB files was incomplete and that GRU (Soviet military intelligence) files were inaccessible. Then, in November 1993, a Hungarian historian uncovered restricted files of the Interior Ministry in Budapest that implicated Hiss through the confessions of former friend and American spy, Noel Field.

The most damning archival evidence is Cable No. 1822 of the VENONA decrypts, released in 1996 by the National Security Agency. This cablegram identified a senior State Department official as a Soviet agent who worked under the cover name of "Ales" whom the FBI claimed was "probably" Hiss. Like Hiss, "Ales" was an employee of the State Department in 1945; like Hiss, "Ales" attended the Yalta Conference and thereafter flew to Moscow with Stettinius; and like Hiss, "Ales" returned to Washington before March 30, 1945. Historiographical debate over interpretations of this cable continues. But, as with the upholders of the Rosenbergs' innocence, Hiss' defenders are rapidly dwindling and the weight of historical evidence now leans heavily towards Hiss being guilty as charged.

See also: Chambers, Whittaker; Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); McCarthy, Joseph; State Department Intelligence; VENONA

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Phillip Deery

HITCHCOCK, ETHAN ALLEN
(MAY 18, 1798–AUGUST 5, 1870)

U.S. military officer and author, born May 18, 1798, in Vergennes, Vermont, Hitchcock was a descendant of a prominent New England family. His father was a U.S. Circuit Court judge and his mother was a daughter of Ethan Allen, a hero of the American Revolution. After graduating from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1817, Hitchcock served on garrison duty in Alabama and Louisiana before being appointed to the faculty of West Point in 1824. An administrative quarrel at the academy led to Hitchcock being dismissed and ordered to garrison duty in Minnesota in 1827. He returned to West Point in 1829 and served as commandant of cadets for three years. In 1833, Hitchcock left West Point to join his company in Wisconsin. In Florida, as acting inspector general during the Second Seminole War, he denounced the conflict as the result of the U.S. government's unjust and deceitful policies toward the Seminole. From 1837 to 1842, Hitchcock resided in St. Louis, serving as a conscientious and incorruptible disbursing officer for Indian funds.

When the Mexican War began in 1846, Hitchcock was on duty with General Zachary Taylor's forces in Texas. He opposed the war as immoral, labeling the United States an arrogant and expansionistic aggressor, but he felt bound to follow orders. General Winfield Scott, appointed by President James K. Polk to launch an amphibious attack on Veracruz, requested and received $30,000 from the War Department for covert operations. Scott also requested Hitchcock on his staff, and put him in charge of covert operations. After Veracruz fell, Scott's forces moved inland toward Mexico City. Hitchcock hired the Mexican bandit leader Manuel Dominguez in June 1847. Through Dominquez, Mexican bandits were paid to allow U.S. forces to travel unmolested. Hitchcock then arranged for Dominguez to recruit bandits and freed prisoners into the Mexican Spy Company, which became the largest recipient of Hitchcock's secret service funds. Hitchcock successfully managed the company's paid spies, couriers, and scouts, who remained loyal despite inducements from Mexican General Antonio López de Santa Anna to betray the U.S. forces. Dominguez fled to the United States after the U.S. victory and settled near New Orleans. With help from Mississippi Senator Jefferson Davis, Hitchcock tried to secure a pension for Dominquez, but the U.S. Congress refused.

As commander of the Military Division of the Pacific in San Francisco following the Mexican War, Hitchcock ordered the seizure of William Walker's ship, thereby thwarting the adventurer's plan to take over Baja California, Mexico, and extend Southern slavery. In 1855, Hitchcock resigned his commission and lived in St. Louis, devoting himself to philosophical and literary pursuits. Reentering the army during the U.S. Civil War, he was made a major general of volunteers. Stationed in Washington, DC, Hitchcock became a friend and advisor to President Abraham Lincoln while

serving as commissioner for the exchange of prisoners and president of the board of officers that revised the military code. Hitchcock retired in 1867 and married Martha Rind Nicholls two years before his death on August 5, 1870, in Sparta, Georgia.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage; Mexican Spy Company

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HOMELAND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF

On September 20, 2001, nine days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress. As part of his administration's response to these attacks, he announced the creation of an Office of Homeland Security (OHS) that would be located in the White House Office. Its director would have cabinet rank and report directly to him. OHS was charged with leading, overseeing, and coordinating the development of a "comprehensive national strategy" to safeguard the United States against terrorist attacks and to respond to any such attacks if they happen. OHS officially came into existence on October 8 when he signed Executive Order 13228. That same day Tom Ridge was named assistant to the president for Homeland Security which, according to Executive Order 12228, also made him head of OHS. In his role as advisor to the president he was expected to have powers similar to that of National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.

Moving forward, using an executive order instead of a piece of legislation passed by Congress to create OHS carried with it several important political and administrative implications. First, it meant that Ridge's appointment was not subject to Senate approval and that Congress could not easily compel him to testify. Presidents routinely invoke the power of "executive privilege" to block such requests. Second, funding for the OHS would come from discretionary funds appropriated by Congress to the president and the White House Office. This removed OHS from the normal pattern of budgetary oversight exercised by Congress over agency budgets where funds are authorized and appropriated annually by congressional committees. In this case George W. Bush used $25.5 million from the Emergency Response Fund set up by Congress in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks to finance the initial business of OHS. Third, since OHS was not created via a law, its organizational structure as well as goals and missions could be changed at the will of the president simply by issuing another executive order. In the extreme it would permit the president to abolish OHS.

At the same time, Executive Order 13228 also created the Homeland Security Council that would be chaired by the president. Its mission was twofold. First, the

Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge unveils a color-coded terrorism warning system in Washington, DC, on March 12, 2002. Ridge said that the nation is on yellow alert. The five-level system is a response to public complaints that broad terror alerts issued by the government since the September 11, 2001, attacks raised alarm without providing useful guidance. (AP/ Wide World Photos)

Homeland Security Council would "advise and assist the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security." Second, it would be an instrument for ensuring co-ordination among agencies and departments involved in the development and implementation of homeland security policies. Nine officials were designated as members of the Homeland Security Council: the assistant to the president for homeland security, the vice president, the director of the FBI, the director of FEMA, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the attorney general, the secretary of defense, the secretary of health and human services, and the secretary of transportation. Other officials would attend meetings at the discretion of the president.

Members of Congress shared the Bush administration's post-9/11 belief that organizational changes were necessary to ensure homeland security. They also shared the administration's relative indifference to the matter before the tragic events of that day. They disagreed with his proposed solution favoring instead the creation of a new super department to oversee intelligence, law enforcement, and domestic security activities that would be created by legislation approved by Congress and subject to its oversight. The leading congressional alternative to Bush's plan was that put forward by Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) a few days before Bush established OHS. Lieberman's reorganization bill was passed out of committee along party lines. Public pressure for creating a department rather than office of homeland security in the White House

was coming from revelations that communication failures between the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation may have contributed to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Only hours after an FBI whistle-blower made accusations before a congressional committee that the FBI had mishandled warning information about those attacks, George W. Bush on June 6, 2002, put forward his proposal to create a new Department of Homeland Security. In announcing the new plan the president stressed that the change in approach was a logical outgrowth of his administration's thinking about homeland security and did not constitute a sudden change in direction.

The new proposal was crafted with great secrecy by a small group led by Ridge; Director of the Office of Management and Budget Mitchell Daniels, Jr.; White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Jr.; and White House counsel Alberto Gonzalez. The president's reorganization plan was far more expansive than that contained in the Lieberman proposal. It would absorb all of FEMA, the Coast Guard, Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Customs Service along with the new Transportation and Security Administration. The FBI and CIA would not be affected by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) but the new department was to have an "intelligence and threat analysis" unit that would serve as a customer of FBI and CIA intelligence for purposes of assessing threats, taking preventive action, and issuing public warnings. Under his plan there would also exist a separate homeland security advisor.

Legislation to create a Department of Homeland Security became mired in congressional-presidential politics. The 2002 midterm elections gave the Republicans control of both houses of Congress and President Bush pressed his advantage, calling upon Congress to create a cabinet-level DHS in its lame-duck session. On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act creating the DHS land security and nominated Tom Ridge to be its first secretary.

The DHS was set up around four directorates. The first is border and transportation security. Housed in it are the Transportation Security Administration, the Border Guard, Customs Service, the Agricultural Inspection Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The second is emergency preparedness and response. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) dominates this directorate. The Science and Technology Directorate focuses on developing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear counterterrorism measures. Fourth, there is the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate. Among its tasks is running the colored-coded national warning system. Twenty-two different agencies with 170,000 employees were brought together in the new DHS.

The new DHS got off to a rocky start administratively, as had its predecessor the OHS. Two factors contributed to the DHS' problems. The first was the massive managerial challenge involved in bringing this number of units together. Not long after its creation the General Accounting Office included it in its list of "high-risk" programs and the Office of Management and Budget it gave it a "red" rating, the worst possible grade. Second, it was not until July 2002, one month after the president announced that he wished to create a DHS and 10 months after he established an OHS that his administration released its National Strategy for Homeland Security. Placing structure before mission created uncertainty and conflict over the purposes of DHS.

Foreshadowing complaints that were voiced about DHS's performance in responding to
Hurricane Katrina, commentators worried that incorporating non-terrorist-related emergency response and preparedness functions within DHS would divert attention away from dealing with natural catastrophes.

On February 15, 2005, Michael Chertoff became the second secretary of Homeland Security. One of his first acts was to address these organizational problems, as well as others, by proposing a Six Point Agenda. Central to this agenda was a reorganization that would increase the HDS' ability to "prepare, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other emergencies." To accomplish this goal, he recommended establishing a Directorate of Policy, a Directorate of Preparedness, a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and a New Director of Operations Coordination.

The new Office of Intelligence and Analysis would gather information from all relevant field operations and the different parts of the intelligence community, analyze mission-oriented intelligence, inform senior policy makers, and disseminate information to all levels of government and the private sector. This mission is roughly consistent with that of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Directorate that is charged with Congress provided the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with a clear statutory mandate to reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism and to detect, to prevent, and to respond to terrorist attacks.

The DHS does not engage in espionage or other forms of intelligence collection. It is an all-source consumer of intelligence that conducts independent assessments of the information it receives. The CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency all successfully resisted proposals that they be folded into the DHS. The current intelligence watchword at DHS is "fusion." It is not intended to replace or replicate existing mission-intelligence programs or systems. Instead fusion is designed to leverage intelligence in support of the rapid identification of patterns and trends that may indicate an emerging threat condition. The focal point of intelligence fusion is terrorism.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Chertoff, Michael; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Intelligence Community; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (9/11 Commission); National Security Agency; Ridge, Tom; September 11, 2001

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HOMELAND SECURITY ACT

The Homeland Security Act (HSA) was composed and passed in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and constitutes the largest overhaul of the federal government since the creation of the Department of Defense roughly 50 years before. Sponsored by Rep. Richard Armey of Texas, the HSA was passed by the House and Senate and soon after signed into law by President George W. Bush on November 25, 2002, becoming Public Law No. 107-296.

Most importantly, the legislation created the Department of Homeland Security to prevent terrorism on U.S. soil and to reduce the U.S. vulnerability to such attacks. It called for the department to also make appropriate and applicable emergency response plans, to retain and to expand upon the functions of the braches or entities transferred to the authority of the new department, and to ensure that all potential actions or protections of the homeland are evaluated or undertaken in some way, except in the case of a congressional act or order. Notably, the law expresses the point that homeland security does not simply mean preventing attacks and destruction on the American soil, but also protecting and reinforcing the nation's economic security. It may also pursue issues of drug trafficking, which could act as a means of financing potential terrorist activities.

The HSA established the position of secretary of Homeland Security, a member of the president's cabinet, to act as the head of the new department. The secretary is thus charged with fulfilling the missions of the department and reporting to the president. In order to assist the secretary, the position of special assistant to the secretary was also established by the HSA. The special assistant is responsible for advising the secretary on the department's policies and actions and for interacting with the private sector.

During the formation of the HSA, one of the focal points of debate was centered upon the protection of information. Since the new department would have many new employees, there were fears of security leaks and questions were raised about how to share information between branches and entities in direct response to the intelligence gathering and sharing failures which led up to September 11, 2001. Essentially, the HSA protects top-secret information by having the new department act as the conduit and connection through which the communication flows between branches, agencies, and entities. Additionally, it makes the publication or disclosure of any protected information a criminal act.

Controversies festered about the new department's employee rights and benefits, as well as about riders attached to the bill before its approval. President Bush wanted to be able to immediately fire an employee for incompetence or for security reasons, but Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle disagreed, favoring a hearing and appeals system. Daschle was unable to gather enough support and the new department has different labor regulations than the other federal entities. Additionally, a last-minute rider was added to the bill, dealing with lawsuits related to the drug thimerosal and its manufacturer, the pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly. Following the uproar for such an unrelated rider by the public, it was quickly repealed.

The Department of Homeland Security, created by the HSA, officially came into being on January 24, 2003. It was not until March 1, 2003, that most of the agencies that were transferred to it actually came under its authority. These agencies, 22 entities in all, included citizenship and immigration services, customs and border security, the cyber security division, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Secret Service.

Former Governor of Pennsylvania Tom Ridge was appointed by President Bush to be the first secretary of Homeland Security, accepting the post in January 2003. He faced an incredible task fulfilling the demands set out by the HSA, which ended up giving him control of a department staffed by over 180,000 employees. He unveiled the department's most well-known system, the color-coded security threat scale.

Ridge announced his desire to resign on November 20, 2004, and was eventually replaced by federal judge Michael Chertoff on February 15, 2005, following a scandal surrounding President Bush's first nominee, former NYPD Commissioner Bernard Kerik.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Chertoff, Michael; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (9/11 Commission); Ridge, Tom; September 11, 2001

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Arthur Holst

HONEYMAN, JOHN
(CA. 1729–AUGUST 18, 1822)

John Honeyman was a spy for General George Washington whose main service was to provide intelligence for the battle of Trenton. Born in County Armagh, Ireland, about 1729, Honeyman joined the British 48th Regiment in 1758 and fought at Quebec the following year. He settled in Philadelphia and, when the War of American Independence began in 1775, allied himself with the patriot cause. Shortly after Washington became commander in chief on June 15, 1775, Honeyman was employed as a spy and organized an intelligence network in New York and New Jersey. He posed as a Loyalist in order to operate in British territory.

In late December 1776, Honeyman visited Washington under pretense of being captured and informed the general of British army dispositions in New Jersey. Operating upon this information, Washington was able to attack Trenton on December 26, rout the Hessians encamped there, and kill their commander, Colonel Johann Räll. In early 1777, Honeyman provided Washington with information on British troops at Princeton and helped the American commander to attack there on January 3.

For the remainder of the war, Honeyman maintained his cover behind enemy lines, feeding Washington information about the enemy. He was so successful in posing as a Loyalist that in 1777 he was captured by the Americans at Trenton and jailed for treason. Only the quick intervention of Washington rescued him from being hanged

as a spy. After the war, the general also saved Honeyman from his neighbors' ostracism as a Loyalist by explaining his role in the fighting. He died on August 18, 1822, in Lamington, New Jersey.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Paul David Nelson

HOOVER COMMISSION (FIRST)

The first Hoover Commission, officially the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, was established on July 7, 1947, with the passage of the Lodge-Brown Act. Spurred by the dramatic growth in the size of the federal government brought on by the New Deal and World War II and in anticipation of a Republican victory in the 1948 presidential election the Hoover Commission Report was to be the basis for reorganizing the government in a "new Republican era."

The Lodge-Brown Act established a 12-person commission with members appointed by President Harry Truman, Speaker of the House Joseph Martin, and President of the Senate Pro Tem Arthur Vandenberg. Martin appointed Herbert Hoover as chairman. Its work was to be carried out by 24 task forces that examined everything from national security policy to the Post Office and Indian affairs. Hoover announced the formation of the Committee on National Security Organization task force on May 21, 1948, under the chairmanship of Ferdinand Eberstadt. The task force held its first meeting on June 8, 1948, and submitted its report to the Commission on November 15, 1948. The overwhelming majority of the task force's attention was directed to the operation of the national military establishment. It made recommendations in six major areas, one of which was that "Teamwork and Coordination throughout the National Security Organization Should Be Improved."

The Eberstadt Committee Report noted that "the Central Intelligence Agency deserves and must have a greater degree of acceptance and support from old-line intelligence services than it has had in the past." Singled out as still unsatisfactory were relations between the CIA and G-2 (Army intelligence), the FBI, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the State Department. The Eberstadt Committee asserted that it was imperative that a more comprehensive collection system, better coordination, and more mature and experienced evaluation be put into place. The medical and scientific intelligence fields were explicitly cited as areas of concern by the task force.

According to CIA's Official Historian Arthur Darlington, the Eberstadt Report "seems not to have been read by many" and that it had little influence on the 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act. One positive impact attributed to the Hoover Commission's work is later creation of the Board of National Estimates as a collective body to review the quality of estimates produced. Overall, its influence on CIA reform was eclipsed by the report of a committee of outside experts, the Dulles-Jackson-Correa

Report, commissioned by the NSC to survey, the CIA, and related intelligence problems.

See also: Eberstadt Report; Intelligence Community

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Glenn P. Hastedt

HOOVER, J. EDGAR
(JANUARY 1, 1895–MAY 2, 1972)

J. Edgar Hoover was Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for 48 years. In that capacity he became the self-proclaimed expert on domestic Communist subversion in the United States. A classic example of a bureaucratic entrepreneur, Hoover rose steadily through the ranks of the Justice Department, escaping blame for policy excesses and adroitly working with the media to establish his image as an indispensable defender of freedom. As the height of the cold war competition gave way to détente, Hoover's obsession with subversion extended beyond communists to include Black civil rights activists, anti-Vietnam war protestors and others on the political left.

Hoover was born in Washington, DC, and, after completing law school there, he joined the Alien Enemy Bureau of the Justice Department in 1917. Two years later he became a special assistant to Attorney General Mitchell Palmer and was placed in charge of a newly established General Intelligence Division. Its charge was to collect intelligence on radical individuals and groups. There he planned and directed the "Palmer Raids" that paid little respect to civil liberties, led to the arrest of thousands of political radicals, and the deportation of such notable figures as anarchist Emma Goldman. Most of those arrested were released and not deported. Hoover survived the political backlash against the Palmer Raids and the allegations of widespread corruption that plagued the FBI in the early 1920s.

The next decade of his career was spent improving the FBI's efficiency as a crime fighting organization from his position as Director of the Bureau of Investigation. By the late 1930s Hoover was again involved in collecting information on potential subversives. President Franklin Roosevelt had secretly ordered him to spy on the leadership of the American Nazi movement. During World War II Hoover clashed with British intelligence in their efforts to coordinate counterespionage and intelligence activities. Such was his intransigence that the British, through William Stephenson, helped Bill Donovan create the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Hoover's major success in this

bureaucratic war was to keep the OSS out of Latin America where the FBI was active in anti-Nazi surveillance efforts.

With the onset of the cold war, Hoover turned his attention to Communist subversion within the United States. Dissatisfied with the Truman administration's pursuit of Communists within the government, Hoover struck out on his own or in cooperation with Republicans on the House Un-American Activities Committee to expose this threat. These efforts led to the arrest of Klaus Fuchs in 1950 and the 1951 convictions of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. A key tool in Hoover's pursuit of domestic Communist spies was the Smith Act. In 1956 a Supreme Court ruling severely limited its utility to Hoover. He then adopted a different strategy, one that would later place him at the center of controversy. Hoover established a Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) that employed "dirty tricks" to disrupt the activities of the American Communist Party. He then expanded it to include the Ku Klux Klan, the Black Panthers, and student groups. One of Hoover's main targets became Dr. Martin Luther King who had spoken out criticizing the FBI's handling of civil rights cases. As part of his campaign against King, Hoover secretly collected information on his personal life that could be used for blackmail. It was a practice that Hoover employed against many government officials including presidents.

The national traumas of Vietnam and Watergate produced a series of investigations and exposes of the intelligence community. One of the most thorough was that conducted by Senator Frank Church's Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Its report concluded that Hoover had engaged in a "sophisticated vigilante operation" against domestic political dissenters. Hoover remained as Director of the FBI until his death on May 2, 1972. Controversy continues to surround his tenure in office and is fueled by the fact that his personal files were destroyed after his death by his secretary and his lifelong assistant.

See also: Church Committee; COINTELPRO; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; Office of Strategic Services; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel

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Glenn P. Hastedt

HORTALEZ AND COMPANY

A company organized by French playwright Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais during the War of American Independence to supply Americans with covert aid. In 1776, the Continental Congress sent Silas Deane, and later Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee, to Paris to seek aid and recognition for the United States from French Foreign Minister Comte de Vergennes. Vergennes asked Beaumarchais to submit a plan for giving secret aid to the Americans. The playwright proposed that the French government subsidize the rebellious colonists with a million livres ($200,000), to provide arms and to

bolster the American economy. War materials would be purchased through a firm that Beaumarchais would organize, to be named Roderigue Hortalez and Company.

The government agreed to allow Beaumarchais to set up the company, with the loan of a million livres, augmented by another loan of the same amount from Spain and a third to be collected from private businessmen. Beaumarchais was authorized to draw obsolescent military supplies from French arsenals, which the Americans would pay for by exporting tobacco and other products. Hortalez and Company was to be a self-supporting business. Any profits or losses were to be Beaumarchais' alone.

In June 1776, Beaumarchais organized the company, setting up headquarters in Paris. A month later, he contracted with Deane to ship military equipment to the United States. Already the French government was sending the rebels gunpowder, muskets, and other materials through other channels. Despite various snags and delays, Beaumarchais by 1777 had commissioned about 12 vessels to ship supplies to the United States. Before his operations ended, he was using 40 merchant ships. In 1776 and 1777, he sent five million livres' worth of goods across the Atlantic, enough to supply 25,000 American soldiers. Perhaps nine-tenths of the rebels' military materials in 1777 came from Beaumarchais' efforts. In return, the United States gave Beaumarchais nothing, and he was kept afloat by loans from Vergennes. Throughout the war, Congress dithered in repaying Beaumarchais, claiming that his aid had been intended by the French government to be a gift. After the French-American alliance was signed in 1778, the operations of Hortalez and Company were swallowed up in much larger French aid to the United States. Beaumarchais' company remained in business until 1783, making a profit by trading in West Indies sugar. The money owed him by the United States, estimated in 1781 to be 3,600,000 livres, was not paid. Not until 1835, after Beaumarchais had been dead for 36 years, did a parsimonious Congress finally agree to pay his heirs 800,000 francs for the aid that he had provided during the fight for independence.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Deane, Silas; Franklin, Benjamin; Lee, Arthur

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Paul David Nelson

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (HPSCI)

The U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (usually abbreviated HPSCI) was established in 1977 as a result of a widespread perception that Congress had failed adequately to monitor the activities of U.S.

intelligence agencies. Prior to this time the House had left intelligence matters to the small subcommittees of the appropriations and armed services committees with the result that few members of Congress were aware of intelligence activities; responding to public controversies over domestic spying and covert actions abroad, intelligence oversight was institutionalized in a select intelligence committee (even if jurisdiction overlapped that of older committees). As a select committee, HPSCI is composed of members of Congress appointed by the Speaker of the House and the minority leader; their terms are currently limited to eight years to ensure that intelligence oversight does not become the exclusive domain of a few members and that a substantial portion of the House has some insight into often-arcane intelligence matters.

A major responsibility of HPSCI is the preparation of the annual intelligence authorization bill which is to be voted on by the entire House. The bill authorizes funding for staff of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the major intelligence agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), etc. Unlike its Senate counterpart, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), HPSCI also prepares the budget for "intelligence related activities"—the tactical intelligence gathering efforts of the military services. Intelligence authorization acts are of course public documents, but the classified accompanying reports have the force of law for the intelligence agencies.

The other major responsibility of HPSCI is the oversight of intelligence activities. Oversight by Congress involves conducting hearings and investigations to monitor how the executive branch administers laws that been passed. The committee seeks to determine if the statutes are being faithfully implemented and to ascertain if further changes are needed. Given the necessary security surrounding intelligence activities, oversight by HPSCI assumes a special significance as it functions on behalf of the whole House in an area in which the public remains largely uninformed.

HPSCI does provide extensive information to the public, not only in the text of legislation, but also in occasional public hearings and unclassified committee reports. HPSCI has its own Web site (http://intelligence.house.gov).

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Church Committee; Director of Central Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; National Security Agency; Pike Committee

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Richard A. Best, Jr.

HOUSTON, LAWRENCE REID
(JANUARY 14, 1913–AUGUST 15, 1995)

Lawrence Reid Houston was the principal draftsman of the National Security Act of 1947 and general counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Born on January 14, 1913, in St. Louis, Lawrence Reid Houston graduated from Harvard University in 1935 and received a law degree from the University of Virginia Law School in 1939. He started his career in the field of intelligence when he joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

After the OSS was dissolved in October 1945, Houston became counsel to its successors, the Strategic Services Unit followed by the Central Intelligence Group. It was during this period that he did his most important work, drafting the National Security Act of 1947 which created the CIA. After the establishment of the CIA, he became the first general counsel and remained in that capacity until his retirement in 1973. Houston died on August 15, 1995, while vacationing at his summer house in Westport, Massachusetts.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Act; Office of Strategic Services

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Naoki Ohno

HOWARD, EDWARD LEE
(OCTOBER 27, 1951–JULY 12, 2002)

In June 1986, Edward Lee Howard became the first known Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer to defect to the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). Howard, an army brat who was raised in New Mexico, graduated from the University of Texas in 1972. Upon graduation, Howard served in the Peace Corps and went on to receive an MBA from American University. He was briefly employed at the Agency for International Development (AID) before the CIA's Directorate of Operations hired him in January 1980. In the fall of 1981, Howard's wife, Mary, joined him at the CIA and she too was trained for clandestine work. In 1983, Howard failed a series of polygraph tests about his past illegal drug use and was fired by the CIA. Howard, disgruntled by his dismissal, disclosed the identity of his CIA contact in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow after making an angry phone call over a KGB-tapped line.

Upon Howard's return home to New Mexico, he descended into a downward spiral of drinking while working for the state in Santa Fe. He was arrested for a firearms violation in 1984 and was later paroled. By 1985, Howard was identified by Vitaly

Yurchenko, a KGB defector, and CIA case officer Aldrich Ames as a KGB source code-named "Robert" in the CIA. Using his CIA training, Howard evaded the FBI and fled the United States for the Soviet Union before he could be arrested. In exchange for asylum, Howard supposedly turned over the names of CIA officers serving in Moscow and a top Soviet scientist who specialized in stealth technology. After Howard's flight, Yurchenko redefected to the Soviet Union and Ames was convicted of spying for the Soviets in 1994. These events cast doubts on Howard's level of participation. On July 12, 2002, Howard was found dead with a broken neck after apparently falling down steps in his Russian dacha.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Lazarus F. O'Sako

HTLINGUAL

From 1940 to 1973 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted a series of 12 covert mail opening programs in the United States. The programs lasted between 3 weeks and 23 years. The purposes of these mail openings varied. The CIA sought to obtain foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information. The FBI sought counterespionage information. Information gathered through these mail openings was sanitized so that the source of the information was not known to those who received it. Recipients included other members of the intelligence community; the attorney general; and at least one president, Lyndon Johnson.

All of these mail openings were initiated by the CIA without prior authorization by the postmaster general, the attorney general, or the president. Proposals were put forward in 1954 and again in 1965 to brief the president about the existence of HTLINGUAL. No action appears to have been taken at either time. In some cases programs were initiated without the approval of senior officials within the CIA. The Hawaii program, for example, was started on the authority of the CIA's single representative there.

The CIA conducted domestic mail opening programs in four cities as part of these 12 operations, the longest of which lasted 20 years. The New York City program ran from 1953 to 1973 and was known as HTLINGUAL. A second program, known as KMSOURDOUGH, operated in San Francisco from 1969 to 1971 and consisted of a series of mail intercepts ranging in length from one to three weeks. A third program, identified as Project SETTER, took place in New Orleans and operated for three weeks in 1957. The fourth operation took place in Hawaii from late 1954 to late 1955. Additionally, the CIA opened the mail of at least 12 targeted Americans within the United States.

HTLINGUAL was proposed by the Soviet Division in 1952. The hope was to obtain information that could be used for psychological warfare, intelligence material that might be used by American agents, and creating a channel for sending information to American agents inside the Soviet Union. HTLINGUAL went into full operation in February 1953 after having undergone a trial run. For the first seven months information was hand-copied from the outside of envelopes after that it was photocopied. A further expansion of the operation took place when in November 1955 James Angleton, chief of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, recommended opening all mail traffic to and from the Soviet Union through New York City. The FBI became involved in HTLINGUAL in January 1958 when it discovered its existence as a result of inquiries to the CIA about a proposed FBI mail opening program. The FBI never opened any mail as part of HTLINGUAL but it did place collection requirements on the program and received copies of intercepted mail until the program was terminated in 1973. A final expansion of HTLINGUAL occurred in March 1961. In February 1960, Angleton proposed the establishment of a laboratory to examine mail for secret messages and open mail that was sealed using sophisticated adhesives.

Mail was intercepted at New York airports. One CIA agent estimated that two to six bags of mail containing a total of 5,000 to 15,000 pieces of mail were examined by the CIA five days a week. Two criteria were used to determine which letters would be selected for opening. A watch list contained names of individuals of interest to the CIA. Originally this list had 10 to 20 names but it grew in size rapidly. By the time HTLINGUAL was terminated, 600 names were on it, many of whom had little connections with suspected espionage and whose correspondence offered little by way of intelligence. In 1969, for example, the names of many domestic radicals, antiwar activists, and black militants were added. From 1958 forward, the FBI contributed 286 names to the watch list. Other mail was opened about 75 percent of the mail based on a process of random selection. Finally, some mail was opened and kept in a separate file on the basis of a special-category items list. Included in this list was correspondence to and from government officials including Senators Frank Church and Edward Kennedy.

HTLINGUAL began on a relatively small scale. In 1956 only 832 letters were opened. That soon changed. In 1961 over 14,000 letters were opened. The single busiest year was 1967 when 23,617 letters were opened. According to CIA records made public at the Church Committee investigations into CIA activities within the United States, a total of 28,322,796 letters were made available to CIA agents in New York City as part of HTLINGUAL. The exteriors of 2,705,706 letters were photographed and 215,820 letters were opened. In terms of recipients of this information, the FBI received copies of more mail openings than did CIA analysts.

Evaluations of the worth of HTLINGUAL information varied but tended to be negative. Where James Angleton was highly supportive of the program evaluations by the CIA's Inspector General's Office were not as positive, noting that they found few cases where HTLINGUAL information was translated into operations that had any tangible benefit to the Soviet Division. Evaluations of HTLINGUAL's contribution to domestic intelligence operations were not positive either. A CIA official called the product "meager" and FBI officials stated that it did not provide leads to a single Soviet agent.

The CIA's Inspector General's staff proposed terminating HTLINGUAL in 1969 in large part because although the FBI was the primary recipient of HTLINGUAL's

information, the CIA bore all of the risks of embarrassment should it become public. A 1971 inquiry regarding mail openings from the Federation of American Scientists to the chief postal inspector led to concerns within that organization about the continuation of the program and brought forward a threat to go public from Chief Postal Inspector William Cotter unless it could be documented that senior government officials had approved it. HTLINGUAL was suspended in 1973 by the new Director of Central Intelligence, James Schlesinger, after it was unsuccessfully offered to the FBI and Cotter refused to withdraw his ultimatum.

See also: Angleton, James Jesus; Central Intelligence Agency; Church Committee; Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); KMSOURDOUGH, Operation; Schlesinger, James Rodney

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Glenn P. Hastedt

HUSE, CALEB
(FEBRUARY 11, 1831–MARCH 12, 1905)

Caleb Huse served the Confederate States of America as a purchasing agent in Europe. He was instrumental in securing military supplies for the Confederacy during the early stages of the American Civil War. Huse, an ardent believer in the Southern cause, resigned a position as artillery officer in the U.S. Army in 1860 and took a teaching position at the University of Alabama. Following the outbreak of hostilities, Huse joined the Confederate navy. He was appointed as a purchasing agent for the Confederate army and ordered to proceed to London. Upon arrival, Huse moved quickly to obtain arms from several large factories. His energetic efforts provided much-needed arms to the Confederacy while blocking the United States from obtaining arms overseas.

The Confederacy was chronically short of foreign exchange to pay for Huse's purchases. Huse improvised, organizing a bond issue in Europe repayable in Southern cotton, which raised $8 million. The flow of material from Europe was barely impacted by the U.S. blockade, which only slowly gained effectiveness as the United States built up its navy and seized Southern ports.

Although Huse was not the only Confederate purchasing agent, he often was given priority due to his visibility and reputation. Huse's effectiveness has been debated; his sense of urgency led to several poor decisions. Many rifles he purchased from Austria proved useless in wet weather. In addition, his pursuit of easy credit led him into contracts that charged exorbitant interest rates and heavily inflated prices. At the time, several Confederate officials argued that his judgment was poor and demanded his recall.

After the end of the Civil War, Huse returned to the United States and education, founding a school near West Point.

See also: Civil War and Intelligence

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James L. Erwin

HUSTON PLAN

In 1970 Tom Charles Huston, a White House aide to President Richard Nixon, put forward a plan for espionage against domestic political forces that in Nixon's view were determined to destroy American society. Huston was tasked by White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to develop a plan for increased domestic intelligence operations to stem the tide of "escalating revolutionary violence" in the United States. His initial efforts met with little success, something William Sullivan, head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Domestic Intelligence Division, attributed to the reluctance of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to participate in such plans. To move plans forward, Huston arranged for a June 5, 1970, meeting between Nixon and the heads of the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency. As a result of that meeting Nixon charged the four intelligence heads with developing a plan of action. Hoover was placed in charge of the ad hoc committee.

The plan, "Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)," was produced later that month. Accompanying this 43-page document was a memorandum authored by Huston and directed to Haldeman, "Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan: Analysis and Strategy." Hoover balked at the project. On June 23 he broke off FBI liaison operations with the other three intelligence agencies as well as the Secret Service and International Revenue Service. Hoover indicated in the Special Report that the FBI did not wish to change its present procedures for covering internal security threats but had no objection to other agencies moving forward. Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, suggested that neither he nor the others involved were doing much more than going through the motions and that Huston and Sullivan were the only ones truly committed to the program.

Hoover's opposition and the reluctance of the other intelligence chiefs had little do to with the acknowledged illegal nature of the activities being proposed. These organizations had already long been carrying out illegal espionage activities and covert action against domestic groups through such programs as CHAOS and COINTELPRO. Hoover's fear was of being caught and having the activities exposed. Apparently among all of the participants only Huston was not aware of these ongoing domestic espionage campaigns. Among the steps Huston recommended were: lifting restrictions on mail openings, allowing the National Security Agency to broaden its monitoring of communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities, relaxing restrictions on secret break-ins, developing a network of campus informants, and establishing an Interagency Group on Domestic Intelligence.

On July 14, Haldeman sent Huston a memo indicating that Nixon had approved his recommendations but did not wish to issue a directive to that effect. Huston was just to move forward on the basis of Haldeman's memo. Accordingly, Huston sent a directive under his name to the intelligence chiefs to that effect. Hoover responded by going to Attorney General John Mitchell and protesting the plan and indicating he would proceed only under a presidential directive. Mitchell went to Nixon who rescinded his approval five days after giving it. The demise of the Huston Plan did not end the White House's interest in additional domestic espionage undertakings, an interest that would ultimately culminate in the Watergate affair.

See also: CHAOS, Operation; COINTELPRO; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); National Security Agency; Nixon Administration and Intelligence; Watergate

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Glenn P. Hastedt

HYNSON, JOSEPH

Joseph Hynson was a trans-Atlantic sea captain from Kent County, Maryland, left unemployed in England in 1776, who performed marine tasks for the American diplomats in France. Because he was related to Lambert Wickes and Samuel Nicholson, naval captains serving in France under the direction of Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane, and was a friend of William Carmichael, Deane's personal secretary, he had access to information about the secret operations of American diplomats and seamen. In England to take charge of a cutter Nicholson acquired, Hynson was recruited as a double agent by the Loyalist, John Vardill, agent for British intelligence chief William Eden. In exchange for an annual pension of 200 pounds, Hynson agreed to deliver American dispatches through a prearranged capture at sea in January 1777, but they were diverted to another ship and the waiting British warships received nothing. George III proclaimed that Hynson, "like every other spy from N. America is encouraged by Deane and Franklin and only give intelligence to deceive." Nonetheless, Hynson relayed marine intelligence to British agent Edward Smith, while ostensibly helping Deane secure him a vessel on which to sail home. Assigned to deliver to Captain John Folger dispatches for the Continental Congress, Hynson replaced copies of months of the secret correspondence between the commissioners and the French ministry with blank paper, and sped to London with the dispatches in October 1777. Returning to Paris, Hynson was shunned by all the Americans except Carmichael, who reportedly told him that the French knew of his going to England and had accused the commissioners of sending him there for their own diplomatic purposes. Eden soon

relieved the unhappy Hynson from spy duties, but he remained in England and married there in 1783.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Deane, Silas; Eden, William; Franklin, Benjamin

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Elizabeth M. Nuxoll

I

ILLEGALS PROGRAM

The Illegals program was the name given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to a sleeper espionage ring begun by Soviet authorities during the final stages of the cold war. It was exposed on June 27, 2010 when 10 people were arrested as spies by FBI officials in raids in the New York metropolitan area, Boston, and the Washington, DC area. An 11th suspect, Christopher Metsos, was arrested in Cyprus preparing to fly to Budapest. He was subsequently released on bond and disappeared presumably making his way back to Russia. As a group they had been under investigation since the Clinton administration through video surveillance, hidden microphones and secret searches of their homes.

As sleeper agents the 10 Russian spies were expected to blend in with American society and position themselves so that they might get important information on such matters as U.S. policy on arms reduction and its Iranian policy. It is uncertain to what extent any important information was passed on to Russian officials since none of the spies held positions in the intelligence community. Some (Cynthia and Richard Murphy) had lived in the United States for up to two decades posing as husband and wife and raising a family while another (Mikhail Semenko) had been in the United States for only a few months. There occupations varied greatly. One (Vicky Pelaez) was a reporter for a Spanish-language newspaper in New York. Still another (Anna Chapman) operated an online real estate company) and a third (Juan Lazaro) was an adjunct college professor.

FBI officials acted to end the Illegals program when they feared that one of its key participants suspected her cover had been compromised and that another was about to go to Moscow and would not return. Anna Chapman, 28, daughter of former KGB official and Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Vasily Kushchenko was heard to tell her father in a phone conversation listened to by FBI authorities that she may have been discovered. A telephone call from an FBI informant had set up a face-to face meeting with her so that she might take a false passport to another Russian agent.

An undated image taken from the Russian social networking website "Odnoklassniki," or Classmates, shows Anna Chapman, who appeared at a hearing, June 28, 2010, in New York federal court. Chapman, along with 10 others, was arrested on charges of conspiracy to act as an agent of a foreign government without notifying the U.S. attorney general. (AP/Wide World Photos)

Richard Murphy was to leave for Moscow the next day. He had travelled there in March but now FBI officials feared that after Chapman's phone call he would not return. Intelligence officials feared that other spies operating in the United States would also be alerted. As part of their sting operation to close down the Illegals program the FBI also arranged for an informant to give Semenko $5,000 and have him hide it at an Arlington, Va. County park.

Both U.S. and Russian leaders downplayed the significance of the arrests which came just days after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev met with President Barack Obama in Washington, DC With stunning speed a spy exchange was arranged. The 10 alleged spies pleaded guilty to being unregistered foreign agents for Russia. They were sent to Russia in exchange for four people: Igor Sutyagin, a nuclear researcher who had been arrested in 1999, Alexander Zaporozhsky, Sergei Skripal, and Gennady Vasilenko all of whom were former intelligence officials.

After the spy swap was announced FBI officials revealed the existence of a 12th sleeper spy who was not part of the Illegals program spy ring. The individual who was to be deported was identified as a Russian citizen who had only recently come to the United States.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Post-Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

INDO-GERMAN-IRISH CONSPIRACY IN SAN FRANCISCO

Just months into World War I, an Indo-German-Irish plot was established to ship American weapons to India for a revolt against the British. The objective was to reduce Britain's ability to fight Germany and Irish nationalism by jeopardizing British recruiting in India and forcing Britain to commit military and intelligence resources to the United States and Asia. Ultimately the plot collapsed as ships failed to rendezvous off Mexico in spring 1915 and a neutrality investigation was launched by American officials. American agents (Bureau of Investigation, BOI), British agents, Irish republicans (Sinn Fein), private detectives, German agents, and Indian revolutionaries (Gadar Party) were all entangled in a cloak-and-dagger tale that ended in a San Francisco courtroom with U.S. attorneys assisted by British agents facing Irish-American defense attorneys. The November 1917 to April 1918 trial ended with shots fired in the courtroom and two defendants lying dead. This conspiracy demonstrated the pragmatic alliances of Indian and Irish nationalists with German spies as well as the working relationship between American and British intelligence. It also illuminated deficiencies in the fledgling BOI and British Secret Service that would later impact the evolution of the FBI, MI-5, and MI-6.

The conspiracy was coordinated through the German consulate in San Francisco, led by Consul-General Franz Bopp and Vice-Consul Ekhart von Schack. Military Attaché Wilhelm von Brincken handled most of the coordination with Sinn Fein and the Gadar. Consulate agent Charles Crowley and his assistant, Margaret Cornell, took care of many details and may have been British infiltrators.

Larry de Lacey was the leading Sinn Fein agent in the Bay Area and used Irish Catholic priests as couriers. The scholar-priest Father Peter Yorke funded De Lacey and housed Sinn Fein and Gadar records at his Rincon Publishing Building. De Lacey worked with Joseph McGarrity, an East Coast Irish operative, to arrange for the shipment of guns by ship from New York to Galveston and then by train to San Diego. De Lacey also began arrangements in San Diego and Los Angeles for the guns to be put aboard gun-smuggler Fred Jebsen's schooner, *Annie Larsen*, to rendezvous with the steamship Maverick off the coast of Mexico. The ships missed each other due to British infiltration.

Lala Har Dayal, who founded the Gadar in San Francisco in 1913, turned it over to Ram Chandra when deported the following year. Ram Chandra was aided by Taraknath Das, Muhammad Barkatullah, and Gopal Singh, with Singh taking over as leader when released from prison after the war. Manabendra Nath Roy was the Gadar agent in

Calcutta waiting for the guns that never arrived and became one of the founders of the Indian Communist Party.

The British consulate in San Francisco, under Alexander Ross, infiltrated the conspiracy and helped the Americans to investigate and prosecute the conspirators. British secret service sent India police officer Robert Nathan to aid Ross in the United States after May 1916. Nathan had secret service agent Alexander Marr lead the investigation in San Francisco with the help of William Mundell's Private Detective Agency, which included dozens of private detectives and may have been a front for British agents. Ross assigned J. S. Hale to be the British agent who accompanied the BOI on raids under Special Agent-in-Charge Don Rathbun and aided U.S. Attorney John W. Preston in putting the case together. The head of British secret service in India, George Denham, was also in San Francisco to aid the investigation and trial by 1917. British assistance was crucial. Preston reported to the attorney general: "The evidence is in good shape. The British agents have worked very hard in putting the evidence in accessible form." Some evidence was supplied by the seized papers of German agent Franz von Papen in New York.

Preston won the trial in April 1918 with the aid of Assistant U.S. Attorney Annette Adams, who later became the first woman on the California Supreme Court. However, on the final day of trial, Gadar member Ram Singh entered the courtroom with a pistol that he obtained in the restroom during recess and killed Gadar leader Ram Chandra. A U.S. marshal then shot and killed Singh. In the end, nearly three dozen conspirators including Bopp and his consulate staff, De Lacey and some of his contacts, and the Gadar leadership were convicted and sent to prison for the duration of the war.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); MI-5 (The Security Service); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service)

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Matthew Plowman

INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

For the sake of simplicity, espionage can be defined as the clandestine and unlawful stealing of political, business, or military secrets. Espionage takes place in both times of peace and in wartime. It is done by civilians or by military personnel. Political espionage is conducted during both peace and war time. Military intelligence is usually conducted in wartime in order to fight battles. Industrial espionage is usually the focus of clandestine operations during peacetime.

The terms *business intelligence, commercial intelligence, corporate intelligence, economic espionage, economic intelligence,* and *industrial espionage* are often used as synonyms. However, they are distinguishable, but they can overlap in conflicting ways. For example if an industrial spy from a foreign country is working for a private industry making a product that has no apparent military applications then this would be normally termed *industrial espionage.* However, if the spy's homeland is not capitalist and the secrets stolen will build up a regime hostile to the host country, say, the United States, then this threatens the national security of the country. In addition if the industrial spy is working for a civilian contractor and steals secrets related to a weapons program in peacetime the theft is economic intelligence and could even be called military intelligence, although the military is not directly involved.

Business intelligence is the practice of many businesses gathering intelligence on their competitors. It is industrial espionage if it is done by spying in industry. Businesses also use counterintelligence operations to protect themselves from competitors. However, this type of espionage is done by private firms to gain intelligence and not by governments. If governments are involved, as most are, then the spying is probably better called *economic intelligence.*

Commercial intelligence can be defined as intelligence gleaned about business competitors from open sources. It is practiced from the local to the global levels. It is sometimes called *competitive intelligence.*

Since the end of World War II there has been an enormous reluctance on the part of American businesses to admit to being victims of industrial espionage. This is true when the theft of secrets has been the work of the agents of another American firm. However, there has been in recent American history a reluctance to admit to being the victims of industrial espionage. Sometimes the theft is not even recognized. This may be due to the fact that computers and other machines can be used to copy blueprints, formulas, or other industrial or trade secrets. The theft may not even be noticed until the firm wonders how a foreign competitor has been able to advance so quickly in developing a product that is now driving it out of business.

Historically, prior to World War II, American businesses were often engaged in economic espionage. One of the foundations of the rise of American industry was due to the economic espionage by Francis Cabot Lowell. He took his family to Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1811. Using as a cover that they had come "for reasons of health," Lowell and his wife soon visited a number of the new textile mills in the north of England. There he was able to see the new water-powered loom and was able with a near-photographic memory able to understand the complexities of the new textile machinery. The British government, aware of the economic potential of the new industry and its implications for national security through the wealth it was bring to the country as finished fabrics flowed out to the world from the north of England, had adopted legislation that forbade taking any parts, drawings, or other information out of the country.

When Lowell left England in 1813 to return to Boston he carried the technical data on the powered loom in his head. In 1814 Paul Moody and he were able to create improved versions of the spinning and weaving machinery he had seen. Shortly thereafter the Boston Manufacturing Company put the entire process from fiber to woven cloth under one roof in Waltham, Massachusetts, on the Charles River.

This was the beginning of American industry and its rise in the world. Other Americans were to also use intelligence from overseas to build American industry.

When governments engage in intelligence operations to gain economic information they are doing economic intelligence that may be overt. However, covert economic intelligence is appropriately called *microeconomic intelligence, microeconomic espionage, commercial intelligence*, or *loosely industrial espionage*. It is done to aid business at the expense of the economic activities of a foreign power. It can be done for example to help a weak home business or to gain technology that can be used to create domestic business that would not exist without the theft of business or industrial secrets.

The United States as a matter of policy has rejected conducting microeconomic espionage operations on behalf of American business interests. This policy has had strong supporters both within and outside of the U.S. government and its clandestine services. This kind of operation is also not of great interest to American companies because most can find a sufficient number of former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or other intelligence officers to do this kind of work for them. In addition, the discovery of an American intelligence operation aimed at stealing industrial secrets from foreign companies would have serious negative consequences for the conduct of American foreign relations.

Complicating the conduct of microeconomic espionage by American intelligence agencies is the issue of what is an American company in the multinational corporate world of the post-twentieth century. It would also be difficult to decide how to share the intelligence take and it is very likely that secrets stolen on behalf of one company would disadvantage another. Most American businesses prefer to conduct their own economic espionage operations and to not be associated with U.S. secret agencies for fear that discovery would have a long-term negative impact on business.

Although the United States has so far been reluctant to conduct microeconomic espionage, many other countries have no such qualms. France, Russia, China, Japan, Korea, India, and many other countries are and have been engaged in massive campaigns of microeconomic espionage against American economic activity. Many secrets have been stolen by exchange students or by foreign nationals who studied in the United States and then took jobs that gave them the opportunity to spy for their native lands.

The open educational system of the United States has recruited a vast army of bright foreign students who are trained in American universities at taxpayers' expense or through the generosity of American donations to educational foundations. This openness has been the entry point for thousands of industrial spies. Many of these students have then gone on to participate in research projects or in jobs after graduation that grant them access to industrial and scientific secrets that are used by their governments to grow the businesses of foreigners at American expense.

The cost to the United States of the industrial espionage of Japan, the Soviets, the Chinese, and others has been enormous. Billions and billions of dollars worth of trade secrets have been stolen which has led to a decline in the income of Americans. In addition the Chinese and the Russians as well as others are constantly seeking military secrets that can aid their military development.

Joint ventures with contractors who hire long-term foreign workers are vulnerable to acts of economic espionage. Foreign students may work for free with professors in an

area targeted by their home country for the purpose of gaining information that will give a technological advantage. In the case of the Chinese, who have large communities in the United States that provide cover for Chinese economic spies, any reluctance to spy for the industries owned by the Chinese Red Army may generate threats against family that remains in China.

Industrial espionage is often directed against the overseas subsidiaries of American companies. Economic espionage is relatively easy for a spy working for an American company in a third country. For example, if the spy is a Frenchman working for an American firm in Columbia it is unlikely that American, French, or Columbian intelligence agencies will be investigating any thefts, which are likely hard to be detected in any case.

In foreign countries, intelligence agencies of the host country or of other foreign countries are not restrained by law from eavesdropping on telecommunications, from bugging hotel rooms, or engaging in other forms of surveillance that is strictly forbidden in the United States. The great concern of many who present themselves as civil libertarians defending freedom of speech against government intrusion is totally absent when it comes to the activities of foreign spy rings. In this condition economic espionage against American firms can flourish, especially if private firms do not complain to the government.

Complaints against the American intelligence community that it is a threat to freedom begin to look like the work of agents of influence who are seeking to neutralize any counterespionage activities, because if the National Security Agency, CIA, or Federal Bureau of Investigation were to listen to conversations without a warrant there would likely be a significant price to be paid by career members of the agency concerned. However, in foreign countries wholesale eavesdropping on conversations of businesspeople, especially Americans, in hotels or elsewhere is being conducted with growing intensity.

If the U.S. intelligence community has been reluctant to conduct microeconomic espionage against foreign firms, the reluctance has usually been dropped if the foreign target is an important manufacturer of military equipment. When microeconomic intelligence data is taken it is usually sent to the Commerce Department to be disposed of as it wishes.

However, many foreign countries have economies that are mostly state owned and operated, or they have enterprises that are protected or favored by governmental policy. In the intelligence game, if American intelligence agents gain information about unfair competition by foreign companies or countries the intelligence is very likely to be circulated via the Commerce Department to American firms.

Economic intelligence has grown dramatically in importance since the end of World War II when it consumed about 10 percent of the intelligence budget. By the year 2000 economic espionage consumed 40 percent of the intelligence budget.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has become the lead agency in the American effort to stop economic espionage. It has estimated that thefts have cost billions of dollars and thousands of jobs for Americans.

Economic espionage takes a number of forms and is a federal crime under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 as amended (18 U.S. Code, Section 1831–1839 et al). The Act protects trade secrets, cyber secrets, and business information against acts of piracy, illegal

technology transfers, and more. Economic espionage is also prohibited in other places in the Code.

Numerous cases of economic espionage have been prosecuted successfully. Thefts of proprietary economic information, especially by foreign governments, while not acts of terrorism, are often just as destructive because they destroy man-years of labor, huge investments, and whole businesses by stealing their inventions or copyrighted intellectual property. In fact these acts of espionage, although less dramatic than acts committed by terrorists, can be far graver threats to national security because their destructiveness is insidious in nature.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Andrew J. Waskey

INMAN, ADMIRAL BOBBY RAY
(APRIL 4, 1931–)

Admiral Bobby Ray Inman served as Director of the National Security Agency from 1977 to 1981. Prior to assuming that post he was Director of Naval Intelligence and then Vice Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. After leaving NSA, Inman went on to become Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He served in that position from February 2, 1981 until June 10, 1982.

Inman was born on April 4, 1931, in Rhonesboro, Texas. He graduated from the University of Texas in 1950 at the age of 19. In 1952 he was commissioned as an ensign in the navy. After graduating from the National War College in 1972, Inman went on to become executive assistant and senior aide to the vice chief of naval operations. From there his next post was assistant chief of staff for intelligence on the staff command of the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Inman was the first naval intelligence specialist to earn the rank of four-star admiral.

Inman retired in 1982 and went into private business. In 1987 he joined the faculty at the University of Texas–Austin when he became the LBJ Centennial Chair in

National Policy at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. In 2005 he served as the school's interim dean. Additionally, Inman chaired a commission on improving U.S. embassy security following the bombing of the American embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, in April 1983 and was acting chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1991 to 1993.

Throughout his career Inman was somewhat of a controversial figure. Some reacted negatively to his quick wit and reputation for being a fast-rising whiz kid in the intelligence community. Others saw him as a skilled administrator. He became embroiled in controversy in January 1994 after having been nominated by President Bill Clinton on December 16, 1993, to replace Les Aspin as secretary of defense. His nomination was met by charges that he was deceitful, manipulative, a tax cheat, and a failure as a businessman. Inman responded by publicly lashing out at the media at his January 20, 1994, press conference, explaining his decision to withdraw his name from consideration for the position. He accused the media of engaging in a McCarthyite conspiracy to destroy his character. Inman singled out Senator Robert Dole and columnist William Safire in making these charges. In his press conference he also went on to reveal previously secret information about military aid to Israel when he was Deputy Director of the CIA and his efforts to prevent Israel from obtaining some satellite photos after it used some to bomb an Iraqi nuclear plant. In his place Clinton nominated William J. Perry to become secretary of defense.

He again became a controversial figure in 2006 when he spoke out against the George W. Bush administration's use of warrantless wiretaps in its efforts to identify and capture terrorists in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

See also: Clinton Administration and Intelligence; McCarthy, Joseph; National Security Agency; President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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Glenn P. Hastedt

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Intelligence collection, analysis, reporting, as well as counterintelligence activities and covert action, are not carried out by a single agency within the U.S. government. Instead, a wide variety of organizations are involved in these tasks. Collectively they are referred to as the intelligence community (IC). The origins of the IC can be traced back to the 1947 National Security Act that laid the foundations for the post–World War II national security system in the United States by beginning the process of unifying the military into a single department, creating the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council. Along with the CIA, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the intelligence agencies of the military services

were given membership on the National Security Council and can be considered charter members of the IC.

The first formal description of membership in the IC did not come until Executive Order 1190 was issued in by President Gerald Ford. In addition to the aforementioned organizations it identified the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Treasury, and the Energy Research and Development Administration, along with the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and special offices within the Defense Department charged with collecting specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs as members of the IC.

The first legislative definition of IC membership came with the passage of the Intelligence Organization Act of 1992. It codified the existing structure of the intelligence community and provided for further changes in its structure as determined by the president. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, there are now 16 members of the IC. Although the term *community* denotes a strong element of likeness and compatibility, the operation of the IC in practice has more resembled that of a loose warring federation with the different members competing for policy influence and funding. All totaled, over 80 percent of the IC budget is generally held to lie within the Defense Department. The internal politics of the IC was further complicated by the fact that up until recently the head of the CIA, the Director of Central intelligence, also served as head of the IC. As part of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms, the position of Director of National Intelligence was created in an effort to achieve greater managerial control over the members of the IC.

Of all the members of the IC, only the CIA does not exist as part of cabinet departments with other roles and missions in addition to their intelligence activities. The CIA is defined as possessing an all-source intelligence analysis capability. Created in 1947 through the National Security Act, it collects information using sophisticated technology, human sources, and open sources; analyses information; disseminates intelligence to policy makers and other members of the IC; and conducts counterintelligence and covert action programs.

Four important members of the IC reside within the Defense Department. They are the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The first three rely heavily upon signals (SIGINT) and photographs (PHOTOINT) to obtain information from satellite and airborne collection platforms. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency was created in 1996 as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). It received its current name in 2004. It has central responsibility for helping the Defense Department achieve "dominant battlefield awareness" through the accurate description and referencing of the earth's physical features. The NRO was set up in 1960 but only became publicly known in 1992. At the time it was charged with developing the U.S. reconnaissance satellite systems. It continues to be responsible for developing and acquiring the technology needed to operate these systems as well as managing them. The NSA is responsible for protecting U.S. secret communications and exploiting weaknesses in the communication systems of others to further U.S. foreign policy goals. It too was established in secret and operated that way from its founding in 1952 until 1982 when its existence was revealed. Periodically NSA has come under criticism for eavesdropping on Americans. This was most

recently the case in 2005–2006 when press accounts revealed that it had engaged in warrantless surveillance on Americans as part of the George W. Bush administration's war on terrorism.

The DIA was established in 1961 in an attempt to bring greater coherence and unity to military intelligence analysis by integrating the military intelligence efforts of all Defense Department agencies. To this end DIA was tasked with collecting, processing, evaluating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the Defense Department. In addition to serving as the primary intelligence advisor to the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military intelligence issues, in 1986 the DIA was also designated as a combat support agency and charged with providing timely and objective military intelligence to combat units.

Also found within the Defense Department are the intelligence units of the army, navy, air force, and Marine Corps. Set up in 1882, Naval Intelligence is the longest continuously operating U.S. intelligence organization. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) monitors the maritime shipment of illegal cargoes, provides technical expertise on foreign naval weapon systems, and operational intelligence for naval commanders operating in combat theaters. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity provides operational support and threat data for Marine Operating Forces from predeployment and training through combat. Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) resources consist of shipborne, space-based, airborne, and group-based collection systems that provide support to theater commanders as well as combat crews. Army intelligence, likewise, is geared to providing combat commanders with the information they need to eliminate intelligence surprises and make accurate threat assessments.

The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) was established in 1946 and is one of the smaller members of the IC and is strictly an analytic organization. Its primary mission is to serve American diplomacy and to that end it produces some 3,500 written intelligence assessments each year. In doing so it draws upon diplomatic reporting from embassies as well as a full array of other sources, including open-source material.

Especially since September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) primary intelligence focus is on terrorism and counterterrorism. Unlike other members of the IC, its focus historically had been inward and because of this it has found itself embroiled in controversy over intelligence-gathering activities directed at such groups as the American Communist Party, anti-Vietnam War protesters, and Black Power groups. Throughout its history, but especially under its longtime director J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI had an uneasy coexistence with the CIA. Cooperation between the two was often strained and uneven, a fact that many pointed to as a contributing factor to the failure to prevent the 9/11 hijackings.

The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism. The principal directorate within the department charged with the intelligence portion of this challenge is the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Directorate. It seeks to map out the critical vulnerabilities that might be exploited so that terrorists will be thwarted or the response to a terrorist attack will be quickened and made more effective. This directorate is also responsible for monitoring, assessing, and coordinating indicators and warnings of potential terrorist activity in the United States.

U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence now operates within the organizational structure of the Department of Homeland Security. Its roots go back to the Prohibition era, when its primary targets were rumrunners. Today, Coast Guard Intelligence is concerned with such matters as narcotics and illegal immigration interdiction in addition to providing intelligence on potential security threats in American inland waterways and international waters.

Three organizations with a lesser presence in the IC are the intelligence units of the Department of Energy, the Department of the Treasury, and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The Office of Intelligence in the Department of Energy is the IC's principal source of technical expertise on nuclear weapons and proliferation, energy security, science and technology, and nuclear energy safety and waste. Its organizational roots trace back to the Manhattan Project during World War II and the subsequent establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Treasury Department's Office of Intelligence and Analysis was established in 2004 and is responsible for the receipt, collation, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information pertaining to terrorist groups, proliferators, narcotics traffickers, money launderers, and other key national security threats.

The Drug Enforcement Agency's Office of National Security Intelligence is responsible for providing drug information that is relevant to IC intelligence requirements. The DEA has the largest overseas law enforcement presence of any U.S. agency operating in 86 different countries.

See also: Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence; Atomic Energy Commission; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Department Intelligence; Defense Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; Energy Department Intelligence; Executive Orders; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Homeland Security Department of; Marine Corps Intelligence; Naval Intelligence; Office of Naval Intelligence; State Department Intelligence

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

The Intelligence Community (IC) staff formally came into existence on March 1, 1972, through the renaming of the National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE) Staff. This body was established in 1963 by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)

John McCone to give him an instrument for community-wide management-related leadership in directing the intelligence community.

The IC staff was created by DCI Richard Helms, who was responding to a November 5, 1971, decision memorandum, "Organization and Management of the US Foreign Intelligence Community," issued by President Richard Nixon that gave the DCI responsibility for improving the intelligence product and increasing efficiency in the allocation of resources. The IC staff was intended to better allow Helms to achieve these goals, especially the latter and ever since has served as the principal bureaucratic tool DCIs rely on to help construct the National Foreign Intelligence Program's budget and oversee its implementation and any reprogramming of funds.

Since its creation, the IC staff has been organized in a number of ways and has been the subject of many reports seeking to improve the efficiency of the intelligence community's collection and analytical efforts. Under DCIs Helms, William Colby, James Schlesinger, and George W. Bush, a unitary IC staff existed. DCI Stansfield Turner divided the IC staff into two parts, one group served the Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking and the other the Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management. DCI William Casey recombined the IC staff into a single unit responsible for "examination of critical cross disciplinary intelligence problems, coordination of Community priorities and requirements, maintenance of Community planning mechanisms, and development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget."

Under DCI William Webster, the IC staff underwent two evaluation studies. The first was by the Inspector General's Office. A major finding was that the IC staff saw the DCI as detached from community-wide issues and not interested in its work. The report also concluded with negative comments about the quality of those serving on the IC staff, said to number 250 in the early 1990s. The remedy identified by the IC staff to their predicament was greater attention by the DCI to community affairs and restoring the position of deputy DCI for the intelligence community that had been established by DCI Bush. The second was by a committee chaired by CIA officer Dan Childs. It cited the need for more centralized management and stronger planning and resource allocation tools. Childs would recommend to Webster's successor as DCI Robert Gates that the IC staff be abolished and replaced with a smaller community staff of 30 to 40 people who would focus on resource management issues.

These recommendations led to the promulgation of Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/3 of June 12, 1995, transforming the IC staff into the Community Management Staff under the direction of the executive director for Intelligence Community Affairs. The Community Management Staff, originally numbering less than 100 people, focused on strategic planning and annual program guidance, resource trade-offs, cross program issues, and alternative solutions to intelligence community problems.

With the creation of the position of Director of National Intelligence, control of the Community Management Staff was transferred to this office. An additional 500 new positions and more than 100 rotational positions were also authorized.

See also: Bush, George Herbert Walker; Casey, William; Director of Central Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; Executive Orders; Helms, Richard McGarrah; Intelligence Community; Schlesinger, James Rodney; Turner, Admiral Stansfield; Webster, William Hedgecock

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INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1982

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act, designed to protect the lives and identities of U.S. intelligence agents, was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in 1982 to amend the National Security Act of 1947. More widely known as the Covert Agent Identity Protection Act, it defines the constraints and penalties related to unauthorized disclosure or endangering of a covert agent. The act was passed in large measure as a response to the activities of former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official Philip Agee who was regularly publishing the names of active CIA personnel. One of those whose identity he revealed, Richard Welch, was assassinated in 1975.

Once passed and signed into law by President Reagan, the Act (50 USC 421) criminalized the disclosure of classified information related to the identity of covert agents. Revealing information to anyone who is not authorized to receive such details results in a maximum prison sentence of 10 years. Additionally, for anyone who somehow learns of an agent identity and decides to share the intelligence, a maximum five-year sentence is permitted. Lastly, for those who unknowingly reveal the identity of a covert agent through a series of actions or comments may be sentenced to a maximum penalty of three years. In certain cases, such as those of double agents, penalties enacted as a result of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act may be cumulative with other penalties.

Historically, the Act came about as a result of fear that one of the many former intelligence officers or former upper-level elected officials had the power to destroy the U.S. covert intelligence abilities by simply revealing names. Clearly, simply "naming names" could result in the deaths and torture of U.S. covert agents across the globe. Most recently, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act has been brought up and debated in relation to the Valerie Plame scandal, a covert agent whose identity was disclosed in an editorial in the *Washington Post*.

See also: Agee, Philip; Plame, Valerie Elise; Reagan Administration and Intelligence; Welch, Richard

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Arthur Holst

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION ACT OF 1992

On October 24, 1992, President George H. W. Bush signed the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993 into law, which contained the Intelligence Organization Act of 1992 at title VII. The Intelligence Organization Act of 1992 amended the National Security Act of 1947 by essentially reorganizing the U.S. intelligence community.

The new Act gave new responsibilities to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and to the Secretary of Defense, while redistributing older powers and authorities. In the Act, the DCI was authorized to actively participate in meetings of the National Security Council. The office of the DCI was placed within the structure of the CIA for administrative purposes, even though the DCI had previously led the CIA in spite of the fact that the office was not within the CIA organization.

Concerning the new responsibilities, the DCI essentially becomes the center of U.S. intelligence, connecting the president, the National Security Council, and the CIA. The DCI is also responsible for acting as a liaison between all the heads of departments and agencies within executive branch, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the related U.S. Congress committees. Additionally, the DCI was charged with directing the U.S. foreign intelligence program, controlling all budgeting and staffing necessary.

In the Act, the secretary of defense became responsible for ensuring that the defense budget makes sufficient appropriations to military intelligence, to verify that the demands of the DCI are met within the U.S. defense forces, and to guarantee the timeliness of intelligence delivery. Furthermore, the secretary must coordinate operations efficiently with the DCI and the National Security Council.

See also: Bush, George H. W., Administration and Intelligence; Director of Central Intelligence; Intelligence Community

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INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT OF 1980

Ever since the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Congress has maintained and developed its oversight authorities upon the CIA. With the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, Congress reformed these responsibilities, which had lain with the Armed Services Committees in the House and in the Senate throughout the 1970s.

Previously, Congress' oversight functions were taken care of by the chairmen of the congressional armed services committees in the House and Senate. As a result, these chairmen coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence, then reporting to their respective committees. In the run-up to the passing of the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, it was noted by supporters of the new bill that formal meetings between the DCI and the entire armed services committees were too rare, not allowing for sufficient amounts of dialogue.

Additionally, the Senate had set up the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 19, 1976, in the aftermath of ongoing allegations of misconduct by U.S. intelligence agents. On July 14, 1977, the House established a similar committee under its jurisdiction, known as the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. So at that point in the late 1970s, the armed services committees, the foreign affairs committees, and also to a limited extent the appropriations committees, all had a hand in Congress' oversight authority, along with the newer select intelligence committees.

Due to the confusion that came about and the lack of dialogue between the DCI and the respective committees, the Intelligence Oversight Act was aimed to respond to these issues. It made the select committees the only two oversight committees, aside from the minor role played by the appropriations committees. Within the CIA itself, the Office of Congress Affairs became the branch which coordinated with the select committees. These reforms helped to ameliorate the issues revolving around Congress' oversight responsibilities and allowed for the more timely delivery of covert action notifications to Congress.

See also: Church Committee; House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI); Pike Committee; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

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Arthur Holst

INTERNATIONAL SPY MUSEUM

The International Spy Museum opened on July 19, 2002, with the stated purpose of exploring the craft, practice, history, and contemporary role of espionage. The museum is, to date, the only public museum in the United States solely dedicated to espionage activities. It was in development since 1994, the brainchild of broadcasting mogul Milton Maltz, who became fascinated with the world of intelligence while working for the National Security Agency during the Korean War. With the backing of the

District of Columbia, Maltz, chairman of Cleveland's Malrite Co., put up $25 million himself as start-up funds and then tried to raise the rest of the $40 million total from other sources. The museum became the first DC project to officially receive Tax Increment Financing (TIF); it initially received $6.9 million in TIF and $15 million in tax-exempt Enterprise Zones (EZ) bonds.

The construction of the museum, projected to boost local economic development through new jobs, tax revenue, and increased tourism for the region, benefited from a city-wide effort by the District of Columbia government to restore historic downtown sites, in this case a set of buildings in the F Street, NW, block of downtown Washington, across from the newly renovated National Portrait Gallery. Under the oversight of the Historic Preservation Review Board, the building facades were meticulously restored to maintain the character of the streetscape and a majority of the interior spaces were preserved as they were originally configured.

The museum's purpose is to tell the story of famous and infamous spies, master deceptions, and intelligence operations that changed the course of history. From the great strategist Sun Tzu to the myth of Mata Hari, from revolutionary Russia to the cold war, from the KGB to the CIA, its exhibitions illuminate the clandestine history of international intelligence gathering. It features films, interactive technology, exhibitions, and one of the largest collections of espionage artifacts open to the public, including the legendary German cipher machine, Enigma; secret KGB cameras; OSS sabotage weapons; Shoe Transmitter, a Soviet listening device hidden inside the heel of a target's shoe; "Through the Wall" Camera, a Czech camera used by the East German STASI to photograph through walls; and Escape Boots, designed for British pilots in World War II.

The International Spy Museum's exhibits present the tradecraft of espionage through the stories of individuals and their missions, tools, and techniques. Exhibits include: School for Spies, orientation into the world of espionage; Secret History of History, the history of spying from biblical times to the early twentieth century; Spies Among Us, espionage through both World Wars, showcasing real-life spy stories, Pearl Harbor, the use of misinformation, and propaganda throughout the war, and the sabotage and subversion employed by spies working behind enemy lines in France; War of the Spies, the cold war, a period characterized by mistrust and suspicion, the development of sophisticated espionage technologies such as spy planes and satellites as well as the use of microtechnology in listening and tracking devices, the McCarthy hearings, the House Un-American Activities Committee and the Red Scare, and the impact of espionage on popular culture; and Twenty-first Century, espionage in the new century.

In May 2004, the museum opened 'The Enemy Within: Terror in America: 1776 to Today," which provided a historic perspective on acts of terror that have taken place on American soil, beginning with 'The City of Washington Captured and the White House Burned' (August 24, 1814) through the attack on Pearl Harbor to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. It also highlights, initiatives by the U.S. government to root out terrorists elements in the country that have irrevocably changed the lives of Americans.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; American Intelligence, World War II; Cold War Intelligence; Early Republic and Espionage; Post–Cold War Intelligence; Spanish-American War

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The International Spy Museum, 800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC. Web site: http://www.spymuseum.org.

Martin J. Manning

INTERNET—AND INTELLIGENCE/ESPIONAGE

The advent of the World Wide Web in 1989 provided the ease of access to information necessary to propel the Internet into the communications hub it is today. With more and more users and information linked to the Internet, its value as an information depository and retrieval tool to those in the intelligence-gathering community worldwide is undisputed. Considered a revolutionary technology, this informational realm, also known as cyberspace or the infosphere, is therefore viewed as offering great opportunity along with great danger to the national security interests of the United States on both its military and economic fronts.

Three main levels of information-gathering activities can be conducted by utilizing the Internet. The first are those based on ethical and legal methods of obtaining information. Examples include normal Web surfing, browser searches, membership in chat rooms, and news service subscriptions. Anonymizers and cookie (ID text file) disablement are employed so user identity is not revealed. Terrorist virtual intelligence operations directed at target sets, such as metro stations, via public and hobbyist Web sites, are frequently conducted at this level.

Such activities will typically only be able to access open-source materials and occasionally stray business or public safety information that was inadvertently posted on the Internet. Much espionage, in terms of intelligence gathering, is based on the collection and analytical fusion of materials considered open source. The power of open-source information fusion analysis, however, allows the piecing of disparate bits of intelligence to arrive at equivalent levels of understanding to that contained in restricted, and potentially classified, information.

The next level of information gathering is that utilizing legal yet ethically questionable methods to obtain information. Examples include posing as someone else, such as a business employee or relative of an employee of a targeted organization, in a chat room or social networking site. These methods additionally allow for the collection of more restrictive business and public safety and law enforcement information. Access to more sensitive material is believed prohibited to unauthorized parties through the use of security technology such as firewalls and strong passwords. Their effectiveness, however, is vulnerable to continual inroads by operatives unless security measures are constantly reviewed and updated accordingly.

The highest level of information-gathering activities utilizes both unethical and illegal methods to obtain information. Examples include password collection via keystroke counters, Trojan horses and worms (computer viruses), takeover of individual

computers, and the hacking into and theft of information from classified U.S. networks. These techniques are necessary if U.S. governmental classified levels of information are to be obtained because of the well-developed security measures, protocols, and counter-measures that must be overcome. Certain techniques may also allow further access to U.S. governmental classified levels of information (Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret) or classified information that requires specialized handling called Sensitive Compartmented Information [SCI]).

Beyond the information-gathering opportunities presented by the Internet are other espionage-related uses. Information is easily shared between individuals and groups at the touch of a button and can be transmitted in forms that are virtually undetectable. Those conducting espionage can both find a covert identity and have it unmasked via information available on the Internet. Further, cybercrimes can be undertaken to fund intelligence-related expenses.

Finally, in tandem with the rise of Internet, there has been a phase shift in the global security environment with the emergence of nonstate entities that are challenging the nation-state as the dominant social and political organizational form. These entities, including al-Qaeda and its global radical Islamic insurgency, along with traditional nation-state threats, such as North Korea, Iran, and, potentially China, will increasingly be perpetrators of Internet intelligence and espionage activities directed against the United States and, in turn when applicable, targets of such activities directed by the United States against them.

See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

The Iran-Contra Affair was a political scandal in President Ronald Reagan's administration involving the illegal sale of weapons to Iran, the proceeds of which were used to illegally fund Nicaraguan Contra rebels. As its name implies, Iran-Contra was the linkage of two otherwise vastly different foreign policy problems that bedeviled the Reagan administration at the beginning of its second term in 1985: how to secure the release of American hostages held by Iranian-backed kidnappers in Lebanon and how to support the Contra rebels fighting against Nicaragua's Cuban-style Sandinista government. In both cases Reagan's public options were limited, for he had explicitly ruled out the possibility of negotiating with hostage takers, and Congress refused to allow military aid to be sent to the Contras.

In August 1985 Reagan approved a plan to sell more than 500 TOW antitank missiles to Iran, via the Israelis, in exchange for the release of Americans held by terrorists in Lebanon. (Reagan later denied that he was aware of an explicit link between the sale and the hostage crisis.) The deal went through, and as a follow-up, in November 1985, there was a proposal to sell HAWK antiaircraft missiles to Iran. Colonel Oliver North, a decorated marine attached to the NSA's staff, played a key role in the development of the plan and in subsequent negotiations. A number of Reagan's senior cabinet members, including Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, began to express reservations about this trade with Iran, for it was not only diametrically opposed the administration's stated policy but was also illegal under U.S. and international law. Nonetheless, Reagan continued to endorse arms shipments throughout 1986 and in all more than one hundred tons of missiles and spare parts were exported to Iran by the end of the year. The policy's success in hostage releases proved limited, however, because although some Americans were set free as acts of quid pro quo, others were quickly taken captive in their turn.

Meanwhile, North had begun secretly funneling the funds from the missile sales to Swiss bank accounts owned by the Nicaraguan Contra rebels, who used the money in part to set up guerrilla training camps run by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). All this was in direct violation of the Second Boland Amendment, a congressional law passed in October 1984 that specifically forbade the U.S. government from supporting any paramilitary group in Nicaragua. To what extent North's superiors knew of the Contra connection at this stage remains unclear, as is the final amount of money supplied to the Nicaraguans, although it is thought to have been on the order of tens of millions of dollars. Later investigations suggested numerous accounting irregularities by North, but these were never proven.

On November 3, 1986, the affair became public when a Lebanese magazine, *Ash-Shiraa*, revealed that the Americans had been selling missiles to the Iranians. Reagan responded with a televised statement in which he denied any arms-for-hostages deal, and U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese was ordered to conduct an internal inquiry. North and his secretary, Fawn Hall, immediately began shredding incriminating documents, but on November 22 Meese's staff discovered material in North's office that linked the Iranian shipments directly to the Contras. Meese informed Reagan, and on November 25 the U.S. Justice Department announced its preliminary findings to the press. North was fired, and National Security Advisor John Poindexter, who had replaced McFarlane, promptly resigned.

The following month, Reagan appointed an independent commission to investigate the affair, chaired by former Texas Senator John Tower. The commission's March 1987 report severely criticized the White House for failing to control its NSA subordinates, which led to the resignation of Regan. An apparently contrite President Reagan admitted to having misled the public in his earlier statements, although he pled sins of ignorance rather than design. A subsequent congressional inquiry lambasted the president for failings of leadership but decided that he had not known about the transfers of money to the Contras.

In 1988 independent prosecutor Lawrence Walsh indicted North, Poindexter, and 12 other persons on a variety of felony counts. Eleven were convicted, but North and

Poindexter were later acquitted on Fifth Amendment technicalities. At the end of his term in office in December 1992, President George H. W. Bush pardoned six other persons implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal, including Weinberger and McFarlane.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Council; North, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver; Reagan Administration and Intelligence

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Alan Allport

IRAQ, U.S. OPERATIONS IN/AGAINST

U.S. intelligence activities in Iraq date back many decades and became a factor in internal Iraqi politics in the 1950s when operations were aimed at supporting Nuri Said. Iraq's international borders were largely drawn with British direction following the close of World War I and Nuri Said was closely aligned with British interests. However, in 1958 the elderly Said was eliminated in a Communist-inspired coup.

Shortly thereafter, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower ordered the CIA to remove the leader of the Iraqi coup, Abdul al-Karim Kassem, from power. In 1959 resources were provided to the opposition Ba'athist Party as CIA believed that with their contacts within the Iraqi army the party would prove useful in U.S. efforts, although their membership at the time was only about 850 individuals. A member of the party, a young Saddam Hussein, was part of a CIA-approved six-man assassination team. The team's first attempts at eliminating Kassem were unsuccessful. However, by 1963, the coup leaders were overthrown and Kassem assassinated. CIA officer William McHale was instrumental in the successful operation.

After the removal of Kassem, CIA supplied the Ba'athist Party with intelligence on threats to the new government in general and the Communist Party in particular. These efforts significantly degraded the ability of the Communists to conduct operations within Iraq. However, U.S. influence in Iraq waned after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War when Arab sentiment was highly critical of the United States as it continued its unwavering support of Israel.

By 1971, traditional British influence in the Persian Gulf had diminished, effectively creating a power vacuum as the oil-producing countries were left to find their own way and solve their own problems. Following these developments, and causing great concern in the West in 1972, Iraq entered into an arms agreement and treaty with the Soviet Union. Compounding these effects was the 1973 decision by Arab energy-producing nations to place an oil export embargo on the United States for its support of Israel.

As massive oil price increases subsequently led to financial problems within the American economy, the United States began reformulating its strategy in the energy-rich region and efforts were begun to create a greater military and intelligence capability within the Gulf. One outcome of this process was the establishment of the American

Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), the precursor to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Also established was the Carter Doctrine, which served notice to the Soviet Union the United States would use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to keep the region and its resources open to the American-led free world.

With increased oil revenue, the Iraqi government, under Ba'athist direction, began spending substantial amounts on acquiring advanced military equipment and technology. During the 1970s, billions of dollars of military hardware entered Iraq and served to embolden the leadership. American intelligence closely monitored these activities and when Iraqi efforts extended into the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. government became increasingly concerned.

Among the extensive agreements was a deal struck in 1978 in which a Brazilian construction company signed a $2 billion (USD) contract for a 250-kilometer railroad in Iraq. By 1980 some 3,000 Brazilians were actively engaged inside Iraq. In 1979, American intelligence monitored a visit by the vice president of Iraq, Taha Mudiedin Maarouf, who offered to increase oil exports to the energy-hungry South American country.

As was the case in much of the newly industrializing world, Brazil suffered financially during the rapid increase of oil prices following the Arab oil embargo of 1973. These problems were compounded with the spike in prices that occurred following the takeover of Iran by Muslim radicals in 1979. Iraqi officials also offered to buy more Brazilian military hardware and expressed an interest in advanced technology.

During the 1960s the United States had cooperated with Brazil in the development of its civilian nuclear sector. By the early seventies, fearing that this technology was not being adequately safeguarded and in the face of political turbulence within Brazil itself, the United States began to reduce its peaceful civilian cooperation with Brazil. As a result Brazil turned to West Germany and the two countries began nuclear cooperation.

U.S. intelligence found that during the 1979 visit by Iraq's vice president, the Iraqi government requested the transfer of nuclear knowledge and equipment as a condition of any further oil agreements. Also discovered was that in September of 1979, the Minister of Industry in Iraq, Hassan Ali, signed a protocol with Brazil's nuclear agency, Commisao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN). U.S. intelligence monitored the exchanges as CNEN President Paulo Nogveira Baptista began negotiating with Iraq for the sale of natural uranium and the collaboration on the construction of PWR-type nuclear reactors which were being built in Brazil with assistance from West Germany.

In various meetings, Iraqi officials indicated an interest in the purchase of more Brazilian industrial products as well as agricultural crops if the atomic protocol were implemented. These activities on the part of American intelligence allowed the U.S. government to take action and to forestall major transfers of western nuclear technology from Latin America into Iraq.

Later, during U.S. Operation Desert Shield in 1990, it was revealed that Brazil was cooperating with Iraq on developing ballistic missiles. Moreover, American intelligence learned that Brazil had passed unsafeguarded gas centrifuge technology to Iraq. These claims were denied by the Brazilian government.

In June 2004, a special joint investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Allied Coalition (Iraq) confirmed that Iraq had made two purchases

(September 1981 and January 1982) through Brazil's CNEN, totaling nearly 30,000 kilograms of "natural" uranium dioxide.

From 1982 through 1990, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was viewed by American intelligence as a necessary western buffer against the radical mullahs in neighboring Iran and their stated desire to extend their reach throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Feeling relatively confident in tacit Western acquiescence, in mid-September 1980, Iraq attacked Iran with the mistaken assumption that Iranian disarray would allow for a short war and quick victory.

When Sadddam's forces faltered after initial success, U.S. intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in backing Iraqi defenses against "human wave" suicide attacks from Iran. In order to shore-up Iraqi defenses, U.S. President Ronald Reagan directed American intelligence to supply battlefield intelligence on Iranian troop build-ups to the Iraqis. The large majority of this battlefield intelligence was channeled to Iraqis by the CIA office in Baghdad. Beginning in 1984, the Defense Intelligence Agency began supporting operations for CENTCOM and in 1985 attached an 11-man DIA intelligence production element to CENTCOM headquarters.

DIA also opened a U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) in Baghdad to expand access to developments in Iraq and to obtain information on the Iran-Iraq War. In 1988, DIA was active in the Persian Gulf War Working Group (PGWG) in the National Intelligence Center (NMIC) which was involved in monitoring the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988).

Following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in the summer of 1990, all elements of U.S. intelligence were called upon for intelligence collection and reconnaissance. These agencies included the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence at the State Department (INR), and other entities analyzing and reporting information at the highest levels of the U.S. military and political leadership. U.S. space assets, including Keyhole-11 visual reconnaissance, Lacrosse radar reconnaissance, Magnum, Vortex, and Ferret electronic intelligence satellites, including two U.S. Lansats, were assigned to reconnoiter the Iraqi armed forces.

Four new Pioneer remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) reconnaissance systems were also deployed in support of U.S. Marines and Army ground forces. E-3 AWACS long-range radar and control aircraft along with U-2 spy planes, TR-1, and RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft continually monitored Iraqi armed forces activities. The reconnaissance system deployed in the conflict zone was capable of warning the United States and allied command element about possible initiation of Iraqi military actions 12 to 24 hours beforehand. The integrated employment of intelligence/recon electronic assets allowed the Multinational Force, despite the prolonged preparatory period, to achieve operational and tactical surprise in the war.

However, despite the high technical level of intelligence systems, commanders found that great deficiencies existed in intelligence operations and analysis during Operation Desert Storm. Reconnaissance very often was late in identifying the command element of the redeployment of Iraqi operational units and analyzing aerial photography of targets. As a result, air strikes in a number of instances were made against dummy or non-existence targets. Moreover, reconnaissance data did not always reflect the actual Iraqi armed forces losses and deceived the political leadership of the United States as to

Iraq's combat potential. These inaccurate assessments led to the adoption of significant political decisions based on questionable assumptions.

The president of the United States, George H. W. Bush, made a decision to halt military operations after only four days, largely on intelligence concerning the loss rate of Iraq in men and material. In short, estimations of Iraqi capabilities produced a low reliability base upon which major political decisions were made. These inaccuracies in strategic intelligence and the subsequent political decisions allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power for more than a decade. Moreover, the administration mistakenly believed that Saddam and his military capacity had been sufficiently weakened as to allow internal Iraqi elements to stage a successful coup shortly after the close of Operation Desert Storm in February 1991.

Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, there had been a robust U.S. all source intelligence collection program against Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction program (WMD). Following the Gulf War, most of the intelligence community's knowledge of Iraqi WMD programs was obtained from, in conjunction with and support of, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections. From 1991 to 1998 there was a full complement of UNSCOM inspectors inside Iraq, but Saddam Hussein began a calculated strategy of noncooperation with UNSCOM, and without adequate U.S. HUMINT on the ground, American policy makers were unsure of the actual state of affairs regarding Iraqi weapons programs. One fact was certain, Saddam was embarking on an extensive strategy of deception.

In response to Saddam's subterfuge, in September 2001, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) established a Joint Task Force within CIA's Counter-proliferation Division housed within the Directorate of Operations. By the fall of 2002 political decisions were being formulated to affect a policy of regime change within Iraq. One of the principal propositions within the war's rationale was the undeniable fact that Iraq was in violation of the agreement that ended the Gulf War in 1991, by its refusal to cooperate fully with weapons inspectors.

However, American leaders over-relied on a DCI-supported National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in October 2002 regarding the actual state of affairs with Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. Postwar assessments were critical of the lack of reliable HUMINT within Iraq and within his close circle of advisors. The widely held perspective was that the United States was deficient in its ability to collect adequate intelligence, particularly HUMINT, within Iraq in the late 1990s and up to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

Iraq through the 1980s and 1990s was a difficult intelligence target as Saddam had created a highly proficient counterintelligence capability. Two examples serve to underscore this reality. At one point his operatives uncovered a British MI-6 network. The Iraqi agents working for MI-6 were rounded up and herded into a warehouse and MI-6 officers were summoned to the location. As they entered, they saw all of their Iraqi agents lined up and restrained by piano wire suspended from the ceiling. The Iraqi counterintelligence officers told the MI-6 officers it might be best if they departed the country immediately.

On another occasion, Iraqi counterintelligence uncovered a CIA operation and located the Iraqi spies and their communication devices. The Iraqi counterintelligence

officers then telephoned the CIA and informed them of the demise of its operation and the CIA-supported agents—using a telephone CIA provided their spies.

By the late 1990s the Clinton administration adopted a policy of regime change in Iraq. Yet nothing transpired until October of 2002, when a presidential directive or "finding" issued by U.S. President George W. Bush directed the CIA to assassinate Saddam Hussein, as it believed the elimination of the Iraqi dictator would avert a costly and dangerous war that was being contemplated by U.S. leaders.

At the beginning of 2003, about 100 U.S. special operations military personnel and more than 50 CIA Special Activities Division officers were inside Iraq performing pre-battle operations. By the spring of 2003, American intelligence, in coordination with the U.S. military, tracked Saddam down and detained him for trial inside Iraq, on a variety of charges, including mass murder and genocide.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; September 11, 2001; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; Waterboarding

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James Brian McNabb

IVY BELLS, PROJECT

Project IVY BELLS was one of the most successful and aggressive intelligence gathering efforts undertaken by U.S. intelligence during the cold war. It provided U.S. officials with important information until its existence was revealed to Soviet authorities by Robert Pelton, a National Security Agency (NSA) official who was also a Soviet spy.

The Soviet Union had constructed an undersea cable in the Sea of Okhotsk that connected its naval bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. In the early 1970s a joint NSA-navy mission was put together for the purpose of secretly obtaining information from this cable by tapping into it. This mission, while offering rewards in terms of the information it would provide to U.S. authorities, was also highly risky. The Sea of Okhotsk was claimed by the Soviet Union as territorial waters. It was the site of regular Soviet naval exercises and the location of numerous sound detection devices to alert the Soviet navy to intruders.

On their first mission, divers from the USS *Hallibut*, an aging submarine, attached a small device on to the cable. This device was built to fall away if the cable were lifted for repairs or inspection. It was able to listen to communications without physically compromising the cable but did require periodic trips by divers to retrieve the communications listened to. At first this required return trips every six to eight weeks but later the capacity of the device was increased to require far fewer retrieval visits. So confident were the Soviet officials of the security of the cable that they sent uncoded messages to one another.

In 1981 the United States correctly came to fear that discovered that the Soviets had uncovered the tap when a Soviet salvage vessel hurriedly made its way to the Sea of Okhotsk and positioned itself above the spot where the listening device was located. A subsequent retrieval operation revealed that the device was missing. Later it became known that Pelton had told the Soviets about IVY BELLS.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; National Security Agency; Pelton, Ronald W.

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Glenn P. Hastedt

J

JACKSON, ANDREW
(MARCH 15, 1767–JUNE 8, 1845)

As a general and the seventh president of the United States, Andrew Jackson understood the importance of covert operations for advancing the nation's interests. Using information from informants, Jackson acted decisively in the War of 1812 to repulse a British invasion. Moreover, during his presidency he also used covert means as he opened trade with Asian countries and unsuccessfully attempted to acquire Texas from Mexico.

Born on the Carolina frontier in 1767, Jackson was a self-trained soldier and a skillful general. During the British invasion of Louisiana in the War of 1812, he effectively used reports on the enemy provided by Jean Lafitte's pirates and members of the Louisiana militia. Jackson subsequently led American troops to victory at the Battle of New Orleans, which made his name a household word throughout the country.

When Jackson became president in 1829 he appointed Colonel Anthony Butler to facilitate American acquisition of Texas in order to provide protection for New Orleans and U.S. exposed southern flank, to open up more land for American farmers, and to provide land where the government could relocate the Indians from east of the Mississippi River. Jackson also believed that the U.S. purchase of Texas would provide Mexico with funds for defense against Spanish aggression and eliminate the possible creation of an independent Texas republic that could become a major controversial issue between the United States and Mexico.

Butler was a fast-talking land speculator and former member of the Mississippi legislature who had been brought to Washington by Secretary of State Martin Van Buren. To aid Butler, Jackson placed $5 million at his disposal from the president's Secret Service Fund. Jackson suggested to Butler that he use these funds to bribe Mexican officials.

In an unfortunate statement in October 1829, Jackson declared: "I scarcely ever knew a Spaniard who was not the slave of avarice, and it is not improbable that this weakness may be worth a great deal to us, in this case." But later Jackson also told Butler that he needed to be careful in his actions, so that the Mexican officers could not charge him with using corrupt means to acquire Texas. Furthermore, Jackson instructed Butler on a method for deceiving the Mexican president and other officials. To win their confidence, Butler was to "very confidentially" let them read false instructions from Jackson that did not advocate American acquisition of Texas. Due to concern about the repercussions if his instructions, fell into the hands of the Mexican government or Jackson's opponents in the United States, the president told Butler to burn their correspondence. In short, Jackson wanted to have plausible deniability should any allegations be made against him for scheming to acquire Texas. However, the secret efforts failed, as Butler for six years unsuccessfully attempted to use his covert funds to acquire Texas.

In 1832, near the end of his first term as president, Jackson sent Edmund Roberts, a New Hampshire sea captain, on a secret mission to negotiate commercial treaties with Burma, Siam, Muscat, Japan, and Cochin China (Indochina). The mission was secret. to prevent other nations from trying to disrupt the negotiations. Roberts, however, was hampered by the State Department's great lack of knowledge about East Asia. In fact, he did not even know the name of the ruler for some of the countries. Nevertheless, Roberts negotiated treaties with Muscat and Siam. When his second term as president ended in 1837, Jackson retired to his Tennessee home, the Heritage, where he died eight years later.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage; Lafitte, Jean and Pierre; Secret Service Fund

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Steven E. Siry

JAHNKE, KURT B.
(1882–)

Also known as Kort Boder, Jose Iturber, and Kurt Jansen, Kurt Jahnke was a legendary imperial German spy and saboteur operating in the United States during World War I. Having allegedly worked for the Pinkerton Detective Agency, the U.S. Border Patrol, and Secret Service, Jahnke volunteered for service at the outset of hostilities in 1914. Operating out of San Francisco, by 1916, he was responsible for the German

Admiralty's intelligence and sabotage operations in the western half of the United States. Though he was primarily active on the West Coast, Jahnke's activities also included missions in the Northeast and in England. He was responsible for inciting a dockworkers' strike and sabotaging 14 seagoing vessels. Among these ships was the USS *San Diego*, which sank on July 19, 1918, 11 miles off Long Island killing six sailors. The cause of the sinking was undetermined in the West until 1999. Jahnke was most well known for his association with the July 30, 1916, explosion at the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company terminal on Black Tom Island in New York Harbor and the January 11, 1917, explosion in Kingsland, New Jersey. Jahnke subsequently fled to Mexico.

After the war, Jahnke returned to Germany where he conducted limited operations along the border with France. After the National Socialists assumed power, in 1934, he was inducted into the army with the responsibility of running a unit tasked with penetrating enemy lines wearing the opposing force's uniforms in order to harass lines of communication and supply under Rudolph Hess. His role in the German military abruptly ended in 1940 and he was subsequently accused by the SS as being a British agent. Jahnke briefly escaped to Switzerland but was captured by the Soviet army upon his return to Germany in 1945. Jahnke was tortured and interrogated by the Soviets during which he provided numerous details regarding his operations. He was subsequently executed by the Soviet *Smersh* ("Death to Spies") organization, along with his wife.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I

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William T. Thornhill

JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION

The Jamestown Foundation is an American nonprofit organization originally founded to assist Soviet defectors and dissidents. Close ally to the Ronald Reagan administration and cold warrior, William Geimer established close relationships with the highest-ranking Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko and highest-ranking defector from the Eastern Bloc, Romanian Ion Pacepa. Geimer's assistance to these cold war defectors in publishing studies became the impetus for him to launch the Jamestown Foundation in 1984. The nonprofit, independent, nonpartisan organization became one of the most prominent sources in Washington, DC, during the 1980s in disseminating information on the internal matters of closed, totalitarian societies. Unique, however, was the critical role of offering material support to Soviet defectors.

As the United States continually advocated and cultivated defections from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, a growing problem grew in the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA): dissatisfaction among dissidents and defectors with the financial arrangements established by the American government. As complaints amassed during the 1980s, Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey took a sympathetic position towards the grievances and strongly backed the formation of the Jamestown Foundation. In the context of economic saliency for defectors, the Jamestown Foundation enabled individuals to supplement their government stipends with remunerations for giving lectures and publications.

Significant publications credited to the Jamestown Foundation include Shevchenko's 1985 *Breaking with Moscow* and Pacepa's 1990 *Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu's Crimes, Lifestyle, and Corruption*. The total effect of lectures and publications sponsored by the Jamestown Foundation increased knowledge of Americans and American officials to the inner working of the Soviet Union, from those who worked within. Since the end of the cold war, the Jamestown Foundation has expanded its focus from the Soviet Union and Russia to China and the Middle East.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs)

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Jonathan H. L'Hommedieu

JAY, JOHN (DECEMBER 12, 1745–MAY 17, 1829)

John Jay was a moderate New York revolutionary leader who served on state committees investigating disloyalty; also a member of the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress involved in secret negotiations and correspondence. Appointed to the Continental Congress's Committee of Secret Correspondence formed on November 29, 1775, Jay participated in early secret negotiations with French representatives like Bonvouloir and Penet and Pliarne regarding French aid. Early in 1776 he provided American agent Silas Deane with invisible ink invented by his brother Sir James Jay, for use during his mission to France. Jay continued to receive, decipher, and forward Deane's letters even when he was no longer attending Congress. In 1778 he facilitated use of the ink by Washington's spy ring in New York. Ironically, it was Jay, who knew more than most about French assistance prior to the alliance, who, as president of Congress in 1779, had to orchestrate the public denial of that aid during the Deane-Lee affair. He had to appease French concerns about publicly dishonoring the French king who had repeatedly denied to the British that such aid was being given. Later it was Jay who, as secretary for foreign affairs, encouraged Thomas

As a delegate to both Continental Congresses, a diplomat in Spain and France, an author of several *Federalist Papers*, the first chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and a Federalist governor of New York, John Jay helped shape the government of the United States. (National Archives)

Jefferson to purchase some of Deane's letterbooks to prevent documentation of Deane's prealliance activities, including a link to arsonist John the Painter, from being sold to the British.

As early as March 1776, Jay, in conformity with congressional resolutions that each colony take action to arrest and secure persons who might endanger the safety of the colony or the liberties of the United States, wrote Alexander McDougall that it would be necessary to remove the notoriously disaffected from New York City. At the same time, Jay sought clear lines of demarcation between civilian and military authority on loyalty issues, objecting to General Charles Lee's efforts to require civilians to take test oaths. "When the Army becomes our legislators, the people that moment become slaves."

In June 1776, the New York Provincial Congress appointed Jay to a committee to deal with internal enemies. During its investigations into charges of aiding the British armies and fleets, dissuading inhabitants from associating for defense, attempting to undermine the Continental currency, or engaging in schemes to defeat colonial defense measures, the committee learned of the conspiracy known as the Hickey Plot. Those involved planned to pave the way for the British occupation by recruiting soldiers and civilians to join with the British troops upon their arrival and to sabotage defense installations in New York City and vicinity. The plot was also rumored to include plans to kidnap or kill Washington and other Continental officers, though no evidence of that appears in the official records of the investigation or trial. Jay was appointed to a secret committee to cooperate with Washington in the investigation. Thomas Hickey, one of the Continental soldiers turned over to the army for court martial, was convicted and publicly hanged. Seventeen men specifically linked to the Hickey investigation, including mayor David Matthews and several counterfeiters were ultimately convicted and

exiled to Connecticut but most subsequently escaped. However, over the next months following the arrival of the British fleet, many others were seized, investigated, and either jailed, exiled, or paroled.

After serving in July and August 1776 on a secret committee responsible for preparing Hudson River defenses, Jay was appointed in September 1776 to the New York State Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies, which he headed from late December 1776 until mid-February 1777 when it was replaced by a commission. His committee conducted hundreds of counterintelligence investigations, arrests, and trials of active and influential Loyalists, and employed at least 10 counterintelligence agents in the Hudson Valley, including Enoch Crosby and Elijah Hunter. Crosby is considered to have been a model for "Harvey Birch," the protagonist in James Fennimore Cooper's novel, *The Spy*. After the war, Cooper discussed with Jay the exploits of his agents in the Fishkill area, but Cooper's spy seems to have been a composite character, not based on Cosby alone. In May 1777 Jay supported replacing the legislative investigation committees and commissions with civilian courts established to handle cases of treason, insurrection, and violation of oaths of allegiance, but American military courts gradually took over the judicial process for such cases.

Jay developed and employed many codes and ciphers for use in his diplomatic correspondence during missions in France and Spain from 1779 to 1784. Aware that his correspondence was frequently intercepted and read, not only by the British but by agents of the French or Spanish courts to which he was assigned, Jay became a strong advocate of preserving secrecy in matters of diplomacy and defense, but retained a respect for due process. As secretary for foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation from 1784 to 1789, he secured formal permission from Congress to examine the papers of foreign diplomats and agents in the United States; to what extent this power was actually used is unknown.

Jay also played a critical role in defending the right of the executive branch to conduct intelligence activities in secrecy. During the debates over the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Jay argued in Federalist Paper No. 64 in support of the power of the president to negotiate treaties with Senate advice and consent. A president could prudently manage the business of intelligence; information could be obtained "if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery . . . many . . . would rely on the secrecy of the President, but . . . would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly."

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Committee on Secret Correspondence; Cooper, James Fenimore; Deane, Silas; Hickey Conspiracy; Jay, Sir James

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Elizabeth M. Nuxoll

JAY, SIR JAMES
(OCTOBER 27, 1732–OCTOBER 15, 1815)

Inventor of invisible ink used to convey intelligence during the American Revolution, and born in New York, October 27, 1732, James Jay was a physician educated at the University of Edinburgh. Knighted by King George III in 1763 for collecting funds in Britain for the support of Kings College, later Columbia University, he became known as Sir James Jay. Practicing medicine in England when the American Revolution broke out, James informed his younger brother John Jay, a member of the Continental Congress, of a form of invisible ink he had invented. Modern tests indicated the ink primarily consisted of tannic acid, with ferrous sulfate as the mordant or counterpart to make it visible. In 1776 Jay gave the ink to American agent Silas Deane for communicating with the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress. John Jay used the counterpart and forwarded the hidden messages to the committee. James Jay also personally used the ink to send information to Deane and Benjamin Franklin in France on British plans, including those for Burgoyne's expedition from Canada.

In July 1778 James Jay returned to New York, became a member of the state senate, sponsored strong anti-Loyalist legislation, and conducted artillery experiments for the American army. He supplied his ink to George Washington for use by his New York spy ring and secured Washington's support for a secret laboratory where he produced additional ink. After being captured by British troops and sent to England in 1782, Jay sought to market his artillery ideas to the British and to conduct private peace talks. This led many to suspect James had defected and to his estrangement from John Jay, one of the official peace negotiators. After his return to the United States in 1784, Sir James resided and practiced medicine in New Jersey and New York City until his death, on October 15, 1815.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Deane, Silas; Franklin, Benjamin; Jay, John

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JEDBURGH, OPERATION

Operation Jedburgh was a joint special operation by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), and the Free French forces created to aid the Allied forces' invasion upon Europe in World War II. From the early stages of the war, Britain laid a plan, which in due course became Operation Jedburgh, to parachute SOE officers behind enemy lines in German-occupied France in order to provide resistance groups with weapons, to coordinate resistance activities with the Allied invasion forces, and to break enemy lines of communication. The Special Operations Branch of the OSS later joined this plan. Operation Jedburgh was put into action by the SOE and the OSS, with help from the Free French forces. After preparatory training, specially selected soldiers gathered at the SOE training facility, named Milton Hall, about 90 miles north of London, and received such training as physical training, map reading, fieldcraft, street fighting, demolition, weapons training, and so on. Each Jedburgh team was composed of three persons, one officer, one deputy, and one radio operator whose task it was to communicate with the headquarters in London. With some exceptions, they operated mainly in uniforms for safety under the regulations of the Geneva Convention of 1929 in case they were captured by German troops.

Although the Jedburgh teams were supposed to have been sent to the field just after D-day of the Operation Overlord, June 6, 1944, their entries were, to a large degree, delayed by the confusion caused by the change of the high command structure. The first teams were dropped into France on D-day, but the majority went in August or later. The battle of Normandy was already over at that time. Their original mission was to disturb German reinforcements. However, their role was, in fact, to attack withdrawing German troops and to guard the civilian population and infrastructure.

The operations in France, mainly from Britain and partly from Algeria, were implemented 93 times. The composition of these teams were 40 American officers, 37 American radio operators, 47 British officers, 38 British radio operators, 89 French officers, 17 French radio operators, 1 Canadian, and 1 Belgian. Subsequently 14 among them died, including 3 who died in accidents. Future Director of Central Intelligence William Colby participated in this operation, leading a team code-named Bruce. Jedburgh teams were also inserted into Holland, Belgium, and Italy. After the operations in European theaters, considerable portions of them were also transferred to Burma, China, and French Indo-China.

See also: Colby, William Egan; Office of Strategic Services; Special Operations Executive

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Naoki Ohno

JMWAVE

JMWAVE was the code name for the secret CIA station in Miami, Florida, that ran covert operations and intelligence-gathering operations in Communist Cuba from 1961 to 1968. Former congressperson and Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss once worked for it. JMWAVE was located at the one-time site of U.S. naval blimp air station Richmond Naval Air Station and then the south campus of the University of Miami. Prior to moving to this site, JMWAVE was housed at a CIA office in Coral Gables, Florida. University of Miami school officials denied knowing the true purpose of the operation although longtime CIA Station Chief Ted Shackley claimed that its president, Henry King Stanford, knew of its true mission.

At its height JMWAVE was purported to be the second-largest CIA station in the world, second only to the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, employing 300 to 400 CIA professionals and another 15,000 anti-Castro Cubans. Its budget was said to be $50 million per year. JMWAVE operated through a series of front companies, the main one being Zenith Technical Enterprises. When the true identity of this firm became public in 1964 as a result of a *Look* magazine article written by David Wise and Thomas Ross, its name was changed to Melmar Corporation. Zenith Technical Enterprises was only one of many front companies controlled by JMWAVE. Others included detective agencies, travel agencies, gun shops, real estate companies (for safe houses), banks, aircraft, and boats (it was said to control the third-largest navy in the Caribbean Sea). It also operated training sites, one of which was in the Everglades disguised as a hunting club. Combined, JMAVE controlled assets of over $50 million in 1960 dollars or $333 million in 2006 dollars making it a major economic force in the Miami and south Florida area. Significant portions of its spending were directed to enterprises owned by staunch politically active anti-Cuban émigrés.

During its years of operation, agents in Cuba and exiles provide JMWAVE with a steady stream of information not all of which was reliable. JMWAVE also provided training in such skills as commando tactics and espionage. Propaganda campaigns were a mainstay of its operations. One plan called for doing a mass mailing into Cuba under the cover of the Christmas season to infiltrate instructions on conducting subversion as well as anti-Castro propaganda onto the island. Another propaganda program had the objective of sowing discord between Cubans and Soviet workers stationed there. JMWAVE did not restrict itself to solely targeting Cuba. In 1964 it sponsored Castro's sister, Juana Castro, on a speaking tour of Latin America to spread anti-Castro stories.

JMWAVE was deactivated in 1968. The official rationale was that over the years its sustained level of activity against Cuba had reduced the security and effectiveness of its operations. More generally there was a feeling in some quarters that JMWAVE was out of control and a potential embarrassment. A new station took its place that year working out of a Miami Coast Guard facility with about 50 people down from the 150 that were still working at JMWAVE when it was closed.

See also: Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Goss, Porter Johnston; Shackley, Theodore G., Jr.

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Glenn P. Hastedt

JOHNSON, CLARENCE "KELLY" (FEBRUARY 27, 1910–DECEMBER 21, 1990)

Clarence Leonard "Kelly" Johnson made possible some of the greatest accomplishments of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Although the American military-industrial complex often yields endless delays and massive cost overruns, Kelly Johnson's exceptional skills in aeronautical design and path-breaking managerial approaches led to revolutionary aircraft produced on time and under budget. The U-2 surveillance aircraft he designed and developed allowed the United States to determine the extent of Soviet nuclear capabilities during the darkest years of the cold war.

Just out of the University of Michigan, Johnson began his career with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in 1933, working first on commercial aircraft and then on the P-38 fighters that would be used in every theater of World War II. When asked to develop a prototype jet aircraft, Johnson he put together a small group of engineers and mechanics in a separate organization within Lockheed, soon to be known as the Skunk Works. The prototype was developed in just over three months and the P-80 was too late for World War II but would see extensive service in the Korean War. The "Skunk Works approach," which Johnson pioneered, had small groups of engineers and designers working together with minimal supervision from the larger organization. The concept proved its worth at Lockheed and has been widely copied albeit not always with the extent of success achieved by Johnson.

In the early years of the cold war the United States had virtually no solid information on Soviet bomber and missile inventories. Johnson and the Skunk Works developed the U-2 that could fly above 70,000 feet and over 4,000 miles. It was this platform that enabled the United States to judge the extent of Soviet order-of-battle and avoid ruinously expensive acquisition programs. Subsequently, Johnson produced the titanium-hulled SR-71s that became the world's fastest and highest flying aircraft. Although the SR-71 proved difficult to operate and became largely redundant to satellites, the U-2 has continued to be a workhorse of intelligence collection into the twenty-first century.

Johnson retired from Lockheed in 1975, having been awarded the Medal of Freedom by President Lyndon Johnson and the National Security Medal by President Ronald Reagan. He died in 1990.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Incident

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Richard A. Best, Jr.

JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Lyndon Johnson was president from 1963 to 1969. John McCone, Admiral William Frances Raborn, Jr., and Richard Helms served as Directors of Central Intelligence in his administration. Johnson came to the presidency with little interest in foreign affairs or intelligence. His background was in domestic politics and he brought a conspiratorial mind-set to intelligence, one that included the belief that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had worked to deny him the Democratic Party's nomination in 1960. The morning presidential brief that had been a key means by which President John Kennedy had come to interact with the intelligence community was replaced by a one-page evening brief that Johnson read at night. Johnson looked to the intelligence community for help early in his administration in the context of covert action.

Johnson's overall lack of interest in intelligence analysis, especially on Vietnam, belied an intense bureaucratic battle being fought between the CIA on the one hand and the military service intelligence agencies and the Defense Intelligence Agency on the other. Most frequently it was the CIA that was presenting Johnson with pessimistic assessment about the progress of Vietnam and the military presenting optimistic ones. CIA analysis felt that the military was manipulating North Vietnamese order of battle statistics to bolster their argument and that aerial reconnaissance photos were being used to give Johnson a false impression about the success of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Symptomatic of the overall pattern of decision making on Vietnam, DCI John McCone, who served from 1961 to 1965, was not a participant in the Tuesday Lunch Group that came to serve as Johnson's decision-making body for Vietnam nor was it consulted in the administration's decision on how to respond to the reported August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese attack on the signals intelligence (SIGINT) ship the USS *Maddox* in the Gulf of Tonkin. This pattern repeated itself in 1965 when Johnson turned to DCI Raborn for intelligence supporting his already-made decision to send U.S. Marines to the Dominican Republic rather than for intelligence on the situation there. Johnson had more positive experiences with intelligence on two other occasions. One involved Operation Black Shield, which was able to establish that no surface-to-air missiles had been placed in North Vietnam by the Soviet Union. The other involved the stream of high-quality intelligence produced on the Arab-Israeli conflict that would lead to war in 1967.

Johnson's conspiratorial view of intelligence made for a more positive relationship with J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Investigation than that experienced

by his predecessors, although Johnson reportedly feared Hoover in addition to admiring him. And just as his predecessors had, Johnson received information from Hoover on the person lives of contemporary political figures. On May 8, 1964, Johnson waived the mandatory retirement age of 70 for Hoover, allowing him to continue in office.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Defense Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Helms, Richard McGarrah; Hoover, J. Edgar; McCone, John A.; Raborn, Vice Admiral William Francis, Jr.

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was established during World War II to coordinate the military branches. The ability of the JCS to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence is key to its function as a component of the American national security structure.

The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was established in 1941 as a military intelligence cooperative group with cooperation from army, navy, State Department, and the Board of Economic Warfare, as well as the Coordinator of Information that eventually became the Office of Strategic Services and later the Central Intelligence Agency.

The postwar 1947 National Security Act established new organizations, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. All of these organizations, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were responsible for getting intelligence to the president to make national security decisions. After the 1947 National Security Act, the Joint Intelligence Committee was retained in the JCS. The JIC coordinated intelligence information but did not produce composite intelligence estimates.

The Joint Intelligence Committee was later changed to the Joint Intelligent Subcommittee Staff. The JISS was run by military officers assigned to the committee staff and the JISS eventually evolved into the Joint Intelligence group or the designation J-2. The problem was that intelligence was still being collected and analyzed by the various branches of the military. Different estimates by different branches produced different results since the information was shaded to serve the branch that had produced the estimate.

Also in 1952 intelligence on target selection became an issue to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The secretary of defense was proposed to become a coordinator of intelligence. The defense secretary created the post of assistant secretary of defense for special operations in 1953 to coordinate defense intelligence. The secretary for special operations again was simply a coordinator of intelligence and had no power to produce resources or to manage assets.

In 1960 the secretary of defense, CIA, and others formed the Joint Study Group. The group's recommendation was the establishment of a centralized intelligence organization that could take the military intelligence collected by the various branches and integrate it. This was the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

The 1970s saw the DIA become a credible provider of intelligence to the national intelligence establishment. The J-2 Support Office was established in 1974 to better serve the Joint Chiefs. In the 1980s field intelligence and national-level decision makers relied on DIA information. The Defense Intelligence Analysis Center at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC, was established in April 1981 to house the DIA. By the 1990s the DIA had been forced to reorient its focus to terrorism and smaller conflicts. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and response provided DIA with a new task: provide intelligence to policy makers to prosecute the war on terror.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Defense Department Intelligence

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Steven F. Marin

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

The British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) originated in 1936 as a subcommittee of the Chiefs of Staff. The JIC was charged with coordinating intelligence from the different branches of the armed services in order to gain a complete picture of enemy capabilities. Starting from modest beginnings, the JIC today is an essential and controversial component of Britain's national intelligence machinery. The main function of the JIC is to coordinate the flow of intelligence and to produce assessments on threats to British national security.

The Chiefs of Staff reported to the Committee for Imperial Defense which advised the cabinet and prime minister. During the early years of its existence, JIC efforts to coordinate British intelligence encountered resistance from the armed services who resented intrusions into their mandates. Originally the JIC membership consisted of the three service heads of intelligence and the heads of the Security Service (MI-5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6). Gradually, representatives from other government ministries, such as the Foreign Office, were added. During World War II, under the leadership of Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, the JIC matured and came to

fulfill the role for which it was originally intended. The JIC offered assessments on all aspects of Britain's war effort. So important was the JIC's contribution that it was continued into the postwar era. In 1957 the JIC was made part of the Cabinet Office, a move that reflected the importance of the JIC in the British government.

Today, members of the JIC include representatives from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense, the head of the Secret Intelligence Service, the head of the Government Communications Headquarters, the head of the Secret Service, and other senior government officials. The JIC meets at least once a week and is also responsible for assessing the performance of Britain's intelligence agencies. The Permanent Secretary, Intelligence, Security and Resilience acts as chair of the JIC and has direct access to the prime minister.

The JIC became involved in a major controversy in British domestic politics during the lead-up to the Iraq War of 2003. Critics alleged that JIC assessments of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction threat had been exaggerated, or "sexed up," in order to politically justify the invasion of Iraq. In 2004 the British government conducted an inquiry into the role of the British intelligence community in the origins of the war. The report, known as the Butler Report, concluded that although the JIC had made mistakes overall there was no evidence of deliberate distortion or culpable negligence.

See also: MI-5 (The Security Service); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service)

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JORDAN, GENERAL THOMAS (SEPTEMBER 30, 1819–1895)

Thomas Jordan was a Confederate spy and later general, who was instrumental in establishing the Confederate spy network in Washington, DC. Thomas Jordan was a career soldier who served in the Mexican War. At the outset of the Civil War, Jordan was a captain in the U.S. Army and a staff officer with a talent for logistics. He contacted the Confederate army and was tasked with organizing a spy ring in Washington, DC. Jordan set up a network centered on a pro-Confederate widow named Rose Greenhow. He did not resign his commission in the U.S. Army until May of 1861.

The Greenhow operation sent ciphered notes by courier to Jordan, now a lieutenant colonel on the staff of P. G. T. Beauregard. The importance of this intelligence is still debated; although Greenhow and Jordan provided Beauregard with important

intelligence about federal movements before the Battle of Bull Run, much of the same information could have been gathered from newspapers.

In the summer of 1861, Greenhow was arrested. She managed to exploit and outwit her jailers and transmit more information to the South. Despite Greenhow's ingenuity, Jordan realized his cipher would soon be broken. He unsuccessfully sent an agent to Washington with orders to sell the cipher to the federal army. In December of 1861, Greenhow was moved from house arrest to a prison. She was then barred from entering Washington in June of 1862. This setback hurt, but did not end, Confederate intelligence efforts in the capital. Jordan became a brigadier general and served as a staff officer for the rest of the war.

After the Civil War, Jordan became an author and newspaper editor. In 1868, he became chief of staff of the Cuban insurgent army. After a brief and fairly successful career in Cuba, Jordan resigned when it became apparent that he could not supply his army. He returned to the United States and settled in New York City, where he resumed his literary career and resided until his death in 1895.

See also: Civil War Intelligence; Confederate Signal and Secret Service Bureau; Greenhow, Rose O'Neal

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James L. Erwin

JOURNALISTS, ESPIONAGE AND

It is not surprising that throughout history a great number of journalists have been thought to be employed in espionage work, largely because of the similarity of activity: journalists and intelligence officers alike seek to ferret out valuable information not widely known, to maintain confidential contacts to acquire such information, to check that information against what is already known, and to write reports intended to influence readers by the value of that information. David Ignatius, a veteran journalist and editor who has written a novel about a journalist working for U.S. intelligence, has observed, "As a writer and reporter I try to penetrate to the heart of the way the world works, and to describe what I see in the simplest and most direct way. That is what spies are supposed to do, so there is a neat fit."

A long historical record shows that some journalists were indeed spies as well. Writer and pamphleteer Daniel Defoe, for example, secretly served as a spy and propagandist for the English government in the early eighteenth century. As a young man, Winston Churchill reported to British military intelligence while working as a journalist in Cuba, and a former KGB officer has testified that during the cold war about two-thirds of the USSR's foreign correspondents were working for Soviet intelligence.

In the American experience, U.S. leaders historically have not shied from using the services of journalists on intelligence-related missions or journalistic cover for operatives: the Continental Congress secretly sent an agent and printing press to Canada in 1776 to publish "such pieces as may be of service to the cause of the United Colonies" and authorized the penetration of a prominent Dutch newspaper by an American agent. In 1846, President Polk sent a New York newspaper editor on a covert mission to Mexico to gain the Roman Catholic Church's support for a peace treaty. Such practices continued into the post–World War II era; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–cleared memoir of former director William Colby, for example, mentions the use of journalistic cover by CIA officers abroad in the early 1950s.

The U.S. Senate committee investigating U.S. intelligence activities in the mid-1970s found that the CIA had maintained covert relationships with some 50 U.S. journalists or media employees for the purposes of gathering information. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George H. W. Bush, however, in February 1976 announced new internal regulations that prohibited paid or contractual relations with any journalist—U.S. citizen or not—accredited to a U.S. media or news company. Bush's successor as DCI, Stansfield Turner, strengthened this regulation by prohibiting the use of U.S. companies' names or facilities for cover purposes; DCI Stansfield Turner also stipulated that no exception to these rules could be made "except with the specific approval of the DCI."

These CIA policies were public and provoked little attention for nearly 20 years, until a 1996 study by the Council on Foreign Relations suggested a "fresh look" at these limitations in order to improve intelligence collection. U.S. journalists then rediscovered the long-standing Turner-era prohibitions, focusing on the so-called "waiver" by which the DCI could authorize the use of information from journalists or of journalistic cover. A vigorous debate developed in U.S. media circles, with many media executives, editors, and commentators arguing for a total ban, preferably in law rather than in policy, on any and all use of journalists or journalistic cover for intelligence purposes. A typical opinion was that of television journalist Ted Koppel of the ABC News show *Nightline*, who declared, "I am unalterably and categorically opposed to the notion of the CIA having the legal option of using journalism as a cover for its officers or agents." The *New York Times* editorialized that such cover or the intelligence use of real journalists should be absolutely prohibited, citing the need to protect foreign correspondents from hostile regimes and claiming that "using reporters as agents offends and confounds the principles of American democracy." Likewise, the *Los Angeles Times* declared that "a free press is more important to a country than a secret agency. National security is not served by casting doubts upon journalists."

Others—including the DCI at the time, John Deutch, as well as former DCI Turner—maintained that in extraordinary circumstances exceptions to the policy must be made for the safety of Americans. Examples DCI Deutch cited that might constitute such circumstances included cases where a U.S. journalist could provide helpful information concerning U.S. citizens being held hostage or had access to terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.

U.S. legislators, such as Senators Bob Kerrey of Nebraska and John Glenn of Ohio, were not swayed by impassioned arguments from the U.S. media for an absolute ban with no exceptions; Senator Kerrey said, "I simply don't see why any profession should be completely and permanently excluded from the possibility of working with CIA" or

with other U.S. intelligence services. Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts expressed the views of speakers on both sides of the debate who were uncomfortable that the issue had been so publicized, saying that henceforth all journalists would be suspect even "if they weren't tainted before."

When the Congress in October 1996 passed the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, section 309 essentially reaffirmed what had been long-standing practice: the law declared that "it is the policy of the United States that an element of the Intelligence Community may not use as an agent or asset for the purposes of collecting intelligence" anyone representing himself "as a correspondent of a United States news media organization" or is recognized as such by any foreign government. Moreover, the law stated that "the President or the Director of Central Intelligence may waive" this policy as long as the congressional oversight committees, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, are informed. Finally, this policy "shall not be construed to prohibit the voluntary co-operation of any person who is aware that the cooperation is being provided to an element of the United States Intelligence Community."

Proponents of a total prohibition were not satisfied with the new law because of the waiver provision and because, they said, it did not apply to freelance writers, but criticism over the perceived sanctimoniousness of the media made them reluctant to air the matter again. Many expressed the view that, although journalistic cover for intelligence officers might be outside the pale, there might be times when U.S. media personnel could provide information necessary for the safety of Americans. The *New Republic*, for example, asked "why journalists are such suspect citizens" and editorialized that journalists see themselves "as a priestly class above national security, citizenship, even life and death—as if we didn't have a high enough opinion of our selves already." The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, may have further influenced views on the issue: Stephen Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists, a frequent critic of the U.S. Intelligence Community, suggested in December 2001 that U.S. intelligence agencies might make proper use of information provided by journalists: "In their point of view, there may be higher values than the protection of journalists—and I'm not sure they're wrong. It may save many lives."

See also: Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982; Kahn, David; MOCKINGBIRD, Operation; Plame, Valerie Elise; September 11, 2001

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Nicholas Dujmovic

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KADISH, BEN-AMI

In April 2008, 84-year-old Ben-Ami Kadish was arrested on charges of having spied for Israel from 1979 to 1985. He was charged with four counts of conspiracy including a charge that he disclosed national defense documents to Israel and that he was an unregistered agent of Israel. Kadish confessed to Federal bureau of Investigation agents that he had passed between 50 and 200 classified documents to Israel. Kadish stated that he did not receive financial compensation for the material, only small gifts and an occasional dinner.

Kadish was born in Connecticut and served in the British and American militaries in World War II. He grew up in the British Mandate of Palestine. Kadish was employed at the Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal from 1963 through 1990. During this time Kadish's Israeli handler provided him with lists of information that he should try and obtain. Information Kadish secured for Israel included that on the F-15 fighter, the Patriot missile, and nuclear weapons.

Kadish's Israeli handler, Yossi Yagur, appears to be the same individual who handled navy civilian analyst Jonathan Pollard who was also convicted of spying for Israel and is serving a life sentence. Yagur, along with Israeli embassy official Illan Ravid, were recalled by the Israeli government in 1985. Kadish was warned by Ravid in March 2008 that U.S. officials were investigating him for espionage and instructed Kadish to say nothing.

Kadish was defended by friends as a loyal American patriot who firmly believed that there should be a Jewish state where Jews could practice their religion without persecution.

See also: Pollard, Jonathan Jay

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Glenn P. Hastedt

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KAHN, DAVID
(FEBRUARY 7, 1930–)

David Kahn, who was born on February 7, 1930, is a historian of communications intelligence specializing in code breaking. Kahn's groundbreaking work has provided critical insight into the history of military intelligence. As an author of numerous books, scholarly publications, and popular articles, Kahn is considered a leading scholar in the field of the use of codes in espionage. Kahn focuses on codes used in political and military intelligence activities.

Initially intrigued by codes as a young boy when reading *Secret and Urgent* (Fletcher Pratt, 1939), he decided to study cryptology. He attended Bucknell University and during his time as an undergraduate he pursued stories about the National Security Agency's code-making and code-breaking organization.

Kahn's most noted publication is *The Codebreakers* (1967). In 1968 it was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize for general nonfiction. After publication of *The Codebreakers* Kahn focused on World War II German military intelligence, which led to the publication of *Hitler's Spies* in 1978. In 1991 he published *Seizing the Enigma* that explores German naval code usage during the Battle of the Atlantic (1939–1945).

In 1995 Kahn served as a Scholar in Residence for the National Security Agency. Kahn is a founding coeditor for *Cryptologia*, a scholarly quarterly publication. He continues to actively write and currently serves on the board of the International Spy Museum in Washington, DC.

See also: Journalists, Espionage and

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Kristin Whitehair

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KALB, BARON JOHANN DE
(JUNE 19, 1721–AUGUST 19, 1780)

Baron Johann de Kalb, a military officer in the Revolutionary army, was born on June 19, 1721, in Huettendorf, Bavaria. He was born into the peasantry, but was able to successfully master French and English, allowing him to take a position in the Lowendal regiment of the French army.

He fought valiantly throughout the War of Austrian Succession, receiving a significant military commission. He became a baron in 1763, after being awarded the Order of Military Merit award in the Battle of Wilhelmstahl. De Kalb remained in the military and was asked by the French government to go on a mission to the American colonies in 1768. He was asked to investigate and evaluate the colonists' discontent with the British government.

When the Revolutionary War began, De Kalb returned with his friend, the Marquis de Lafayette, in 1777. Both joined the Continental army and quickly proved their worth to General George Washington. First, De Kalb served as a badly needed administrator for Washington, but received a field command in the spring of 1780.

De Kalb led his troops to Charleston, South Carolina, in an attempt to save the besieged city. At the resulting battle of Camden later in the season, he was mortally wounded and captured by the British, dying on August 18, 1780.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Arthur Holst

KALUGIN, OLEG DANILOVICH
(SEPTEMBER 6, 1934–)

Arguably the most controversial Committee for State Security (KGB) officer during the late perestroika period, General Oleg Kalugin, a shooting star of the 1960s Soviet intelligence community, became a short-lived reformer of the intelligence system before resigning amidst scandal and persecution.

Born on September 6, 1934, in Leningrad as the son of an People's Commissariat for State Security (NKVD) guard, Kalugin graduated from high school in spring 1952, publicly announcing his intention to work for the secret police. From 1952 to 1956, he studied at the KGB-run Leningrad Foreign Language Institute and, after graduating from the KGB Advanced School in Moscow in 1958, was sent to the United States under the cover of a "Fulbright scholar" studying journalism at Columbia University. In August 1959, he recruited a Russian émigré chemist code-named "Cook" and delivered money to a Soviet mole, "UNSUB DICK," in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) field office in New York. Kalugin joined the rezidentura (residency) of Vladimir Barkovskii under the code name "Felix" in New York in 1960, using the cover of a Radio Moscow correspondent. In July 1965, he joined the residency of Boris Solomatin in Washington, DC, where he delivered $50,000 to Soviet spies William (Vladimir) Weisband (1908–1967) and supervised the handling of John Anthony Walker. His cover was that of second secretary of the USSR embassy and press officer.

In March 1970, Kalugin was appointed KGB deputy chief of counterintelligence and later chief of counterintelligence (March 1973). He was promoted to the rank of major general—the youngest ever in the history of the KGB—in 1974. In December 1975, he was involved in the accidental death of defector and double agent Nikolai

Artamonov. In 1978, he played a major role in the assassination of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov. However, late in 1978, Kalugin had a fallout with his superiors over his first recruit, "Cook," now suspected of being a double agent. Kalugin was transferred to the Leningrad KGB office as first deputy chief under Daniil Nozyrev (1980–1987). Following a series of demotions, he was forced to retire in September 1989. A public supporter of perestroika and glasnost, Kalugin made sensational suggestions to reform the KGB. In September 1990, he was elected to the Soviet parliament, serving until December 1991. After the August 1991 coup attempt, President Gorbachev returned him his rank and awards which he had earlier revoked.

After the collapse of the USSR and a failed reelection attempt in 1993, Kalugin went into private business. While in the United States in 1995, the Russian government issued a warrant for his arrest, prompting Kalugin to request political asylum, which was granted. In 2002, he was sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison for high treason. Kalugin now resides in New York and Washington, DC, as a consultant. In 2009 he published an updated version of his memoirs which provided more detailed information about many of the events he alludes to in the original.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs); Walker Spy Ring

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Jefferson McCarty, Peter Rollberg

KAMPILES, WILLIAM
(1955–)

William Kampiles served as a watch officer at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operations Center from March to November 1977. In 1978, Kampiles was convicted on charges of espionage and sentenced to 40 years in prison. Kampiles received only $3,000 from a Soviet agent in Athens, Greece. The damage to U.S. national security cannot be estimated in monetary terms.

Kampiles became dissatisfied as a watch officer and wanted to become an intelligence operative. After seven months on the job, Kampiles had unlawfully removed a copy of the top-secret technical manual on the KH-11 ("Big Bird") reconnaissance satellite system, and then resigned. He then traveled to Greece, where he met with a Soviet agent, and sold the copy of the KH-11 manual.

According to Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of Central Intelligence and Director of CIA, the KH-11 manuals, each individually numbered, were not regularly inventoried, including the document Kampiles removed prior to resigning from the agency. The compromise of the KH-11 manual allowed the Soviets to implement countermeasures in order to negate U.S. space surveillance efforts.

Despite the fact that what Kampiles did was categorized as one of the most serious security breaches of the cold war, the U.S. satellite reconnaissance system, to this day, returns priceless intelligence against targets in North Korea, Iran, and numerous terrorist training camps throughout the world.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; KEYHOLE—SIGINT Satellites

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David Jimenez

KELLEY, CLARENCE
(OCTOBER 24, 1911–AUGUST 5, 1997)

Clarence Kelley was the sixth director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He assumed the position on July 9, 1973, and followed acting Directors L. Patrick Gray and William Ruckelshaus. Kelley was born in Kansas City, Missouri, and received his law degree from the University of Kansas City in 1940. Later that year he joined the FBI as a special agent. During his career with the FBI, Kelley was special agent in charge of the Birmingham and Memphis offices. He retired from the FBI in 1961 and became chief of police in Kansas City.

Following the highly controversial directorships of J. Edgar Hoover who died in office in 1972 and Gray, Kelley worked to improve the FBI's management and the morale of its agents. He is credited with opening up lines of communication between agents and senior administrators and shifting the FBI's focus away from short-term investigations that produced positive statistics about its performance level to more long-term investigations.

At the same time, Kelley continued to defend the FBI's programs of espionage directed at Americans. As justification for these programs, he cited both a 1939 Presidential Directive and a preventive law enforcement function. Shortly after taking office Kelley also spoke out in defense of the COINTELPRO program that had ended in 1971. Intended to target the activities of the American Communist Party, COINTELPRO quickly expanded to a general surveillance program of Americans. Kelley asserted it did more good than harm and called for legislation that would allow it to begin again in case of a national emergency. He also repeated the familiar refrain that the FBI was conducting its work because of its responsibilities to the American people.

See also: COINTELPRO; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

KEMPEI TAI

The Japanese Kempei Tai, a counterespionage unit, was a branch of the Japanese armed forces. Assigned tasks regarding Japan's security, including both internal and external threats, the Kempei Tai exerted influential power in Japan and in Japanese-occupied territories. The Kempei Tai's primary duties included counterintelligence; protecting military secrets and sensitive information; preserving peace by collecting information; enforcing discipline in the Japanese army; and conducting surveillance of depots, post offices, and civilian employers. Kempei Tai were distinguished by their white arm bands worn on the left arm.

The foundation of the Kempei Tai was developed by Toyotomi Kideyoshi (1536–1598) as part of an underground secret society later known as the Black Ocean Society that acted to protect the ruler's power. Kideyoshi is noted as a leader who unified Japan and a critical part of his unification efforts focused on espionage. The Kempei Tai was officially established by Japanese government officials in 1881 to preserve the emperor's power. The Kempei Tai are part of a long tradition of espionage and secret societies in Japanese culture.

As a semi-independent branch of the Japanese army, they worked closely with Japanese intelligence forces. The Kempei Tai developed training schools such as Nakaro Ku located in Tokyo. Students at these schools studied homeland defense, law, and thought control methods.

In Japan the Kempei Tai primarily focused on enforcing conformity and suppressing dissident individuals and organizations. Additionally, elite Kempei Tai worked with espionage and counterespionage operations. The Kempei Tai gathered information about enemies. For example the Kempei Tai investigated weapons used by potential enemies such as armaments used by Germany during World War I.

However, their primary focus was on movement of people in Japan to gauge the potential development of threats to the military and rulers. One method to limit expression of dissident opinions was arresting individuals on the charge of "dangerous thoughts." Dissident thoughts, as defined by the Kempei Tai, were ideas that advocated change. Individuals supporting decreasing the military's power were especially targeted. In Japan between 1933 and 1936 over 59,000 individuals were charged with "dangerous thoughts" and arrested. Although the majority of those arrested on this charge were released, approximately 5,000 were tried in a court. Those convicted in a trial were imprisoned.

The Kempei Tai also acted to implant key ideas in the Japanese populace through propaganda. The Kempei Tai were particularly active in the campaign to the Greater East Asia Prosperity Plan. Educating the public about potential threats identified by the Japanese military was a major task assigned to the Kempei Tai. The Kempei Tai sponsored antispy weeks when numerous posters were hung in public spaces.

During World War I and World War II the Kempei Tai became even more powerful in Japan in attempts to prevent liberalization. The influential Japanese military and political leader Hideki Tojo (1884–1948) is evidence of the power held by the Kempei Tai as he rose to power and essentially controlled the entire Japanese government through the Kempei Tai. In regard to size, the Kempei Tai also dramatically expanded. During World War II the Kempei Tai increased their numbers from an estimated 2,600 in the 1930s to 70,000 active and reservists in 1945.

Additionally, Nazi Germany influenced the Kempei Tai prior to the outbreak of World War II. Nazi leaders who oversaw Nazi prison and concentration camps visited Japan and consulted with the Kempei Tai. Nazi leaders offered advice pertaining to treatment of prisoners and general policies. Immediately after the Nazi visit the Kempei Tai were noted as being significantly more brutal.

In Japanese-occupied territories, Kempei Tai's primary goal was to ensure stability of Japanese rule. Often former rulers were placed in Kempei Tai camps. The strategic imprisoning of former leaders allowed the Japanese to more easily set up their own governing systems. Abroad, Kempei Tai were commonly assigned duties to suppress guerrilla movements. Communists were regularly targeted due to their tendency to be uncooperative with Japanese officials.

The Kempei Tai also attempted to create an atmosphere in the occupied territory that would create a friendly neighbor for Japan and promote a united greater East Asian economy. In Japanese-occupied territories where Kempei Tai were stationed, the Kempei Tai are often noted for their extreme torture tactics. Common tactics Kempei Tai used in Japanese-occupied territories between 1942 and 1945 include beatings, various forms of water torture, electrocution, starvation, and mental torture.

Kempei Tai commonly arrested individuals deemed dissident or suspected of espionage activities. Prisons where Kempei Tai captives were held commonly were overcrowded and dysentery was common among prisoners. Commonly prisoners were provided little food and water. As evidence of this it is estimated that at Fort Santiago, the Philippines, in December of 1944 more than 200 prisoners died due to overcrowding. Generally prisoners were confined approximately five months and then released or sent elsewhere.

The official Kempei Tai was dissolved during the Allied occupation of Japan. Additionally, 233 secret societies advocating rightist philosophies were disbanded by decrees issued by occupational forces including the secret society supporting the Kempei Tai. As the Japanese grew to trust the occupying Allied forces they grew more comfortable without a powerful espionage network as had existed before.

However, in 1954 Japanese Self Defense Forces were legalized. With the Japanese Self Defense Forces a Public Security Investigation Agency was established which engaged in limited espionage activities. As the Self Defense Forces continued to grow, other units were established that were charged with additional espionage activities.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; American Intelligence, World War II

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Kristin Whitehair

KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

John F. Kennedy was president from 1961 to 1963. Allen Dulles and John McCone served as Directors of Central Intelligence during his presidency. Kennedy brought a military background to thinking about intelligence as had Dwight Eisenhower before him. He tended to think of human intelligence (HUMINT) in terms of paramilitary activity. He also shared Eisenhower's fascination with imagery intelligence (IMINT) but was far less taken with signals intelligence (SIGINT). Kennedy shared yet another link to Eisenhower. Both failed to ask hard questions of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) about its plan to overthrow Cuba's Fidel Castro by means of the Bay of Pigs invasion and when that failed through assassination. Both confused Richard Bissell's success in managing the development of the U-2 spy plane with a capacity to organize a successful covert operation. Eisenhower left office with the Bay of Pigs still in the planning stages. Kennedy dealt with the consequences of its failure. The price for the CIA was the dismissal of Allen Dulles and reduced influence with the president. One step it took to try and regain access was the product of a new morning intelligence report especially tailored to the president's interests, the "President's Intelligence Checklist." Kennedy also reactivated the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in an attempt to upgrade the performance of the intelligence community and provide better oversight. James Killian, who during the Eisenhower administration had chaired the committee that recommended the development of the U-2 spy plane, and Clark Clifford, who would become secretary of defense in the Johnson administration, chaired the PFIAB under Kennedy. One of its many recommendations accepted by Kennedy was the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It was to bring order to the competition among military service intelligence agencies without replacing them. During Vietnam it would emerge as a major competitor to the CIA within the intelligence community in construction of intelligence estimates.

Both HUMINT and IMINT played major roles in two of the Kennedy administrations most significant foreign policy successes. HUMINT, in the form of Soviet spy Colonel Oleg Penkovsky of Soviet military intelligence, provided valuable information regarding Soviet thinking during both the Berlin crises and the Cuban missile crisis. IMINT, in the form of U-2 photographs, provided the administration with concrete proof of Soviet actions in Cuba and time to formulate a response. Their public release helped galvanize American and world opinion behind the administration.

John Kennedy's relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was strained by the mutual hostility felt by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney

General Robert Kennedy toward one another. For political reasons Kennedy felt he had little choice but to allow Hoover to continue to serve as director and announced he would do so during the 1960 presidential campaign. Moreover, not only was Hoover widely respected by the American public but John Kennedy had been, and continued to be throughout his presidency, a prime target of Hoover's illicit domestic espionage activities. At the same time both John and Robert Kennedy were consumers of Hoover's intelligence on other political figures.

See also: Bay of Pigs; Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr.; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Cuban Missile Crisis; Dulles, Allen Welsh; McCone, John A.; Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich; President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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Glenn P. Hastedt

KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested for murdering the president later that day. On November 23, Oswald was killed by Jack Ruby while he was in the custody of the Dallas police. Since that time controversy has surrounded the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) support of plans for assassinating Cuban leader Fidel Castro and the extent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) knowledge of and handling of Oswald, prior to Kennedy's assassination.

Following a June 1963 decision by the Special Group of the National Security Council to increase covert actions against Cuba, the CIA had contact with a high-level Cuban official given the code name AMLASH, who proposed the overthrow of the Cuban government, an act he anticipated would require Castro's assassination. The United States had earlier made contact with and used underworld crime leaders to plot Castro's assassination. Not long after this June 1963 meeting Castro announced that the United States had met with terrorist leaders who wished to kill Cuban officials. He promised to retaliate in kind. Additional meetings were held between AMLASH and the CIA right before and on the day of Kennedy's assassination in which support for an overthrow of Castro was given.

Oswald provided a link to Cuba that has been at the center of conspiracy theories because of his contact with pro-Castro Cubans in the United States. Born on October 18, 1939, in Slidell, Louisiana, Oswald became a self-pronounced Marxist while a teenager. Nonetheless, he enlisted in the marines prior to graduating from high school and served

U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Governor John Connally of Texas, and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy ride through Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963, moments before the president is killed by an assassin. (Library of Congress)

as a radar operator. Oswald defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and told the American embassy in Moscow he wanted to renounce his American citizenship and that he intended to provide the Russians with radar secrets. At that point the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) opened a file on Oswald. It concluded he did not have the information he promised to deliver to the Russians but warned that someone might try and return to the United States using Oswald's identity. This warning was apparently lost in the bureaucracy.

Oswald returned to the United States on June 13, 1962, with a Russian wife, Marina Prusakova. He was interrogated twice by the FBI and denied having threatened to defect or turn over secrets to Russia. The FBI closed his case on August 20, 1962. It was not opened again until March 26, 1963. Shortly after the case was reopened the FBI's New York Field Office reported that Oswald had made contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a pro-Castro organization. This information, along with information that he had subscribed to a Communist newspaper, were not given to the Dallas office until September 1963.

In August 1963 Oswald was arrested in New Orleans for his activities on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. At his request he also met with an FBI agent and repeatedly lied to him. Soon thereafter, from September 27 to October 2, Oswald went to Mexico City. While there he met with Soviet Embassy Vice Council Kostikov who was known to work for the KGB and be involved in assassination and sabotage operations. Information on this meeting was slow to be sent to the Dallas and New Orleans FBI offices and when uncovered did not produce any increased coverage of Oswald. Upon his return to the United States, Oswald moved from New Orleans to Irving,

Texas. He also visited the FBI's Dallas office and left a note for FBI Special Agent James P. Hosty, Jr., that was subsequently destroyed. After Oswald's death an informer approached the U.S. embassy in Mexico City and stated that he was in the Cuban Consulate on September 18 and saw Cubans pay Oswald a sum of money and talk about assassination.

In reviewing the evidence, the Church Committee, officially the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, did not find evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. It identified many instances of bureaucratic ineptitude in the handling of Oswald's case before the assassination. The Church Committee also concluded that there were serious deficiencies in how the FBI and CIA investigated the assassination, including efforts to prevent the Warren Commission from receiving potentially important information that reflected poorly on these agencies. The Church Committee also found that pressures were placed on the FBI by Director J. Edgar Hoover and higher government officials to conclude its investigation quickly.

See also: Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Church Committee; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Paisley, John

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Glenn P. Hastedt

KENT, SHERMAN
(DECEMBER 6, 1903–MARCH 11, 1986)

Sherman Kent was an intelligence analyst at the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Department of State; director of the Office of National Estimates and chairman; of the Board of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Born on December 1, 1903, in Chicago, Sherman Kent received his undergraduate and doctoral degrees in 1926 and 1933, respectively, from Yale University where, as a professor, he taught modern European history from 1935 to 1941.

In 1941, he joined the COI and became chief of the Africa section of its Research and Analysis Branch. From 1943 he served as chief of the Europe-Africa Division of the same branch of the OSS. After the OSS was abolished and the branch was transferred to the Department of State, he became the acting director of the Office of Research and Intelligence of the department.

He returned to Yale in 1947 and published a book in 1949, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. This is one of the earliest and most highly regarded writings on strategic intelligence. In 1950 he joined the CIA and became deputy director of the Office of National Estimates and vice chairman of the Board of National Estimates. Two years later he became their director and chairman, respectively, and remained in those positions until his retirement in 1967. He died on March 11, 1986, at his home in Washington, DC.

See also: Board of National Estimates; Central Intelligence Agency; Coordinator of Information; National Intelligence Estimates; Office of Strategic Services

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Naoki Ohno

KEYHOLE—SIGINT SATELLITES

KEYHOLE, also referred to in the past as KH and TALENT-KEYHOLE is the previously classified top-secret codeword term, now unclassified, used to describe a series of U.S. communication and imagery satellites, the first of which was placed into orbit as early on December 19, 1976. The National Security Agency (NSA) had used the term *Keyhole*, whereas *Talent* belonged to the Central Intelligence Agency. The earlier versions of the KH satellite itself were described as about half the size of a football field. Subsequent generations of KH satellites, such as the cylindrical-shaped KH-11, measured 64 feet in length, 10 feet in diameter, and weighed in at around 30,000 pounds. Some of the KH satellites reached orbits of at least 300 miles from earth.

KEYHOLE satellites were used in 1968 to monitor and photograph various areas of Czechoslovakia (specifically activities at airfields, massing of troops near the border, and other logistical indicators), which revealed no indications of Soviet preparations for an invasion. Other subsequent satellite coverage (CORONA) did reveal the above indications, but was too late for the United States, as the invasion had already taken place.

The KH-11 satellite system, also referenced by the code names Crystal and Kennan, was also commonly known as "Big Bird." It was the first American spy satellite to utilize electro-optical digital imaging and create a real-time optical observation capability. Though the KH-11 provided near real-time digitized imagery, it was designated as

an Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) type of satellite since it was also capable of transmitting signals intelligence (SIGINT) information. KEYHOLE results, particularly for the KH series satellites, were eventually classified Top Secret Umbra, an overall codeword used to describe high-level SIGINT information. Some of the names used to also describe the KH series included Kennan and Crystal.

On April 28, 1984, a KH-11 imagery satellite, an electro-optical satellite not requiring film, and already in orbit, was used to monitor the nuclear incident disaster in Chernobyl, Soviet Union, several days after the explosion. The KH-11 satellite was able to obtain such high-quality images of the disaster that photo interpreters at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC, now part of National Imagery & Mapping Agency) were able to observe that the roof of the nuclear power plant had literally blown off, and the walls of the facility pushed outward. The United States continued to monitor the Chernobyl disaster well into May 1984, providing updates to the U.S. intelligence community and government officials. The KH-11 reportedly provided imagery resolution down to four to six inches across, though subsequent generations and variations of the KH series satellites today provide much better resolution.

Also noteworthy is the fact that several of the KH series satellites could actually operate at stationary locations over 22,000 miles out from the earth, focused on the former Soviet Union and also China. Both telemetry tests and even microwave telephone calls were collected simultaneously by such platforms.

The KH-11 satellite was among the first generation of KEYHOLE satellites that were referred to as "real-time imagery." These KH series satellites did not require film. All imagery was processed into a digitized format which was then relayed to a ground station where the images were then "reassembled" within a relatively short period of time. The KH-11 series was also used to obtain very high-quality, near real-time images of the American embassy in Tehran, during the takeover by Iranian militants on November 4, 1979, and made available to then President Jimmy Carter.

During the mid-1980s, the average cost of an individual satellite was estimated to be anywhere from 60 to 70 million dollars. This does not reflect the cost of associated equipment and relay terminals on the ground. One such location, 600 miles southeast of Alice Springs in Australia, and code-named "Casino," processed information downloaded from KEYHOLE satellites after they passed over China. In the United States, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, about 20 miles south of Washington, DC, was another ground station.

KEYHOLE satellites came under the direct oversight of what was then the highly classified National Reconnaissance Office, or NRO. The designation NRO became public in 1995. Keyhole derived intelligence was shared with U.S. allies around the globe, most notably Australia, Canada, and the UK, sometimes referred to in correspondence as CANUKUS.

See also: National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC); National Reconnaissance Office; National Security Agency; Satellites

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David Jimenez

KEYSER, DONALD
(JULY 17, 1943–)

A career foreign service officer, Donald Keyser, then 63, was arrested on September 15, 2004, only days before retirement from the State Department and a few months after he submitted his resignation. He was sentenced on January 23, 2007, to one year and one day in jail, fined $25,000, and placed on three years of supervised release for (1) admitting that he was in unauthorized possession of 3,659 classified documents; (2) that he lied to State Department investigators about a relationship with Isabelle Cheng, then 37, and a Taiwanese intelligence officer, that made him vulnerable to coercion and exploitation by a foreign government; and (3) that he lied on a U.S. Customs form in September 2003 about not having visited Taiwan. In return for his cooperation U.S. authorities agreed not to prosecute Keyser for espionage. They later reversed this decision when it appeared that Keyser was not cooperating fully with investigators but then reaffirmed their original decision when his level of cooperation increased.

Keyser joined the foreign service in 1972. At the time of his arrest Keyser was the principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and pacific affairs. Prior to holding this position, Keyser had served as special negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and New Independent States Regional Conflicts, senior inspector in the Office of Inspector General, and office director in the Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. He had served three tours in the U.S. embassy in Beijing, two times in the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, and three times in the State Department's Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs. President Bill Clinton appointed Keyser to the rank of ambassador in 1999.

Keyser is known to have met with Cheng on his September 2003 trip to Taiwan, and again in May and July 2004. He often communicated with her through e-mail on such topics as his conversations with Chinese President Jiang and a possible target working for the Heritage Foundation Asia that Keyser said was "ripe for recruitment." He was stopped by FBI agents leaving an Alexandria, Virginia, restaurant on September 2, 2004. Cheng returned to Taiwan for "family reasons" after the FBI questioned her about her relationship with Keyser. Keyser's fourth wife was senior intelligence officer

in the CIA who was working in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and reportedly knew that Keyser had some classified material on his home computer.

Keyser was highly regarded by his colleagues for his expertise in Asian affairs but he had already encountered security problems once. In December 2000 he was one of several State Department officials disciplined for the disappearance of a laptop computer with secret information about weapons of mass destruction proliferation from Secretary of State Madeline Albright's office.

See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

KGB (KOMITET GOSUDARSTVENNOI BEZOPASNOSTI)

The main Soviet security and intelligence agency from March 13, 1954, to November 6, 1991. During this period, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB, Committee for State Security) operated as an agency and even a ministry. Its tasks included external espionage, counterespionage, and the liquidation of anti-Soviet and counterrevolutionary forces within the Soviet Union. The KGB also guarded the borders and investigated and prosecuted those who committed political or economic crimes.

Soviet security forces have a long history, dating back to the pre-1917 czarist period. Communist predecessors of the KGB were the All-Russian Extraordinary Commissary against the Counterrevolution and Sabotage (also known by its Russian acronym, Cheka), the Main Political Department (GPU), and the Joint Main Political Department (OGPU) headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky, the "Knight of the Revolution," from 1917 to 1926. The name "Cheka" suggested that it was to be only a temporary body, but the agency became one of the principal pillars of the Soviet system. In 1934, the OGPU merged into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), with Genrikh Yagoda (1934–1936), Nikolai Yezhov (1936–1938), and Lavrenty Beria (1938–1945) as its chiefs. Under Yezhov and Beria, the NKVD carried out brutal purges within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). NKVD officers, for example, murdered Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1940.

During the rule of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, the security apparatus had achieved almost unrestricted powers to harass, arrest, and detain those who were perceived as class enemies. The Soviet Union thus became a police state in which millions of innocent victims suffered arbitrary and brutal terror. Official figures suggest that between January 1935 and June 1941, some 19.8 million people were arrested by the NKVD and an estimated 7 million were subsequently executed.

Following World War II, in 1946 the NKVD was raised to a state ministry under Beria, who became a member of the Politburo. After the deaths of Stalin (March 1953) and Beria (December 1953), the security services were again reorganized, and on

March 13, 1954, the secret police was renamed the KGB. There were a half dozen principal directorates.

The First Directorate was responsible for foreign operations and intelligence-gathering activities. The Second Directorate carried out internal political control of citizens and had responsibility for the internal security of the Soviet Union. The Third Directorate was occupied with military counterintelligence and political control of the armed forces. The Fifth Directorate also dealt with internal security, especially with religious bodies, the artistic community, and censorship. The Ninth Directorate, which employed 40,000 persons, provided (among other things) uniformed guards for principal CPSU leaders and their families. The Border Guards Directorate was a 245,000-person force that oversaw border control. Total KGB manpower estimates range from 490,000 in 1973 to 700,000 in 1986.

The KGB helped and trained the security and intelligence agencies in other Communist countries. It was also heavily involved in supporting wars of national liberation in the developing world, especially in Africa. The Soviet Union also maintained a close alliance with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), providing it with arms, funds, and paramilitary training. The KGB mostly avoided direct involvement with terrorist operations, but it played an important role in directing aid to these groups and producing intelligence reports on their activities. Scandals concerning defectors and moles plagued the KGB throughout its existence, but the agency also scored notable successes such as, for example, the recruitment of the Cambridge Five in Great Britain; atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs; and Aldrich Ames, a KGB mole within the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Under Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, the terror lessened considerably. Both the security police and the regular police were subjected to a new legal code, and the KGB was made subordinate to the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, it was allowed to circumvent the law when combating political dissent. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, the KGB waged a campaign against dissidents such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, who became worldwide symbolic figures of communist repression. In July 1978 the head of the KGB received a seat on the Council of Ministers.

The KGB had a considerable impact on Soviet domestic and foreign policy making. Its chief, Yuri Andropov, became CPSU leader in 1982. Under Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies from 1985 to 1990, Soviet citizens' fears of the KGB diminished, which signaled the erosion of the Soviet system. The KGB was dissolved in November 1991 following the August coup attempt against Gorbachev, which was engineered by KGB chief Colonel General Vladimir Kryuchkov. Its successor organization, the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB, Federal Security Service), bears great resemblance to the old security apparatus.

See also: Ames, Aldrich; Atomic Spy Ring; Beria, Laventry Pavlovich; Cold War Intelligence; FSB Russian Federal Security Service; Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

KILLIAN, DR. JAMES R., JR.
(JULY 24, 1904–JANUARY 29, 1988)

Dr. James Rhyne Killian, Jr., served as President Dwight Eisenhower's special assistant for science and technology from 1957 to 1959 and was responsible for recommending and overseeing the development of the U-2 spy plane and the Corona surveillance satellite, as well as the creation of NASA. He served as chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) under President John F. Kennedy from 1961 to 1963.

Killian was born July 24, 1904, in Blacksburg, South Carolina. After earning a BS in engineering and business from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1926, Killian remained at the school in a variety of positions over the next three decades, including the presidency of MIT from 1948 to 1959. Killian also served in a number of science and intelligence related posts in the 1950s and 1960s.

From 1954 to 1955, he served as chairman of the Technological Capabilities Panel in the Office of Defense Mobilization, which recommended the development of the U-2. Eisenhower appointed him special assistant for science and technology in 1957. Responding to Sputnik's launch, Killian chaired the President's Scientific Advisory Committee and recommended the creation of NASA and development of CORONA intelligence satellites. After the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy appointed Killian chairman of the PFIAB. Killian died on January 29, 1988, in Cambridge.

See also: Bay of Pigs; CORONA; President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; Satellites; U-2 Incident

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Richard M. Filipink Jr.

KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN BICKFORD, JR.
(JULY 15, 1916–MARCH 3, 1995)

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., played a prominent role in the early formation of the U.S. intelligence structure. Kirkpatrick was born on July 15, 1916, in Rochester, New York. He graduated from Princeton University's School of Public and International Affairs in

1938. In 1942, Kirkpatrick relinquished his position on the editorial board of U.S. News and World Report in Washington, DC, to enlist in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, which later evolved into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Based in London, Kirkpatrick served as a liaison to Allied intelligence services during World War II. In 1943, he was commissioned as a lieutenant in the U.S. Army and made responsible for briefing General Omar Bradley on intelligence matters. He retained this position until the end of the war. In January 1947, Kirkpatrick was recruited into the newly formed Central Intelligence Group. He continued his responsibilities with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after its establishment in September 1947.

Kirkpatrick worked as a division chief and later as the Deputy Assistant Director for Operations under Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Roscoe Hillenkoetter. In December 1950, DCI Walter Bedell Smith made Kirkpatrick his executive assistant. In July 1952, Kirkpatrick contracted polio while in Asia on CIA business. Paralyzed from the waist down, he spent the rest of his life in a wheelchair.

In 1953, Kirkpatrick returned to the CIA as inspector general under Director Allen Dulles. As inspector general, he chaired a joint study group on foreign intelligence whose findings led to the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1961. Following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, Kirkpatrick compiled an internal report on the CIA's handling of the operation. The report, which was critical of the agency's management of the operation, incited controversy within the CIA and remained classified until 1998. In April 1962, DCI John McCone appointed Kirkpatrick to the newly created position of executive director. Kirkpatrick retired from the CIA in 1965 and assumed a professorship at Brown University.

While at Brown, Kirkpatrick published a number of books and articles on intelligence. He retired from teaching in 1982 and moved to Middleburg, Virginia, with his wife, Rita Kirkpatrick, in 1983. Kirkpatrick died in Middleburg on March 3, 1995.

See also: Bay of Pigs; Central Intelligence Agency; Office of Strategic Services; Smith, General Walter Bedell

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Derek A. Bentley

KISSINGER, HENRY ALFRED
(MAY 27, 1923–)

Henry Alfred Kissinger was secretary of state of the United States from 1973 to 1977 and received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. As scholar and politician, Kissinger contributed to the elaboration of the American realpolitik and détente in the cold war.

President Richard Nixon in deep discussion with adviser Henry Kissinger. Kissinger was the principal architect of U.S. foreign policy during the administrations of Republican presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, serving as national security adviser during the first Nixon administration and secretary of state from 1972 until the end of the Ford administration. (National Archives)

He was born in Germany on May 27, 1923, and was naturalized in the United States after his family fled from Germany due to Nazi persecutions. Kissinger attended Harvard College and received a BA in 1950, MA in 1952, and PhD in 1954. Between 1954 and 1971 he worked as a member of the faculty in the Department of Government and at the Center for International Affairs. At the same time, he occupied different positions as a consultant within the National Security Council and the Council of Foreign Relations.

As a scholar, Henry Kissinger conducted extensive researches and studies on American foreign and security policy, international relations, and diplomacy. His books and articles in these fields brought him numerous awards and distinctions: the Woodrow Wilson Prize (1958), the American Institute for Public Service Award (1973), the International Platform Association Theodore Roosevelt Award (1973).

After Richard Nixon was elected president he appointed Henry Kissinger as national security advisor, a position in which he served until 1975. Later on in 1973, Kissinger became secretary of state. He held this office until 1977, under President Gerald Ford as well.

A convinced supporter of realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role upon the U.S. foreign policy during his years at the White House. His belief was that American national interest should prevail upon the idealistic principles pursued traditionally by American foreign policy makers since Woodrow Wilson. Kissinger sought a policy of détente between Washington and Moscow. He encouraged the negotiation of the Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT I Treaty) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. His strategy towards the Soviet Union was dual: détente by negotiations in arms control were accompanied by an unusual turn in American foreign policy towards China. Given the conflict between China and the Soviet Union, Kissinger successfully tried to apply pressure on the Soviet Union and expand the American options in foreign affairs by a rapprochement with Red China. In 1971 Kissinger conducted the American talks with Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, which marked the beginning of a historical reconciliation between the two countries. This way, Kissinger managed to create a new Sino-American alliance directed against Moscow.

In order to counter the Communist menace, Kissinger was in favor of close political relations with anti-Communist military dictatorships in Latin America. Later on, he was to be accused of being responsible for the atrocities committed by the Argentine military Junta. Also, in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Kissinger granted support to the Pakistani forces in spite of the massacres they committed. His purpose was to discourage the alliance between India and the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger played an important part in the cease-fire that concluded the Vietnam War and made possible the American military withdrawal. For this contribution especially, Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. In 1977 he also received the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

Kissinger's stay in the White House was highly controversial for several reasons. For one, the Vietnam War was a highly divisive undertaking and the Nixon-Kissinger strategy to end it through large-scale bombings of the North and invading Cambodia produced large protests. His championing of détente as a foreign policy strategy to replace containment also alienated many conservative Republicans who would break with the party and support Ronald Reagan's candidacy for president over that of Gerald Ford. Finally, his support for covert action and tolerance of human rights abuses as part of a strategy for securing American national interest in the Third World drew the opposition of liberal internationalists. Nowhere was this more apparent than in their opposition to the Nixon-Kissinger policy of bringing down the government of Salvadore Allende in Chile. Kissinger's association with this policy and the repressive regime of General Augusto Pinochet would later lead to calls for bringing Kissinger before international and national courts for human rights violations.

See also: Chile, CIA Operations in; National Security Council; Nixon Administration and Intelligence

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Cezar Stanciu

KMSOURDOUGH, OPERATION

KMSOURDOUGH was a clandestine and illegal Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mail opening operation run in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Unlike HTLINGUAL, which also operated at the time, KMSOURDOUGH did not involve gathering information for purposes of counterintelligence or domestic intelligence.

KMSOURDOUGH was run out of San Francisco and was targeted on mail entering the United States from East Asia. It consisted of four different episodes. The first took place in September 1960 and only involved the examination of exterior envelopes. Approximately 1,600 pieces of mail were examined. Mail was opened in the remaining three episodes which occurred in February 1970, May 1970 and October 1971. The second episode lasted one week. Between 5 and 80 pieces of mail were examined each day. The third episode lasted three weeks with 2,800 letters being screened. The fourth trip lasted two weeks and examined 4,500 letters. As was the case with HTLINGUAL, a Watch List of names of interest existed to govern the selection of letters for examination during KMSOURDOUGH. The locations of the mailings and possible signs of censorship also prompted letter inspection.

The foreign intelligence collected by KMSOURDOUGH involved such matters as a risk assessment of letter drops as a means of communicating with agents and as a basis for recruiting agents. It also was said to provide information on the health and activities of Asian leaders. No evidence exists that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed any collection requirements on the CIA in KMSOURDOUGH. One reason suggested is poor relations between the CIA and FBI which may have led the CIA not to reveal the existence of KMSOURDOUGH to the FBI.

No firm evidence exists as to when or why KMSOURDOUGH was terminated. An internal CIA memo of December 1974 does speak of its termination but admits to not having information on when that decision was made. A June 1973 memo suggests that the reason was largely political with a fear of the political fallout from its disclosure being seen as outweighing the intelligence benefits of its continued operation.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); HTLINGUAL

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Glenn P. Hastedt

KNIGHTS OF THE GOLDEN CIRCLE

The Knights of the Golden Circle was an organization founded in 1854 by George Bickley which hoped to conquer Mexico and the Caribbean and create a Southern slaveholding empire. During the Civil War, the Knights of the Golden Circle reinvented themselves as a pro-Confederate secret society.

Before the Civil War, a number of attempts were made to conquer or annex parts of Latin America. These filibusters (from the Dutch "vrijbuiter," or pirate) were almost entirely a Southern phenomenon. The first filibusters were aimed at Spanish possessions in North America; the most famous early filibuster attempt is that of Aaron Burr in 1805. After the Mexican War, filibusters focused on annexing Mexico or extending American influence into Central America. The most notable of these filibusters was William Walker, who briefly ruled Nicaragua in 1855.

George Bickley founded the Knights of the Golden Circle in 1854. A newspaper editor, self-styled doctor, and inveterate self-promoter, Bickley organized the group to capitalize on filibustering interest in the wake of Walker's expedition. The "Golden Circle" that Bickley conceived was a slavery-based empire, centered on Cuba that would encompass the islands of the Caribbean, the American South, Mexico, and parts of South America. This empire would ensure the survival of slavery and Southern ideals despite the growing political power and population of the industrial North and the West.

The Knights were a national organization, although most of its membership was based in Texas. It first came to wide attention in 1860, when Governor Sam Houston sparked a confrontation with Mexican troops and threatened to invade. Bickley summoned the Knights to the border to assist in the invasion, and several hundred actually made the journey. Governor Houston, alarmed at this, defused the crisis and ordered the Knights to leave. They did, although some did remain in the region as cattle rustlers. Anger over the failed invasion led to a leadership challenge in May of 1860, which Bickley managed to overcome.

After the start of the secession crisis which led to the Civil War, Bickley left Texas to drum up support for secession in Tennessee and Kentucky. The Texas Knights transformed themselves into a prosecession militia, which threatened and intimidated voters before Texas held a referendum on secession. Most joined the Confederate army.

Bickley, still in the North, became the focus of suspicion. The Knights in the North were the subject of nearly hysterical newspaper stories and rumors, which asserted that they were the nucleus of a vast pro-Southern conspiracy. Although the Knights of the Golden Circle were undoubtedly pro-Southern, they had neither the organization nor numbers to seriously threaten the United States. Bickley was arrested in July of 1863 and charged with espionage. He was released in October of 1865 and died in 1867.

See also: Civil War Intelligence

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James L. Erwin

KOECHER, KARL
(1934–)

Karl Koecher is considered to be the only mole known to have infiltrated the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Born in Czechoslovakia in 1934, he joined the Czechoslovak intelligence service in 1962. In 1965 he and his wife staged a defect and moved to the United States where Koecher became a U.S. citizen in 1970. In reality they were positioning themselves as "sleepers" who would later be activated into espionage activities. This took place beginning in 1973 when Koecher joined the CIA as a translator/analyst tasked with analyzing wiretaps and documents provided by CIA agents. He, in turn, provided this information to Soviet intelligence. One of those whose identity Koecher compromised was Aleksandr Ogorodnik, who worked in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Henry Kissinger stated his intelligence was among the most important he read as secretary of state. Beyond engaging in espionage, Koecher and his wife were frequent participants in sex orgies with members of the White House, CIA, and Pentagon from whom they obtained intelligence.

Koecher would retire from the CIA only to be reactivated as a spy by the Soviets during the Reagan administration when he returned to the CIA as a part-time employee. Shortly after returning to work, he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a spy and agreed to become a double agent, although his value and reliability as a double agent was soon called into doubt. On November 24, 1984, one day before the Koechers were to leave the United States they were arrested. Prosecuting Koecher proved difficult because the FBI was promised him immunity and his wife had been denied access to a lawyer. Ultimately a prisoner exchange was arranged in which the Koechers were released for nine dissidents held in the Soviet Union, including Natan Sharansky.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

KOLBE, FRITZ
(SEPTEMBER 25, 1900–FEBRUARY 16, 1971)

Fritz Kolbe was a German diplomat who provided the United States with information against the Nazi government during World War II. Born on September 25, 1900, Fritz Kolbe joined the diplomatic corps and worked as a junior diplomat posted to Madrid, Spain, and Cape Town, South Africa. As he refused to join the Nazi Party, he was not promoted and did not have access to any secret information. In 1941 he became influenced by the surgeon Ferdinand Sauerbruch who was keen on Germans

doing something practical against the Nazis, and two years later Kolbe had his opportunity. On August 19, 1943, he was asked to take a diplomatic bag from Germany to Berne, Switzerland. There he offered the British some of the secret documents, but they turned him away, and so he turned to the Americans.

Allen Dulles was involved in the handling of Kolbe, who went by the code name "George Wood." Over the next two years Kolbe provided Dulles with 2,600 documents, including some highly sensitive ones such as the German plans for countering the D-Day landings, plans for the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, details on the V-1 and V-2 rocket programs, and some details about Japanese plans for the Pacific. He also managed to provide information which would lead to the identification of the Albanian Elyesa Bazna who was working as a cleaner at the British embassy in Turkey. His information was of such a high quality that the Americans initially felt it was false. Indeed Sir Claude Dansey was critical of the Americans falling for such an obvious double agent as Kolbe.

After World War II, Kolbe tried to settle in the United States, but, unable to find work, applied to the German Foreign Ministry which rejected him. He worked as a representative for an American manufacturing company and died on February 16, 1971. In 2004 a conference room at the German Foreign Ministry was named after him to commemorate his efforts against the Nazis during the war.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Dulles, Allen Welsh

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Justin Corfield

KOVAL, GEORGE
(1913–JANUARY 31, 2006)

George (Zhorzh) Koval's family was from the Byelorussian *shtetl* of Telekhany (near Minsk) and immigrated to the United States in the early twentieth century. George Koval was born on a Christmas Day in 1913 in Sioux City and graduated with honors from the local Central High School in 1929. After graduation, Koval enrolled in the University of Iowa where he studied electrical engineering. However, the Great Depression soon forced his family to move to Chicago where young Koval began to work as a secretary at the Association for Jewish Colonization in the Soviet Union (ICOR), a Yiddish organization that opposed the Zionist movement. In 1932, the Kovals traveled to the Soviet Union, seeking to return to Byelorussia but were instead compelled by the Soviet authorities to settle in Birobidzhan, administrative center of the newly established Jewish Autonomous Region. The family became involved in collective farming and Koval enrolled in the Dmitri Mendeleev Institute of Chemical Technology in Moscow in 1934. In 1939, he completed his studies with honors and, receiving Soviet citizenship, he was also recruited by the GRU (KGB's predecessor). In 1940, he returned to the United States and settled in New York City, where he

worked at the Raven Electric Company, a cover for the GRU station where Koval served as a deputy chief and went under code name *Delmar*. With the start of World War II, Koval enlisted in the U.S. army in NYC and was assigned to the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) 1943. As part of this program, Koval, who scored particularly high on intelligence tests administered by the army, studied electrical engineering at the City College of New York and, in 1944, he was assigned to the Special Engineer Detachment (SED), a research laboratory based in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which was part of the Manhattan Project. At the laboratory, Koval served as an officer, monitoring radiation levels and had almost unlimited access to various parts of the building. He used this access to transmit valuable research information to the Soviet intelligence. In 1946, he was transferred to a top-secret research laboratory in Dayton, Ohio, where, as a radiation officer, he was again given free access to the installation. While serving there, Koval passed crucial information on the design of nuclear bombs, particularly the makeup of the initiator, which, in combination with information provided by other spies, allowed the Soviet Union to detonate its first atomic bomb in the summer of 1949. By then, Koval left the United States after being discharged from the army and completing his bachelor's degree at City College of New York in 1948. He immigrated to the Soviet Union where he resided until his death in 2006. Koval was highly successful in infiltrating U.S. installations and passing highly sensitive information to the Soviets, which caused one scholar to describe him as a spy, who, with the exception of the British scientist Klaus Fuchs, may have done more than any other spy to help the USSR to develop nuclear parity with the United States. In November 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized Koval's contribution by posthumously awarding him a gold star of the Hero of the Russian Federation and publicly revealing him to be the agent Delmar.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); VENONA

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Alexander Mikaberidze

KRIVITSKY, WALTER
(1899–FEBRUARY 10, 1941)

Walter Krivitsky was an undercover Soviet intelligence officer who defected to the West in order to escape becoming a victim of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's Great Purge of 1936. On February 10, 1941, Krivitsky was found shot to death in his room at the Bellevue Hotel in Washington, DC, along with suicide notes. Officially termed a suicide, many others believe he was murdered by Soviet agents who had uncovered his identity and whereabouts.

Krivitsky was born Samuel Ginsberg in the western Ukraine in 1899. He adopted the name Krivitsky when he joined the Red Army as an intelligent agent during the Russian Revolution. Fluent in many West European languages, his career in intelligence took him to Germany, Austria, Italy, and Hungary where he became a control officer running Soviet agents. In 1933 he was sent to Holland and was placed in charge of Soviet military intelligence for all of Western Europe. There he started to become disenchanted with Stalin's regime abandonment of socialist ideals. In September 1937 a close friend, Ignace Reiss, was assassinated after he defected and spoke out against Stalin. The following month, Krivitsky defected. After several attempts on his life in Paris, Krivitsky fled to Canada and became Walter Thomas.

Now in exile across the Atlantic Ocean, he penned a critical account of Stalin that first ran as a series of articles in *The Saturday Evening Post* and then as a book, *Stalin's Secret Service*, in which he predicted a nonaggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Krivitsky provided both U.S. and British officials with information about Soviet espionage activities. In London he met with British intelligence officials identifying spies operating in Great Britain. By some accounts he gave descriptions of two individuals closely matching Kim Philby and Donald MacLean. In the United States he met with anti-Soviet journalist Isaac Don Levine and passed along information about Alger Hiss and a Washington, DC, spy ring. Krivitsky also appeared before the Dies Committee, a special investigations committee established under the House Un-American Activities Committee. Krivitsky's interpretation of Stalin as a threat to the West was not universally well received in the United States. Critics labeled him an opportunist, coward, gangster, and traitor. The information he gave the British Security Service (MI-5) and the Dies Committee was published in Walter G. Krivitsky, *MI5 Debriefing*.

See also: Hiss, Alger; MacLean, Donald Duart; Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"

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Glenn P. Hastedt

L

LA RED AVISPA (THE WASP NETWORK)

La Red Avispa was a Cuban spy ring operating in south Florida. It was the subject of a major 1998 foreign counterintelligence investigation that led to the arrests of 10 individuals on September 12. Principal targets for La Red Avispa included U.S. military installations, including the U.S. Southern Command, and the Cuban-American émigré community.

For more than 30 years the FBI and other security and law enforcement organizations monitored the activities of suspected Cuban spies. Few arrests were made, however. The decision to pursue La Red Avispa more aggressively followed the February 1996 Cuban MIG shooting down of two planes operated by the anti-Cuban Brothers to the Rescue organization that resulted in the deaths of four members of that organization.

Five of the 10 arrested pled guilty, receiving prison terms of 42 months to seven years. The others, all Cuban nationals, asserted their innocence but were convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage and sentenced from 15 years to life imprisonment. One of them was also convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. The charge stemmed from his providing information to Cuban authorities that led to the February 1996 shoot-down incident. Known as the Cuban Five, they are the subject of an international protest movement.

Following the 1998 action against La Red Avispa, three Cuban diplomats accredited to the United Nations and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC, were expelled. Two other diplomats suspected of involvement in the spy ring had already left the United States.

In 2001 two additional members of La Red Avispa were arrested in Florida as agents of the Cuban Directorate of Intelligence. George Gari and Marisol Gari entered into plea agreements with prosecutors and on January 4, 2002, they received sentences of 7 years and 42 months, respectively. They were charged with checking out the security system in place at the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) headquarters

and managing another agent who sought to obtain employment at the Southern Command. Marisol Gari was also charged with using her position at the U.S. Postal Service to try and intercept (CANF) mail.

See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

LAFITTE, JEAN AND PIERRE (JEAN, CA. 1776–1823; PIERRE, 1770–1821)

Jean and Pierre Lafitte were French-born smugglers and pirates based first in New Orleans and then at Galveston Island. They were involved in several filibusters against Mexico and were double agents in the pay of Spain.

Born in France, the Lafitte brothers immigrated with their father to the United States in 1803. Pierre established himself as a merchant, while Jean Lafitte found work as a privateer and smuggler. By 1809, both brothers had moved to New Orleans. They established a base outside the city and became leaders in the city's thriving black market. As their operations expanded, they relocated to the island of Barataria outside New Orleans, where they established a virtually independent enclave. Several hundred men were employed by the Lafitte operation.

The War of 1812 disrupted the Lafittes' preparations. Their success was attracting unwelcome attention as the war continued. The Lafittes began consorting with revolutionaries and filibusters, hoping to relocate their operations. Instead, Pierre Lafitte was arrested. Jean Lafitte was approached by British agents, who hoped to gain the Lafittes' assistance in an invasion. Instead, Jean Lafitte informed Louisiana's Governor Claiborne. Unable to trust the Lafittes, Claiborne responded by destroying the smugglers' base at Barataria. The Lafittes went into hiding, but their offer of help was accepted by the newly arrived General Andrew Jackson.

The Baratarians fought bravely at the Battle of New Orleans a few weeks later, and were given a presidential pardon. For several months, the Lafittes quietly prepared to leave New Orleans. In late 1815, the Lafittes secretly agreed to spy for Spain. The various filibustering schemes against Spain seemed unlikely to succeed, and the Lafittes needed any source of income they could find. The Lafittes, in return for payment, forwarded information on filibuster plans and even sounded Louisiana creoles on their willingness to rejoin the Spanish empire.

In 1817, much of the filibuster activity removed itself to Galveston Island in Texas, and the Lafittes followed the crowd. They also continued reporting to the Spanish on the activities there. Soon, the Lafittes had engineered a coup and taken control of the pirate kingdom. While profiting from control over the privateers of the Caribbean, they also milked them for information and gave the Spanish information. In turn, the

Spanish promised payment, but not enough to allow the Lafittes to build up a truly menacing power.

This state of affairs continued for several years, until Spain and the United States signed an 1819 treaty settling their border disputes. Although the treaty's ratification was uncertain, the Lafittes attempted to betray Spanish positions to the United States to preserve their own skins. This attempt failed, and the Lafittes were driven to outright piracy. Their base at Galveston was abandoned, and they turned to a series of temporary refuges. Pierre Lafitte died of disease after escaping Spanish custody in late 1821. Jean Lafitte, who obtained a legitimate privateering commission from Bolivar's Colombia, died in battle in 1823.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage; Jackson, Andrew

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James L. Erwin

LAMPHERE, ROBERT J.
(FEBRUARY 14, 1918–JANUARY 7, 2002)

Robert Lamphere was a Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agent who supervised some of the most important espionage cases of the early cold war, including Karl Fuchs, the Rosenbergs, and Kim Philby.

Robert Joseph Lamphere was born on February 14, 1918, in Wardner, Idaho. He graduated from the University of Idaho and attended the National Law School in Washington. Lamphere joined the FBI and worked on criminal cases before being transferred to the Soviet espionage squad. From 1943 until 1945 he worked on deciphering Soviet cables in order to identify spies. FBI director J. Edgar Hoover began such investigations because of the reports regarding Soviet infiltrations in the Manhattan Project.

Since 1948, Lamphere devoted his time to these activities and was the FBI liaison with the VENONA project. He was involved in almost all major investigations on Soviet espionage in the late 1940s and the early 1950s due to his previous experience in the field. Robert Lamphere had a major contribution in the discovering of the Soviet atomic espionage network. Some of the documents he deciphered pointed to Klaus Fuchs and Harry Gold. Further investigations revealed Julius and Ethel Rosenberg's involvement. These led to their arrest and subsequent execution in 1953. Although familiar with the vastness of the Soviet espionage in the United States, Lamphere was very critical of Joseph McCarthy's anti-Communist crusade.

Robert Lamphere left the FBI in 1955 and held positions in the Veterans Administration and in a large insurance company. After retirement, he published a book

about the espionage cases of the 1950s and his experience with the FBI. Lamphere died on January 7, 2002, in Tucson.

See also: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; Gold, Harry; Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel; VENONA

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Cezar Stanciu

LANG, HERMANN W.
(1902–)

Hermann Lang was a German agent during World War II who was responsible for acquiring the Norden bombsight plans. Hermann W. Lang was born in 1902, and had settled in the United States in 1927, living in New York where he was an inspector at the factory on Lafayette Street, Manhattan, where Carl L. Norden was producing a bombsight that was believed to be the most accurate way of guiding a bomb from the airplane onto its target. In the fall of 1937, while Lang was still working through his naturalization, he was approached by Major Nikolaus Ritter of German intelligence, the Abwehr. Lang, who retained a loyalty for Germany, told Ritter of his work, including the fact that he was supposed to leave the blueprints at work, but had taken them home. He then copied the blueprints over his kitchen table while his wife was asleep.

When Lang gave them to Ritter, the Abwehr major, who had only been in the United States for a fortnight, offered to pay Lang for the secrets. Lang refused, saying that he wanted Germany to have the bombsights and if he was given any money he would throw it away. On November 30, 1937, a steward from the *Reliance*, a passenger ship from the Hamburg-Amerika line, and who also worked for the Abwehr, smuggled the plans on board within an umbrella. Lang continued to copy other plans and get them to Ritter.

Days before Britain went to war with Germany in 1939, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain asked Roosevelt for the Norden bombsight plans but the Americans refused, wanting to remain neutral, unaware the Germans already had the plans and these were being used by the Luftwaffe. It later emerged that $3,000 was placed in a bank account in Lang's name in Germany.

See also: Abwehr; American Intelligence, World War II

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Justin Corfield

LANGER, WILLIAM L.
(MARCH 16, 1896–DECEMBER 26, 1977)

William L. Langer was an American historian and intelligence analyst. Born March 16, 1896, in Boston, Langer received his BA from Harvard in 1916, before serving with the Chemical Warfare Service in World War I. He returned to Harvard to complete his PhD in 1923, with a specialty in the diplomacy of the Near East. He joined the faculty at Harvard in 1928.

In July 1941 Langer joined James Phinney Baxter III in establishing a research branch for the Organization for Strategic Services (OSS). With Baxter's retirement in October 1942, Langer became the head of the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A). In that capacity, Langer directed the work of hundreds of scholars studying international political, economic, social, and cultural issues affecting the U.S. war effort.

With the abolition of OSS at the end of the war, Langer moved with R&A to the State Department with the title of special assistant for research and intelligence. But when the staff was divided among the Department's regional desks, Langer resigned in the summer of 1946.

In November 1950, Langer joined the Central Intelligence Agency as the first director of the Office of National Estimates. He took personal responsibility for the content of all National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) until passing the directorship to Sherman Kent in early 1952. He returned briefly to the world of intelligence in 1962 as a member of John Kennedy's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. In both the OSS R&A and the ONE, Langer sought to impose academic standards of integrity, unaffected by politics, on all written intelligence reports.

See also: Board of National Estimates; Central Intelligence Agency; National Intelligence Estimates; Office of National Estimates

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Peter F. Coogan

LANGLEY, VIRGINIA

Langley, Virginia, located in Fairfax County of northern Virginia and combined with the unincorporated town of McLean, Virginia, in 1910, is one of the richest Washington, DC, suburbs and home of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Historically, Fairfax County was created out of a northern section of Prince William County and was named after the region's proprietor at that time, 6th Lord Fairfax

of Cameron, Thomas Fairfax. Soon after, roughly two-thirds of what was then Fairfax County were used to create Loudoun County. The establishment of the District of Columbia, as well as the Civil War, further contributed to the diminishing size of the county from its larger original dimensions.

Thomas Lee, proprietor of the land where Langley is located, named his tract after his hometown in England in 1719. It was later divided among relatively wealthy plantation owners. Interestingly, President James Madison and his wife sought refuge in Langley, fleeing the British capture of Washington, DC, during the War of 1812. During the Civil War, Langley was home to significant Union forces, even though it was within Confederate territory. The arrival of the Great Falls & Old Dominion Railroad in 1906, following three years of construction, made Langley a suburb of Washington, DC, as well as a weekend and vacation getaway.

For Langley, as well as Fairfax County, the expansion of the federal government following the Great Depression and during World War II resulted in significant growth throughout the town and the county. In these years, the once rather rural region began to become more and more suburbanized.

In 1959, the federal government, notably President Dwight Eisenhower, began construction of the CIA's headquarters, which was completed in 1961. Although Langley had been combined with McLean in 1910, the building was located in Langley even though it was and still is simply a neighborhood of McLean, Virginia.

Following the arrival of the CIA, the area became even more suburbanized, especially after the opening of Tysons Corner Center. It was one of the first U.S. mega-malls and remains a top shopping attraction throughout the DC region. Today, the town of McLean, Langley included, has a population of roughly 40,000 and a per capita income of $62,000, well above the American average.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency

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Arthur Holst

LANSDALE, EDWARD GEARY
(FEBRUARY 6, 1908–FEBRUARY 23, 1987)

Born in Detroit on February 6, 1908, Edward Geary Lansdale spent a military career involved in counterinsurgency, overseeing clandestine activities in the Philippines (1946–1948, 1950–1954), Vietnam (1954–1957, 1965–1968), and Cuba (Operation MONGOOSE, 1961–1962). A shadowy figure of the cold war, much of his work was connected with the Central Intelligence Agency. After retiring from the U.S. Air Force

as a major general in 1963, he briefly headed the Food for Peace program and afterwards served as a senior liaison officer at the American embassy in Saigon.

An innovator of counterinsurgency doctrines and tactics for countering the spread of Communism, Lansdale championed "democratic revolutions" that emphasized winning the hearts and minds of the people. His legacy influenced a generation of special operatives, including Colonel Oliver North.

Lansdale attended the University of California at Los Angeles, where he majored in English and participated in ROTC. Unfortunately, he never completed his degree due to his failure to learn a foreign language. Afterwards he joined the Army Reserve as a second lieutenant while working as an advertising copy editor. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor he was put on active duty and worked for the Office of Strategic Services, assigned to the San Francisco office of Army Military Intelligence. During the war he may have made some clandestine trips to New Zealand and China. After the Japanese surrender, he was sent to the Philippines, where he served as the deputy chief of staff for intelligence and later as the head public information officer. While studying Filipino culture, he worked to promote a positive American image and at the same time he monitored the Communist-inspired Hukbalahap (Huk) rebellion.

After transferring to the air force in September 1947, Lansdale taught strategic studies for the Department of Air Intelligence Training at Lowry Air Force Base in Denver. Afterwards, as a lieutenant colonel, he was assigned as an intelligence officer to the Office of Policy Coordination under the Central Control Group in Washington, DC. In September 1950 he returned to the Philippines and became a confidant of Ramón Magsaysay, the Filipino congressman whom he arranged to have appointed as secretary of the defense. Together the two directed a counterinsurgency campaign against the Huk rebels. In 1954, with Lansdale's behind-the-scenes involvement, Magsaysay was elected the country's president by an overwhelming margin, prompting one foreign ambassador to dub the American operative "Colonel Landslide."

In 1954 Lansdale joined the Saigon Military Mission and became a key adviser to Ngo Dinh Diem, the premier of South Vietnam. He was soon appointed the CIA station chief. Lansdale oversaw the training of Diem's army, worked at uniting the different military sects, and thwarted coup plots. Clandestine activities in the north included disinformation campaigns, sabotage, and the planting of deep-cover operatives. Lansdale utilized a network of Filipinos with experience against the Huks. Also, a Filipino-based company, Freedom Company (later the Eastern Construction Company), was a CIA front that enabled operatives disguised as technicians to be deployed in Vietnam as well as other parts of the Far East. Lansdale's time in Vietnam inspired novelistic portrayals, including "Alden Pyle" in Graham Greene's *The Quiet American* (1955) and "Homer Atkins" in William Lederer and Eugene Burdick's *The Ugly American* (1956).

He worked at the Pentagon in March 1957 through to his retirement in October 1963. In Washington he served in various planning roles involving strategic services and special operations. He warned that the Bay of Pigs invasion would fail due to its small force and lack of a political base of support on the ground. He also advised against sending troops to Vietnam, yet at the same time he inspired President John F. Kennedy to allocate more resources to Special Forces.

During the Kennedy administration, Lansdale was put in charge of Operation MONGOOSE for the purposes of orchestrating an anti-Castro rebellion. Years afterwards, appearing before the Church Committee, he denied any knowledge of the CIA attempts to assassinate Castro. However, Lansdale was found to have agreed with plans calling for the "liquidation" of Cuban leaders.

In retirement, Lansdale wrote his memoirs, *In the Midst of Wars*. On February 23, 1987, he died in his sleep at his home in McLean, Virginia. He was buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Greene, Graham; MONGOOSE, Operation; Vietnam War and Intelligence Operations

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Roger Chapman

LAURENS, HENRY
(MARCH 6, 1724–FEBRUARY 24, 1792)

Henry Laurens was an American planter and merchant born in Charleston, South Carolina. Although originally favoring reconciliation with Britain, Laurens supported the United States in the conflict with the British by 1775. He was elected to South Carolina's first provincial Congress in 1775, and became president of the Committee of Safety in the same year. By March 1776, South Carolina had formed an independent government and chose him as vice president.

In 1779, the Continental Congress chose Laurens as minister to Holland. He was to travel to Holland in an effort to negotiate a treaty that would include Dutch support for the American Revolution, and to secure a $10,000,000 loan. Britain captured the *Mercury*, the ship carrying Laurens, off the coast of Newfoundland during his return voyage in 1780. In an attempt to keep the alliance between Holland and the United States secret, Laurens threw his official papers overboard; the British navy recovered the papers and the draft of the treaty. Britain used these documents to justify their declaration of war on Holland; Laurens was charged with treason and imprisoned in the Tower of London.

On December 31, 1781, Great Britain released Laurens in a prisoner exchange for General Lord Cornwallis, and Laurens returned to South Carolina. In 1783, Laurens helped negotiate the Treaty of Paris that ended the Revolutionary War. Once back in the United States, Laurens retired to private life. He served in the state convention that ratified the Constitution in 1788, before passing away at his home in Mepkin, South Carolina, on December 8, 1792.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Gregory Kellerman

LE CARRE, JOHN (DAVID JOHN MOORE CORNWELL) (OCTOBER 19, 1931)

Born in Poole in County Dorset, the son of confidence man and political schemer Ronnie Cornwell, lightly fictionalized as the father of Magnus Pym in *The Perfect Spy*, David Cornwell had an irregular childhood marred by the desertion of his mother and his father's jailing on charges of fraud. Cornwell attended Bern University in Switzerland and studied modern languages at Oxford graduating in 1956. In 1958 he joined the British Foreign Service, a cover for his real work with the British Security Service (MI-5), the agency responsible for counterintelligence. After transferring to the Security Intelligence Service (MI-6), Britain's counterpart to the Central Intelligence Agency Cornwell became an eyewitness to such early cold war events as the construction of the Berlin Wall. One of the most famous Soviet agents, Kim Philby, a rising star in MI-6 and the most famous member of "Cambridge Five," a group of upper-class Britons recruited as Soviet agents in the 1930s while students at Cambridge, gave Cornwell's name, among many others, to the Soviet Union. Philby's treachery ended Cornwell's career in intelligence work and, coupled with his mother's abandonment of her family, inspired a lifelong fascination with the theme of betrayal. In 1954 Cornwell married Alyson Ann Veronica Sharp, the couple had three children, and for a time in the 1960s lived in Greece. Their divorce inspired his autobiographical novel *The Naïve and Sentimental Lover* (1971). Cornwell remarried in 1972 to Valérie Jane Eustace.

Cornwell adopted the pseudonym John le Carre and began writing while still in the Secret Service, publishing his first book, *A Call for the Dead*, in 1961. Written to counter the glamorous image of espionage in James Bond novels, the book introduces le Carre's greatest character, George Smiley, a chubby, unassuming anti-Bond in rumpled clothing. Le Carre's third novel, *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*, published in 1963, established his reputation as a master of the grimly realistic espionage novel and won him the prestigious Somerset Maugham award. In his subsequent novels, le Carre perfected his depiction of a shadowy world held together by personal connections while simultaneously being torn apart by lies and betrayal. Although his novels are regarded by some as virtual handbooks on the practice of espionage, le Carre freely admits that most of it is made up for literary effect. His most famous three novels *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* (1974); *The Honorable School Boy* (1977); and *Smiley's People* (1980) revolve around the hunt for "Karla," an austere spymaster resembling real-life East German intelligence chief Marcus Wolf. Another real-life character, Kim Philby, appears as the mole, Gerald, in *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*. The end of

the cold war left le Carre adrift and he experimented with plots involving drug dealers, *The Night Manager* (1993); American colonialism, *The Tailor of Panama* (1996); and post-Soviet regional conflicts such as *Our Game* (1995). Recent works such as *The Constant Gardener* (2000) and *Mission Song* (2006) take place in Africa and feature befuddled diplomats; heroic, doomed idealists; brutal security squads; and callous international corporations.

See also: Fiction—Spy Novels; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"

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Vernon L. Pedersen

LEE, ANDREW DAULTON
(1952–)

Andrew Daulton Lee, a drug dealer and spy, was born in Los Angeles, California, in 1952. He was the son of a well-established physician who had built a successful career in the Los Angeles area. He grew up in the Palos Verdes Peninsula section of the city, one of Los Angeles' more wealthy neighborhoods at that time.

Lee took to the streets during his childhood and became a relatively successful drug dealer in the area, avoiding arrest and making significant money. He began his illegal career while in high school and started to increase his supply and customers. Thanks to his abundant sales of heroin and cocaine, Lee became known as the "snowman" in Los Angeles and throughout California.

Along with his childhood friend, Christopher Boyce, who had received a top-secret position with a U.S. defense communications center located in Redondo Beach thanks to his father's connections with the FBI, the two began to intercept and to accumulate CIA messages that they hoped to eventually sell to the Russians for cash. Soon after, they decided upon the Soviet embassy in Mexico City as their transfer point.

Beginning in the early 1970s, Lee traveled to Mexico City and delivered the stolen documents to Soviet officials at the embassy in microfiche format. Most of the documents permitted the Soviets to better understand how to decode encoded messages from the CIA and FBI. Additionally, they gave the Soviets top-secret descriptions of the latest U.S. satellites.

For roughly two years and a couple trips, the scheme worked and Lee was able to deliver the secrets for cash that he then shared with Boyce. It came to an end however, in December 1976, when Lee was arrested by Mexican police in front of the Soviet embassy on suspicion that he was involved in the recent murder of a Mexican police officer. Once searched, the police found the microfiches and he was quickly extradited to the United States.

Once in the United States, Lee was found guilty of espionage and was sentenced to life in prison. He also told the police about his connection with Boyce, who was also

convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Interestingly, Lee was released on parole in 1998 and was soon after hired by Sean Penn, who acted as Lee in a movie based on his life, titled *The Falcon and the Snowman*.

See also: Boyce, Christopher John; Falcon and the Snowman

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Andrew Holst

LEE, ARTHUR
(DECEMBER 20, 1740–DECEMBER 12, 1792)

Arthur Lee was an American agent and diplomat during the War of American Independence. Lee was born on December 20, 1740, in Stratford Hall, Westmoreland County, Virginia. He was educated at Eton (1751–1757), the University of Edinburgh (1761–1764), and the Inns of Court (1770–1774). He achieved degrees in medicine and law, proficiency in Greek and Roman history, and a deep respect for English Whig politics. Living in England in the 1760s and 1770s, he was a pro-American polemicist, cultivating a wide circle of influential acquaintances, among which was Benjamin Franklin. He became an intelligence agent for Congress in 1775. In 1777, he joined Franklin and Silas Deane in Paris as part of the U.S. fledgling diplomatic corps.

Restlessly practicing militia diplomacy, Lee antagonized his colleagues while seeking aid for his new country. He visited Spain and Prussia, and he infuriated Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais, a French agent, by arguing that French military assistance was a gift to the United States rather than a sale. In early 1778, he angered Franklin and Deane during negotiations leading to a French-American alliance. Also, he claimed that his colleagues were colluding with Dr. Edward Bancroft, a secretary in the embassy whom he knew to be a British spy. In 1778 Lee attempted without success to have Franklin recalled. He was himself recalled in 1779. He died on December 12, 1792, at Landsdowne, near Urbanna, Virginia.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Bancroft, Dr. Edward; Deane, Silas; Franklin, Benjamin

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Paul David Nelson

LEE, PETER H.
(1939–)

Peter Lee was a nuclear physicist who worked at the Los Alamos Laboratory from 1985 to 1991. Prior to that, he worked for almost a decade, from 1976 to 1984, at the Livermore Labs. On December 7, 1997, Lee pled guilty to having provided China with secret information in 1985 about using lasers to simulate a nuclear detonation. According to Lee, he passed on this information both to help the Chinese scientists and improve his reputation in China. Under terms of the agreement, Lee did not have to spend any time in prison. He was fined $20,000 and ordered to perform 3,000 hours of community service.

Lee was born in China in 1939. His father was strongly anti-Communist and the family moved to Taiwan in 1951. Later they moved to the United States where Lee became a naturalized citizen in 1975. He earned a PhD in aeronautics from the California Institute of Technology. As a result of his work on lasers and nuclear reactions, Lee came into contact with Chinese scientists. In 1985 he traveled to China where he was approached about providing Chinese scientists with help. He admitted to attending a meeting where he provided detailed answers on questions related to laser fusion research. This information was declassified in 1993 by the Department of Energy.

An investigation into Lee, code-named "Royal Tourist," was begun in 1991 by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents James J. Smith and William Cleveland, Jr., and ran until 1997. After leaving Los Alamos, Lee went to work for TRW where he worked on a radar imaging program that is vital to the security of U.S. submarines. He sought to return to Los Alamos but was turned down for a job due to security concerns raised by the FBI. In 1997 he again when to China where he gave a lecture on radar imaging to Chinese scientists and answered questions about its relevance to antisubmarine warfare. Lee had told TRW his trip was for pleasure and did not reveal he planned to present a lecture.

The failure to charge Lee with espionage, his general lack of cooperation with government officials, and the light sentence imposed created a great deal of controversy. Singled out for blame for the failure to prosecute the case more vigorously was a prolonged period of miscommunication between the prosecutors, defense officials, and FBI. Adding further confusion to the case was the fact that FBI agents Smith and Cleveland, who investigated Lee, were handlers of Katrina Leung, who was reportedly a double agent for China but was never convicted of espionage. She also had an affair with both Smith and Cleveland.

See also: China, Intelligence Operations of; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Leung, Katrina; Los Alamos; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

LEE, WEN HO
(DECEMBER 21, 1939–)

Wen Ho Lee, a University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, was accused of providing China with secret information about the W88, a U.S. nuclear warhead. Lee was born in Taiwan on December 21, 1939, and came to the United States to study. He received a PhD from Texas A&M and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in the 1970s. He was arrested in December 1999 and held without bail in solitary confinement for 278 days. This charge was dropped but in its place the government charged Lee with the improper handling of restricted data. On September 13, 2000, Lee pled guilty to one count as part of a plea bargain arrangement with the other 58 counts being dropped. Later, Lee brought suit against the U.S. government and five news organizations (the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, ABC News, and the Associated Press) for leaking information that violated his privacy. On August 18, 2004, a U.S. district judge held reporters from four manor news organizations in contempt for not revealing the source that identified Lee as a spy. On June 3, 2006, they agreed to pay Lee $1.6 million to settle the suit, with the government paying $900,000 in legal fees and taxes and the news organizations paying $750,000 saying it was the best way to protect their source and journalists.

Information from an intelligence source in China revealed that China had obtained details of the W88. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) examination of the case (Operation Kindred Spirit) led them to focus on Lee. He had traveled to China twice in the 1980s to meet with scientists. During his questioning by the FBI, Lee admitted that he had been asked by them to supply information that would help China develop a nuclear missile force. Lee took a polygraph test and it indicated he was not always being truthful in his responses. An examination of his computer revealed that he had transferred classified documents to an unsecured network and in the process deleted the security classification on the material. This information was accessed over 40 times on a computer at the UCLA student union by an unknown individual(s).

As the investigation in Lee's alleged espionage began, he was fired from his job at Los Alamos by UCLA on March 8, 1990, under pressure from the Energy Department which oversees the laboratory. His firing was leaked to the media that same day by an unidentified source and was widely reported. While his alleged espionage was making news, the FBI had determined that Lee could not have been the source of information on the W88 to China. Still the FBI continued with its investigation.

Lee's case raised a number of troubling issues. The first was the possibility of racial profiling. Lee and his supporters argued that he was unfairly singled out for investigation because of his Chinese heritage. Some have likened it to the Dreyfus affair in interwar France. A second issue relates to the state of security at national research labs where classified work is being done and more broadly the relationship between the culture of scientific research that values openness and the culture of national security that does not.

See also: China, Intelligence Operations of; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Los Alamos; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

LEUNG, KATRINA
(MAY 1, 1954–)

Katrina Leung was a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in Canton, China, in 1954. On April 9, 2003, she was indicted for the "unauthorized copying of national defense information with the intent to injure or benefit a foreign nation." Although not charged with espionage, apparently for lack of evidence, she is regarded as having been a double agent for China for at least 20 years. Her case was dismissed on January 6, 2005, when a district judge ruled that prosecutors had acted improperly in and denied Leung her constitutional right to a witness for her defense by the terms of the plea agreement it reached with James J. Smith, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent who was her lover and handler, that prohibited him from sharing information on the case with Leung or her attorney. In December 2005 she would plead guilty to one count of lying to the FBI and one count of filing a false federal tax return for which she was required to cooperate with the government in debriefings, fined $10,000, required to do community service, and placed on three years' probation.

Leung first came to the attention of the FBI in 1980 as part of an investigation into illegal technology transfers to China. At that time she was not under suspicion but in February 1981 the FBI began an investigation into her activities, believing that while working at an export-import company she was engaged in clandestine intelligence collection for China. When Leung left the firm, the investigation was dropped. It was reopened by Smith in 1982 in pursuit of information on another. Smith soon recruited Leung as a spy for the FBI under the code name "Parlor Maid" and then began an affair with her. Smith worked for the FBI from 1970 to 2000 when he retired. By the time of her arrest, Leung had been paid over $1.7 million.

In 1984, with the FBI's help, Leung was recruited as a spy by China's Ministry of State Security. In 1990 the FBI discovered that Leung had been providing China with classified information about the FBI's counterintelligence program. As part of his plea agreement with the FBI, Smith later admitted to bringing top-secret material to her which he left in an open briefcase. In April 1991 a conversation between Leung and her Chinese handler was caught on tape by the FBI. Special Agent William Cleveland, Jr., who listened to the tape, recognized Leung's voice, and informed Smith that she might be a double agent. He too had become involved in an affair with her in the late 1980s. The FBI determined that she should not be terminated and allowed to continue to function as an FBI spy even though she was providing China with unauthorized information.

Leung's case attracted notoriety for two reasons. First, she was a prominent socialite who was regularly identified as a Republican fundraiser and activist. By one account she gave about $27,000 to the Republican Party. Second, her case highlighted the FBI's lax internal roles and procedures for handling agents. Smith was not closely watched nor was his judgment challenged by superiors when presented evidence that Leung was engaged in espionage for China. For example, information about her past activities and suspicions was not made available to an internal investigation that judged she should be allowed to continue to function as a spy for the FBI.

See also: China, Intelligence Operations of; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Lee, Peter H.; Los Alamos

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Glenn P. Hastedt

LEWIS, MERIWETHER
(AUGUST 18, 1774–OCTOBER 11, 1809)

Meriwether Lewis was a leader, with William Clark, of the Corps of Discovery's exploring expedition through the Louisiana Territory and the Oregon Country from 1804 to 1806. The expedition was the first to navigate the Missouri River to its source, cross the Continental Divide, and descend the Columbia River to the Pacific Ocean. Lewis and Clark discovered and recorded many plant and animal species new to science, established relations with several Native American tribes, and helped the United States establish a claim to the Oregon Country—the present states of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho.

The son of William and Lucy Meriwether Lewis, Meriwether was born on August 18, 1774, near Charlottesville, Albemarle County, Virginia. In 1794, he volunteered as a private in the Virginia militia and participated in putting down the Whiskey Rebellion. Later that same year, he received a commission as an ensign in the regular U.S. Army. Serving in the army under Gen. Anthony Wayne, he first met William Clark in 1795.

After his election in 1800, President Thomas Jefferson—long a friend of Lewis' family—selected Lewis to serve as his private secretary. Jefferson, who held Lewis in high regard, described him as "Brave, prudent, habituated to the woods, and familiar with Indian manners and character." In 1803, when Congress appropriated funding for an expedition to explore the new Louisiana Territory, Jefferson chose Lewis to lead the Corps of Discovery. Lewis invited Clark to share command as a co-leader. On May 22, 1804, the party of 25 soldiers and voyageurs launched their boats up the Missouri River. One of factors motivating Jefferson's interest in the Pacific Northwest was French interest in the region. King Louis XVI couched French interest in terms of promoting scientific research but Jefferson doubted this was the case, seeing in it instead a political purpose.

Jefferson had instructed Lewis to follow the Missouri River to its source and find the best passage through the Rocky Mountains to the headwaters of the Columbia River and the Pacific Ocean. He also directed him to make detailed maps of the terrain through which they passed; to contact and establish relations with the Native American peoples through whose lands he traveled, and to make ethnographic observations of them; to investigate soils and the productive capacity of the land for agriculture; to identify and collect specimens of plant and animal species as yet unknown to science; to survey the territory's mineral resources and geological features; and to record detailed observations of the region's weather and climate.

Lewis and Clark constructed Fort Mandan on the Missouri River near present-day Bismarck, North Dakota, where they spent the winter of 1804–1805. In April 1805, they resumed their trek west. In August, they crossed the Continental Divide at Lemhi Pass, in the Bitterroot Mountains of present-day Idaho and Montana. Once in the Columbia River drainage, they made their way by foot and horseback to the Clearwater River, where they constructed dugout canoes. They arrived at the Pacific Ocean in November 1805 and erected Fort Clatsop near present-day Astoria, Oregon. In March 1806, they began the return trip eastward. At Traveler's Rest, in the Bitterroot Valley of present-day Montana, Lewis and Clark divided the party. While Clark went south to explore the Yellowstone Valley, Lewis went north to explore the Marias River country. On August 12, Lewis and Clark reunited their expedition on the Missouri River and continued downstream, reaching St. Louis on September 23, 1806.

As a naturalist, Lewis had kept detailed scientific records and specimens for the expedition. He described approximately 100 new animal species and 70 new plant species. The expedition also established relations with several Native American tribes and recorded ethnographic information that remains valuable to researchers to this day. Lewis shared his discoveries with Jefferson when he reached Washington, DC, in December 1806.

The expedition was the high point of Lewis' short life. Deepening depression, debt, and alcoholism consumed him and he committed suicide on October 11, 1809.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage

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Glenn P. Hastedt

LIBERTY, USS

The USS *Liberty* was a U.S. Navy intelligence ship attacked by the Israeli military on June 8, 1967, during the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War. The USS *Liberty*, with a crew of 294 sailors, was a modernized version of the World War II–era Victory ship. Loosely identified as an "Auxiliary General Technical Research Ship," the *Liberty* was a signals intelligence ship, equipped with modern listening devices. It carried an array of antennas and radars, and was lightly armed, with four .50-caliber machines guns. The *Liberty* was en route from Virginia to the Ivory Coast in mid-May 1967, when

the Middle East crisis intensified, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) ordered the ship to the eastern Mediterranean. Though technically under control of the Sixth Fleet, the *Liberty* was directed by the JCS and the National Security Agency. Although its mission still remains classified, because the crew included Arab and Russian linguists, the mission probably involved eavesdropping on the Egyptian army, with its Russian advisors.

The *Liberty* arrived on station in the predawn hours of June 8, 1967, four days after the Six Day War had begun, and assumed a patrolling position 12 miles off the coast of the Gaza Strip. This placement allowed the ship to maintain it was in international waters at the time of the attack, but also placed the ship in close proximity to the Sinai war zone. Poor communications within the U.S. Navy prevented the ship from receiving new orders issued by the JCS to move one hundred miles off the Egyptian coast, orders which were issued prior to the *Liberty*'s arrival off Gaza. Poor communications played a major role in the episode, as the Israelis were quite concerned about the lack of naval liaison with the American Sixth Fleet, which they would later claim caused, in part, the attack on the *Liberty*.

The Israelis acknowledge that their aircraft properly identified the *Liberty* as an American naval ship at least twice on the morning of June 8. The *Liberty*'s crew claimed proper recognition was made at least an additional six times that morning. When a morning explosion rocked the city of El Arish on the Sinai coast, the Israelis believed that an Egyptian naval attack was underway. The "fog of war" appeared to have caused the Israelis to change the *Liberty*'s status from friendly to possible enemy combatant, largely because the ship had changed direction as part of its patrolling procedure, and because the Israelis misjudged its forward speed. The Israelis later claimed that they believed the *Liberty* to be an Egyptian freighter, possibly the *El-Quseir*.

A harsh Israeli air attack was launched against the *Liberty* around 2 P.M., and was followed up with attacks from motor torpedo boats. The attack lasted well over an hour. Israeli pilots claimed that the ship did not display the American flag, a charge flatly rejected by the U.S. Navy and by the ship's crew. The Israeli attack ended when American aircraft launched by the carrier USS *Saratoga* were en route to the attack site. The spy ship was left a burning hulk, with heavy casualties: 34 dead, with another 173 wounded.

The attack on the *Liberty* remains a source of American unhappiness with Israel. The Israelis have long been condemned in many American quarters, from government officials to former military leaders to the press, most of whom believe the attack was deliberate and reject the Israeli claim of mistaken identity. The crew members of the *Liberty* still believe that their story was never truly told, thanks to a government cover-up. If the attack was deliberate, one important question remains unanswered: What information had the *Liberty* gathered which Israel absolutely wanted protected? The Israeli government continues to maintain that the attack was an unfortunate incident of poor liaison and misidentification. Formal inquiries conducted by both the United States and Israel all concluded that no proof existed that the Israeli military deliberately attacked the vessel. The Israeli government apologized for the attack and paid over $12 million in compensation to the victims and their families and to the American government. The United States later awarded the commander of the ship, Captain William L. McConagle, the Medal of Honor.

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Thomas D. Veve

LINCOLN ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Abraham Lincoln and his administration started the Civil War with several disadvantages in the field of military and political intelligence. Washington, DC, and the federal bureaucracy were full of Southern sympathizers who could be tapped for espionage by the confederacy. Comparable federal agents did not exist in the confederate government, newly formed by the most dedicated secessionists. Prewar federal army strength was only around 16,000, with no department devoted to intelligence. Lincoln had to obtain intelligence where he could get it, and make the best of it.

The primary sources the Lincoln administration came to rely on were: (1) Allan Pinkerton, a private detective before and after the war who provided military intelligence services of mixed value; (2) scouting and intelligence networks established by generals in the field, which varied in scope and reliability; (3) telegraphic communication to the War Department; (4) civilian sympathizers in the confederate states, who organized their own networks; (5) Lincoln's personally recruited secret agent, William A. Lloyd, reporting directly and solely to the president.

Pinkerton detected a plot to kill the president-elect in Baltimore, on his way to Washington, and was successful in placing agents in the confederate capital. His best agent, Timothy Webster, was detected and hung as a spy, after penetrating the Richmond office that eventually became the War Department's secret service operation. Pinkerton became intelligence chief for General George McClellan, reinforcing the general's cautious nature with estimates inflating the actual strength of Confederate forces by a factor of two or three. The Army of the Potomac probably refrained from several opportunities for battlefield success against the Army of Northern Virginia as a result. General Joseph Hooker established a Bureau of Military Intelligence during his brief command of the Army of the Potomac, headed by Colonel George H. Sharpe, who continued in that capacity until the end of the war. One of the most accurate and comprehensive intelligence networks was developed by Grenville M. Dodge, the chief intelligence officer for General Ulysses S. Grant in the western theater of combat. Dodge organized over 120 operatives whose identities were known to him alone.

Elizabeth Van Lew, a Richmond resident who openly expressed sympathy with the Union, visiting imprisoned Union soldiers, was known as "Crazy Bet"—an excellent cover for her spy ring. Operatives included an educated former slave, Mary Elizabeth Bowser, whom she placed as a domestic in the Confederate White House, and Samuel Ruth, superintendent of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, who was able to slow down, and provide reports on, the rail movement of troops and supplies for Confederate forces in Virginia. Van Lew, reporting to Colonel Sharpe, was particularly useful during the 1864 to 1865 campaigns around Richmond and Petersburg.

President Lincoln got most of his information on the many military fronts in the telegraph office at the War Department, walking over from the White House several times a day to keep up to date. Lincoln spent several hours a day reading incoming telegrams, writing responses to commanders in the field. David Homer Bates, one of the "Sacred Three" telegraph and cipher operators at the War Department, recorded that it was common for Lincoln to send 10 to 12 telegraph dispatches a day to various generals, after reading all incoming telegrams. Lincoln drafted the Emancipation Proclamation there, after the Seven Days battles. During the Second Battle of Bull Run, Lincoln kept up a running exchange of messages with a Colonel Haupt, who provided more detailed and timely information on federal positions than either General Pope or General McClellan.

In the early summer of 1861, Lincoln recruited William A. Lloyd as his personal secret agent for the duration of the war. Intelligence Lloyd collected went directly to President Lincoln, and was not shared with military commanders. The president seemingly used him as an independent measure of intelligence coming through military chains of command and the cabinet. His reports included maps of military camps and forts in various parts of the Confederacy, data on artillery and forts of Richmond in July 1862, and the strength of General Robert E. Lee's army in March 1865. Lloyd, a publisher of schedules for railroads and steamboats in Southern states, originally came to Lincoln's attention by applying for a passport to travel in the Confederacy to keep his information up to date. Lincoln made the espionage work a condition of issuing the passport, offering a salary of $200 a month. Ironically, he was never paid, having destroyed his contract when arrested by Confederate authorities, so after Lincoln's assassination, he had no proof. He did obtain $2,380 in expense reimbursements from Secretary of War Edwin Stanton.

See also: Baker, Lafayette; Civil War Intelligence; Pinkerton, Allan; Sanford, Henry; Van Lew, Elizabeth; Webster, Timothy

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Charles A. Rosenberg

LONETREE, SERGEANT CLAYTON J.

Marine Sergeant Clayton J. Lonetree, who had served as a security guard at the U.S. embassy in Moscow was arrested for spying in December 1986 after he told a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official at an embassy Christmas party in Vienna what he had done. After his arrest he quickly confessed to having passed an old embassy

phonebook, blueprints of the embassy building including the location of alarm systems, photographs of embassy employees, and other documents to his Soviet handler who he knew as "Uncle Sasha," believed to have been Alexei Yefimov. Lonetree was convicted of spying in August 1987 and received a 30-year sentence, reduced to the rank of private, fined $5,000, and given a dishonorable discharge. His sentence was reduced to 15 years in July 1994 by a Marine Corps general on the grounds that his lawyers, who included noted defense attorney William Kunstler, may have been incompetent. In October 1993 his sentence had already been reduced to 20 years because of his cooperation with U.S. authorities. Lonetree was released from prison on February 26, 1996. He was the first marine convicted of espionage.

Lonetree, a Navajo, is described as being not very bright and an alcoholic. He was also very lonely in Moscow and became infatuated with Violetta, a Russian translator/receptionist at the embassy in 1985. She introduced him to Yefimov. When his tour of duty in Moscow was up, Lonetree was able to get a position as a security guard at the U.S. embassy in Vienna, Austria. There he was visited by Yefimov who brought pictures and a letter from Violetta as well as a proposal that Lonetree should return to Russia to obtain KGB training. At this point Lonetree reportedly began to have second thoughts about what he was doing, began drinking even more heavily, and approached the CIA official with his story.

Lonetree received some $3,600 from Yefimov for the material he delivered. At first it was thought that Lonetree's espionage was responsible for the deaths of as many as 20 CIA agents. It was later determined that the source of the information that cost these individuals their lives was Aldrich Ames.

See also: Ames, Aldrich; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

LONSDALE, GORDON ARNOLD (JANUARY 17, 1922–SEPTEMBER 9, 1970)

Gordon Arnold Lonsdale was a Russian spy whose real name was Konon Trofimovich Molody. Gordon set up spy networks in Britain and continental Europe. In 1961, British police arrested a man who appeared to be a Canadian-born businessman named Gordon Lonsdale on charges of espionage. In 1964, he was exchanged for the British agent Greville Wynne who was convicted for espionage by the Soviets in 1962. The Soviets

revealed Lonsdale's true identity as Konon Trofimovich Molody. The real Lonsdale was indeed Canadian born, but in 1931, at the age of seven, his mother had taken him back to her native Finland. Here, he fought and died in World War II, whereupon the Soviets stole his identity and used it in 1954 to plant Molody as an agent in the West. Molody had spent part of his childhood and youth in California, but went home to fight for the Soviet Union in World War II, probably serving in the Red Navy. Molody himself maintained that Lonsdale was his real name until his death.

Molody's cover was selling gambling machines and jukeboxes, under which he could travel across Western Europe to organize espionage activity. He was also the contact point of the so-called Portland Spy Ring, whose other members were Harry Houghton, Ethel Gee, and Peter and Helen Kroger (Morris and Lona Cohen). The group was named after their base in Portland Dorset, England. It was in relation to the uncovering of their activity that Molody was arrested by the Special Branch of the Scotland Yard. Upon apprehension, they held classified material originating from the British Admiralty in their possession.

See also: Cohen, Lona (Leontina) and Morris, aka Helen and Peter Kroger; Cold War Intelligence; Wynne, Greville

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Frode Lindgjerdet

LOS ALAMOS

Los Alamos is the secure facility located on an isolated mesa in northern New Mexico that researched, developed, and constructed the first atomic bomb. It was part of the Manhattan Engineer District (the Manhattan Project), a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers program begun (1942) in the belief that Nazi Germany had a two-year lead in the development of nuclear weapons. The isolation facilitated both the scientific interaction of the American and British scientists and technicians as well as security. Though all of the personnel were vetted and stringent security enforced, at least three people are known to have engaged in espionage that sped the development of the Soviet Union's atomic weapons programs: Klaus Fuchs, Theodore Hall, and David Greenglass. Though these spies worked at Los Alamos at the same time, they were unaware of the others' activities. Evidence gleaned (1990s) from the Soviet Union's intelligence and security (KGB) archives and the VENONA files allude to a possible fourth spy code-named Perseus.

Klaus Fuchs, a German communist and theoretical physicist, fled Nazi Germany (1933) for Britain and was interned in Canada as an enemy alien (1940) before being assigned (1943) to the British scientific team working on implosion problems. Fuchs had earlier spied for the Soviets in Britain and that contact was reestablished (1944) through the American chemist, Harry Gold, who served as a Soviet courier in

the 1940s after intermittently spying for them beginning in 1935. Fuchs passed details of implosion and bomb design to Gold in two meetings (Boston and Santa Fe) in February 1945. Fuchs spied again for the Soviets (1947) while head (1946) of the Theoretical Physics Division of Britain's Harwell nuclear facility. British intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were alerted (1949) to Fuchs' espionage by Soviet intelligence cables decrypted by the joint American and British VENONA project. Fuchs confessed (1950), was convicted of espionage, spent 14 years in prison, and moved to East Germany upon his release.

Theodore Hall, a Harvard-educated American physicist involved in the radioactive Lanthanum (RaLa) test instrumentation, volunteered to spy for the Soviets (November 1944) and passed supplemental information confirming Fuchs' espionage. VENONA uncovered (early 1950s) Hall's espionage, but he did not confess at the time; though he did confess later, he was never tried.

David Greenglass, a U.S. Army draftee (April 1943) and Special Engineering Detachment machinist, was initially assigned (July 1944) to Oak Ridge and then Los Alamos (August 1944) where he worked on the shaped charges for the Fat Man implosion bomb. He passed sketches of the implosion lens to Harry Gold (1945) and later claimed to have been recruited into espionage by his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg, to whom he also passed information. His plea-bargained testimony led to the Rosenbergs' execution (June 19, 1953).

See also: Atomic Spy Ring; Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; Gold, Harry; Greenglass, David; Hall, Theodore Alvin; Nunn May, Allan; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel; VENONA

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Richard M. "Rich" Edwards

LOVELL, JAMES
(OCTOBER 31, 1737–JULY 14, 1814)

James Lovell was a cryptanalyst during the war of American independence, credited with the invention of ciphers for encoding official dispatches. Born on October 31, 1737, in Boston, Massachusetts, Lovell was tutored by his father and received a degree from Harvard College in 1756. After a year's extra work in the classics, he joined his father in teaching Latin in Boston. He became an orator, and joined the American rebels in 1775. Arrested by the British for spying, he languished in jail until exchanged in November 1776. Immediately, he was elected to Congress, and spent five continuous years in that body. With his scholarly attributes, he became a key member of various

committees. He quickly emerged as an advocate of independence from Britain, identifying with radicals such as Samuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee.

Among his many responsibilities, Lovell was a regular member of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. He corresponded with diplomats in Europe, sending and receiving official congressional correspondence. As part of his duties, he developed a system of ciphers for encoding official documents and provided recipients in Europe with keys to use in reading and encoding their own messages. In factional congressional disputes, he became a partisan of Arthur Lee, John Adams, and John Jay; he did not trust Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane. He also supported General Horatio Gates in controversies over army command, particularly in 1777. He died in Windham, Maine, on July 14, 1814.

See also: Deane, Silas; Franklin, Benjamin; Jay, John; Lee, Arthur

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Paul David Nelson

LOWE, THADDEUS
(AUGUST 20, 1832–JANUARY 16, 1913)

Thaddeus Lowe was chief of Army Aeronautics during the Civil War from October 1, 1861, until his resignation on May 8, 1863, due to differences with Union Major General Joseph Hooker. Lowe later became an inventor of numerous patents.

Born Thaddeus Sobieski Constantine Lowe in Jefferson Mills, New Hampshire, on August 20, 1832, Lowe achieved recognition for "designing, manufacturing and deploying gas-filled balloons and portable gas generators for the purpose of gathering intelligence" for the Union army. Though serving in a civilian capacity, Lowe was named Chief of Army Aeronautics where he supervised several aeronauts in the use of ballooning and handling gas generators he built.

A self-educated person, he completed only grammar school, Lowe was deeply interested in science. He built his first balloon in 1858. The following year he built a large balloon, the *City of New York*, which he had hoped could cross the Atlantic Ocean. Several trials proved unsuccessful, so he changed the name of his balloon to the *Great Western*. At the same time he continued to seek funds to underwrite his experiment. But he soon realized that the *Great Western* was incapable of flight. With the advice of the secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, Dr. Joseph Henry, Lowe went to Cincinnati, Ohio, with a new balloon named *Enterprise*. On April 19, 1861, he ascended for a flight to the East Coast. Due to unexpected southerly air currents, he ended up near Unionville, South Carolina. Though setting a distance record of more than 900 miles in nine hours, he was promptly arrested by Carolinians who thought he was a Yankee spy. Receiving help from some local academic supporters, Lowe was released and sent back to Ohio.

The outbreak of the Civil War in America led Lowe to offer his services to the Lincoln administration. He believed that aeronautics could be used to gather intelligence by aboveground observation. On June 18, 1861, to prove his point, Lowe lifted off from the Columbian Armory in Washington, DC. The balloon made a number of flights from the armory, the Smithsonian grounds, and the south lawn of the White House. Equipped with a telegraph, he sent Lincoln the following message: "I have pleasure in sending you this first dispatch ever telegraphed from an aerial station . . . " The responsibility for aeronautics as a military intelligence gathering unit was promptly given to the Topographical Engineers.

Despite competition from fellow aeronauts, John Wise and John La Mountain, Lowe emerged as the leading figure for the program. Ordered to produce several balloons, Lowe constructed two large ones, the *Union* and the *Intrepid*, and two smaller ones, the *Constitution* and the *Washington*. Sent to Fort Monroe in support of the Army of the Potomac, Lowe and his trained aeronauts served effectively during Major General McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. What enabled Lowe to assist the Union troops was the ability to telegraph the positions of the Confederates. During his many flights for gathering information, Lowe discovered the evacuation of Yorktown and made important observations during the battle of Fair Oaks in which he was able to distinguish the main attacks from false ones. After contacting malaria on the peninsula, his Balloon Corps lost favor with the army commanders who came after McClellan. After a disagreement with his new supervisor, Captain C. E. Comstock of the Corps of Engineers, one involving a reduction in pay and dismissal of his father from the corps, Lowe resigned on May 8, 1863. In July the Balloon corps was officially disbanded, yet the contributions Lowe made in gathering and relaying information proved valuable to commanders in the field.

After the war Lowe became a successful businessman and inventor. He developed numerous designs for refrigerated shipping and one patent, particularly, was for carbureted water gas. In 1887, Lowe moved to California where he devoted his remaining years to airship design and astronomy. He died on January 16, 1913, a year prior to the outbreak of world war in Europe.

See also: Balloons; Civil War Intelligence; Confederate Signal and Secret Service Bureau

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LUCY SPY RING

The Lucy Spy Ring was an anti-German operation focused on preventing the spread of Fascism during World War II. It provided vital information to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) leaders. The name Lucy Spy Ring is derived from the code name "Lucy" that the leader Rudolf Roessler used for his espionage activities.

Directed by Rudolf Roessler, the Lucy Spy Ring collected information about German operations and strategies. The Lucy Spy Ring consisted of a complex network of contacts and agents including individuals in USSR, British, and Swiss intelligence agencies.

The Lucy Spy Ring consisted of three primary spy networks, and Rudolf Roessler was the key contact connecting these spy networks. Roessler was born on November 22, 1897, in Kaufbeuren, Germany. Before entering the field of espionage Roessler served as manager of a German association of popular theater. While in this position he developed relationships with individuals both liberal and conservative throughout Germany. Additionally, he had contacts in the German military who were sympathetic to the anti-Fascism cause and provided Roessler with critical information.

One network was headed by Sandor Rado who was known by the code name "Alex." He was a Hungarian geographer, born in Budapest in 1899. He joined the Hungarian Red Army when the revolution collapsed and he was forced to flee. While studying geography at a university, he created a highly accurate atlas of the USSR that provided critical information for the Lucy Spy Ring and Allied forces. In 1935 Rado joined the Red Army and moved to Switzerland. His business contacts in the United States and geographical knowledge made him a valuable asset to the Lucy Spy Ring. While serving as an agent in the Lucy Spy Ring, Rado used the cover of running a press specializing in geographic publications. This provided an excellent cover for his travels throughout Europe and the Soviet Union.

Allan Foote headed the second network in the Lucy Spy Ring and first began his career in espionage in the summer of 1947. In the evenings he would then transmit information to his contacts to reach the Soviet government. Rado doubted Foote's loyalty and suspected that Foote was a double agent working for the British intelligence. However, the spy ring continued to heavily rely on him because he continued to provide valuable and reliable information. For Foote's service during World War II he earned the rank of major in the Soviet army and received four official honors.

The third branch was headed by renowned Communist Rachel Dubendorfer. She was motivated by her Communist ideology to prevent the spread of Fascism.

Using existing networks, Roessler contacted Alexander Rado to use contacts in Switzerland by Soviet intelligence. Rado Roessler then passed information to the Soviets. This information was provided to the Soviets on the condition that they would not attempt to identify his sources of information. This was a key condition that protected Lucy Spy Ring agents and their informants. The Lucy Spy Ring communicated with the Soviet Centre, which was the central agency for collecting information and distributing the information to appropriate leaders in Soviet intelligence. In addition to information discovered by Lucy Spy Ring agents sent to Moscow, at times the Soviets requested specific information from the Lucy Spy Ring about their enemy, such as specific information about German military locations.

An example of the critical information the Lucy Spy Ring provided to Soviet leaders is a message provided by the agent Dora. In early August of 1941 Dora sent a message that informed Soviet leaders that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union. Japanese military leaders reached this decision because Germany had not successfully defeated the Soviet Union in any battles. This key information was the basis of the Soviet decision to move forces from areas closest to Japan to those nearer the western front and Moscow. Later these troops were vital to fighting German attacks. This single critical piece of information provided by the Lucy Spy Ring had a substantial impact on the outcome of World War II.

The Lucy Spy Ring commonly encountered problems transmitting information. They relied heavily on radios to transmit their messages to government contacts. During the transition of a crucial message in October of 1941 to Moscow the signal was abruptly cut off. The message was cut off because at this time Moscow was essentially under siege by the German army. It is likely that the contact in the Soviet government receiving the signal was forced to evacuate the building where receivers were located.

Following the military disaster in 1942 in Kharkov, Stalin blamed the USSR Intelligence Centre for misinformation. In response, the Centre blamed its informant the Lucy Spy Ring. With this situation the Lucy Spy Ring lost favor with Moscow. The likely cause of inaccurate information provided by the Lucy Spy Ring was lost contacts within British intelligence. Without these key contacts the Lucy Spy Ring agents were left to their field agents with limited information. Later the Lucy Spy Ring regained support by providing accurate information regarding German troop movements.

Aware of the threat of the Lucy Spy Ring, Germany diligently worked to destroy it. Recognized as a key agent, Foote was also targeted by Germans who repeatedly attempted to kidnap him. When the Swiss government located Lucy Spy Ring transmitters, the spy network was shut down. Several key agents were arrested, including Foote. After shortly being imprisoned, Foote was released after a vague confession.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Kristin Whitehair

LUDWIG, KURT FREDERICK
(1903–)

Kurt Frederick Ludwig was the head of a German spy ring operating in the United States from 1940 to 1941. He was born in 1903 in Ohio, his parents having migrated to the United States in the 1850s. Soon after Kurt was born, the family moved to

Germany and the boy went to school there, and ended up in business in Munich. He was recruited by German intelligence and was arrested by the Austrians in February 1938 after being caught photographing bridges along the Austrian-German border. He was still being held when the Nazis occupied Austria, was immediately released, and then sent to the United States to run an important spy ring.

Trained in Berlin, Ludwig's reports were to be sent by transatlantic clipper to a fictitious couple, through Spain, and directly to Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich using the code names "Manuel Alonzo" and "Lothar Fredreich." On arrival in New York, Ludwig, operating as a salesmen of leather goods, attended some meetings of the German-American Bund, and recruited a number of agents including Paul Theodore Borchardt-Battua, an ex-German army officer who gained the code name "Joe"; Rene Charles Froehlich, an American soldier stationed at Fort Jay, in the middle of New York harbor; Cark Schroetter, a Swiss businessman from Miami; and Karl Mueller, a naturalized American from Austria. Ludwig and Mueller were involved in many clandestine actions getting information from factories. They even walked into the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, where they photographed the cadets and the facilities.

British agents in Bermuda intercepted mail from the United States to Spain and Portugal, and among these were letters from "Joe K," who, using invisible ink, reported on the British soldiers stationed in Iceland and the U.S. bombers sent to Britain. Soon afterwards, on March 18, 1941, a pedestrian was run down while crossing Times Square, New York. He held a Spanish passport with the name Don Julio Lopez Lido. When the FBI searched his room at the Taft Hotel, they found intelligence documents including a report on the defenses at Pearl Harbor. It was not long before the British censors in Bermuda came across a letter referring to the death of "Phil" in Times Square and, realizing that he was an important German agent, had the Americans close in on the spy ring which they quickly learned centered on Ludwig. Ludwig fled New York for Montana and was eventually arrested in Seattle. He was tried in March 1942 and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. In 1953 Ludwig was released and deported.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Justin Corfield

M

MACLEAN, DONALD DUART
(MAY 25, 1913–MARCH 16, 1983)

Donald Maclean (coded-named "HOMER") was a member of the Cambridge Group and an active Committee for State Security (KGB) agent with Kim Philby. He was probably the most productive of all British KGB agents in terms of the volume and quality of the secrets he stole.

The Maclean family was Scottish. Donald's father was a barrister, a knight, a member of Parliament, and a very stern authoritarian person. He compelled Donald to attend a very strict boys' school. After graduating, he entered Cambridge and was initiated into the excesses of alcohol and homosexual practices by Anthony Blunt and Guy Burgess. He was also led into a naive form of Marxism that was exploited by the KGB.

During his Cambridge days, Maclean dreamed of becoming a peasant instructor of English in the Soviet Union. However, Theodore Maly, a KGB agent of Hungarian origins, persuaded him to abandon this dream. Instead he was to blend into the English bureaucratic system and spy.

In 1935 Maclean began working for the Foreign Office. In 1938 he was posted to the British embassy in Paris. In 1940 he was evacuated to London, having given the KGB secrets of both the French and the British. In London he was assigned to the Combined Policy Committee where he had access to some of the Manhattan Project secrets which he promptly gave to the KGB. In 1944 Maclean was transferred to Washington, DC, which provided an intelligence bonanza for the Soviets.

After World War II, the Americans and the British began to decode and translate the huge volume of Soviet intercepts they had accumulated. Soon they realized that HOMER was a major traitor. In 1948 he provided the Soviets with information that revealed American planes carried only conventional bombs and therefore without a full-scale war could not stop the building of the Iron Curtain. In 1950, as head of the

American sector of the British embassy in Washington, he learned that Truman was going to keep the war in Korea limited.

In 1951 Burgess and Maclean were warned by Philby that a code-breaking success was leading investigators to Maclean. Philby contacted their Soviet handlers for extraction. On Friday, May 25, Burgess went to Maclean's home. The two fled to the Soviet Union where they were welcomed, but soon found life unsatisfying.

Maclean was sent to live in the industrial city of Kuibyshev where he worked on an economic magazine. He was joined by his wife and three children; however, unhappy, he turned to alcohol, causing his marriage to be destroyed. He died alone behind the Iron Curtain, a man embittered by his idealistic devotion to a failed cause on March 16, 1983.

See also: Blunt, Anthony; Burgess, Guy Francis De Moncy; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"

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Andrew J. Waskey

MACLEISH, ARCHIBALD
(MAY 7, 1892–APRIL 20, 1982)

Archibald MacLeish was American scholar, poet, librarian of Congress, and intelligence analyst. Born May 7, 1892, in Glenco, Illinois, MacLeish graduated from Yale University in 1915. He enrolled in Harvard Law School in 1916 but interrupted his studies to join the Yale Mobile Hospital Unit in 1917. He later became an artillery officer, commanding a battery during the Second Battle of the Marne.

Following the war, MacLeish returned to Harvard Law, where he graduated first in his class in 1919. He briefly taught government at Harvard before practicing law until 1923, when he turned down an offered partnership to become a poet. MacLeish won his first of three Pulitzer Prizes in 1922 for his poem "Conquistador," about the Spanish conquest of the Aztecs.

During the 1930s MacLeish joined the staff of *Fortune Magazine*. His writing, both poetry and prose, increasingly condemned both Fascism and Communism. During the Depression, he also criticized the excesses of American capitalism and strongly endorsed Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. In 1939 FDR nominated him to be the librarian of Congress.

When Roosevelt's Executive Order 8922 created the Office of Facts and Figures in October 1941, the president's first choice for director was Archibald MacLeish. MacLeish's responsibilities in this role emphasized the dissemination of "white" propaganda about the justice of the Allied cause. When the newly formed Office of War Information absorbed the Office of Facts and Figures in June 1942, MacLeish

became assistant director of OWI. In 1944 he became assistant secretary of state for cultural and public affairs, eventually becoming the head of the U.S. delegation to UNESCO. He retired from government service in 1949 and returned to teaching poetry at Harvard.

See also: Office of Strategic Services

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MAGIC

MAGIC is the code name given to information obtained by breaking into PURPLE, the Japanese cipher machine carrying messages in its most important diplomatic code. PURPLE was broken in 1940 but because the Japanese navy used a different code, JN-25, PURPLE did not provide warning of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It did yield a diplomatic message that was sent to the Japanese embassy in Washington instructing the ambassador to break off diplomatic relations with the United States at 1:00 P.M., December 7, 1941.

The U.S. Army and Navy worked independently of one another in decoding the information from PURPLE intercepts. Each maintained a series of intercept stations and then sent those intercepts to Washington. A significant time lag often took place in transmitting these intercepts. The most common delivery method was by air but on occasion bad flying weather led to the use of ships. Once the messages arrived, the lack of translators again created a bottleneck that slowed the production of intelligence. The navy, for example, had six translators only three of whom were skilled enough in Japanese to work alone. Once translated, the distribution of MAGIC was tightly controlled. The distribution list in January 1941 consisted of nine individuals: the secretary of state, the president's military aide, the secretary of war, the chief of staff, the director of military intelligence, the secretary of the navy, the chief of naval operations, the director of naval intelligence, and the chief of the War Plans Division. The army was responsible for daily deliveries of selected MAGIC to the State Department, War Department, and White House, whereas the navy did likewise for the Navy Department and the White House. After they were read, the material was taken back by messengers.

This limited distribution of MAGIC would later come in for extensive criticism by those who argued a fuller distribution of MAGIC would have allowed for greater coordination in Washington and permitted U.S. officials to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although not rejecting the argument that MAGIC was not distributed widely enough, others counter that MAGIC in and of itself would not have prevented or limited the consequences of the attack. They assert that although 20–20 hindsight does reveal information pointing to the attack, at the time there was information

supporting many different interpretations of Japanese actions. It was only after the attack was it possible to separate out true signals from background noise and clutter.

MAGIC was not the only source of information on Japanese thinking available to military and civilian policy makers before Pearl Harbor. PURPLE was the transmission means used for the highest-ranking diplomatic messages. American cryptanalysts also had access to espionage messages sent in simpler J-19 or PA-K2. Deemed less urgent than PURPLE intercepts, these messages were given secondary priority.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Pearl Harbor; PURPLE

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MAGNUM

MAGNUM is the code name given to a class of signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites launched into a geosynchronous orbit between 1985 and 1990 by the National Reconnaissance Office. MAGNUM satellites have a mass of nearly 6,000 pounds and a large 100-m diameter umbrella-like reflecting dish pointed at Earth to collect signals. There were believed to be three MAGNUM launchings, all by space shuttle missions: January 24, 1985, November 23, 1989, and November 15, 1990. Within the framework of their general SIGINT mission against the Soviet Union and China, MAGNUM satellites also obtained missile test telemetry intelligence (TELINT), radio communications intelligence (COMINT), and radar emissions intelligence (RADINT).

MAGNUM satellites replaced the RHYOLITE/AQUADE and CHALET series of SIGINT satellites. The name of the program itself was changed to ORION by the time of the first launch by the Discovery Space shuttle and the entire program is often referred to by the joint designation MAGNUM/ORION satellites. In turn this program was replaced by MENTOR/Advanced ORION satellites. Three MENTOR launchings took place on Titan IV and Titan IVB rockets from Cape Canaveral between 1995 and 2003: May 14, 1995, May 9, 1998, and September 9, 2003.

It is believed that at least one of the MAGNUM satellites launched in the 1980s is still functioning. With the end of the cold war, the mission for the MAGNUM/ORION and MENTOR satellites has changed. ORION satellites downloaded information directly to receivers in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War. The Australia-based Nautilus Institute, which examined the involvement of Australian

forces and facilities such as the Pine Gap Radar station in supporting the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, reported the use of MENTOR satellites in those conflicts.

See also: CHALET; Cold War Intelligence

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MAK, CHI

Chi Mak, who was born in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1940 and became a naturalized citizen of the United States in June 1985, was sentenced in March 2008 to 24 ½ years in jail on charges that he did not register as an agent of a foreign government (the PRC), conspired to violate export control laws, and made false statements to federal investigators. He was arrested at his home in Downey, California, on October 28, 2005. The same day, his brother, Tai Wang Mak, was arrested at the Los Angeles International Airport.

Mak was employed as an electrical engineer by Power Paragon where he worked on more than 200 U.S. defense and military contracts during his career. Included among them was the navy's highly sensitive Quiet Electric Drive (QED) propulsion system. Mak was charged with taking computer disks home where his wife copied them and delivered the disks to his brother who encrypted them in preparation for a flight to Hong Kong. Mak is also charged with e-mailing photos and reports on the QED system to his home computer.

Mak obtained a secret level security clearance in 1996. Mak was identified as a "sleeper" agent. He admitted to having been sent to the United States more than 20 years before his arrest for the purpose of gaining entry into the defense-industrial establishment in order to steal secrets. Mak had been under investigation for 18 months. Court-ordered wiretaps were obtained to follow his activities. Secret property searches and the clandestine installation of a video camera inside his home were also used to obtain information. Among the shredded documents found in a search of the trash at his residence were two documents urging him to join more professional organizations on topics of particular concern to China. Included among them were space-based electromagnetic intercept systems; space-launched magnetic levitation platforms; submarine torpedoes; aircraft carrier electronic systems; water jet propulsion systems; early warning technologies; and high-frequency, self-linking satellite communications.

In his defense, Mak argued that all of the information he copied was available from nonclassified sources on the Internet and that it therefore was in the public domain. The prosecution argued that the information was export-controlled and could not be shared with foreign nationals without explicit permission.

Other members of Chi Mak's espionage ring included his wife, Rebecca Lai-wah Chiu Mak; his brother, Tai Wang Mak; his brother's wife, Fuk-heung Li; and Tai

and Fuk Li's son, Yui "Billy" Mak. Tai Mak was sentenced to 10 years in prison, Fuk Li was sentenced to three years of probation, and Yui Mak was sentenced to time served. All three members of the family were deported. Rebecca Mak received the same 24-year jail sentence as her husband.

The investigation of Mak's home also revealed the identity of another person engaged in espionage for the PRC, Dongfan Chung, who was arrested on February 12, 2008.

See also: China, Intelligence Operations of; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn. P. Hastedt

MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE

The twenty-first-century U.S. Marine Corps emphasizes the generation of tactical intelligence that facilitates the planning and execution of marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. This downward focus, toward the point where marines are in contact with the enemy, ensures that commanders of marine ground and air units have the maximum amount of relevant intelligence at their fingertips when they are called upon to make informed decisions as to the best use of the assets under their control. The development of Marine Corps intelligence operations during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has led to the integration of the corps' collection and dissemination assets with those of the broader intelligence community, but not at the expense of commanders in the field.

The Marine Corps' appreciation of the importance of intelligence has evolved over time. The nineteenth-century Corps did not have a need for sophisticated intelligence capabilities until the expansion of American interests in the Pacific and its participation in the Spanish-American War led to an increase in the Corps' size and its range of activities. As an adjunct of the "New Navy," the Marine Corps acted as colonial infantry, providing muscle for the imperialistic American foreign policy of the early twentieth century. With this mission in mind, marine and navy planners developed the Advanced Base Concept. It was in the development of this concept that the most famous Marine Corps covert operative, Major Earl "Pete" Ellis, made his name. Ellis' prescience was not typical of Marine Corps intelligence analysis, however. Insertion ashore to develop and defend advanced bases for the navy did call for the development of better intelligence capabilities, but the Corps developed a rudimentary intelligence structure for itself that emphasized the production of tactical intelligence for use by lower-level commanders in the field, relying on the navy for the generation of intelligence above the battalion level. This low-level tactical focus, joined to a reliance on the swift application of massive firepower to make up for any shortfalls in overall intelligence coverage, remained the Marine Corps mind-set concerning the generation and use of intelligence products until the late 1980s.

General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., began to change this mind-set after assuming the office of commandant on July 1, 1987. Gray brought a combination to the job of commandant that was rare in the Marine Corps: he considered himself a "warrior" in the best traditions of the Corps, but he believed in fighting smarter rather than just ratcheting up the level of combat power in the field. His emphasis on brains as well as brawn was most evident in his attitude toward intelligence. Gray had served in an intelligence capacity several times during his career. His experience in the gathering and use of intelligence and his interest in helping the Corps recover its self-confidence and sense of importance after the difficulties of the 1980s led him to establish the USMC Intelligence Center. In a "White Letter" to senior marine officers dated July 27, 1991, Gray explained his intentions: "When I established the . . . Center almost four years ago, I had a clear vision of the need for a Service intelligence center and the functions it would perform . . . [It] is the institutional vehicle by which our Service exploits and augments existing defense intelligence capabilities in order to obtain the all-source tailored intelligence required to make sound decisions about our force structure for the future. . . . I urge each of you to visit the Center, gain an understanding of its capabilities, and return to your command or parent activity prepared to task and exploit this precious Service asset. . . . We have made a substantial investment. Use it!" Gray's work became the foundation upon which the present Marine Corps intelligence structure is built.

Even with all the strides made by Gray, however, the test of combat showed that further improvements were warranted. After the first Persian Gulf War, Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Gray's successor, issued a directive detailing solutions to problems uncovered by an analysis of Marine Corps intelligence during Desert Storm. Six fundamental deficiencies were identified: inadequate doctrinal foundation; no defined career progression for intelligence officers; insufficient tactical intelligence support; insufficient joint manning; insufficient language capability; and inadequate imagery capability. The solution for doctrinal deficiencies addressed more than one problem area. Concerning doctrine, the directive stated that the mission of Marine Corps intelligence was "[to p]rovide commanders, at every level, with tailored, timely, minimum essential intelligence, and ensure that this intelligence is integrated into the operational planning process." It then laid down seven principles considered essential in ensuring effective intelligence support of operations. These principles, modified by further thought and experience, are listed in the 2003 publication *Intelligence Operations*: the focus is on tactical intelligence; intelligence is focused downward to tactical commanders; intelligence drives operations; intelligence activities require centralized management; the G-2/S-2 (staff intelligence officer) facilitates use of intelligence; intelligence must be tailored to the requirements of the user and delivered in a timely fashion; and, finally, utilization, not dissemination, is the final step of the intelligence cycle.

The connection between Marine Corps intelligence and the national security intelligence structure was finally solidified on April 27, 2000, when Commandant General J. L. Jones announced the establishment at Marine Corps Headquarters of an Intelligence Department. Jones stated in his announcement that "the emblematic and practical significance of the Commandant having a 'G2' who can serve as both a proponent of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance inside the combat development process and as the focal point for leveraging intelligence community support for our warfighting

capability." With the elevation of intelligence to the level of USMC Headquarters staff, General Gray's ultimate goal of fighting smarter was realized and the evolution of Marine Corps intelligence was brought full circle. The Marine Corps could now reach out to the intelligence assets of the world and pass the benefits of those assets to tactical commanders in the field.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; Army Intelligence; Code Talkers; Intelligence Community; Office of Naval Intelligence

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Donald K. Mitchener

MARQUAND, JOHN P. (APRIL 10, 1893–JULY 16, 1960)

A prominent American novelist, Marquand wrote a number of spy novels about a fictional "Mr. Moto," some of which were turned into films. John Phillips Marquand was born in Massachusetts and won a scholarship to Harvard University. He served in World War I and then started writing fiction for the *Saturday Evening Post* and other magazines, as well as novels, his most famous being *The Late George Apley* (1937) which won the Pulitzer Prize for fiction in 1938.

Marquand traveled extensively, including to Malaya, Indochina, Mongolia, and Japan, and in 1935 started writing his "Mr. Moto" spy novels. The first was *Your Turn, Mr. Moto*, and the others were: *Thank You, Mr. Moto* (1936), *Think Fast, Mr. Moto* (1937), *Mr. Moto Is So Sorry* (1938), *Last Laugh, Mr. Moto* (1942), and *Right You Are, Mr. Moto* (1957). This led to eight films, the first being *Think Fast, Mr. Moto* (1937) starring Peter Lorre, only loosely based on the novels. The books and films do not have Mr. Moto as the main character—not meant to be a Japanese agent—but as the man who helps the American hero escape from the entanglement with others. The last film had the Moto character removed from the story. Marquand died on July 16, 1960. There was an attempt to revive the character in the film *The Return of Mr. Moto* (1965).

See also: Fiction—Spy Novels; Movies, Spies in

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Justin Corfield

MARSHALL, GENERAL GEORGE CATLETT (DECEMBER 31, 1880–OCTOBER 16, 1959)

George Catlett Marshall was army chief of staff during World War II, secretary of state (1947–1949), secretary of defense at the start of the Korean War, architect of European Recovery Plan named after him, key shaper of U.S. cold war policies, and first professional soldier honored with the Nobel Peace Prize.

Although George C. Marshall is best remembered as the architect of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), he is considered, first and foremost, the creator of the World War II army and the primary organizer of the Allied victory over the Axis powers. Born into a well-to-do family in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, Marshall graduated from Virginia Military Institute in 1902, where he served as first captain of the Corps of Cadets. Upon receiving his commission as a second lieutenant of infantry, Marshall served one year in the Philippines and later graduated with honors from the Infantry-Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth.

Throughout his early years in the military, Marshall demonstrated extraordinary ability as a staff officer. His organizing abilities earned him the praises of his superiors to the extent that he was given numerous responsibilities well beyond his rank. In World War I he was deployed with First Division Units to France. A favorite of the AEF (American Expeditionary Forces) commander, General John J. Pershing, Marshall was assigned to his staff. During the war Marshall played a major role in planning the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. Developing a unique reputation for organizing and operating within Allied commands, he served as First Army's chief of operations in the final weeks of the war.

During the interwar period Marshall served as head of the Infantry School at Fort Benning from 1927 to 1932, training many of the key officers who would compose the U.S. High Command during World War II. In July 1938, Marshall accepted a post with the General Staff in Washington, DC. In September 1939, Marshall was named chief of staff and accorded the rank of general by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was selected for the post over numerous senior officers.

With the start of World War II, Marshall began focusing all his energies on the creation of a large, modern army. Due to his efforts, he reorganized the nation's fighting capacity as well as its intelligence-gathering capabilities. The U.S. military expanded from 175,000 in 1939 to 1.4 million in 1941. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Marshall was responsible for "the building, supplying, and, in part, the deploying of over eight million soldiers." Overseeing highly secretive intelligence and logistic matters, Marshall became the leading figure in the newly

formed U.S. Joint and Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff and later became Roosevelt's chief military adviser.

Involved with top-secret intelligence information, Marshall attended all the Allied wartime summit conferences from Argentina in the summer of 1941 to Potsdam in 1945. Under his guidance he created "the joint and combined chiefs and in the application of the unity of command principle to all U.S. and British ground, naval, and air forces." His most secretive assignment was his participation as a member of the policy committee, the Top Policy Group, which supervised the atomic studies engaged in by American and British scientists. Along with Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Marshall obtained significant funding from Congress—which was told very little about where the money was going—for the top-secret project.

One of Marshall's greatest strategic and planning achievements was his securing approval for the 1944 cross-channel assault culminating in the decisive invasion of Normandy. Roosevelt refused to send him overseas to carry out the invasion. Instead, that assignment fell into the hands of General Eisenhower. So effective was Marshall's efforts in training, planning, and supplying the Allies that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill referred to him as the "true organizer of victory." He became only one of a handful of five-star generals when Congress established such rank in 1944.

From 1947 to 1949, Marshall served as secretary of state. In this position he was responsible for "defining, implementing, and winning bipartisan support for an activist cold war policy of containing Soviet expansionism." The European Recovery Program, named after him, saw Congress earmark more than $13 billion for the reconstruction and rebuilding of the devastated countries in Europe. He also played a major role in the formation of West Germany. When the Korean War broke out, despite some health issues, he acceded to President Truman's wishes and assumed the post of secretary of defense from 1950 to 1951. In this capacity he rebuilt U.S. military forces; played a key role in the controversial relief of General Douglas MacArthur, accused of being soft on Communism by followers of Senator Joe McCarthy; pushed a plan for universal military training; and helped establish a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Marshall was a strong defender of U.S. military interests, but his diplomatic savvy encouraged him to seek peaceful solutions despite cold war hostilities. In 1953, for his efforts in this regard, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the only professional soldier to receive such distinction. Considered by most one of the world's greatest soldier-statesmen, Marshall was "one of the foremost defenders of civilian control of the military" and a major policy maker regarding the army's proper role in a democratic society. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

See also: American Intelligence; Office of Policy Coordination; Office of Strategic Services

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Charles F. Howlett

MARTIN, RICHARD H., AND BERNON MITCHELL

Richard H. Martin was an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA) who, along with his colleague Bernon F. Mitchell, defected to the Soviet Union in 1960. At a Moscow press conference on September 6, 1960, they revealed information about the mission, workings, and operations of the NSA that had not been known publicly before.

Martin and Mitchell first met at the Naval Security Group in Alaska in the early 1950s. They remained friends after their tour of duty ended and both joined the NSA in September 1957. Martin and Mitchell showed few signs of disaffection with their jobs until 1959 when they became aware of U.S. electronic intelligence over fights over Soviet territory. They were sufficiently disturbed by what they saw as reckless behavior by the Untied States that they arranged to talk with Representative Wilbur Mills about their concerns. Mills listened but did little with the information. At that point the two apparently began to consider defecting to the Soviet Union as a means of highlighting their concerns.

On June 25, 1960, the two of them flew from Washington, DC, to Mexico City. From there they made their way to Havana and on to Moscow where they held a press conference revealing to the existence of NSA. Beyond the highly unfavorable publicity generated by their defection and the light it shined on the NSA, it is uncertain how much information of significance they were able to pass on to the Soviet Union since by all accounts they did not have access to highly classified information.

Their defection became the subject of a House Committee on Un-American Activities investigation as well as internal NSA inquiries. The explanation that became popularized in the media was that Martin and Mitchell were homosexuals. Consistent with this explanation, NSA soon dismissed some 26 employees suspected of being security risks because of their sexual orientation. Later studies suggested that evidence against Martin and Mitchell on this point was weak. This explanation, it is argued, was seized upon as a way of casting doubts on them as individuals and keeping the image of the intelligence community intact.

Reportedly both considered their defections to have been a mistake and began exploring ways of returning to the United States. They were unsuccessful in this. Mitchell died in Moscow on November 12, 2001. Martin died in Mexico on January 17, 1987.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; National Security Agency

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Glenn P. Hastedt

MARTIN, ROBERT M.

Robert M. Martin was a Confederate agent who coordinated a plot to terrorize and then capture New York City by setting fires throughout the city in 1864. The plot was devised by Jacob Thompson, a Confederate sympathizer based in Canada and supported by Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate secretary of state. A small team of Confederate agents, led by Colonel Martin, was to set fire to the city's hotels as a signal to Confederate sympathizers to rise up and seize New York City before the elections. Martin arrived in New York but found that a mole had revealed the plot to U.S. authorities and that soldiers were stationed throughout the city. As a result, the plotters had to postpone their attack until after the elections.

Martin faced reluctance on the part of Confederate sympathizers in New York, and therefore did not execute his plan until November 25, when he received word of the burning of Atlanta. That evening, he and his men set around 30 buildings and several ships on fire. The federal authorities, helped by informants, closed in rapidly. Although Martin and nearly all of his men escaped, several of their collaborators were arrested and one member of his team, Robert Kennedy, was captured and later hung.

Martin made his way from Canada through the United States after his escape, and attempted, without success, to abduct Vice President Andrew Johnson in Louisville. He was captured near the war's end, but never charged with a crime. He became a tobacco merchant and lived until 1900, dying in a New York hospital.

See also: Civil War Intelligence

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James L. Erwin

MASTERMAN, SIR JOHN
(JANUARY 12, 1891–JUNE 6, 1977)

Sir John Cecil Masterman was the chairman of the Twenty Committee during World War II, which ran the "Double-Cross System"—German spies captured in Britain were given the choice of either being executed or turning into double agents.

John Masterman was educated at the Royal Naval Colleges of Osborne and Dartmouth, and then studied Modern History at Worcester University. When World War I broke out, he was working at the University of Freiburg in Germany on an exchange, and spent four years in a prisoner-of-war camp where he became fluent in German. Returning to England, Masterman was a tutor of modern history at Christ Church, Oxford, and also a keen cricketer, and played tennis and field hockey.

In 1933 Masterman wrote a novel called *An Oxford Tragedy*, in which an Oxford University tutor is found murdered and the crime is solved by a Viennese lawyer and his assistant, an Oxford don. The book is seen as the first of the Oxford-based crime novels which gained popularity under Michael Innes.

When World War II broke out, Masterman became chairman of the Twenty ("XX") Committee which had the task of dealing with German agents captured in Britain. As such, it was responsible for feeding false information to the Germans, initially on air bases. This caused the Germans to divert their attacks from important bases to others which had few or no supplies. The main effort, later in the war, was in Operation Fortitude, persuading the Germans that the main attack on D-Day in 1944 would be on the region around the Pas de Calais, not Normandy. That was regarded as the greatest success of the committee's work.

After the war, Masterman returned to academia as provost of Worcester College from 1946 until 1961 and vice chancellor of Oxford University from 1957 to 1958. In 1957 he wrote his second novel, *The Case of the Four Friends*, in which a crime is "pre-constructed," an approach which was novel. Masterman was knighted in 1959. He wanted to write about the Double-Cross System and when he asked Roger Hollis in 1961, permission was refused. After the unveiling of the Cambridge Spy Ring in the 1960s, Masterman again asked whether he could publish about his wartime exploits in order to increase the morale in British intelligence. This was again rejected, and in 1970 he approached Yale University Press to publish in the United States. Norman Holmes Pearson of Yale University, who had served with the Twenty Committee as the wartime head of the counterintelligence division of the OSS, although not as a member of the committee itself, was keen on the book which was finally published in 1972 with several passages deleted. Masterman died on June 6, 1977.

See also: Double-Cross System; Fiction—Spy Novels; Office of Strategic Services

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Glenn P. Hastedt

MATA HARI (MARGARETHA ZELLE MACLEOD) (AUGUST 7, 1876–OCTOBER 15, 1917)

Falsely known as a spy for the Germans in World War I, Mata Hari was born Margaretta Gertrude Zelle on August 7, 1876, in Leeuwarden, Netherlands. "Mata Hari" (the sun at dawn) was her stage name. In 1905, when she took Paris by storm as an exotic dancer, Mata Hari claimed to have been born in the Dutch East Indies and raised as a sacred dancer in a Hindu temple. In reality she had married at age 18 to Captain Rudolph (John) MacLeod of the Netherlands Colonial army, 20 years her senior, and moved with him to the Indies. The marriage ended badly, and they separated. With no other means of livelihood, she went to Paris, became a dancer and courtesan, and invented the striptease.

Never a good dancer, Mata Hari was, however, an extraordinary courtesan. One of her biographers claimed that she slept with lovers "on an almost industrial scale." Reportedly her conquests included both French diplomat Jules Cambon and Crown Prince Wilhelm of Germany.

During World War I, Mata Hari was brought to trial in Paris, accused of spying for the Germans, and was convicted on little real evidence and executed in 1917. (Library of Congress)

Mata Hari was in Berlin when World War I began, but was not recruited there as a German agent as later charged. Indeed, the Germans seized her possessions, and she returned to Amsterdam penniless. Traveling to Paris, she came under immediate suspicion as a German agent. Confronted in 1916 by Georges Ladoux, the chief of French counterintelligence, she agreed to work for the French for money, so that she might marry the love of her life, Vladimir de Masloff, a young Russian officer whom she met in France. De Masloff was 21; Mata Hari had just reached 40.

The British knew nothing about her dealings with French officials, and mistakenly confused her with a real German spy, taking her off a Channel ship when she tried to reach Germany by sea. Ladoux took the British mix-up as proof of her guilt. Mata Hari ended up in Spain where she endeavored to win over a German diplomat who was in charge of a spy network in Barcelona. He saw through her efforts and fed her stale information. He also hatched a plan to deal with her, sending a message to be intercepted by the French, implicating her as a German agent.

Mata Hari returned to France to report to Ladoux. She was arrested on February 13, 1917. Incompetence and duplicity on the part of French and British counterintelligence officers, and the situation in France (1917 was the low point in the war for the Entente), were the chief factors in her conviction of July 25, 1917, as a German agent. Mata Hari protested her innocence and died bravely before a French firing squad at Vincennes on October 15, 1917.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I

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Spencer C. Tucker

McCARTHY, JOSEPH (NOVEMBER 14, 1908–MAY 2, 1957)

In 1952 Senator Joseph McCarthy became chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations and headed its subcommittee on Investigations. He used those positions to launch what is commonly described as a witch hunt for Communist sympathizers within the government. He was known for his bullying tactics, deceit, and loose use of facts. McCarthy left the Senate in disgrace. McCarthy was born in Wisconsin. His first foray into politics was an unsuccessful bid for district attorney as a Democrat. In his next attempt he was elected as a circuit judge. The election was nonpartisan. McCarthy won handily in an election in which he misrepresented facts about the incumbent. McCarthy joined the military in 1942 in hopes of laying a foundation that would advance his postwar political career. For most of the war he served as an intelligence officer and saw minimum combat duty. In his political campaigns he would embellish this record to make it appear he was a war hero. In 1946 McCarthy pulled off a stunning upset of Republican Senator Robert La Follette, Jr., in the primary and went on to win

election to the Senate. Both campaigns were marked by innuendo and falsehoods on McCarthy's part. McCarthy accomplished little his first term.

With his reelection campaign in the offing, McCarthy made his most famous speech on February 7, 1950, in Wheeling, West Virginia. He boldly announced that he had in his possession the names of 205 known Communists in the State Department. The allegations were not new; they had first been raised in 1946 and were investigated with some 79 people being fired. Spies were known to exist in and outside of the State Department. Alger Hiss had recently been convicted for perjury and Klaus Fuchs confessed to sending atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. Moreover, McCarthy did not have such a list nor was he an expert on espionage. His allegations created a sensation due to their timing. China had "fallen" to the Communists; Russia had exploded an atomic bomb; and the Korean War was on the horizon. The country was looking for answers as to why U.S. security was threatened and the specter of spies from within provided a comforting answer.

Emboldened by the positive public response to his charges, McCarthy went on the offensive. He referred to Secretary of State Dean Acheson as the "Red Dean of Fashion" and called Secretary of Defense George Marshall a traitor. Republican senators who had once shunned him now urged him on, hoping to weaken the Truman administration. McCarthy's first series of public hearings into Communist influence within the government were held in 1953 and produced little that was newsworthy. Hearings held in the fall of that year would accomplish all that McCarthy hoped. He now targeted the army for harboring a spy ring at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and for coddling Communists. Army officials were constantly on the defensive and McCarthy pressed his case.

By spring 1954, however, the political tide had turned against McCarthy. Republican leaders expressed concern about the impact of "McCarthyism" on what was now a Republican foreign policy bureaucracy and President Dwight Eisenhower who had resisted engaging in "politics" with McCarthy was now angry with McCarthy and wished to see him stopped. In April 1954 the Senate held 36 days of televised hearings into McCarthy's conflict with the army. They proved to be McCarthy's undoing as he came across to the American public not as a defender of freedom but a bully. In December 1954 the Senate censured McCarthy for bringing "dishonor and disrepute" to that body by a vote of 67–22. Just as rising cold war tensions had earlier helped McCarthy, they now conspired against him. The Korean War had ended, Joseph Stalin had died, and European postwar economic recovery was under way. The world no longer appeared to be quite as threatening. McCarthy was now politically isolated within the Senate and died on May 2, 1957, in a Bethesda, Maryland, military hospital of hepatitis reportedly brought on by alcoholism.

See also: Chambers, Whittaker; Cold War Intelligence; Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; Hiss, Alger

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Glenn P. Hastedt

McCONE, JOHN A.
(JANUARY 4, 1902–FEBRUARY 14, 1991)

John Alex McCone was the sixth Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) serving under Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson from November 19, 1961 to April 28, 1965. Born in San Francisco, he received a BS degree from the University of California–Berkeley in 1922. An engineer, McCone went into the steel and construction businesses. He founded the Bechtel-McCone construction company and the California Shipbuilding Corporation, enterprises which made him a millionaire. McCone first entered government service in 1947 as a member of the President's Air Policy Commission. From there he went on to become deputy secretary of defense, undersecretary of the air force, and chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Kennedy appointed McCone to succeed DCI Allen Dulles, whose career had become tarnished by the failed Bay of Pigs operation. The choice was largely political. McCone was known to be a hard-line anti-Communist and a Republican. He was also an outsider to intelligence.

McCone was far more interested in intelligence analysis and technical intelligence collection than was Dulles, who considered himself the classic "spymaster." He was also a skilled manager both inside the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and within the broader intelligence community. Among his most significant administrative moves in the area of espionage was to create the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology and to increase CIA decision-making power with regard to the operation of the National Reconnaissance Office.

Two episodes in intelligence analysis marked McCone's tenure as DCI. The first was the Cuban Missile Crisis where McCone correctly asserted that the Soviet Union was trying to build up a missile presence in Cuba. Photographic intelligence obtained by U-2 overflights of Cuba played a key role in supporting McCone's argument and guiding U.S. decision making during the crisis. The second episode involved Vietnam estimates. Here McCone was less optimistic than Johnson over the prospects for victory. Conflicts with Johnson in the form of unsupportive intelligence estimates caused him to be seen as a naysayer and would lead to his removal in favor of Admiral William Rayborn. In fact, virtually from the outset McCone and Johnson had failed to connect personally. Where he had easy access to Kennedy, McCone was now kept at a distance and excluded from key Vietnam decision-making bodies.

After resigning, McCone returned to private business. He would go on to serve on the Board of Directors of International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT). From this post in May 1970 he approached DCI Richard Helms about the possibility of a joint CIA-ITT venture to prevent the election of Socialist Party candidate Salvadore Allende to the Chilean presidency. ITT was one of many American firms who had major investments in Chile and were distressed by the possibility of an Allende victory. McCone offered Helms $1 million to carry out a covert action to stop Allende.

Anaconda Copper had already offered $500,000 for this purpose. Uncertain of the prospects for success of such an operation, Helms declined the money but provided them with contacts in Chile to help them in their cause. This did not mean an end to the CIA's involvement, as President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had formulated their own plans for accomplishing this same end and Helms was carrying that plan out.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Chile, CIA Operations in; Cuban Missile Crisis; Director of Central Intelligence; Helms, Richard McGarrah; Johnson Administration and Intelligence; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; U-2 Incident

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Glenn P. Hastedt

McCONNELL, VICE ADMIRAL JOHN (JULY 26, 1943–)

Retired Vice Admiral John Michael McConnell was the second Director of National Intelligence (DNI) holding that position under President George W. Bush from February 20, 2007, and into the first seven days of the Obama administration. McConnell previously served as director of the National Security Agency from 1992 to 1996 and before that as the intelligence officer for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

McConnell's tenure as DNI was marked by the promulgation of two major initiatives for improving cooperation among the members of the intelligence community. The first, the 100 Day Plan, established six priorities: (1) creating a culture of collaboration, (2) fostering collection and analytical transformation within the intelligence community, (3) building acquisition excellence and technology leadership, (4) modernizing business practices, (5) accelerating information sharing, and 6) clarifying and aligning the DNI's authorities. The 100 Day Plan was declared a success.

It was followed by the announcement of a second, 500 Day Plan. Whereas the 100 Day Plan was meant to jump-start progress in the above areas, the 500 Day Plan was designed to sustain the gains made and broaden the collaborative process now under way. It contained nine initiatives. They were (1) treat diversity as a strategic mission imperative, (2) implement a civilian intelligence community joint duty program, (3) enhance information-sharing practices, (4) create a collaborative environment for intelligence analysis, (5) establish National Intelligence Coordination Centers, (6) implement an acquisition improvement plan, (7) modernize the security clearance process, (8) better align budget and capabilities through an enhanced management

system, and (9) update policy documents pertaining to authority within the intelligence community. McConnell left the position of DNI before the 500 days had been reached.

McConnell also worked on Vision 2015 as DNI. This plan sought to lay the foundation for a new twenty-first-century intelligence enterprise for the U.S. government based on the principles of integration, collaboration, and innovation. It was made public in July 2008.

See also: Director of National Intelligence; Intelligence Community; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

MEHALBA, AHMED FATHY
(1973–)

On January 10, 2005, Ahmed Fathy Mehalba pled guilty to lying to government agents and removing classified documents. Initially Mehalba denied having stolen classified material but in January 2005 he changed his plea to guilty. On February 20, 2005, Mehalba was sentenced to 20 months in prison and given time off for the 17 months he already served. Mehalba was released from prison on March 10, 2005.

Mehalba was born in Egypt, immigrated to the United States in 1992, and became an American citizen in 1999. After holding a variety of jobs, having a marriage end in divorce, and filing for bankruptcy, Mehalba joined the army military intelligence program as an interrogator. He received a medical discharge due to depression in May 2001. In 2002 Mehalba was hired as a translator by Titan Corporation that provides "comprehensive information and communication products, solutions, and services for national Security." He was sent to Guantanamo Bay. After-the-fact analysis indicated that major security breaches occurred at Guantanamo Bay as regular checks of contract employees did not occur.

On September 29, 2003, upon returning from visiting his family in Egypt, one of whom, an uncle, worked for Egyptian intelligence, Mehalba was detained by U.S. customs agents at Logan Airport, Boston. In his possession they found over 100 computer disks in his possession. One of them contained 725 documents, 368 of which were classified FBI, CIA, Justice Department, and Defense Department documents classified as SECRET or SECRET/NOFORN. Mehalba indicated that he had no idea how these documents got onto the disk. Later he would assert it was an innocent mistake brought about by being overly zealous about his job, wanting to do work at home. Additionally Mehalba sold a personal computer used at Guantanamo Bay. It was recovered and found to contain classified documents on the hard drive.

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See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

MENDEZ, ANTONIO J.
(1940–)

Antonio J. Mendez became a pioneer of disguise in espionage during his career with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). At the CIA he developed new disguise techniques that were used in numerous CIA operations during the cold war.

In 1940 Mendez was born in Eureka, Nevada. He briefly attended the University Colorado at Boulder and then married Karen Smith. In 1965 Mendez was recruited by Richard Ryman to duplicate documents from foreign countries after responding to a newspaper advertisement.

In this position he developed his skills duplicating documents and eagerly pursued foreign assignments. In 1967 his first overseas assignment stationed him in Okinawa, Japan. During his time in Okinawa, Mendez met "Jacob Jordan" who was known as an expert disguise artist in the CIA. While working with Jordan, Mendez further developed his artistic skills creating disguises.

In 1974 he returned to the United States as the CIA chief of disguise. Motivated by the conviction that realistic disguises allowed for critical face-to-face meetings between informers and agents, Mendez lobbied for increased support of his projects. Mendez used disguise techniques and materials originally developed for use in motion pictures in his CIA operations.

In February of 1976 Mendez arrived in Moscow for the first of his repeated visits. While in Moscow he collected information about KGB surveillance practices and developed tactics to evade their watch, primarily using disguises that could easily and quickly be applied and removed. This information was critical to the development of standard procedures for U.S. agents in the USSR.

In 1979 he was promoted to the CIA deputy of authentication. In recognition of Mendez's significant contributions to the CIA, Mendez received the Intelligence Star, the second-highest CIA valorous declaration, in May of 1980. In November of 1990, ending a career of 25 years at the CIA, Mendez retired. After retirement, Mendez acted as an advisor to the International Spy Museum located in Washington, DC.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Kristin Whitehair

MERRY, ANTHONY (AUGUST 2, 1756–JUNE 14, 1835)

British minister to the United States during Thomas Jefferson's presidency, Anthony Merry supported Aaron Burr's western conspiracy by requesting British assistance from 1804 to 1806. Merry, born in London, keenly watched American politics and the possibility that the United States might divide along sectional lines. Others too were waiting to pounce, including Vice President Aaron Burr, who asked Merry for British assistance in 1804. Burr's conspiracy was to separate the Trans-Appalachian west from the United States, and lead a filibustering expedition against Spanish Mexico. Burr told Merry that many western citizens desired independence and would welcome the British. He recommended the British send him two or three frigates to protect New Orleans and he asked for a 100,000-pound loan.

However, the British never responded to Aaron Burr's requests. Soon the conspiracy had leaked, and the press questioned Burr's western activities. In December 1805, Jefferson received an anonymous letter warning of Burr's activities and the possible involvement of Merry. In June 1806, Burr called on Merry again, but by this point it was too late. Merry realized the British would not help Burr. Although Merry's involvement was not deemed inappropriate, later Jefferson partially blamed Merry for the deterioration in American-British relations. By the end of 1806 Merry returned to England. He continued to serve the Foreign Office and died in 1835 in Dedham, England.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage

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Cynthia A. Boyle

MEXICAN SPY COMPANY

The Mexican Spy Company was an organization of disaffected Mexicans who served the U.S. Army as scouts, translators, and antiguerrilla forces during the Mexican-American War. After the war, many of the Spy Company's members took refuge in the United States. The Mexican Spy Company was largely the work of one man,

Manuel Domínguez. Domínguez started in life as a weaver, but joined a bandit gang after his goods were stolen on the road by a Mexican officer. Domínguez soon rose to lead the band. In the years before the Mexican-American War, Domínguez's men dominated the road between Puebla and Mexico City. They lived by robbing travelers on the road and exacting tolls for safe passage.

When American forces arrived in Puebla during their invasion of Mexico, Domínguez was arrested. He offered his services to the U.S. Army, and was given his first assignment as a courier on June 5, 1847. After the Americans gained confidence in his skill and reliability, Domínguez was allowed to recruit men from the Puebla jail and form the Mexican Spy Company. The Company's original mission was to act as couriers and scouts. Much of the American invasion route from Puebla to Mexico City was reconnoitered by the Spy Company. Soon, Domínguez was tasked with suppressing guerrilla resistance to the U.S. Army.

In September of 1847, Mexico's President Santa Anna offered a pardon and a substantial reward to Domínguez and his men. The pardon was on the condition that they use their position of trust to sabotage the American offensive. Domínguez instead handed the pardon to his commanding officer, Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock.

Domínguez acted under the direct supervision of a Virginian officer named Spooner, who had also run an outlaw group in Mexico before the war and who had volunteered to join the U.S. Army. The Spy Company was extremely efficient at discovering and capturing anti-American guerrillas, as they had an unmatched knowledge of the countryside around Puebla.

Captured guerrillas and Mexican troops were sometimes given the choice of joining Domínguez, but others were summarily executed. Domínguez gained an infamous reputation from one instance when he captured a Mexican detachment and prepared to execute his 50 prisoners. An American observer, Dr. Elisha Kane, prevented the execution but received several sword wounds in the process. The attack erased any goodwill the Spy Company had earned.

At the conclusion of the war, Domínguez and his men were removed from Mexico. Domínguez, who ended the war as a colonel, arrived at New Orleans and was soon living in abject poverty. Despite appeals by Domínguez and Hitchcock, Congress refused to take up the cause of compensating the Spy Company for their services. In 1856, Congress passed a law granting homestead lands to veterans of the Mexican War, but Domínguez and his men were not recognized as veterans. Most of the Spy Company ended up settling in southern Texas, where they lived out their lives in anonymity.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage; Hitchcock, Ethan Allen

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James L. Erwin

MEYER, CORD, JR.
(NOVEMBER 10, 1920–MARCH 13, 2001)

Cord Meyer, Jr., was a career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer who spent most of his career involved in covert operations. Meyer came to intelligence work in 1949 when he joined the Office of Policy Coordination. By that time he has established himself as a supporter of world federalism but was now becoming disillusioned with the promises of world government although he continued to be involved in its causes, founding the Committee to Frame a World Constitution. In 1951 he joined the CIA and became active in counterintelligence operations. One of those he was linked to was Operation MOCKINGBIRD, an effort by the CIA to influence reporting on it by the U.S. news and motion picture industries.

Another important part of Meyer's early CIA career was his work as head of the International Organizations Division which was the clandestine point of contact with left-wing academic, trade, and political organizations in Western Europe. Later he would supervise Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Closer to home, Meyer's area of expertise put him in contact with such groups as the National Student Organization, the National Education Association, and the Congress of Cultural Freedom. It was not long, however, before Meyer's earlier political views and CIA operations drew the attention of Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover and Senator Joseph McCarthy, who accused him of being a Communist. These allegations were effectively rebuffed by Meyer and the CIA. Progressing through the ranks, Meyer would serve as head of the Covert Action Staff of the directorate of plans, assistant deputy director of plans, and CIA station chief in London before retiring in 1977 for a career as a syndicated columnist.

Meyer's career at the CIA has also become a source of controversy due to events in his personal life. His first wife, Mary Pincohet Meyer, had an affair with President John Kennedy and was shot to death on October 12, 1964, in a crime that was never solved. After the tragedy, James Jesus Angleton, head of the CIA's counterintelligence operations, was discovered in her home looking for her diary. These events have given rise to rumors that Meyer was involved in Kennedy's assassination.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Kennedy Assassination; MOCKINGBIRD, Operation; Office of Policy Coordination

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Glenn P. Hastedt

MI-5 (THE SECURITY SERVICE)

MI-5, also known as the Security Service, is the United Kingdom's counterintelligence and security agency. Responsible for protecting the United Kingdom from threats against national security, MI-5, along with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI-6),

and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) are all under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee. MI-5 and British intelligence have long had a close relationship with the United States in intelligence gathering from World War II and the cold war to the war on terrorism after the events of September 11, 2001.

MI-5 came into existence in 1909 and was first known as the Secret Service Bureau. It was created to help combat Imperial Germany's espionage operations in the United Kingdom on the eve of World War I. Under the leadership of Major Vernon Kell, MI-5 successfully identified and arrested several German spies, including Frederick Gould, and destroyed a German spy ring. During the war, MI-5 continued to identify and detain German spies in the United Kingdom. After the war, the growing threat of Nazism, Fascism, Communism, and Irish nationalism posed a different threat to the United Kingdom. Several British citizens became Fascists and Communists and MI-5 monitored them before and during World War II.

During World War II, MI-5, under the umbrella of the British Security Coordination, had a presence in the United States even before the United States joined the war with its base in New York City. The American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA, and MI-5 pooled together their intelligence gathering, helping to uncover spies, collaborating on different operations, and, in one instance, thwarting a Nazi kidnapping plot in the United States. British and American intelligence's biggest collaboration was Operation Fortitude, part of Operation Bodyguard, which was the deception surrounding the Normandy invasion in 1944. MI-5 supplied a double agent named Juan Pujol, code-named "Garbo," who deceived the German High Command by misleading them into believing the invasion would occur at areas other than Normandy. MI-5 also enacted a unique program called the Double-Cross System, which turned captured German agents into British double agents. This highly successful operation played a major role in the victorious deception surrounding the Normandy invasion.

After the war, MI-5 focused its attention on the Soviet Union and the Cold war. In 1947 or 1948, the UK and U.S. intelligence organizations, along with Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, formed the highly secret UKUSA agreement. Called ECHELON and still in effect today, this alliance enables each country's intelligence organization to have shared satellite technology access or SIGINT. Secrecy still surrounds this agreement, with many countries refusing to acknowledge their participation.

In 1952, during his second term as prime minister, Winston Churchill undertook significant internal reforms within MI-5. Personal responsibility for the organization went to Home Secretary Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who placed MI-5 on a statutory footing until 1989.

During the postwar years, the relationship between the American and British intelligence services and the British evolved into one of necessity rather than sentiment. The Soviet Union's penetration into MI-5 and other British intelligence services combined with the massive amount of defections contributed to an already tense relationship.

In particular, the Cambridge Spy Ring delivered a crushing blow to British and American intelligence. Before World War II, the Soviet Union recruited five affluent students from Cambridge with the intention of placing them in prestigious civil service jobs in an effort to infiltrate British intelligence.

One of the "Magnificent Five," as they were dubbed, Harold "Kim" Philby was part of a British-American intelligence cooperative operation. In 1949, he was stationed in Washington, DC, and gained access to CIA and FBI files. He also was privy to the VENONA project intercepts, allowing him to tell the Soviets of the U.S. efforts to break their codes. He also monitored how much the United States knew of the Soviet spy networks in the United States and passed on this information, as well.

For some time, another of the five, Donald Maclean, had been under MI-5 surveillance, but they acted too late. He worked at the British embassy in Washington, DC, and was able to tell the Soviet Union about Anglo-America policy. He was also privy to highly classified atomic secrets which he passed on to the Soviet Union.

MI-5 and the CIA continued to battle Soviet espionage, especially in terms of atomic secrets. The Cambridge Five caused remarkable damage to both the United Kingdom and the United States not only in terms of classified information lost, but also to their relationship. After Philby's defection to the Soviet Union in 1965, Great Britain and the United States only shared limited information with each other for the next decade.

The Suez Crisis in 1956 only exacerbated the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States, exposing the holes in the British and American policy machine. But the crisis served to show the balance of power shifting from Europe and Great Britain to the United States and the USSR. This signaled a significant decline in the British Empire and reduced the United Kingdom and United States' already rocky relationship to strictly business.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, MI-5 and American intelligence began to focus on counterterrorism. Middle Eastern terrorist groups continued to plague MI-5 and the United States, but MI-5 also had to worry about Northern Ireland and the IRA.

After the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the United States opened an ongoing discussion of forming an intelligence agency very similar to MI-5. Due to the large-scale attack of 9/11, government funding for MI-5 was substantially increased. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre was created to analyze and assess international terrorism, and the two countries have continued their business relationship. MI-5 continues to work closely with the American CIA and the FBI in the fight against terrorism.

See also: Bletchley Park; Blunt, Anthony; Burgess, Guy Francis De Moncy; ECHELON; Government Communications Headquarters; MacLean, Donald Duart; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); MI-8 (British Radio Service); Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"; UKUSA; VENONA

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Melissa A. Marsh

MI-6 (SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE)

The Secret Service Bureau was founded in 1909 as Britain's prime intelligence agency under the leadership of Commander (later Captain) Mansfield Cumming. The Foreign Section of the Bureau, responsible for gathering intelligence outside Britain, expanded steadily and in 1920 became known as Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), or MI-6 (MI referring to military intelligence). The SIS today is an essential component of Britain's national intelligence machinery.

The rise of German naval and military power in the years leading up to World War I proved worrisome to British leaders who needed accurate intelligence on German strengths and weaknesses. The Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau was created in 1909 to provide accurate intelligence from foreign sources to the British government. During World War I the Foreign Section, increasingly known as the Secret Intelligence Service, developed networks of agents in German-occupied areas of France and Belgium, making an invaluable contribution to the war effort.

After the war ended Captain Mansfield Cumming made sure that the SIS would not be dismantled. During the 1920s the SIS focused on the activities of the USSR and the Communist International (Comintern), which were believed to pose a major threat to Britain and the empire. However, the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s forced the SIS to refocus on Germany once again. The Nazi conquest of Western Europe in 1940 meant that the SIS lost most of its sources of human intelligence. SIS intelligence networks had to be painfully rebuilt from the ground up during the years of Nazi occupation in Europe. The SIS also supervised the work of the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park during World War II. At the Bletchley Park location Allied code breakers decrypted intercepts from the German Enigma enciphering machine. The decrypts, known as Ultra, were distributed to Allied commanders during the war.

During the years of the cold war the SIS focused on the threat posed by the USSR. The SIS was challenged with providing accurate intelligence during the many crises of that long conflict. More controversially, the SIS was also involved in a range of covert activities, ranging from an early, clumsy attempt to overthrow the Bolsheviks in Russia to a more successful role in overthrowing the government of Iran in 1953 (Operation Boot). Since the end of the cold war, the SIS has dealt with a variety of issues including terrorism, international crime, and regional instability. The SIS has most recently been the subject of criticism for its part that led up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The role of the SIS was formally defined by the Intelligence Services Act of 1994. SIS headquarters are located at Vauxhall Cross, central London.

See also: Bletchely Park; MI-5 (The Security Service)

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Paul W. Doerr

MI-8 (BRITISH RADIO SERVICE)

Military Intelligence, Section 8 (MI-8) was the label attached to the British Radio Security Service (RSS) during World War II. It was set up in 1939 as a department within the Directorate of Military Intelligence within the War Department. The need for MI-8 stemmed from the need to identify German agents in Great Britain who were communicating with German intelligence officials through illegal wireless stations.

In order to accomplish its mission Major J. P. G. Worlledge recruited voluntary interceptors throughout Great Britain who scanned the airwaves for evidence of such communications. Within three months a staff of 50 voluntary interceptors had identified over 600 transmitters, none of which originated in Great Britain.

MI-8 continued to intercept communications even after its initial mission of identifying possible Germany spies in Great Britain had passed. So successful was it at gathering this information and even at breaking its codes that control over MI-8 was transferred to MI-6 in 1941. Up until this time MI-6 had lacked its own communication interception ability. The merger of these two organizations is seen has having contributed greatly to Great Britain's decoding of the Enigma cipher in December 1941.

See also: Bletchley Park; MI-5 (The Security Service); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service)

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MI-8 (U.S., CIPHER BUREAU)

More popularly known today as the Black Chamber, MI-8 was the Cables and Telegraph unit within the Military Intelligence Division. It was created shortly after the United States entered World War I. Organizationally it was a successor to the Military Information Division but conceptually it was closer to the British Secret Intelligence Service. Where the Military Information Division served largely as a central reference service, the Military Intelligence Division also supervised the army's positive and negative intelligence activities. MI-8 was located within the positive branch of intelligence work, along with other units engaged in such activities as foreign intelligence gathering, mapping, photography, and field training but it also had a strong negative intelligence component. As the army's cryptological unit, MI-8 was responsible for setting the codes to be used in army communications, ensuring the security of those codes and intercepting and decrypting foreign ciphers. Herbert Yardley was placed in charge of MI-8.

A reorganization of the Military Intelligence Division came about following the conclusion of World War I, resulting in establishment of MI-8 as a standalone unit funded by both the War and State Departments. The navy had its own communications intelligence service located within the Office of Naval Intelligence. The existence of MI-8

was hidden from the public by the use of a false flag operation. MI-8 operated from New York City under the name of the Code Compilation Company, which produced codes from private businesses.

One of Yardley's major early successes was breaking the Japanese diplomatic code in 1919. This allowed the United States to read Japanese communications during the Washington Naval Conference (1921–1922). At the end of the decade MI-8 was closed as a result of a loss of funding from the State Department due to Secretary of State Henry Stimson's objection to the practice of communication intercepts. By the time it ceased operations, MI-8 had read more than 45,000 communications from over 20 countries.

See also: Army Intelligence; Black Chamber; Yardley, Herbert

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Glenn P. Hastedt

MIDWAY, BATTLE OF

Allied cryptographers, composed of the American Combat Intelligence (COMINT) Units in Philippines (Station Cast) and Pearl Harbor (Station Hypo under Commander Joseph J. Rochefort's command since 1941), Washington's Office of Naval Intelligence's (OIC) OP-20-G, and British cryptographers, first in Hong Kong and then later in Singapore, along with Dutch cryptographers (Dutch East Indies), combined their expertise to break (1942) the Imperial Japanese Navy's (JN) JN-25 code following the Pearl Harbor attack (December 7, 1941). The information derived from this intelligence coup (1942) led Commander in Chief Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Pacific Fleet, to commit the U.S. aircraft carriers *Lexington* and *Yorktown* to the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942) and uncovered an impending target designated by the Japanese simply as AF, posited by Rochefort's staff as Midway Island and by the OP-20-G and Station Cast as the Aleutian Islands.

During May 1942 the staff of Hypo worked 36-hour shifts decoding, translating, and analyzing up to 140 JN messages daily and passing them onto Nimitz's intelligence officer, Lieutenant Commander Edwin Layton. Knowing in early May that the Japanese First, Second, and Fifth Fleets were being assembled to attack AF between May 20 and June 20, Hypo's Jasper Holmes suggested that Midway report a broken freshwater condenser in a compromised cipher hoping the Japanese would report the problem in their Daily Intelligence Reports in the decrypted code, thereby confirming or disproving Midway as the target of the planned attack. The message was sent somewhere between May 14 and 16. The Japanese reported "AF is short of water" and on May 16 ordered its AF attack force to load additional water desalinization equipment and to position itself 50 miles northwest of AF.

Nimitz ordered Admiral Bull Halsey's task force with the carriers *Enterprise* and *Hornet* to Pearl Harbor the same day (May 17) that COMINT had determined the JN task force included the carriers *Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, Hiryu, Zuikaku*, and *Junyo*, and the positioning of the JN submarines prior to the attack, 150 miles east of A1 (a presumed garbled AF). COMINT noted the change (May 20) of code designator from AF to MI (Midway Island) and determined (May 25), based on the JN task force element departure dates, that the attack would commence on approximately June 4 with occupation planned for June 6. Halsey's task force arrived on May 26, followed on May 27 by the *Yorktown* badly in need of repair from the damage sustained in the Coral Sea engagement. The JN changed (May 28) to an as-of-then undecrypted code the same day Nimitz set the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942) ambush when he ordered the *Enterprise* and *Hornet* (Task Force 17) to sortie for a position 350 miles northeast of Midway to be followed by the miraculously repaired *Yorktown* (Task Force 16) on May 30.

U.S. Navy long-range reconnaissance PBYs (Catalina Flying Boats) found the JN task force of 185 ships 600 miles from Midway and the ensuing battle (June 4 and 5) saw the American carrier aircraft sink four Japanese carriers to the U.S. one (*Yorktown*). The JN also lost 275 aircraft, substantially more than the 115 total American aircraft committed to the battle, and some of their best pilots. The Battle of Midway brought the opposing naval forces into rough parity in the Pacific and established the importance of Comint in modern warfare.

Though Rochefort's intelligence changed the course of the war, infighting between the director of naval intelligence and the director of naval communications led to his eventual transfer to the Pacific Strategic Intelligence Group in Washington (1942–1946). However, the contribution of COMINT to the success of Midway was never disputed and resulted in increased funding, more and better trained personnel, more and better equipment, and more direct communications between COMINT units bypassing the Washington bottleneck. Commanders increasingly incorporated COMINT into their battle plans and by 1943 the army, navy, and marine COMINT units were colocated in the field under the Joint Intelligence Committee, Pacific Ocean Area, which more efficiently coordinated local and theater-wide operations.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Richard M. "Rich" Edwards

MILITARY INFORMATION, BUREAU OF

During the American Civil War (1861–1865), the Bureau of Military Information (BMI) was the Union's most effective intelligence-gathering organization. The BMI was not given any counterintelligence duties. Instead, under the direction of Colonel

George H. Sharpe, the BMI's main function was collecting intelligence from all sources on the Confederacy. It was the all-source intelligence approach that distinguished the BMI from all previous Civil War intelligence ventures, and earned it the distinction of being the first modern intelligence service. The BMI provided Union generals valuable information that greatly benefited the Union cause and ultimately aided Union victory.

In 1861, at the beginning of the war, both the South and North were ill-equipped for intelligence gathering. Union General George B. McClellan, who was in command of the Army of the Potomac, enlisted the help of Allan Pinkerton, John C. Badcock, and a team of agents to secure intelligence. For the first two years of the war, Pinkerton's team took on the huge tasks of disguising themselves as Confederate troops and infiltrating the Confederate army; interrogating captured soldiers, deserters, and runaway slaves; rooting out spy rings from Washington, DC; and reporting on enemy troop movements, strength, and morale. Pinkerton had some successes, but his chief shortcoming was that he often overestimated the Confederate troop strength in his reports to McClellan. As a consequence, this contributed to McClellan's reoccurring reluctance of moving on the enemy with haste.

In November 1862 President Abraham Lincoln relieved McClellan of command of the Army of the Potomac and replaced him with General Ambrose Burnside. McClellan's dismissal also terminated Pinkerton's employment, who departed taking his team with him. In fact, only Badcock remained to aid Burnside with intelligence as a one-man agency. General Joseph Hooker replaced Burnside in January 1863 and appointed Sharpe as deputy provost marshal with the primary duty of creating an effective intelligence service for the Army of the Potomac. Sharpe retained Badcock as his deputy and took Captain John McEntee as his assistant, and together they built up the BMI with government payroll to 70 scouts and agents from the military ranks.

In contrast to Pinkerton's endeavors, the BMI spent a negligible amount of effort on counterintelligence. Instead, Sharpe made intelligence gathering the primary mission of the BMI. Also, compared to the earlier endeavor, the BMI used a much greater variety of sources to collect information, which included the earlier sources plus cavalry reconnaissance, captured documents, intercepted mail, intercepted telegraph messages, newspapers, balloonist's observations, signal corps stations of observation, and others. The increased number of information sources resulted in a much greater accuracy of intelligence than ever before. Furthermore, the BMI collected, analyzed, and summarized fairly reliable information in detailed reports.

In 1863, no comparable intelligence organization existed in the South or North. The Confederacy's intelligence efforts paled in comparison. Even the Union's Army of Northern Virginia's information service was a far smaller organization to merit fair comparison. Hooker soon came to trust and rely on the information supplied to him by the BMI. During the Chancellorsville Campaign (April–May 1863), for example, BMI intelligence convinced Hooker to order troops to the rear of Confederate General Robert E. Lee's army. Consequently, Hooker was able to surround Lee's army at Fredericksburg. In June, the BMI was able to provide General George Mead, who replaced Hooker, with accurate and detailed information about the size and direction of Lee's army right before the largest battle of the war at Gettysburg (July 1–3). The foreknowledge of Lee's direction enabled Mead to secure the best ground for the three-day battle in which Lee's forces were repulsed.

The BMI's work soon impressed other Union generals in the field. For example, General William S. Rosecrans, who was in command of the Army of the Cumberland, asked Mead to direct the BMI to also keep him informed of Confederate troop movements in Tennessee. Mead agreed and Sharpe directed activities as he was ordered. In 1864, Lincoln appointed General Ulysses S. Grant commander of the entire Union army. Soon after, Grant placed Sharpe on his staff and left Badcock with Mead, while the BMI continued to work as a solitary unit. By this point, the BMI had become so adroit in its craft that Sharpe boasted that he could provide Grant with any specific accurate information about the enemy that he desired.

Like generals before him, Grant came to trust and rely on BMI intelligence. In fact, Grant kept Sharpe close at hand during his sieges of Petersburg and Richmond. After the fall of Richmond, the BMI took over the activities of the "Richmond Underground," a pro-Union group who lived in the Confederate capital. Headed by Elizabeth Van Lew (an abolitionist) and Samuel Ruth (a member of the BMI) the group had reported on morale, living conditions, and any other information that could be gleaned from the residents of the city.

Grant was so impressed with the BMI that, in December 1864, Sharpe was promoted to Brigadier General, and, just three months later, he was again promoted to Major General. On April 6, 1865, Sharpe managed paperwork in Lee's surrender to Grant at Appomattox Court House. Soon after, the BMI, the first modern intelligence organization, was dissolved.

See also: Civil War Intelligence; Pinkerton, Allan; Van Lew, Elizabeth

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Rolando Avila

MILLER, RICHARD W.

Richard Miller was a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent who was arrested for espionage in 1984. The case is noteworthy not so much for the information which Miller provided as it is for the FBI's handling of the matter. Miller was the first FBI agent indicted for espionage. His first trial ended in a mistrial after 11 weeks of testimony. He was found guilty of espionage and bribery in his second trial. On

July 14, 1986, Miller was sentenced to two consecutive life terms for espionage and 50 years on other charges. His conviction was overturned by a higher court on the grounds that the presiding judge in Miller's trial had made a mistake in allowing polygraph evidence be used against him. A third trial took place in 1990 and on October 9, 1990, once again he was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. On May 6, 1994, Miller was released from prison after having his sentence reduced to 13 years.

Miller was a 20-year veteran of the FBI when he committed espionage. He is described as inefficient and a blunderer who was once suspended for using his government car to sell Amway products. Miller also had significant financial problems. In 1982 Miller was transferred to the counterintelligence unit. In May 1984 Miller became romantically involved with Svetlana Ogorodnikov who was a low-level KGB agent and well known to the FBI. She and her husband had come to the United States in 1973. Both Richard Miller and Svetlana were soon placed under surveillance. In August Svetlana went to the KGB and told them about Miller and her plan to turn him into a Soviet mole within the FBI. She then revealed her KGB identity to Miller and asked him to sell her information. He agreed and sought $50,000 in gold for his information. Among the items Miller gave her was a 1983 FBI handbook detailing U.S. counterintelligence activities and techniques.

The FBI now became interested in the possibility of turning Miller into a double agent. Wiretaps revealed that Miller was going to fly to leave the United States with Svetlana and possibly defect. Miller failed a lie detector test given to him on September 28, 1984, and a search of his Los Angeles home produced Svetlana's original FBI file and classified documents. At this time Miller offered to become a double agent. The FBI did not take the offer seriously, seeing it as an attempt by Miller to protect himself from prosecution. Instead, the FBI fired Miller and then arrested him as a former agent in order to protect the FBI's reputation.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

MINARET, PROJECT

Project MINARET was a series of watch lists of Americans deemed by intelligence agencies to be engaged in subversive activities. In one form or another Project MINARET ran from 1965 to 1973 and is closely associated with the longer running secret electronic surveillance program known as Project SHAMROCK. In the period from 1967 to 1973 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provided the names of 950 Americans to these lists, the Central Intelligence Agency provided 30 names, the Secret Service provided 180 names, the Defense Intelligence Agency provided 20 names, and the National

Security Agency provided between 50 to 75 names. Found on those lists were Black power advocate and civil rights leader Malcolm X, actress Jane Fonda, singer Joan Baez, pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock, and minister and civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King. All told over 5,925 foreigners and 1,690 organizations and U.S. citizens were found on Project MINARET's lists. From 1969 to 1973 the NSA distributed approximately 2,000 reports based on Project MINARET to other government agencies. Additionally, from 1972 to 1974 NSA's Office of Security Services had on file reports on over 75,000 Americans. The name of anyone mentioned in an NSA-intercepted message was included in that report list.

Project MINARET moved from an informal set of watch lists to a more formal program in July 1969. Construction of the watch lists as well as the secret operation of the program was a self-authorized action. No such authority was given by Congress. And in fact, after 1969 NSA placed an even greater veil of secrecy surrounding this program than it did its other intelligence-gathering activities. That blanket of secrecy was partially lifted by the 1972 *Keith* case in which the Supreme Court ruled that warrants were needed to place wiretaps on Americans who did not have a clear connection with a dangerous foreign power.

Subsequent to that verdict and with the political storm over the Watergate break-ins gathering steam, Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson inquired as to the FBI's involvement in Project MINARET. FBI Director Clarence Kelley minimized the FBI's involvement and challenged the applicability of the Supreme Court's ruling in the *Keith* case to NSA domestic electronic surveillance programs. Nevertheless, in October Peterson and Acting Attorney General Elliot Richardson informed the NSA that they considered Project MINARET to be of questionable legality. Like the FBI, the NSA challenged this view but they too failed to change Richardson's position and in the fall of 1973 Project MINARET was terminated.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); SHAMROCK, Project

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Glenn P. Hastedt

MITROKHIN, VASILI NIKITICH
(MARCH 3, 1922–JANUARY 23, 2004)

Vasili Mitrokhin was a Committee for State Security (KGB) agent who became famous for his defection in the West in the early 1990s. Mitrokhin left Russia in 1992 with a large number of classified documents from the former KGB archives. The documents were published in a large collection called the Mitrokhin Archives, revealing important information regarding secret KGB operations abroad during the Soviet era.

Vasili Nikitich Mitrokhin was born on March 3, 1922, in Yurasovo, in the central region of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. He graduated from an artillery school after which he attended university courses in the former Soviet and Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan. He obtained degrees in history and law. Mitrokhin started a military career in Kharkov but soon after World War II entered the KGB (Ministry of State Security) in 1948, where he served as a foreign intelligence officer.

Since 1952, when he received his first assignment abroad, Mitrokhin served on numerous undercover missions in foreign countries. In 1956 he was removed from the operational field due to apparent failures in mission and became an archivist at the KGB's First Chief Directorate. He would serve there for the rest of his career. From 1972 until 1984 he was in charge of a large transfer of KGB archives from the Lubyanka headquarters to the new building at Yasenevo. It was during this move that he stole or made copies of a series of classified KGB documents which he deposited at his home. Mitrokhin retired in 1985 and only came to attention after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Vasili Mitrokhin fled with these documents in the west in 1992. During the Soviet era he had no contact with Western intelligence services. He would claim that even from the 1950s he was disillusioned with the Soviet system, especially after the Khrushchev secret report. In 1992 Mitrokhin traveled to Estonia with copies of the documents and turned them over to MI-6 at the British embassy in Tallinn, after being refused by the CIA. Mitrokhin and his family moved to Britain.

The *Mitrokhin Archives* were published by Vasili Mitrokhin in collaboration with historian Christopher Andrew, expert in espionage. The documents reveal important information regarding: weapon designs stolen from the United States, Western politicians who worked with KGB in France or West Germany, political parties in Western countries infiltrated with KGB agents, sabotage operations prepared in the United States, attempts to incite racial hatred in the United States, etc. Also, the documents disclosed information about preparations for the assassination of certain personalities like Third World leaders or Russian anti-Communist dissidents. The names of KGB agents or informers in other countries, including major political leaders, were published as well.

The book determined judicial and parliamentary inquiries in countries such as Italy, India, and Great Britain. Although its significance for Western intelligence had been confirmed by American and British officials, there are still historians who doubt the originality of the documents. Vasili Mitrokhin published two other books with Christopher Andrew on related issues. He died on January 23, 2004.

See also: Andrew, Christopher; KGB ((Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Cezar Stanciu

MOCKINGBIRD, OPERATION

Beginning in the 1950s the Central Intelligence Agency sought to control and shape both the extent to which the existence of intelligence activities and organizations were reported on in the media and the manner in which they were depicted when discussed. Operation MOCKINGBIRD was the code name given to this set of activities. Attention was given to periodic film and book accounts as well as day-to-day reporting and commentary in major U.S. newspapers and weekly magazines.

Operation MOCKINGBIRD was set in motion in 1948 by Frank Wisner when he was placed in charge of the CIA's Office of Special Programs was tasked with engaging in propaganda efforts, among other activities. Cord Meyer would join the CIA in 1951 and become Operation MOCKINGBIRD's principal guiding force.

The scale of Operation MOCKINGBIRD's undertakings remains debated. Published accounts place the number of American journalists participating in it reaching as high as 400. Reportedly 25 newspapers and wire agencies were under its influence in the early 1950s. Among those journalists linked to it are Joseph Alsop, Ben Bradlee, James Reston, and Walter Pincus. Executives similarly identified are Henry Luce of *Time* and *Newsweek*, Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the *New York Times*, and Phillip Graham of the *Washington Post*. Other assets identified include ABC, NBC, and CBS television networks along with the Associated Press and United Press International news wire services. Operation MOCKINGBIRD activities here ranged from suppressing news stories such as on the operation to unseat Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala to writing favorable stories and commentaries and using newspapers and media outlets as cover for stationing agents abroad.

U.S. journalists were not the only ones whose cooperation was sought out or paid for by the CIA. According to the Church Committee's 1976 investigation of CIA activities, it maintained a network of several hundred foreign contacts in press services, publishing houses, periodicals, newspapers, television, and radio who would use their positions to author and propagate support of stories about the CIA and U.S. foreign policy. That same year Director of Central Intelligence George H. W. Bush announced that the CIA would no longer enter into any paid or contractual relationship with full-time or part-time news correspondents accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio, or television network or station. He did, however, indicate that the CIA would continue to enter into a voluntary, unpaid relationship with journalists.

Beyond influencing journalist's accounts of the CIA, the agency also sought to stop the publication of periodical articles and books that portrayed the CIA in a negative light. Particularly notable in this regard was a 1966 article in *Ramparts* and a 1963 book, *The Invisible Government*, by David Wise and Thomas Ross. The CIA entered into a failed covert campaign aimed at undermining its financial stability to block *Ramparts* from publishing the article. Failing to get Wise and Ross to agree not to publish the book, the CIA reportedly considered buying the entire production run. The CIA also secretly helped support the publication of books that were favorable to it such as the *Penkovsky Papers* and financially supported Hollywood filmmaking efforts of movie projects that it favored.

See also: Bush, George Herbert Walker; Central Intelligence Agency; Meyer, Cord, Jr.; Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich; Wisner, Frank Gardiner

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Glenn P. Hastedt

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MONGOOSE, OPERATION

Operation MONGOOSE was a program of covert activities—political, economic, psychological, and sabotage—conceived by the administration of John F. Kennedy to destabilize the regime of Fidel Castro of Cuba and promote an internal rebellion that would lead to Castro's overthrow. The U.S. failure at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 provided the immediate background for the formation of MONGOOSE. President Kennedy appointed a commission headed by General Maxwell Taylor, former army chief of staff, to investigate the Bay of Pigs and to make recommendations for future Cuban policy. Among the recommendations of the commission was a new program of covert activities against Cuba.

On November 30, 1961, President Kennedy authorized a new program of covert action against Castro, code-named Operation MONGOOSE. The president selected as "chief of operations" for the program Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, who had earned his reputation as a successful counterinsurgency fighter in the Philippines in the 1950s. Oversight of MONGOOSE lay with the "Special Group," made up of top-level representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the White House, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When this group was joined by Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor, a special advisor to the president, it was referred to as the Special Group Augmented. It was clear from the outset that the real person in charge was Robert Kennedy.

Lansdale energetically developed plans for the operation, a difficult task given the number of different agencies involved. In particular the CIA took a dim view of both Lansdale and MONGOOSE. Although the CIA had a leading role to play in the operation, it had only 28 agents in Cuba in late 1961. On January 18, 1962, Lansdale issued a program review of MONGOOSE which established 32 tasks that needed to be accomplished including intelligence gathering, political action, economic activities, and sabotage efforts. Two days later in a discussion with Robert Kennedy, CIA Director John McCone questioned whether many of the 32 tasks could be completed as scheduled—if at all.

The early months of the project were spent planning, discussing, and increasing intelligence assets in South Florida and Cuba rather than carrying out exile raids and sabotage. On March 14, 1962, the Special Group Augmented approved "guidelines" for Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines stressed the need for more hard intelligence and the use of indigenous resources. At the same time the guidelines put forward the contradictory view that decisive use of U.S. military force would be needed to achieve final success.

The slow pace of MONGOOSE activities, especially sabotage, came under official scrutiny. By the end of July 1962, the CIA had infiltrated 11 teams into Cuba but had aborted 19 maritime operations. On July 25, 1962, Lansdale reported to the Special Group Augmented that possible targets for sabotage were still being reviewed.

As the United States lurched toward the missile crisis, Robert Kennedy at a meeting of the Special Group Augmented on October 4, 1962, expressed the president's concern over the lack of progress of MONGOOSE, operations, especially sabotage activities. The group decided to put more emphasis on sabotage, including the possibility of mining Cuban harbors. As late as October 16, Robert Kennedy was still urging an acceleration of activities under MONGOOSE. Fearful that MONGOOSE might be interfering with a settlement of the missile crisis, the Kennedy administration ordered an end to all MONGOOSE, operations on October 30.

For much of its history, Operation MONGOOSE activities mainly centered on organization, planning, and building up an intelligence capability. Sabotage activities received increasing emphasis, but few were undertaken, and fewer succeeded. Ironically, one of the few successful sabotage activities—the blowing up of a Cuban industrial facility—took place on November 8, 1962, after operations were supposed to have been suspended. Not all covert activities between November 1961 and November 1962 took place under the auspices of Operation MONGOOSE. Cuban exiles engaged in some covert activities independent of MONGOOSE and of the U.S. government. Not all U.S. activities fell under the MONGOOSE program. A plan to drop propaganda leaflets over Cuba developed outside of MONGOOSE. The highly controversial assassination plans promoted by the U.S. government were not a part of Operation MONGOOSE. Although Operation MONGOOSE was dismantled in early 1963, the Kennedy administration continued its covert activities against the Castro regime, including the planning of sabotage efforts.

See also: Castro, Fidel; JMWAVE; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; Shackley, Theodore; G. Jr.; Special Group

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Don M. Coerver

MOORE, EDWIN G., II
(1921–)

Edwin Gibbons Moore II was a retired Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Supply Officer who attempted to sell classified information to the Soviet Union in 1976. Moore began working with the CIA in 1951 but was suspended in 1961 following allegations of intentionally setting fire to a motel he owned in North Carolina. He was

reinstated in 1967 after his arson conviction was overturned. He was sent to Vietnam by the agency, but returned after being diagnosed as suffering from paranoia. He retired from the CIA in 1973 on a disability pension. Moore was on a list of five individuals suspected of writing a letter to Director William Colby in 1975 that threatened to compromise the names of 5,000 agency employees unless staff, including retirees, were retroactively promoted. On December 21, 1976, Moore threw a package over the gate of a Soviet residence, containing sensitive information and an offer for additional information in return for $200,000. The offer instructed the Soviet Resident to drop the money in front of Moore's. The package contained pages from the CIA's internal telephone directory, which identified approximately 300 agency employees. The Soviets, thinking the package was a bomb, contacted U.S. officials. Upon inspecting the package, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) developed a plan to arrest Moore after he took possession of what he believed to be payment for the compromised documents. In Moore's home, the FBI found eight boxes containing thousands of sensitive pieces of information. The FBI also discovered portions of the 1975 letter to Colby. Moore pled guilty by reason of insanity during his trial in 1977, while also claiming that he had been recruited to work on behalf of the agency on a special project. He was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He received parole in 1979.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Colby, William Egan; Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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William T. Thornhill

MORRISON, SAMUEL LORING
(OCTOBER 30, 1944–)

Samuel Loring Morrison was not a spy in a traditional sense. He did not provide a foreign power with secret information. Rather, he provided classified photos to the press. For this he was charged with "the willful release of secret government documents to a person not entitled to receive them." Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials and naval investigators agreed that Morrison did not intend to provide information to a hostile intelligence service. Arrested on October 1, 1984, Morrison was convicted on October 17, 1985, and sentenced to two years in prison on December 4, 1985. President Bill Clinton pardoned Morrison on January 20, 2001.

Morrison was an American citizen born in London on October 30, 1944. He followed in his grandfather's footsteps and joined the U.S. Navy after graduating from the University of Louisville in 1967. Beginning in 1974, he went to work for the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) and remained employed there until his arrest. While working for the NISC, Morrison was also employed as a part-time contributor

to the London-based *Jane's Fighting Ships*. This was a position he hoped to turn into a full-time job.

In July 1984 Morrison sent *Jane's Defense Weekly* three photographs classified secret. They were pictures taken of a Soviet naval shipbuilding facility taken by the KH-11 surveillance satellite. Morrison had cut off the top-secret control marking. He also planned to provide them with a summary of a report that he did on an explosion at Severomorsk, a Soviet naval base on the Kola Peninsula. A search of his residence revealed several hundred classified government documents.

Morrison justified his actions on the ground that the public had a right to know what the Soviet Union was doing. The photos showed the construction of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Morrison believed this changed the naval balance of power between the United States and Soviet Union. Armed with this information, he hoped the American public would support an increase in the defense budget. It was also argued in his defense that similar photos had already appeared in *Aviation Weekly* and other press outlets, thereby casting doubt upon their secret status and that spy William Kampiles had already provided the Soviet Union with information on the KH-11.

See also: Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Kampiles, William

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Glenn P. Hastedt

MOSSAD

Prior to the creation of the State of Israel, underground Jewish groups engaged in numerous intelligence operations against hostile Arabs and against the British. These groups, including the Hagganah, were abolished and replaced by new Israeli organizations almost immediately after independence was declared on May 14, 1948.

In 1948 the creation of the new state of Israel, which was almost immediately at war, demonstrated the need for an Israeli intelligence community. Three organizations were created: military intelligence, domestic counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence. In 1951 these were refined with the emergence of the Mossad, called the Institute of the Mossad. It is Israel's foreign intelligence agency which is more far reaching in its activities than the Central Intelligence Agency.

The chief officer of the Mossad reports to the Israeli prime minister alone. Its budget is secret, but its work ultimately includes protecting every Jew in the world. It is organized into eight departments. The Collections Department is the largest and operated to gather intelligence data globally. Its agents operate under both diplomatic cover or without it. Its overseas stations run agents in every country with a Mossad presence.

The Political Action and Liaison Department conducts both political activities and engages in liaisons with the intelligence services of friendly foreign countries. The Special Operations Division (Metsada) conducts covert black operations. These include

One of the hostages injured aboard a hijacked Air France flight is transported by Israeli military to Tel Aviv on July 7, 1976. The plane had been hijacked by pro-Palestinian terrorists on June 27 and landed at Entebbe in Uganda. Non-Jewish passengers were released, but 103 Jewish people were held captive until a daring rescue raid by the Israeli Defence Force on July 4. The IDF acted on intelligence provided by Israeli secret agency Mossad. (AFP/Getty Images)

assassinations, sabotage, psychological warfare, and paramilitary operations. The Lohama Psichlogit Department (LPD) is in charge of the conduction of psychological warfare through deceptions, disinformation campaigns, and propaganda operations.

The Mossad Research Department is organized into 15 geographically specialized departments. These are called sections, or desks, for Canada, the United States, and Western Europe; Latin America; the former Soviet Union; China; Africa; the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia); Libya, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, and Iran. In addition it has a WMD intelligence desk.

The Research Department is responsible for intelligence analysis and production. The intelligence products include the daily report, the weekly summaries, and the monthly reports.

The Technology Department develops advanced technological equipment for the Mossad's agents. It also evaluates all technology considered for Mossad agent use.

The directors of the Mossad have been Reuven Shiloah (1951–9852), Isser Harel (1952–1963), Meir Amit (1963–1968), Zvi Zzmir (1968–1974), Yitzhak Hofi (1974–1982), Nahum Admoni (1982–1989), Shabtai Shavil (1989–1996), Danny Yatom (1996–1998), Efraim Halevy (1998–2002), and Meir Dagan (2002). The individuals have been recognized as people of high achievement and integrity. It has been the goal of the Mossad to recruit the "princes of the people."

The success of Mossad in generating a steady stream of intelligence on Arabic countries and Islamic terrorists is due to dedicated quality agents such as Shula Cohen who was a housewife with a large family and a flower shop in Beirut or Wolfgang Lotz the "champagne spy" in Cairo produced volumes of high-quality intelligence data.

Most of the achievements of the Mossad will never be known; some of its successes are known. The Mossad's successes have included kidnapping and assassination. Its most famous kidnapping was of Adolph Eichmanm in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Eichmann was taken to Jerusalem, put on trial, and eventually hanged.

Mossad agents have been very good at infiltrating both Arab and Communist organizations. Eli Cohen, in the 1960s, infiltrated the top ranks of the Syrian government. After two years he was caught and publicly hanged in Damascus.

One of those alleged to have been assassinated by the Mossad was Canadian artillery expert Gerald Bull, who was developing a long-range cannon that could fire a round for hundreds of miles. His last sponsor was Saddam Hussein. However, Bull was killed at this apartment in Brussels. This relieved Israel of the threat he posed.

Other assassinations have included all of those responsible for the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics. In addition, the leaders of violence in the Intifada who make bombs, launch rocket attacks, or engage in other violent practices have been assassinated.

Another very important success was Operation Thunderbolt. The Operation's mission was to conduct a raid on the Entebbe, Uganda, airport at night to free hostages on Air France Flight 139. The hostages were being held at the Entebbe Airport in Entebbe, Uganda. Idi Amin, the strongman ruler of Uganda at the time supported the PLO hijackers. The raid's commander was Colonel Yonatan "Yoni" Netanyahu, brother of Benjamin Netanyahu. Colonel was the only Israeli killed on the raid. Also killed were 3 hostages, 40 Ugandan soldiers, and 6 hijackers. One hundred hostages were freed.

A major blow against the Palestinian Liberation Organization came in April 1988. The Mossad send an assassination team on a small but very fast naval craft from Israel to Tunisia. The target was Abu Jihad, the deputy of Yasser Arafat. Abu Jihad was the PLO's chief military and terrorism planner. His seaside home was assaulted, Jihad was killed, and the team was extracted successfully.

In 1966 the Mossad aided the defection of a Christian Iraqi pilot to Israel. The pilot flew a MiG-21, the top Russian fighter, to Israel in what looked like a defection. At the same time Mossad also exfiltrated his family.

A major intelligence failure of Mossad came on July 21, 1973, when Admad Boushiki was murdered in Lillehammer, Norway, in the presence of his pregnant wife. He was an Algerian with a Moroccan passport who had the misfortune to be a dead-ringer for Ali Hassan Salameh, the head of PLO security. The five operatives were caught and convicted; however, their sentences were light. Salameh was killed in a car bombing in 1979.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Eitan, Rafael; Pollard, Jonathan Jay; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence

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Andrew J. Waskey

MOVIES, SPIES IN

The movie industry had made movies about spies from virtually the beginning of Hollywood. One constant in spy movies is that there has to be an antagonist. The enemy may be rogues, criminals, Nazis, the KGB, the Japanese, Islamists, or others. In more recent times the enemy may be rogue elements in American and British intelligence agencies. What is essential is that there is a melodramatic or a cosmic struggle between the forces of good and evil. Some spy movies during the latter part of the cold war tried to put the work of espionage into the category of keeping potential friends from misunderstanding or expressed a cynical attitude toward the cold war and espionage.

In the silent movies about Confederates and Union supporters it was common for there to be girl spies such as *The Girl Spy* (1909). Spies, male and female, for both sides made profitable film themes. In other cases a romantic female spy from North of the Border who spies for one side in Mexico was a theme. In Westerns a detective or a cowboy would go undercover to expose outlaw gangs. John Wayne played the role of secret agent in several Westerns.

The outbreak of World War I made the German spy the agent of evil. After the October Revolution (1917), until the Soviets became allies in World War II they were depicted as evil in films such as *Siberia* (1926), *Mockery* (1927), *Tovarich* (1937), and *Ninotchka* (1939). Whether as Bolsheviks or as Stalinists, the godless communists were defeated by American know-how and moral superiority.

Nazis are frequent villains in spy movies such as *The House on 92nd Street* (1945) or *North by Northwest* (1959). Two of the Indiana Jones series, *Raiders of the Lost Ark* (1981) and *The Last Crusade* (1989) have Nazis as bete noirs. Quite often the locations in which the Nazis were operating were exotic places such as Shanghai or Morocco, *Casablanca* (1943) with Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman, or North Africa, *Sundown* (1941). Nazis, powerful agents of evil have figured even in post–World War II movies as conspirators. In the *Lucifer Complex* (1978) the star, Robert Vaughn, an intelligence agent, discovers that Nazi scientists are cloning world leaders to get loyal leaders.

American spies, operating behind enemy lines in World War II, were a common theme in many movies. *Cloak and Dagger* (1946) portrays Gary Cooper as an American spy who parachutes into Nazi-occupied Europe to gain scientific information. Or in *Submarine Alert* (1946) the FBI uses a loyal American, who is a naturalized citizen, as bait to catch a Nazi spy ring operation in the United States.

In some movies such as *The Adventures of Tartu* (1943) the spy may be British but he or she has deep foreign connections and secretly works for the Allies as an undercover agent in Nazi-occupied Europe. Some World War II movies exhibited great daring, as did Rex Harrison in *Night Train to Munich* (1940).

In other spy movies of the era, exotic locations of intrigue were used. Prior to the Communist takeover of China, Shanghai was a favorite location for espionage.

Tom Cruise stars in Brian De Palma's 1996 film, *Mission Impossible*. (Photofest)

However, in *Blood on the Sun* (1945), Jimmy Cagney is living in Tokyo and links up with spies working for the Chinese intelligence against Japanese intelligence prior to the invasion of Manchuria. Cagney also starred in *13 Rue Madeleine* (1947) as an OSS agent who dies heroically fighting against the Nazis in occupied Europe.

Many real spy stories were told after World War II such as *Triple Cross* (1967), which tells the story of Eddie Chapman who was a triple agent for the Nazis and the British. Others such as *Operation Crossbow* (1994), staring Sophia Loren, George Peppard, and Trevor Howard mixed fact and fiction. Others such as *The Man Who Never Was* (1956), which tells the true story of the British World War II Operation Mincemeat, mixes some fiction with fantasy to increase the drama of the story.

Spy movies with Soviet agents as the evil agents were made during the early days of the cold war. In *Captain Scarface* (1953) several American civilians defeat Soviet agents operating a ship loaded with an atomic bomb they intend to use to destroy the Panama Canal.

In some espionage movies agents are forced out of retirement in order to deal with some problem. In *Beyond Justice* (1992) a former CIA officer seeks to free a young boy from Arab kidnappers. In *The Sell Out* (1976) a retired CIA officer is forced to return to action.

Sometimes the lives of actors and espionage mix in deadly ways. Trevor Howard, who played in the *Scarlet Pimpernel*, was shot down in World War II because of intelligence inaction.

Documentary movies about spies have had educational benefits in their day. The 1982 documentary *The KGB Connections* describes the operations of the KGB in North America and the Caribbean as well as how it made use of the intelligence services of the Eastern Bloc countries it dominated. In 1998 Roger Moore narrated a 150-minute documentary called *Spy Tek*. The "Q" branch (quartermaster) developed numerous "Bond" devices. These were more than matched by the spy devices developed during the cold war by both the Eastern Bloc and the West. Other documentaries include a series narrated by Charlton Heston (*Secrets of War: Intelligence*) that includes

coverage of subjects such as *The Ultra Enigma*, and *Women Spies of World War II*, *Spy Games of World War II*, and *German Intelligence in World War II*.

Many of the film noirs of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s involved spies such as *Ministry of Fear* and *British Intelligence* (1940). Women have also played important roles in spy movies *British Intelligence*, *The Forbidden Woman* (1927), and *Mata Hari* (1931).

Some movies used spies to portray the lives and adventures of spies. *5 Fingers* portrayed a spy code-named "Cicero" by the Nazis who stole British secrets from the British Ambassador to Turkey in World War II. *A Family of Spies* (1990) portrays traitors who spied for the Soviet Union and against the West during the cold war.

Some movies are virtually docudramas of historic espionage operations. In some cases, such as *The Uranium Conspiracy* (1978), the story is about a successful operation of Israeli intelligence to capture some significant quantities of uranium. The operation was an intelligence semisuccess story which gained the uranium and left others wondering what had happened.

In others the agents are engaged in a military operation behind enemy lines. In some cases such as *Five Graves to Cairo* (1943) and *Desert Commandos* the agents are Nazis spies. In other cases such as *The Guns of Navarone* (1961), *Tobruk* (1966), *Raid on Rommel* (1971), *Force 10 from Navarone* (1978), and *Where Eagles Dare* (1968) the agents are inventive soldiers working to achieve some destructive objective.

James Bond, 007, the world's most famous spy, is licensed to kill as an agent of MI-6. He engages in covert operations that are usually very black operations. However, all of his opponents are rogues or criminals and not the agencies of sovereign nations. Although Bond is a MI-6 officer, he often works closely with the CIA and visits the United States in the conduction of his operations.

Because of the decades over which the Bond series has been produced, there have been numerous contemporary events depicted in each of the films. Some of those that were the least successful were those that sought to portray Bond as having a tender side in response to the peak of the feminist movement.

Cities often used as a setting for espionage include New York, Washington, DC, and San Francisco. Other American cities are used but not as often. Las Vegas and New Orleans were two others used in two of the James Bond movies. Other cities that have been frequently depicted have been London, Paris, Berlin, Cairo, Jerusalem, Rio de Janeiro, or Casablanca. Exotic locations synonymous with espionage and intrigue were Tokyo and Shanghai especially in the 1930s. Charlie Chan, a mysterious Chinese man who was also westernized, played the role of a man who could bring spies to justice.

The Spy Who Came In from the Cold has been hailed as signaling a change in attitudes in the West about spies. The movie portrayed a cold war spy played by Richard Burton as jaded and sickened by the whole deceitful game. Critics have used it and other similar negative portrayals as the basis for attacking intelligence agencies. In other films such as *The Looking Glass Wars* (1970) cynicism over the spy game leads to death.

In the more recent productions of Hollywood, the CIA is at times portrayed as the victim of rogues who carry out their own agenda. In films such as *Volunteers* (1985) starring Tom Hanks and the late John Candy as Peace Corps volunteers, the CIA

operative they encounter is pictured as insane. In the film *The Company Man* (2000) the whole theme is to picture the CIA as extremely inept and ludicrous. The movie is like Graham Green's attack on the British intelligence in his book, rather than a spoof as in *The Fat Spy* (1966).

Some films have portrayed intelligence agencies negatively. In *Conspiracy Theory* (1998) and *Enemy of the State* (1998) the National Security Agency is portrayed as an evil doer. However, secret agencies have figured in the *Mission Impossible* series on television and in movies. And some spies have been depicted as action heroes in movies such as *I Spy* (2002) with Eddie Murphy and Owen Wilson, *The Detonator* (2006) with Wesley Snipes, *Sneakers* (1992) with Robert Redford, *True Lies* (1994) with Arnold Schwarzenegger, and *The Foreigner* (2003) with Steven Seagal. What is common is that all of these actors play agents who are interpreted as positive persons in a dark world.

In contemporary movies some have portrayed viral outbreaks to be the result of biological weapons made by the American government, but used by rogues to attack Americans. Or the virus falls into the hands of terrorists, especially Islamic terrorists who seek to use it to do harm. In *Outbreak* (1995) and in *Covert One: The Hades Factor* (2006) a super secret agency of the United States is portrayed as responsible for a biological weapon that is being used to kill Americans.

In the *Bourne Identity* (2002) and the *Bourne Supremacy* (2004) the CIA officers in charge of project "Tread Stone" are actually running a rogue black operation that Bourne is trying to escape. The CIA is portrayed as unable to control some of its assets. A similar theme occurs in *Silent Partner* (2005) when a young CIA officer is used as a pawn by sinister forces in his own agency. *The Good Shepherd* (2006) portrays a career American agent with the CIA; however, the individual's life is portrayed as one of personal failure and even of betrayal.

See also: Fiction—Spy Novels; MOCKINGBIRD, Operation

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MUELLER, ROBERT S.
(AUGUST 7, 1944–)

Robert Swan Mueller, current Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) nominated by President George W. Bush, was born on August 7, 1944, in New York City. He spent most of his youth in the Philadelphia suburbs, but went to boarding school at St. Paul's, located in Concord, New Hampshire. He received his undergraduate degree from Princeton University in 1966, going on to study at New York University, where he earned a masters in international relations in 1967.

Following his studies, Mueller signed up with the U.S. Marine Corps, going on to become an officer for a rifle platoon in the Third Marine Division. He saw extensive service in the Vietnam War, during which he received the Bronze Star, the PURPLE Heart, and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry, as well as two commendation medals. Returning to the United States, Mueller studied at the University of Virginia, receiving a Juris Doctor degree in 1973.

Professionally, Mueller started working as a lawyer in San Francisco, before moving on to the U.S. attorney's offices. He stayed in San Francisco and became the chief of the branch's criminal division. In 1982, he moved to Boston, where he was recruited to be an assistant U.S. attorney, dealing primarily with cases of fraud and corruption.

In 1989, Mueller joined the U.S. Department of Justice as an employee of Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh. Soon after, he took charge of the Department's criminal branch, notably prosecuting Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega and the Lockerbie bombing. For his work, the American College of Trial Lawyers selected him to join their ranks.

After a stint in the private sector, he joined the homicide division of the District of Columbia's U.S. Attorney's Office in 1995, before going back to San Francisco as U.S. attorney in 1998. Called back to Washington to fill a vacancy in 2001 as acting deputy attorney general of the Department of Justice, President Bush nominated him to be FBI director on July 5, 2001. He assumed the post on September 4, 2001, only a couple days before the terrorist attacks. In the aftermath of September 11, he came out against the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency, preferring to reform current structures.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Arthur Holst

MURPHY COMMISSION

The Murphy Commission was established by Congress on July 13, 1972. It was one of a series of presidential commissions that have been established to examine the performance of the intelligence community and make recommendations for improvement. The Murphy Commission reported its findings on June 27, 1975. The overall tenor of its report was supportive of the intelligence community. Unlike previous studies, the Murphy Commission concluded that "it was neither possible nor desirable to give the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) line authority over that very large fraction of the intelligence community which lies outside the CIA." Instead it recommended increasing the DCI's political clout by placing this office "in close proximity to the White House and be accorded regular and direct contact with the President."

The Murphy Commission was highly politicized from the outset. Appointed by the president were Anne Armstrong, council to the president, and William J. Casey, president and chairman of the Export-Import Bank. When Armstrong resigned she was replaced by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. Congressional members included Senator Mike Mansfield, Representative Clement Zablocki, and later as a replacement Representative William Broomfield.

A difference of opinion on the part of the authors of the Murphy Commission Report existed over its founding conditions. In the preface to its report the Commission spoke of an increasingly pluralistic world characterized by interdependence and rapid technological change that was blurring the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy. As a consequence of these trends, it stated that the United States needed to consider "a fresh organization of the government for the conduct of foreign policy." Mansfield dissented, asserting that "the Commission paid little attention to the circumstances in which the legislative mandate for the Commission was created." He identified the most prominent feature of the period in which the Commission was set up as "a time of intense confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government." Rather than addressing these issues, he characterized the Commission's study as being "a sort of elaborate management study."

Mansfield was especially upset with one of the Commission's major new proposals, the creation of a Joint Congressional Committee on National Security. He asserted that over time the new joint committee would become a barrier to the dissemination of sensitive material to other committees. Mansfield was most concerned that it would become an instrument of executive domination over Congress.

The Murphy Commission did not have a substantial impact. Before its investigation was completed, Washington politics increasingly became focused on Watergate and the CIA's role in the break-in and covert action. These concerns spawned a series of investigations by Congress and the president. On January 4, 1975, President Gerald Ford appointed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to head a Commission on CIA Activities within the United States. It reported out the same month as did the Murphy Commission. Ford had hoped this inquiry would forestall action by Congress. That was not to be the case as both the Senate (the Church Committee) and the House (the Pike Committee) began their own broader investigations into allegations of CIA wrongdoing.

See also: Church Committee; Clark Report (Second Hoover Commission); Eberstadt Report; Hoover Commission (First); Intelligence Community; Pike Committee; Rockefeller Commission

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N

NASSIRI, GENERAL NEMATOLLAH (1911–FEBRUARY 16, 1979)

An Iranian intelligence chief, Nematollah was director of SAVAK, the intelligence service of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to whom he remained loyal until his execution. Nematollah Nassiri was born in 1911, the son of Amidol Mamalek, a former deputy in the Persian *Majilis* (parliament). He grew up serving the Shah and in 1953 was the man who personally delivered the *firman* (edict) to Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, by which the Shah ordered the arrest of the politician. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansur on January 21, 1965, Nassiri was appointed as head of SAVAK, replacing General Hassan Pakravan, who was sacked. Nassiri rapidly became one of the most feared men in the country, although some writers have suggested that he was more interested in real estate and only the nominal head of SAVAK, with the real power held by Parviz Sabeti. Certainly Nassiri was identified heavily, in the public eye, as the man responsible for crackdowns on opponents of the Shah during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

At the urging of the Iranian ambassador to the United States, Ardeshit Zahedi, and Martial Law Chief General Ali Oveissi, Nassiri was arrested along with his predecessor Pakravan, and Amir Abbas Hoveida (prime minister 1965–1977). It seems that these were to be made scapegoats for the excesses of the Shah's government, and all three men remained in prison when the Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979. Following the fall of the government of Shahpour Bakhtiar on February 11, Nassiri and his colleagues were arraigned before a tribunal, presided over by Ayatollah Khalkhali. Nassiri appeared briefly on television at the trial, his face and neck showing signs of torture. He was sentenced to death and executed by firing squad on February 16, 1979.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence

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Justin Corfield

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES (THE 9/11 COMMISSION)

On November 27, 2002, more than a year after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Bush and Congress created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. The 10-person bipartisan commission received testimony from 160 witnesses and held 12 public hearings. After 19 months of investigation the Commission released its 567-page report on July 22, 2004. The 9/11 Commission issued its report on July 22, 2004.

It identified four kinds of failures that contributed to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and made 41 recommendations. The failures were those of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. In turning to specific recommendations for reform, the Commission asserted that U.S. national security institutions had been constructed to fight the cold war and that today's global setting required a different structure. It recommended creating the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI). This individual would oversee all-source national intelligence centers, serve as the president's principal intelligence advisor, manage the national intelligence program, and oversee the component agencies of the intelligence community. Included in this power would be responsibility for submitting a unified intelligence budget appropriating funds to intelligence agencies, and set personnel policies for the intelligence community. The DNI's office would be in the White House.

Political pressure for creating a bipartisan commission had been slow to build. With U.S. forces engaged in a war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, there was little interest in Washington into an investigation into the causes of 9/11 and Republicans easily defeated efforts by Democrats to establish an independent commission of inquiry. With victory in Afghanistan in hand in December 2001 Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and John McCain (R-AZ) introduced legislation to bring such a commission into existence The administration objected citing a February 2002 decision by the House and Senate to establish their own investigation.

Pressure for an independent inquiry, however, continued to mount as families of the 9/11 victims pressed forward. They found the terms of reference and degree of access to intelligence materials for the House-Senate Joint Committee to be too restrictive and the time frame for the inquiry too short. In July 2002 the House succumbed to their lobbying efforts and voted to endorse the creation of a bipartisan commission. The Senate and White House still resisted, although by October the White House publicly supported the concept. Among the White House's major concerns was the fear that blame would be laid at the door of the Bush administration and that the report would be issued in the midst of the 2004 presidential campaign.

Cover of *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. The report, issued on July 22, 2004, provides the findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in its investigation into the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks)

The 9/11 Commission got off to a rocky star and frequently found itself at odds with the Bush administration. Both of its co-chairs, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Republican) and former Senator George Mitchell (Democrat), withdrew due to conflict of interest charges. They were replaced by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean and former congressperson Lee Hamilton, respectively. The Commission held its first hearing in late January 2004 and by July was publicly complaining of a lack of cooperation by the White House and Justice Department in making documents and personnel available to it. By October, Kean was threatening to issue subpoenas. Another major point of contention between it and the White House was the Commission's expiration date of May 27, 2004. Any extension was opposed by the Bush administration, but once again a vigorous lobbying campaign from the families of victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks forced it to accede to public pressure. In February 2004 it agreed to extend the Commission's life for an additional 60 days. In a final reversal, the administration reluctantly agreed to allow Condoleezza Rice to testify in public and under oath. It had argued against such testimony on executive privilege grounds, seeking to have her testimony carried out in secret as was the case with Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney.

The Commission's reform proposals met with different responses on Capitol Hill and from the White House. Where congressional leaders promised to move quickly on overhauling the intelligence community's structure, the White House urged caution. Acting CIA Director John McLaughlin, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge all spoke out against creating a national intelligence director. With democratic presidential candidate John Kerry endorsing the Commission's report, the Bush administration came under political pressure to do the same. It came out in favor of a national intelligence director but with authority only to coordinate intelligence. Lieberman criticized Bush for wanting a "Potemkin national

intelligence director," whereas republican Senator Arlen Specter (Pa.) referred to it as a shell game.

On October 8, 2004, the House voted 282–134 to create a new national director of intelligence. The Senate had voted in favor of such a move the week before. Their bills differed on the power to be given to that individual. For example, according to the Senate bill, the CIA director "shall be under the authority, direction, and control" of the national intelligence director. In the House version, the CIA director would only "report" to the national intelligence director. By the end of October the House and Senate were deadlocked, with some House Republicans led by Rep. Duncan Hunter (Calif.), chair of the House Armed Services Committee, being adamant that the Pentagon not lose control over its intelligence budget and that the overall budget remain secret. Family members of the victims of the 9/11 attacks called upon President Bush to break the stalemate in favor of the Senate's version of the bill. He did not. Republican opposition in the House remained firm, forcing Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill) to pull the bill from the docket in late November. Behind-the-scenes negotiations produced a compromise acceptable to House Republicans and the White House. President George W. Bush signed The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 on December 17, calling it "the most dramatic reform of our Nation's intelligence capabilities since Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947. Under this new law, our vast intelligence enterprise will become more unified, coordinated, and effective."

The legacy left by the 9/11 Commission has been subject to much debate. Critics have raised four broad areas of concern with the ability of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations to prevent future 9/11s or Pearl Harbors. Even Commission members have raised doubts, although their criticisms have been directed at Congress and the Bush administration. This was most notably the case in December 2005 when members of the 9/11 Commission, acting as the Public Discourse Project, issued a report card on the degree of progress of the Bush administration's implementation of their 41 recommendations. Overall it gave more Fs than it did As. The administration received a B for creating a DNI but a D for intelligence in general.

One line of criticism is that although numerous shortcomings were identified in U.S. intelligence policy by the 9/11 Commission, the structure of the intelligence community was not one of them. The identified problems fell more accurately under the heading of managerial shortcomings. The two are not identical. Management is process oriented. It is concerned with such matters as how individuals approach their work, coordinate their efforts, and are rewarded. Organization is concerned with structure. It deals with the establishment of bureaucratic units and their placement. Where managerial problems frequently are identified as contributing factors to instances of strategic surprise, organization is not. No intelligence organization is immune to being caught unaware.

A second and related criticism is that if the 9/11 Commission was concerned with organizational aspects of intelligence failures, it made the problem worse. Creating a DNI has added an additional layer to the intelligence community and it is a heavy layer. Rather than a powerful staff and lean office with agency heads reporting to one of three deputy directors as put into place, the Office of the DNI contained 1 principal deputy, 4 deputies, 3 associate deputies, and more than 19 assistant deputies. A second move was to establish a National Counterterrorism Center. Establishing joint centers is also

no guarantee of success. In the case of the National Counterterrorism Center, a major factor inhibiting its success is the nature of its database. Although analysts at the Center have access to 26 different information networks spanning the intelligence community no single database unites all 26 and no search engine combs all 26. Finally, in this regard, for many the ultimate test of organizational authority is control over the budget. The DNI emerged with budgetary powers less than those envisioned by the 9/11 Commission. Actions taken by intelligence organizations effectively have further reduced the DNI's budgetary power. Not long after the 9/11 Commission's report was released, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who had spoken out against creating a powerful DNI, announced he would create an Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence who would have authority over all of the Defense Department's intelligence units and control their budgets. The FBI moved 96 percent of its intelligence budget into units not under the jurisdiction of the DNI.

Third, there is continued concern that the culture of intelligence on which the analytical process rests has not changed. Press reports spoke of an atmosphere in the intelligence community that did not encourage skepticism. Studies of how intelligence analysts approached their work documented the pull of the past on current analysis. When given a request, analysts first checked to see what previous intelligence products by that unit had said about the problem and then talked with others to ascertain their views. With these inputs in place the analyst then begins to formulate a response. To break through the stifling influence of status quo thinking observers, including the 9/11 Commission, have called for increasing the diversity of views brought to bear on intelligence matters and hold analysts more accountable for their intelligence products. Evidence on this point is not encouraging. Director of Central Intelligence Porter Goss publicly stated that he would not reprimand any CIA analyst for mistakes made leading up to the Iraq War for fear of further damaging agency morale.

Finally, some maintain that the creation of the 9/11 Commission and its recommendations signified the triumph of domestic politics over intelligence policy. Presidential commissions have become a readily recognizable feature of the American political landscape and the 9/11 Commission was neither the first nor the last presidential commission to examine the analytic and estimating performance of the intelligence community and make recommendations for improvement. Among the core functions commonly identified for presidential commissions is to provide symbolic assurance to the public that the government is aware of the problem and taking steps to deal with it. The history of the 9/11 Commission showed that President Bush resisted its creation and his administration displayed little interest in cooperating with its inquiry, fearing that the Commission would be critical of its pre-9/11 policies. In its immediate response to the release of the Commission's report, the administration was decidedly noncommittal about the merits of its recommendations, although Bush did characterize the report as "an important tool in mapping future strategies against terrorism." He went on to note that many of the actions called for by the Commission had already been taken by his administration.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; Homeland Security Act; Intelligence Community; September 11, 2001; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

NATIONAL DETECTIVE POLICE

The National Detective Police (NDP) was an intelligence organization directed by Lafayette Baker, which pursued Confederate spies and extracted information from them. The NDP's greatest success was the arrest or shooting of the conspirators in the Lincoln assassination.

Lafayette Baker first entered the intelligence world when he walked into the office of Winfield Scott and volunteered to head his espionage division. Scott's embryonic intelligence apparatus was in poor shape—a double agent had penetrated the operation, and ruined efforts to uncover a mole in the U.S. War Department. Scott sent Baker into Virginia, where he gathered some intelligence and, according to Baker's memoirs, bluffed his way past Jefferson Davis. After returning, Baker took on a new assignment. Appointed as provost marshal of the War Department, Baker moved quickly to promote his reputation and to crack down on Confederate intelligence in Washington, DC. Pushing aside the Pinkerton Agency, Baker established the National Detective Police. The grandiose name referred to an organization of 30 men, with responsibilities that focused almost entirely on the capital. In his pursuit of Southern spies, Baker arrested and detained people without charges or trial. His interrogations usually lasted for days, and included questionable tactics such as the use of sleep deprivation, false witnesses, and blank confessions. It must be noted, however, that the usual condition for release was merely taking an oath of allegiance to the United States.

In November of 1861, Baker led a cavalry raid through southern Maryland in order to capture Southern sympathizers and disrupt the communication lines of Confederate intelligence. The raid, meant largely for the benefit of newspaper reporters, accomplished little except angering the residents of the area.

Throughout the war, Baker continued to pressure the Southern sympathizers in the Washington area. One of his greatest coups was the arrest of the Confederate spy Belle Boyd. It was not until the last days of the Civil War, though, that the National Detective Police took on their most important case.

On April 14, 1865, John Wilkes Booth shot and killed President Lincoln. On the same day, co-conspirators shot Secretary of State Seward and stalked Vice President Andrew Johnson, although they made no attempt on his life. The conspirators fled, and remained at large for almost two weeks. Baker took charge of the manhunt, and led the contingent of soldiers that finally cornered Booth. Baker's men set fire to the barn where Booth was hiding, and shot him as he attempted to flee. In the wake of Booth's killing, Baker was promoted to brigadier general.

After the end of the Civil War, Baker's National Detective Police invented new functions for itself. Baker monitored the post office and tracked former Confederate agents. He monitored the activities of Confederate diehards in Canada and Latin America.

Baker also investigated allegations of war profiteering and abuse, which is ironic given lingering questions about his own veracity and accounting. President Johnson discovered that Baker was spying on him, and demanded his resignation in 1867. Baker resigned, but published a book hinting that Booth had been part of a wider conspiracy involving Union officials. He died of meningitis the following year. The National Detective Police was disbanded, although Baker's favored name—the Secret Service—was adopted by the later organization tasked with protecting the president.

See also: Baker, Lafayette; Boyd, Belle; Civil War Intelligence; Confederate Signal and Secret Service Bureau

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

The National Foreign Intelligence Board, an important advisory body which reports to the Director of Central Intelligence, was created on January 14, 1997, pursuant to a directive by the DCI. The NFIB, although established by the DCI, was also formed in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 as amended at that time and Executive Order 12333.

The NFIB was created to serve and to better inform the DCI on the various issues and aspects of national intelligence and the intelligence community. It is responsible for advising the DCI on the gathering, analyzing, and dissemination of national and foreign intelligence; sharing between government branches and agencies; coordinating with foreign governments; protection of sources, agents, and procurement practices; and new intelligence policies and initiatives.

The NFIB is composed of highly ranking intelligence officials who are intricately involved in intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination at their respective posts. It is chaired by the DCI or by the Deputy DCI in the case of the latter's absence. The organizations represented included the CIA, the U.S. military, the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the FBI, the Department of Energy, the Treasury Department, and the National Intelligence Council. On certain occasions, other relevant officials may be invited to attend specific NFIB meetings, either as active participants or simply as observers. For example, a representative of the Department of Commerce and Drug Enforcement Administration is often invited when programs or information within its range of interest are discussed.

See also: Director of Central Intelligence; Executive Orders; Intelligence Community

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NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (GSA) came into existence on November 24, 2003, with the signing of the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill which contained a provision mandating that the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) change its name to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

As was the case with NIMA, GSA is a major combat support agency of the Defense Department. It is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, and operates major facilities in the northern Virginia; Washington, DC; and St. Louis areas and employs cartographers, imagery analysts, computer and telecommunications engineers, photogrammetrists, geodesists, and geospatial analysts.

The GSA is organized into four major directorates. The first is the Analysis and Production Directorate. It provides policy makers, both civilian and military, with the geospatial intelligence they need to make decisions and plans. The Acquisition Directorate focuses on both preacquisition studies as well as obtaining needed systems, engineering, technology, and infrastructure programs. The InnoVision Directorate forecasts future operating environments and defines future needs. Finally, the Source Operations and Management Directorate provides end-to-end support for the production and management of geospatial intelligence requirements.

Although the GSA is among the newest members of the intelligence community, U.S.-government-sponsored research into geospatial intelligence dates as far back as 1803 when President Thomas Jefferson sent Meriwether Lewis and William Clark on an expedition to explore and map the just-acquired Louisiana Territory. A few decades later, in 1830, the U.S. Navy would establish the Depot of Charts and Instruments as it began to map the oceans.

The GSA provides geospatial intelligence for a wide range of needs that extend beyond the boundaries of national security policy. For example the NGA supported Hurricane Katrina relief efforts by providing information to the Federal Emergency Management Agency on affected areas from U.S. government satellites, commercial satellites, and airborne reconnaissance platforms. It also partners with commercial providers of geospatial intelligence to supplement that obtained from U.S. geospatial-intelligence gathering platforms.

See also: Lewis, Meriwether; National Imagery and Mapping Agency

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NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) had a relatively short live span, coming into existence in on October 1, 1996, through the passage of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996 and officially passing out of existence in 2004 with the passage of the Defense Authorization Bill. At that time it became known as the Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

NIMA was responsible for managing imagery and geospatial analysis and production in order to meet national intelligence requirements. Broken down into separate tasks, this meant that among other assignments NIMA was responsible for supporting the intelligence requirements of the State Department and other non–Defense Department intelligence agencies, tasking Defense Department imagery collection agencies to meet the requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence, establishing and consolidating Defense Department geographical information data collection requirements, providing advisory tasking for theater and tactical intelligence consumers, and disseminating imagery intelligence and geospatial information in the most efficient and expeditious means that were consistent with security requirements.

This lengthy and complex set of assignments reflected the political conflict that led to its creation and the agencies that were combined to bring it into existence. Indications that problems existed in the collection of imagery intelligence surfaced publicly in the early 1990s as a result of the perceived inability to provide timely imagery intelligence to combat troops during the Persian Gulf War and the general sense that this would be a key mission that imagery intelligence would have to fulfill in the future. A House Armed Services Committee report on intelligence success and failures in Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield found that collection was generally good and that new imagery intelligence collection platforms proved to be outstanding; substantial shortcomings existed in the distribution of intelligence within the theater especially from the point of view of the air force as only 4 of 12 secondary imagery distribution systems could interact with one another and that the record of analysis efforts was mixed.

In 1992 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates noted in testimony before the House and Senate intelligence committees in April that he had put together an Imagery Task Force. It had recommended establishing a National Imagery Agency that would bring together the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and the Defense Mapping Agency. Gates went on to reveal that he opposed the plan. He also opposed congressional calls for a more thorough reform of imagery intelligence, one that would have created a single agency

with broad control over all means of imagery collection, satellite, and aircraft, from research and development through tasking and analysis of the information obtained.

In spite of Gates' opposition on the next month, on May 6, 1992, a Central Imagery Office was created in the Department of Defense as a combat support agency through simultaneous CIA and Defense Department directives. This office did not absorb any existing imagery intelligence agencies but existed alongside of them. This peaceful coexistence did not last long. During his confirmation hearings to become DCI, John Deutch stated his preference for consolidating all imagery collection, analysis, and distribution duties within a single organization, much like the National Security Agency did for signal intelligence. Once in office Deutch established a National Imagery Agency Steering Committee to look into the matter. A task force put forward 11 different options. In November 1995 Deutch and Secretary of Defense William Perry indicated that they would proceed with the establishment of NIMA.

Unlike the Central Imagery Office, they saw NIMA as absorbing other imagery agencies. Scheduled for inclusion were NPIC, the Defense Mapping Agency, the Central Imagery Office, and portions of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Agency, and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office. When it finally came into existence, NIMA included these organizations along with the CIA's Office of Imagery Analysis and the Defense Dissemination Program Office. All together about 9,000 individuals were moved into NIMA from other agencies.

The move to establish NIMA was not without controversy. Some in Congress feared that while creating NIMA would result in stronger tactical intelligence for military commanders it might also have the effect of diluting the quality of national imagery intelligence that would otherwise be provided by the CIA through NPIC. To lessen this likelihood, the legislation establishing NIMA contained language that ensured the DCI would have a strong voice in the selection of its head and in tasking imagery collection. According to some observers, however, this fear was realized when the United States was caught off guard by the 1998 Indian nuclear explosion.

In addition to its traditional national security missions NIMA was tasked to provide support to the 2002 Winter Olympics in Utah and the Summer 2004 Olympic Games in Greece and surveyed the World Trade Center site after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It reportedly offered to provide images to the Space Shuttle Columbia while it was in orbit in order to try an determine the extent of damage done during takeoff NASA declined this offer but has since entered into a partnership with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to collect imagery on future shuttle flights.

See also: Central Imagery Office; Defense Intelligence Agency; Deutsch, John Mark; Gates, Robert Michael; National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC); National Reconnaissance Office

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

The National Intelligence Authority was a supervisory body for the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). On January 22, 1946, President Harry S. Truman issued a directive that established the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). The NIA consisted of the secretaries of state, war, and navy, and the president's personal representative. Its task was to plan, develop, and coordinate all federal intelligence activities.

In order to substantiate NIA's decisions, the directive also created the post of Director of Central intelligence (DCI) and the CIG. The DCI, designated by the president and responsible for the NIA, was a nonvoting member of the NIA and directed the CIG, the immediate predecessor organization of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose budget and personnel were furnished by the Departments of State, War, and Navy.

When the National Security Act was signed by President Trumann on July 26, 1947, and became effective on September 18, NIA and CIG were replaced by the National Security Council and the CIA, respectively.

See also: Central Intelligence Group; Director of Central Intelligence; Intelligence Community

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

In 1973 the Board of National Estimates and the Office of National Estimates were replaced by a National Intelligence Officer system that became responsible for producing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). In 1979 Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Stansfield Turner set up the National Intelligence Council (NIC) to provide a corporate sense of identity for the National Intelligence Officers, along with a supporting staff structure. It came into being on January 1, 1980.

In the mid-1980s there were three at-large NIOs and NIOs with specific responsibility for Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Near East, South Asia, Latin America, the Soviet Union, Counterterrorism, Science and Technology, Economics, General Purpose Forces, Strategic Programs, Warning, Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities, and Narcotics.

At the time the move to National Intelligence Officers and the elimination of the Board of National Estimates is generally seen as reflecting the diminished importance that NIEs have had in the policy-making process. Where once presidents and their advisors relied upon the intelligence community to provide analysis of information collected by covert or overt means, they now were relying upon their own interpretations of events.

The NIC has had a number of different organizational homes, existing both as part of the Central Intelligence Agency and as an independent operation. Today it reports directly to the Director of National Intelligence. Its principal includes providing a focal point for policy makers in tasking the intelligence community regarding midterm and long-term strategic issues, and helping the intelligence community better allocate its resources in response to policy makers' changing needs.

To accomplish this task, the NIC currently is led by a chairperson who is assisted by a vice chair; a vice chair for evaluation; and two directors, one for strategic plans and outreach and another who is in charge of analysis and production. For analytic purposes the NIC in 2006 was composed of 13 National Intelligence Officers: Africa, East Asia, Economic and Global Issues, Europe, Military Issues, the Near East, Russia and Eurasia, Science and Technology, South Asia, Transnational Threats, Warning, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation, and the Western Hemisphere. Each NIO is charged with (1) becoming knowledgeable about substantive intelligence problems of interest to policy makers, (2) drawing up concept papers and terms for reference for NIEs, (3) participating in the drafting of NIEs, (4) chairing sessions where substantive issues are debated, and (5) ensuring that the final draft accurately reflects the judgment of the Director of National Intelligence.

See also: Board of National Estimates; Central Intelligence Agency; Office of National Estimates; Turner, Admiral Stansfield

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

The National Intelligence Daily served as the intelligence community's main current intelligence product from its introduction under Director of Central Intelligence William Colby until it was renamed the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. Colby, a career intelligence officer, had long recommended that the CIA's National Intelligence Digest should be recast from a magazine to a document that took on the appearance of a daily newspaper. That manner of presentation he argued more effectively conveyed the relative importance of items to readers and better allowed them to determine what issues they wished to read more about. Experience with the National Intelligence Daily as a newspaper showed that this format was too inflexible and it returned to a magazine-style publication.

The National Intelligence Daily was one of several different current intelligence products produced by the intelligence community on a daily basis, including the President's Daily Brief (CIA), the National Intelligence Daily (CIA with IC-wide input), the Secretary's Morning Summary (Department of State), National Military Joint Intelligence Center Daily (Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] with input from other IC members), and the SIGINT Digest (National Security Agency). As a product

of the CIA, the National Intelligence Daily bore the CIA seal on its masthead. Under DCI William Webster the seals of all members of the intelligence community were placed there at the urging of another intelligence agency.

The National Intelligence Daily and its successor, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, contain six to eight relatively short articles that address events which have occurred over the last day or two or which are expected to take place in the near future. It is made available to several hundred senior officials in the executive branch as well to members of the Congressional Oversight Committees. Coverage is said to approximate that of the President's Daily Brief but excludes sensitive information and information that would identify sources and methods.

One example of a National Intelligence Daily is a declassified report issued on June 20, 1981, "USSR-Poland: Polish Military Attitudes." It takes up the question of the reaction of the Polish military to a possible Soviet invasion of Poland. The report concluded that most of the Polish military command is alienated from the Soviet Union and likely to resist an invasion. A second example is a 1987 two-page story on the situation in Lebanon that surfaced as a result of a photo of an issue of the National Intelligence Daily that was inadvertently placed on the cover of the Foreign Service Journal.

Criticism about the National Intelligence Daily and similar intelligence community publications have come from two very different directions. Some argue that there is too much duplication in the material being presented and that the Intelligence Community should eliminate some products. Others argue that these products overwhelm policy makers with more intelligence than they need or can process. The solution here is not necessarily to eliminate products but to better differentiate among audiences and platforms for the dispersal of intelligence.

See also: National Intelligence Estimates; National Intelligence Survey

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

Information gathered through espionage and open sources is not self-interpreting. To be of value it must first be analyzed and interpreted. After that it must be communicated to policy makers. In addition to oral briefings, five different written means have been employed by the intelligence community for this purpose. They are background or encyclopedic type reports, current intelligence documents that summarize the contemporary situation, warning intelligence documents that highlight and pinpoint unfolding dangerous situation that may require an American response, daily briefs to presidents and other key policy makers that present the latest intelligence on subjects of interest and estimates that project a current military, political, or economic situation or problem into the future.

The most authoritative estimates are known as National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). They represent the consensus assessment of the intelligence community as to how a situation containing national security implications is likely to unfold. As such, an NIE is not a prediction of a specific event occurring at a specific time and place. Rather, it is a net assessment of probable future courses of action and developments. Not surprisingly, the content of NIEs are often highly contested as by their very nature they often deal with topics around which great controversy exists and where the consequences of being wrong can be momentous.

In the cold war years the great majority of NIEs focused on the Soviet Union and its allies. Of particular note were the questions of the projected strength of Soviet bombers and Soviet missile forces. In each case the intelligence community was internally divided, with the air force supporting more alarmist interpretations of a bomber gap and missile gap. Incomplete interpretation, organizational self-interest, and partisan political concerns were major contributing factors to these intelligence controversies. Intelligence obtained through aerial and later satellite surveillance helped bring an end to these controversies and the fears they engendered.

Improved intelligence did not, however, bring an end to disagreements over the aims, purposes, and composition of Soviet military power. The 1970s saw renewed controversy as the United States and Soviet Union entered into arms control negotiations. This intelligence debate culminated in the B Team exercise in which a group of outside experts holding far more hostile and ominous interpretations of Soviet policy was convened to challenge and reexamine the intelligence community's assessment. Controversial Soviet-oriented NIEs in the 1980s dealt with Nicaragua.

The pace of production of NIEs has been uneven, reflecting such factors as the foreign policy agenda of the administration, its receptivity to intelligence, and the degree of internal disagreement within the intelligence community. From 1960 to 1962 at least 14 NIEs were produced on various aspects of Soviet military and economic capabilities. In the last years of the Carter administration only about a dozen NIEs were written. Thirty-eight NIEs were written in 1981 and 60 were produced the following year. The number of NIEs in 1997 was down 60 percent from where it had been only a few years before. This decrease reflected the fact that there no longer existed a country with the military power capable of threatening the United States. It also reflected changes in technology which brought more and more information directly to the attention of policy makers and the desire of presidents and their aides to direct all aspects of American foreign policy from the White House. With the end of the cold war and the break-up of the Soviet Union, NIEs also began to address a wider array of foreign policy topics including the global energy situation, North Korea, terrorism, South Africa, Iraq, Zaire, France, the former Yugoslavia, global humanitarian emergencies, and France.

The end of the cold war has not made the content of NIEs any less controversial, as witnessed by the NIE produced just before the Iraq War. An NIE on Iraq was commissioned only after Senator Bob Graham, who was then chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, asked Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to produce one. The administration had not produced an NIE because according to Tenet "we had covered parts of all those programs over 10 years through NIEs and other reports, and we had a ton of community product on all these issues." Where normally NIEs

may take months to produce, as the intelligence community comes to a judgment on a question, the Iraq NIE, some 90 pages long, was produced in three weeks. One senior intelligence official described it as a "cut and paste job." A draft NIE was sent to the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Department of Energy's intelligence unit, the National Image and Mapping Agency, and the National Security Agency on September 23. On September 25 mid- to senior-level officials from these agencies met on the draft. On September 26, the CIA produced a coordinated draft NIE. It was reviewed by Tenet and the heads of the above agencies on October 1. The next day Tenet briefed the Senate Intelligence Committee on its content. Compounding matters was the later admission that neither President George W. Bush nor National S Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice did not read the 90-page report in its entirety and failed to see the objections raised by the State Department to claims that aluminum purchased by Iraq was for nuclear weapons or that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa. The State Department's dissent that Iraq was not reconstituting its nuclear weapons program came at the end of the first paragraph and in an 11-page annex.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; National Intelligence Daily; National Intelligence Survey

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

National Intelligence Surveys are classified encyclopedic treatment of countries that provide policy makers and analysts with basic information. Typical entries would include government, geography, economy, communications, transportation, science and technology, military, and intelligence.

Chronologically it followed the publication of the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) during World War II. Beginning in 1943 and through 1947, 34 JANIS were produced that provided the military with basic information about countries in different theaters of operation. After the war it was determined that the need for this type of basic information still existed and National Security Council Intelligence Directive #3 of 13 January 1948 authorized the production of the National Intelligence Survey under the general direction of the Central intelligence Agency but with participation from all members of the intelligence community. Once produced, a volume in the National Intelligence Survey series would be periodically updated. For

countries such as the Soviet Union and China, several volumes were needed to catalog all of the pertinent information, whereas for others one volume was sufficient.

By the mid-1960s the National Intelligence Survey series had, according to one Director of Central Intelligence, grown to be "10 times the size of the Encyclopedia Britannica." The series was terminated in 1974 largely because it was found to be less important for analysts and policy makers than other products. Increasingly policy makers favored current intelligence and estimates over basic intelligence. Analysts found that their own expertise plus working documents provided them with sufficient information to proceed with their tasks.

See also: National Intelligence Daily; National Intelligence Estimates

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NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER (NPIC)

The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) was established within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to be a community-wide asset in the interpretation of aerial photos. It grew out of the CIA's Photographic Intelligence Center and later was collapsed, along with several other imagery interpretation and production units, to form the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). Today NIMA is known as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

The CIA's Photographic Intelligence Center was not the first unit with the agency tasked with the interpretation of aerial photographs. It was preceded by the Photographic Intelligence Division, which was established in 1953 with 13 photo interpreters under the direction of Arthur Lundahl. In 1958 it was merged with a statistical unit to form the Photographic Intelligence Center. A few years later, in 1961, in recognition of the increased volume of aerial and satellite photographs now being produced and their value to analysts throughout the intelligence community and not just the CIA, the Photographic Intelligence Center was made a "service of common concern."

The 1950s and early 1960s saw considerable disagreement between intelligence agencies over the state of Soviet military power and gave rise to such controversies as the bomber gap and the missile gap. Aerial photography did much to end these controversies but it not escape unscathed from the growing sense among policy makers that the intelligence community was in need of reform. In 1958 the Eisenhower administration planned to undertake a series of studies on the structure and organization of the government. Intelligence was one area recommended for study. Action was not forthcoming until after the U-2 incident in which an American aerial reconnaissance plane was shot down over Soviet territory in May 1960 on the eve of a U.S.-Soviet summit conference in Paris. The pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was captured alive.

After the U-2 incident, CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick was placed in charge of intelligence with special attention to military intelligence. It produced a list of 42 recommendations one of which was the creation of a National Photographic Interpretation Center to better coordinate the production and dissemination of photographic intelligence. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara acted on this recommendation and NPIC came into existence in 1961. For the early part of its existence, NPIC was part of the CIA's Intelligence Directorate. In the mid-1970s Director of Central Intelligence William Colby transferred it to the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate.

NPIC photo interpreters did not undertake an extensive analysis of the material they received. Rather, they did a quick and dirty analysis, often based on a list of items of interest such as Soviet missile silos. Within 48 hours after its receipt NPIC would provide a preliminary report and send photos that were of potential interest on for further analysis. Still, their initial analysis often was quite definitive. NPIC was able to document that Soviet bombers were being crated up for shipment back to the Soviet Union at the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis and that intermediate range ballistic missile sites at San Critobal and Remedios had been abandoned.

NPIC was absorbed into NIMA in 1996 due to growing dissatisfaction with the production and dissemination of imagery intelligence during the Persian Gulf War. Some in Congress objected to incorporating NPIC into NIMA on the grounds that the new structure favored military tactical intelligence at the expense of national strategic intelligence. This argument did not, however, prevent the establishment of NIMA.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Colby, William Egan; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; National Imagery and Mapping Agency; U-2 Incident

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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is formally responsible for managing and supervising the development of space reconnaissance systems and related intelligence activities needed to support global information superiority. Its emergence as a major force in the intelligence collection efforts of the United States is symbolic of the position of importance that technological intelligence collection has assumed. Espionage is no longer the exclusive province of human spies. It is an activity engaged in from great distances by expensive and highly sophisticated devices that listen to conversations; take pictures; and capture signals emitted from aircraft, missiles, and satellites.

The NRO was established by President Dwight Eisenhower by executive order in August 1960. It became operational on September 6, 1961, following an agreement

between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the air force setting it up as a joint CIA-air force operation. Its existence did not become public until 1973 when a Senate report inadvertently failed to remove its name from a list of intelligence agencies whose budgets were to be made public. Its existence was not officially recognized until September 18, 1992.

The importance of moving beyond human intelligence in gathering scientific and technical information on Soviet missile developments was quickly recognized after World War II. The knowledge of captured scientists and technicians would soon become obsolete and gathering additional information through traditional means of espionage would be difficult. A 1946 RAND Corporation study, Preliminary Design for an Experimental World Circling Spaceship, suggested a long-term solution to the problem. Another RAND study pointed to the short-term solution, the development of an aircraft capable of penetrating Soviet airspace and taking pictures of missile installations and test facilities. This aircraft became the U-2. From the outset policy makers recognized that U-2 flights would produce a counter-response by the Soviet Union, which would limit its long-term utility. As such in March 1955 the air force issued General Operational Requirement #80 that set out the desired specifications of an advanced reconnaissance satellite.

Both the air force and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) put forward competing concepts and satellite systems. The air force program was initially referred to as the Advanced Reconnaissance System. It was soon relabeled as the SENTRY system and then SAMOS. The CIA plan was known as CORONA. In February 1958 President Eisenhower gave his support to CORONA in large part out of concerns that the air force plan would not lead to an operational satellite quickly enough. These concerns became intensified in May 1960 when a U-2 plane was shot down over Soviet airspace and its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was captured alive. These developments did not end the air force program. Instead it was reorganized in an effort to speed it up and improve the performance of its satellites. With competing satellite programs still under way, two of the principal movers behind the U-2 spy plane and satellites, James Killian and Edwin Land, called for a CIA-air force satellite partnership. The two intelligence organizations had worked together successfully on the U-2 and Killian and Land now urged the creation of a permanent joint venture.

Given this history, the NRO was not envisioned as a stand-alone unified organization. It was seen as a loose federation of those parts of the CIA and air force that were involved in the development and operation of satellites. Predictably, the result was repeated conflicts between the CIA and the air force over such matters as the selection of reconnaissance missions, launch schedules, and the technical specifications of the satellites being developed.

From its inception until 1992, NRO's programs tended to divide into three groups. Program A consisted of the Air Force Office of Special Projects which was in charge of developing reconnaissance satellites. Program B consisted of CIA reconnaissance projects including the CORONA satellite and the U-2, an A-12 reconnaissance aircraft. Program C was made up of the navy's signals intelligence satellite project known as GRAB (Galactic Radiation and Background). From 1963 through 1969 a second air force program was Project D. It was the air force's version of the CIA's aerial

reconnaissance effort. In 1969 it was placed under the jurisdiction of the Strategic Air Command. It was terminated in 1970 or 1971.

In 1992 Director of Central Intelligence announced a major reorganization of the NRO. No longer would it be restructured around the three separate agency intelligence projects. Instead there would be three functional acquisitions and operations directorates organized around IMINT (imagery intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), and COMINT (communications intelligence). Five years later a fourth directorate was established. It grew out of a project that was investigating the potential utility of small reconnaissance satellites. Other offices include Management Services and Operations, Plans and Analysis, Space Launch, and Operational Support. The NRO does not analyze the information it collects but distributes the pictures and signals intercepts to other intelligence agencies where the analysis takes place.

CORONA was the NRO's first photo reconnaissance satellite. Although its first test flight took place on February 28, 1959, the first successful mission did not take place until August 12, 1960. CORONA's pictures were jettisoned back to earth in film capsules, where they were caught in midair and then developed and disseminated for analysis. The 145th and last CORONA mission was launched on May 25, 1972.

A second major photo reconnaissance satellite program was the Keyhole launch series that went by the designator KH. Particularly important in the series were the KH-11 launches, the first of which took place on December 19, 1976. The last launch in the original KH series took place on November 6, 1988, and remained in orbit for seven and one-half years. What made the KH-11 series so important was that they produced near real-time photographs. Among the missions it was used for were trying to find where in the U.S. embassy in Tehran the American hostages were being held in 1980. It also revealed the existence of Soviet programs to construct new super submarines and mini aircraft carriers and disproved reports of a new Soviet chemical-biological-warfare center.

Also of importance is the LACROSSE series, which initially was known as INDIGO and later as VEGA. Rather than take pictures, this satellite carries imaging radar that allows it to operate even when targets of interest are covered by clouds. Between 1991 and 1996 LACROSSE satellites were tasked with covering such diverse tasks as missile and nuclear activity in China, North Korea, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, and India as well as refugee movements in Rwanda and narcotics convoys in Laos.

With the end of the cold war the place of the NRO in the intelligence community is being reexamined. Many believe that technological intelligence collection has been emphasized to the detriment of human intelligence collection and that a better balance between the two needs to be restored. This is especially so in light of the emergence of terrorists as the prime national security threat to the United States. Additionally, the NRO has found itself being asked to provide more tactical information for the military. The first tactical use of NRO capabilities came in Bosnia in 1996.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; CORONA; Director of Central Intelligence; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Post–Cold War Intelligence; Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Incident

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

Following the conclusion of World War II, American officials intended to reform the nation's military system in light of the wartime experiences. For instance, the war caused President Harry S. Truman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other civilian and military leaders to favor the unification of the armed services into an integrated system. Additionally, the developing cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union reinforced their decision to centralize defense and foreign policies. More importantly, federal planners believed that modernizing the U.S. national security programs through the establishment of new institutions to coordinate military and diplomatic strategies would reduce security threats and promote lasting world peace.

On July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, which realigned the U.S. armed forces; coordinated domestic, foreign, and military policies; and created new security agencies. The Act established the U.S. Air Force as an independent armed service, and it coordinated the navy, army, and air force under the National Military Establishment headed by the secretary of defense. Air force officials favored the plan because they believed that it would protect their interests against the army in regards to scarce funds. However, the navy opposed the unification of the armed forces because it feared that the air force and army would dominate the new military system. Despite the navy's misgivings, James Forrestal took office as the first secretary of defense on September 17, 1947.

The act solved the problems associated with interservice coordination by stipulating that the three military branches would be administered as individual executive departments, and had specific powers and duties. For example, each of the service secretaries had a right to appeal to the president regarding military policies.

According to the National Security Act, the secretary of defense, the three service secretaries, and the three service chiefs constituted the War Council. Additionally, the three service chiefs and a Chief of Staff comprised a Joint Chiefs of Staff organization.

The National Security Act of 1947 also created the National Security Council (NSC), which was a defense planning group designed to coordinate national security policy. Composed of the president, chairman of the National Security Resources Board, secretary of state, secretary of defense, secretary of the air force, secretary of the army, secretary of the navy, and other department and agency heads appointed by

the president, the NSC discussed all problems relating to the defense of the nation. In 1949, an amendment to National Security Act dropped the military service secretaries from the NSC and added the vice president as a member of the group. The permanent staff of the NSC remained small during its initial years of operation, but its personnel increased to 70 by 1980.

Additionally, the Act established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to coordinate intelligence-gathering activities of the various government agencies. Personnel in the CIA interpreted information relating to foreign and domestic actions deemed as vital to national security. The agency also provided facts and information to help the National Security Council and other federal institutions in making plans and decisions.

Other organizations established by the National Security Act of 1947 included the National Security Resources Board, which advised the president on issues relating to the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization for future war efforts; the Munitions Board, which coordinated the procurement activities of the three armed services; and the Research and Development Board, which coordinated military research and development.

In March 1949, President Truman amended the National Security Act to provide the secretary of defense with more authority. The amendment also changed the National Military Establishment into the U.S. Department of Defense. Thus, the three military branches were no longer administered as separate executive departments; instead they became military departments within the Department of Defense.

The National Security Act of 1947 represented a major component of the U.S. cold war strategy. The legislation established a variety of institutions that enabled the nation to cope effectively with threats to its security.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Intelligence Community; National Security Council; Office of Strategic Services

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NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

The national security advisor, also known as the assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, directs and oversees the work of the National Security Council. Over time the national security advisor has emerged as the president's principal advisor on national security affairs, although this individual's actual influence has varied from administration to administration. As an assistant to the president and not a cabinet secretary running a department such as the secretary of state or secretary of defense, the national security advisor is not subject to Senate confirmation.

The National Security Council came into existence as a result of the National Security Act of 1947. Under President Harry Truman, the National Security Council was directed by Sidney Souers who held the title of executive secretary. This position was transformed into that of the national security advisor by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953. Robert Cutler was the first national security advisor. Initially the national security advisor served primarily as an impartial communication link between the national security bureaucracies and president as each distanced themselves from national security council decision making.

The national security advisor became a more visible and politically important figure in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and the growing American involvement in the Vietnam War. In part this was due to the greater role that the national security council staff began to play in decision making. It also reflected the change in orientation that Walt Rostow brought to the position under Johnson. He saw himself less as a facilitator and more as a policy advocate. Behind these changes lay a common refrain coming from presidents that the national security bureaucracies lacked an appreciation or understanding of the presidential perspective on foreign policy matters and instead were trying to advance their own particular bureaucratic and professional agendas.

Perhaps the most powerful national security advisor was Henry Kissinger who held that position under President's Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Kissinger and Nixon distrusted the national security bureaucracy in general and the Central Intelligence Agency in particular. Consequently they concentrated national security decision making in the White House and controlled the national security bureaucracies through an elaborate National Security Council committee system that he personally controlled. Also powerful was Zbigniew Brzezinski who held the post under President Jimmy Carter. However, unlike Kissinger who dominated over Secretary of State William Rogers, Brzezinski frequently clashed with Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The result was that important foreign policy decisions made at the National Security Council, such as those pertaining to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, were not always effectively communicated to the State Department. Vance would resign in protest over the failure to inform him of the failed hostage rescue effort.

The influence of the national security advisor declined in the Reagan administration with the appointment of a series of weak individuals who were unable to mediate the conflicts between Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey. Only with the selection of Colin Powell late in the Reagan administration and the departure of these individuals did the National Security Council system begin to operate smoothly.

The trend since the Reagan administration has been to appoint relatively low-keyed and knowledgeable individuals to the position of national security advisor. As with early national security advisors, they have seen their task as primarily that of protecting the president and serving as a mediator among competing bureaucratic interests. They have not sought to invite conflict with the secretaries of state and defense or the head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Nor have they sought to inject themselves into the day-to-day operations of these agencies.

Neither the mediator nor policy advocate approach by the national security advisor guarantees the effective use of intelligence in the policy process. Problems of over selling intelligence obtained through espionage, competition among agencies, and the production

of "intelligence to please" have occurred under both approaches as evidenced by the histories of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars.

See also: Kissinger, Henry Alfred; National Security Council

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

The National Security Agency (NSA) was established by a secret executive order, National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 6 entitled "Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence," on September 15, 1952. That directive remains secret. A version of NSCID No. 6 dated February 17, 1972, states the director of the NSA "shall exercise full control over all SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) collection and processing activities of the United States and to produce SIGINT in accordance with the objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence Board." It formally came into existence on November 4, 1952. So secret was the NSA that its existence was not even mentioned indirectly by U.S. government organizational manuals until 1957 when a reference appeared to an organization performing "highly specialized technical and coordinating functions relating to national security."

The NSA is the successor organization to the Armed Forces Security Agency. It was set up as the result of a Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive signed by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson on May 20, 1949. Located within the Defense Department, the Armed Forces Security Agency was assigned responsibility for directing the communications intelligence and electronic intelligence of the three military services signals intelligence units. In spite of this broad mandate, the Armed Forces Security Agency had little power. For the most part its activities consisted of tasks not being performed by the Army Agency, the Naval Security Group, and the Air Force Security Service, the units whose work it was to direct.

Walter Bedell Smith, President Harry S. Truman's executive director of the National Security Council, found this state of affairs to be unsatisfactory. He wrote a memo in December 1951 calling for a review of communications intelligence activities, calling the current system for collecting and processing communications intelligence "ineffective." Three days later, on December 13, 1951, the National Security Council

Headquarters of the National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Although the agency's budget and number of employees are classified, the NSA is the U.S. government's largest intelligence agency. (National Security Agency)

set up a committee commonly referred to as the Brownell Committee, after its chair Herbert Brownell, to examine the matter. The Brownell Committee recommended strengthening the national level coordination and direction of communications intelligence activities. The NSA was created as a result of these recommendations.

SIGINT is signals intelligence. It is typically used as an overarching term referring to three different types of intelligence-gathering efforts. First, it refers to intelligence obtained by intercepting communications. Second, it refers to intelligence gathered by monitoring data relayed during weapons testing. Third, it can refer to electronic emissions of weapons and tracking systems.

SIGINT is gathered by earth-based collectors such as ships, planes, or ground sites as well as by satellites. Key ground stations are located in Colorado, Great Britain, Australia, Turkey, Japan, and Germany. Protecting and securing NSA earth-based collection platforms has often presented significant challenges to U.S. foreign policy. In 1967 the USS *Liberty*, a signals collection ship, was bombed inadvertently by Israeli forces during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Similarly, during the Vietnam War, the C Turner Joy and Maddox were reportedly attacked in 1964 by North Vietnamese forces in the Gulf of Tonkin in an action that provided the justification for a major escalation of the U.S. war effort. Both ships were on intelligence-gathering missions for the Navy Security Group. Turkey has repeatedly threatened to evict the United States from listening posts in retaliation either for U.S. support of Greece in conflicts over Cyprus or for American support of Armenian claims of Turkish genocide. NSA listening posts in Iran were a reason that the United States continued to support the Shah in Iran in the face of rising opposition.

One of the major challenges faced by the NSA is deciphering the raw information it obtains. Much of SIGINT is encrypted. The information is encased in a code that must be broken. Decoding information thus is a major component of NSA's work. Given the volume of information that must be studied and the time-sensitive nature of intelligence work, computers are an important tool for finding patterns within the flow of information and determining what it means. The high cost of its computer systems makes the NSA budget the largest of all members of the intelligence community. NSA's leading role in breaking codes has, on occasion, placed it at the center of controversy with private firms and organizations. In the 1970s it was accused of deliberately recommending changes in the creation of a Data Encryption Standard that would potentially make it easier for NSA to break commercial and governmental codes.

NSA was also involved in debates in the 1990s over exporting cryptography software and hardware.

NSA does not engage in analysis. It is a collector of raw information. The job of translating that information into intelligence falls upon the analytic agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The line between collecting SIGINT and interpreting it is a fine one and in reality analysis does take place. Often this creates tension in the intelligence community when the results of NSA information gathering/analysis can be presented directly to policy makers and not filtered through other agencies. This occurred during the Carter administration when Admiral B. R. Inman, head of NSA, reported that it had found evidence of a previously unreported Russian "combat brigade" in Cuba. Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Stansfield Turner was angered by Inman's conclusion, feeling it crossed the line from collection to analysis. The report subsequently became public and created a serious problem for the administration. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had denied the allegations in private. Now, satellite photos confirmed the presence of between 2,000 to 3,000 Russian troops in Cuba. For its part, the CIA and other elements of the intelligence community believed that those troops had been in Cuba for at least three years.

Beyond breaking foreign codes, the NSA is charged with the task of making and protecting U.S. codes. The highly sensitive nature of this work has made the NSA a target for penetration by foreign intelligence services. One of the more publicized cases of foreign penetration was the arrest of Richard Pelton in 1985. Pelton had worked for NSA from 1965 to 1979 and worked for the Soviet Union from 1980 until his arrest. Among the operations compromised was a project to tap Soviet underwater cables in the Sea of Okhostk off of the coast of Siberia.

The NSA has also become repeatedly embroiled in domestic controversy because of its involvement in espionage carried out in the United States and against Americans. Executive Order 12333 from 1981 allows NSA to collect foreign intelligence and counterintelligence but prohibits it from "acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of U.S. persons." Three secret NSA espionage programs directed against American citizens have received special notoriety.

NSA espionage against Americans is often identified as beginning with the Kennedy administration and its interest in Cuba. The target of these early NSA communication intercepts, begun in 1962, were American racketeers whose names were given to NSA officials by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In the late 1960s the target list changed. An October 20, 1967, top-secret message sent by William Yarborough, the army's assistant chief of staff, to NSA Director Marshall Carter requested assistance in obtaining information about possible foreign influences on civil disturbances in the United States. Specially included here were peace groups and Black power organizations. The army, CIA, DIA, and FBI all began providing NSA with names. On July 1, 1969, this domestic surveillance program officially and secretly became christened Operation MINARET. Between 1967 and 1973 when it was terminated by Attorney General Elliot Richardson over 5,925 foreign and 1,690 organizations and U.S. citizens were included on this watch list. In 1975 NSA Director Lew Allen acknowledged that over 3,900 reports had been written on watch-listed Americans.

A second major secret NSA domestic communications intercept program was Operation SHAMROCK. Its origins precede NSA and date back to the closing days of World War II when in August 1945 Brigadier General W. Preston Corderman Chief of the Signal Security Agency, the predecessor of the Armed Forces Security Agency, launched an effort to persuade ITT, Western Union, and RCA to take part in a plan whereby incoming and outgoing cable traffic into the United States would be microfilmed. At one point 150,000 messages per month were being copied and analyzed. Operation SHAMROCK was terminated in 1975 by NSA Director Lew Allen.

The third major NSA program is ECHELON. It intercepts radio and satellite communications, telephone calls, faxes, and emails from almost anywhere in the world through a system of intercept stations operated by the UKUSA community. Under an agreement worked out among U.S. allies after World War II each member of the system is responsible for monitoring a different area. The information gathered is the analyzed through a series of supercomputers and made available to the intelligence agencies of member states (U.S., Great Britain, Canada, Australia). An estimated three billion communications are intercepted daily. NSA critics argue that ECHELON is used to get around prohibitions on spying on Americans. When the existence of these types of programs came to light they served as a major rationale for writing legislative charters for the members of the intelligence community. These efforts stalemated and no legislative charter for NSA was written.

Questions about the existence, legality, and effectiveness of NSA domestic surveillance program erupted again on December 16, 2005, when stories broke that in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks the George W. Bush administration had authorized NSA to conduct warrantless phone taps on individuals inside the United States calling individuals outside the United States. The Bush administration claimed the program was limited and restricted in nature, focusing on legitimate national security issues. Further controversy erupted in May 2006 when it was reported that the NSA had been secretly collecting the phone records of Americans obtained from AT&T, Verizon, and Bell South. Qwest also was approached but declined to participate.

Where the Bush administration claimed the authority to conduct such programs on several grounds including inherent presidential commander and chief powers, critics argued that he had bypassed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court set up by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1975 that was designed to provide presidents with a means for obtaining secret warrants while at the same time protecting American civil liberties. Critics also raised doubts about the effectiveness of these domestic surveillance programs, arguing that terrorists had long since abandoned any heavy reliance on telephones to reduce the likelihood of having their communications intercepted and identities uncovered.

See also: Armed Forces Security Agency; Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; ECHELON; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1947; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; Intelligence Community; MINARET, Project; SHAMROCK, Project; UKUSA

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NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE

Founded in 1985 by Thomas Blanton, the National Security Archive is a private nonprofit organization that serves as a repository for declassified information obtained under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Based at George Washington University, it "serves as a repository of government records on a wide range of topics pertaining to the national security, foreign, intelligence, and economic policies of the United States." Documents are also acquired through mandatory declassification, court records, congressional records, presidential libraries, and through diligent pursuit of information by the Archive's staff.

The Archive provides access to documents primarily through its Web site and at its reading room in George Washington University's Gelman Library. In addition, it publishes portions of its collections on microfiche, CD-ROMs, and books, as well as providing e-mail updates to subscribers.

The Archive has long emphasized the declassification of intelligence-related documents. Over the past 15 years, it has published documents collections from the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Iran-Contra affair, which drew heavily from previously unseen files from intelligence agencies. Additionally, it published a top-secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) study of the Bay of Pigs debacle in which the CIA's internal auditor blamed the CIA for the failure of the program. In 2006 it released documents on the CIA's activities during the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, Poland in the 1970s and 1980s, and war games on Iraq.

The Archive has clashed repeatedly with the CIA over its interpretation of the FOIA and of the Clinton administration's rules for declassification. In 2006, the Archive sued the CIA for illegally charging journalists copying fees for documents obtained under FOIA requests. Furthermore, the Archive uncovered a secret reclassification program that sought to remove from public circulation documents concerning U.S. nuclear weapons and intelligence programs from as early as the Truman administration. The ensuing public outcry forced a reexamination of the program.

See also: Bay of Pigs; Central Intelligence Agency; Cuban Missile Crisis; Iran-Contra Affair

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council was established in 1947 as an interagency cabinet-level position responsible for advising the president and coordinating various forms of policy to developing and ratifying policy decisions related to the defense and security of the United States.

Post–World War II decisions over armed services unification were finally achieved through compromise in 1947. During World War II it became apparent that there existed certain inadequacies in civil-military policy coordination, between the various service branches, and means of intelligence gathering. The main concern was that if there was going to be a unified military force, civil-military coordination had to be improved. Such improvement in terms of policy coordination also required more coherent intelligence support. A combination of problems at the beginning of World War II, along with an emerging cold war with the Soviet Union, led to the enactment of the National Security Act. The bill was signed into law on July 26, 1947. It created a number of permanent structures within the government: a National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate policy, composed of the president, vice president, secretary of state, the newly created secretary of defense, a Department of Defense, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The act became a central document in cold war policy making. Although the act did not unify the armed services—the U.S. Air Force was now recognized as a separate branch and the marines were not absorbed by the army—it nonetheless increased the coordination of the national security establishment.

The council's creation as a mechanism to coordinate military and foreign policy was initially proposed in the 1946 Eberstadt Report. Ferdinand Eberstadt, a former business colleague of Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal, proposed an American version of the British Committee of Imperial Defense. Forrestal's worry about unifying the armed services led him to support the creation of a National Security Council as a way to guarantee "timely and unified action in time of crisis, avoid the organizational confusion of World War II, and check the authority of a president." More directly, Forrestal had little confidence in Truman and considered the council's creation as a way to offset a strong secretary of defense. His primary objective was to preserve the navy's autonomy. The navy failed in its attempts to block the creation of a secretary of defense but did manage to win support for the permanent establishment of a National Security Council.

In the 1947 act Congress declared that the NSC's purpose would be to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies" in order to provide for more effective cooperation in national security policy making. The council was also given the authority to supervise the Central Intelligence Agency, recently created to monitor overseas intelligence gathering. At first, council members were the president, secretary of defense, secretary of state, the three service secretaries—army,

President Harry S. Truman with members of the National Security Council (NSC) on August 19, 1948. Truman was the first president to have an NSC. From left to right, clockwise around the table: Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Sidney Souers, National Security Resources Board Chairman Arthur M. Hill, Director of Central Intelligence Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, President Truman, Under Secretary of the Navy W. John Kenney.
(Harry S. Truman Presidential Library)

navy, and air force—chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and other such officials as the president chose to appoint. A 1949 amendment removed the service secretaries and the National Security Resources Board, and replaced them with the vice president and designated the director of Central Intelligence and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as statutory advisers.

With the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–1953), Truman elevated the NSC's status. He regularly presided over its meetings and designated a senior staff under the direction of the council's executive secretary. He also integrated it into the executive office of the presidency. In 1950, he appointed well-known democrat, W. Averill Harriman, as a special assistant, authorized to monitor the implementation of national security policy. During Truman's presidency one of the council's most comprehensive and ambitious memoranda was NSC 68. Issued on April 14, 1950, and titled, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," it called for massive increases in

military spending to support the U.S. position in Europe and Asia. This document highlighted the U.S. policy of containment against the threat of Communist expansion.

Upon leaving the presidency of Columbia University to head the nation in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower made the most use of the NSC. Throughout his eight years in office, Eisenhower met the council on a weekly basis. He designated Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray to serve, at various times, as special assistant to the president for national security affairs. He relied heavily on his assistants and instituted auxiliary planning and coordinating boards to develop position papers offering guidelines for official state policy on many different issues. Among some of the more important papers the council issued were those on basic national security policy delineating foreign and military policy in Asia, Latin America, and Europe; concepts detailing strategic objectives; and standard requirements for foreign aid and military capabilities. Of all presidents during the cold war period, Eisenhower made the most of the council as an advisory body.

Unlike Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy dismantled much of the complex structure of the NSC. During his brief tenure, Kennedy and the council rarely met. His chief national security assistant, McGeorge Bundy, was directed to turn the NSC staff "into an instrument that could work quickly and secretly at the president's command and develop a 'White House' perspective that was not restricted by the bureaucracy's recommendations." Burdened by the debacle in Vietnam, moreover, Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, did away with council meetings, opting, instead, for policy discussion and coordination over luncheon meetings on Tuesdays.

As a forum for policy discussion the council did not fare much better under Richard Nixon or Gerald Ford. Chief executives were now more inclined to pay lip service to the council. Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, created new decision-making parties such as the Washington Special Action Group. Secrecy and limiting information to a select few guided his actions. When it came to arms control talks with the Soviet Union or normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China, Nixon and Kissinger avoided the council's input. Instead, they favored secret communications or "backchannels" with key allies and opponents.

In an effort to allay the fears of agency heads and chief negotiators who felt that they were being left out of the process, President Jimmy Carter and his national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, enabled the NSC staff to play central roles when it came to offering policy advice. The Carter administration did sustain the trend toward a strong national security advisor and an important role for the NSC, but also put in place certain structures and policies governing its actions. The revelations of the "Pentagon Papers" of the Vietnam era had made chief executives more cautious with respect to the dissemination of national security information.

The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, following on the heels of the Iranian hostage crisis, witnessed the new president's desire for cabinet members, not national security advisors, to play a dominant role in policy making. Reagan did not have a major national security advisor, choosing rather to showcase the role of his secretary of state. Reagan was far more determined to reawaken the spirit of patriotism in the United States and devoted a good portion of his foreign policy to ending Communism in Eastern Europe through a massive U.S. military buildup. Yet the role of activism in policy making and implementation of programs by the NSC staff was clearly evident

in the "Iran-Contra" roles played by national security advisors Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter as well as their assistant, Lt. Colonel Oliver North.

With the cold war at an end and the sour taste regarding Iran-Contra, subsequent presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have relied less and less for council advice. They have turned to other advisory bodies such as the War Cabinet and allowed powerful individuals to dominate the advisory process. Also, since the 9/11 attacks more and more emphasis has been devoted to homeland security, while the secretary of defense has increased visibility due to the war on terrorism. The addition to the cabinet of the secretary for homeland security and the reorganization of government agencies to deal with the threat of terrorism has not diminished the importance of a national security advisor and NSC staff. The NSC remains in place to coordinate the various aspects of military, diplomatic, and intelligence policy as a necessary springboard for advice and implementation of significant initiatives. Yet the NSC's major historical contribution occurred during the early years of the cold war when certain strategic initiatives were undertaken to counter the threat of Communist expansion. For most of the cold war, national security policy was premised on the twin pillars of containment and deterrence. The National Security Council provided valuable input with respect to an overall strategy that alternated between arms buildups and deployment, nuclear doctrines and targeting, and rhetorical commitment to preserve democratic freedoms throughout the world.

See also: Eberstadt Report; Iran-Contra Affair; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; National Security Act of 1947; National Security Advisor

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NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Naval intelligence involves the synthesized or collated information that relates to an adversary's naval war-making intentions and capabilities. Naval intelligence has existed as long as there has been naval warfare. In its simplest form, it consists of the identification of an adversary's ships or strategic location.

During the age of sail, individual ship commanders were their own intelligence officers. Their main concern was to balance information provided by superiors, scout ships, and spies. Although this system could be quite sophisticated, the lack of institutional memory and lessons learned put a premium on the ability of an individual commander. Capture of enemy vessels and interrogation of their crews yielded intelligence information.

From the eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries, naval intelligence was gathered primarily in nonclandestine ways. Naval officers with billets abroad (naval attachés) had access to information on the host country's military establishment. Newspapers provided a wide variety of information, including shipping news, commercial transactions, and government policy of a given country.

With the advent of the Industrial Revolution and the concomitant rise of technology and modern weapons, gathering intelligence became especially important. Countries closed off avenues of access, and information, once easily available, became harder to obtain. By the end of the nineteenth century, naval intelligence became more formalized and its operations more secretive.

In 1882 Britain and the United States established formal intelligence offices. These organizations, poorly staffed and without centralized planning or coordination, were chiefly interested in the increasingly dynamic and evolving world of technology, specifically ordnance and ship design. Such organizations were more technology assessment offices than naval intelligence organizations. In time, they addressed other subjects, including geographical, industrial, political, and social aspects of an adversary or potential adversary. In 1896 the U.S. Naval War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) collated intelligence relating to Spain into a coherent (and successful) war plan. Germany, Great Britain, and Japan followed that same pattern and integrated war planning into their intelligence efforts.

By the eve of World War I, radio revolutionized communications. Ships could now communicate over vast distances. With radio waves bouncing from unit to unit, interception was inevitable, making radio transmissions a valuable target for intelligence collection. The capture by the Russians early in World War I of codebooks in the German cruiser Magdeburg was of great importance in enabling the British code-breakers of "Room 40 O.B." (Old Building, Admiralty) to read German signals traffic. Supported by Director of Naval Intelligence Admiral Sir William R. Hall, the British built up a comprehensive direction-finding system. German signals traffic led the Admiralty to commit the entire Grand Fleet to the North Sea before the May 31 to June 1, 1916, Battle of Jutland. Despite this, the Grand Fleet was at least partially surprised because of a misunderstanding by the Operations Division. Signals intelligence—the ability to locate, intercept, and translate radio transmissions and message traffic for tactical or strategic use—had become a crucial element at sea by the beginning of World War II.

Even before World War II, Germany sought to protect its message traffic by encoding it using the Enigma machine. Thanks to the initial work of the Poles, the Western Allies could ultimately read encoded German radio messages. The British set up a complex at Bletchley Park for this work, which came to be known as the Ultra secret. Ultimately, all German codes could be read, the Luftwaffe being the easiest to break and U-boat communications the most difficult. Ultra played a key role in the Battle of the Atlantic, for example. The Germans also had considerable success with their own code-breaking operation, B-Dienst, and were able to read Allied convoy codes.

Code-breaking also proved invaluable in the fight against the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific. Beginning in 1939, British, Dutch, and American intelligence units were busy working to read the Japanese Navy operation codes (JN-25), but this proved a daunting task because the Japanese changed the already complex codes. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Allies stepped up this effort. The U.S. Navy's lead cryptographer, Commander Joseph R. Rochefort, had little success at breaking the JN-25 code and its variants, but by March 1942 he was able to provide sufficient information for Pacific Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Chester Nimitz to send carriers to intercept a Japanese invasion force heading for Port Moresby. This resulted in the May 7–8 Battle of the Coral Sea. Naval intelligence also provided critical warning that the Japanese planned to attack Midway Island. This enabled Nimitz to position resources and win the pivotal battle in the Pacific war, the Battle of Midway on June 3–6, 1942.

Signals intelligence continues to be of great importance today, although it is only one part of a complicated system of intelligence collection. Such information must then be carefully analyzed and the proper conclusions drawn. Students of the cold war will have to wait until primary source material is declassified before a balanced conclusion can be made concerning the role naval intelligence played in the post–World War II era. We already know, however, that for years the United States was able to read highly sensitive communications of the Soviet military by tapping into submarine cables.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; American Intelligence, World War II; Army Intelligence; Fleet Intelligence Center; MAGIC; Marine Corps Intelligence; Midway, Battle of; Pearl Harbor; PURPLE; Room 40; Ultra

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NEGROPONTE, JOHN
(JULY 21, 1939–)

John Negroponte was sworn in as the first Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on April 21, 2005. Born in London, England, he graduated from Yale University and entered the Foreign Service. His career as a foreign service officer spanned three decades, from 1960 to 1997. Among the high-ranking positions he held were ambassadorships to Honduras, Mexico, and the Philippines. During the Vietnam era he served as a political officer in South Vietnam and as a liaison officer between the American and

North Vietnamese delegations at the Paris Peace Talks. Negroponte also served two tours of duty with the National Security Council. On September 14, 2001, just days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Senate approved Negroponte's nomination as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. There he would argue unsuccessfully the U.S. case for war against Iraq.

Negroponte's nomination for the position of DNI was highly controversial for two reasons. The first had to do with his tour as ambassador to Honduras during the Reagan administration. As part of the administration's efforts to defeat Communism in Central America, U.S. military aid to Honduras rose from $3.9 million in 1980 to $77.4 million in 1984. A significant portion of this money went to train the Honduran military and intelligence units and the Contras, the Nicaraguan paramilitary force the United States was supporting against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Human rights agencies have concluded that large numbers of Honduran and Nicaraguan citizens were killed, kidnapped, and tortured by these U.S.-trained forces during that time period. Negroponte is accused of permitting these killings to occur and then suppressing information to this effect from appearing in official U.S. reports from Honduras. Negroponte maintains such accounts of his actions are no more than revisionist history.

The second reason Negroponte's nomination was controversial had to do with the position of DNI itself. Creating this position was one of the central recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report. It found the significant problems facing the intelligence community and called for its restructuring. Among the problems it cited were lack of common standards, a weak capability to set priorities and allocate resources, and divided management authority. The DNI was to replace the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as head of the intelligence community. The DCI would retain his position as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The George W. Bush administration initially resisted creating a DNI but reluctantly agreed to do so under mounting public and congressional pressure.

Legislation creating the position of DNI did not give this individual all of the authority proposed by the 9/11 Commission, especially in the area of budgetary control. Negroponte's first major decision regarding espionage capabilities came in 2005 when he made a recommendation to Congress on two new controversial spy satellite programs developed by the National Reconnaissance Office. Critics argued they were too expensive and ill suited to deal with terrorist groups, whereas supporters cited their technological potential and sophistication.

See also: Director of Central Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (The 9/11 Commission); National Security Council; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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NICHOLSON, HAROLD JAMES (NOVEMBER 17, 1950–)

At the time of his arrest for espionage on November 16, 1996, at Dulles Airport in Washington, DC, awaiting a flight to Zurich, Switzerland, Harold Nicholson was the highest-ranking Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official charged with espionage. He began spying for Russia in June 1994 while serving in Malaysia as deputy station chief. It is estimated that Nicholson received about $120,000 for the information he passed on to the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR). Following his arrest, Nicholson pled guilty to charges of espionage in March 1977 and cooperated with U.S. authorities in order to reduce his prison sentence from a possible life imprisonment to 20 years.

Nicholson began working for the CIA in 1980 following a tour of duty with the U.S. Army as an intelligence officer fulfilling his ROTC requirement. He was posted by the CIA to Manila, Bangkok, and Tokyo as a case officer from 1982 to 1989. He was then sent to Romania where he served as chief of station. From there he went to Malaysia as deputy chief of station. While there he had a number of authorized meetings with representatives of the SVRR. On June 30, 1994, after his last meeting he wired $12,000 to his U.S. bank account. This pattern was repeated in the following months. After a December 1994 trip to Kuala Lumpur he wired $9,000 to his account. He also made $6,000 cash payment on a credit card bill. In June 1995 a repeat trip to Kuala Lumpur was followed by a $23,815 deposit. In December 1995 and June 1996 Nicholson made deposits in his bank account of $26,900 and $20,000, respectively. The information Nicholson passed to the SVRR included the identities of recruits at the CIA's training facility where he was transferred to after leaving Malaysia. He also sought information at their request on Chechnyan terrorism.

Nicholson came under suspicion when in October 1995 he took a routine polygraph test that indicated he was not being truthful. An investigation into his finances followed that revealed the above pattern of activity with no legitimate source of funds being identified. When he was arrested he had rolls of film containing documents marked top secret.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Richard Milhous Nixon was president from 1969 to 1974. Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, and William Colby served as Directors of Central Intelligence in his administration. Like his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon possessed a conspiratorial mind-set regarding politics and blamed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for his earlier failed presidential bid. He also saw the CIA as populated by "Ivy League liberals" who did not agree with his policies and could not be trusted to

help formulate or implement them. Such was his distrust of the CIA that National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger served as Nixon's primary intelligence advisor. He paid little attention to the President's Daily Brief or to its estimates and kept the CIA (and State Department) in the dark about key foreign policy initiatives that were run by Kissinger from the White House.

For Nixon, intelligence analysis existed to support his policies, not to guide their formulation. He directed the CIA to find evidence of Communist involvement and support in antiwar student protests in the United States and abroad. Its conclusions angered and disappointed Nixon who was convinced that this was the case. Nixon also made public use of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in an effort to gain public support for his policies. A notable case involved public references concerning the ability of U.S. SIGINT platforms to read enemy radar systems in his statements about North Korea's downing of a U.S. Navy aircraft on a routine electronic intelligence gathering mission on April 14, 1969. Reading intercepts, the National Security Agency had concluded the attack was an accident but Nixon believed it was a calculated act and referenced this capability in support of his interpretation. Nixon and the intelligence community also clashed publicly and privately over his administration's assertion that the Soviet SS-9 was a MIRVed missile rather than a MRVed one. The former was far more threatening since it contained multiple independently targeted warheads and the latter had only multiple warheads.

In contrast to his disregard for intelligence agencies in the area of analysis, Nixon embraced them for covert action. Here too, however, operational control came from the White House. The most notable covert action program was directed at keeping Socialist Salvadore Allende from becoming president of Chile. As vice president under Dwight Eisenhower, Nixon had been a strong advocate of the CIA's plan to remove Fidel Castro from power in Cuba through covert action. Upon becoming president, Nixon again supported a series of covert actions designed to bring this about.

Nixon's distrust for the CIA plus his conspiratorial view of politics did draw him to the intelligence community in a manner that would ultimately bring down his presidency. Beginning in November 1969, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover began presenting Nixon with an "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President" that summarized information as well as presented gossip on domestic demonstrations and political activity. Even with this, Nixon still felt that the FBI was not doing enough to address the Communist influence in these disturbances. He instructed the heads of the intelligence agencies to form a committee do devise a strategy for improving U.S. capabilities to gather information on radicals. Tom Huston, a White House staffer, moved forward with a vigorous plan that would remove most restrictions on the intelligence community then in existence. Nixon approved the Huston Plan on July 14, 1970. Hoover, whose influence in the intelligence community and FBI as well as his standing with the public had declined significantly, was now feeling vulnerable and, concerned with past FBI activities being exposed, opposed the plan. Days before it was to go into effect Nixon withdrew his support for the Huston Plan. Frustrated by the reluctance of the FBI to move forward in support of his concerns, Nixon would create his own intelligence unit, the "Plumbers," in the White House to collect the information he desired. After it was terminated, two of its members, H. Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt, went to work for the Committee to Reelect the President. There they would become the principal figures in the Watergate break-ins. As the Watergate

scandal unfolded, Nixon turned one more time to the intelligence community for protection. He sought to use the CIA to stop the FBI's investigation of the Watergate break-in by having it cite national security concerns. The CIA refused to go along with this request. One of the articles of impeachment voted by the House of Representatives was "endeavoring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency."

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Colby, William Egan; Ellsberg, Daniel; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Helms, Richard McGarrah; Huston Plan; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Schlesinger, James Rodney; Schlesinger Report; Watergate

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NKVD (NARODNYJ KOMISSARIAT VNUTRENNIKH DEL—PEOPLES COMMISSARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS)

The NKVD was the Soviet security apparatus of the Stalin era, responsible for internal security, espionage and contra espionage, special operations, border protection, and military policing. The NKVD also ran the famous GULAG system.

In 1565, Ivan the Terrible established the Oprichnina, Russia's first secret police. Since then such organizations have been an omnipresent part of the country's public life. The main mission of the nineteenth-century Okhrana was to secure the Romanov rulers from the radical revolutionaries. When the Bolsheviks eventually took power in 1917, they established their own security service—the Cheka which by then had centuries of tradition to build upon.

The Cheka, under its infamous Polish-born leader, Felix Dzerzhinsky, became the scourge of the counterrevolution through its extensive authority to conduct summary trials and executions. Its members were delilberately drawn from the minorities of the Russian empire on the assumption that they would be extra-zealous in their service, having centuries-old scores to settle with the Czarist regime. Also, loyalty to the Soviet system was believed to be superior with an individual who had nothing in common with the local societies they were set to monitor, a strategy continued within the interior troops throughout the remainder of the Soviet era.

The NKVD itself was established in 1918, and was initially engaged in regular crime investigation and fire fighting, as well as providing internal security troops and running penal facilities. As the Bolsheviks consolidated their power, the Cheka was reorganized as the Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie (GPU—The Directorate of State Police) in 1922 and made subservient to the NKVD. The following year, however, the GPU—now renamed Ob'edinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe (OGPU—Joint

Ribbons and plants decorate rows of white crosses in a cemetery for the victims of the Katyn Massacre. In early 1940, Soviet secret police (NKVD) killed thousands of Polish officers who were interned on Russian soil. Advancing German troops discovered mass graves, but Soviet officials maintained until 1990 that the Germans themselves were to blame. Although 4,443 corpses of officers were recovered, some 10,000 prisoners of war remain unaccounted for. (David Turnley/Corbis)

State Political Section)—became a separate department independent of the NKVD. With Stalin's rise to power in the late 1920s, the security services strengthened its grip on Soviet society.

One of the NKVD's earliest and major responsibilities was running the central coordination of the Commintern—the Communist international that was turned into a tool for Soviet foreign policy and Lenin's dream of exporting the Revolution. Through Commintern, large sums of money were transferred to Communist Parties all over the world, paying functionary wages, printing and distribution of newspapers, and so on. This control of international Communism existed parallel to and in complement with official state foreign service (diplomats and embassies). Also, it provided the Soviet Union with vast information networks consisting of individuals motivated by ideology, mirroring the NKVD's role at home as the eyes and ears of the Kremlin amongst the party cadres and the population at large.

The best-known OGPU operations in the following years involved luring central contra-revolutionaries back into the Soviet Union for their capture and execution (the Trust Operation 1925–1926); establishment of the GULAG system in 1929, and the persecution of the Orthodox Church. The OGPU was then renamed Glavnogo Upravleniya Galakticheskoi Bezopasnosti (GUGB—Section of State Security) and incorporated into the reformed NKVD in 1934. The new organization was given extensive authority, answering directly to Stalin himself.

It was through the ranks of the GUGB and before that the OGPU that the notorious Lavreti Beria rose to power, becoming GUGB chief in 1937 and moving on to head the NKVD the following year. The NKVD now included the frontier guards, internal security troops; the GULAGs, a popular militia; fire fighting units; and antiaircraft batteries. The NKVD, through its various departments, also did Stalin's dirty work during the purges of the Communist Party and the military of the 1930s. Not even the Commissariat itself was spared, as Beria's predecessors Genrik Yagoda (1934–1936) and Nikolai Yezhov (1936–1938) were purged themselves.

Through a 1927 law, the NKVD was also authorized to facilitate assassinations and other covert activity abroad. The best-known operation of this kind is probably the 1940 murder of Leo Trotsky. Having led the Red Army during the Civil War and served as Lenin's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Stalin had him exiled in 1929, perceiving him as his major rival to power.

The NKVD and their labor camps also played a major role in the rapid modernization and industrial development of the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Their role as the pioneers of Siberia explains the otherwise unlikely incorporation of railroad and engineering troops into a service dealing mainly in state security. Yet another reform in 1939 also saw the establishment of separate NKVD departments for protecting government property and industry.

In 1941, with war looming at the borders, espionage and counterespionage, as well as internal security were again separated from the NKVD and turned over to the NKGB led by V. N. Merkulov but still under the patronage of Beria. During the latter half of 1941 NKGB functions were once more returned to the NKVD only to be separated again in April 1943. Meanwhile, counterespionage was made into a separate service (the Smert Shpionam or "Death to Spies"—SMERSH for short) under the People's Commissariat of Defense.

In World War II, the NKVD provided frontline intelligence, as well as rear guard security and general policing of the Red Army. It also dealt with deserters, insubordination, and so on. The perhaps most infamous NKVD operation of the World War II years occurred prior to the Soviet Union's actual entry into the war. In 1940, after Stalin and Hitler had partitioned Poland between them, the NKVD, on Stalin's orders, massacred 10,000 Polish officers and buried them in the Katyn forest. Soviet leaders blamed the murders on Nazi Germany, until Mikhail Gorbachev admitted Moscow's responsibility in 1990.

As World War II ended, hoards of freed Soviet soldiers were handed over to NKVD who treated them as traitors in accordance to the Red Army ban on surrender. The worst incident involved the 25,000 man strong force of General Vlasov, who had fought alongside the Germans and then were captured by the Americans in Czechoslovakia. Turned over to the NKVD, they were tortured and executed with their fate receiving a great deal of publicity inside Russia.

As Eastern Europe fell to the Soviets, Stalin asserted that with territorial occupation followed the political system of the occupier. The NKVD apparatus became his tool for aiding Communist regimes to power. This included material support in the form of transport, printing presses, as well as food and medical supplies for would-be supporters. NKVD intimidation of opponents also went into the plot.

When the first Soviet atomic bomb exploded in 1949 it was in a small way due to the actions of the NKVD and its NKGB branch. The secrecy surrounding the

Anglo-American Manhattan Project was aimed at countering Axis espionage. Only later was it uncovered that the real treat of infiltration came from Soviet agents who cultivated contacts with scientists like Klaus Fuchs. Not only did this keep Stalin informed of progress made, it also provided research data for his own bomb project, which, to no wonder, was headed by NKVD Chief Beria.

In 1946, the People's Commiserates were renamed Ministries, and the NKVD became the Ministerstovo Vnutrennikh Del (MVD—Ministry of the Interior). Beria was replaced by S. N. Kruglov as chief, but the former continued his reign as don of Soviet security services through his position in the Soviet Politburo and as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. The NKGB became the Ministerstovo Gosudarstvennoij Del (MGB—Ministry of State Security), which Stalin also made responsible for the increasingly important gold and platinum industry, where forced labor also was used. Also in 1946, the SMERSH was dissolved and functions transferred to the MGB.

The frequent reorganization and overlapping functions within the Soviet Security apparatus under Stalin reflects how he played individuals as well as their fiefdoms up against each other in order to keep his subordinates in check. This, in addition to the blurring of boundaries between internal and external security services may also be attributed to the revolutionary nature of Soviet Communism in the pre–Word War II years. First, the government had to be built virtually from scratch, which naturally included some trial and error. Second, as revolutionary ideology did not recognize national borders, why would the state security apparatus?

When Stalin died, Beria was sentenced to death for high treason. The existing security apparatus went down with him, and a new ministry of the interior and KGB rose from the ashes to assume most of the historic functions of the NKVD. In 1988, Soviet leader and chairman of the Communist Party, Gorbachev denounced the legitimacy of much of the NKVD's activity.

See also: Beria, Laventry Pavlovich; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); SMERSH

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Frode Lindgjerdet

NOLAN, BRIGADIER GENERAL DENNIS (APRIL 22, 1872–FEBRUARY 24, 1956)

Brigadier General Nolan was a U.S. Army officer who was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal in 1918 "for organizing and administering the Intelligence Service" during World War I. Dennis Edward Nolan was born on April 22, 1872, in Akron, New York, and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1896. He entered the infantry and in

1899 was promoted to major in the 11th Cavalry. In the Spanish-American War, Nolan fought in Cuba and was at the battle of El Caney on July 1, 1898. He was aide-de-camp to Brigadier General Chambers McKibbin at Santiago, Cuba, before being posted to the Philippines where he remained until 1902, returning from 1906 to 1911, and then serving in Alaska from 1912 to 1913.

In World War I, Nolan served with the General Staff Corps in France from 1917 until 1919, as chief of the intelligence service of the American Expeditionary Force until demobilization. He was particularly keen on ensuring that the Americans kept abreast of developments on the Russian and Italian fronts, and fighting in the Balkans, as well as what was happening on the Western Front. It was a period when he served with particular distinction, receiving a Distinguished Service Cross for his "conduct in action" at Apremont.

Returning to the United States after the end of World War I, Nolan was deputy chief of staff of the U.S. Army from 1924, and served on the Preparatory Commission on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in Geneva from 1926 to 1927. After two more army postings, Nolan retired in 1936 to become a director of the New York World Fair. He was chairman of the board of trustees for the Citizens Budget Commission for New York City from 1940 until 1951. He died on February 24, 1956, and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; Spanish-American War

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NORTH, LIEUTENANT COLONEL OLIVER LAURENCE (OCTOBER 7, 1943–)

Oliver Laurence North, a medaled former U.S. Marine who was at the center of the Iran-Contra scandal, was born on October 7, 1943, in San Antonio, Texas. During his youth, his family moved to Philmont, New York, where he graduated from high school. He went on to study at the State University of New York–Brockport, before being accepted into the U.S. Naval Academy. In 1968, he graduated and began his 22-year career in the U.S. Marines.

North served extensively in the Vietnam War and received a Silver Star, a Bronze Star, and two PURPLE Hearts. His deeds were not overlooked by officials within the federal government, and the Reagan administration selected North for the National Security Council. He was the U.S. Counterterrorism Coordinator from 1983 to 1986, before being reassigned to the post of deputy director for Political-Military Affairs.

In these posts, North organized the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 and he was credited with creating a rescue plan to save U.S. and international medical students on the island. In 1985, he planned the U.S.-led operation to retake and to arrest the Palestinian hijackers of the Italian ship *Achille Lauro* in Egypt and in Sicily. Soon after,

he contributed to the U.S.-led bombing runs against Libyan bases around Tripoli and Benghazi in retribution for a terrorist bombing against a nightclub in Berlin, Germany. Interestingly, international terrorist Abu Nidal, found dead in Iraq in 2002, called for North's assassination as a result of his antiterrorist actions.

North became most famous, or notorious, for his involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair. As the leader of a covert network of agents and Iranian and Nicaraguan representatives, North organized the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran in order to use the profits to finance the Contra rebel group operating in Nicaragua to overthrow the government there. Following his firing by President Ronald Reagan in November 1986 and the discovery of the Iran-Contra network soon after, North was called to testify at hearings by a joint congressional committee formed to investigate the matter in July 1987.

It was revealed during the hearing that North had maintained good relations with Panamanian dictator and drug trafficker Manuel Noriega. North detailed how he offered to arrange for Noriega to go after the Sandinista leaders in exchange for support and positive publicity in the United States and throughout the world. He planned the sales of weapons to Iran instead, ruling against Norridge's proposal.

After the hearings, North was tried for his involvement in the scandal in 1988. He was found guilty and sentenced on July 5, 1989, to a three-year prison term, two years' probation, and substantial fines. His sentence was overturned however on July 20, 1990, because an appeals court found the congressional hearings had ruined North's chances for a fair trial.

In 1994, North failed in his run for the U.S. Senate in Virginia. He has had success as an author and journalist, as well as a political commentator.

See also: Iran-Contra Affair; National Security Council; Reagan Administration and Intelligence

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NORTHWEST CONSPIRACY

The Northwest conspiracy was a failed attempt by the Confederacy to unleash a pro-South insurrection in the Northwest states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. Support for the rebellion was expected to come from the large number of Copperheads in these states and from Canada which, although antislavery, was not fully supportive of the North and housed a number of important Confederate spies and sympathizers. Confronted by such a rebellion, Confederate officials expected the Union to end the Civil War and accept Confederate independence.

Planning for the Northwest conspiracy took shape after the Confederate Congress passed legislation and authorized $5 million for sabotaging Union property. Confederate spy Thomas Henry Hines, who was working out of Toronto, Canada, and whose mission it was to carry out "any hostile mission" against the North that did not violate Canadian neutrality, was the driving force behind the Northwest conspiracy. The security of Confederate operations in Canada was compromised by the North's penetration of the Richmond-Canada communication system. One of the Confederate couriers, Richard Montgomery, was a double agent.

One plan involved freeing Confederate soldiers from a Union prisoner of war camp at Fort Douglas in Chicago where some 9,000 prisoners were held. Originally planned for July 20, 1864, it was first postponed to August 16 and then to August 29 to coincide with the Democratic National Convention being held in Chicago. Nothing came of it and Hines and his forces left Chicago on August 30. Another attempt to liberate Fort Douglas was made in November of that year and it too failed. In both cases the commander of Fort Douglas was forewarned of the impending attacks.

Another plan called for Confederate forces to board Lake Erie dressed as civilians and then commandeer these ships for purposes of capturing the USS *Michigan* which patrolled Lake Erie for the North. Once in possession of the USS *Michigan*, the plotters would attack a Union prisoner of war camp on Johnson's Island. The released Confederate soldiers would then align with pro-Southern forces and begin an insurrection. In September 1864 this plan was put into action but failed in part because a key Confederate participant had been captured by the Union and disclosed details of it.

In addition to these efforts directed at the Northwest, Confederate agents in Canada also covertly crossed into the United States in October 1964 to attack St. Albans, Vermont. Montgomery had revealed the existence of this planned operation but not its specific location. Confederate agents also set a series of fires in New York City in hopes of setting of an uprising, but to no avail.

See also: Civil War Intelligence; Sons of Liberty (Civil War); St. Alban's Raid

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Glenn P. Hastedt

NOSENKO, YURI IVANOVICH (OCTOBER 30, 1927–AUGUST 23, 2008)

Yuri Nosenko was a KGB agent whose 1964 defection to the United States became ensnarled in a bureaucratic civil war within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). His arrival and the information he brought with him placed him at odds with Anatoli

Golitsyn, who had defected in December 1961 and had the firm support of James Angleton who headed the CIA's counterintelligence unit. Richard Helms and J. Edgar Hoover felt that Nosenko was the legitimate defector and that Golitsyn was not. Believing that Nosenko was not a legitimate defector but the Soviet plant that Golitsyn earlier had warned would appear, Angleton placed Nosenko in solitary confinement for 1,277 days in an unheated cell about the size of a bank vault. A light was kept on continuously. He was not spoken to or given anything to read. Nosenko underwent almost 300 days of interrogation. In April 1969 the CIA determined that Nosenko was legitimate. He was made an advisor to the CIA with a salary of more than $35,000 and given a lump sum payment of $150,000 to compensate him for his treatment.

Nosenko was born in 1927. He was drafted into the Soviet military where he served for three years in naval intelligence. In 1953 Nosenko began to work for the KGB's second chief directorate. For 10 years he examined Western tourists who came to Moscow as possible KGB agents. He told the CIA that in this capacity he evaluated Lee Harvey Oswald but that no attempt was made to recruit him as a KGB agent because he was considered unstable.

Nosenko approached the CIA about becoming a spy in June 1962 while attending a disarmament conference. He had made an earlier unsuccessful attempt to become a spy in 1960 following a trip to Cuba. Nosenko's primary motivations appear to have been financial plus anger over having come across a KGB file that was kept on his father who rose to the position of minister of shipping and died in 1956. Nosenko defected with his family in 1964, fearing that he had been discovered as a CIA agent.

Much of the information given by Nosenko contradicted or undermined the information presented by Golitsyn. Nowhere was this more critical than with regard to Oswald, who Angleton was convinced had connections to the KGB. Additionally Nosenko was suspected by Angleton of knowing the identity of a Russian mole code-named "Shasha" within the CIA and that he was sent to direct attention away from him.

Nosenko undermined his own legitimacy by failing a series of polygraph tests. It appears that he had repeatedly embellished his life story in order to attract interest from the CIA. For example, he indicated that his defection was set in motion by his recall to the Soviet Union. National Security Agency intercepts showed that this was not the case. Nosenko also falsely claimed that he was a lieutenant colonel in the KGB. The accuracy of his accounts was established not only by his failure to break during his long confinement but also by information that came forward from another defector, Yuri Loginov.

See also: Angleton, James Jesus; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Golitsyn, Anatoli; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); National Security Agency

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Glenn P. Hastedt

NOUR, ALMALIKI

Indicted on March 30, 2006, following an investigation by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, Almaliki Nour pled guilty on February 14, 2007, to charges of illegally possessing national defense documents. He had previously pled guilty in December 2005 to charges of using a false identity to obtain U.S. citizenship and access to classified military materials. The U.S. government did not charge him with passing information to agents of foreign governments or terrorist groups. Nour faces a maximum sentence of 60 years of imprisonment.

Nour's true identity is unknown. The indictment against him officially identified him as "First Name Unknown, Second Name Unknown." Among the other identities he has adopted are Abdulhakeem Nour, Abu Hakim, Noureddine Malki, and Almalik Nour Eddin. Nour claims to have been born in Beirut, Lebanon, in December 1960. It is believed that he entered the United States illegally from Canada and applied for political asylum in 1989 and received permanent residence status in 1993. He became a naturalized citizen on February 18, 2000.

Nour began working as a civilian army contract translator in August 2003. At that time he used the name Almaliki Nour to obtain a translator's job with Titan Corporation and then a security clearance. Nour was assigned to work with the 82nd Airborne Division. That job took him to Iraq and the Sunni Triangle from late 2003 through fall 2005 when he came under suspicion from the FBI.

While stationed at Al Taqqadam Air Base, Nour downloaded a classified document as well as took hard copies of classified documents that dealt with the 82nd Airborne's mission, the location of insurgency targets, and plans to protect Sunni Iraqis traveling to Mecca in January 2004. Later, while stationed at a base near Najaf, Nour also photographed a classified battle map involving the battle of Najaf. Nour was also found to have made over 100 phone calls to Islamic leaders, including al-Qaeda officials and admitted taking bribe money from them.

See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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NUNN MAY, ALAN
(MAY 2, 1911–JANUARY 12, 2003)

Alan Nunn May was a British atomic scientist who was one of the first cold war spies to work for the Soviet Union. In the last years of World War II, he provided extensive information on the Manhattan Project to the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. His arrest in 1946 astonished atomic scientists and shocked the West. Born to working-class parents in Birmingham, England, on May 2, 1911, Alan Nunn May's academic prowess won him school and university scholarships. He was radicalized at

Cambridge, from which he graduated and gained his doctorate, and joined both the Communist Party of Great Britain and the Association of Scientific Workers. He was a retiring, serious, lonely man who never married and who distanced himself from other members of the "Cambridge Comintern."

With the outbreak of World War II, Nunn May allowed his Communist Party membership to lapse and began working on the Tube Alloys project, the British atomic weapons program. In 1943 Nunn May was transferred with the British team to the Chalk River laboratory near Montreal. This became an annex of the Manhattan Project. The following year he worked on the separation process for uranium at the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago. He was recruited by Soviet military intelligence in 1943. Under the code name "ALEK," he supplied his handler, Pavel Angelov, and controller, Colonel Nikolai Zabotin (Soviet military attaché in Ottawa), a range of atomic secrets including details about the Trinity and Hiroshima bombs, the Alamogordo bomb test, outputs of plants, and microscopic samples of both uranium-235 and uranium-233, an artificially created fissionable isotope. These samples were regarded as so important that Zabotin flew with them to Moscow. However, the information he passed was of a general nature of restricted use to the Soviets. Nunn May received $200 and two bottles of whiskey for his services.

The defection of Igor Gouzenko was Nunn May's nemesis. His revelations led directly to Nunn May. Because British intelligence hoped that further insight into Soviet Foreign Military Directorate (GRU) penetration of the Allied atomic bomb program could be gleaned, and because Gouzenko's defection was still secret, Nunn May was permitted to return to his King's College, London University, in September 1945. He was arrested on the afternoon of March 4, 1946, just after he had finished a lecture; taken to Bow Street magistrate's court; and charged with violating the Official Secrets Act. He made and signed a confession but pleaded not guilty at his trial. After a strong plea for mitigation from his defense counsel on the grounds that the Soviet Union was an ally not an enemy, Nunn May was sentenced on May 1 to 10 years' imprisonment, of which he served six. For a decade after his release in December 1952, he was blacklisted but in 1961 was invited to work in Ghana by President Kwame Nkrumah. In 1978 he returned to Cambridge where he died on January 12, 2003, age 91.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate)

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Phillip Deery

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ODOM, LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM E.
(JUNE 23, 1932–MAY 30, 2008)

Army Lieutenant General William E. Odom served as director of the National Security Agency (NSA) from 1985 to 1988 under President Ronald Reagan. Prior to that Odom served from November 2, 1981, through May 12, 1985, as assistant chief of staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, and Department of the Army. He also served as military assistant to Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's national security advisor. Odom's tenure as head of the NSA was controversial. One of his major projects was to make U.S. surveillance satellites survivable in case of a Soviet attack, a plan many senior NSA officials did not support. He was widely considered to be the most ineffective director in its history. Odom was also seen as obsessed with secrecy. He was distrustful of Congress and officials in the Reagan administration (and Reagan himself) for leaking intelligence. Odom left the NSA after being passed over for promotion to the rank of four-star general, reportedly due to differences with Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and having the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommend against extending his tour of duty there.

Born in 1932, Odom graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1954. He went on to attend the Command and General Staff College. Odom obtained his PhD from Columbia University in 1970. Following his retirement in 1988, Odom became a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute specializing in military issues, intelligence, and international relations and an adjunct professor at Yale University. He has authored several books on American foreign policy, *America's Inadvertent Empire* (2004); intelligence policy, *Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America* (2003); and the Soviet Union, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (1998). Odom became the center of controversy in October 2005 when he openly disagreed with the George W. Bush administration and called the war a massive mistake. He made the argument for leaving Iraq as the best alternative open to the United States and for Iraq and the Middle East, arguing that the

war actually strengthened Osama bin Laden and the extremists in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

In writing on intelligence reform, Odom argues that the challenge today is for the intelligence community to deal effectively with a series of accumulating dysfunctions and inefficiencies. In particular he is concerned with the ineffective management of a constant infusion of new technologies, changing intelligence targets, and requirements and long-standing organizational legacies dating back to the 1947 National Security Act that obstruct desperately needed changes.

See also: National Security Agency

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OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE

The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) came into existence on January 5, 2001, through Presidential Decision Directive 75 by President Bill Clinton shortly before leaving office. The ONCIX is headed by a National Counterintelligence Executive and Mission Manager for Counterintelligence who is appointed by the Director of National Intelligence to whom ONCIX reports.

The ONICX chairs a National Counterintelligence Policy Board that is the main interagency instrument for coordinating counterintelligence programs. According to Clinton's PDD 75, his Board's minimum membership included senior counterintelligence officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Energy, as well as from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Security Council.

ONCIX is charged with six coordinating, developing, and producing six products: (1) annual foreign intelligence threat assessments and other counter intelligence products as directed; (2) an annual national counterintelligence strategy for the U.S. government; (3) priorities for counterintelligence collection, investigations and operations; (4) counterintelligence program budgets and evaluations; (5) in-depth espionage damage assessments; and (6) counterintelligence awareness, outreach, and training standards and policies. In carrying out this mission an important target audience is the private sector which it seeks to educate on issues related to economic and industrial espionage.

ONCIX replaced the National Counterintelligence Center which came into existence in 1994 and reported to the National Security Council. A primary factor leading to its creation was the failure of the intelligence community to identify Aldrich Ames and others that preceded him in the late 1980s as spies in a timely fashion.

See also: Aldrich, Ames; Clinton Administration and Intelligence

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OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

The Office of National Estimates (ONE) was established by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) General Walter Bedell Smith on November 13, 1950, a little more than one month after becoming DCI on October 7, 1950. Working with Deputy Director of Central Intelligence William Jackson, who had worked with future DCI Allen Dulles on the 1949 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, Smith set out to solve what were perceived to be three core problems confronting the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): the need for a more structured process for producing intelligence estimates, the need to strengthen the position of the DCI in the intelligence community, and the need to clarify the CIA's research and analysis missions. A central component of their solution was the dismantling of the Office of Reports and Estimates. Dissatisfaction with the intelligence output of this unit had long been voiced and had reached great heights months earlier for its failure to warn the Truman administration of the onset of the Korean War.

In its place Smith set up the ONE and placed Harvard historian William Langer in charge of organizing it. ONE had two divisions. It had a staff that composed national estimates and a senior review body, the Board of National Estimates, which reviewed their efforts and coordinated the intelligence judgments of other members of the intelligence community. In drafting estimates, it was originally expected that the ONE would rely upon intelligence provided to it by other intelligence agencies. Gradually, however, the ONE came to rely more and more on CIA intelligence and in the process ONE estimates increasingly took on the character of CIA products rather than the product of the intelligence community as a whole. Arguably Langer's most important hire was Sherman Kent, a Yale historian. Kent served as Langer's deputy director both for ONE and the Board of National Estimates. When Langer returned to academia in 1952, Kent assumed the directorship of both bodies, positions he held until his retirement in 1967. Not only did Kent play an important leadership role in these organizations, he would become one of the early and most influential authors on intelligence as a field of academic study.

William Colby terminated the ONE along with the Board of National Estimates in 1973 and replaced it with the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) system. Colby was far more willing to consider organizational solutions to the problems of the intelligence community than had been his predecessors and he moved to reorganized covert action and intelligence analysis within the CIA. In his view and that of many others, the Board of National Estimates and the ONE had lost their way. The Board had become insulated from the policy-making process and no longer served as an effective vehicle for

checking the work of analysts or serving as a link with senior policy makers. The ONE was criticized for being overly staffed with narrow specialists who failed to interact with intelligence analysts outside of the CIA or write estimates that meted the needs of policy makers.

NIOs were defined as senior staff officers for the DCI in their areas of expertise. Their task was not primarily to write estimates but to supervise, coordinate, and facilitate the writing of intelligence estimates by others. They were also tasked with making recommendations to the DCI on intelligence priorities and the allocation of resources within the intelligence community.

See also: Board of National Estimates; Colby, William Egan; Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report; Kent, Sherman; Langer, William L.; Smith, General Walter Bedell

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), established in 1882, was the first agency of the U.S. government tasked with collecting and disseminating intelligence. From its beginnings as an obscure office in the Bureau of Navigation, it has become an important component of the U.S. intelligence community, providing maritime intelligence to joint operational commanders, the Department of the Navy, and numerous national agencies and departments. The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) in Suitland, Maryland, houses the ONI as well as the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC), and the Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA). Together, these agencies provide the United States with comprehensive maritime intelligence-gathering and dissemination capabilities.

The ONI was born during a time of change and innovation in the American naval establishment. The Civil War–era U.S. Navy deteriorated almost to the point of inconsequence over the years from 1865 to 1882. Out of the frustration that ate away at the very core of the service during these years arose a new navy. An important component of the reforms that brought about the naval renaissance of the late nineteenth century was an interest in oceanic and naval science as well as a need to stay abreast of European weapons technology developments of the period. These interests, combined with official concern over the relative impotence of the U.S. Navy relative to the navies of Chile, Peru, and Bolivia that fought the War of the Pacific (1879–1884), produced a climate within which the idea of a naval intelligence organization could take hold and grow (Dorwart, 1979, 3–5).

Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt (1881–1882) created the Office of Intelligence, shortly renamed the Office of Naval Intelligence, on March 23, 1882. The Navy

Department chose Lieutenant Theodorus Bailey Myers Mason as its first chief on June 15, 1882 (the head of the ONI would be renamed the director of naval intelligence on November 20, 1911). William Hunt's successor as secretary, William H. Chandler (1882–1885), issued a memorandum on July 25, 1882, outlining the policies and procedures for the new office. The scope of naval intelligence, according to this memo, extended to everything from the size and capabilities of the fleets of foreign powers to "Information which may be of use to our officers in their professional studies" (Packard, 1996, 3). In other words, the ONI's information collection during these early years was to be very broadly based, not simply focused on information about potential adversaries.

The office grew in duties and responsibilities through the end of the nineteenth century. Much of its information on foreign powers came from naval attachés attached to U.S. embassies abroad. A significant increase in prestige came in 1885 when, along with the newly created Naval War College, it was tasked with developing war plans for the navy. The Spanish-American War (1898) demonstrated to many within the navy that naval intelligence needed more support from Congress and, in February 1899, Congress came through by officially establishing the ONI (up to this time it existed only at the fiat of the sitting secretary of the navy).

The period between the end of the Spanish-American War and the beginning of the Great Depression brought a number of important developments in American naval intelligence. During the years just prior to World War I, the ONI developed an interest in German and Japanese naval activities. The office completed its first version of War Plan Orange in 1912, making the Japanese Navy the focus of the ONI's efforts in the Pacific. World War I brought an emphasis on Germany for the duration of the war, but the focus once again shifted to Japan during the 1920s.

Stringent military cost cutting during the decade of the Roaring Twenties hit the ONI as hard as it did the rest of the navy. Intelligence officers used meager funds to fine-tune War Plan Orange, but the major intelligence breakthrough during the decade, the cracking of certain Japanese codes and ciphers, was not a triumph for the ONI. The Office of Naval Communications (ONC), a unit of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, claimed that coup for itself through its Code and Signal Section. The director of naval intelligence sought to incorporate the ONC into the ONI, but he was unsuccessful. The bureaucratic squabbling over who should control the ONC tarnished the ONI's reputation and being saddled with part of the blame for the United States being taken by surprise at Pearl Harbor did nothing for its rehabilitation. Admiral Ernest J. King, when he became chief of naval operations (CNO), established his own intelligence section within the CNO's office, leaving little for the ONI in the way of positive intelligence gathering. For most of World War II, then, the ONI operated as a counterintelligence and security agency.

Geopolitical conditions during the cold war provided the impetus for a resuscitation of the ONI. The Navy Department made the DNI an assistant chief of naval operations and gave him the responsibility of providing the secretary of the navy and naval planners and policy makers with information concerning the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries. In 1992, as part of a major reorganization within the Navy Department, the DNI became the CNO's N-2, thus more closely aligning naval intelligence with the intelligence organizations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

According to Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence, promulgated jointly by the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1994, the ONI "organizes and trains intelligence personnel, provides highly specialized, maritime-related intelligence analysis, and administers intelligence oversight, security, and intelligence manpower issues. Its day-to-day operations include liaison with DOD [Department of Defense] and non-DOD agencies, long-term scientific and technical analysis, strategic trade analysis, and intelligence systems acquisition" (NDP-2, Appendix A). The early twenty-first-century reorientation of the U.S. Navy from a blue water force to one more focused on littoral warfare and the support of long-term land operations has brought the ONI into closer collaboration with Marine Corps intelligence. Together, the two communities provide U.S. commanders with the information they need to counter threats from the land, sea, and air.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; Army Intelligence; Marine Corps Intelligence; Naval Intelligence

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Donald K. Mitchener

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) first significant foray into covert action. OPC came into existence as a direct result of National Security Council (NSC) Directive 10/2 issued in June 1948 that provided for a U.S. capability for covert political intervention and paramilitary action. Secretary of State George Marshall supported the concept but opposed placing such an organization within the State Department. As a result, a complicated bureaucratic compromise was reached whereby the OPC was placed within the CIA for staffing and budgetary purposes but its head was designated by the secretary of state and it took policy direction from the State Department and the Defense Department. In terms of organizational lineage, the OPC was a successor unit to the Special Procedures Group and the Special Programs Office. The former had been established in December 1947 as a result of NSC 4/A that authorized the CIA to engage in covert psychological warfare. The latter was the original designation given to the organization to implement NSC Directive 10/2. The Korean War transformed the OPC from a small office to a large bureaucratic organization. In 1949 it employed 302 people, had a budget of $2.8 million, and operated stations in seven countries. In 1952 it employed 2,812 people, had a budget of $4.7 million, and operated stations in 47 countries.

Frank Wisner, an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veteran who had served with Future Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles in Germany, was placed in charge of the OPC. He described it as a "mighty Wurlitzer." OPC programs initially were directed at Western Europe and focused on four targets areas: refugee programs, labor activities, media development, and political action. Both in the field and in Washington the OPC came into frequent conflict with the Office of Special Operations (OSO), the CIA's other clandestine service whose mission was more directly related to espionage and counterespionage. The OSO and the OPC competed for agents to recruit, a competition that at one point required the intervention of Lyman Kirkpatrick, assistant director for special operations. OPC personnel were also paid more and tended to be promoted more quickly. Under DCI General Walter Bedell Smith, the OPC and the OSO gradually were merged into a single organization that came to be known as the Directorate of Plans.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Kirkpatrick, Lyman Bickford, Jr.; Marshall, General George Catlett; Office of Special Operations; Office of Strategic Services; Smith, General Walter Bedell; Wisner, Frank Gardiner

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OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

The Office of Special Operations (OSO) was established in 1946, the result of a directive from the National Intelligence Authority. It authorized the Central Intelligence Group to conduct independent intelligence analysis not currently being carried out by other departments and to engage in clandestine intelligence collection activities. These activities had been a core feature of the Office of Strategic Services' (OSS) mission during World War II but now existed as somewhat of an unwanted bureaucratic stepchild. They were housed temporarily in the army's Strategic Services Unit (SSU). With this directive in hand, Director of Central Intelligence Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg moved to bring clandestine intelligence collection into the CIG. The two key organizations absorbed were SI (espionage) and X-2 (counterespionage).

The SSU maintained operations in North Africa and the Near East. In addition to operating them, the OSO began operating in Europe. A prime source of information was the newly created West German intelligence service that was headed by General Richard Gehlen. The OSO came into frequent conflict with the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) in the field and in Washington. Part of the conflict dealt with competition for agents in the field. Although both were clandestine organizations, they had very different missions. The OPC was oriented to covert action, whereas the OSO was oriented to the collection of information. There was also a conflict in organizational

cultures. OSO personnel saw themselves as having a higher degree of professionalism than did the OPC. A difference in background also existed. OPC personnel tended to be wealthy individuals or academics that came into intelligence work late (although many had OSS experience) and received higher salaries than did OSO personnel who saw themselves as intelligence careerists. Finally, as the OPC grew ever more rapidly, OSO personnel began to fear for their organizational identity and prestige.

When DCI General Walter Bedell Smith took office in 1950 he began to take steps to combine the OPC and the OSO into a single organization. He moved forward incrementally, with the first effort at merger occurring in 1951 with the Western Hemisphere Divisions of the OPC and the OSO. A full bureaucratic integration of the two into a single Directorate of Plans did not take place until August 1952.

See also: Central Intelligence Group; Gehlen Organization; National Intelligence Authority; Office of Policy Coordination; Office of Strategic Services; Smith, General Walter Bedell

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

The Office of Strategic Services was an American intelligence agency during World War II. Established by order of President Franklin Roosevelt on June 13, 1942, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the United States' first centralized intelligence agency. The OSS evolved from the president's appointment of William Donovan as coordinator of information in June 1941. Before the creation of the OSS, American intelligence consisted of the army's Military Intelligence Division, the navy's Office of Naval Intelligence, and a bewildering variety of civilian agencies, none of whom routinely shared information with each other. Donovan's task as COI and later as Director of the OSS was not to replace those agencies, but rather to centralize their efforts.

Donovan patterned the OSS after the British equivalents MI-5 and MI-6, which he had observed during two extended visits to Britain with Sir William Stephenson, the Canadian head of British Security Co-ordination in the Western Hemisphere, in 1940. Originally, as COI, Donovan's responsibilities included propaganda as well as espionage and intelligence analysis. But with the establishment of the OSS, the president transferred control of propaganda to the new Office of War Information (OWI). Throughout the war, Donovan reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Donovan's vision of a global intelligence organization, however, faced considerable wartime opposition. J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation, backed by Nelson Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs, maintained a firm hold on intelligence

Built for the Office of Strategic Services, this tiny "M.B." camera—no larger than its namesake, a matchbox—could be easily hidden in a man's hand and used to take a picture under the cloak of such a simple gesture as lighting a cigarette or reading. Eastman Kodak designed and built 1,000 of these cameras for use by OSS agents and underground forces during World War II, ca. 1940s. (Bettmann/Corbis)

collection in Latin America. Similarly, General Douglas MacArthur tried, but failed, to exclude the OSS from the Far East. And throughout the war Donovan had to fight off charges of both excessive Communist influence within the organization and Fascist tendencies toward "Gestapo-like" centralized government power.

The structure of the OSS reflected the diversity of its missions. The collection and analysis of intelligence was directed by Director of Intelligence Services Brigadier General John Magruder. Magruder's responsibilities included the Research and Analysis (R &A) Branch; the Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch, which coordinated incoming information from covert sources in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia; the Counter-Intelligence (X-2) Branch, which monitored foreign intelligence operations, sought to identify foreign agents, and ran double agents; and the Foreign Nationalities (FN) Branch, which interviewed foreigners living in the United States for information on enemy military, political, industrial, agricultural, and cultural figures.

The largest of these branches was Research and Analysis. At its peak R&A, headed by Harvard historian William L. Langer, employed almost a thousand scholars with expertise on politics, economics, history, and geography. Among the well-known professionals who worked for Langer were historians Felix Gilbert, Hajo Holborn, and

Arthur Schlesinger; political scientists Geroid Robinson, Franz Neumann, and Philip Mosely; sociologists Morris Janowitz, Edward Shils, and Barrington Moore; social theorists Herbert Marcuse and Otto Kirchheimer; geographers Richard Hartshorne and John Morrison; and economists Walt Rostow, Charles Kindleberger, and Carl Kaysen. R&A specialists produced reports ranging from the future of the British empire to the character of individual foreign leaders to the growth potential of foreign agriculture and industry. Long-term strategy and postwar planning were specific areas in which R&A produced significant work.

The Special Intelligence Branch, directed by New York businessman Whitney Shepardson, maintained agents around the globe to provide secret intelligence to Washington. SI agents in Spain kept close watch on Francisco Franco's government. From Madrid and Lisbon, American observers reported on military and economic collaboration between Spain and Germany. SI personnel in Switzerland, including Allen Dulles, conveyed critical information from sources within the German Foreign Ministry, and eventually played a critical role in relaying intelligence about the Nazi "Final Solution." SI operatives in Scandinavia provided highly classified data on Nazi efforts to secure heavy water for nuclear experiments. SI also quickly moved into liberated areas in Italy and France to coordinate the flood of information from captured documents and enemy personnel. SI agents, including future Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey, maintained communications with French resistance groups and played significant roles in linking intelligence and military operations in German-occupied France.

Perhaps the most successful OSS operations involved Germany. Throughout the war the OSS tried to establish contact with any viable anti-Nazi opposition. One of those assets, German Foreign Ministry official Fritz Kolbe, smuggled over 2,000 documents to OSS representatives in Switzerland. OSS agents also negotiated the surrender of German forces in Italy under the command of SS General Karl Wolff.

The responsibility for protecting OSS operations around the globe from foreign infiltration fell to the Counter-Intelligence Branch. X-2, led by Norman Holmes Pearson, cooperated closely with British Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in identifying and tracking potential security risks. The unit actively vetted both new OSS employees and intelligence sources recruited by SI operatives. By the end of hostilities, X-2 operated over 600 employees and maintained a card file of approximately 400,000 names.

The final branch of the intelligence directorate, the Foreign Nationalities Branch, headed by DeWitt Poole, was perhaps the most controversial of OSS activities. FN provided translations of foreign news stories, worked with foreign national groups inside the United States, and sought to identify potential sources of contact with foreigners in occupied areas. FN was most successful in its gathering of information on nationalist groups in Eastern Europe. But those same contacts also led to frequent accusations that FN relied too heavily on ethnic workers who had contacts with Eastern European Communists, and was, as a result, riddled with Communist sympathizers.

The second directorate of the OSS organization was the Special Operations Branch (SO), headed initially by Lt. Col. Robert Solborg, and after February 1942 by Maj. Preston Goodfellow. The men and women of SO carried out missions of subversion and sabotage in enemy-controlled areas. The most famous of these operations were the Jedburgh missions into occupied France. Jedburgh teams consisted of one OSS

member, plus one member of the British Special Operations Executive and a representative of the French Underground. These teams parachuted into France and coordinated resistance activities in support of Allied military operations after the Normandy landings in June 1944.

SO also played a significant role in preparing for the TORCH landings in North Africa in November 1942. Agents operating from Oran and Tangiers sabotaged French defenses and established communications between Allied forces and French underground units. The success of SO operations in identifying and contacting potential French supporters in that zone of operations helped convince General Dwight Eisenhower to permit an expanded role for the OSS in future operations in the Sicily and Normandy landings.

OSS operations were less successful in other theaters. In the Balkans, for example, SO agents tried to work with both Tito's Communist partisans and the Serbian nationalist Chetniks of Draza Mihailovich in coordinating anti-Nazi activities. But Americans, as they would at the end of the twentieth century, underestimated the depth of ethnic animosities in Yugoslavia. That misjudgment resulted in occasional military victories, but eventual political failure.

Similarly in China, OSS operatives struggled to define a role amidst three constituencies who lacked trust in the organization: the Chinese Communist Party of Mao Zedong, the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek, and the American military commanders in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz. Although OSS units in China reported few successes, operations in Thailand and Burma made significant contributions to the war effort in those theaters. In Burma, OSS agents formed Detachment 101, commanded by Col. Carl Eifler, which recruited and trained Kachin tribesmen into a combat unit over 10,000 strong which engaged in extensive combat operations along the Burma Road. One OSS mission in Asia, which later resulted in controversy, involved contacts with Ho Chi Minh's forces fighting the Japanese in Indochina. OSS agents supplied Ho's Viet Minh with small arms and explosives in return for intelligence and assistance extricating downed American flyers. In fact, the first American casualty of the Vietnam War is usually listed as Major Peter Dewey, the OSS station chief in Indochina.

Another branch of the operations directorate, the Morale Operations (MO) unit, commanded by Frederick Oechsner and after 1943 by Col. K. D. Mann, controlled "black" propaganda. Although "white" propaganda, control of information at home, had been transferred to the OWI in 1942, the OSS continued to employ propaganda abroad as a method of subversion. MO propaganda sought to discredit Nazi leaders by disseminating false information about anti-Hitler activities. Other operations used German film and music stars, including Marlene Dietrich, to broadcast into Germany. One station, Soldatensender West, particularly targeted German military units with American music interspersed with negative news stories about the Nazi leadership. Other efforts targeted German industrialists with tales of phony Nazi economic plans for state-run industries. Operation SAUERKRAUT, run by the MO office in Rome, infiltrated captured German POWs back behind enemy lines to distribute counterfeit pamphlets and letters and spread dissention among German troops. The same office originated Operation CORNFLAKES, which issued counterfeit Nazi stamps with Hitler's image as a death's head.

A third significant element of the OSS was its technical branch. This section developed and provided communications equipment to agents in the field, created its own code ciphers, pioneered miniaturized photography techniques, produced counterfeit documents, and coordinated communications with all of the organization's far-flung outposts. The research and development office created a number of specialized weapons for sabotage, including new limpet mines, types of explosives, and silencing devices. Elsewhere in technical services, OSS geographers produced some of the most sophisticated maps drawn anywhere in the world, while others designed and produced creative presentation materials.

By the end of the war, the OSS had established major bases of operations in London, Berne, Stockholm, Rome, Caserta, Paris, Wiesbaden, Salzburg, Rome, Cairo, Istanbul, Chungking, and New Delhi. OSS personnel eventually exceeded 13,000 men and women before cuts started near the end of the war.

The existence of the OSS was terminated by Harry Truman's presidential order on September 20, 1945. Truman not only distrusted the Republican Donovan, but he also apparently accepted the advice of those around him who warned against the potential dangers of an enormous secret intelligence agency in a democracy. Although only R&A was maintained reasonably intact and transferred to the State Department, many other OSS operatives joined the War Department's new Strategic Services Unit until the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. OSS alumni who went on to significant careers in intelligence or national security included Frank Wisner, William Casey, Allen Dulles, David K. E. Bruce, Sherman Kent, Lyman Kirkpatrick, Edward Lansdale, Henry Cord Meyer, Richard Helms, E. Howard Hunt, and William Colby. Other famous OSS members who went on to fame in other fields included Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, actor Sterling Hayden, director John Ford, baseball player Morris "Moe" Berg, missionary and anti-Communist symbol John Birch, chef Julia Child, and diplomat Ralph Bunche.

See also: Berg, Morris (Moe); Birch, John; Casey, William; Child, Julia McWilliams; Colby, William Egan; Donovan, Major General William Joseph; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Goldberg, Arthur Joseph; Hayden, Sterling; Hoover, J. Edgar; Kent, Sherman; Kirkpatrick, Lyman Bickford, Jr.; Langer, William L.; Lansdale, Edward Geary; Meyer, Cord, Jr.; Special Operations Forces; Stephenson, Sir William Samuel

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OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT (1889; NEW 1911; AMENDED 1920, 1939, 1989)

The Official Secrets Act (OSA) is a piece of British legislation aimed at protecting the United Kingdom from espionage and the unauthorized disclosure of official information. The original OSA, enacted in 1889, targeted unauthorized leaks by Crown servants and government contractors but did little in practice to combat threats of espionage. In 1911, the 1889 act was replaced with a more extensive law making it illegal to approach or enter a prohibited place "for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State" or to obtain or communicate information that might be useful to an enemy. Section 1 of the Act dealt specifically with espionage, while Section 2 covered unauthorized disclosure of official information. Amendments to the OSA in 1920 introduced a number of new ancillary crimes connected with espionage, as well as new powers of enforcement and stiffer penalties. Section 6 of the 1920 law, which made it a misdemeanor to fail to provide information relating to any suspected offense under the OSA, was revised in 1939 to apply only to espionage offences. Finally, in 1989, Section 2 of the OSA was amended to cover only limited classes of official information deemed essential to national security.

The difficulty of obtaining espionage convictions under the existing legislation—together with high-profile leaks of official documents in the 1880s—provided the impetus for the passage of the first Official Secrets Act in 1889. The legislation, which covered both espionage and unauthorized disclosure, was beset with several shortcomings. In addition to its limited scope (the Act applied only to servants of the Crown and certain classes of government contractors), the first OSA was difficult to enforce. Although it was the norm in British law to assign the burden of proof to the prosecution, such a requirement in cases of espionage—for example, the requirement to prove *intent* to obtain information illegally—made convictions under the OSA (1889) difficult to obtain and rendered the Act largely unworkable.

As rumors of German spy rings and invasion plots circulated throughout Britain on the eve of World War I, the British public became increasingly receptive to tighter security measures. The House of Lords approved a new Official Secrets Bill in July 1911. The following month the bill passed its second and third readings in the House of Commons in less than an hour. The new law, which replaced the 1889 legislation, extended the ambit of the Official Secrets Act and strengthened the powers of

enforcement. Additions were made to the list of "prohibited places," and the legal burden of proof in espionage cases shifted from the prosecution to the accused. Under the 1911 legislation, all crimes of espionage (covered by Section 1 of the OSA) were classified as felonies, whereas information leaks (Section 2) were considered misdemeanors. Section 2 of the Act was extended to cover anyone—including the press—who knowingly received or communicated official information without prior authorization.

The OSA was once again revised at the close of World War I in order to make permanent certain antiespionage provisions found in the wartime Defense of the Realm Act. Amendments in 1920 included the introduction of ancillary crimes related to espionage such as impersonating a government employee or tampering with a passport. The maximum penalty for espionage was increased from seven years, as stipulated by the 1911 Act, to 14 years. Changes to the rules governing evidence also made it possible to prosecute an espionage case under a lesser Section 2 (unauthorized disclosure) charge if there was insufficient evidence for a Section 1 (espionage) conviction. Section 6 of the 1920 amendments made it a misdemeanor to withhold information about a suspected breach of the OSA.

Initially Section 6 of the 1920 Act applied to any breach of the OSA, including unauthorized disclosure. After sufficient public outcry about the rights of journalists to protect their sources, however, a further amending Act was passed in 1939 limiting Section 6 to cases of espionage. Finally, in 1989—one hundred years after the passage of the original Official Secrets Act—Section 2 of the OSA was amended to cover only limited classes of official information deemed essential to national security. Despite public pressure, however, there continues to be no Freedom of Information Act in the United Kingdom comparable to the U.S. legislation allowing for the eventual disclosure of classified material.

See also: MI-5 (The Security Service); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service)

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Kathleen Ruppert

OLSON, DR. FRANK R.
(JULY 17, 1910–NOVEMBER 28, 1953)

Dr. Frank Rudolph Olson was a U.S. Army biochemist who died under mysterious circumstances after being unwittingly dosed with LSD by Central Intelligence Agency scientist Dr. Sidney Gottlieb as part of the agency's MKULTRA experiments. Prior to his death on November 28, 1953, Olson worked in the Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland, where he was involved in biological weapons

research. Although his death was officially ruled a suicide, evidence exists that contradicts the U.S. government's version of events.

According to information uncovered in 1975 by the Rockefeller Commission, Olson jumped through a closed window on the tenth floor of the Hotel Statler in New York City to his death after suffering a mental breakdown as a result of LSD consumption. Olson's widow, Alice Olson, accepted a settlement of $750,000 in compensation for government complicity under the condition that she could not pursue the case in civil court. In 1994, however, Olson's son, Eric Olson had his father's body exhumed to undergo an autopsy at the George Washington University.

Professor James E. Starrs, the forensic scientist in charge of the examination, found no evidence of cuts or abrasions consistent with a fall through a closed glass window. Starrs also determined that Olson had suffered a blunt force trauma to the head prior to falling and concluded that Olson had been immobilized by a blow to the head and then thrown to his death. Although the evidence revealed by Eric Olson's inquiry convinced the Manhattan district attorney to open a homicide investigation into Olson's death in 1996, he did not acquire enough evidence to bring specific charges.

See also: Gottlieb, Dr. Sidney; Rockefeller Commission

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OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL

A personal initiative of President Dwight Eisenhower and presented at a July 1955 Geneva Summit Conference with the Soviet Union, the Open Skies Proposal would have legalized overhead reconnaissance and aerial photography. It called for (1) exchanging "blueprints" on all military forces and installations, (2) permitting verification through aerial reconnaissance, and (3) reinforcing aerial reconnaissance with a system of on-site inspection. Nikita Khrushchev, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, rejected the proposal as "nothing more than a bald espionage plot." The Soviets also objected to the plan because it did not include provisions for aerial reconnaissance over other countries, it did not provide for arms reductions, and it would not prevent the concealment of military forces.

The Open Skies Proposal was linked to two ongoing technological national security initiatives. The first involved military competition and the development of new weapons technologies. At this time the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) had introduced a new element into the strategic equation. First-generation ICBMs were highly vulnerable and slow-reacting weapons that were incapable of being recalled. They created a "reciprocal fear of surprise attack."

The second involved the development of the U-2 spy plane which offered the promise of providing the United States with valuable information about the state of Soviet military programs, especially in the nuclear area, that could otherwise not be obtained. Eisenhower made his proposal the same month as the U-2 spy plane flew its first test flight. The Soviet Union was expected to take military countermeasures once the U-2 began its espionage missions and the long-term success of the U-2 would best be ensured by establishing its legitimacy. Once the U-2 program became public, Eisenhower sought to justify it by noting that although spying was a distasteful business it was necessary in order to lessen the chances of being surprised and experiencing another Pearl Harbor.

Analysts are uncertain as to Eisenhower's true intent. Some see it largely as an exercise in cold war propaganda because there was little doubt that the Soviet Union would reject the proposal. As recently as May 1955 the Soviet Union had made it clear that in their view American disarmament had to precede any verification system. A second interpretation asserts that Eisenhower was personally committed to reducing the dangers of nuclear war through arms control and that he had become worried about the specter of an arms race between the two countries. He made the proposal over the objections of his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who was extremely skeptical over any plans for cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Over the next few years events overtook the Open Skies Proposal. In 1957 the Soviet Union launched Sputnik into orbit around the earth. This added an entirely new dimension to the question of national control over air-space and the manner in which espionage was conducted. In 1960, the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane over its territory. This act and the revelations of U.S. over-flights changed the debate from a theoretical question of the limits of sovereignty to one that had a real politico-military dimension.

See also: Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Incident

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Glenn P. Hastedt

ORLOV, ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH (AUGUST 21, 1895–APRIL 7, 1973)

A master spy of the Soviet Union during the interwar years and a recipient of the Order of Lenin, Major Alexander Mikhailovich Orlov was the primary professional pseudonym for Leiba Lazarevich Feldbin, who was born on August 21, 1895, in Bobruisk, Byelorussia. In July 1938, after coming under suspicion of being part of an assassination conspiracy against Stalin, he fled with his wife and teenage daughter to the United States. The most senior Soviet intelligence officer to defect to the West, Orlov died in Cleveland on April 7, 1973, after being hospitalized for cardiac complications.

During the early 1930s this NKVD operative was on assignment throughout Western Europe, establishing a network of deep-cover agents in Germany, France, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Switzerland. In 1934 and 1935 he lived in London and had some connection with the Cambridge spy ring. Afterwards he ran the NKVD operation in Spain during the Spanish Civil War, conducting a purge against Trotskyites, establishing a secret police network, and diverting the Spanish gold reserves to Moscow.

Orlov, who had joined the Communist Party in 1920 and had fought with the Red Army in the Russian Civil War, may have maintained a lifetime allegiance to the Bolshevik Revolution. His writing of *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (1953), which was serialized in *Life* magazine, is not necessarily a repudiation of Communism. Despite debriefings with American intelligence officials and even presenting testimony before Congress, he died taking many Soviet secrets to the grave.

Twice, on November 14, 1969, and August 10, 1971, Orlov was paid a visit by the KGB agent Dimitri Petrovich Feoktistov, who worked undercover as a Soviet employee of the UN Secretariat in New York. There are conflicting reports about the nature of those meetings and what the two men discussed.

See also: KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs)

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Roger Chapman

ORTIZ, COLONEL PETER JULIEN (JULY 5, 1913–MAY 16, 1988)

One of the most decorated and well-known OSS agents during World War II, he later became a Hollywood legend. Peter Julien Ortiz was born on July 5, 1913, in Arizona, his father being from Mexico. He grew up in Yavapai, Arizona, and then in France, becoming fluent in French. In 1932 at the age of 19 he joined the French Foreign Legion and fought the Germans in the Battle for France in 1940. Interned as a prisoner of war by the Germans, Ortiz managed to escape and managed to get to the United States where he joined the U.S. Marines. Given a commission, he was appointed as assistant naval attaché in Tangier, Morocco. There he was involved in intelligence work getting tribesmen to fight against the Germans in preparation for the Allied landing in Operation Torch.

With OSS, in 1943 Ortiz was parachuted into France to work with the Free French Resistance. In France, he helped organize the rescue of four Royal Air Force pilots who had been shot down over the country. This continued until 1944 when Ortiz was forced to hand himself in to the Germans in order to prevent reprisals against some villagers, spending the rest of the war as a German internee. For his efforts, he was

awarded two Navy Crosses, the Legion of Merit, the Order of the British Empire, and five Croix de Guerre, also being made a Chevalier of the (French) Legion of Honor. The legend for one of his navy crosses noted: "The story of self-sacrifice of Major Ortiz and his marines has become a brilliant legend in that section of France where acts of bravery were considered commonplace."

Returning to civilian life in 1955, Ortiz became the subject of two films produced in Hollywood. The first, *13 Rue Madeleine* (1946) by TCF, starred James Cagney, and the second, by Warner Brothers was *Operation Secret* (1952), produced by Henry Blanke and directed by Lewis Seiler, starring Cornell Wilde. Ortiz retired to Prescott, Arizona, and died on May 16, 1988, in Prescott. He was buried at the Arlington National Cemetery.

See also: Movies, Spies in; Office of Strategic Services

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Justin Corfield

OSHIMA, HIROSHI
(APRIL 19, 1886–JUNE 6, 1975)

Hiroshi Oshima was a Japanese soldier and diplomat who unknowingly provided the Western Allies with much useful intelligence during World War II. Born in Gifu Prefecture, Japan, on April 19, 1886, Oshima Hiroshi came from a prominent family. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1905 and, as a major in the army in the early 1920s, served as a military attaché in Germany, Austria, and Hungary.

In 1934 Colonel Oshima, who spoke excellent German, secured appointment as the senior military attaché in Berlin. A strong supporter of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists, Oshima secured direct access to the upper governmental echelons, including Hitler himself. By 1938 Oshima had risen to both lieutenant general and ambassador to Germany.

Oshima worked hard to bring about the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact that led to the 1940 Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Shortly after the beginning of World War II, Oshima was recalled to Tokyo but Japanese leaders were sufficiently impressed with German military successes during 1939 and 1940 that he returned to Berlin in his former post in early 1941. Because the two men were in near complete agreement on policies, Hitler confided much to Oshima.

By this time, however, the U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) had broken the Japanese diplomatic cipher, identified as PURPLE. SIS was thus able to read more than 2,000 of Oshima's communications to Tokyo sent by supposedly secure cipher. These provided invaluable information to the Allies on German attitudes, intentions, and strategic dispositions. Oshima, for example, provided information on the German military buildup in North Africa and the German reluctance to conclude a separate

peace with the Soviet Union. Oshima also assisted D-Day planners seeking to determine German defensive dispositions. Oshima was, however, unaware of Japanese attentions to attack Pearl Harbor and thus did not provide any information on it to the Americans.

Oshima escaped from Berlin in April 1945 but surrendered to U.S. forces. Interned in the United States, after the war he was taken to Japan to be tried as a war criminal by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Found guilty in November 1948 of conspiracy against peace, he was sentenced to life imprisonment but was paroled in December 1955. Oshima died in Chigasaki, Japan, on June 6, 1975, shortly before the declassification of SIS successes in solving Japanese World War II ciphers.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Spencer C. Tucker

OVERFLIGHT, OPERATION

After the Soviet Union successfully tested an atomic bomb in 1949, abruptly ending the American nuclear monopoly, officials in Washington desperately sought a means to obtain intelligence information on the military capability behind the Iron Curtain. American concerns were increased after the Soviets successfully detonated a nuclear bomb in an air-burst test in 1951 and exploded a thermonuclear weapon in 1953. The fear of the unknown in the atomic age, coupled with a "Pearl Harbor" complex prompted President Dwight D. Eisenhower to approve Operation OVERFLIGHT, for conducting covert reconnaissance flights over Communist territory. From 1956 to 1960 this CIA program flew 24 missions over the USSR.

During the Geneva Summit in July 1955 Eisenhower proposed Open Skies, a plan in which the United States and the Soviet Union could openly conduct reconnaissance flights over each other's territory. Predictably, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev dismissed the plan as simply another Western espionage scheme. His pessimism was based on the harsh realities of the cold war, events beginning with the Truman administration.

In a futile effort code-named "Redsox," the United States parachuted behind the Iron Curtain specially trained agents who were nationals of the new territories under Soviet control. In 1946 the Western Allies started conducting flights along the Red borders as part of the Peacetime Airborne Reconnaissance Program. In 1949 the U.S. Air Force began deliberate over-flights of the Soviet Far East, using specially modified RF-80A aircraft. The British utilized CIA-owned RB-45C Tornado as well as RAF English Electra Canberra aircraft to fly over Communist territory. Even Sweden participated in surveillance missions, flying CIA-supplied DC-3 aircraft and forwarding to Washington reports on Soviet radar chains along the Baltic. The

Americans also experimented with unmanned balloons equipped with cameras (Project GENETRIX) for traversing the Soviet Union.

After Open Skies was rejected, Eisenhower proceeded with the U-2 program, a Central Intelligence Agency project that was well underway. The year prior the first U-2, a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, called the Dragon Lady, rolled out of its Skunk Works hangar in Burbank, California. This single-seat, single-engine spy plane, capable of flying at an altitude of 80,000 feet, was practically a glider. It was designed to collect signals and imagery intelligence. Operated by a single pilot wearing a pressurized suit and breathing liquid oxygen, the U-2 was capable of flying beyond the range of missiles and fighter jets. Engineers believed that the aircraft would fly undetected by ground radar. U-2 pilots did not wear military uniforms because Eisenhower thought that would otherwise represent an act of war. Having the CIA run the program had the advantage of keeping the gathering and interpreting of intelligence out of the hands of air force officials, the same who proposed budgets based upon perceived Soviet threats.

On April 29, 1956, Detachment A, consisting of four U-2 planes, was deployed in Lakenhealth, England. It was soon, however, transferred to Wiesbaden and later Giebelstadt, both in West Germany, due to Great Britain's refusal to grant permission for surveillance flights to originate from its territory. Beginning in late August of that same year Detachment B was stationed at Incerlik Air Base near Adana, Turkey. Detachment C moved to Eieslon Air Force Base in Alaska during summer of 1957. At different times U-2 planes used bases in Norway, Pakistan, and Japan.

In June 1956 the first U-2 over-flights of East Germany began. On July 4 of that year the first U-2 surveillance of the Soviet Union was conducted. Flown by Harvey Stockman, the plane photographed the bomber bases in the Baltic and the submarine base at Leningrad. To the surprise of the Americans, the spy plane was tracked by Soviet radar and pursued by MiG-17 fighters. The second flight over the USSR, piloted by Carmine Vito, occurred the following day and covered Moscow and the flight test and research center at Ramenskoye. Four additional missions over Soviet territory took place on July 9 and 10. After Moscow issued a protest note on July 10, U-2 flights over Russia were temporarily suspended.

The intelligence gathered from these flights disproved the speculation that there was a "bomber gap" with the Reds ahead of the Americans. The film developed afterwards clearly showed that the Soviets did not have near the number of Bison bombers Pentagon strategists had supposed. In its first 17 months Operation OVERFLIGHT conducted 23 missions, including six flights over the USSR and five over Eastern Europe. Eisenhower reluctantly approved additional missions when analysts convinced him that data from a specific site was needed. But between March 1958 and July 1959 there were no U-2 flights over the USSR.

The U-2 program was not the only flight espionage the Americans were conducting against the Soviets during this period. Operation HOME RUN, which was approved by Eisenhower, was designed to determine the best flight entry points along the northern, 3,500-mile-long Soviet border, from the Bering Strait to the Kola Peninsula in Eastern Europe. Approximately 50 converted American bombers were used for this task. In one dramatic episode on May 6, 1956, six bombers flying abreast, as if in attack mode, crossed the North Pole and penetrated Soviet air space during daylight hours. The purpose was to activate Soviet radar to ascertain its capabilities.

On May 1, 1960, with the Soviets shooting down a U-2 over Sverdlovsk, a serious cold war crisis erupted. Although the pilot Lieutenant Francis Gary Powers was photographing intercontinental ballistic missile test sites near the Urals, the State Department initially denied that the flight was a spy mission. The May 1960 Paris summit abruptly ended on its first day after Khrushchev walked out, angry over Eisenhower's refusal to issue an apology for violating Soviet airspace. He also cancelled Eisenhower's upcoming visit to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet downing of the U-2 prompted the CIA to develop a faster-flying reconnaissance plane, capable of higher altitudes, producing the SR-71 Blackbird. Also, spy satellites, beginning with Corona in 1960, offered improved photography and electronic eavesdropping. Even so, heading into the twenty-first century the U.S. military maintained nearly three dozen U-2 aircraft in its inventory.

See also: Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Open Skies Proposal; Pearl Harbor; Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Incident

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Roger Chapman

OVERLORD, OPERATION

Operation Overlord was the cover name for the D-Day operation on June 6, 1944, during which Allied forces landed on the beaches of Normandy to begin the Liberation of France.

Because of the difficulties with a seaborne landing, and the vulnerability of the troop-carriers, before the operation, the Allies were involved in a mass deception plan to get the Germans to believe that the Allies were actually landing in the Pas-de-Calais rather than at Normandy. This deception became known as Operation Fortitude, and included Operation Zeppelin, whereby the Allies pretended that they were going to attack in the Balkans rather than in France.

The origins of Operation Overlord go back to the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 after which there was a massive buildup in U.S. and Canadian forces in the British Isles. The first aim was to find a place where the beaches were suitable for landing, and which was within range of Allied aircraft based in England. There was also the need to have a rapid buildup of Allied forces to establish a massive beachhead. The raid at Dieppe on August 19, 1942, had been a disaster and Operation Overlord involved

planning a landing between Cherbourg and Le Havre—the former, it was hoped, would be captured early in the campaign to allow for large ships to bring supplies which, until then, would have to be landed on the beaches of Normandy.

The Quebec Conference of August 1943 confirmed the feasibility study but the British prime minister wanted an increase of 25 percent in the soldiers being used. The main problem was the massive shortage of landing craft and a decision on whether or not this was possible was delayed. In February 1944 U.S. General Eisenhower was made supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, with British General Montgomery in charge of land forces.

The Allies succeeded in deceiving the Germans as to the place of the invasion, and then also after the actual attack whether or not it was the full assault or just a diversionary operation. Part of this relied on the structure of the German command, with Hitler and Field Marshal Rommel, commander of Army Group B, wanting to use maximum force to prevent any Allied landing, and Field Marshal von Runstedt, commander-in-chief west, wanting a large reserve to attack the Allies after they had landed.

The attack was originally scheduled for June 4, June 5, or June 6, owing to the tides, and started on the morning of June 5, but had to be delayed until the very early hours of June 6 because of bad weather in the English Channel. Just after midnight of June 5/6, Operation Neptune saw 23,400 British and U.S. paratroopers landed on the flanks of the invasion beaches to hold the areas and prevent any German reinforcements coming once the main beach assaults began. The first village to be liberated was Ste Me"ere Eglise, where the 82nd and 101st U.S. Airborne Divisions landed. Several hours afterwards the five main naval assault forces started landing on the beaches which were code-named "Utah," "Omaha," "Gold," "Juno," and "Sword." At the same time Allied ships bombarded German positions while the five Allied divisions landed and held the beaches which allowed two artificial harbors to be towed across the English Channel. Altogether 75,215 British and Canadian soldiers and 57,500 U.S. troops landed on D-Day, June 6, with 3,450 British casualties, 946 Canadian casualties (of whom only 35 were killed), and 6,603 U.S. casualties (1,465 killed, 3,184 wounded, 1,928 missing, and 26 captured)—high figures but far lower than were expected by the Allied High Command. there were 1,1213 naval warships involved in D-Day, of which 79 percent were British and Canadian, 16.5 percent were American, and the remainder were Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, and Polish. Some 195,701 naval personnel took part, with some of these, and also some of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, being involved in operations against Calais to confuse the Germans as to the actual place of the assault. It has been estimated that German casualties ran to between 4,000 and 9,000 on D-Day itself, with by the end of June, Rommel being able to report that he had lost 28 generals, 354 commanders, and some 250,000 men, killed, injured, captured, or missing.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Justin Corfield

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PAISLEY, JOHN
(AUGUST 25, 1923–SEPTEMBER 24, 1978)

John Paisley was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee who died on September 24, 1978, under circumstances that have clouded his career in debate and made him the subject of conspiracy theories regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Two days after Kennedy's death, Paisley was found floating in the Patuxent River. His boat was found anchored to a mooring. He was strapped down with two 19-pound diving weights and had a single gunshot wound to the left side of his head. The coroner ruled his death a suicide.

Paisley was born on August 25, 1923, in Sand Springs, Oklahoma. In 1941 he joined the marines. In 1948 he started work at the United Nations as a radio operator, a position he had held in the marines. In December 1953 Paisley joined the CIA. There he was responsible for monitoring the development of electronics in the Soviet Union. In 1955 he was posted to the National Security Agency (NSA) where he analyzed information obtained from a listening post secretly established by the CIA in a tunnel under the Soviet embassy in Berlin. He returned to work for the CIA in 1957 and would eventually reach the position of deputy director of the Office of Strategic Research. In that position he interviewed Soviet defectors including Oleg Penkovsky, Anatoli Golitsyn, and Yuri Nosenko. At the time of Paisley's death, Nosenko was making claims that as a member of the KGB he had evaluated Lee Harvey Oswald, Kennedy's assassin, as a potential agent.

In 1971 Paisley was made the CIA's liaison to the White House Special Investigations Unit, "the Plumbers," whose job it was to identify sources of leaks in the Nixon administration. Their first target was Daniel Ellsberg. His relationship with the Plumbers did not become a major point of investigation by the Senate Watergate Committee. Paisley ostensibly retired in 1974 but in fact kept working for the CIA.

The day of his death Paisley had gone out sailing on the Chesapeake Bay. He told a friend that he had an important report to write. Found in the boat were an attaché case filled with classified documents. Some argue that he was a Soviet spy and did not die but rather escaped to the Soviet Union. Others claim he was executed perhaps because he had identified a Soviet mole in the CIA or knew something about the Kennedy assassination.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Ellsberg, Daniel; Kennedy Assassination; National Security Agency; Nosenko, Yuri Ivanovich; Watergate

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Glenn P. Hastedt

PALMER RAIDS

A. Mitchell Palmer had a tumultuous political career that reached its most controversial point during his service as President Woodrow Wilson's attorney general from 1919 to 1921. Palmer worked his way quickly up the ranks of the Democratic Party in Pennsylvania. Loyal to the party, elected to Congress, and a gifted speaker, he served as Woodrow Wilson's floor manager in the 1912 democratic presidential convention. Wilson offered Palmer the position of secretary of war following his election as president, but Palmer declined sighting his Quaker background and beliefs. Remaining in Congress, Palmer established himself as a champion of workers' rights. In 1914 he failed to obtain a seat in the Senate and his candidacy was opposed by organized labor. In 1919 Wilson appointed Palmer to be attorney general.

With Wilson largely incapacitated by a stroke and World War I not yet officially over, Palmer moved vigorously to end strikes by miners and railroad workers by invoking wartime powers. Allied with J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Palmer also unleashed a campaign against political radicals claiming to have uncovered a worldwide Communist conspiracy. Palmer's legal justification for acting was the Immigration Act of 1917, which as amended to allow for the deportation of alien anarchists and those who supported organizations that advocated violence. In excess of 3,000 suspected anarchists and members of the Communist Party were arrested, often without warrants. Among those arrested was notable anarchist Emma Goldman.

The Palmer Raids are widely considered to be among the most widespread violation of civil liberties and few of his arrests were later upheld. Politics figured prominently in Palmer's thinking. Having helped create the "Red Scare," he had no choice but to take forceful action. This was especially the case since he was an active candidate for the 1920 democratic presidential nomination. He failed to get the nomination in part because party leaders feared that labor would not support the ticket in the general

election. Palmer continued to be active in Democratic Party politics in his later life. At Franklin Roosevelt's invitation, he played a central role in writing the party's 1932 platform and died while working on the 1936 platform.

See also: American Communist Party; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Hoover, J. (John) Edgar

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PANETTA, LEON
(JUNE 28, 1938–)

Leon E. Panetta is the 19th director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He assumed that position on February 13, 2009, after having been nominated for the post by President Barak Obama and approved by the Senate. His prior executive branch service consisted of being President Bill Clinton's chief of staff and director of the Office of Management and Budget. Panetta also served in the House of Representatives for California from 1977 to 1993.

Panetta's appointment came as somewhat of a surprise since he had no prior experience in intelligence work or the broader field of national security policy. His was the last major initial appointment made by Obama. The new administration had run into difficulty in finding a nominee who was not somehow tainted by the Guantanamo Bay prisoner interrogation controversy. Panetta's nomination was characterized as a testament to his managerial skills and bipartisan standing in Washington. It is thought that his standing in Democratic Party circles would provide him with access to President Obama and provide the Obama administration with tighter control over the CIA than if an intelligence insider had been appointed. Skeptics pointed out that the CIA historically had not proven to be an inviting place for those with little experience in intelligence.

Prior to his nomination, Panetta openly criticized the CIA for its interrogation practices which he termed to be torture. After assuming office, Panetta sent an e-mail to agency employees reassuring them that no one who engaged in torture would be held personally accountable so long as they were following orders.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Waterboarding

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PEARL HARBOR

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, came as a complete surprise to the U.S. military and public, but had been the result of many years of preparation by the Japanese, including the use of some of their best spies.

The idea of attacking Pearl Harbor was to destroy the U.S. Pacific fleet and thus give the Japanese dominance at sea for their invasion of Southeast Asia. The idea was similar to the Japanese actions in the Russo-Japanese War when they had successfully destroyed the Russian fleet in Port Arthur, buying them enough time to build up their land forces. Curiously, the idea of attacking Pearl Harbor had been envisaged by a British World War I spy, Hector Bywater, who had been born in London but had spent some of his childhood in Cambridge, Massachusetts, his father having served with the secret service section of the Union forces, later himself working in New York before becoming a British spy. Becoming the British naval attaché in Washington, Bywater wrote his book *The Great Pacific War* (1925) in which he showed that a Japanese attack on the U.S. Pacific fleet could give them victory in a Pacific War. The importance of the book was quickly realized by Japanese intelligence, and Admiral Yamamoto later credited the work with providing the basis for his plans. U.S. General Billy Mitchell also warned of a possible Japanese attack but his advice was ignored.

In 1932 the U.S. Admiral Yarnell embarked on a joint army-navy exercise which was to deal with a hypothetical situation in which the United States had to retake Hawaii. To this end, he planned to have aircraft carriers, and use planes from them to attack. It was a military exercise that was earnestly followed by Japan.

The Japanese sent some of their best agents to Hawaii where some members of the large Japanese population were called on for assistance, often unwittingly. Although the basic intelligence about Pearl Harbor was easy to gain, the Japanese were keen to know the exact disposition of the U.S. naval vessels on any particular day, their antiaircraft positions, and similar information. The U.S. authorities had broken the Japanese code and there are theories that either they, or British intelligence, with access to German decoded messages, knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor in advance, but did not reveal this because an attack would have forced the United States to enter the war. However it seems that the Japanese had anticipated that some of their codes might have been compromised and for this reason sent one of their best spies, Takeo Yoshikawa, to Hawaii as the vice consul, using the name Ito Morimura.

When he arrived in Hawaii in August 1941, three German agents had been collecting information for several years. They were the Keuhns—Dr. Bernard Keuhn, his wife, and another woman who they claimed was their daughter, but was actually unrelated. The three were members of the German Secret Service who had settled in Honolulu, their interest in the prehistory of the Hawaiian islands allowing them to travel around easily. Although the Keuhns had established a good network, with the "daughter" running a beauty parlor where she listened to the U.S. officers' wives gossip, the Japanese felt that they needed their own agent, and this was why Yoshikawa was dispatched. There were already some 200 Japanese consular agents and staff on the Hawaiian islands, mainly because of the large Japanese population, but many would also have been involved in spying.

Yoshikawa quickly collected the information that was needed, and clearly suspected that the Americans knew that he was a spy, although they never realized how important

Aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. The battleship *West Virginia* is in the background. (Library of Congress).

his role was in the Japanese operations on Hawaii. Yoshikawa worked out two ways of deceiving the Americans. He increased the number of messages he sent through normal consular channels, thereby creating a backlog in translating by a short-staffed FBI, and sent all important information using a different route. The Americans followed him around Hawaii and reported in detail on his social engagements.

On December 5, only two days before the actual Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Yoshikawa was able to continue to send messages to Tokyo recording that three battle-ships had arrived in the port, but inaccurately named one of them as the *Wyoming* whereas it was actually the *Utah*. He also did not spot the arrival of two heavy cruisers. On the night before the Japanese attack, Yoshikawa, clearly expecting the Japanese planes at any time, destroyed all his code books and records. The Keuhns were less well prepared and Bernard Keuhn was sending signals from his house to the Japanese Consul Otojiro Okuda during the attack. Noticed by an alert U.S. intelligence officer, the FBI arrested the Keuhns and sentenced Dr. Keuhn to death, later commuted to life imprisonment. For his cooperation with the authorities, he was released in 1946, but his wife and "daughter" were both deported at the end of the war. Yoshikawa, working under consular cover, was repatriated to Japan in the exchange of diplomatic and con-sular staff which took place, and he spent the rest of the war working in Japanese naval intelligence.

Straight after the attack on Pearl Harbor, following worries about the possible disloyalty of Japanese-Americans, President Roosevelt signed an order for the internment of all Japanese-American civilians. Some residents on Hawaii were already thought to have been spies and one, Dr. Motokazu Mori (1890–1958), a dentist, was repeatedly questioned over a recent telephone call he had made to Tokyo in which he had described some flowers in bloom, the FBI believing that it was a coded message for something far more sinister.

See also: MAGIC; PURPLE; Yoshikawa, Takeo

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PEARSON, NORMAN HOLMES (APRIL 13, 1909–NOVEMBER 6, 1975)

Norman H. Pearson, a professor of American literature, was the OSS counterintelligence director during World War II. Norman Holmes Pearson was born on April 13, 1909, in Gardner, Massachusetts, the son of Chester Page Pearson and Fanny Holmes (née Kittredge). He was educated at Phillips Academy, Yale University, and Magdalen College, Oxford, gaining a doctorate from Yale University in 1941. He had also completed some graduate study at Berlin University in 1933. From 1941 until 1975 he was a member of the faculty at Yale University, attached to the OSS from 1942 until 1946.

Going to Britain, Pearson's role was to liaise with British intelligence, some of whom he had known from his time at Oxford. He found working with the Double Cross Committee extremely difficult and full of moral contradictions, but acquitted himself well, earning the respect of his British counterparts. Pearson worked alongside many of the major figures in British intelligence, including Kim Philby. He was also responsible for recruiting poet James Angleton into the OSS. Pearson was awarded the American Medal of Freedom and made Chevalier of the Legion of Honor for his wartime work. After World War II, he returned to Yale and remained there until his death. During that time he held several important fellowships and wrote extensively on American literature, specializing in Nathaniel Hawthorne and Henry David Thoreau. From a young age he had been crippled by polio, and required leg braces to walk. He died on November 6, 1975.

See also: Office of Strategic Services; Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"

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PELTON, RONALD W.
(1942–)

Ronald Pelton joined the National Security Agency (NSA) in 1965 after having served in air force intelligence in Pakistan. He worked at NSA for 14 years as a communications specialist and had top security clearance, although he did not rise very high in the organization. Pelton left NSA in 1979 under the clouds of a growing personal debt that he feared would cost him his security clearance and lead him to declare bankruptcy. Pelton was a classic "walk-in." Soon after leaving NSC, in January 1980, Pelton contacted the Soviet embassy with an offer of information for cash. His phone call was recorded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as was his subsequent visit to the Soviet embassy. But his identity was not established. At the embassy he talked with Vitaly Yurchenko, a security officer at the embassy. Pelton was not able to provide Soviet intelligence officers with any secret documents but he was able to recount from memory key pieces of information that were of value to the Soviet Union.

Twice between 1980 and 1983, Pelton flew to Vienna where he was debriefed by a Soviet intelligence officer. For his information he was paid $35,000. The most valuable pieces of information that Pelton revealed involved Project Ivy Bells. This was a NSA-navy intelligence operation run by the Central Intelligence Agency that intercepted messages from a Soviet communications cable in the Sea of Okhotsk that linked Soviet naval bases at Vladovostok and Petrapavlovsk. The unencrypted communications seized in this operation provided the United States with an important window into Soviet military procedures and planning. Disclosing the existence of Project Ivy Bells also undermined a planned expansion of the program to replace recorders with an on-line system that would provide early warning of any change in the deployment of Soviet naval forces. Other possible disclosures include Operation Chalet/Vortex and a joint American-British signals and communication intercept operation.

Pelton's espionage was revealed in 1985 when Yurchenko briefly defected and told the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the visit by a "Mr. Long." Although they had little firm evidence to go on, a process of elimination led the FBI to identify Pelton as Mr. Long. He was arrested on November 25, 1985. By this time he had left his wife and was living with a girlfriend, Ann Berry, and was heavily involved in drugs. Pelton admitted to the FBI that he had spied for the Soviet Union, apparently in the expectation that he might stay free and become a double agent.

Few details of Pelton's espionage career surfaced at his trial given the sensitivity of Project Ivy Bells. On June 5, 1986, he was convicted of two counts of espionage, one count of disclosing classified information, and one count of disclosing classified communications intelligence. He was sentenced to three consecutive life terms in prison plus 10 years.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); IVY BELLS, Project; National Security Agency

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PENKOVSKY, OLEG VLADIMIROVICH (APRIL 23, 1919–MAY 15, 1963)

Born in the period following the Russian Revolution, Oleg Penkovsky's family had strong connections with the old Tsarist regime. He never knew his father, who was an engineer and lieutenant in the tsar's army and who died fighting the Bolsheviks in the last phases of the civil war. As a youth, Penkovsky joined the Komsomol, the Communist youth league, and graduated from Kiev Military School. In 1937 he enlisted in the army and would later join the Communist Party. After World War II Penkovsky enrolled in the Frunze Military Academy and in 1949 he joined the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence organization. Penkovsky became arguably the most important known spy the United States had in the Soviet Union during the cold war.

His first overseas assignment was to be in Turkey in 1955 but after a dispute with a supervisor he was sent back to Moscow and began studying missile technology at the Dzershinky Military Artillery Engineering Academy. He was scheduled to return to intelligence work as a military attaché in India in 1957 when his father's background was uncovered. He was kept in Moscow where he secured a position as a senior officer in the GRU's Third Division, which was responsible for collecting scientific and technical intelligence from the West.

It was from this position the Penkovsky approached the West about spying. His initial attempts to volunteer his services as a spy were directed at the United States and took place in 1960. They met with failure. Following closely on the heels of captured U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers' public trial, his offers were met with skepticism and provoked fears that he might act as a double agent spying on the West. Penkovsky was more successful in his approach to Great Britain through British businessperson Greville Wynne. Some two weeks after providing Wynne with secret information that established his legitimacy, Penkovsky was part of a Soviet trade mission to London. There he met with British and American intelligence officials, supplying them with documents and information about Soviet missiles. One estimate suggests that he passed along 5,000 photographs of key documents before his arrest on October 22, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition he provided "gossip" intelligence on high-ranking GRU conversations he heard and participated in as well as the identities of key GRU personnel in India, Egypt, Paris, London, and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) as well as hundreds of GRU and KGB officers. Penkovsky had warned Wynne at one of their meetings in July 1962 that he thought he was being watched by the KGB. In fact, in

January 1962 the KGB photographed him meeting with the wife of a British intelligence officer to whom he regularly gave information. His last act of espionage came in August 1962. Evidence points to two double agents working in Washington, William Whalen and Jack Dulap, who revealed Penkovsky's identity to the KGB.

The information provided to the United States by Penkovsky is widely credited with having played a major role in American decision making during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He provided the United States with the operating manual for the SS-4, which the Soviet Union was placing in Cuba as well as information regarding problems with the Soviet missile guidance system and warheads. Additionally he provided important information on Soviet military doctrine, bureaucratic behavior and patterns of decision making, and Soviet command and control problems.

Controversy surrounds Penkovsky's espionage career on three counts. The first centers on whether or not (and for how long) the Soviet Union knew he was spying but allowed him to continue to feed information to the West. The possibility also has been raised that Penkovsky was in fact a triple agent. The second controversy centers on the timing of his arrest and execution. Some suggest that it was an attempt by the Soviet Union at crisis management, signaling to the United States that the information he had given them was accurate. The third questions the significance of Penkovsky's intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here it is argued that the lack of archival documents and the political and personal agendas of those writing on Penkovsky have led to a sensationalization of his role and in the process distorted his true influence.

Penkovsky was tried along with Wynne, who was arrested in Hungary, for espionage in May 1963. Both were found guilty. Penkovsky was shot five days after the verdict was rendered. Wynne was sentenced to eight years in prison and exchanged in April 1964 for Soviet spy Gordon Lonsdale who was operating in Great Britain.

See also: Cuban Missile Crisis; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Lonsdale, Gordon Arnold; Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Incident; Wynne, Greville

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PERSIAN GULF WAR

The Persian Gulf War was the first major international conflict of the post–cold war era. The first stage of the conflict began in early 1990 and ended with Iraq's August 2 invasion of Kuwait. It was dominated by raising tension between the United States and Iraq, and Iraq and its Arab neighbors. On February 15, 1990, Iraq protested a Voice of

America broadcast on global democratization that characterized Iraq as a state where "secret police were widely present." Iraqi President Saddam Hussein repeated his attacks on the United States in a late February meeting of the Arab Cooperation Council where he also stated that Arab states needed to provide Iraq with $30 billion in aid for its war effort against Iran in the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq War. Failure to do so, he threatened, would cause Iraq to "take steps to retaliate." That war had cost Iraq over $500 billion. Oil sales were the key to Iraq's recovery but the price of oil was steadily dropping.

A flurry of diplomatic activity followed. Jordan's King Hussein tried and failed to broker an agreement between Iraq and the other Middle East oil-producing states. Saddam Hussein continued his verbal attacks on the United States and the George H. W. Bush administration responded by labeling them as "inflammatory" and "irresponsible." At a May summit meeting of Arab states he charged that Kuwait and other quota-busting oil-producing states were "virtually waging an economic war" against Iraq. He then charged Kuwait with being part of a "Zionist plot aid by imperialists." Low oil prices were termed a "dagger" pointed at Iraq. These outbursts set off a new round of diplomatic activity to defuse the growing crisis. On July 31 a high-ranking State Department spokesperson told Congress the United States had "no defense treaty relationship with any Gulf country."

Accompanying this hostile rhetoric were troop movements by key units of Iraq's Republican guard toward the Kuwaiti border. The United States was disturbed by this action but concluded that their purpose was to intimidate rather than invade. The United States continued to hold to this interpretation right up until the invasion, although on July 31 elements of the intelligence community concluded that war was now imminent given the scale and direction of recent Iraqi troop movements. Within 11 days Saddam Hussein had moved eight divisions to within 300 to 400 miles of the Kuwait border. Given that the United States only had 10,000 military personnel in the region and that most of them were naval forces, there was little that the United States could do to prevent the invasion.

A second period of the Persian Gulf War encompasses the period between the invasion of Kuwait and the beginning of the bombing campaign in January 1991. On August 2, 1990, Kuwait was invaded by Iraqi troops that took control of most of the country within a matter of hours. Caught off guard by the Iraqi attack, the George H. W. Bush administration's first priority became protecting Saudi Arabia and its vast oil reserves from Iraqi forces that were massing along the Iraq-Saudi border. To accomplish this objective Operation Desert Shield was launched. An unprecedented aspect of this operation, one that would be objected to strongly by Osama bin Laden, was Saudi Arabia's unprecedented willingness to allow U.S. soldiers to be stationed on its soil.

It was the third week of August before the international coalition of forces, assembled under U.S. leadership, was able to be confident that an Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia could not succeed. The United States was the major contributor with 430,000 troops. Great Britain (35,000), Egypt (30,000), and France (17,000) were significant contributors of military personnel. Saudi Arabia provided 66,000 front line troops. In addition to organizing army troops, Operation Desert Shield also put in place a naval force to protect Saudi Arabia. The core of the naval force was provided by the United States. It sent more than 100 ships, including six aircraft carriers. Great

Britain and France sent 18 and 14 ships, respectively. This coalition of forces would come to provide the foundation for Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. Japan and Germany provided funding rather than troops. The largest financial contributors were Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Each gave more than $16 billion. All totaled, foreign states gave some $54 billion to the effort.

On November 8, 1990, just after the midterm elections, the Bush administration announced that it was sending reinforcements to the region. This move signaled a shift in U.S. thinking away from the use of economic sanctions as a means of forcing Iraq out of Kuwait. Instead, a large military force would be assembled that would try to intimidate Saddam Hussein into withdrawing from Kuwait and failing that could undertake an offensive military operation. On November 29, the Security Council voted 12–2, with China abstaining, to set January 15, 1991, as the deadline for Iraq's peaceful exit from Kuwait. It authorized member states to "use all means necessary" to bring about Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal. That same month Congress took up the question of whether to support the use of military force as requested by Bush. On January 12, the House of Representatives voted 250–183 to support the president's use of military force against Iraq. The Senate did so by a 52–47 margin. When the compliance deadline established by UN Resolution 678 went unmet, the Persian Gulf War entered its offensive phase with the launching of Operation Desert Storm.

On January 16, 1991, Operation Desert Storm began. Coalition aircraft took off from Saudi Arabia to begin the air campaign against Iraq. Coalition air forces would fly over 109,000 sorties, drop 88,500 tons of bombs, and shoot down 35 Iraqi planes. On January 17, Iraq responded by launching Scud missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel. One of the major concerns U.S. war planners had was Israel's response to these attacks. The fear was that if Israel retaliated, the Arab members of the coalition would defect. Israel did not retaliate and the coalition held together. On September 23, after a failed Soviet-Iraqi peace initiative and the refusal of Iraq to begin a large-scale withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait, coalition forces launched a ground assault into Iraq.

The ground phase of Operation Desert Storm began on February 24. It lasted exactly 100 hours. Approximately 700,000 troops were assembled in and around Saudi Arabia for the attack but fewer than 400,000 actually participated in it. Great uncertainty surrounded the beginning of the campaign due to the uncertainty over the abilities of Iraq's army and Saddam Hussein's strategy. American, British, and French forces led a blitzkrieg operation deep into Iraq when the fighting began. With his forces defeated and surrounded, Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq had withdrawn from Kuwait on February 26. Fighting continued until February 28 when President Bush announced that the coalition's military objectives had been met. American war casualties were listed as 125 combat deaths. Approximately 63,000 Iraqi soldiers were taken as prisoners of war and 25,000 to 100,000 were killed. As many as 30 percent of Kuwaiti forces in Kuwait deserted. British estimates place the number of Iraqi tanks destroyed at 3,500 out of 4,200.

On February 28, Iraq announced a cease-fire and agreed to a meeting of military commanders to discuss terms for ending the war. The UN Security Council approved Resolution 686, setting out the terms for ending hostilities on March 2. The following day Iraq agreed to these terms. On April 3 the UN Security Council approved Resolution 687, which established a permanent cease-fire in the Persian Gulf War and ended

international sanctions against Iraq. Iraq accepted these terms on April 6, formally ending the war.

The performance of the intelligence community during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was found to range from very good and deserving of praise to very poor, depending upon which facet is analyzed. Intelligence collection came in for the highest praise. Still, several problems were identified. One problem was that in the buildup to Operation Desert Shield intelligence capabilities were intentionally restricted, with the emphasis instead being placed on building up U.S. forces in the region as quickly as possible. As a result, military commanders in the theater of combat were forced to rely primarily upon national collection systems for much of their intelligence. A further complicating factor is that the Central Command (CENTCOM) was unprepared to handle the surge of intelligence it began to receive once war appeared imminent. When CENCOM/J-2 was first deployed to the theater on August 7 it had a staff of less than 10. It was described as being an empty shell to which people and resources would be attached should it become necessary. As such, no intelligence architecture or structure was in place to guide the buildup of theater intelligence resources. Over time the number of individuals assigned to CENTCOM/J-2 rose to almost 700.

An additional complicating factor was that some national intelligence organizations appeared to be unfamiliar with or unresponsive to the needs of wartime commanders. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was singled out for criticism in this regard. In its defense, the CIA noted it responded to over 1,000 information inquiries from CENTCOM. Additionally it appears that some combat commanders did not have a full appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. intelligence system. As a consequence, all of the information potentially available to commanders was not used to its maximum potential.

On a more positive note, although some tactical imagery and signals intelligence systems were not able to provide a high degree of support to field commanders, other collection systems performed admirably. The air force-army Joint Surveillance Target Radar System (JSTARS) provided combat commanders with near real-time intelligence on a wide range of targets in all weather conditions. Working in tandem with JSTARS, the air force's U-2 reconnaissance aircraft provided high-resolution images tracking the movement of vehicles during all weather conditions and during night and day. Also, the Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) provided considerable imagery support to army, navy, and marine units.

Dissemination of intelligence was rated as very poor. Here again the absence of an intelligence structure to ensure that commanders received intelligence, especially imagery intelligence, in a timely fashion was a major problem. No fewer than one dozen different secondary imagery dissemination systems were delivered in theater. Each of the services brought their own systems with them. Operating independently, they often performed admirably but only four of them were able to send pictures from one system to another. No service was willing to give up its system and at the same time no service was capable of forcing others to adopt its system. Moreover, the timely dissemination of tactical intelligence within the combat theater was hindered by bottlenecks created by communication problems within CENTCOM. Problems arose from junior officers having insatiable intelligence appetites and more senior officers removing intelligence

from distribution channels without adequately consulting others about its potential value. These problems were largely found in the air force, although they also existed to some extent in army units.

The quality of intelligence analysis was judged to be mixed. The central analytical weakness involved tactical battlefield damage assessments. This task was given to the army rather than the air force in part because of the well-established tendency for pilots to overstate the success of their missions. Unfortunately, the army had little idea of how to do this. In the brief period of combat, great doubts were expressed in Washington about the rapidly mounting number of kills reported. After-the-fact analysis of selected engagements found that CENTCOM counts of Republican guard tank units destroyed was exaggerated by 100 percent. Another combat analysis found the margin of error in estimating tank kills to be above 134 percent. An additional dimension to the analytical problem was the manner in which intelligence was reported. For example, stating that a bridge was 52 percent destroyed did not inform commanders if a truck could cross the bridge, which is the key operational question from their point of view.

Finally, intelligence controversies encompassing collection, dissemination, and analysis arose in two areas. The first was the hunt for SCUD mobile missile launchers. Observers described it as a double military loser. It diverted resources from more pressing ground battle targets and no evidence emerged that even a single SCUD missile or mobile launcher was destroyed. The second intelligence controversy surrounded the search for Iraq's nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons capability. The absence of definitive intelligence on this matter would return to haunt U.S. policy in Iraq years later when George W. Bush would use an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capability as a major reason for going to war.

See also: Iraq War; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

PETERS, J.
(1894–1990)

J. Peters was an alias used by a Hungarian Communist, Sándor Goldberger, who played a prominent role in the American Communist Party (CPUSA) during his 25-year residence (1924–1949) in the United States. His major accomplishment was the establishment in the mid-1930s of a spy apparatus that was one of the earliest and most successful Soviet beachheads in the Roosevelt administration.

Born in Hungary to Jewish parents in 1894, Sándor Goldberger received an excellent secondary school education. He enrolled in a law college but his studies were interrupted by World War I, in which he served as an infantry officer. Traumatized by the war and the rise of political anti-Semitism, he became a Communist and emigrated to the United States in 1924. In 1931 he was sent by the CPUSA to Moscow where he received special training in conspiratorial work. In 1932 he took the name J. Peters and was appointed director of the CPUSA's secret apparatus. His most important project was the creation of an underground Party unit in Washington, DC, consisting of middle- and high-level government workers, some of whom he recruited for espionage work. Peters was the handler of Whittaker Chambers, who actively coordinated the work of Peters' spy ring. Its greatest success was penetration of the State Department, where Alger Hiss was a principal source. In late 1936 Peters handed over control of the spy apparatus to Col. Boris Bykov, a Soviet military intelligence agent. When Whittaker Chambers defected in 1938, Peters withdrew from his Washington underground activities but continued to cooperate with Soviet intelligence agencies by providing the names of government employees willing to carry out espionage work.

Peters, who had never become an American citizen, was deported in 1949 and returned to Hungary. Adhering to the code of silence expected of Communists who had engaged in conspiratorial work, he insisted in the rare interviews he gave to historians or journalists that he had never been involved in underground or espionage work. However, in an unpublished memoir that he wrote for the Hungarian Communist Party archive, he admitted for the first time that he had indeed engaged in what he euphemistically called "special work" for the CPUSA. He died in 1990, one year after the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

See also: Chambers, Whittaker; Hiss, Alger

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Tom Sakmyster

PETROV, VLADIMIR M.
(FEBRUARY 7, 1907–JUNE 14, 1991)

Vladimir Petrov was the most senior Soviet spy to defect to the West since the 1930s. His defection was a coup for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, aroused the intense interest of the Western counterintelligence community, and threw fresh light on the "missing diplomats," Anthony Burgess and Donald McLean. Of peasant origin, Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov was born in the Siberian village of Larikha on February 15, 1907. He established a local Komsomol cell in 1923, became a full-time organizer and Communist Party member in 1927, and was recruited by the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKVD) in 1933. He survived Stalin's purges, was

posted to Stockholm during World War II, and arrived in Australia on February 5, 1951. Ostensibly third secretary to the Soviet embassy in Canberra, Petrov was actually a colonel in the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and directly responsible to Beria.

On April 3, 1954, Petrov defected. Two weeks later his wife, Evdokia, an embassy cipher clerk and MGB officer, also defected, after dramatically being freed from armed Soviet couriers by Australian police at Darwin airport. This resulted in the dual withdrawal of the Soviet embassy from Canberra and the Australian embassy from Moscow. Prime Minister Robert Menzies promptly established the Royal Commission on Espionage, which sat for 126 days, examined 119 witnesses, and received over 500 exhibits. The latter included the controversial "Petrov Papers," documents handed over at the time of defection. Although many on the Left alleged these to be forgeries, the declassified VENONA decrypts confirmed their authenticity in 1996. The Royal Commission exposed Soviet espionage in Australia between 1945 and 1948, but prosecutions could not be initiated without compromising the VENONA operation. Petrov's revelations also caused a sensation in Great Britain, for he provided new material, leaked to the British press by Security Service (MI-5) officers, concerning the escape and whereabouts of Burgess and Maclean. Petrov was given a new identity, Sven Allyson; lived in a "safe house" in East Bentleigh, Melbourne; and thereafter in a nursing home in Parkville, Melbourne, where he died, aged 84, on June 14, 1991.

See also: Australian Security Intelligence Organisation; MI-5 (The Security Service); NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs)

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Phillip Deery

PHILBY, HAROLD ADRIAN RUSSELL "KIM" (JANUARY 1, 1912–MAY 11, 1988)

Harold "Kim" Philby was a member of the Cambridge Group of spies. His betrayals cost the lives of hundreds of agents and provided the Soviets with an enormous number of American and British secrets. Philby was born on January 1, 1912, in Ambala, India, the son of Harry St. John Philby. He was nicknamed "Kim" after Rudyard Kipling's famous fictional character.

In 1929 he entered Cambridge University. With the Great Depression growing he was drawn into socialist politics and joined the Cambridge University Socialist Society. In 1933 "Kim" completed his studies at Cambridge and moved to Vienna where he joined underground Communists. While in Vienna, Philby married Alice "Litzi" Friedman, a Communist on the run from the police. In 1934 he returned to Great Britain with her. Not long afterward he was recruited as a Soviet spy and given the long-term assignment

Kim Philby in 1955, the time he was cleared of being the "hired man" in the Maclean Burgess Affair. Philby later defected to the Soviet Union. (AP/Wide World Photos)

of getting into the British secret service. His short-term assignment was to go the Spain where Civil War raged between Fascists and Communists.

Philby was a reporter for the *Times* of London and went to Spain where he pretended to be a supporter of General Francisco Franco's nationalists. He was given the Red Cross of Military Merit by the nationalists. He also cut all visible ties to his former Communists associations and separated from "Litizi." With his right-wing cover, Philby successfully joined the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), also known as MI-6, with the aid of Guy Burgess who was also a KGB agent.

During World War II Philby was head of a subsection of SIS which directed resistance groups in Nazi-occupied Europe. His work was viewed as excellent so in 1944 he was put in charge of a new section of British counterintelligence, a unit (Section Nine) tasked with uncovering Communist moles within British intelligence.

Section Nine was small at first but Philby built it into an organization which was in charge of all intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert operations against the Soviet Union and other Communists. He was thus able to protect the Committee for State Security's (KGB) important assets and himself. However, all would have been lost with the defection to the British of KGB agent Konstantin Volkov in Turkey because Volkov knew the names of numerous British agents serving the Communists. Philby was able to delay Volkov's debriefing, which gave the KGB time to murder Volkov, thus eliminating the threat of exposure.

In 1946 Philby married Aileen Furse. The marriage however, required a divorce from Litzi. At the time she was living in East Berlin with a Soviet agent known to British

intelligence. The divorce and her association with Philby should have rendered him a security risk; however, an investigation that might have exposed him did not occur.

In 1947 Philby was posted to Istanbul. There he was able to betray several anti-Communist groups, which were subsequently exterminated. In 1949 he was assigned to the British embassy in Washington, DC, as the liaison officer between SIS and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). With his CIA connection, Philby was able to give the Soviets numerous American secrets about its military intensions, relations with allies, atomic research, and covert operations against Communists.

In late 1950 Philby learned that David Maclean, another KGB agent and an old friend of Philby's from Cambridge days, was about to be exposed. Philby used Guy Burgess to alert Maclean. Together the two escaped to Moscow. Because Burgess went to Moscow with Maclean, he brought suspicion on Philby who had been an active friend of Burgess'. After a long investigation British intelligence was convinced, but unable to prove, Philby was a KGB agent. However, Philby stoutly denied that he was a spy. In the end his reputation was undone and he was asked to resign.

Philby then went to work again as a journalist for *The Observer* and *The Economist*. And then to the surprise of many he was rehired by SIS of which he remained a member until 1963. He also continued to provide the KGB with intelligence, only mostly overt political information at this time.

In 1957 Philby was stationed in Beirut, Lebanon, where his wife, Aileen, died of heart problems. In 1958 he married Eleanor Brewer, ex-wife of a *New York Times* correspondent. In 1961, Anatoli Golitsyn, a KGB officer, defected to the West where he provided proof of Philby's espionage activities. Golitsyn's information stimulated a new investigation of Philby. In late 1962 he was confronted with the evidence against him and seemed to be prepared to give a complete confession. However, on January 23, 1963, he fled Beirut on a cargo ship bound for Russia.

In the Soviet Union Philby learned Russian, became a Soviet citizen, and eventually was promoted to the rank of KGB general. He gave the Soviets every detail of every agent he had ever met, the organizational structure and function of the British and American intelligence organizations, the physical layouts of every facility where he had worked, and every detail he could remember no matter how trivial. The secrets that he gave were very damaging and took years to assess.

In 1963 Eleanor Philby joined him in the Soviet Union, but she never adjusted. She left in 1965 after Philby began an affair with David Maclean's wife. Eleanor died in 1968. Philby then married in 1971 his fourth wife, Rufina Ivanova, a Russian 20 years younger.

Philby worked for Soviet intelligence after his defection. In 1965 he received the Order of Lenin. He died on May 11, 1988. He was buried with full military honors in Kuntsevo Cemetery in Moscow.

See also: Blunt, Anthony; Burgess, Guy Francis De Moncy; Central Intelligence Agency; Golytsin, Anatoli; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Maclean, Donald Duart; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service)

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Andrew J. Waskey

PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE (OCTOBER 31, 1922–JULY 7, 1988)

David Atlee Phillips was a career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer who specialized in covert action. He joined the CIA as a part-time agent in Chile in 1950 where he was editing an English-language newspaper. Phillips joined the CIA full-time in 1954. That same year he participated in PBSUCCESS the CIA covert action plan targeted at removing Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz from power. The propaganda campaign he ran was a major reason for its success. Phillips worked in Cuba around the time that Castro came into power. Returning to Washington from the posting, he participated in the planning of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion that was intended to topple Fidel Castro as well as assassination plots directed against him.

These later sets of covert operation plans found Phillips working out of Mexico. It is here that he came into contact with Gilberto Alvarado, a Nicaraguan youth that contacted the U.S. embassy in Mexico City with information about Lee Harvey Oswald and an upcoming murder. The failure to act on this information, along with his reported contacts with anti-Castro Cuban refugee groups, has fueled conspiracy theories involving Phillips and President John Kennedy's assassination.

Phillips retired from the CIA in 1975 and helped found the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO). Phillips successfully sued for libel against those making these accusations, donating the money he was awarded to the AFIO for use as a defense fund for other intelligence officers who felt they were being libeled.

See also: Association of Former Intelligence Officers; Central Intelligence Agency

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Glenn P. Hastedt

PIGEONS

The United States first used homing pigeons extensively in military service during World War I. European countries had hundreds of thousands of pigeons in service during World War I. The United States had none upon entering the war in 1917. General John J. Pershing saw how successful the birds were for communication on the battlefields in France and insisted that the United States had to incorporate pigeons into its strategy as well. Until this time pigeons were seen as impractical for military value according to a U.S. Army Signal Corps report released in 1882.

Pigeons were used primarily as a means of last-resort communication in World War I; however, in World War II they took on another role: spy. American pigeons were trained predominantly in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, by the Pigeon Service of the U.S. Army Corps, whose motto was "Get the message through!" In those days birds were trained to fly at night. A flock of pigeons was equipped with cameras attached to their breasts. These cameras were about two inches and took snapshots "at regular intervals when the rush of air through a tiny ball released the lever and clicked the shutter" (Cothren 1944, 14). When the Germans gained knowledge of possible espionage, "they ordered every pigeon in the occupied countries put to death by the Gestapo" (Cothren 1944, 11).

Signal Corps' Pigeon Service became official in 1917 and ended on May 1, 1957. Pigeons were used in the Korean War and made a brief comeback during the Vietnam War, which proved unsuccessful. Technology was the demise of the Pigeon Service; pigeons could not compete with the advancements in technology. Pigeons were also used in the navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; American Intelligence, World War II

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Vanessa de los Reyes

PIKE COMMITTEE

Formally known as the House Select Intelligence Committee, the Pike Committee, so named after its chair Congressperson Otis Pike (D-NY), was initially created on February 19, 1975, to investigate the operation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Intelligence Community. It was created shortly after the Ford administration created the Rockefeller Commission and the Senate created the Church Committee for the same purpose. From the very outset, the Pike Committee's activities were surrounded in controversy and its final report was never officially released.

The House established the House Select Intelligence Committee by an overwhelming vote of 286–120. Pike was the second person to chair this committee. The first chair was Congressperson Lucien Nedzi (D-Ohio), who chaired the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and was known to be a strong supporter of the CIA but otherwise had solidly liberal foreign policy credentials opposing the Vietnam War and the development of the B-1 bomber. Nedzi's Committee had 10 members, seven Democrats and three Republicans, and was highly partisan in nature with all Democrats being hostile to the CIA and all Republicans being supporters of it. Nedzi identified the CIA's own internal study of wrongdoings, the "Family Jewels" report, as the focal point for the

committee's work. However, before the committee held its first meeting, a *New York Times* article showed that Nedzi had been briefed on its contents two years earlier. This revelation angered Democrats on the committee and led to Nedzi's resignation. The full House refused to accept his resignation by a vote of 290–64. Nedzi refused to reconsider his decision and on July 17 the House formally abolished his committee and established a new one under Pike's leadership.

Pike was first elected to Congress in 1960 and served until January 1979 when he retired after choosing not to seek reelection. Pike's Committee had 13 members but the partisan split remained. This divide, along with Pike's perceived political ambitions, and a young and aggressive staff that was seen by the CIA and Ford administration to be hostile and naïve—often demanding that significant amounts of sensitive intelligence information be turned over to it the next day—prevented it from ever achieving a solid working relationship with the CIA or White House in its quest to gather information.

Where the Church Committee focused largely on questions of domestic abuses by the CIA and the intelligence community, Pike directed his committee's attention to three areas that were broadly concerned with the effective management and operation of intelligence. The first area was intelligence budgets. Pike hoped to determine how much money was being spent, on what, and whether or not waste existed. These budgets had been secret and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby refused to testify in open sessions regarding CIA expenditures. He did, however, testify on the budget when the committee went into executive session. In its final report the Pike Committee concluded that the intelligence budget was three to four times higher than Congress was led to believe.

The Pike Committee's second area of inquiry was with intelligence failures. It wanted all documents relating to the 1973 Mideast War, the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the 1974 coup in Portugal, the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion, the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, the declaration of martial law in the Philippines and South Korea in 1972, and the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The committee found fault with the CIA's intelligence work in several of these cases, an assessment often shared by the CIA's own internal postmortems. Singled out for criticism were its predictive efforts in the 1973 Mideast War, the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 1974 coups in Cyprus and Portugal and the Indian nuclear explosion of the same year, and the 1968 Czech invasion.

The final area it examined was CIA covert action. Among the operations highlighted were the 1972 Italian elections, aid to the Kurds, and activities in Angola. In its conclusions, the Pike Committee rejected the charge that the CIA was out of control. Instead it concluded that covert actions were often sloppily implemented and irregularly approved. It did not recommend doing away with covert action except for assassinations.

The first draft of the committee's Final Report was rejected by Pike. A second draft was found to be acceptable. The CIA then was given one day to review it. Over its objections the Pike Committee voted along party lines to release the report without any substantial changes. DCI Colby then made a preemptive public attack on the not-yet-released report, calling it a threat to U.S. national security. At this point the full House stepped in and voted 246–124 to direct the Pike Committee not to release the

report. Pike refused to accept this decision. As the political battle raged over whether or not to release the report, how much, and to whom, Daniel Schorr gave a copy of the report to *The Village Voice*, which published it in its entirety on February 16, 1976.

See also: Central Intelligence Committee; Church Committee; Colby, William Egan; Family Jewels; House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI); Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

PINCHER, HENRY CHAPMAN (MARCH 29, 1914–)

A British journalist and author, Chapman has written extensively on the intelligence services, including *Their Trade is Treachery*, published in 1981 which claimed that Sir Roger Hollis, former director general of MI-5 had been a Soviet spy. He also named Sir Anthony Blunt, using a code name "Maurice," as having confessed to being a Soviet spy.

Henry Chapman Pincher was born on March 29, 1914, in Ambala, India, the son of a British army officer. He was educated at Darlington Grammar School and King's College, London, where he studied botany and zoology. In 1940 Pincher joined the Royal Armoured Corps and then worked as a technician at the Rocket Division of the Ministry of Supply, resigning in 1946 to became a defense, science, and medical writer at the *Daily Express*, a position he held until 1972 when he was appointed the assistant editor of the paper and chief defense correspondent of the Beaverbrook newspapers.

Pincher's first two books were on farm animals and fishes, but he rapidly became interested in security matters and was the author of *Inside Story* (1978), *Their Trade is Treachery* (joint author, 1981), *Too Secret Too Long* (1984), *Traitors—The Labyrinths of Treason* (1987), *The Web of Deception* (1987), and *The Truth about Dirty Tricks* (1991). Several other books followed, as well as a number of novels. Pincher was taken into confidence by many senior government officials and members of the British security services. At the heart of many of Pincher's work during the 1980s, including his collaboration with Peter Wright, author of *Spycatcher* (1987), was his belief that Roger Hollis was a Soviet spy and that the Wilson Labour government in Britain in the 1970s included many Soviet agents.

See also: Journalists, Espionage and; MI-5 (The Security Service)

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Justin Corfield

PINKERTON, ALLAN
(AUGUST 21, 1819–JULY 1, 1884)

Allan Pinkerton founded one of the United States' most famous detective agencies and served as director of intelligence for the Union during the Civil War. His success in that role was limited, however; the intelligence he provided was often inaccurate, and his key agent was captured and executed by Confederate forces.

Pinkerton was born in Glasgow, Scotland. Due to police persecution for his involvement in a workers' protest movement, he fled Scotland in 1842, going first to Canada and then to the United States. Ultimately settling in Chicago in 1850, he became that city's first detective, setting up the North West Police Agency, which later became Pinkerton's National Detective Agency. Pinkerton had entered the detective business accidentally when in 1847 Pinkerton had helped break up a rural counterfeiting ring and in the process earned a reputation as a detective.

Railroads provided the main source of employment for Pinkerton's firm. Railroad companies had dramatically increased the miles of track laid in the 1850s to the point that they could no longer police or secure the property themselves. Pinkerton focused his efforts on dishonest employees and set up an espionage system to uncover corrupt behavior. Not only was he successful, his successes were also highly publicized and contributed to rising labor tensions within the railroad industry. In early 1861 while he was investigating the possibility of Confederate sabotage against the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad, Pinkerton claimed to have uncovered a plot to assassinate president-elect Abraham Lincoln. He met with Lincoln's advisors and organized a plan to get Lincoln safely to Washington for his inauguration.

Pinkerton met with newly elected President Lincoln about the establishment of a federal secret service, but nothing came of the discussions. In May 1861 Pinkerton was asked by General George McClellan to set up a spy ring that could be used to gain information from the Confederacy. Pinkerton's successes were well publicized but not extensive. In the area of counterespionage he did succeed in capturing Confederate spy Rose O'Neal Greenhow, but his own espionage efforts provided little intelligence of value and were restricted in scope. When McClellan was relieved of command in 1862, Pinkerton returned to his detective business. Railroad companies continued to provide an important segment of his business. He now expanded the scope of his efforts from policing employee honesty to pursuing railroad robbers and bank robbers such as the Dalton gang and the James brothers.

See also: Civil War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

PITTS, EARL E.
(SEPTEMBER 23, 1953–)

Earl Pitts was a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) supervisory special agent who was arrested for conspiracy to commit espionage on December 18, 1996. Pitts had spied for the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1992 and received $224,000 for the information he provided. This included information on recruitment operations involving Russian intelligence officers, double agent operations, operations targeting Russian intelligence officers, the true identities of human assets in Russia, operations against Russian illegals, and procedures concerning surveillance of Russian intelligence officers in the New York area. Pitts was arrested after being lured into a trap by FBI agents in 1995 who posed as Russian intelligence officers wishing to reactivate him in a "false flag" operation. The purpose of this operation was to confirm his espionage in the 1987 to 1992 period.

Pitts was a 13-year veteran of the FBI, having begun work there in 1983. He went to work in the New York office in 1987 where he soon wrote to the Soviet mission at the United Nations asking to be put in contact with a KGB agent. This individual put Pitts in touch with Alesandr Karpov. They first met at the New York Public Library. They would meet nine times between 1988 and 1992, with Pitts exchanging information for money that was deposited in various bank accounts. With his 1992 transfer to the FBI's Legal Counsel Division, Pitts' espionage came to an end.

The individual who received Pitts' letter in 1987 later became a double agent who recalled its contents. Armed with this information, the FBI determined that Pitts was the likely spy. The false flag operation began in August 1995 when this individual contacted Pitts and informed him that there were visitors from Moscow who wished to see him. In reality, they were FBI agents. During the 16 months that the false flag operation was in place, Pitts provided information on 22 occasions and received $65,000 for his efforts. Pitts also revealed information from his previous activity as a spy and about an individual who was passing top-secret military information to the Soviet Union. It is believed that this individual was Robert Hanssen.

Pitts had been transferred to the FBI's Quantico Training Academy, and it was there that he was arrested. The charges against him carried a possible sentence of life imprisonment. Pitts pled guilty to the charges of espionage on April 30, 1997. He was sentenced to a 27-year prison term. Pitts explained his spying for the Soviet Union/Russia by saying that he did so in revenge for the many grievances he held against the FBI.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

PLAME, VALERIE ELISE
(APRIL 19, 1963–)

Valerie Elise Plame Wilson, a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer at the center of a political scandal starting in 2003, was born in Anchorage, Alaska, on April 19, 1963. She went to high school in Lower Moreland, Pennsylvania, going on to receive her BA in journalism from Pennsylvania State University in 1984.

Following her graduation, she was recruited by the CIA, although not many details of her career are known. She most likely worked as a CIA agent in Europe, where she was also able to complete two masters programs, the first at the London School of Economics and the second at the College of Europe in Bruges, Brussels.

Her superiors were pleased with her performance in Europe. She had agreed to work in Europe, oftentimes without her passport, which could have resulted in life in prison if she was caught spying. For these actions, she received a promotion and a new position.

Back in the United States, she worked for a "private company," essentially a CIA-front organization, known as "Brewster Jennings & Associates." While working as an "energy analyst" for the front company, Plame was able to perform certain classified investigations.

Plame married Joseph C. Wilson IV, former U.S. ambassador to Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe, on April 3, 1998. They had met while at a social function in Washington, DC, one year earlier. Early in the relationship, Plame was able to reveal her CIA status since Wilson had security clearance.

Although some have debated whether or not she was actually a secret agent at the time, as a result of her family situation with Wilson and their two young children, Plame's cover was blown by an article written by political analyst Robert Novak in the *Washington Post* on July 14, 2003. This information leak, which Novak claims came from a senior U.S. official in the Bush administration, was printed just days after Wilson had criticized President's Bush position on Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium in Niger.

A Justice Department investigation followed, looking into potential violations of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. Vice President Cheney's top advisor, Lewis Libby, was indicted as a result of this investigation and convicted of obstruction of justice and perjury. He was sentenced to 30 months in jail and fined $250,000. He was also sentenced to community service and placed under supervisory parole. President George W. Bush commuted Libby's prison term but let the other parts of the sentence stand.

See also: Agee, Philip; Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982

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Arthur Holst

POINDEXTER, ADMIRAL JOHN
(AUGUST 12, 1936–)

Admiral John Poindexter, born August 12, 1936, was national security advisor under Ronald Reagan from December 1985 to November 1986. He was deeply involved in the Iran-Contra scandal. He worked for 20 months as head of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under George W. Bush, stepping down in 2003. Poindexter graduated first in the class of 1958 at Annapolis and earned a doctorate in nuclear physics from the California Institute of Technology. His naval career included service as assistant naval secretary from 1966 to 1974.

In September 1986, the mutual release by the Soviets of journalist Nicholas S. Daniloff and by the Americans of science student Gennadi Zakharov ended an international tension. Although neither man was a true espionage agent (Daniloff had been implicated by Central Intelligence Agency correspondence intercepted by the KGB), both had been held as spies. Reagan insisted that the two had not been traded. Poindexter, apparently not comprehending the danger Daniloff was in, urged during the crisis that the United States expel Soviet diplomats.

Poindexter was surprised at Reagan's interest in the imminent Reykjavik summit shortly after the Daniloff affair. Poindexter recognized that the United States would lose credibility if it simply rejected Soviet offers to reduce strategic arms, but he also believed that the American public would not accept the elimination of all nuclear arms.

National security policy was compromised by a conflict between Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz. Shultz conceded oversight of Central America and the Middle East to Director of Central Intelligence William Casey.

Casey, Poindexter, and Colonel Oliver North organized a covert program to sell missiles to Iran at inflated prices. Iran would then use its influence to help secure the release of American hostages held in Lebanon. Proceeds from the arms sales would be provided to the Contras, an anti-Communist rebel group in Nicaragua. Congress had forbidden aid to the Contras, and the administration itself had called for Operation Staunch, a worldwide arms embargo against Iran to facilitate an end to the Iran-Iraq war; the covert operation would undercut both of these policies.

In October 1986 a C-123 carrying arms bound for the Contras was shot down, and the following month the Lebanese newspaper *Al Shiraa* broke the story of covert U.S. operations. Casey died several months later from a brain tumor. Poindexter and North were each prosecuted for lying to Congress.

Poindexter returned to government in 2002 when George W. Bush named him head of DARPA. His controversial projects under Bush, Total Information Awareness (TIA) and especially the Futures Markets Applied to Predictions (Futures MAP), became known in the summer of 2003 and prompted his resignation. TIA would track personal information and commercial transactions, and Futures MAP would allow individuals to wager on terrorist acts.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Daniloff, Nicholas; Iran-Contra Affair; North, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver Laurence; Reagan Administration and Intelligence

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Nicholas M. Sambaluk

POLGAR, THOMAS C.
(JULY 24, 1922–)

CIA station chief in Saigon at the end of the Vietnam War, Polgar was born in southern Hungary on July 24, 1922, to Jewish parents, who fled to the United States in 1938 to escape the Nazi oppression in Europe. He earned a BA degree from the Gaines School in New York City in 1942 and became a naturalized citizen in 1943. He was subsequently drafted into the U.S. Army and, because of his fluency in several languages, trained to be a counterintelligence agent in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor to the CIA. Later, he parachuted behind enemy lines with a false Nazi Party ID card, and operated as a spy in Berlin during the closing days of the war. After the war, he remained with the OSS and with its subsequent incarnations, the Strategic Services Unit, the Central Intelligence Group and, finally, the Central Intelligence Agency. He became a principal assistant to General Lucian Truscott, chief of the CIA's station in West Germany, where he served until 1954. He was assigned to the U.S. embassy in Vienna from 1961 to 1970.

In 1970, he became the CIA's station chief in Buenos Aires, Argentina. There, his successful handling of an airliner hijacking resulted in his assignment to the highly coveted station chief's job in Saigon. Polgar first arrived in Southeast Asia in 1971 for an area orientation in Laos and Vietnam before assuming his new job in January 1972. He was among the last Americans to be lifted by helicopter off the embassy rooftop on the morning of April 30, 1975, as Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese troops.

Much to his consternation on his return to Washington, top officials at the State Department and at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, threatened those who were in Saigon during the final days from talking, as though the debacle never happened. Polgar maintains that he knew about North Vietnamese plans months in advance of the final offensive that toppled Saigon, but he asserts that Washington refused to accept human resource reporting without corroborating evidence from radio or electronic intercepts, thereby willfully blinding itself to the reality of the situation until it was too late.

Polgar became chief of the Agency's Mexico City station in 1976. He retired from the CIA in 1981 and has since worked as a writer for the *Miami Herald* and as a consultant to the Department of Defense. In 1991, Polgar testified against the nomination of Robert Gates for CIA director, maintaining that Gates had been part of the Iran-Contra cover-up. Nevertheless, Gates was confirmed and served as CIA director until 1993.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Gates, Robert Michael; Office of Strategic Services

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James H. Willbanks

POLLARD, JONATHAN JAY
(AUGUST 7, 1954–)

Jonathan Jay Pollard was born in Galveston, Texas, and grew up in South Bend, Indiana. He received his undergraduate degree from Stanford University in 1976 and went on to graduate work in law at Notre Dame and in international affairs at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy at Tufts University but did not receive an advanced degree at either institution. Pollard began working as a naval analyst in 1979. In November 1985 Pollard was arrested as an Israeli spy. He was sentenced to life in prison in March 1987.

Working in naval intelligence was not Pollard's first career choice. In 1977, while still in law school, Pollard applied for a position with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and was rejected after a polygraph test pointed to drug use. Undeterred he applied for a job with the U.S. Navy in 1979 and was hired as an intelligence analyst in the navy's Filed Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO). The navy did not know of his failed CIA polygraph test nor did it detect false information on his application for a government job.

Pollard's office was responsible for providing warning of hostile foreign naval activity. Although technically his access to intelligence was limited to his job requirements, Pollard found that in this position and others he would go on to hold that he could circumvent this compartmentalization and gain access to a far wider range of intelligence. While working for NFOIO Pollard constructed a fictionalized life history, claiming that he had lived in South Africa and that his father, a university professor, had been a CIA station chief there. Friends at Stanford had been told his father was a CIA station chief in Czechoslovakia and that he was a member of the Mossad, Israeli's intelligence organization. He also made contact with a South African military attaché. It is unclear whether Pollard passed any secrets to South Africa but its intelligence service was known to have been penetrated by Soviet spies. When this contact was discovered his superior reduced Pollard's security clearances in 1981. After his superior had moved on to another job

Pollard successfully appealed this reduction in his security clearance and his rights were restored and no damage was done to his career. This episode did not stop Pollard from talking freely with those who came in contact about the secrets he had access to.

In June 1984 Pollard began work in the navy's new Anti-Terrorism Alert Center. That same month he contacted Israeli officials about the possibility of spying for them. He had long told friends of his fervent support for Israel and, to the end, justified his spying in ideological terms rather than in monetary ones, although he would receive substantial compensation by Israel for the information he provided them. Pollard's initial contact was Col. Aviem Sella, to whom he would give information regarding the identity of Iraqi chemical weapons plants. Not long thereafter, Pollard and his fiancé were sent to Paris where Pollard met his handler. They were provided with $10,000 or $12,000 for the trip and Pollard was promised $1,500 per month. A similar amount would fund another trip to Europe in 1985, at which time Pollard's monthly retainer increased to $2,500. Pollard was also provided with an Israeli passport under the name of Danny Cohen and a Swiss bank account that reportedly contained $30,000 and would increase by that amount for each of the next 10 years.

Pollard's tradecraft was relatively straightforward. Several times a week he would take secret material from work. With his security clearance, his briefcase was not inspected. About every other week he would take this material to the Washington, DC, apartment of an Israeli intelligence official to be copied. On the last Saturday of each month he would meet with another Israeli intelligence officer to be paid, go over select documents, and receive guidance as to what material he should bring them. Pollard was told that terrorism intelligence was not needed. Among the secrets he provided Israel were U.S. military plans, maps, and reconnaissance photos of the Middle East; documents regarding Libyan, Syrian, and Saudi Arabian weapons systems; the identity of American agents in the Middle East; and U.S. military and diplomatic codes. Some of this intelligence was obtained by the Soviet Union and led to the capture of several agents.

Gradually Pollard's espionage began to impinge on his actions as an intelligence analyst and he came under suspicion. Hidden cameras at his workplace showed him stealing secrets. On November 18, 1985, Pollard was arrested. During a break in his interrogation, he and his wife sought refuge in the Israeli embassy where they were assured help awaited them. Instead, they were turned away. His handlers, whom he had alerted to his arrest, had already fled the United States. Pollard was sentenced to life in prison and his wife, Anne, received a five-year sentence.

Pollard's conviction has drawn strong protests from Jewish-American groups. Israeli officials have also intervened on Pollard's behalf, going so far as to return material to the United States that Pollard gave them. President Bill Clinton turned down Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's request that Pollard be pardoned. Although his supporters argue that his sentence was excessive, members of the intelligence community argue that was fully deserved given the information he provided Israel with. Underlying these different evaluations is the question of does the identity of the state spying on the United States matter?

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Eitan, Rafael; Kadish, Ben-Ami

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Glenn P. Hastedt

POLYAKOV, DIMITRI
(JULY 6, 1921–MARCH 15, 1988)

Dimitri Polyakov was a Foreign Military Directorate (GRU) officer who reached the rank of general and who spied for the United States. Operating under the code name "Top Hat," he was one of America's most valuable cold war spies. Polyakov's identity was revealed to the Soviets first by Robert Hanssen in 1979 and then again by Aldrich Ames who was arrested for espionage in 1994. He is credited with having uncovered 19 Soviet spies and 150 foreigners acting as undercover agents. Polyakov was arrested on July 7, 1986, and subsequently sentenced to death in November 1978 on charges of espionage. He was reportedly executed on March 15, 1988.

Polyakov served in the Russian military during World War II as an artillery officer. After the war ended he received an appointment to the Frunze Military Academy where he graduated at the top of his class and was recruited by the GRU. His first overseas posting came at the United Nations in 1951. From there he moved to Berlin where he was in charge of sending illegal immigrants into Germany as agents.

Polyakov first offered his services as a spy to the United States in 1960. Then a colonel, he had come to the attention of U.S. intelligence officials the year before while stationed at the Soviet mission to the United Nations. Polyakov gave as his justification a sense of disillusionment with the Soviet system and a belief that it was broken and headed for disaster.

In his 25 years of espionage for the United States Polyakov provided U.S. intelligence with information on such Soviet spies as Jack E. Dunlap, who gave the Soviets National Security Agency documents; William Whalen, who provided them with air force operational plans; Nelson Drummond, who supplied weapons systems and cryptographic information from a navy communications center; and Herbert Bockenhaupt, who provided details of the air force's cryptographic system to the Soviet Union. Polyakov also provided the United States with important information on Soviet military matters and the Sino-Soviet split. All told, the information he provided the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency are said to fill 25 filing cabinets. Polyakov was also used to send false information to the Soviet Union. One key area was with regard to chemical and biological warfare, where the United States wished the Soviet Union to believe it was engaging in a significant research and development program. Polyakov's efforts were seen as so successful that he was promoted to general.

The sudden loss of Central Intelligence Agency agents in the Soviet Union in 1985 signaled that the Committee for State Security (KGB) was in possession of an important intelligence source operating within the American intelligence community. It was later determined that this source was Aldrich Ames and that he provided the Soviet Union with Polyakov's name. In 2001 another Soviet spy, Robert Hanssen, claims to have alerted Soviet officials to Polyakov's identity in 1979. This raises the unanswered question of why the Soviet Union did not act on Hanssen's information and the possibility that Polyakov was being provided with false information to give to the United States from that time forward.

At a May 1988 summit conference between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan reportedly offered to release a Soviet spy held by the United States for Polyakov. Gorbachev replied that Polyakov had been executed two months earlier.

See also: Ames, Aldrich; Boeckenhaupt, Herbert W.; Central Intelligence Agency; Drummond, Yeoman 1st Nelson C.; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); Hanssen, Robert Philip; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Whalen, William

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Glenn P. Hastedt

POPOV, PYOTR SEMYONOVICH (1922–1960)

Pyotr Popov was one of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) first and most important cold war spies, providing the United States with information on Soviet military plans and capabilities. An officer in the Foreign Military Directorate (GRU), he volunteered to spy for the United States in 1953. Popov was arrested in October 1959 and tried on January 6–7, 1960. He was executed in June 1960.

Popov was born in 1922. He served in World War II and joined the Communist Party in 1943. Two years later he began his education at Frunze Military Academy. From there he went on to attend a military intelligence school from which he graduated in 1951. In 1952 he began a tour of duty in Vienna, Austria. In January 1953 Popov placed a note inside a car belonging to a U.S. Foreign Service officer. That act began his recruitment as a spy. Although he had financial problems, largely due to the need to support a family and a mistress, Popov's primary motivation for engaging in espionage against the Soviet Union was a deep-felt antipathy for the Soviet System. He also harbored a resentment for the manner in which his family had been treated when he was a child and the poverty that surrounded their existence.

Once he made the decision to become a spy, Popov was put in touch with George Kisevalter who was his CIA handler. Kisevalter, himself, was born in Russia to the son of a tsarist military officer. In the United States, when the Russian Revolution erupted, the family stayed here and became American citizens. Kisevalter would also be Colonel Oleg Penkovsky's handler when he became an American spy in 1961. Popov

provided the United States with the identities of some 650 GRU officers and information that helped locate numerous Soviet agents.

Popov's exposure is linked to a March 29, 1957, report written by the CIA which he provided information for. The report contained information from a speech given that month by Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov in East Berlin, which Popov attended. Though only a few copies of this report existed, one fell into the hands of the KGB and allowed it to track the information back to Popov.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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POST–COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE

Just as the onset of the cold war did not mark the beginning of espionage by and against the United States, so its passing in 1989 did not mark the end of espionage. Evidence of the continued relevance of espionage regularly surfaces. President George W. Bush's first foreign policy crisis involved the downing of a spy plane over China on March 31, 2001. A U.S. Navy surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter pilot that had been "playing tag" with it in international airspace over the South China Sea. The plane and crew landed safely in China. China demanded an apology for the incident and the death of the pilot. The United States refused and demanded the return of the plane and crew. The crisis was ended peacefully but not until the U.S. aircraft had been subjected to careful analysis by Chinese authorities.

Soviet espionage has also not ended. In 1996 CIA officer Harold Nicholson was arrested and charged with spying for Russia. He pled guilty and is serving a 23-year sentence. In 1997 Edward Pitts, a 13-year FBI agent, was charged with spying for Russia. The FBI was tipped off to his case by a Russian double agent. Pitts is serving a 27-year prison term. In 1998 David Boone, an analyst with the National Security Agency, was arrested for spying for Russia. A walk-in, among the information he passed to the Russians was the list of Russian sites targeted by U.S. nuclear weapons. In 2000, Army Reserve Colonel George Trofimoff was arrested for spying for Russia for over 25 years. He is the highest-ranking military officer ever charged with espionage.

Still, if anything, espionage in the post–cold war era is a more complex phenomenon and therefore one more difficult to counter. During the cold war, the United States concentrated its national security resources on one enemy: the Soviet Union. Likewise, it had to protect its secrets from only one enemy. The end of the cold war reduced, but did not eliminate, the Russian security threat. At the same time, it elevated the challenges and threats posed by other states. As a consequence, the United States faces a

Equipment and parts from the Navy EP-3, a naval reconnaissance aircraft, are loaded onto an AN-124 cargo plane on July 2, 2001. (AP/Wide World Photos)

situation in which prudence suggests it must seek to obtain information about the policies and capabilities of many states and it must protect its own secrets from a larger number of states. Accused spies in the post–cold war era have worked for Cuba, China, Taiwan, and Israel.

In addition, the national security agenda of states has expanded. Where once questions of military capability and strategy sat atop this agenda and dominated all others, today we are as likely to find trade, monetary, scientific, and technology issues being contested at the highest levels of government. Just as espionage served to further the development of military policy in the cold war, it has the potential for advancing state policy in these areas as well. Industrial espionage, for example, is of increasing concern as states seek dual-use technologies and seek to better position themselves in a globalized economy.

Advances in technology also have not stopped and the game of spy and counterspy continues apace here. In 1999, for example, India knew when American spy satellites would be over their nuclear testing facilities and took countermeasures to ensure that their development of a nuclear weapon would go undetected. And although satellite technology remains very much an area in which the advanced industrial states of the north hold a comparative advantage over all others, the burgeoning commercial satellite industry is making satellite technology available to all. Cyber warfare, in which the Internet becomes the weapon of choice, is also coming into its own. Russia made effective use of it against Georgia in their 2008 border war.

Spy satellites also remain very much an important part of the U.S. espionage arsenal, especially in war or the preparation for war. Published accounts suggest that Keyhole

and Lacrosse satellites (the former produces digital pictures and the latter radar images) flew over Baghdad 19 times in the first 18 hours of the land war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War. More recently, in Afghanistan as part of the war against terrorism, the United States made use of Predator drone aircraft that provided long-term coverage. The Keyhole and Lacrosse satellites were over their targets for only a few minutes at a time, whereas the Predator could provide 24-hour coverage. Some suggest that perhaps the most significant long-term post–cold war development in the technology area was the decision of the Clinton administration to approve the export of advanced encryption software. This will greatly complicate the task of trying to intercept and break enemy codes and ciphers.

If all of this were not enough, the events of September 11, 2001, were a transformational event for the U.S. intelligence services. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency came under public and congressional criticism for their failure to anticipate and provide warning of the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. The net result of these investigations was the creation of a Director of National Intelligence to oversee the intelligence community and the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security to better deal with the problem of terrorist attacks on the United States.

The declaration of a "Global War on Terrorism" has raised concerns in many quarters. Some within the intelligence community are concerned that it will lead to a neglect of spy satellites. In place is a program to develop a new generation of spy satellites, the Future Imagery Architecture program. One estimate suggests that from $625 to $900 million is needed to get the program back on track so that new satellites will be operational when needed to replace the existing inventory of KH-11 Keyhole satellite. Others inside and outside of the intelligence community voiced concerns about possible violations of civil rights and liberties that might accompany an overzealous or excessive interpretation of the mandate given to those charged with domestic spying. Among the programs which have drawn the most intense criticisms are those involving the warrantless wiretapping of Americans, the waterboarding of suspected terrorists and their sympathizers, and the policy of renditions. An overarching concern is that intelligence has become politicized to an unprecedented extent, as seen by the selective use and release of intelligence on the reasons for going to war with Iraq, most notably on the question of its possessing weapons of mass destruction.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Industrial Espionage; Homeland Security, Department of; Iraq, U.S. Operations In/Against; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (The 9/11 Commission); National Security Agency; Persian Gulf War; Renditions; September 11, 2001; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; Waterboarding

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Glenn P. Hastedt

POWERS, FRANCIS GARY
(AUGUST 17, 1929–AUGUST 1, 1977)

Francis Gary Powers was a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft pilot whose spy plane was shot down over Russia in 1960. The United States first denied that it was involved in spying but when Russian authorities produced Powers they were forced to recant their story. Powers' failed mission led to the cancellation of a Paris summit conference between President Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev that was under way at the time. Powers was born in Kentucky and enlisted in the air force upon graduation from Milligan College. Commissioned in 1952, he was assigned to the Strategic Air Command. In January 1956, Powers and other pilots were recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to fly the new U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft on spy missions over the Soviet Union and other key sites. For example, in 1956 Powers flew missions over the Mediterranean Sea to provide information on the Suez Crisis. Powers' unit was based at Incerlik Air Force Base in Adana, Turkey, and operated under the cover of the Weather Observational Squadron of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. This was the predecessor body to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Powers flew his first mission over the Soviet Union in November 1956. He would fly his last on May 1, 1960. On that date he was flying a mission that was to take him from Preshawar, Pakistan, to Bodo, Norway. As his plane approached Sverdlovsk, Soviet Union, it was hit by a surface-to-air-missile. The Soviets had known about the U-2 overflights from the beginning and protested against them to the United States. Initially they lacked the capacity to shoot down these planes due to the high altitude they flew at, some 80,000 feet. The CIA had provided Powers with suicide poison but he chose to eject from the aircraft. On the ground he was captured with documents identifying him as a CIA agent. Under interrogation he admitted to being a spy. Khrushchev made his confession public as well as some of the aerial photographs he was taking, thereby nullifying the American cover story that a weather plane was missing along the Soviet border. Powers was placed on trial by Soviet authorities in August 1960. He pled guilty to spying and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Two years into his sentence he was exchanged for Soviet spy Rudolf Abel on February 10, 1962, at one of the checkpoints along the Berlin Wall. Powers died on August 1,

1977, when the helicopter he was piloting as part of his job as a traffic reporter for a radio station in Los Angeles crashed. With the permission of President Jimmy Carter, Powers was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

See also: Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Open Skies Proposal; U-2 Incident

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James H. Willbanks

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) is a group of independent, nongovernmental experts who provide nonpartisan advice and analysis of the quality of intelligence being provided to the president. The board meets in secret with the heads of the intelligence agencies and with the president, providing both a limited amount of citizen oversight and an objective source of insight for the president.

President Dwight Eisenhower established the board as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1956 in response to questions about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement in the overthrow of the governments of Iran and Guatemala. Under Eisenhower, the board played primarily a technological/scientific role by affirming the decision to maintain the secrecy of the U-2 program.

President John F. Kennedy gave the board its present name in May 1961 when he reconstituted the PFIAB in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy blamed the intelligence community and the CIA for the failure, and asked the PFIAB to recommend changes in the way U.S. intelligence operated. Chaired by James Killian and with longtime presidential advisor Clark Clifford a key member, the PFIAB made 170 recommendations, including reassigning some of the CIA's military intelligence activities to the Defense Intelligence Agency and expanding the CIA's technological capabilities, emphasizing satellite and ultra-high-resolution photography. Clifford chaired the PFIAB from April 1963 until becoming secretary of defense in February 1968.

Under President Richard Nixon, the PFIAB became less important and less independent as Nixon appointed a number of political allies without any particular expertise to the board. President Gerald Ford expanded the PFIAB's scope in the aftermath of the Church and Otis Committees' investigations into the CIA's activities. Ford created the Intelligence Oversight Board as an addendum to the PFIAB to monitor the intelligence agencies for improprieties and abuses, which it could then report directly to the president.

President Jimmy Carter, responding to the advice of CIA Director Stansfield Turner, abolished the board in 1977, claiming it did not provide any unique or necessary

functions. President Ronald Reagan revived the board in 1981, although neither he nor President George H. W. Bush appeared to utilize the PFIAB significantly.

Under President Bill Clinton the PFIAB again assumed an important oversight and analytical role. Clinton asked the PFIAB to analyze security and intelligence threats to the Energy Department's nuclear laboratories. The PFIAB's 1999 report suggested that China had acquired American technology to enhance its nuclear program through espionage. Under President George W. Bush the PFIAB once again diminished in importance.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Carter Administration and Intelligence; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Ford Administration and Intelligence; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; Reagan Administration and Intelligence

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PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB) was created by President Gerald Ford via Executive Order (EO) 12334 in 1976. Ford was responding to the many revelations of illegal CIA activity that surfaced as part of the Church Committee investigations and hoped that by creating such a committee he could lessen the growing interest in setting up permanent congressional oversight committees for the intelligence community. To this end, according to EO 12234, the purpose of the IOB was "to enhance the security of the United States by assuring the legality of activities of the Intelligence Community."

Composed of three private citizens, most of whom were members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that was charged with providing the president with advice on the quality and adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis, estimates, counterintelligence, and other intelligence activities, the PIOB was tasked with the responsibility of preparing reports on intelligence activities it considered to be "unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive." It was empowered to refer these reports directly to the attorney general.

Perhaps the most highly publicized FIOB investigation took place in the mid-1990s when it was tasked by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in April 1995 to investigate intelligence that related to the death, torture, and disappearance of any U.S. citizens in Guatemala since 1984. A public outcry had arisen around the 1990 torture of Sister Diana Ortiz, the 1990 death of Michael Devine, the 1992 disappearance of Effrain Bamaca Valasquez, the 1985 death of Griffith Davis, and the 1995 death of

Nicholas Blake. The PFIO report issued in June 1996 concluded that the CIA had failed to keep Congress informed about its operations in Guatemala and that it paid insufficient attention to human rights events there but that it did not find any complicity by CIA officers or any other U.S. government employees in the abuses referred to it for investigation.

In 1993 President Bill Clinton made the IOB a subcommittee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This was not seen as a major structural change in oversight since as a matter of general practice the three IOB members had been drawn from the membership of the larger 16-person Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

A more controversial change took place as a result of an executive order issued by President George W. Bush in February 2008. Through it he ended the PIOB's authority to oversee the general councils and inspector generals of the intelligence community members, ended the requirement that inspector generals report to the PIOB every three months, and took away the PIOB authority to refer matters directly to the attorney general. Now, the PFIOB informs the president if it has found a problem but only if other officials are not adequately addressing the matter.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Ford Administration and Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

PRIME, GEOFFREY
(1938–)

Geoffrey Prime was a Soviet spy who worked in Great Britain's cryptography agency. He confessed to being a spy on June 26, 1982. In November 1982 he was sentenced to 35 years in prison for espionage. He received an additional three-year term for assaulting three young girls. Prime was released from prison in March 2001.

Prime was drafted into the Royal Air Force in 1956. With a flair for learning foreign languages, Prime became an expert in Russian and in 1964 he was assigned to Berlin where his job involved monitoring Soviet voice transmissions. In January 1968, while traveling on a train, he threw a message out of a window to a Soviet guard in which he volunteered his services to the Soviet Union as a spy. His offer was taken up and he was trained in spycraft in Potsdam, East Germany, where he learned how to photograph sensitive documents, use one-time pads for communication, and microdots.

In September 1968, Prime, now retired from the Royal Air Force, began working as a civilian transcription specialist working on Russian transmissions. His Soviet handlers provided him with $400. He would later travel to Vienna, Dublin, and Rome to meet with his handlers and receive additional payments. On a 1972 trip to Cyprus to meet his controller, Prime lost his one-time pads. Informed of this, his handlers deactivated Prime and turned him into a "sleeper." He was reactivated in December 1974. By now

he had been promoted to the point where he worked with information gathered by Rhyolite satellites. Prime resigned from General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) on September 28, 1977, but not before taking numerous photographs and over 15 reels of film that he gave to his KGB handler in Vienna. Published estimates place the amount of money received by Prime from the Russians for the information he gave them at $6,200.

Prime was identified as a Soviet spy in 1981 after he went to the home of a 14-year-old girl and attempted to assault her. When she resisted and screamed he fled. His car was identified and the police visited his home to question him. He was later arrested and his home searched and an extensive amount of pedophile information, including 2,287 index cards with notes and pictures, was seized. The police would be summoned to his home again by his wife who had uncovered spycraft paraphernalia. The subsequent police search revealed additional material, including top-secret information that Prime had taken from GCHQ.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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PROJECT PAPERCLIP

Project Paperclip is the code name for a series of operations and plans, including Operation Paperclip and Operation Overcast, to acquire German scientists and war material for use by American forces. Its original purpose was to use the information and material against the Japanese, but quickly shifted focus to the Soviet Union with the end of World War II and the increase in cold war tensions. Throughout its history, Project Paperclip brought over 642 specialists between 1945 and 1952. The value of their work was estimated at $2 billion worth of intellectual and military property and saved defense agencies decades in researching man-hours. Nearly as important, the project also denied these same scientists to the Russians. However, it also brought hundreds of former Nazi scientists who had suspicious pasts in some of the more notorious German research and concentration camps.

Operation Paperclip began as Allied troops were overrunning German units following the invasion of Europe. American troops were instructed to interview the German scientists they met, and these were found to be so valuable that the Pentagon created a new program to harness this intellectual force. The Alsos Mission was created as a joint venture between the army, navy, and Office of Scientific Research and Development, with a focus on finding nuclear secrets. Teams of civilian scientists and technicians would enter active theaters of war to seize personnel, equipment, and documents alongside combat troops. Members of an Alsos team were among the first Americans to enter Paris in 1944 with French forces. Other navy and army groups under the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS) and the Technical

Industrial Intelligence Committee (TIIC) would be operating by October of 1944. These groups justified themselves with the capture of many distinguished Germans including Dr. Herbert Wagner, inventor of the HS-293 glide bomb. Following the war, Operation Paperclip would come under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Military General United States (OMGUS) and then the Joint Intelligence Operations Agency (JIOA). It is important to note that intelligence groups were in charge of Paperclip because of the implications for espionage and the need for secrecy with such high-profile scientists.

One of the most well-known captures is Wernher von Braun and his team of rocket experts at Peenemunde. Besides the many surplus V-2 rockets and rocket parts found at Peenemunde, the Americans had over 400 of the world's top rocketry experts in their hands. Von Braun and his team would eventually become top rocket experts at government research installations in Huntsville, Alabama; White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico; and Fort Bliss, Texas. Although the Russians got the laboratories and research facility at Peenemunde because it was in their zone of occupation, the Americans got the brains behind the German rocket superiority. Besides rocket experts, Americans also got top scientists in chemistry, space medicine, physics, communications, and other fields. In fact, denial of the specialists to the Soviets motivated Operation Paperclip as much as any gains the scientists could give the United States.

Americans also received intelligence information on the Soviet forces and terrain. Immediately following the war, the United States had little to no intelligence on the Russians. The scientists living in areas invaded by the Russians gave detailed reports on troop strengths, terrain, and other elements of the Russian military. This was some of the first intelligence received by the United States and helped allay fears that the Russians might continue their invasion Western Europe.

One of the most controversial aspects of Paperclip is the fact that former enemies were given access to top-secret American research facilities and information. The scientists went through a supposedly very thorough investigation of their backgrounds to ensure that no one who was an "ardent Nazi" be allowed into the country. It is clear now that the ideological background was less important in restricting potential specialists than their value to science and to the Russians. Several scientists were sent to the United States but bypassed the normal State Department channels because they would not pass State Department rules prohibiting former Nazis from entering the country. The government kept much of this information confidential as it could have created a huge public outcry. Paperclip scientists were also responsible for some ethically questionable behavior, including the MKULTRA project, extreme cold, and high-altitude experiments on U.S. soldiers and civilians. In 1946, dozens were arrested in Canada in connection to giving atomic secrets to the Russians. There was a great fear that Paperclip would cause similar security risks.

One of the most serious espionage breeches of Paperclip did not involve any German scientists, but one of its chief officers in the 1960s, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Whalen. In 1957, Whalen became head of the Joint Intelligence Operation Agency (JIOA), which at that time ran "National Interest." This program allowed the government to bring German scientists over to the United States and place them in governmental agencies and universities. Whalen's clearance as head of the JIOA gave him access to the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others. In 1959, Whalen, a near

bankrupt alcoholic, began spying for the Russians after being recruited by Sergi Edemski, a Soviet Intelligence (GRU) agent. Whalen would eventually become the "highest placed American military officer ever convicted of espionage."

Although Paperclip had an auspicious end with several scandals in the 1960s to 1990s, its rewards were almost incalculable for American military research, not to mention the industrial technology and academia. Without Project Paperclip, many of the achievements in space travel, military weaponry, and pure science would not have occurred. Whether this is justification to allow former war criminals and Nazis into the country remains to be seen.

See also: American Intelligence; Cold War Intelligence; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); Whalen, Lieutenant Colonel William H.; World War II

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PUEBLO, USS

The USS *Pueblo* was a U.S. Navy intelligence ship seized by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in January 1968. In 1967, under a joint naval and National Security Agency (NSA) program, the *Pueblo*, a former cargo ship commissioned in 1944, was refitted with sensitive electronic and cryptographic gear and converted into an intelligence-gathering ship.

After training operations off the U.S. West Coast, the *Pueblo*, captained by Commander Lloyd Bucher, sailed for Japan in late 1967. In January 1968, the ship began conducting surveillance of Soviet naval activity in the Tsushima Straits to collect signal and electronic intelligence.

On January 23, the *Pueblo* was approached by a North Korean subchaser, which ordered her to stand down or be fired upon. The *Pueblo* attempted to maneuver away, but the subchaser was soon joined by four torpedo boats, another subchaser, and two MiG-21 fighters. The *Pueblo* was armed with only two .50-caliber machineguns, which were wrapped in cold-weather tarpaulins. The ammunition was below decks and the gun mounts were unarmored, so the crew made no attempt to man them.

The *Pueblo* at first tried to outmaneuver the North Korean vessels while her sailors attempted to destroy the great volume of classified equipment and material aboard. However, the quicker North Korean vessels opened fire and Bucher had no choice except to direct the *Pueblo* to follow the North Koreans as ordered. However he stopped the ship just outside North Korean waters; the North Koreans opened fire again, killing

Members of the USS *Pueblo* crew greet officers at the United Nations Advance Camp after almost a year in North Korean custody. (Naval Historical Center)

a U.S. sailor, Seaman Duane Hodges, and wounding several other crew members. North Korean sailors subsequently boarded the *Pueblo*, and tied up and blindfolded the crew.

The *Pueblo* was taken into port at Wonsan and the crew was moved to POW camps, where members of the crew later said they were starved and regularly tortured. During their imprisonment, they were forced to sign confessions that they had been spying.

Following negotiations between the United States and North Korea, the United States apologized and the North Korean government released the eight-two remaining crew members. On December 23, 1968, the crew was trucked to the DMZ between North and South Korea where they were ordered to walk south across the "Bridge of No Return" at Panmunjon.

A navy court of inquiry recommended the court-martial of Commander Bucher and two of his officers, but Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee overruled the court, saying that the men had "suffered enough" in their 11 months of imprisonment. Bucher, however, did receive an official letter of reprimand. He died in San Diego on January 28, 2004, partly from complications caused by the injuries he had suffered during his time as a prisoner in North Korea. The *Pueblo* remains a commissioned ship in the U.S. Navy, but has never been released by the North Koreans. Today, it is a major tourist attraction in Pyongyang.

See also: Bucher, Commander Lloyd M.; Naval Intelligence

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PURPLE

PURPLE was the code name given to the cipher machine that broke the most important Japanese diplomatic code. Collectively, the products of this code-breaking operation were known as MAGIC. The term *PURPLE* was used because it identified the color of the binder used in the code-breaking process.

The most common cipher machine is an electrorotor machine used to send and receive secret messages. The heart of the machine consists of a keyboard for typing in the message, a set of rotating disks (rotors) which substitute a different letter for that being struck, and a system for turning the disks as a key is pressed. In the system, each press of a key results in a different substitution being made for the letter struck. Cipher machines came into existence at the end of World War I and were commercially available in the early 1920s. Enigma is the best known rotor machine. The PURPLE machine differed slightly from the Enigma machine because it did not use rotors but a set of telephonic switches connecting two typewriters, one of which input the message and the other which printed it out for transmission.

During the Washington Naval Conference that was held from November 1921 to February 1922 the United States succeeded in breaking the code used to transmit Japanese diplomatic communications. Having become aware that the Black Chamber had broken the secrecy surrounding their communications, Japan set out to construct a new machine. It was first used in prototype form at the London Naval Conference of 1930. The "Red" machine, as it was known, again for the color of the binder used to collect the information obtained from it, was formally put into place in 1931. It proved to be relatively unreliable and was replaced in 1937 by the PURPLE machine.

American cryptanalysts, led by William Friedman, broke the PURPLE machine in 1940. The U.S. possessed four PURPLE machines for cryptanalysis. The army and navy each had one in Washington, one was in the Philippines, and one was in Great Britain. The Japanese were informed that the United States had broken into PURPLE by their Russian allies. They reached this conclusion on the basis of comments made by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, close advisor to President Franklin Roosevelt. Japanese authorities, however, disregarded this warning and continued to use PURPLE, confident that it could not be broke.

Japanese military and diplomatic communications were sent by different machines, with the result that the information contained in these communications was often highly compartmentalized. PURPLE thus revealed little about the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Later in the war, PURPLE provided important insights about

Germany's war plans because of messages sent by the Japanese ambassador in Berlin back to Tokyo. Evidence also points to the Soviet Union as having independently broken into PURPLE communications during World War II.

See also: MAGIC; Pearl Harbor; Ultra

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R

RABORN, VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM FRANCIS, JR. (JUNE 8, 1905–MARCH 6, 1990)

Born in Decatur, Texas, William Francis Raborn, Jr., graduated from the Naval Academy in 1928. He served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from April 28, 1965 to June 30, 1966. Raborn was retired from the navy and working for the aerospace industry at the time of his appointment to the post of DCI by President Lyndon Johnson. In his navy career Raborn reached the rank of vice admiral and held the position deputy chief of naval operations (development). Much of his career had been spent in the Special Projects Office where he directed work on developing the Polaris submarine.

Johnson appointed Raborn with the hope of making intelligence more responsive to the direction of the White House. Johnson had become increasingly frustrated with the intelligence community as the Vietnam War continued. Its analyses were often at odds with the desired policies of the administration. An example of what Johnson sought from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Raborn came in the Dominican Republic when Johnson sought intelligence to support his sending of troops and not about the situation itself or the wisdom of this course of action. Johnson's hopes for Raborn were not realized for at least two reasons. First, Raborn's managerial skills did not translate into control over the CIA. He came to the CIA with no background in intelligence and he had difficulty adapting himself to the internal operations of the CIA. Second, Raborn failed to establish a good working relationship with Congress, thus preventing him from obtaining important external support in any effort to redirect the CIA. Soon Johnson also began to distance himself from Raborn. Consequently, Raborn had only a minimal impact at the CIA and on intelligence. Critics cite his brief ineffective tenure as DCI and the political nature of his appointment as the beginning of a decline in the prestige of the CIA.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence

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RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY

During the cold war, Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), U.S. government-sponsored international radio broadcasts transmitted to Communist nations and other authoritarian regimes, broadcast uncensored news and information to audiences in the Soviet bloc in an attempt to weaken Communist control over information and to foster internal opposition. RFE broadcast to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania and, in the 1980s, to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. RL transmitted in Russian and some 15 other national languages of the Soviet Union.

Unlike other Western broadcasters, RFE and RL concentrated on developments within and about their target countries not covered by state-controlled domestic media. They acted as surrogate home services, reporting on actions of the authorities and relaying views of dissidents and opposition movements. Notwithstanding repeated technical interference (jamming, for example), broadcasts generally reached their intended audiences. Evidence of the impact of the broadcasts on the eventual collapse of the Communist regimes has been corroborated in the testimony of leaders such as Czech President Václav Havel after 1989.

RFE and RL were conceived in 1949 by George F. Kennan of the U.S. Department of State and Frank G. Wisner, head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of Policy Coordination, as instruments to utilize Soviet and East European émigrés in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Founded as nonprofit corporations ostensibly supported with private funds, RFE and RL were in fact funded by the U.S. government through the CIA until 1972. The first official broadcast took place on July 4, 1950. RFE and RL initially adopted more confrontational editorial policies and used more aggressive language than other Western broadcasters. By the mid-1950s, however, as U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet bloc became more conciliatory, the networks emphasized the need for liberalization and evolutionary system changes. In so doing, they broadcast news and information about domestic politics and economic issues as well as cultural and historical traditions normally suppressed by Communist authorities. Over time, the networks evolved into saturation home services, seeking large audiences by broadcasting almost around the clock and by incorporating programs on Western music, religion, science, sports, youth, and labor issues.

The networks faced the considerable challenge of operating as surrogate home services in information-poor environments. They carefully monitored state-controlled print and electronic media and frequently interviewed travelers and defectors in field bureaus around the world. The networks cultivated ties with Western journalists and other visitors to Communist countries and received information from regime opponents, often

President of the U.S. government-funded and Prague-based Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Thomas A. Dine addresses a news conference in Prague, 2002. The radio was established in 1949 to spread pro-Western news to countries behind the Iron Curtain and to promote democratic values and institutions. (AP/Wide World Photos)

at great personal risk to the informants, within their target countries. This information was gathered to support broadcasts, but RFE and RL research reports also served many Western observers as their major source of information about the Communist bloc.

RFE and RL programs were produced in Munich in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and were broadcast via shortwave transmitters operating on multiple frequencies and high power to overcome jamming and other frequency-disruption tactics. The networks enjoyed substantial operational autonomy and were highly decentralized in function. Émigré broadcast service directors with intimate knowledge of their audiences were responsible for most broadcast content, within broad policy guidelines and under U.S. management oversight.

The Communist authorities devoted major resources to countering RFE and RL broadcasts. In 1951, Soviet leader Josef Stalin personally ordered the establishment of local and long-distance jamming facilities to block Western broadcasts. Eastern bloc authorities also launched propaganda, diplomatic, and espionage campaigns intended to discredit the broadcasts. In addition, they jailed individuals providing information to either network. Ironically, the same authorities relied on secret transcripts of the broadcasts for information they could not obtain from local media that they themselves controlled.

After 1971, direct CIA involvement in the networks ended, and they were then openly funded by congressional appropriation through the Board for International Broadcasting. The network corporations were merged into a single entity, RFE/RL, Incorporated, in 1976.

The networks established intimate contact with their audiences during the 1970s and 1980s, when new waves of émigrés strengthened broadcast staffs and as dissidents and other regime opponents, emboldened by the Helsinki Final Act (1975), began to challenge the Communist system. RFE and RL provided a "megaphone" through which independent figures, denied normal access to local media, could reach millions of their countrymen via uncensored writings. RFE and RL were able to document large audiences and acted as the leading international broadcaster in many target countries. After the Velvet Revolution of 1989, many East European and Russian leaders testified to the importance of RFE and RL broadcasts in ending the cold war. Operating today from Prague in the Czech Republic, RFE/RL broadcasts to the southern Balkans, most of the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq in support of democratic institutions and a transition to democracy.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Radio Marti; Wisner, Frank Gardiner

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A. Ross Johnson

RADIO MARTI

Radio Marti is a U.S. broadcasting service to Cuba. Prior to the 1980s, the U.S. government tried its hand unsuccessfully at broadcasting to Cuba. Radio Swan was unveiled to support the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; it soon became Radio Americas and then disbanded. These stations lacked credibility and an effective audience to justify their funding. Then, in 1981, President Ronald Reagan declared that it was his administration's intention to establish a Radio Free Cuba that was modeled on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, but there was initial opposition by other North American broadcasters who feared that Cuban President Fidel Castro would retaliate by jamming existing commercial medium-wave broadcasts from Florida.

The Office of Cuba Broadcasting, which operates Radio Marti and Television Marti, was created by the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act of 1983 (Public Law 98-111) to focus on Cuban domestic and international news and information that is not reported by the media controlled by the Cuban government. According to the legislation, Radio Marti programming, with its mixture of Spanish-language news, feature, cultural, and entertainment programming to its Cuban audience, must follow all Voice of America standards; programs must be objective, accurate, and well balanced.

Radio Marti went on the air May 20, 1985, which commemorated the anniversary of Cuba's independence from Spanish colonial rule, May 20, 1902. The new station, using a transmitter located in the Florida Keys, was named for Cuban writer Jose Marti who fought for Cuba's independence from Spain and against U.S. influence in Latin

America. Since its first broadcast, the Cuban government has continuously jammed its signals, especially those on medium wave, but the Cuban government's most effective interference has been to transmit alternate programs on the same AM frequency used by Radio Marti.

In 1994, Radio Marti introduced live coverage of special events in the United States and around the world that directly affect Cuba and its citizens, such as hearings held by Congressman Charles B. Rangel (D-NY) to lift the U.S. embargo against Cuba; speeches by Latin American heads of state at the Summit of the Americas in Miami; and reports from exiles, defectors, and former prisoners in Cuba.

The administration consolidated U.S. international broadcasting operations with Public Law 103-236 (April 30, 1994), under an International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), and created a new Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), with oversight authority over all civilian U.S. government international broadcasting; this included the VOA and Radio and TV Marti.

In 1998, Radio Marti completed the move of its operations from Washington, DC, to Miami, Florida, under legislation passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton in April 1996. This move placed the radio station closer to its target audience. Today, Radio Marti, which broadcasts seven days a week, transmits over shortwave transmitters in Delano, California, and Greenville, North Carolina, with an AM-medium wave broadcast band in Florida.

See also: Castro, Fidel; JMWAVE; Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Liberty; Shackley, Theodore G., Jr.

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REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Ronald Reagan was president from 1980 to 1989. William Casey and William Webster served as Directors of Central Intelligence under him. Reagan campaigned as president on a platform of rebuilding U.S. military strength and conducting an aggressive foreign policy against the Soviet Union, which he once referred to as the "evil empire," holding it to be a national security threat to the United States and not a partner as had been the case under the détente policies of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter. Reagan had unsuccessfully challenged Ford for the Republican nomination for the 1976 election. He won the party's 1980 nomination and, buoyed by the foreign policy setbacks of the

Carter administration, most notably the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan was easily elected.

Upon entering office, Reagan made good on his promises. Following Jeanne Kirkpatrick's assertion that there was a fundamental difference between authoritarian regimes and Communist regimes, Reagan supported these governments as allies rather than criticize their human rights records. Second, in rejecting détente he did not move U.S. foreign policy back to containment. Instead, the Reagan doctrine not only called for containing existing Communist regimes but also for helping to remove them from power. The initial application of the Reagan Doctrine and the support for authoritarian governments was in Central America where El Salvador was identified as a threat, Grenada invaded, and the Contras were created to fight against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The Reagan Doctrine also provided the rationale for supporting mujahedin against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The spirit of the Reagan Doctrine also led to stepped-up action in the Middle East even though the enemy was not so much Communism as it was radical opposition to the United States. In 1984 Reagan sent marines to Lebanon where they became the target of a terrorist attack, killing 244. He also ordered a military raid on Libya, intended to kill Libya President Muammar Qaddafi for his role in the 1986 bombing of a Berlin Discotheque that killed U.S. soldiers. Earlier, in 1985, he had authorized a covert action program to destabilize his government. Under Reagan, the United States also supported Iranian exile groups who opposed the new regime there and as well as running an anti-Khomeini radio station out of Egypt. Finally, it led the administration to support Saddam Hussein against Iran in the Iran-Iraq War.

As these last examples illustrate, a central component of this new foreign policy was a change in direction of U.S. intelligence policy. Where Carter's executive order governing the policies of the intelligence community had stressed negatives, what not to do, Reagan's Executive Order 12333 adopted a more positive and supportive rhetoric. For example, it permitted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to collect "significant foreign intelligence" within the United States so long as it did not involve gathering information on the domestic activities of U.S. persons. This executive order largely remains in place.

The person Reagan called upon to redirect U.S. intelligence was William Casey. A veteran of World War II and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Casey embraced covert action. He also treated intelligence estimates as his estimates and felt free to adjust them to this thinking. This attitude brought Casey, and thus intelligence policy, into frequent conflict with Congress. His selective use of CIA intelligence analysis was most pronounced with regard to Soviet estimates. It led to resignations in protest and public charges by intelligence analysts of politicizing intelligence. Casey's deputy, Robert Gates, was sufficiently tarred by these accusations that his 1987 nomination as Director of Central Intelligence had to be withdrawn.

Casey's stance on covert action led him to hold information back from Congress on the extent of U.S. covert action undertakings such as mining Nicaraguan harbors. This standoff ultimately resulted in the Boland Amendments that forbid the use of U.S. government funds to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. It was an attempt to circumvent this restriction that led the Reagan administration to embark on the Iran-Contra initiative in which arms intended for Israel would be sold to Iranian moderates

(with Israel getting replacement weapons) in return for help in getting U.S. hostages in Lebanon released and with the money being deposited in foreign bank accounts and then sent on to the Contras. When discovered, it created a crisis for the administration from which it did not recover.

See also: Casey, William; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Iran-Contra Affair; Webster, William Hedgcock

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RED ORCHESTRA

The Red Orchestra, or Rote Kapelle in German, was the name of a group of spies who gathered intelligence for the Soviet Union. Numbering around one to two hundred, they were discovered in 1942 and executed by the Abwehr. The Nazis called spy rings orchestras because they referred to the transmitters as "music boxes" and the radio operators as "musicians." Because the Red Orchestra operated in so many countries at once it was really a set of overlapping spy rings.

Prior to World War II the Soviets had organized a spy network in the countries around Germany. Belgium was the first country with spies in this ring. Later, Holland, Switzerland, and Germany were added as locations for spies being run by Leopold Trepper, who was chief of the European Red Orchestra.

After the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Stalin was desperate for intelligence on the Nazi war machine, so he ordered that an ever-increasing amount of intelligence data be sent. For over a year the Red Orchestra was successful in passing large volumes of intelligence data to the Soviets. However, on December 13, 1941, the Abwehr got a break.

Directional finders were used to locate radio signals. The finders would first position a signal along a line. Then it would try to cross the line in one or two other places. The crossing would be a line drawn by other directional finders. This meant that "X" would mark the source of the radio signals.

The capture of the first of the Red Orchestra agents was due to a common espionage problem. The more successful a spy or a spy ring is at stealing intelligence the more information it has to transmit. The larger the volume of intelligence to transmit, the longer time it takes to transmit and thus the more vulnerable are the agents transmitting to detection. In the case of the Red Orchestra agents, coded messages had been sent for over five straight hours from three houses in Brussels located on the Rue des Attrebats.

Seized in the raid were code books, equipment, invisible inks, false papers, and other spy craft tools. While the raid was in progress, Leopold Trepper arrived. He however was able to lie his way to freedom with a claim that he was selling rabbits.

In June of 1942 the Nazis captured Johann Wenzel, a radio operator for a sector of the Red Orchestra. He gave information that led to the capture of the whole spy ring and to Leopold Trepper. For some months thereafter the Nazis ran the Red Orchestra as a disinformation operation against the Soviets. Eventually the Soviets became suspicious and demanded sensitive information the Nazis would not supply. This led to the end of the activities of the Red Orchestra.

Inside of Germany the original leaders of the Red Orchestra were Harro Schulze-Boysen and Arvid Harnack, nephew of a world-renowned theologian. Schulze-Boysen was a member of the Junker class. He was also an officer for the German Ministry of Air. He joined forces with Arvid Harnack and his U.S.-born wife, Mildred Harnack. The Harnacks were prominent prewar members of Berlin literary society. They also recruited Alexander Erdberg, Adam Kuckhoff, Holst Heilmann, Herbert Gollnow, Gunther Weisenborn, and Johann Graudenz as agents.

Harnack was a member of the German Ministry of Economics. Adam Kuckhoff was a theater producer, but his wife worked in Alfred Rosenberg's department of race policy. Heilmann was a cryptologist working in the coding department of the Wehrmacht signals group. Gollow worked for German counterintelligence. Graudenz had access to all German airfields because he sold brakes for airplanes to the German military. Weisenborn was an official with Joseph Goebbel's propaganda radio department.

Other spies working with the Red Orchestra were Rudolf von Scheliha, an aristocrat and a libertine. He at first sold German secrets to the British who then dropped him when they learned he was also selling the same secrets to the Soviets. Scheliha used the money from espionage to finance his hedonistic lifestyle. He was discovered when a message to Moscow was intercepted and decoded by Johann Wenzel, a former SOE operative who had gone over to the Nazis. Scheliha and his assistant Ise Stobe were executed by a firing squad on December 22, 1942.

The German portion of the Red Orchestra was destroyed by the treachery of Johann Wenzel. Arrested on August 30, 1942, were Schulze-Boysen and his wife. Harnack and his wife were arrested on September 3, 1942.

Fourteen of the leaders of the Red Orchestra were tried by the Nazis. Eleven were sentenced to death. Mildred Harnack and Ericka von Brockdorf were given life sentences. The men were sentenced to be hanged; however, Berlin did not have a gallows so meat hooks were thrust through their throats. They were then pulled up to be left dangling until dead.

Adolph Hitler took a deep personal interest in the trial of the Red Orchestra. He was so angry at the idea that Germans should spy on his Nazi regime that he complained to the Nazi court about those who were not executed. For Hitler their treason merited death and those who thought differently were of suspect loyalty. The Gestapo court changed its sentence for Mildred Harnack and Ericka von Brockdorf. Both were beheaded with a guillotine.

In neutral Switzerland the operating head of Red Orchestra was Sandor Rado. His ring was not shut down when the rings in Germany and in occupied Europe were arrested. However, traitors within his ring betrayed it to Swiss authorities.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Andrew J. Waskey

REGAN, SERGEANT BRIAN PATRICK (OCTOBER 23, 1962–)

On August 23, 2001, Air Force Sergeant Brian Patrick Regan, age 38, was arrested at Dulles Airport in Washington, DC, on espionage charges as he was planning to board a flight to Zurich, Switzerland, via Frankfort, Germany. He carried with him a coded message and a list of names and addresses hidden in his shoe. Regan's clients were Iraq, China, and Libya. On April 19, 2002, the Justice Department announced that it would seek the death penalty for Regan even though it acknowledged that no information had been passed to these countries. This marked the first time that the death penalty had been sought since Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were executed in 1953. On February 20, 2003, a federal grand jury convicted Regan of three charges of attempted espionage. Four days later it rejected the death penalty. Less than one month later, on March 20, 2003, an agreement was reached between Regan and the government on a sentence of life imprisonment in return for his agreeing to tell the government about any classified information he may have given to others. In return, the government agreed not to prosecute his wife and allowed her to keep a portion of his military pension.

Regan retired from the air force on August 30, 2000, at which time he went to work for TRW, a defense contractor, where he was assigned to work at a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) facility. Trained in cryptanalysis, Reagan last worked at the NRO where he managed a classified Intelink Web site that was accessible only to members of the intelligence community and held a top-secret security clearance. According to the government affidavit in fall 2000, U.S. government officials were told by a reliable source that someone had made contact with government "A" from a public library in an encrypted message offering to provide classified documents. The public library was near Regan's house and surveillance began in May 2001 and he was observed regularly using computers at the library. The computer used by Regan at NRO also was examined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); it contained links to documents that the reliable source indicated were being offered to these states. They included electronic images from overhead surveillance platforms, statements about a foreign country's satellite capabilities, and pages from a Central Intelligence Agency newsletter. The day he was arrested the FBI observed Regan on a closed-circuit surveillance television examining and taking notes on a secret document on his computer. The primary motive appears to have been money. The affidavit indicates

The FBI displays various items during a news conference in 2003 to discuss the items recovered after being buried by Brian Regan, a former air force master sergeant serving a life sentence for attempting to sell U.S. secrets to Saddam Hussein and others. Officials said roughly 10,000 pages of documents, as well as videotapes and CD-ROMs, were taken and buried at undisclosed locations in the Washington area by Regan while he worked at the National Reconnaissance Office, which operates the nation's spy satellites. (AP/Wide World Photos)

that in February 2001 Regan had consumer debts of $53,000. Other accounts place his debt at almost $117,000. Regan requested a total of more than $13 million for the secrets he was offering.

See also: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); National Reconnaissance Office; Post–Cold War Intelligence; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel

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Glenn P. Hastedt

REILLY, SIDNEY
(MARCH 24, 1874–NOVEMBER 5, 1925)

Born Salomon Sigmund Rosenblum on March 24, 1874, Sidney Reilly, considered by some to be the model for the fictional James Bond, was much more of a confidence man and opportunist than the intrepid secret agent portrayed by Sam Neil in the

successful and well regarded 1980s mini-series *Reilly: Ace of Spies*. A youthful brush with radical politics brought Reilly to the attention of the Trazist secret police, the Okrana, who recruited him as an informant to spy on the exile community in Paris. In 1895 Reilly appeared in England, continued to work with the Okrana, and may have begun to cooperate with the British Secret Service as well, but mainly occupied himself with a series of dubious commercial ventures. On August 22, 1898, Reilly married Margaret Callahan Thomas, the widow of a wealthy English cleric and the first of several wives and mistresses. While married to Margaret he changed his name to Sidney George Reilly, acquired a passport identifying him as an Irish-born British citizen, and returned to Russia where he established himself as middleman bringing together Western businessmen with Russian officials.

Reilly's myriad connections made him very appealing to the British Secret Service during the Russian Revolution, especially after the seizure of power by the antiwar Bolsheviks. Commissioned a captain in the Royal Air Corps as a cover for his fieldwork, the Secret Service charged Reilly with keeping Russia engaged on the Eastern Front. Reilly's activities over the next year earned him his undying fame and reputation as the Ace of Spies. Reilly joined forces with anarchist and former Okrana agent Boris Savinkov and Robert Bruce Lockhart, a British diplomat, in the "Lockhart" or "Ambassador's Plot." Reilly infiltrated the Latvian guards assigned to protect top Bolshevik leaders in a plan to kidnap or kill them, topple the young Communist state, and replace it with a pro-Allied government possibly headed by Reilly himself. The scheme failed and the increase in security following an assassination attempt on Lenin forced Reilly to flee the country.

Reilly returned to England, where he continued to work for British intelligence advocating a gradualist approach to the Bolsheviks, who he believed would be forced by economic realities to abandon radicalism for a pragmatic approach to government. At the same time Reilly continued to involve himself in unsavory business ventures and political conspiracies, which in 1921 caused the Secret Service to sever all official ties with him. Reilly continued to independently pursue anti-Bolshevik activities and became involved with a monarchist group inside Russia known as the Trust. Unfortunately, the Trust had been created by the Unified State Political Agency (OGPU), precursor of the KGB, as part of its counterintelligence efforts to penetrate genuine opposition groups abroad. In 1925 members of the Trust lured Reilly into Russia where he was arrested, interrogated, and executed. Reports of Reilly's death contained numerous ambiguities, leading many to believe that he was still alive. Documents released after the fall of the Soviet Union, however, confirm his death on November 5, 1925.

See also: Fiction—Spy Novels

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Vernon L. Pedersen

RENDITIONS

In legal terms, rendition refers to the practice of handing over someone to another authority. In the context of intelligence work it has become associated with the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) abduction of individuals suspected of being involved in terrorist activities and handing them over to foreign intelligence agencies where they are held captive and interrogated. Often the program is referred to as "extraordinary renditions."

President Bill Clinton approved a renditions program that targeted returning suspected Islamic terrorists to foreign countries where they were wanted for criminal prosecution. In order to be in compliance with the International Convention Against Torture, the CIA obtained assurances that the suspects would not be tortured. The purpose of this renditions program, according to Clinton administration officials, was to disrupt terrorist attacks and not to obtain information as was the case with the George W. Bush administration's post–September 11, 2001 program.

This renditions program was the product of two different post-9/11 concerns. The first problem was what to do with high-ranking al-Qaeda leaders. One option was assassination. A second was to capture them and interrogate them. President Bush authorized both courses of action in a Presidential Finding signed six days after 9/11. On September 6, 2006, Bush acknowledged the existence of a covert action program in which suspected terrorists were kidnapped and taken to prisons located outside of the United States where they were subjected to what he referred to as "tough" but "safe and lawful and necessary" interrogation methods carried out by specially trained CIA officers.

Nearly 100 detainees were held in these prisons until they were shut down when Bush made his speech. Fourteen "high-value" terrorist suspects were moved to Guantanamo Bay. Whereas Bush characterized the interrogation methods as legitimate, others condemned them as torture. Interrogation techniques said to be used include feigned drowning, extreme isolation, slapping, sleep deprivation, reduced food intake, and light and sound bombardment. The first agreements on "black site" facilities were reached in mid-2002 with Thailand and an east European country. Publicity about the Thai site in June 2003 led to its closing and agreements were then signed with other countries. Public reports indicated that Egypt, Indonesia, Poland, and Romania were among the countries to which suspects were taken. A European Union investigation identified Germany, Sweden, Spain, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Denmark, Turkey, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Romania as all having participated in some fashion in the CIA flights that took terrorist suspects to their final destinations. In four cases the renditions took place in Europe (Sweden, Macedonia, and Italy) and in five instances European intelligence services were said to have provided direct assistance to the CIA.

In April 2009 Leon Panetta, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, announced that the CIA was no longer holding anyone at any of their detention sites.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Panetta, Leon; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

REVERE, PAUL
(JANUARY 1, 1735–MAY 10, 1818)

Paul Revere, a courier for patriot American Revolutionaries, was born in Boston in 1735, educated in metallurgy, and became a master silversmith and engraver. As an artisan, Revere became the leader of Boston's mechanic class of rebels, rising to political prominence through his participation in the North End Caucus that reported on British troop activities. His friendship with Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and Joseph Warren, and his anti-British engraving that made prints immortalizing the Boston Massacre in 1770, distinguished him as a political leader. Revere took an active part in the Boston Tea Party in 1773 and in its aftermath rode as courier to New York to advise patriots there of Boston's activities to resist the British Coercive Acts. In the spring of 1774 he completed a horseback circuit journey urging support from patriots in New York and Philadelphia for Boston's revolutionary measures opposing the Boston Port Bill that had closed Boston to trade. In September 1774 Revere rode as official courier for the Boston Committee of Safety, carrying the Suffolk Resolves to Philadelphia. Because of his trustworthiness and competence as an express rider, he was named the official courier for the Massachusetts Provincial Assembly to the Continental Congress. His daringly magnificent rides aroused patriotic fervor and bound the colonies together in common cause against British tyranny through his communications network.

On the evening of April 18–19, 1775, in an event immortalized by Longfellow, the "midnight ride of Paul Revere" occurred. Revere waited to receive the signal from the steeple of the Old North Church of how the British were moving—"one if by land, and two if by sea." Upon seeing two lanterns, Revere crossed the Charles River and rode from Charlestown to Lexington to warn Hancock and Adams that the British intended to arrest them for their revolutionary activities and to alert the minutemen of Middlesex County that the British were coming to seize their military stores. Revere reached Hancock and Adams, who escaped British capture. Revere then rode towards Concord but was halted, questioned by the British, and his horse taken. He returned to Boston and continued to work for independence by designing and printing the first Continental currency, making the first official seal used by the revolutionary government, and designing the state seal for Massachusetts. Revere served the Revolution as lieutenant colonel, commanding the defense of the fort, Castle William, in Boston Harbor. Post-Revolution, he developed a mill for rolling sheets of copper used in plating American ships including the Constitution. Revere died in Boston in 1818.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Sons of Liberty (American Revolution)

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Barbara Bennett Peterson

RICHELSON, JEFFREY T. (1949–)

One of the leading U.S. writers on the U.S. and foreign intelligence community, Jeffrey Richelson has written extensively on the field of intelligence collection and dissemination since the mid-1970s. Educated at the University of Rochester in Rhode Island with a masters in 1974 and a PhD in 1975, Richelson has taught at the University of Texas and American University. Richelson is currently a senior fellow at the National Security Archive in Washington, DC.

His books published between the middle 1980s until now cover a variety of intelligence topics. His *US Intelligence Community* is in its fourth edition and is a standard text for students studying the intelligence community.

At the archive, Richelson has directed projects examining U.S.-China relations, the organization and operation of the U.S. intelligence community, U.S. military space activities, and presidential national security directives. His February 1998 article in *Scientific American*, "Scientists in Black," examined the involvement of scientists in the use of intelligence community assets for nonintelligence research.

Richelson has published articles in the *Scientific American, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, International Security*, and *Intelligence and National Security*, as well as others. Richelson's books include *Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries; The UK, US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand* (1985); *The US Intelligence Community* 1–4th Editions (1985, 1989, 1995, 1999); *Sword and Shield: the Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus* (1986); *American Espionage and the Soviet Target* (1987); *Foreign Intelligence Organizations* (1988); *A mericas Eyes in Space: The US Keyhole Spy Satellite Program* (1990); *Americas Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security* (1991); *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century* (1995); *The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology* (2001); and *Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea* (2006).

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Steven F. Marin

RIDGE, TOM
(AUGUST 26, 1945–)

Tom Ridge was the first secretary of Homeland Security, serving in that position from October 8, 2001, to February 15, 2005. Ridge was born near Pittsburgh and received a law degree from Dickinson School of Law. Drafted into the military, he served as an infantry staff sergeant in Vietnam. Ridge entered government service as an assistant district attorney in Pennsylvania and then was elected to Congress in 1982. He was serving his second term as governor of Pennsylvania when he became secretary of Homeland Security. Ridge had strong personal ties to President George W. Bush, who described Ridge as a "trusted friend". He was reportedly considered as a possible vice presidential running mate from both Robert Dole in 1996 and Bush in 2000, and was also under consideration for secretary of defense by Bush. In each of these cases Ridge encountered opposition from the conservative wing of the Republican Party that objected to his Reagan-era opposition to U.S. policy in Nicaragua and to the MX missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Ridge came to his position as a Washington outsider and with little experience in bureaucratic infighting. The task facing Ridge was daunting, combining 22 preexisting agencies and 180,000 employees into a single cohesive unit. By most accounts it remained only partly accomplished. Solidifying managerial control over the Department of Homeland Security was a top priority facing Ridge's successor, Michael Chertoff. Ridge also enjoyed only limited success in warding off challenges to its role in the intelligence community from the White House and existing intelligence organizations and addressing gaps in terrorism protection. Internal government reports cited the failure to secure U.S. ports and to effectively monitor cargo on commercial aircraft as areas in need of attention. It was also under Ridge that the Department of Homeland Security began issuing nationwide color-coded terrorist threat alerts. These alerts proved to be quite controversial since they provided little concrete information to the public about the nature or location of possible terrorist activity.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Homeland Security Department of; September 11, 2001; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

RIVINGTON, JAMES
(AUGUST 14, 1724–JULY 4, 1802)

James Rivington was a journalist, newspaper editor, and possible double agent during the War of American Independence. Rivington was born on August 17, 1724, in London, England. He entered the family printing business, but was bankrupted in 1760 and moved to New York City. He opened bookstores in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, but soon confined his business to the New York store. In 1766 he moved to Annapolis and dabbled in a land scheme, bankrupting himself for a second time. He returned to New York and in 1773 established a successful newspaper, *Rivington's New York Gazeteer*. At first, he published both British and American views on divisive issues between Britain and America, but soon evinced Tory convictions. In November 1775, his press was destroyed by the Sons of Liberty, led by Isaac Sears, and he fled with his family to England.

Rivington returned to New York in September 1777, after the British army occupied the city. He published a pro-Tory paper, *Rivington's New York Loyal Gazette* (later *Royal Gazette*), during the war, and remained in New York after the British were defeated. There is some evidence that he may have been a double agent, spying for the Americans during the conflict. In his later years, he returned to bookselling, but went bankrupt for a third time. He was in debtor's prison from 1797 to 1801, and died in poverty in New York on July 4, 1802.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Paul David Nelson

ROBERTS, EDMUND
(1784–1836)

Edmund Roberts was Andrew Jackson's special agent responsible for initiating diplomatic relations and commercial treaties with the nations of Cochin China, Siam, and Muscat. Roberts was also tasked with spying on the operations of the British East India Company, which controlled commerce in and around India and coastal Africa, as well as reporting on U.S. commercial security interests in the Indian Ocean. The mission was kept secret to prevent British, French, and Dutch disruption of U.S. outreach in the region. For this reason, Jackson bypassed the Senate and designated Roberts as "special agent" rather than provide him with a diplomatic rank.

Roberts left for the Far East in March 1832 aboard the USS *Peacock*. Despite a failure in Cochin China, Roberts secured a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Siam on March 30, 1833, and a commercial treaty with Muscat on September 21, 1833. Both treaties opened these nations to U.S. trade on most-favored-nation basis and were ratified by the Senate in June 1834.

Because of the mission's success, Jackson dispatched Roberts back to the area in April 1835. He was to renew talks with Cochin China and initiate negotiations with Japan. Roberts died en route on June 11, 1836, in Macao. The information Roberts obtained about commercial advantages in Asia prompted a steady expansion of American trade in the region.

Roberts was born in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on June 29, 1784.

See also: Jackson, Andrew

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Steve Roane

ROCHEFORT, CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. (MAY 12, 1900–JULY 20, 1976)

Captain Joseph John Rochefort, born May 12, 1900, in Dayton, Ohio, and died July 20, 1976, in Torrance, California, was one of the founders of U.S. naval cryptanalysis and helped alert (1942) Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to the Japanese attack on Midway Island. Rochefort rose from the enlisted (1918) ranks (a "mustang") and was commissioned (1919) following graduation from the Stevens Institute of Technology. His acumen for solving puzzles, noted while serving on the USS *Arizona* (1925), led to his posting (October 1925) to the then single-person code-breaking bureau. Rochefort headed the Office of Naval Communications (1926–1927); returned to sea (1927–1929); studied the Japanese language while posted to the United States Tokyo Embassy (1929–1932); was posted to the Office of Naval Intelligence (OIC, 1932–1936); was reassigned to the Eleventh Naval District, San Diego (1936–1938); and was the intelligence officer for USS *Indianapolis* Scouting Force in the Pacific (1938–1941) before assuming command (1941) of the Combat Intelligence (Comint) Unit Station Hypo, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Rochefort's staff helped break the Japanese Navy's JN-25 code following the Pearl Harbor attack (December 7, 1941), and the derivative intelligence led to the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942) and uncovered an impending target designated by the Japanese as AF, posited by Rochefort's staff as Midway and by the OIC's OP-20-G as the Aleutian Islands. Hypo's Jasper Holmes suggested that Midway report a broken freshwater condenser in a compromised cipher and the Japanese informed the AF attack task force to load additional water desalinization equipment. Nimitz used this information to set the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942) ambush, sinking four Japanese carriers to the U.S.'s one (USS *Yorktown*) and bringing the opposing naval forces into rough parity.

Though Rochefort's intelligence changed the course of the war and demonstrated the importance of intelligence in modern warfare, infighting between the director of naval intelligence and the director of naval communications led to his eventual transfer to the Pacific Strategic Intelligence Group in Washington (1942–1946). He retired (1947), was reactivated (1950) for the Korean War, and retired again (1953). He consulted for the movie *Tora, Tora, Tora* (1970), but he died before the release of the movie *Midway* (1976) with Hal Holbrook appearing as Rochefort.

He was posthumously awarded the National Defense Service Medal (1986) and was inducted (2000) into the National Security Administration's Honor Hall of Fame.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Midway, Battle of; Pearl Harbor; PURPLE

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ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

Officially known as the U.S. President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, the Rockefeller Commission was established by President Gerald Ford on January 4, 1975, in response to a series of articles that appeared in the *New York Times*, written by Seymour Hersh, on CIA illegal domestic activities including surreptitious mail openings, engaging in surveillance of domestic dissidents, and experimentation with mind control drugs (Project MKULTRA).

In his memoirs Ford stated that he established the commission in the hope that it would prevent crippling investigations into the CIA by congressional committees. Ford placed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller in charge of the commission. Rockefeller had served as governor of New York from 1959 until his appointment as vice president under Ford, following Richard Nixon's resignation and Ford's elevation to the presidency. Earlier in his career Rockefeller had served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Commission members included Ronald Reagan, Douglas Dillon, and Lane Kirkland.

The Rockefeller Commission submitted its report to President Ford in June 1975. It identified 10 significant areas of investigation: (1) mail intercepts; (2) intelligence community coordination; (3) Operation CHAOS; (4) involvement of the CIA in improper activities for the White House (including Watergate); (5) domestic activities of the Directorate of Operations; (6) domestic activities of the Directorate of Science and Technology; (7) CIA relationships with other federal, state, and local agencies; (8) protection of the Agency against threats of violence; (9) other investigations by the Office of Security; and (10) allegations concerning the assassination of President John Kennedy.

In addition, the Rockefeller Commission gathered evidence on the CIA's involvement with organized crime in assassination plots against foreign leaders, most notably

Cuba's Fidel Castro and the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo. In doing so it also examined the possible role of Cuban involvement in Kennedy's death. Their study was not completed by the time the Commission completed its report and all of the data collected was given to the White House.

Ford's hopes that the Rockefeller Commission would silence potential criticism of the CIA went unrealized. The Church Committee was established by the Senate on January 27, 1975, and the House of Representatives set up its own committee on February 19, 1975. It was first chaired by Lucien Nedzi and then by Otis Pike. The Commission's largely supportive report also had little impact on softening the findings of either the Church or Pike Committees.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Church Committee; Colby, William Egan; Ford Administration and Intelligence; Pike Committee

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Glenn P. Hastedt

ROE, AUSTIN
(MARCH 2, 1749–NOVEMBER 29, 1830)

Austin Roe was a courier in the Culper Ring, an American spy network in New York and on Long Island during the War of American Independence. Roe was born on March 2, 1749, in Drowned Meadow, New York. He joined the Culper spy group in 1778, when Major Benjamin Tallmadge organized it at the behest of General George Washington. His job was to carry intelligence about the enemy from Robert Townsend (Culper Junior) in New York City to Abraham Woodhull (Culper Senior) in Setauket, Long Island. Woodhull then had Caleb Brewster carry the information by rowboat across Long Island Sound to Tallmadge in Connecticut.

Repeatedly during the war, Roe made the round-trip of 110 miles through territory infested with British soldiers, carrying documents on his return that were invaluable to Washington but endangered his own and his colleagues' lives. He died on November 29, 1830, in Patchogue, New York.

See also: Brewster, Caleb; Culper Ring; Tallmadge, Major Benjamin; Townsend, Robert; Woodhull, Abraham

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Paul David Nelson

ROOM, THE

The Room as a private U.S. intelligence service. In 1927 a group of prominent East Coast businessmen, bankers, attorneys, and philanthropists began meeting together to share intelligence on world events. The initial group included Vincent Astor, son of John Jacob Astor IV, Kermit Roosevelt, son of President Theodore Roosevelt, journalist Marshall Field III, naturalist Suydam Cutting, and philanthropist Duncan Ellsworth. New recruits included investment banker Winthrop Aldrich, publisher Nelson Doubleday, landlord and socialite William Rhinelander Stewart, Chief Justice of the New York Court of Special Sessions Frederic Kernochan, and diplomat and future OSS agent David K. E. Bruce. Members met monthly in a Manhattan apartment at 34 East 62nd Street to discuss world events and to share information gleaned from their extensive travels and networks of global contacts. Members also occasionally invited outsiders to share stories of their travels, including Admiral Richard E. Byrd and British intelligence officer and novelist Somerset Maugham.

In 1932 the members of the Room began sharing their discoveries with their social peer, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Astor and Kermit Roosevelt became the primary conduits for information into the White House. Frequently these reports were verbally communicated during fishing outings on Astor's yacht, the *Nourmahal*. Other written reports remain in the Franklin Roosevelt Papers in the FDR Library.

Because of the connections of the membership, most of the information produced by the Room involved foreign banking and business practices. Aldrich, for example, used his position as chairman of the board of Chase National Bank to monitor the financial activities of the Amtorg Corporation, which controlled all Soviet trade, and allegedly espionage, within the United States.

The wealth of members also allowed them to travel extensively to collect information. In 1937 Astor and Kermit Roosevelt sailed the *Nourmahal* around the Japanese-mandated islands in the Pacific recording the location of Japanese radio stations, fortifications, and military personnel. With the outbreak of war, the members of the Room scattered in a variety of wartime endeavors. Many, however, including Kermit Roosevelt, Henry Field, and David Bruce, remained involved in intelligence activities including the OSS and the army's Military Intelligence Division.

See also: Astor, Captain William Vincent; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Roosevelt, Kermit

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Peter F. Coogan

ROOM 40

Considered to be the most among the most innovative and significant code-breaking operations of World War I, Room 40 is the location and name of the British Royal Navy Admiralty's establishment in Whitehall, which began operations at the onset of World War I. Among the successes enjoyed by the cryptanalysts of Room 40 was the ability to read practically all of Germany's naval and diplomatic communications traffic.

Many of the staff hired to work within the Room 40 establishment were noted scholars, and faculty with expertise in German from the Royal Naval Colleges of Dartmouth and Osborne. Their first success came with the capture of a code book that was retrieved from the blown-up German cruiser ship *Magdenburg* in August 1914.

Perhaps one of the most startling and decisive Room 40 code-breaking efforts of World War I dealt with the deciphering of the January 1917 Zimmermann Telegram. Arthur Zimmermann was the German Foreign Minister, who attempted, through his ambassador in Mexico, to convince Mexico to engage in a war against the United States. The actual encrypted message read as follows: "We make Mexico a proposal of alliance . . . [with] an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. Arthur Zimmermann." Those in Room 40 deciphered a total of 1,000 code groups in several weeks. This code-breaking effort resulted in significant change to U.S. foreign policy.

Among the consumers of encrypted products coming from Room 40 was Sir Winston Churchill who, in November 1914, issued specific instructions for the careful handling of all intercepted telegrams. Realizing the significance and capability of Room 40, Churchill himself drafted instructions for handling all intercepted telegrams, and to see them all himself.

The code-breaking operations of Room 40 continued well beyond World War I and into World War II.

See also: Zimmermann Telegram

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David Jimenez

ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO (JANUARY 30, 1882–APRIL 12, 1945)

The only U.S. president ever to serve more than two terms, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected to office in 1932 and was reelected three more times before he died near the end of World War II. In domestic politics Roosevelt was a reformer credited with

securing the passage of the New Deal legislation and helping guide the United States out of the Great Depression. In foreign affairs he helped move the United States from a policy of neutrality and isolationism into one of global involvement and leadership.

Born on January 30, 1882, Roosevelt spent his early years at the family estate in Hyde Park, New York, and later attended Harvard and Colombia Universities. In 1905 he married Eleanor Roosevelt, a distant cousin and niece of Theodore Roosevelt. A Democrat, Roosevelt entered into the field of electoral politics in 1910 by winning a seat in the New York Senate in a heavily Republican district. His political star rose rapidly on the national scene, coming to serve in the Wilson administration as assistant secretary of the navy and as the party's vice presidential candidate in 1920 only to be undercut by polio in 1921. Roosevelt recovered his health to the point where in 1928 he was elected governor of New York. Four years later he was elected president.

Roosevelt initially did little to challenge the isolationist consensus in the United States. During his first term his major foreign policy imitative was the Good Neighbor Policy. As part of it in December 1933 he signed he Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States which pledged the United States not to intervene in Latin American affairs, something the poor state of the U.S. economy virtually precluded in any case.

In his second term Roosevelt sought to move the United States away from isolationism. To this end he entered into secret talks with France on how to bypass U.S. neutrality legislation. Once war broke out in 1939, Roosevelt also entered into talks with Great Britain. In 1940 he prodded Congress into establishing a peacetime draft and called for the United States to become the "arsenal of democracy." In 1941 this translated into the establishment of the Lend-Lease program.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor transformed the domestic political climate in which Roosevelt operated laying the foundation for post–World War II internationalism in U.S. foreign policy. During the war Roosevelt helped oversee a centralization of U.S. military planning and organization. Among its most concrete manifestations were the creation of a de facto Joint Chiefs of Staff and setting up the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This organization was charged with gathering and analyzing intelligence as well as conducting covert operations and engaging in espionage. Col. William Donovan was placed in charge of the OSS. As Roosevelt's personal agent he had been instrumental in meeting with the British leaders and promoting a centralized intelligence service for the United States. Roosevelt's actions laid the foundation for the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency and the unification of the military services under a secretary of defense in a Department of Defense.

See also: Donovan, Major General William Joseph; Office of Strategic Services; Pearl Harbor; Stephenson, Sir William Samuel

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Glenn P. Hastedt

ROOSEVELT, KERMIT
(FEBRUARY 16, 1916–JUNE 8, 2000)

Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt, Jr., was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent who directed Operation Ajax, an Anglo-American covert operation in 1953 that overthrew the democratically elected government in Iran of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and restored Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the throne. Operation Ajax was the first time the CIA orchestrated a covert action to overthrow a democratically elected government. The success of Operation Ajax emboldened the CIA to carry out similar operations in Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1961).

Roosevelt was born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on February 16, 1916. He was the eldest son of Kermit Roosevelt, the son of former president Theodore Roosevelt. After completing his education at Harvard University, Roosevelt joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of the CIA. During World War II, he worked and traveled in the Middle East. After the war, Roosevelt returned to teach at Harvard University. In 1950, Frank Wisner recruited Roosevelt to work in the Office of Policy Coordination, the espionage branch of the CIA.

In 1951, Mossadegh was elected prime minister of Iran. In 1952, he nationalized without compensation the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). At the same time, Mossadegh began to favor socialist legislation and show greater tolerance toward the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party. In 1953, CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, in collusion with British government officials, authorized Roosevelt to spend $1 million to fund pro-monarchy forces in Iran. On August 3, Roosevelt told the Shah that the United States was willing to fund an insurrection, especially within the military, against Mossadegh. The resulting chaos between Mossadegh supporters and U.S.-funded insurgents convinced the Shah to flee the country on August 16. Nevertheless, on August 19, Mossadegh was arrested by pro-U.S. forces and the Shah returned home. As a condition of restoring the AIOC to the British, the U.S. government insisted that the AIOC's monopoly on oil production in Iran was over. Thereafter, five U.S. and two European oil companies were also allowed to operate in Iran.

In 1958, Roosevelt left the CIA to work for the Gulf Oil Company, eventually becoming a vice president. In 1970, he became a consultant for U.S. companies doing business in the Middle East. In 1979, he published his recollections of Mossadegh's overthrow in *Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran*. Roosevelt argued that the U.S. operation was needed to keep Communism out of Iran. Roosevelt died on June 8, 2000.

See also; Ajax, Operation; Central Intelligence Agency; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Office of Strategic Services

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Michael R. Hall

ROSENBERG, JULIUS AND ETHEL
(JULIUS: MAY 12, 1918–JUNE 19, 1953;
ETHEL: SEPTEMBER 28, 1915–JUNE 19, 1953)

The penetration of the Manhattan Project during World War II was a spectacular espionage coup by the Soviet Union. Most likely it accelerated the development of a Soviet atom bomb by 18 months, which had profound repercussions on the foreign policies of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Although physicists such as Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall transmitted more vital information to the Soviets than the small spy ring gathered around Julius Rosenberg, it was the arrest, trial, and execution of the Rosenbergs that was indelibly etched into the history of espionage during the early cold war. They were convicted for committing what Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover termed "the crime of the century," and their death sentence for espionage in peacetime was unprecedented in U.S, history.

Julius Rosenberg, the son of Polish immigrants, Harry and Sophie, was born in East Harlem, New York, on May 12, 1918. With one older brother and three sisters he was the youngest in the family. Bar Mitzvahed at 13 and educated at Hebrew schools until 16, he was passionately devoted to Judaism until politicized on the streets of Lower East Side by radical orators during the Great Depression. After several local rabbis refused to participate in the campaign against the conviction of the Scottsboro Boys, a cause célèbre of socialists in the early 1930s, Julius exchanged Judaism for Marxism, the Torah for the Daily Worker. In 1934 he enrolled in electrical engineering at the tuition-free College of the City of New York. He was a central figure in a close-knit and influential group of engineering students who were members of the Young Communist League, some of whom he later recruited into Soviet espionage. He became a passionate supporter of the Republican cause in the Spanish civil war. In December 1936, at the age of 18, he met the 21-year-old Ethel Greenglass, whom he married three years later on June 18, 1939.

Ethel was the only daughter and eldest child of Tessie and Barnet Greenglass, Jewish immigrants from, respectively, Austria and Russia. She was born on September 28, 1915, in an overcrowded tenement at 64 Sheriff Street on New York's Lower East Side. David, whose incriminating testimony contributed to her execution in 1953, was born seven years later. Her early life was impoverished and her relationship with her mother was embittered. However, her school experiences at Seward Park High, especially in music, language, and acting, were positive. She graduated in June 1931 and briefly embraced the world of amateur theatre and singing. After completing a secretarial course, Ethel was employed by the National New York Packing and Shipping Company from February 1932 until September 1935. This position both widened her horizons and exposed her to the Communist Party. She joined the Shipping Clerks' Union strike committee, was fired from her job. and successfully challenged her employer with wrongful dismissal under the National Labor Relations Act. The year 1936 found her singing at demonstrations and local political events organized by the Communist-dominated Workers' Alliance of America; at one of these, a benefit concert for the International Seamen's Union, she met for the first time her future husband.

By the time of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which the now-married Rosenbergs both supported, Julius's political convictions had solidified; on December 12, 1939, he formally

Ethel and Julius Rosenberg ride to separate jails on March 29, 1951, after being convicted of espionage. The trial of the Rosenbergs for conspiracy to commit espionage took place in New York City from March 6–29, 1951, at the height of the red scare. (AP/Wide World Photos)

joined Branch 16B of the American Communist Party (CPUSA). In 1940 the FBI established files on each. During World War II, she worked in the United States Department of Commerce and he as a civilian inspector for the Army Signal Corps. Based on FBI information, he attended army loyalty hearings in 1941 and, foreshadowing his response 10 years later, denied under oath that he had any interest in or involvement with Communism. He was not dismissed until February 9, 1945, when unequivocal evidence of his past membership of the CPUSA resurfaced.

In 1943, the year their first son, Michael, was born, Julius had the first of 50 meetings with Alexander Feklisov, a Soviet intelligence officer, and commenced providing classified information. He also commenced running an active espionage operation. Amongst others, he recruited his brother-in-law, David Greenglass who, since August 1944, worked at the Los Alamos weapons research laboratories as a machinist. Greenglass supplied him with sketches, drawn from memory, of a high-explosive lens mold being developed by Manhattan Project scientists. According to Greenglass' testimony in 1951, but recanted by him in 2001, his sister typed up his notes, intended for transmission to Moscow, on a portable Remington typewriter. Ethel was now a full-time volunteer secretary for a Communist front organization, the East Side Defense Council. From 1946, Julius, whose code name had been changed from "Antenna" to "Liberal" in November 1944, ran a small, unsuccessful machine workshop, G and R Engineering, with Greenglass. The Rosenbergs now lived in Knickerbocker Village in the Lower East Side and Ethel immersed herself, with difficulty, in motherhood. Their second son, Robert, was born in May 1947.

On June 17, 1950, the FBI arrested Julius Rosenberg after interrelated confessions by Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, and David Greenglass. Three weeks later, on August 11, Ethel was also arrested. On March 6, 1951, in the federal courthouse at Foley Square, Manhattan, the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell were tried on the charge of conspiracy to commit espionage. They were alleged to have played central roles in a plot to procure classified information on U.S. atomic bomb development for the benefit of the Soviet

Union. They were charged with conspiracy rather than espionage or treason because the United States and the Soviet Union were wartime allies at the time information was being passed to the Russians. The principal prosecution witness against the Rosenbergs was David Greenglass. He stated that his sister had typed notes which were given to Harry Gold, who would then turn them over to Anatoly Yakovlev, a senior NKVD case officer. He had agreed to testify on condition that his wife, Ruth, would not be charged and that his sentence would be mitigated. The trial was both protracted and controversial, and it polarized the United States. To some the Rosenbergs personified the threat of atomic espionage and reinforced fears of Communist subversion; to others they were unjust victims of McCarthyism and anti-Semitism.

The trial was preceded by a series of sensational events that fuelled anti-Communist hysteria and provided the Rosenberg trial with a dramatic context: the detonation of an atom bomb by the Soviet Union in September 1949, the loss of China to the Red Army in October, the conviction of Alger Hiss in January 1950, the Wheeling speech by Joseph McCarthy in February, the sentencing of Klaus Fuchs in March and, significantly—for it intruded upon the judgment of Judge Irving R. Kaufman—the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Because the charge was conspiracy, hearsay evidence (normally ruled invalid in sworn testimony) was permitted; this made it easier for the prosecution to secure a conviction. On the other hand, the top-secret decrypted VENONA cables, which clearly implicated Julius and supported the testimony of Gold and Greenglass, were not made available to the court. From these the FBI was also aware of Ethel's minor, accessory role in the espionage ring and, along with Justice Department officials and the prosecuting attorney, Irving Saypol, was opposed to the imposition of the death sentence upon her. Both Rosenbergs persistently denied either any involvement in espionage or any ties to the CPUSA, while the CPUSA distanced itself from the efforts of the National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case.

On April 5, 1951, Judge Kaufman imposed a double death sentence. The severity of the sentence contrasts to that imposed by British courts on Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs who passed far more vital atomic information to the Soviet Union and who were jailed for, respectively, 10 and 14 years. Kaufman wrongly judged Ethel to be a "full-fledged partner" in espionage, just as he wrongly insisted that the Rosenbergs had put the atomic bomb in the hands of the Russians—which was "worse than murder"—and that they were responsible for 50,000 Korean War casualties. J. Edgar Hoover believed that Ethel would succumb to the threat of the electric chair and persuade Julius to confess and identify his espionage confederates. The Rosenbergs knew a confession would save their lives and prevent their two young sons from being orphaned. Yet they admitted nothing and defiantly protested their innocence until the end.

The Rosenbergs remained on death row for 26 months whilst lawyers appealed and international outrage intensified. The appeals process spent itself, President Eisenhower refused to grant clemency, and the White House was picketed. On June 19, 1953, one newspaper headline read "Spies Fry Tonight." Ten thousand sympathizers gathered in Union Square and waited, emotionally, for the countdown. At 8.00 P.M. in Sing Sing prison, New York, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were electrocuted. Ethel's death was difficult: the first minute-long jolt of electricity failed to kill her and she was given two more jolts before being pronounced dead. She was 37 years old; Julius was 35 years old. Until recently, their sons continued to proclaim their innocence.

With the declassification of the VENONA documents and the publication of Feklisov's memoirs, this position—unlike the appropriateness of the death penalty—is no longer a source of debate.

See also: Atomic Spy Ring, Feklisov, Alexandre; Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; Gold, Harry; Greenglass, David; Hall, Theodore Alvin; Hiss, Alger; McCarthy, Joseph; Nunn May, Alan

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Phillip Deery

ROSITZKE, HARRY
(FEBRUARY 25, 1911–NOVEMBER 4, 2002)

Born in Brooklyn, New York, on February 25, 1911, Harry August Rositzke held important positions within the U.S. intelligence establishment during World War II and the cold war. Rositzke graduated from Union College in 1931 and received his PhD in Germanic philology from Harvard University in 1935. After completing his PhD, he taught English at Harvard University, the University of Omaha, and the University of Rochester. At the outbreak of World War II, Rositzke enlisted in the U.S. Army, where he attained the rank of major. In 1944, he was transferred to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

In 1947, Rositzke joined the newly created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a member of the Office of Special Operations, which was responsible for clandestine intelligence activities. In May 1952, he was appointed chief of Soviet operations in Munich, West Germany. Here, he was responsible for agent operations in the Soviet Union, agent recruitment, and counterespionage. Rositzke was appointed CIA chief of station in New Delhi, India, in 1957 and charged with conducting operations against Soviet and Chinese intelligence services. In 1962, he was reassigned to Washington DC, where he was responsible for intelligence operations targeting Soviet and East European officials in the United States and coordinating operations against Communist parties abroad. He remained at this position until his retirement in 1970.

Following his retirement, Rositzke moved to his farm in Middleburg, Virginia. He subsequently authored a number of books on the subject of intelligence. Rositzke died of pneumonia on November 4, 2002, in Warrenton, Virginia.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Office of Strategic Services

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Derek A. Bentley

ROWAN, LIEUTENANT ANDREW SUMMERS

Lieutenant Andrew Summers Rowan was a U.S. Army officer sent to make contact with Cuban rebels before the Spanish-American War. Rowan graduated from West Point in 1881 and became a staff officer. In 1897, Rowan published a book about Cuba and was considered one of the army's leading experts on the island. As tensions between Spain and the United States began to lead to war, General Nelson Miles took charge of planning an attack on Cuba. Fearing decimation by tropical diseases, Miles decided to emphasize the supply of Cuban rebel forces instead of a large U.S. expeditionary force.

Rowan's expertise won him an important role in Miles' planning. On April 9, 1898, Rowan was dispatched to enter Cuba and establish contact with the island's guerrilla insurgents. On May 1, Rowan located the rebel general Calixto García. Rowan then smuggled three Cuban diplomats back to the United States. Rowan's mission was vital in establishing links between the Cuban rebels and the United States, and provided General Miles with invaluable intelligence. Rowan was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Rowan's success was immortalized in Elbert Hubbard's 1899 essay "A Message to Garcia," which held Rowan up to a generation of schoolchildren as the epitome of dutiful perseverance. After the Spanish-American War, Rowan served in the Philippines, fighting the anti-American independence movement. He left the army a few years later and lived in retirement for over 30 years.

See also: Spanish-American War

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James L. Erwin

RUSSIAN FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE

In November 1991 following an unsuccessful coup against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in which some of its members participated the Committee for State Security (KGB) was dismantled. The KGB was the Soviet Union's premier intelligence

organization carrying out a wide range of security, police, and intelligence functions. With its dissolution, these functions were distributed among a number of different agencies. Its domestic security tasks including counterintelligence, border security, internal security, counterterrorism, and surveillance were assigned to a newly established Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK). In 1995 the FSK was renamed the Federal Security Service (FSB). A comparison is often made between the FSB and the combined missions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, National Security Agency, Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration in the United States.

In 1998 Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointed career KGB official Vladimir Putin to head the FSB. Putin's later rise to the presidency of Russia along with the prevalent position that FSB officials hold in the Russian government has caused many to argue that it is the driving force in Russian politics today. Under Putin FSB funding reportedly increased by 40 percent in 2006 and 78 percent of the "top 1000" political leaders in Russia are said to have worked for the FSB or its predecessors. In some eyes the FSB is more powerful politically than the KGB because the KGB was responsible to a strong central Communist party.

Following this line of argument many link the FSB to attacks on a series of attacks conducted against Putin's opponents. Two of his leading critics, Anna Stepanova Politovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko, were killed in 2006. Politovskaya was a journalist who covered Russia's war in Chechnya and Litvinenko was a former KGB official writing an expose on FSB abuses. In addition a number of high-profile scientists who opposed the regime have been arrested and sentenced to long prison terms on espionage charges or accusations of illegally export, high-technology products out of Russia. The same is true of investigative journalists who have sought to highlight ecological problems in Russia.

The FSB is also asserted to have played a central role in building up support for the Chechnya War as well as helping to provoke it. During the war the FSB reportedly assassinated several Chechen leaders during the Chechnya War. Some also hold it responsible for terrorist incidents such as the hostage crisis at a Moscow Theater and the bombings of a marketplace in Astrakham. The FSB is said to have arranged these incidents in order to build up support for Putin and the war against Chechnya. Lending support to these arguments is the fact that those making these arguments such as Politovskaya and Boris Stomakhim were targeted for reprisals.

See also: GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

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SABERI, ROXANA
(APRIL 26, 1977–)

Roxana Saberi is a U.S.-Iranian national who was convicted by Branch 28 of the Iranian Revolutionary Council of espionage on behalf of the United States in April 2009. A journalist, she was first arrested in January 2009 for buying wine which is illegal in the Islamic Republic of Iran. She was next charged with working as a journalist without a valid press card. The charge of espionage was added on April 8.

Saberi had worked in Iran as a journalist from 2003 to 2006. She initially worked for Feature Story News, an independent news broadcast service. Her reports were carried on PBS, NPR, and Fox News in addition to many non-U.S. news outlets. In June 2003, less than six months after it began operation, Feature Story News was closed and her press credentials were revoked by the Iranian government. Saberi was able to obtain a new set of press credentials and began work for the BBC. In late 2006 these credentials were again rescinded. She continued to live in Iran researching a book and providing occasional reports to NPR and ABC Radio.

Saberi has maintained her innocence and no evidence of her reported espionage was made public before or during her trial. An appeals court reduced her eight-year prison sentence to a suspended two-year sentence. Saberi was released on May 9, 2009.

See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

SACKETT, NATHANIEL
(APRIL 10, 1732–JULY 28, 1805)

Nathaniel Sackett was a spymaster in New York from 1776 to 1777. Sackett, a merchant in Fishkill, New York, helped organize his local committee of safety and became a member from Dutchess County of the New York Provincial Convention in 1776. On September 21, 1776, the convention appointed him to its newly formed Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies; he had direct responsibility for supervising its intelligence activities and the militia units arresting those suspected of "disaffection." In February 1777 on the recommendation of William Duer, then chairman of the committee, General Washington authorized Sackett to form an organized intelligence network for the region. Washington promised him $50 per month for his "care and trouble" and $500 per month for intelligence expenditures. Sackett's ring collected information on British recruitment in the Hudson Valley and also conveyed information from British-occupied Long Island across the Long Island Sound to Connecticut and from there to the army in New York. Sackett developed a system for disguising agents as enemy sympathizers with realistic cover stories and placing them behind British lines, and outlined his various new forms of spycraft in a letter to Washington of April 7, 1777. However, Washington complained Sackett failed to relay reliable intelligence in a timely manner and dismissed him after an abortive mission. Sackett was later a sutler for the Continental Army. In 1785 he failed to persuade Congress to create a new state in the Ohio Valley and in 1789 to receive a federal political appointment from Washington.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence

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Elizabeth M. Nuxoll

SANFORD, HENRY
(JUNE 13, 1832–MAY 21, 1891)

Henry Shelton Sanford was U.S. minister to Belgium and headed the Secret Service in Europe. During the Civil War, he organized agent networks to track Confederate procurement, conducted "grey" propaganda operations, and engaged in covert economic warfare.

Born in Woodbury, Connecticut, on June 13, 1823, Sanford received a law degree in Heidelberg and served as an American diplomat. Joining the Republican Party in 1860,

he befriended Senator William H. Seward. After Seward became secretary of state, Sanford went to Belgium as American minister in April 1861.

Seward instructed Sanford to counter Confederate activities in Europe. By October 1861 Sanford had recruited agents in London, Liverpool, Paris, and Antwerp. Besides personal informants, Sanford paid private detectives, including the famous English detective Ignatius Pollaky to collect intelligence on Confederate agents. Sanford's principal opponent was Confederate Navy Captain James Bulloch, who obtained two raiders, the *Florida* and the *Alabama*, despite Sanford's efforts.

Sanford paid to place unattributed stories in the French-language press and enlisted a journalist of the Parisian *Opinion Nationale*. He preempted Confederate purchases of war material, once cornering the market on salt-peter to deny the Confederacy a key gunpowder ingredient.

Sanford's operations angered Charles Adams, American minister to Great Britain, who accused Sanford of "poaching" in his territory. Seward's deputy in November 1861 instructed Sanford to turn his agents in England over to Freeman Morse and Thomas Dudley, American consuls in London and Liverpool. Sanford then concentrated his efforts in Belgium and Paris, where his intelligence blocked the sailing of Confederate raiders fitted out in France. Sanford remained Seward's conduit for funding secret service operations throughout Europe.

Sanford remained minister to Belgium until 1869. He later bought land in Florida and founded the city of Sanford. Sanford died on May 21, 1891, in Healing Springs, Virginia.

See also: Secret Service; Wood, William P.

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SATELLITES

For the duration of the cold war, the United States used various airborne methods to collect intelligence over the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pac, and China. Having found political, technical, and mechanical issues with the use of balloons and aircraft, the United States moved to the use of satellites in the late 1950s. By the end of the 1960s, the United States used specifically designed satellites for collecting a wide variety of electronic, signals, communication, and political intelligence throughout the world. Satellites became one of the primary intelligence collection platforms used by the United States during the cold war, and remain a vital and valuable tool in the intelligence community.

The history of the development of U.S. intelligence-gathering satellites began in October 1945 when the U.S. Navy contracted with North American Aviation and

An Aerospace Audiovisual Service crew of videographers and photographers set up an Inmarsat satellite transmitter on the sand during Operation Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia. (Courtesy U.S. Department of Defense)

the Guggenheim National Aeronautical Laboratory to assess the technical feasibility of building satellites. Although the report from North American Aviation and Guggenheim Aeronautical Lab provided positive feedback on the technological feasibility of producing a satellite, the navy scoffed at the estimated cost of five to eight million dollars for the satellite. To assist in alleviating the cost of producing a satellite, Commander Harvey Hall of the navy's Bureau of Aeronautics proposed a joint navy and army air force program to air force Generals H. J. Kerr, H. W. McLellan, and W. L. Richardson. The air force generals agreed to present the program to the air force's director of research and development, Major General Curtis E. LeMay. Lemay rejected the joint research project and instead asked a burgeoning think tank within the Douglas Aircraft Company, known as Project RAND, to produce a satellite feasibility study for the air force. On May 2, 1946, the engineers from Project RAND presented their report, "Preliminary Designs of an Experimental World Circling Spaceship" to the air force.

Within the report, Louis Ridenour, an engineer at the Douglas Aircraft Company and a member of the Project RAND team, outlined the military significance and application of satellites for the air force. According to Ridenour, satellites could provide reconnaissance, navigation, intelligence gathering, communication, and weather data functions for the air force and other military services. From these initial findings, the air force expressed interest in the future use of satellites, but wanted more studies and research into the technology and application of future satellite systems.

In the interim, between the findings of Project RAND (1946) and the next satellite study (1951), the army air force achieved independent status and evolved into the

United States Air Force (USAF) and the small think tank within the Douglas Aircraft Corporation broke away and became the RAND Corporation. By the end of the 1940s the air force, army, and navy were all interested in the future use of satellites for intelligence and military purposes, with the air force taking the lead in the development of satellites.

In the first half of the 1950s, the RAND Corporation continued to refine the use and application of satellites for military use. In April 1951, USAF authorized RAND to produce further studies on the feasibility and technological capabilities of satellites. Known as Project FEEDBACK, this project became the foundation for the first U.S. military intelligence-gathering satellites.

The air force's Air Research and Defense Command (ARDC) ran the satellite program initially known as Project 1115, and later as Weapons System 117L (WS-117L). WS-117L had several components to it. The air force's initial plan identified the WS-117L program as a series of satellite systems designed to collect continuous photographic, video, and infrared intelligence over enemy territory. Theses system evolved into separate and distinct intelligence-gathering platforms. The photographic and video program evolved into the CORONA satellite program, while the infrared detection satellite system developed as the Missile Defense Alarm system (MIDAS). Together, these two satellites provided the United States with a robust capability to keep track of a wide variety of photo-optic strategic intelligence. Beyond the use of satellites for the collection of visual and heat signatures, the air force, navy, and army worked toward the development of better satellite systems that could provide additional intelligence gathering capabilities.

Beyond the development of CORONA and MIDAS, the United States developed a full spectrum of satellite systems designed to collect communication, signal, electronic, weather, and geodetic intelligence from space. After the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, Eisenhower supported the development of satellites for intelligence-gathering missions. The air force no longer had a monopoly of satellite development; the army and navy developed systems, as did the newly created National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The proliferation of satellite systems for civilian, military, and intelligence-gathering operations flourished in the decades to come.

Future U.S. presidents, from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush, maintained and used intelligence-gathering satellites for a wide variety of national security missions. Beyond the use of satellites for the collection of photographic intelligence, the U.S. government also developed satellites for electronic, oceanic, nuclear explosion detection, and meteorological intelligence-gathering missions between 1960 and present day. Electronic reconnaissance satellites, also known as Ferets, were designed in the late 1950s as U.S. aircraft used to collect electronic signatures became increasingly susceptible to air-to-air and surface-to-air interception. Feret satellites were able to eavesdrop on communications and electromagnetic emissions from enemy air defense systems and radar stations. These systems provided U.S. military commanders and presidents with intelligence that advanced the understanding of data collected from photoreconnaissance satellites. Furthermore, the U.S. government also used Feret satellites to collect telemetry data from missile tests done by the Soviet Union and China. Often the U.S. government and its allies used the collected electronic data in conjunction with photographs to produce a more complete picture of the enemy's strategic systems.

To keep track of activity on the world's oceans, the U.S. Navy, in conjunction with the Applied Physics Laboratory at John Hopkins University, developed the TRANSIT and ANNA navigation satellites starting in 1960 as a means to provide a more accurate navigation system for U.S. Navy ships. As these systems evolved beyond navigation beacons in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, they became more sophisticated in their abilities to locate and track surface vessels and submarines through both active and passive measures. During the cold war, knowing the location of the Soviet Union's surface ships and submarines became vital intelligence in the planning of national security and strategic policy of the United States. Although the details of the early TRANSIT and ANNA navigations satellites are declassified, the U.S. government has maintained tight security on the release of information and details about ocean reconnaissance satellites.

A third series of intelligence-gathering satellites used by the United States detected nuclear explosions worldwide. The VELA nuclear detection satellite program evolved out of the MIDAS program during the Eisenhower era. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), an organization within the Department of Defense that worked on the application of advanced technologies for military applications, developed the program between 1959 and 1963. The United States launched the first VELA satellites in October 1963, with the follow-on launch of additional sets of satellites in July 1964 and July 1965. The United States superseded the initial series of VELA satellites with advanced models in the three-year period between 1967 and 1970.

The VELA hotel satellite program provided the U.S. government with a consistent and reliable platform that detected nuclear detonations throughout the globe. In addition to providing vital strategic intelligence, the VELA program also provided verification that signatories to the October 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Agreement, which banned the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, did not violate the terms of the international agreement. The VELA satellite program provides insights into the dual-use capability of intelligence-gathering satellites. Although the satellites provided valuable data on nuclear detonations, the U.S. government also used them as peaceful sentries designed to maintain the integrity of the Nuclear Test Ban agreement.

The final class of intelligence-gathering satellites, weather reconnaissance, is probably the most common system known. The engineers from the Douglas Corporation first identified weather data collection as a potential mission for satellites in their initial report in 1946. Taking over research from the military services in 1958, NASA built the Television Infrared Observation System (TIROS) as a satellite designed to collect weather data from space. First launched in 1962, NASA continually refined the program from its first launch. Presently, NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) maintain derivatives from the original TIROS satellite that still orbits in space and broadcasts weather data back to earth. The images can be seen by watching a nightly news weather segment.

In addition to the TIROS satellite system, NASA also developed the NIMBUS weather satellite in 1964. NASA, and later NOAA, used NIMBUS satellites for the collection of data on atmospheric temperatures, sea-surface temperature, and sea and ice coverage. The data supplied by NIMBUS provided additional atmospheric and sea-state data that NASA and NOAA could combine with the data collected by TIROS to provide a better forecast of atmospheric and meteorological conditions. Although often overlooked as vital military and intelligence assets, weather satellites

provide the U.S. military with a constant stream of data that is vital in the planning and execution of a wide variety of missions. Unlike the other categories of intelligence-gathering satellites, the public can easily see the data collected by weather reconnaissance satellites and the U.S. government openly acknowledges their existence.

The satellite functions first identified in 1946 by the engineers of the Douglas Aircraft Company framed the use and application of satellites for the collection of photographic, electronic, oceanographic, nuclear detection, and meteorological intelligence for the duration of the cold war. Despite the end of the cold war, intelligence-gathering satellites remain a vital asset in the military, political, and diplomatic actions of the United States. Although the U.S. government maintains tight security in the operations and capability of many of these space-based systems, the commitment to the use of satellites for intelligence-gathering missions has become an entrenched element of the U.S. national security system.

See also: Aerial Surveillance; Balloons; Central Intelligence Agency; CHALET; CORONA; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Ferret; GENETRIX; Johnson Administration and Intelligence; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; KEYHOLE—SIGINT Satellites; MAGNUM; Open Skies Proposal; Overflight Operation; U-2 Incident

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SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR M., JR. (OCTOBER 15, 1917–FEBRUARY 28, 2007)

Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Jr., U.S. journalist, writer, social critic, and historian, was born on October 15, 1917, in Columbus, Ohio. His father, Arthur M. Schlesinger, was a well-known and respected historian. During his youth, Schlesinger, Jr., excelled academically and was admitted to Harvard University.

The year following his graduation from Harvard, Schlesinger had his senior thesis published in 1939, titled *Orestes A. Brownson: A Pilgrim's Progress*. The publication garnered him immediate attention and even praise. Soon after however, Schlesinger was hired by the federal Office of War Information in 1942. While there, he worked on the United States' positive propaganda campaign until he was transferred to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, in 1943. He served with the office until the conclusion of the war, returning to journalism and writing in 1945.

In 1946, Schlesinger became a history professor at Harvard University, where he stayed until 1961. While at Harvard, he found time to finish and to compose many prize-winning works, including *Age of Jackson* and *Age of Roosevelt*. Soon after in 1947, he was one of the founders of Americans for Democratic Action, a liberal organization formed in support of the Democratic Party. While still at Harvard, he served as an assist to John F. Kennedy during his presidential campaign.

After Kennedy's election, Schlesinger was appointed as his advisor for Latin American affairs. With his access to the Kennedy White House, he was able to compose one of his most famous works, *A Thousand Days*, a study of Kennedy's time in power. It was published in 1965 and it was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for biography.

Schlesinger went back to teaching in 1966, joining the faculty at the City University of New York. He continued writing, authoring many more titles. He is respected for his scholarship, his two Pulitzer Prizes, and adamant support for liberalism and the Great Society.

See also: Office of Strategic Services

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Arthur Holst

SCHLESINGER, JAMES RODNEY
(FEBRUARY 15, 1929–)

James Schlesinger was the ninth Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). He served from February 2, 1973, to July 2, 1973. Born in New York City, Schlesinger earned a PhD in economics from Harvard and taught at the University of Virginia prior to moving to the Rand Corporation. From there he moved to the Bureau of the Budget, now the Office of Management and Budget, where he rose to the position of assistant director. Immediately prior to becoming DCI, Schlesinger served as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Schlesinger came to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with clearly defined views on the intelligence community. While serving in OMB he authored a 47-page report, commonly referred to as the Schlesinger Report, which called for streamlining and centralizing the management of intelligence. It concluded that too often operators and

program managers in intelligence collection rather than the intelligence customers were determining collection priorities, and that much unproductive duplication of collection efforts existed. One of its recommendations was creating the position of Director of National Intelligence, leaving the DCI to concentrate on management of the CIA. Upon becoming DCI, Schlesinger moved quickly to bring about his desired reforms. Convinced that there was too much deadwood and too many "old boys" from the days of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) still working in the CIA, he forced the retirement of some 1,400 CIA officials. Over 100 were members of the Clandestine Service. Additionally, Schlesinger renamed the Directorate of Plans the Directorate of Operations and subordinated the overt collection system to the clandestine services. He set in motion steps to abolish the Office of National Estimates. And, in a symbolic move he replaced the old "Bureau of Public Works" sign that marked the entrance to the CIA from the George Washington Parkway with one identifying it as the CIA. Days before stepping down as DCI Schlesinger gave instructions for all current and past CIA employees to come forward with any information they might have about past or ongoing illegal activities being carried out by the CIA. These instructions were the foundation for the "family jewels" study that his successor, William Colby, presented to Congress in its investigations of CIA illegalities. Schlesinger reforms made him among the least popular DCIs. So too did the fact that his appointment was regarded as an overt attempt by President Richard Nixon to gain managerial control over the CIA and the intelligence community. Some at the time referred to his appointment as "Nixon's revenge."

Schlesinger went from DCI to secretary of defense where he served from 1973 to 1975. Following that he became the first secretary of energy, holding that position from 1977 to 1979. Schlesinger returned to government service in 1983 as a member of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Schlesinger Report

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SCHLESINGER REPORT

The Schlesinger Report was commissioned in 1971 by President Richard Nixon. Long obscured by more famous investigations into the operation of the intelligence community, such as those by the Church and Pike Committees and the Rockefeller Commission, the Schlesinger Commission has recently come into renewed attention with recent publication of its report.

James Schlesinger was the assistant director of the Office of the Management and Budget in Nixon's administration. A concern for the inability of the intelligence community to effectively coordinate its activities in producing intelligence analytical products had long been a concern of those receiving intelligence. To this was now added a concern for controlling the spiraling costs of intelligence that followed on its increased reliance on sophisticated technology to supplement, if not supplant, human intelligence-gathering efforts. Still another impetus for the Schlesinger study was the suspicion and distrust of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Nixon brought with him to the White House in 1969. He along with his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, saw its members as having a political agenda that was at odds with theirs and unsupportive of the policies they sought to advance.

In his report Schlesinger argued that structural problems lay at the heart of the intelligence community's problems. It had been created in an era in which collection capabilities were smaller and cheaper, the conflicts between tactical and strategic intelligence less pronounced, and the coordination challenges facing the Director of Central Intelligence far fewer in number making it possible for this individual to simultaneously head the CIA and the intelligence community. To remedy this situation the Schlesinger Report recommended separating these two positions and as part of this separation creating the position of Director of National Intelligence to control the budgets and operations of the major intelligence collection agencies. Within the Defense Department, where much of the technology-driven growth had taken place, the Schlesinger Report called for creating a Director of Defense Intelligence who would direct and control all Defense intelligence resources. Third, the Report called for redrawing the functional boundaries between intelligence agencies in an effort to rationalize the collection and production of intelligence.

The reform proposals of the Schlesinger Report were in many respects ahead of its time. The Nixon administration found them too far reaching and, soon absorbed by Watergate, it did not pursue them with vigor. Congress would soon become the driving force behind intelligence reform and bring a different agenda with it. The report nonetheless remains significant for focusing attention on managerial and structural issues in intelligence reform.

See also: Church Committee; Defense Department Intelligence; Director of National Intelligence; Nixon Administration and Intelligence; Pike Committee; Schlesinger, James Rodney

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SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS

From 1946 to 2000, the School of the Americas was the U.S. Army's principal Spanish-language training facility for Latin American military personnel. In 1946, the School of the Americas originated at Fort Amador, Panama Canal Zone, as the Latin American Training Center-Ground Division. By 1950, the training center had moved to Fort Gulick, Panama Canal Zone, and been renamed the U.S. Army Caribbean School. Initially, the primary purpose of the School of the Americas was to train Latin American military personnel how to use advanced weapons and artillery systems that the United States was selling to Latin American nations. A secondary goal was to instruct the Latin Americans in nation-building skills. In the aftermath of Fidel Castro's successful 1959 Cuban Revolution, however, the school's curriculum was greatly expanded to include counterinsurgency training to combat Communist insurgencies in Latin America. To reflect the school's hemispheric role, the institution was renamed the U.S. Army School of the Americas. Under the provisions of the Panama treaty signed in 1977, the School of the Americas left the Panama Canal Zone and moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1984.

Since its inception, more than 63,000 soldiers, officers, civilians, and noncommissioned officers from 22 Latin American nations and the United States have trained at the School of the Americas. The presence of the School of the Americas in Georgia brought the institution to the attention of human rights activists. Critics of the School of the Americas, who allege that the institution trained the Latin American military personnel responsible for human rights abuses committed by Latin American military dictatorships during the 1970s and 1980s, argue that U.S. Army training manuals recommended torture, false arrest, and the use of truth serum. Human rights activists point out that former Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega; El Salvador's Roberto D'Aubuisson; and Argentina's General Leopoldo Galtieri, who was largely responsible for Argentina's Dirty War which resulted in the disappearance of thousands of civilians, were trained at the School of the Americas. School of the Americas officials, however, contend that only about 300 graduates of the institution have ever been accused of human rights violations. They argue that no school should be held accountable for the actions of some of its graduates. Following a decade of intense criticism by liberals, the army temporarily closed the School of the Americas in December 2000.

In January 2001, a new institution, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), opened at Fort Benning. WHINSEC uses the same facilities as the School of the Americas and offers many of the same courses. The new institution, which includes a human rights component in every class, contends that the courses at WHINSEC foster knowledge, cooperation, democratic values, respect for human rights, and understanding of U.S. traditions. Since it reopened in 2001, the largest number of students have come from Chile. Currently, the cost to operate WHINSEC is about $6 million.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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Michael R. Hall

SCOWCROFT, LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT (MARCH 19, 1925–)

Brent Scowcroft was born on March 19, 1925. He served in various capacities in government, including national security advisor during the Gerald Ford and the George H. W. Bush administrations. In topics ranging from the Soviet Union to the Middle East, he has resisted ideas which he believes are overly optimistic and threaten to lull the United States into a false sense of security.

A West Point graduate, his military career lasted 29 years and rose to lieutenant general. He served as professor of Russian history at West Point and also as head of the Political Science Department at the Air Force Academy. He was a member of the President's Special Review Board (called the Tower Commission), which investigated President Reagan's management style in the wake of the Iran-contra scandal. He mentored Sovietologist Condoleezza Rice, who later served as national security advisor and then as secretary of state. Scowcroft later sat on the boards of several corporations and nonprofit organizations.

He chaired the Scowcroft Commission in the early 1980s. The Commission was established to make suggestions about strategic issues, especially regarding the controversy surrounding deployment of the MX missile. The Commission's findings sought to create a middle ground, but the Commission's report was upstaged by President Reagan's announcement on March 23, 1983, of a space-based missile defense research program later dubbed "Star Wars" by the media.

Unwilling to endanger U.S. security through excessive optimism, Scowcroft was skeptical of many appraisals, which were often later shown to be overly simplistic. As national security advisor to Gerald Ford, Scowcroft applauded Ford's courage in deciding to keep marines in South Vietnam—rather than to immediately remove all U.S. personnel from the country—to facilitate the evacuation of Vietnamese fleeing Communist takeover in 1975 after the U.S. pullout two years earlier.

As national security advisor under George H. W. Bush, he viewed an optimistic prediction, NSR 3, made by the National Security Council regarding the Soviet transformation away from Communism to be a "big disappointment." Although pleased with the CIA's ability to gather information (particularly in its use of satellites), Scowcroft noted its inability to predict Soviet policy intentions and a lack of high-value intelligence sources from within the Kremlin.

In 2002, he argued against the impending campaign against Saddam Hussein of Iraq, writing that the campaign would distract the United States from its focus against terrorism. He emphasized the importance of "enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence" to combat terrorism.

See also: Bush, George H. W., Administration and Intelligence; Ford Administration and Intelligence; Reagan Administration and Intelligence; Scowcroft Commission

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SCOWCROFT COMMISSION

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks the Bush administration found it politically necessary to set up a commission to investigate the factors that led to the surprise attack. As the 9/11 Commission neared the completion of its report, the Bush administration turned its attention to a report by retired General Brent Scowcroft. Four months before 9/11 President George Bush had commissioned two studies of the intelligence community. One chaired by Scowcroft and the other by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet. After 9/11 Tenet's inquiry ended its work without issuing a report but Scowcroft continued his work. In March 2002 he issued his report and according to press reports its recommendations included giving a single person managerial authority over all members of the intelligence community and removing the three largest intelligence agencies (the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Agency, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency) from the control of the Department of Defense.

The Scowcroft Commission Report (formally, The 2001 Presidential Commission on Intelligence Reform) received little attention at the time from the White House but was now being reexamined as a means of preempting the 9/11 Commission's reform proposals. In the end, instead of calling for a Director of National Intelligence, the administration settled for issuing an executive order that strengthened the DCI's power over the intelligence budget. The Report remains classified.

At the time he wrote this report Scowrcoft was the president of the Scowcroft Group, an international business consulting firm. He was a retired air force officer who had risen to the rank of lieutenant general. A protégé of Henry Kissinger, Scowcroft had served in Richard Nixon's administration as a military assistant to the president and as deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs. He went on to hold the position of national security advisor under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. After leaving government service, Scowcroft was appointed to several presidential commissions. Among the most notable were the President's Special Review Board (the Tower Commission) that investigated the Iran-Contra Affair and the Defense Policy Review Board. Scowcroft was an outspoken critic of the George W. Bush administration's policies leading up to the start of the Iraq War and its occupation policies after the war.

See also: Iran-Contra Affair; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (The 9/11 Commission); National Security Advisor; September 11, 2001; Tenet, George

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SCRANAGE, SHARON
(1955–)

Sharon Scranage was the first person convicted under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act that was passed in 1982. At the time of her arrest, Scranage was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee working as an operations support assistant in Ghana. There, she passed along classified information to her boyfriend, Michael Soussoudis, who was a Ghanaian intelligence officer, first cousin of Ghana's leader and had permanent residence status in the United States. Included in the information she passed to him were the identities of Ghanaians working as espionage agents in Ghana for the United States.

Scranage was identified as a security threat when, upon coming back to the United States in 1985, she failed a polygraph test. Scranage agreed to cooperate with intelligence officials as evidence mounted of her activities, leading to the arrest of Soussoudis who was sentenced to 20 years in prison. He was exchanged for Ghanaian agents that had been arrested for spying on behalf of the United States after Scranage was indicted. Scrange was sentenced to five years in prison with this sentence later being shortened to two years.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence

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SEBOLD, WILLIAM G.
(MARCH 10, 1899–1970)

William G. Sebold was a double agent who was recruited to spy against the United States by Nazi Germany in World War II but in reality worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to identify and arrest Nazi agents working in the United States as part of the Duquesne Spy Ring.

Sebold was born in Germany in 1899 and, after serving in the German army in World War I, he left to take jobs with aircraft plants in the United States and South America. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen on February 10, 1936. In 1939 Sebold returned to Germany for a lengthy family visit. Adolph Hitler was now in power. In September of that year Sebold was approached by someone identifying himself as "Dr. Gassner," who questioned him about U.S. military plans and equipment. Gassner

also sought to convince Sebold to spy for Germany when he returned to the United States. Fearing for the safety of his family in Germany, Sebold agreed and underwent training in the use of secret codes, microphotography, and transmitting information. On February 4, 1940, Sebold returned to the United States using the alias Harry Sawyer and the code name "Tramp."

Not long after his meeting with Gassner, Sebold's U.S. passport was stolen. He went to the American embassy to obtain a new one and informed officials there about his contacts with German intelligence officials. Sebold also indicated a willingness to work with U.S. officials. As a result, when Sebold arrived in New York City the FBI helped set him up in a business office in Manhattan and a shortwave radio transmitting station on Long Island. Nazi agents were tape-recorded and videotaped in their meetings with Sebold in his office.

Over a period of 16 months, Sebold was able to help the FBI collect massive amounts of information on Nazi spies operating in the United States, Mexico, and South America. On June 24, 1941, the FBI moved to close down the Duquesne Spy Ring. Nineteen members of the spy ring pled guilty. On December 13, 1941, the 14 that pled not guilty were convicted. On January 2, 1942, the 33 members of this spy were sentenced to over 300 years in prison. The leader of the spy ring, Frederick Joubert Duquesne, received a sentence of 18 years on espionage charges and a $2,000 fine for violating the Registration Act.

After the trial ended, Sebold disappeared as the government relocated him and gave him a new identity.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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SECRET COMMITTEE OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

The Secret Committee of the Continental Congress was charged with secretly importing military supplies during the American Revolution. The Second Continental Congress created the controversial Secret Committee on September 18, 1775, to procure military supplies at a time when most private trade was banned by Continental nonimportation and nonexportation regulations. Early in the Revolution the term *secret committee* was also applied to certain other congressional administrative committees, particularly the Committee of Secret Correspondence, and to some similar local committees. Such committees handled matters that had to be kept secret from the public and, at least in matters of detail, from the legislature itself, particularly military procurement, foreign affairs, and intelligence issues.

Initially, the Secret Committee secretly contracted with trusted well-connected merchants to ship commodities or bills of exchange abroad and invest the proceeds in needed supplies—not only arms and ammunition, but medicines, uniforms, blankets,

sail cloth, tent cloth, supplies for allied Indians, and salt. The Committee also purchased munitions privately imported and issued permits for exports of equivalent value. Congressmen from Pennsylvania, New York, and New England dominated the Committee; several also became Secret Committee agents or contractors.

Once Congress opened American ports to foreign trade in March 1776, the committee employed special agents on a commission basis. At that time Robert Morris of Philadelphia became committee chairman and chief domestic agent. Often, for security reasons and to reduce the inflated prices charged the government, Morris disguised committee ventures as private operations of his firm, Willing, Morris and Company. Such procedures aroused suspicion that he juggled public and private ventures to his own advantage.

Silas Deane, sent abroad by the Committee of Secret Correspondence in 1776 to begin negotiating aid and an alliance with France, also represented Secret Committee contractors; his commercial mission was to provide cover for his diplomatic one. Other Secret Committee agents included William Bingham and Stephen Ceronio in the West Indies, and in Europe, William Lee, John Ross, and Thomas Morris. Rivalries and jurisdictional conflicts among the various agents contributed to the Deane-Lee affair, the procurement scandal that embroiled Congress from 1778 to 1779.

Within the United States the continental agents who handled marine affairs also acted for the Secret Committee, receiving cargoes, delivering them to appropriate military agencies, and remitting goods or funds to pay for them. The most important agents were John Langdon (New Hampshire), John Bradford (Massachusetts), Nathaniel Shaw, Jr. (Connecticut), Joseph Hewes (North Carolina), John Dorsius (South Carolina), and John Wereat (Georgia). Agents conducted both public and private business, including privateering. Their private affairs benefited from the scale of operations, prestige, and connections their public role gave them. The public gained the access to mercantile experience and to the private credit of their agents.

The intensifying British naval blockade in 1776 prevented the continued arrival of Secret Committee cargoes in the Delaware and Chesapeake Bay regions, and the departure of shipments of tobacco and grain and other provisions. Rice, indigo, and other commodities were therefore shipped from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia to the West Indies and sold there or transferred to neutral ships for transport to Europe. Goods acquired in France, Holland, Germany, and elsewhere generally also arrived via the West Indies, especially from St. Eustatius, Martinique, and Hispaniola. After 1776, imports landed in Massachusetts or New Hampshire or in the southernmost states. Because the Secret Committee had greater success receiving supplies than in paying for them, the government was deeply in debt to its agents and their suppliers by the time the Commercial Committee replaced the Secret Committee in July 1777. By that time cargoes American diplomats obtained through secret foreign aid replaced Secret Committee commercial ventures as the chief source of supplies. Lost, stranded, and scattered cargoes and records protracted settlement of Secret Committee accounts. The unsettled accounts and charges of malfeasance raised primarily by the Lees of Virginia long shadowed the careers of those associated with the Secret Committee.

See also; American Intelligence; Committee on Secret Correspondence; Deane, Silas

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SECRET SERVICE

The U.S. Secret Service is charged by law and by executive orders with two essential missions—provide physical protection and conduct criminal investigations into certain kinds of crimes. The first mission is to provide physical protection. Most of the other threats, such as counterfeiting or computer fraud, are threats to the integrity of the American financial system.

In 1894 the Secret Service began an informal role as protector of the president when it began work as an agency protecting President Grover Cleveland. In the years following the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901, the Secret Service was assigned the responsibility for protecting presidents.

In the twentieth century, threats against presidents, the attack on President Harry S. Truman (1951), the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (1963), and later of his brother, Robert Kennedy, led to Secret Service protection by act of Congress for presidents, presidential candidates, their families, as well as others such as individuals who are in the order of succession to the office of the president. Foreign heads of state and their spouses have also been placed under Secret Service protection by Congress when these persons are visiting the United States.

In 1997 Congress passed the Presidential Threat Protection Act (Public Law 106–544). It authorizes the Secret Service to participate in the planning, coordination, and implementation of security operations at special events of national significance ("National Special Security Event" NSSA). The president makes the final decision as to what is a NSSA. Events such as the G-8 meeting at Sea Island, Georgia, in 2004 have been so designated.

During election campaigns major presidential and vice presidential candidates and their spouses are given Secret Service protection within 120 days of the presidential general election. After presidential elections the Secret Service protects presidents-elect and vice-presidents elect. The families of these individuals are also assigned Secret Service agents for their protection.

Former presidents' spouses for their lifetimes, even after the death of the former president, are assigned Secret Service protection. However, if the spouse of a late president or vice president remarries then the protection is removed. The children of former presidents are also give protection until they reach age 16. In 1997 Congress

The Secret Service moves in after the assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan on March 30, 1981. The Secret Service is a security agency, under the Department of Homeland Security since 2003, that is responsible for the safety of the president, the vice president, and their families. (Ronald Reagan Library)

acted to limit the Secret Service protection given former presidents and vice presidents to 10 years after they left office.

Events can be designated National Special Security Events. If the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security gives an event this designation then it will be protected by Secret Service agents. The president of the United States may issue executive orders that designate individuals for Secret Service protection.

In 2002 Congress adopted Public Law 107-296, which established the Department of Homeland Security. The act transferred the U.S. Secret Service from the Department of the Treasury to the new Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003. Since joining the Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service has developed a Secret Service Strategic Plan for meeting future challenges.

The work of protection performed by the Secret Service is sensitive, so the agency does not discuss the ways and means of its duties. Operations to keep protectees safe include using advanced technology and other resources to develop a security plan. In the security plan will be assessments of the role and vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures as well as other elements.

The Secret Service conducts protective visits in advance of the arrival of protectees. The protective visits conduct site surveys, assessments of local manpower, equipment, hospitals, evacuation routes, fire, rescue, and other available public service personnel. These are also alerted as to their likely role during a visit. A command post is set up which acts as the communications center for protective activities. It coordinates the

network of support for the members of the detail working close to the protectee. After a protective visit, an after-action report is developed in which agents analyze every step of the protective operation. A record is made of any unusual incidents and then suggestions are made for improvements for the future.

For the Secret Service protective research is the key to effective security operations. Agents and specialists conduct protective research in order to evaluate information received from law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other sources. The intelligence is about individuals or groups that pose a threat to protectees. Any communications received at the White House, whether letters, e-mails, or public comments that can be understood as a physical threat to protectees, is evaluated. The work of coordination protection information is conducted around the clock every day.

In 1998 the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) was created as an institution that could provide the intelligence to assess threats. The NTAC's research into attacks on public officials, public figures, and in the public school has provided information that is specific and is the foundation for clear knowledge of the person or persons who are most likely to become a threat. Its research is currently being extended to other areas of law enforcement such as stalking.

Among the NTAC's research projects has been the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP). Findings have been that assassins are rarely mentally ill; instead they have a range of motives on a variety of issues. Therefore no assassin "profile" exists. Instead what we have is a common is a set of attack behaviors. These include the ability to act in a dangerous manner such as getting weapons, scouting several targets before action, expressing threats, or other behaviors.

Based upon its findings, the Secret Service now seeks to manage subjects who may pose a threat. And it is engaged in ongoing protection research.

See also: Baker, Lafayette; Sanford, Henry; Wood, William P.

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Andrew J. Waskey

SECRET SERVICE FUND

The Secret Service Fund, also known as the Contingency Fund of Foreign Intercourse, helped to establish the idea of the president's prerogative in foreign relations. Despite congressional debate over the fund as a resource for intelligence activities, Congress allowed the president to withhold information regarding Secret Service expenditures. And presidents would use the Secret Service Fund for covert operations, including peacetime efforts to foment violent revolutions against foreign countries.

Remembering the importance of secret agents for the American cause in the Revolutionary War, George Washington in his first annual message as president requested a discretionary fund that would give the chief executive the financial resources for covert operations. Washington, like other leaders of the founding generation, believed secret agents were crucial for achieving some foreign-policy objectives. Indeed, secret agents could be employed in a wide range of overseas missions, including intelligence gathering and other clandestine operations.

Enacted as law on July 1, 1790, the Secret Service Fund by its third year of existence had grown to $1 million, which was 12 percent of the federal budget. And the act that created the fund did not require the president to state how the money was spent. President Washington soon used executive agents in a variety of missions, including a secret effort to ransom American hostages being held by the Barbary states of North Africa, as well as to play off Great Britain and Spain against each other to gain the use of the Mississippi River from Spain and to obtain a more extensive trade treaty with Britain.

From the end of the Washington administration to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, the Secret Service Fund continued to be a vehicle for covert operations in war and peace. Later examples of presidential use of the fund included James Madison's effort to overthrow Spanish authority in East and West Florida, Andrew Jackson's effort to acquire Texas and to negotiate commercial treaties with Asian countries, and Benjamin Harrison's support for the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy.

See also: Jackson, Andrew

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SEDITION ACT, 1918

The Sedition Act of 1918 adopted by Congress on May 16, 1918, was an extension of the Espionage Act of 1917. The Espionage Act adopted shortly after the American entry into the war was the result of public outcry over the Black Tom explosion on July 29, 1916. German espionage agents sabotaged a huge ammunition depot on a spit of land jutting from New Jersey into New York Harbor. The explosion killed two night

watchmen and dramatically destroyed huge quantities of war material destined for the Allies fighting in Europe.

The United States was at the time neutral; however, the German spies had used anti-British Irish immigrants in order to gather information on the facility. That immigrant Americans had been recruited by foreign agents had kindled political suspicions of foreigners and set off an obsession with the "enemy within." The Espionage Act was the first attempt aimed at protecting Americans from foreign spies. It made it a crime to interfere with the operation of the armed forces of the United States. The act also created some new internal security machinery, including a Justice Department agency called the Bureau of Investigation.

The Sedition Act of 1918 extended the Espionage Act to make it a crime to speak out against the government. President Woodrow Wilson had sought the act because he feared widespread dissent which would be a hindrance to American victory.

The law sought to restrict the freedom of speech of Americans in wartime by preventing subversive activities. Wilson was concerned about the effects that "subversive activity" might have. The Easter Rising in Ireland (1916) and Russian Revolution (1917) were products of subversive activities from the government's point of view.

The Sedition Act forbade during time of war interfering with the war effort by disrupting operations of the armed forces. It outlawed acting in concert with others and joining groups to teach or plan to disrupt the government's conduct of the war. In addition it forbade sending subversive literature through the mails. It gave the postmaster general the duty to refuse to deliver subversive literature.

The goal of the act was to prevent agitators who were concealed agents of foreign powers or merely agents of an ideology that was hostile to the war effort from acting. Most of those prosecuted under the Espionage and Sedition Acts were socialists such as Eugene Debs, pacifists, or others who were opposed to the war. Some were given lengthy jail sentences. The Supreme Court upheld the act in *Schenck vs. United States* (1919). However, both laws were repealed in 1921 and most of those convicted were pardoned. Portions of the Espionage Act are now spread across the federal code in a variety of places.

See also: Espionage Act, 1917

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI)

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (usually abbreviated SSCI) was established in 1976 after the investigations of the Church Committee indicated that Congress had not effectively overseen the work of U.S. intelligence agencies that had been involved in abuses in regard to domestic surveillance and covert actions overseas.

As a select committee, SSCI consists of members named by the Senate majority and minority leaders; prior to 2004 members were limited to eight years on SSCI but, responding to recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the Senate removed the limitation.

A principal responsibility of SSCI is preparation of intelligence authorization bills that are subsequently voted on by the entire Senate. These bills authorize the activities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the major national intelligence agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), etc.

SSCI is also responsible for the oversight of intelligence activities conducted by national intelligence agencies such as the CIA, DIA, and NSA. Unlike the situation in the House of Representatives, however, the tactical intelligence activities of the military services are overseen not by the intelligence committee but by the armed services committee (although there is informal coordination). Oversight involves hearings, investigations, and the publication of reports to assess whether the executive branch is faithfully executing the relevant statutes. Oversight may lead the Senate to amend existing laws and to encourage or pressure the administration to modify its policies. SSCI's publications are posted on its Web site: http://intelligence .senate.gov/.

The Senate is responsible under the Constitution for receiving nominations to key positions and for providing its advice and consent before the nominees can take office. For senior intelligence positions, including that of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the names of nominees are forwarded to SSCI for consideration which often takes the form of public hearings. Subsequently, SSCI will send the nomination to the entire Senate for its consideration.

See also: Church Committee; House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI); Pike Committee

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SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

The U.S. Intelligence Community's failure to provide advance warning of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, was quickly characterized as a major intelligence failure. That conclusion, however, was modified by subsequent research and analysis. There was no doubt a failure to provide tactical warning that would have led to the arrest of the hijackers prior to their boarding the

ill-fated aircraft, but in retrospect it was concluded that the failure resulted in large measure from the inability of government analysts to have perceived the linkages between international terrorist groups and a few obscure foreign young men traveling and taking classes in the United States.

Intelligence agencies were well aware of the goals of the al-Qaeda terrorist group; the role of its leader, Osama bin Laden; and its previous successes in attacking U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the USS *Cole* in October 2000. In mid-summer of 2001 analysts warned of the likelihood of an imminent attack (although an overseas location was deemed most likely); as then-Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet has said, the "system was blinking red." Government analysts had not, however, combined their understanding of the threat from al-Qaeda with the scraps of available information about the 19 individuals who had traveled to the United States beginning in early 2000. They did not "connect the dots."

Why this was the case has been analyzed at great length by the two congressional intelligence committees, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), and the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the WMD Commission). In general, assessments focus on the existence of separate worlds of intelligence and law enforcement that did not cooperate effectively. Analysts in the respective communities were unable, because of legal restrictions, regulations, and customary bureaucratic practice, to share information on potential terrorist attacks in the United States. Intelligence agencies focused their attentions overseas. Law enforcement agencies were responsible for monitoring suspicious behavior in the United States. The morass of statutes and regulations that governed any exchanges of information had effectively resulted in a wall between the two sets of agencies. In practice, all agencies were required by law and regulation to avoid collecting information on U.S. persons unless there was probable cause that they had committed a crime or were about to. This limited their ability to monitor the men who would commit the terrorist attacks of September 2001. It has to be recognized, however, that even had there had been far more information and had it been better shared, a discernable pattern may not have emerged. Suicidal terrorists are difficult to stop under any circumstances.

A number of other factors contributed to the inability to prevent the 9/11 attacks. U.S. intelligence agencies had failed to place agents in terrorist groups—a daunting challenge but one that may not have received adequate attention before 9/11. There were also too few linguists to translate the masses of information that had been collected.

The main response by the U.S. government to 9/11 was to tear down the walls that had prevented sharing law enforcement and intelligence information. The USA Patriot Act was quickly enacted in October 2001, followed by the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which was the most far-reaching reorganization of the intelligence community since the National Security Act of 1947.

After 9/11, U.S. executive branch agencies devoted considerable effort to ensuring that information is exchanged and analyzed with the National Counterterrorism Center becoming the focus of the effort. Further attacks on the 9/11 scale have not

reoccurred but to what extent this success results from changed analytical and collection practices cannot be determined. There are, moreover, persisting concerns that collecting more information in the United States and combining it with intelligence from abroad may ultimately threaten civil liberties by exposing innocent individuals to pervasive government scrutiny.

See also: Director of National Intelligence; Homeland Security, Department of; Intelligence Community; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (The 9/11 Commission); National Security Act; USA Patriot Act

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SESSIONS, WILLIAM STEELE
(MAY 27, 1930–)

William Steele Sessions, a famous attorney and former director of the FBI, was born in Fort Smith, Arkansas, on May 27, 1930. He attended Northeast High School in Kansas City, Missouri, from which he graduated in 1948.

Upon graduation, he signed up for the U.S. Air Force and received a commission in October 1952. On active duty until three years later, Sessions found time to pursue his studies as well and he was able to complete his undergraduate degree from Baylor University in 1956. A student of law, he went on to receive his LLB in 1958.

Following the completion of his studies, Sessions began his legal career as an attorney for a firm located in Waco, Texas. He remained there from 1958 until 1969 and quickly became a partner. During his time there, he had accrued some fame and was appointed to chief of the Government Operation Section of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in 1969. Sessions only stayed in Washington, DC, for roughly two years before becoming a U.S. attorney, assigned back to the western district of Texas in 1971. He was appointed to be U.S. district judge for the same district in 1974, going on to become the chief judge in 1980. Meanwhile, he participated on the Board of the Federal Judicial Center in Washington.

Sessions had a good reputation throughout the legal field and the federal government. In 1987, he was selected by President Ronald Reagan to lead the FBI.

He was sworn into power on November 2, 1987, succeeding William H. Webster. Sessions was known for his work to improve diversity at the FBI. His time as director, however, was riddled by two major FBI standoffs at Ruby Ridge, Montana, and at the Branch Dividian compound in Waco, Texas. During the Ruby Ridge standoff, an FBI sniper killed an unarmed woman at the scene in 1992. Later, the storming of the Branch Davidian compound on February 28, 1993, was decried by many as unnecessarily confrontational and violent. Meanwhile, numerous issues arose within the FBI's crime laboratory.

Following Bill Clinton's inauguration as president, Sessions was fired on July 19, 1993, amid a controversy about using federal money for his trips and improvements to his home. He was succeeded by Louis Freeh. Sessions returned to Texas and remained active in politics there, participating in a lobby to reduce gun crime. He remains a member of the U.S. Bar Association and still denies any misuse of federal money or fraud while FBI director.

See also: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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SHAABAN, SHAABAN HAFIZ AHMAD ALI

Shaaban Hafiz Ahmad Ali Shaaban is believed be a Palestinian who was born in Jordan and who once lived in Russia where he may have received intelligence training from the KGB. Shaaban is one of at least one dozen identities adopted by Shaaban, including Shaaban Hafed and Joe H. Brown. He possessed five passports and several Social Security numbers. He came to the United States around 1993 and later obtained U.S. citizenship.

Beginning in 2002 and continuing into 2003, Shaaban acted as an agent for the Iraqi government. In that capacity he agreed to travel to Baghdad in late 2002 to sell the names of U.S. intelligence agents and operatives to Iraq for $3 million. He also sought to gain Iraqi support for a pro-Iraq television station in the United States, tried to get Iraq to sign an agreement whereby he would provide volunteers to act as human shields to protect the Iraqi infrastructure during war, and broadcasted messages supporting the Iraqi government on Iraqi media calling upon listeners to forcibly resist the United States and those who opposed Iraq.

U.S. law requires that anyone who agrees to act as an agent of a foreign government must register with the attorney general. Shaaban never registered. His travel to Iraq was in violation of the International Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) that banned

any type of travel and any transactions with Iraq that were not approved by the attorney general. These restrictions were put in place by President George H. W. Bush after Iraq invaded Kuwait and remained at least partially in place until President George W. Bush rescinded them in July 2004.

Shaaban was arrested in March 2005. He went on trial in January 2006 and was acting as a foreign agent without notification, violation of the Iraqi Sanctions under the IEEPA, and unlawful procurement of naturalization. The jury did not convict him of the charge of offering to sell secrets to Iraq. He was sentenced to 160 months. Shabaan is serving his prison time in a super-maximum security prison in Florence, Colorado. Commentators note that this location is typically reserved for more severe cases of espionage such as that by Robert Hanssen, who is also serving his time there.

Shabaan acted as his own counsel during the trial. He argued that the government was confusing him with a twin brother. Both were CIA agents and the brother was now dead. Another brother testified that Shabaan did not have a twin. Shabaan did not call anyone from the CIA to testify in his defense.

See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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SHACKLEY, THEODORE G., JR.
(JULY 16, 1927–DECEMBER 9, 2002)

Theodore G. Shackley, Jr., was a longtime Central Intelligence Agency covert action specialist who rose to the position of associate deputy director for operations in 1976 under Director of Central intelligence (DCI) George H. W. Bush. This position put him in charge of CIA covert operations. Shackely reportedly had aspirations to become DCI but failed to obtain this position due to opposition from Carter administration officials.

Ted Shackley joined the CIA in the early 1950s after having served in Army Counter Intelligence. His first major posting was as station chief in Miami where he headed up the CIA's post–Bay of Pigs covert action campaign against Fidel Castro. JMWAVE, as the operation was known, included some 2,000 Cuban agents and 200 CIA officers. From Miami, Shackley went to Southeast Asia. He became station chief in Laos in 1966 where he directed the Hmong against the Viet Cong. In 1968 he was transferred to Vietnam where he played a central role in the controversial Phoenix Program that was designed to neutralize the Viet Cong but instead engaged in widespread indiscriminate violence that neutralized its effectiveness. From Vietnam, Shackley became head of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division where he participated in the CIA plan to remove Salvadore Allende from power in Chile. This posting also put him in direct conflict with Philip Agee, a CIA officer who was writing a highly critical account of the agency.

Shackley left the agency under a cloud of controversy stemming from his association with Edwin Wilson, a CIA agent, who was involved in an arms sales project with Libya. In 1984 DCI William Casey sought out his help in obtaining the freedom of William Buckley, a CIA diplomat and CIA station chief, who was being held hostage in Beirut by Hezbollah guerrillas. Efforts to free Buckley ultimately led to the Iran-Contra crisis. Central to the plans formulated by Oliver North and others was the use of dummy companies and foreign bank accounts to hide money obtained from arms sales to Iran that would be sent to support the Contras in Nicaragua. From his days in Laos, Shackley was well connected with such companies. His involvement came to light when in October 1986 a cargo plane flying supplies to the Contras was shot down. Information from the pilot who had worked for Air America, a CIA front company, pointed to the involvement of the CIA and led investigators to longtime associates of Shackley whom he had recruited to help him in the weapons-for-hostages project.

See also: Casey, William; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Iran-Contra Affair; JMWAVE

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SHALER, WILLIAM
(1778–MARCH 29, 1833)

William Shaler was an American diplomat and agent who served in various posts throughout Latin America and supervised an invasion of Spanish Texas by Mexican revolutionaries.

Shaler, orphaned at 13, became a ship's captain and traded throughout Latin America. A friend of Madison's Secretary of State Robert Smith, Shaler was appointed as an agent to observe and report on the Mexican port of Veracruz. He arrived in Havana in 1810 and was denied permission to go on to Mexico. While in Cuba, Shaler colluded with Cuban rebels and was arrested by the Spanish authorities. In December of 1811, Shaler returned to New Orleans. There, he met José Gutiérrez, a former blacksmith who held a commission in the revolutionary army of Hidalgo. Gutiérrez was determined to eject the Spanish from the Americas, and gained the ear of the U.S. government. Madison's administration sent Gutiérrez to the border, and allowed him to gather an army. At the same time, it officially denied any support for the filibuster and attached Shaler to Gutiérrez's expedition as a minder.

In August of 1812, the Gutiérrez expedition—composed largely of American frontiersmen—crossed into Spanish Texas. The invasion stalled at La Bahia, where Gutiérrez's advance force was besieged for four months. On March 2, 1813, Gutiérrez's commander Samuel Kemper (a veteran of anti-Spanish intrigues in West Florida) decisively defeated the Spanish outside San Antonio. On April 6, Gutiérrez declared Texas

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independent. His administration was incompetent and brutal, and by the end of the summer, he had lost his army and his brief independence. Shaler, who never crossed the border, was ordered to abandon the expedition by President Madison.

After the expedition, Shaler was sent to Europe to represent the United States in conferences following the Napoleonic Wars. He then spent 12 years as U.S. consul at Algiers before returning to Havana, where he died of cholera in 1833.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage

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SHAMROCK, PROJECT

Project SHAMROCK was a domestic intelligence-gathering operation in the United States that ran secretly from 1945 to 1975. At its height, some 150,000 messages per month were being analyzed by the National Security Agency (NSA). Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence when Project SHAMROCK was terminated, characterized it as perhaps the largest government interception program ever targeted against Americans.

Project SHAMROCK was set up by the Armed Forces Security Agency, the predecessor of the NSA. It collected and analyzed all telegraphic data entering into or leaving the United States. Access to this information required the participation and acquiescence of the major international cable companies: RCA Global, ITT, and Western Union. Reportedly they pressed officials in Washington for assurances that they would not be subject to criminal prosecution and lawsuits. In receipt of such assurances these companies cooperated and apparently never inquired about what was done with the information they provided.

The initial focus of Project SHAMROCK was limited to a small NSA watch list. At first this information was passed along in the form of microfilm copies of all transmissions passing through their offices. Technological developments such as magnetic tapes and then computer keyword scanning programs gradually made it possible to gather more and more information on more and more people. NSA's watch list, now known as Project MINARET, grew accordingly. Project SHAMROCK grew to such proportions that in 1966 a front company (identified in documents by the code name "LPMEDLEY") was set up in New York near the offices of the three cable companies to facilitate the analysis of intercepted material.

A confluence of factors came together in the early 1970s that led to the termination of Project SHAMROCK. In 1972 the Supreme Court ruled in the *Keith* case (*U.S. vs. U.S. District Court*) that a warrant was necessary to place wiretaps on Americans who

did not have a significant connection to a foreign power. The *Keith* decision did not in and of itself put an end to the existence of NSA watch lists or intercepts. Federal Bureau of Intelligence Director Clarence Kelly, for example, argued that *Keith* did not apply to NSA electronic surveillance. Political impetus for ending Project SHAMROCK came from the joining of *Keith* with the beginning of the Watergate saga and the appointment of General Lew Allen, Jr., to the position of NSA director. With the NSA now coming under increasing public scrutiny by Congress for its involvement in domestic intelligence gathering activities, Allen suspended Project SHAMROCK in May 1975 in an effort to protect the agency from even greater damage. The official rationale given was that it was no longer an effective intelligence-gathering program. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger formally ordered it terminated on May 15, 1975.

One of the major consequences of the congressional investigation into Project SHAMROCK was the passage of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. This secret court was created to hear requests from the U.S. government to put in place electronic surveillance devices on American citizens.

See also: Church Committee; MINARET, Project; National Security Agency

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Glenn P. Hastedt

SHEINWOLD, ALFRED
(JANUARY 26, 1912–MARCH 8, 1997)

Alfred Sheinwold was a bridge expert and newspaper columnist who worked for the OSS during World War II, using his talents in mathematics as the chief coder and cipher expert. Born in England, Sheinwold moved with his family to Brooklyn, New York, at the age of nine. He graduated from City College in 1933, and then worked as a writer for Ely Culbertson, a leading authority on bridge, being editor of the magazine *The Bridge World* from 1934 until 1963, often writing under the pseudonym Saxon Fairwood. This name was derived from "Saxon" for the Anglo-Saxon King Alfred, and "Fair Wood" as a translation from the German "Schein Wald."

During World War II, Sheinwold was used to crack codes for the OSS, with his knowledge of applied mathematics being particularly useful, as well as his ability to speak several languages. His tasks involved working through garbled messages, and also ensure that the OSS codes could not be compromised. After the war Sheinwold helped develop, with Edgar Kaplan, the Kaplan-Sheinwold bidding system used in Bridge, and was on the U.S. Bridge Team as captain of the team in the controversial match in Bermuda in 1975 when two Italian players were accused of using illegal

signals. Sheinwold wanted to withdraw from the game, but was overruled by other officials. He wrote 13 books on bridge, with his *Five Weeks to Winning Bridge* selling millions of copies. Sheinwold, who lived in Los Angeles, was also an authority on backgammon.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II; Office of Strategic Services

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Justin Corfield

SHEVCHENKO, ARKADY (1930–1998)

In 1978 Arkady Shevchenko became the highest-ranking Soviet diplomat to defect to the West. Born in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on October 11, 1930, Shevchenko joined the Soviet foreign service in 1956. Two years later he was temporarily posted to New York City as part of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations (UN). He returned to the United Nations on a permanent posting in 1963, where he remained until 1970. At that time he was made an advisor to Andrei Gromyko. Shevchenko returned to the UN again in 1973 when he became under secretary general, the second highest position at the UN.

Shevchenko claims to have become disillusioned with the Soviet system in the early years of détente. In 1975 he approached the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) about defecting but was convinced to become an agent in place supplying the CIA with information about Soviet political and strategic thinking as well as the identities of many agents. In March 1978 he was recalled to Moscow for consultations. By now Shevchenko was aware that Soviet authorities suspected him of being a spy and he feared the consequences of returning to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, he contacted the CIA and demanded asylum. One of those who formally debriefed him for the CIA was Aldrich Ames, who was himself a Soviet spy.

His wife chose not to defect with him and returned to Moscow. Two months later she died apparently by committing suicide. Shevchenko remained in the United States for the rest of his life and became an American citizen. His later life was punctuated by problems with alcoholism and charges that the CIA provided him with prostitutes.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

SHU, QUANG-SHENG

Dr. Quang-Sheng Shu pled guilty on November 17, 2008, to charges that in December 2003 he violated the U.S. Arms Export Control Act by providing the People's Republic of China (PRC) with a document on the construction of a cryogenic fueling system for space launch vehicles without first obtaining an export license or written approval from the State Department. He also was charged with offering bribes to Chinese government officials in hopes of obtaining contracts from the PRC for his firm and an allied French company. These actions, U.S. authorities argued, put U.S. national security at risk.

Shu, 68, was sentenced to more than four years in federal prison in April 2009. He had faced the possibility of a 10-year prison term. In arguing for a reduced sentence, his defense attorney argued that most of the information Shu gave was publicly available. Also, most of his attempted bribes were unsuccessful.

Shu holds a PhD in physics. Born in China, he came to the United States in 1990 and is a naturalized U.S. citizen and at the time of his arrest was president and treasurer of AMAC International, located in Newport News, Virginia. Before this he worked for Northrup-Gruman in Seattle, Washington. AMAC did contract work for the Department of Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

This case is one of more than a dozen cases involving China that have been prosecuted by U.S. authorities over the past several years.

See also: China, Intelligence Operations of; Industrial Espionage; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Established in 1930, the Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) was an attempt to streamline and make more effective the U.S. Army's code-breaking capabilities. In the early stages of World War I, the United States was the target of intelligence operations of both Britain and Germany. Both warring nations wanted to know the position of the neutral nation. British code breakers had intercepted and deciphered the famous Zimmermann Telegram—Germany's offer of support and territorial spoils to Mexico if it declared war on the United States. American military leaders quickly realized the strategic and diplomatic value of cryptology.

When the United States entered the world war in 1917, its primary intelligence concerns were supporting possible combat operations in France. The United States began a "special relationship" with the British intelligence community and also created its own

U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) with a code and cipher unit. The unit was under the direction of Herbert Yardley. After the war, Yardley's interception and code-breaking efforts were maintained, and designated the Cipher Bureau. Better known as the "Black Chamber," it was funded by both the State and War Departments. Yardley's Black Chamber achieved success when it broke Japanese diplomatic codes during the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference (1921–1922). Yardley's unit managed to provide the U.S. delegation with exact details of Japan's naval limits negotiation position. The United States successfully kept Japanese naval expansion under control, thereby slowing down her imperialistic appetite. However, postwar isolationism saw support for the Black Chamber diminish. In 1929, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson ordered the program to be shut down.

In 1930, however, the U.S. Army enlarged and consolidated its efforts with the establishment of the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS). The division was started by William F. Friedman and three former mathematics teachers, Frank Rowlett, Abraham Sinkov, and Solomon Kullback. In the mid-1930s Friedman's division cracked Japanese diplomatic messages encrypted by the "Red Machine" (began operations in the early 1930s). In 1938, the Japanese foreign ministry, seeking to protect top-secret messages, introduced a more formidable and secure device, the "Purple Machine." In response, Friedman reorganized his small staff by adding more mathematicians, cryptanalysts, and linguists in order to construct his own Purple Machine. The result was MAGIC, the code word applied to the solution of Japanese diplomatic messages that were encrypted by the Purple Machine.

In early 1941, Friedman and SIS managed to re-create several duplicate copies of the machine that broke the Japanese code. By the end of the year eight machines were built—four stayed in Washington, DC, where the army and navy each used two, three were given to the British, and one was sent to intelligence headquarters of General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines.

MAGIC made available to American intelligence agencies a staggering amount of diplomatic communications between Tokyo and all of its consular and embassy representatives throughout the world. Although MAGIC played a far greater role in terms of gathering diplomatic information, it was central to U.S. victories at the battle of Midway and elsewhere in the Pacific. MAGIC also provided the United States with details respecting Hitler's planned invasion of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941 and, later, in May 1944, when Japanese ambassador to Germany, Hiroshi Oshima, informed Tokyo that Hitler was convinced that the main Allied invasion of France would take place near Calis rather than Normandy.

During the war, SIS was renamed the Signal Security Service in 1942. It also began intercepting Soviet messages from New York City. The project was given the code name "VENONA." By 1945 some 200,000 Soviet messages had been deciphered. On December 20, 1946, cryptanalyst Meredith Gardner revealed the existence of a Soviet espionage ring at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. On September 15, 1945, the U.S. Army Signal Security Agency was renamed the Army Security Agency. The 1947 National Security Act, passed by Congress in a growing fear of cold war tensions, created a civilian organization, the Central Intelligence Agency, to handle foreign intelligence. In 1952, the National Security Agency was created to oversee all matters related to gathering and interpreting intelligence information.

See also: Army Intelligence; Black Chamber; MAGIC; VENONA; Yardley, Herbert; Zimmermann Telegram

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Charles F. Howlett

SILICON VALLEY AS AN INTELLIGENCE TARGET

Located in the Santa Clara Valley in Northern California, Silicon Valley has been the center of semiconductor and computer technology since the early 1970s. The area was named for the silicon chips designed and manufactured there, but the area has been a military and technological hub since the 1930s. In 1933 the Naval Air Station Moffett Field opened to house the airship USS *Macon.* In 1939 the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), the precursor to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), was opened on Moffett Field. Renamed NASA Ames in 1958, it is a prime research facility for theoretical aeronautics, aircraft research, wind tunnel research, and simulation technology. Major technology firms, such as Lockheed, opened in the area to serve the U.S. Navy and later the U.S. Air Force.

In 1960 the Air Force Satellite Test Center opened in Sunnyvale, California. Located near Moffett Field and built on land purchased from Lockheed, the Test Center was the primary base of operations for the tracking and control of military intelligence satellites. Known locally as the "Blue Cube," the facility was part of a network of satellite tracking centers around the world. In 1987, concerns over the facility's vulnerability to foreign intelligence agencies and fears that Sunnyvale would be "Ground Zero" in a nuclear attack, the air force established a new satellite center in Colorado Springs, Colorado, called the Consolidated Space Operations Center. The Satellite Test Center (renamed Onizuka Air Force Base after the *Challenger* crash), remained open as a backup facility, but is slated for closure by 2011.

In Silicon Valley an added dimension to corporate espionage is the military's reliance on semiconductor chips. Since the early 1970s, corporate espionage, chip theft, and chip counterfeiting have directly impacted the U.S. government, military, and NASA. Counterfeit chips were discovered in the space shuttle and stolen chips made their way into the hands of Soviets and their allies.

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In the 1970s and 1980s James Durward Harper and Ruby Louise Schuler passed stolen classified documents to the KGB through Polish agents. Both Harper and Schuler had been employed by Silicon Valley companies working on national security projects. Between October 1979 and June 1980 Harper passed research and development designs to the Poles for the Minuteman Ballistic Missile Defense Project. The documents had been obtained by Schuler from Systems Control, Inc., in Palo Alto. Harper was sentenced to life in prison and Schuler died of cirrhosis of the liver in 1983.

In another case, Anatoli Maluta, a Russian-born naturalized U.S. citizen, who had served in the U.S. Air Force as a mechanic and intelligence linguist, was sentenced to five years in prison for his part in a the shipment of electronic components to the Soviet Union through a West German entrepreneur, Werner Bruchhausen. Although the U.S. government and semiconductor chip manufacturers strive to maintain strict security controls, the desire for acquisition of high technology and the financial and strategic rewards for that technology continues to make Silicon Valley the target of corporate and military espionage.

See also: Industrial Espionage; Post–Cold War Intelligence

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Katie Simonton

SKULL AND BONES SOCIETY

The Skull and Bones Society, a secret organization located at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, was created by William Huntington Russell in December 1830. The society is also known as Chapter 322 and the Brotherhood of Death. It is one of the most prestigious and powerful, yet secretive societies in the United States.

William Huntington Russell went to study in Germany from 1830 to 1831 where he came into contact with a multitude of powerful student societies. While there, he was initiated into one of these secret societies that he in turn brought back with him to the United States. The next year in 1832, he worked along with Alphonso Taft to create Skull and Bones at Yale University.

Since the first induction in 1832, 15 rising juniors a year are initiated by the outgoing seniors. Little is known about the initiation, but it has been claimed that every inductee receives $15,000 and a watch. Certainly, it is not like any other organization or fraternity. Members and alumni of Skull and Bones remain committed to the society well after their graduation, creating an extremely powerful network.

Officially, the society is known as the Russell Trust Association which owns the chapter house at 64 High Street at Yale University and a private retreat known as Deer Island located in the Saint Lawrence River. Many conspiracy theories and published research papers deal with the Skull and Bones Society. Nothing conclusive has been

established except for a somewhat overwhelming about of political power its members have come to possess. Claims have been that there are real skeletons in the chapter house, that members are forced to reveal information so they do not break with the group out of fear of blackmail, and that it is an active chapter of an international organization.

Nevertheless, Skull and Bones members are found throughout the U.S. political scene. Famous members include George W. Bush, John Kerry, William Taft, George H. W. Bush, Prescott Bush, and William F. Buckley, Jr.

See also: Buckley, William Frank, Jr.; Bush, George Herbert Walker

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Arthur Holst

SMEDLEY, AGNES
(FEBRUARY 23, 1892–MAY 6, 1950)

Agnes was a journalist and author, well known for her books and articles on China and on the Far East. Agnes Smedley was born February 23, 1892, in Campground, Sullivan County, Missouri, and was largely self-educated. After an early marriage that ended in divorce and various menial jobs, she moved to New York City, probably the winter between 1916 and 1917, where she was accused of "aiding German espionage" from her involvement with an Indian revolutionary movement financed by the German government as a means of damaging Great Britain, then at war with Germany, by undermining British imperial rule in India. Smedley was arrested for violating U.S. neutrality laws but she was not brought to trial and was released. She went to Berlin in the 1920s where she became active in the Communist movement. She visited Moscow in 1921 to attend a meeting of Indian revolutionaries and then went to China in 1928, the year after she published her semi-autobiographical novel, *Daughter of Earth* (1927). Smedley began her journalist career as the correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, working out of Shanghai.

As a Communist sympathizer, Smedley's associations eventually got her involved in intelligence activity. It started when she befriended Richard Sorge, who worked for GRU, Soviet military intelligence; he used her apartment for clandestine radio transmissions and she introduced Sorge to her friend Ozaki Hozumi, who became his principal Japanese collaborator.

Hozumi was her first recruit for Sorge's spy ring but Sorge generally stayed in the background until Smedley identified a candidate for his espionage ring. Others in Smedley's Shanghai circle included Sonia, another top Soviet spy, and Roger Hollis, a future head of the British Security Service (MI-5). When Sorge moved from China to Japan in 1933, Smedley went to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. At the

same time, she wrote about her experiences in *Chinese Destinies*, published in 1933, followed a year later by *China's Red Army Marches*. In 1935, Smedley returned to China where she was a publicist and a field worker for the Chinese Red Cross Medical Corps and a special correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* while she continued to send intelligence material to Moscow and attempted to influence people with her idealistic and rather naive views of Communism. Two important admirers were Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr (Lord Inverchapel), British ambassador to China in the late 1930s and later British ambassador to the United States where his views seemingly confused the issue of American policy toward China after the war, and Joseph Stilwell, later the commanding officer of U.S. forces in Burma and China.

Two more books, *China Fights Back: An American Woman with the Eighth Route Army* (1938) and *Battle Hymn of China* (1943), which praised the Communist forces in China, were heavily compiled from information covertly supplied by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agents that gave Smedley's writing a certain notoriety since these contacts allowed her access to information and to incidents that she might otherwise might not have had. In 1941, she returned to the United States. In a November 1943 radio program, "Author Meets Critic," Smedley attacked the United States and Great Britain as largely responsible for the backward conditions in China. The Federal Bureau of Investigation began to investigate her activities as a suspected Communist and after the war, Major General Charles Willoughby, Douglas MacArthur's chief intelligence officer, exposed Smedley as a key member of the Communist conspiracy in the Far East in an official report completed in 1947 and released in Washington, DC, two years later. Smedley wrote to President Truman to ask him to force MacArthur to apologize to her or to waive the general's immunity so that he could be sued for libel. The Department of the Army issued a retraction: "The [intelligence] division has no proof to back up the spy charges. The report was based on information from the Japanese police and should have said so. While there may be evidence in existence to substantiate the allegations, it is not in our hands."

After this, Smedley chose not to appear at public events with some of her friends, fearing that they would suffer from guilt by association, but other people outright rejected her. Still, several journalists defended her and former Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes wrote: "No one who knows Miss Smedley would ever suspect that this courageous and intelligent American citizen has stooped to be so low as to be a spy for any country, even for her own to which she is deeply attached." However, documents found in Soviet archives after the fall of the Soviet Union found that she was, in fact, working for Communist International and for the Soviet intelligence service. Smedley died on May 6, 1950, in Oxford, England; her ashes were placed in Peking's National Memorial Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs.

See also: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); Sorge, Richard

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Martin J. Manning

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SMERSH

SMERSH was a Soviet military counterintelligence organization operating from 1943 to 1946. In 1943, Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin moved military counterintelligence operations from the Commissariat of Security to the Commissariat of Defense, creating the Chief Directorate Counterintelligence of the People's Commissariat of Defense. The new directorate was given the alias, SMERSH, an acronym for *Smert' Shpionam* or "Death to Spies." SMERSH ultimately would play a critical role in the Soviet success during World War II through monitoring loyalty in all ranks of the Red Army, performing counterintelligence operations against Nazi Germany, and eliminating partisan movements and consolidating Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe.

The precise date of and rationale for SMERSH's formation is unclear. What is clear, however, was the general inability of the Red Army's political officers to manage the continual wave of defection and desertion from 1941 through the winter of 1943. The severity and impact of desertion in the Red Army resulted in Stalin's July 1942 order of "Not One Step Backward," threatening the execution of those seen as cowards. Regardless, SMERSH's formation was the culmination of the growing importance of counterintelligence at every level of Soviet society in the early years of World War II.

Following the appointment of Viktor Abakumov (1894–1954) as head of SMERSH on April 19, 1943, counterintelligence officers were trained and placed throughout the rank and file of the Red Army. One immediate priority of SMERSH was to restore discipline and loyalty throughout the Soviet military. The primary tactic of infiltrating all aspects of the Red Army was recruiting agents to a tertiary level, resulting in as many as two million Soviet soldiers serving as informants. Military tribunals, with SMERSH cooperation, ordered the execution of more than 140,000 soldiers and sent hundreds of thousands more to punishment battalions. Further, SMERSH was responsible for the surveillance of captured senior officers during their detention.

In addition to controlling desertion and subversion within the ranks of the Red Army, SMERSH played a key role in counterintelligence operations. SMERSH activities resulted in the capture of thousands of German spies who provided accurate information on German intelligence priorities. More importantly, however, was the ability of SMERSH to recruit captured Germans to serve as double agents, providing positive information to the Soviets while disseminating false information to the German high command.

Although SMERSH played a critical role from 1943 to 1945 in the success of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, perhaps the longest-lasting impact of SMERSH's activities was in quashing partisan movements and consolidating local Communist Party rule in occupied territories. Following victory in Eastern Europe, SMERSH played an active role in the elimination of Nazi sympathizers throughout the region. Networks of agents were established in the Baltic republics, Ukraine, and Poland to

crack down on anti-Soviet partisan movements, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deportations. Finally, high-level SMERSH officials closely worked with Moscow imposed intelligence services in Eastern Europe, establishing an essential instrument in controlling the Soviet Union's new satellite states. After the conclusion of hostilities in 1946, SMERSH was reincorporated into the Commissariat of State Security.

See also: KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs)

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Jonathan H. L'Hommedieu

SMITH, GENERAL WALTER BEDELL (OCTOBER 5, 1895–AUGUST 9, 1961)

General Walter Bedell Smith was the fourth Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), serving from October 7, 1950, to February 9, 1953. Smith was born in Indianapolis and briefly attended Butler University. Prior to his appointment as DCI, Smith held a series of important military and diplomatic posts. During World War II he served as chief of staff of the Allied forces in North Africa and the Mediterranean and as chief of staff to General Dwight Eisenhower. After the war Smith was ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1949. Upon leaving the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Smith took the position of undersecretary of state.

Smith is considered to be among the most important and best DCIs. He is characterized as a bright, hard driving, and energetic administrator whose rank and stature demanded the respect of those in and out of the CIA. Smith is credited with vigorously weeding out unqualified individuals, recruiting highly qualified top-level administrators, and putting into place an organizational structure that remained largely unchanged for some two decades. Key organizational reforms affected both the analytic and operational sides of the CIA. On the analytic side, Smith broke up the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). Under his predecessor, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the CIA had come to focus heavily on current intelligence. It had not succeeded in producing coordinated national intelligence estimates but instead seemed to drift from task to task producing background papers, country studies, and surveys. In its place Smith set up the Office of National Estimates (ONE) to produce national intelligence estimates. He also renamed the ORE the Office of Research and Reports to carry out research projects. Its most important subunit was the Economic Research Area that focused on Soviet economic, military, and strategic issues.

Smith also engineered an important reorganization on the operational side of the CIA. The central issue here was resolving a growing tension between the Office of

Policy Coordination (OPC) and the Office of Special Operations (OSO). The Office of Special Projects, the immediate forerunner of the OPC, was set up through National Security Council (NSC) Directive 10/2. It sought to provide policy makers with a small, covert action capability that would undertake occasional projects. Formally lodged within the CIA, policy guidance for the OPC came from the State Department and the Defense Department. Once in place, however, the OPC quickly expanded the size and scope of its activities so that it was regularly engaged in operations on a global scale. Also existing within the CIA was the OSO. It had been created by DCI Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg to house the espionage and counterespionage units of the Office of Strategic Services. OPC and OSO operated independently out of American embassies and engaged in competition for foreign agents. They also were in conflict over the true purpose of clandestine activity: gathering intelligence or conducting operations. Smith moved slowly to bring order to their competition. First, they were both placed under the direction of Allen Dulles, who was appointed deputy director for plans in January 1951. The next year, in August, they were formally unified as the Directorate of Plans.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Office of National Estimates; Office of Policy Coordination; Office of Special Operations

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Glenn P. Hastedt

SNEPP, FRANK W.
(MAY 3, 1943–)

Frank Snepp is a journalist and former chief analyst of North Vietnamese strategy for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Saigon during the Vietnam War.

Recruited by the CIA out of Columbia University's School of International Affairs in 1968, Snepp worked on NATO and European security matters for the Agency until he was handpicked for duty at the CIA's station in Saigon in 1969. Doubling as an analyst and counterintelligence officer, his duties included preparation of strategic estimates of NVA forces, coordination of agent networks, and interrogation of captured NVA and Viet Cong. In April 1975, he was one of the last CIA officers to be evacuated by helicopter off the Embassy roof as the Communist forces closed on Saigon.

Upon his return to the United States, Snepp was awarded the Intelligence Medal for Merit for his service in Vietnam, but he was upset at the CIA's unwillingness to rescue Vietnamese left behind when the Americans pulled out. He became further disillusioned with the Agency's refusal to acknowledge the mistakes it had made in Vietnam.

Unable to prompt any internal after-action review, Snepp resigned in 1976 to write *Decent Interval*, his memoir that describes his perception of the shortcomings of the CIA's performance in Vietnam, particularly during the fall of Saigon in 1975. The CIA sued because Snepp had not received prior permission to publish from the CIA Publications Review Board. In a landmark First Amendment decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that because Snepp had failed to seek official clearance for his memoirs, he created the "appearance" of a breakdown of discipline within the CIA and had "irreparably harmed" national security. Snepp, who had enlisted the aid of the American Civil Liberties Union is his defense, was placed under a lifetime gag order preventing him forever writing again without CIA permission, and forced him to surrender all profits from the book.

In 2001, Snepp published another book that chronicled his battle with the CIA and the Supreme Court over free speech and the publication of his earlier memoir.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Vietnam War and Intelligence Operations

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James H. Willbanks

SOBELL, MORTON
(APRIL 11, 1917–JUNE 19, 1953)

Morton Sobell was arrested for espionage in 1950 and tried along with Julius and Ethel Rosenberg as part of the Atomic Spy Ring, although later evidence indicates that he was not part of this conspiracy. All three pled innocent to charges of espionage. Along with the Rosenbergs, he was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union in 1951. Unlike the Rosenbergs, who were sentenced to death and executed on June 19, 1953, Sobell was sentenced to 30 years in prison. He was paroled in 1969.

Sobell was born on April 11, 1917, in New York City to Russian-born parents who had immigrated to the United States. Sobell graduated from college with a degree in electrical engineering in 1938 and went to work for the Bureau of Naval Ordnance the following year. He resigned in 1940 in order to obtain a masters degree in electrical engineering from Michigan State. From there his career took him into the private sector with electric companies in New York. These positions gave him access to classified information.

In his youth Sobell was friends with Julius Rosenberg and Max Elitcher and was believed to have been active in the American Communist Party. He worked summers from 1934 to 1938 at Camp Unity, which was suspected of being under the control of Communists. Sobell and Elichter roomed together in Washington, DC, in 1939 when Elichter claims that Sobell recruited him to join the Communist Party.

Along with his family, Sobell fled hurriedly to Mexico on June 22, 1950, telling his employer he needed a break from work. Mexico City had become a popular destination

for those suspected of being a Communist or fearful of being called to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee. From Mexico Sobell tried unsuccessfully to flee to Europe. Mexican authorities seized him and forcibly returned him to the United States on August 18, 1950.

Sobell did not testify at his trial. Instead, he invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. Sobell asserted that he was innocent, claiming that he fled to Mexico because he had lied about his membership in the Communist Party. No evidence of his involvement in developing the atomic bomb was presented at his trial and at first Sobell was not even charged with a particular crime. The prosecution built its case around the testimony of Elichter that Sobell had obtained secret information while working for General Electric. Sobell appealed his conviction on the grounds that Elichter had provided hearsay evidence and that he had been kidnapped. The appeal was rejected.

See also: Atomic Spy Ring; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel

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Glenn P. Hastedt

SONS OF LIBERTY (AMERICAN REVOLUTION)

The Sons of Liberty were a radical vanguard of American colonists opposed to Britain in the decade from 1765 to 1775, many of whom were espionage agents in the War of American Independence. The first stirrings of the Sons of Liberty came in 1765. At that time, societies were organized to oppose the Stamp Act, which was designed to levy direct taxes upon American colonists. The name Sons of Liberty came from a comment by Colonel Issac Barré, a radical English politician of the 1760s, in a speech in the House of Commons during debates on the Stamp duties. Charles Townshend, Chancellor of the Exchequer, had spoken in favor of the tax, and Barré had risen to declare (in a flight of fervid oratory) that the Americans, hardy sons of liberty, would find it an intolerable violation of their rights as Englishmen.

At first the Sons of Liberty were an unfocused, unorganized group of individuals. Gradually they came together in defiance of the British claim to the right to levy whatever taxes on Americans that were deemed appropriate, without the colonists having any say in the matter. Among the rank and file, the Sons of Liberty were mostly mechanics, artisans, and shopkeepers of the middling and lower sorts, who adopted symbols such as the Liberty Tree in Boston, where meetings were held, and medallions that they wore around their necks. They also adopted headwear such as liberty caps or hats with the number 45 attached, to show their support for John Wilkes, who had criticized King George III in *The North Briton*, Number 45, in April 1763. In Boston, they were organized and led by the Loyal Nine, who came from the upper ranks of society, men like Samuel Adams and John Hancock. In New York they were likewise led mostly by the upper sort.

The Sons of Liberty used various means to protest against British taxes and persuade the American people to join them. Often they resorted to propaganda. They made

great displays of rituals, menacing or otherwise, such as burning public figures in effigy, threatening the use of tar and feathers, raucous parades, or public meetings. They also used violence, destroying the property of offending public officials. Not a few patriotic Americans were disgusted by these excesses, but they also felt that British officials had brought these humiliations upon themselves.

The Sons of Liberty remained a vanguard of revolution until 1775. Afterward, many of them joined in the fighting, or in political groups such as the committees of correspondence and safety. Some, such as Paul Revere, became active espionage agents for the patriot cause, contributing their part to the ultimate independence of the United States.

See also: American Revolution; Revere, Paul

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Paul David Nelson

SONS OF LIBERTY (CIVIL WAR)

During the Civil War, a Copperhead secret society known as the Knights of the Golden Circle was reorganized as the Order of the Sons of Liberty, which attacked President Abraham Lincoln's conduct of the war and sought reunion through peaceful means. In February 1864, the organization elected Clement L. Vallandigham, who was a former Ohio congressman, as its supreme commander. Attending various Democratic conventions throughout the North, Vallandigham attempted to rekindle peace negotiations between the Union and Confederacy by denouncing the Civil War as an unnecessary conflict and called for an immediate end of hostilities. Republicans dismissed his actions and noted that the Sons of Liberty represented a pro-Confederate conspiracy.

In 1864, Union detectives uncovered a plot in which members of the Sons of Liberty residing in the Midwest were planning an insurrection designed to detach their states from the Union. Once free, the states would negotiate a separate peace with the Confederacy. The Lincoln administration regarded this plot as the Northwest Conspiracy.

The Sons of Liberty collaborated with Canadian-based Confederate agents led by Thomas H. Hines, who engaged in sabotage operations against the North. They attempted to capture the USS *Michigan*, a gunboat operating on Lake Erie, and liberate Confederate prisoners housed at Camp Douglas in Chicago and Johnson's Island near Sandusky, Ohio. However, War Department detectives were able to infiltrate the organization's security. The operatives arrested the northern sympathizers, warned officers aboard the *Michigan* about the scheme, and increased the number of Union soldiers stationed at the prisoners of war camps.

Although the initial activities of the Sons of Liberty ended in disaster, federal officials warned Northern governors to remain cautious of other potential plots. Believing that

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the Sons of Liberty was a powerful organization armed to commit treasonable actions, Union authorities sent out additional agents to uncover the various plots linked with the group.

In July 1864, members of the secret society planned uprisings in Chicago and New York. Prior to the scheduled rebellions, Confederate soldiers arrived in the cities to assist the Sons of Liberty. Both insurrections proved unsuccessful because federal authorities and military leaders arrested thousands of conspirators and captured a cache of arms. By the end of 1864, the Sons of Liberty's activities in the Midwest collapsed because some members believed that they could overthrow the Lincoln administration through political measures instead of insurrection.

See also: Civil War Intelligence; Northwest Conspiracy

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Kevin M. Brady

SORGE, RICHARD
(OCTOBER 4, 1895–NOVEMBER 7, 1944)

Richard Sorge was probably the most successful Soviet spy in history. Sorge was born in 1895 in the Russian Caucasus region where his father was working as an oil engineer. Among the first books he read in his youth was a copy of *Das Kapital*, which had been given to him by his paternal grandfather who for a time had served as a private secretary to Karl Marx.

A German citizen, Sorge served in the German army in World War I where he was twice wounded. By 1920 he was a committed Communist and an early member of the German Communist Party and a spy for the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKVD). Threatened with arrest by the German police, he fled to Moscow where he was schooled in spy craft and then was sent back to Germany to settle in Frankfurt where he was to develop a spy ring. In 1925 he went to Moscow and was given membership in the Party by Party leaders.

In 1930 Sorge was transferred to the Foreign Military Directorate (GRU) and was sent to Shanghai. His assignment was to develop a spy ring that provided intelligence on the Chinese Nationalists.

In November of 1930 he met Agnes Smedley and Hotsumi Ozaki. From Ozaki's contacts he was able to gather accurate intelligence on China. However, with the Japanese invasion of China he was recalled to Moscow and given the assignment of developing intelligence on Japan and its intentions of war against the Soviet Union.

Sorge then was given the code name "Ramsey." He returned to Germany where he pretended to undergo a conversion to Nazism. Posted to Tokyo as a journalist, he

developed a spy ring that delivered accurate intelligence to Moscow. He became a close friend of many in the German embassy. He delivered to Stalin the details of Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, but Stalin considered the intelligence to be a British disinformation operation.

In October of 1941 Sorge's end began when his spy ring in Tokyo was captured. He was hanged November 7, 1944, at Sugamo Prison. In 1964 he was declared a Hero of the Soviet Union.

See also: GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate); Smedley, Agnes

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Andrew J. Waskey

SOUERS, REAR ADMIRAL SIDNEY WILLIAM (MARCH 30, 1882–JANUARY 14, 1973)

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers served as the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). He was born in Dayton, Ohio, and graduated from Miami University (Ohio) in 1914. During World War II, Souers rose to the rank of rear admiral and the position of deputy chief of naval intelligence. In June 1945 Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal tasked Ferdinand Eberstadt, a personal friend and investment banker, with the job of examining the question of military unification. Eberstadt's report went beyond the question of unifying the War and Navy Departments and examined a wide range of national security issues. One of its recommendations was the creation of a National Security Council. The section on intelligence, authored by Souers, called for the establishment of a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) headed by a Director of Central Intelligence. The CIG would play a coordinating and synthesizing role in the production of intelligence rather than a managerial one. Once created, it did, however, receive authority to engage in the covert collection of intelligence. On January 22, 1946, President Harry S. Truman acted upon the recommendations of the Eberstadt Report and issued a presidential directive creating a National Intelligence Authority that was to plan, coordinate, and develop the U.S. intelligence effort. Under it was the CIG, headed by the DCI.

Souers served as DCI from January 23, 1946, to June 10, 1946. He had agreed to take the position for a limited period of time with the objective of seeing to it that the CIG's basic organizational structure was put into place. The existing intelligence units within the national security bureaucracy were not inclined to cooperate with the CIG in the production of intelligence. They frequently denied it resources and withheld intelligence. For his part, Souers was not inclined to challenge their position. Souers met less resistance in developing the CIG's covert intelligence collection mission. The primary assets were unwanted remnants of the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Foreign Broadcast Information Service that monitored foreign

radio programs and the Domestic Contact Service that debriefed Americans about what they had seen and heard when they had been abroad.

Souers was not a career officer but a successful businessman who had joined the reserves. After six months in the position he resigned to return to private life in Missouri. Souers, a friend of President Truman, returned to government service in 1947 when he took the position of executive secretary of the National Security Council. He held this position until 1950.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Eberstadt Report; Office of Strategic Services

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Glenn P. Hastedt

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

U.S. intelligence and espionage during the Spanish-American War contributed significantly to a rapid American victory. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the army's Military Intelligence Division (MID), established during the 1880s, were America's first formal, permanent intelligence agencies. In 1898, U.S. military attachés in American embassies in Europe created spy networks and orchestrated reconnaissance missions to ascertain the strength and location of the Spanish navy. The U.S. Secret Service, which had been established in the closing days of the Civil War, dispersed a Spanish spy network based in Montreal, Canada. The most successful and significant U.S. intelligence and espionage activities during the war, however, involved Key West–based U.S. military officer Martin Luther Hellings, who had recruited Domingo Villaverde, a Western Union telegraph officer in Havana, Cuba, to intercept communications between Spanish officials in Spain and Cuba. Not realizing that their telegraph office in Havana had been compromised, at the beginning of the war Spanish officials agreed to keep the telegraph cable linking Key West and the rest of the United States to Cuba and the rest of the Caribbean.

Before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, ONI and MID officers openly collected information in Europe. After April 1898, however, these officers initiated espionage. The Spanish government was assembling two fleets: one, led by Pascual Cevera, was being formed in the Cape Verde Islands for deployment to Cuba; and the other, led by Manuel Cámara, was being formed in Cádiz for deployment to the Philippines. The United States was especially interested in the location of the Cape Verde fleet. William S. Sims, the U.S. naval attaché in Paris, France, directed his spy network, which stretched from Port Said, Egypt, to the Canary Islands, to verify the

A Western Union telegram delivered to Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy announcing the news of the sinking of the battleship USS *Maine* off Havana on February 15, 1898. This unexpected incident led to U.S. military involvement in what became the Spanish-American War over colonial influence in Cuba and the Philippines. (National Archives)

location of Spain's Atlantic fleet. Although Sims even had spies working in Cádiz, he was unable to verify the location of the Cape Verde fleet. Since the U.S. Atlantic fleet had been deployed to blockade Cuba, Americans living along the Atlantic seaboard were justifiably nervous. Unbeknownst to U.S. officials, however, the most important information regarding Cevera's fleet was not its location, but rather its condition. Spanish officials ordered Cevara, whose ships were in a state of disrepair, to depart the Cape Verde Islands without sufficient coal, ammunition, and supplies.

Meanwhile, Spanish officials, after leaving Washington, DC, just days before the outbreak of the war, attempted to establish an intelligence and espionage network in Montreal, Canada. Given the proximity of Montreal to the St. Lawrence River and Montreal's large Roman Catholic population, the Spaniards were convinced that they had found the ideal location for their spy network. Secret Service agents, led by John Wilkie, however, were able to disrupt the Spanish attempts at intelligence gathering and espionage. George Downing, the first agent recruited by the Spaniards, was captured in Washington, DC, when he tried to post a letter containing valuable military secrets.

The activities of Martin Hellings, the manager of the Western Union telegraph office in Key West, Florida, proved to be the most significant example of intelligence and information gathering, both before and during the war. Hellings, who was eventually commissioned as a captain in the U.S. Volunteer Signal Corps, was the principal agent for Charles D. Sigsbee, the commander of the battleship *Maine*, which had been

stationed in Key West since December, 1897. Using Domingo Villaverde, his contact in the Western Union telegraph office in the Governor's Palace in Havana, Hellings was able to pass valuable information about developments in Cuba to Sigsbee. Late in the evening on February 15, 1898, Villaverde cabled Hellings that the *Maine*, which had been sent to Havana on January 25, 1898, had exploded and was sinking off the coast of Havana. Within one hour, President William McKinley knew of the explosion, which caused the death of 268 Americans. A U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry, which quickly, and perhaps erroneously, claimed that the Spaniards were responsible for the explosion, increased prowar sentiment among the American public. On April 22, the U.S. Navy blockaded Cuba in an attempt to end Spanish control of the island. At the same time, the U.S. government ordered George Dewey's Pacific fleet to destroy Spain's Pacific fleet in the Philippines. Dewey, who lacked information about the Spanish Pacific fleet, ordered his aide, F. B. Upham, to pose as a civilian and interview sailors from ships arriving in Hong Kong from Manila. Dewey learned that the Spanish Pacific fleet was weak and unprepared for an attack.

On May 19, 1898, Cevera's Cape Verde fleet, which only consisted of six ships, steamed into the port of Santiago, Cuba. Cevera's fleet had passed undetected through the American blockade, which was concentrated on the western part of the island, especially around Havana and Cienfuegos, where U.S. officials had expected Cevera to arrive. Once in the harbor of Santiago, Cevera's fleet was not longer visible from the Caribbean. Although Cevera's fleet was weak, unable to break the American blockade of Cuba, and posed no significant threat to the U.S. Atlantic seaboard, the U.S. government, which did not even know the location of Cevera's fleet, did not know this. ONI and MID agents in Europe had been unable to ascertain either the location or the strength of the Cape Verde fleet. After going ashore in Santiago, Cevera telegraphed his location to the Spanish governor-general in Havana. Villaverde immediately telegraphed Hellings the location of the Cape Verde fleet. Within a few hours of Villaverde's message, the U.S. Navy had blockaded the port of Santiago. Unwilling to allow the United States to capture the Cape Verde fleet, Spanish officials ordered Cevera to run the blockade. On July 3, 1898, after a brief sea battle, the entire Cape Verde fleet was destroyed. News of the destruction of Cevera's fleet convinced Spanish officials to recall Cámara's fleet, which was on the way to Manila to confront the blockade of Manila harbor imposed by Dewey's fleet. Within a few weeks, the Spanish government sued for peace and the Spanish-American War was over.

See also: Military Intelligence Division; Office of Naval Intelligence; Villaverde, Domingo

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Michael R. Hall

SPANISH CONSPIRACY

The Spanish Conspiracy involved attempts by Spain in the decade after the War of American Independence to create a buffer state west of the Allegheny Mountains between Spanish territory and the eastern United States. In 1783, the Madrid court was not sympathetic with the new American republic. It disputed the claim of the United States to the trans-Appalachian region and maintained military posts on American soil at Natchez and other places. It asserted sovereignty over Indian tribes east of the Mississippi River, in the present states of Mississippi and Alabama, and made treaties of alliance with them. It also contested American claims to free commercial navigation on the Mississippi River to the port of New Orleans. These issues came to a crisis in 1784, when Spain, which saw little reason to make concessions to the weak American Confederation, declared that henceforth the Mississippi River would be closed to American shipping.

Looking to the future, however, Spain feared that the exploding population in the American West would eventually overcome any paper barriers upon Mississippi navigation and would even put pressures upon the Spanish southwest. In 1785, Spain sent Diego de Gardoqui to New York to curry favor with Secretary of State John Jay. Yielding to Gardoqui's ministrations, Jay urged Congress to accept a treaty that ceded American demands for free Mississippi shipping in return for a commercial treaty with Spain. No such treaty could pass muster in Congress, and so the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations ended futilely in 1787.

Thereupon Gardoqui stepped up intrigues with a small group of American westerners who were willing to ignore the American government, withdraw from the United States, and make their own commercial treaty with Spain. This Spanish Conspiracy included John Brown, James White, John Sevier, and James Robertson. The arch-conspirator was General James Wilkinson, a Kentuckian, who in 1787 became a paid agent of Spanish officials in Louisiana and took a secret oath of allegiance to the King of Spain. In the next few years, he worked mightily to get his Kentucky neighbors to set up an independent western country. Cooler heads in Kentucky and Tennessee stymied his and the other secessionists' efforts, and after ratification of the Constitution of 1787 both were soon admitted to the Union as states. All talk of secession ended with the implementation of the treaty of San Lorenzo (Pinckney's Treaty) in 1795. In that document Spain recognized U.S. western boundaries, granted free navigation of the Mississippi River, and ceded control of the Indians east of the river to the United States.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage

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Paul David Nelson

SPANN, JOHNNY MICHAEL
(MARCH 1, 1969–NOVEMBER 25, 2001)

Johnny Michael "Mike" Spann, a paramilitary operative of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Special Activities Division, was the first American to die on the field of battle in Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11. Born on March 1, 1969, Spann grew up in Winnfield, Alabama, and by high school had decided that he would serve in the military and then become an agent with either the FBI or the CIA. After graduating with a degree in criminal justice from Auburn University in 1991, he joined the Marine Corps, where he spent most of his seven years as an artillery officer. In June 1999, after his stint in the military, he joined the CIA, which set him on course for his tragic demise in the war on terrorism.

His death on November 25, 2001, during a Taliban prison revolt at the Qala Jangi fortress in Mazar-i-Sharif shortly followed his interrogation of the "American Taliban," John Walker Lindh. Part of an American contingent (three CIA operatives, a dozen Green Berets, and two air force bomb guiders) attached to a Northern Alliance faction led by the warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, Spann had been in the country six weeks gathering intelligence in the search for Osama bin Laden.

Spann's interrogation of Lindh, conducted about two hours prior to the 400-man uprising, was recorded on videotape and later aired on the major American television networks. The tape shows Spann and another CIA operative, Dave Tyson, questioning the prisoner whom they thought was from Ireland. Lindh remained silent, prompting some to later accuse him of treason for not warning about the pending revolt. Although Lindh has maintained that he was not privy to any plans for an uprising, others remain unconvinced. The 79th CIA agent to die in the line of duty, Spann was buried at Arlington National Cemetery on December 10, 2001.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Post–Cold War Intelligence; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence

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Roger Chapman

SPECIAL ACTIVITIES DIVISION—CIA

The Special Activities Division is a section within the CIA responsible for conducting covert paramilitary operations. One of the advantages of such a group is in providing U.S. policy makers with increased flexibility, mobility, and speed all cloaked within the oftentimes necessity of official deniability. Although SAD personnel are largely recruited from within the U.S. military special operations community, SAD officers wear nothing to identify themselves as agents of the United States. Missions of the Special Activities Division require a "finding" or presidential approval.

In addition to drawing from special operation forces units such as Army Delta, Seal Team Six (now called Naval Development Group), Marine Recon, or Air Force Special Operations, CIA SAD also draws from colleges and other organizations whose members may have specific skill sets or knowledge useful to SAD objectives and tasks. Recruits and existing members receive training in various locations. These include CIA's Special Training Center (STC), Camp Peary—referred to as "The Farm," located in Virginia, a civilian organization, known as G8, and various other privately owned "black ops" training centers throughout the United States. Members of the Special Activities Division also receive specialized training at the Defense Department's Harvey Point Defense Testing Activity, outside Hertford, North Carolina. SAD training includes paramilitary and conventional espionage tradecraft.

The forerunner to the CIA, SAD was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), whose paramilitary operations were performed during World War II. After the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, these units were called the Paramilitary Group (PG) and were contained within the Military Support Program (MSP). It was in 1999 that the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet renamed the unit the Special Operations Group—Special Activities Division (SOG-SAD).

The division has also been referred to as the Special Activities Group or SAG. SAD has a permanent base of personnel referred to as the Special Activities Staff of about two hundred personnel. The SAS consists of mostly hardened, experienced, and extremely skilled former and retired U.S. military. As requirements arise and tasks are assigned, SAD has the capability to draw on a larger group of some three hundred operators constructing special mission units designed for the region and the task at hand.

Generally, SAD operates in small teams usually consisting of 6 to 12 individuals and unlike U.S. military special operations teams, at times, includes women. The units operate in areas throughout the globe, in remote areas or urban, and often behind enemy lines. These missions include espionage, counterintelligence, sabotage, hostage rescue, assassination, recruiting, and training of friendly forces, ex-filtration and infiltration transportation, and protection.

The history of the covert paramilitary capability within CIA began in earnest with American involvement in the Korean War (1950–1953). During World War II, General Douglas MacArthur had refused entry into the Pacific theater of OSS operatives and, as a result, by the beginning of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, the CIA was limited in its Asian capabilities. Despite this, the appointment of Bedell Smith as DCI in October 1950 and OSS veteran Allen Dulles as his operations lieutenant, covert CIA capabilities expanded rapidly. Smith created the Deputy Directorate for Plans (DDP) with the word "plans" serving as a euphemism for covert action and special units were housed within the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC).

During the Korean War, CIA paramilitary groups developed evasion and escape routes for downed U.S. flyers and trained more than one thousand Korean guerrillas to fight behind enemy lines. They also operated two fishing fleets posing as black marketeers and established clandestine civil air transport to support U.S. operations.

In Vietnam, one year after the end of the Korean War, CIA operations veteran Lucien Conein formed squads of anti-Communist Vietnamese to organize guerrillas, abduct or assassinate officials, and establish espionage networks. The CIA had argued

that conventional military tactics would be ineffective in South Vietnam and it would be in the interests of the United States to confine itself to running counterinsurgency operations. This counterinsurgency policy included the Phoenix Program, a covert campaign designed to uproot the Vietcong's rural structure and to target South Vietnam's Communist political organization.

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which lasted from 1979 to 1989, covert CIA operatives provided weaponry and support to the Afghans who fought the Communists. At one point, 300,000 fundamentalist Afghan warriors carried weapons provided by the CIA, including one of the most deadly and effective against Soviet aircraft—Stinger shoulder-held surface-to-air missiles.

After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, SAD officers were among the first on the ground leading the attack that subsequently forced the Taliban from power and removed Afghanistan as a safe haven for the architects of the terror attacks in the United States—al-Qaeda.

See also: Camp Peary; Central Intelligence Agency; Office of Policy Coordination; Office of Strategic Services; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; Vietnam War and Intelligence Operations

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James Brian McNabb

SPECIAL BRANCH

The Special Branch, a division of Scotland Yard, has played a role in surveillance, protection, and counterespionage in the United Kingdom since the late nineteenth century. Known originally as the Special Irish Branch, the unit was founded in 1883 in response to a bombing campaign launched by Irish separatists. Since that time, the Special Branch has been involved in conducting surveillance at British ports, gathering intelligence about political extremists and potential terrorists, protecting government ministers and visiting dignitaries, and assisting other government agencies (most notably Britain's domestic Security Service, MI-5) in combating threats to British security. In October 2006 the Special Branch, which included approximately 600 officers, merged with the Anti-Terrorist Branch to form a new Counter Terrorism Command (SO15). The Branch has since continued its role in intelligence gathering, both in London and throughout the United Kingdom.

The Special Irish Branch was launched in March 1883 as part of a coordinated response to Fenian terrorism in England. In the space of less than two years, radical Irish separatists had detonated bombs throughout London and several other English cities. The Special Irish Branch worked in cooperation with the port police, the Royal Irish Constabulary, a network of informers throughout mainland Britain, and the rest of Scotland Yard to quash the Fenian dynamite campaign.

With the Fenian threat at least temporarily diminished by 1885, the anti-Fenian surveillance system was partially dismantled. Nevertheless, the Special Irish Branch continued to function, though the word "Irish" was dropped from the name. For the next two decades, the Special Branch directed its intelligence-gathering efforts against potentially "subversive" organizations including trade unions and suffragist groups. Special Branch officers also offered protection to government ministers, visiting dignitaries, and members of the royal family.

Following the 1909 creation of Britain's Secret Service Bureau, and throughout World War I, the Special Branch worked closely with the home department responsible for counterespionage (the forerunner of MI-5) to investigate rumors of German spy rings operating in England. After the war, Special Branch detectives continued to conduct surveillance at the behest of MI-5, only now the targets were political extremists and suspected Communists, rather than German spies.

Since the end of the cold war, the main role of the Special Branch has been to assist the internal Security Service, known as MI-5, in combating terrorism, although it has continued to play a role in maintaining public order as well. In 2006, the Special Branch was restructured and subsumed under the new Counter Terrorism Command.

See also: MI-5 (The Security Service); MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service)

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SPECIAL COLLECTION SERVICE NSA-CIA

The Special Collection Service is a super-secret joint NSA-CIA organization conducting high-risk close surveillance deploying the most advanced technology to listen and transmit. The Special Collection Service (SCS) is officially unacknowledged as an intelligence unit and, consequently, has no acknowledged facilities or personnel.

It is believed that SCS maintains operational stations within selected U.S. embassies as well as other clandestine locations. While SCS deploys exceptionally sophisticated electronic listening equipment, it is also a covert-entry organization conducting what is often referred to as "black bag operations."

In covert entries, SCS personnel break into facilities to plant "bugs," install signal capture devices, defeat communication security or COMSEC equipment, steal passwords, copy encryption tokens, and gather information less readily available to other means of collection. Often, long-distance signals intelligence is incapable of obtaining necessary information as the target may be using low-powered signals which may not be obtainable from satellite distances. This creates a requirement for close-in collection techniques.

From 1947 until 1977, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military intelligence units that eventually evolved into the National Security Agency (NSA), ran relatively independent and, at times, overlapping signals and communications intelligence surveillance operations. After the Vietnam War, increased public and congressional scrutiny of the U.S. intelligence community led to efforts to streamline duplicative activities.

Becoming director of the NSA in July 1977, Vice Admiral Bobby R. Inman collaborated with OSO Chief Barry Kelly in leading the effort in creating a joint unit. In 1978, congressional oversight required the CIA to discontinue SIGINT activities and to work more closely with the NSA. Towards this, and using the power of the purse, Congress effectively cut off signals intelligence-gathering funds for the CIA.

The joint collection enterprise established was initially headed by an official from the CIA serving a two-year term and his or her deputy would be selected from the NSA. After two years, an NSA official was expected to take the top slot with a CIA representative serving as his deputy. Thus, an alternating leadership between both agencies was established in the newly created SCS. The first SCS director was CIA's Roy Burk with Bill Black of the NSA serving as his deputy.

The first years following the SCS's creation did not proceed without difficulty as the leadership of the CIA was reluctant to embrace this newly mandated joint organization. Traditionally, close-in surveillance had been the province of CIA's Division D, an elite group of fewer than one hundred personnel. During the initial years following the SCS start-up, NSA employees were not, as was the case in CIA, routinely poly-graphed. Other difficulties arose as CIA leaders were reluctant to courier documents to NSA's College Park, Maryland, headquarters. This forced SCS Director Burk to send a cleared secretary.

During the cold war, the primary targets of the SCS were the communications of hostile military organizations and governments. Reportedly, many sensitive sites in Eastern Europe, then members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, were successfully penetrated and valuable intelligence generated by SCS efforts. SCS expertise and skills used advanced technology as well as simple ideas. For instance, during the late 1970s electronic experts had discovered the fact that a standard telephone's microphone, even while "hung up," transmitted largely unnoticeable impulses through the telephone wires. These impulses could then be exploited as they were isolated and converted to sound. As a result every telephone in every room and office became a listening device without requiring physical intrusion. Later, with the advance of technology, collectors could direct a small invisible beam at windows from the outside and after bouncing the signal off the glance pick it up at a receiver and transmitter located hundreds of feet away.

The core of SCS operations is based on special collections elements of two- to three-man teams which are embedded in U.S. embassies abroad. This often means 12-hour

shifts spent in windowless three-room suites using state-of-the-art technology. However advances and the proliferation of high-tech equipment have created new difficulties for special collection. For example, advances in micro-wave transmissions, which SCS intercepted with relative ease, have given way to fiber-optic cables which allows for far more circuits and at far greater distances. With advances in increased bandwidth, these systems transmit enormous volumes of information and data. Without direct access to the cables, collection efforts become increasingly problematic.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, it became apparent that the American reliance on satellites had come at a cost of HUMINT and close-in surveillance intelligence. The rising need to be on the ground and collect intelligence led to a necessary increase in importance of the missions of SCS personnel.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency

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SPECIAL GROUP

This was the term used to refer to two different National Security Council subcommittees that oversaw covert action plans in the 1950s and 1960s. Originally it referred to the 5412 Committee that took its name from the National Security Council Directive issued in the Eisenhower administration that created it. The Special Group became a short-hand term used to describe this committee. Later it became more formally used to describe the committee in the Kennedy administration following the failed Bay of Pigs operation against Cuba. Its name was again changed by National Security Action Memorandum 303 of June 2, 1964, to the 303 Committee. No change in membership or duties accompanied this change in terminology. During its existence, the Special Group and 303 Committee approved 163 covert operations in the Kennedy administration and 142 covert action plans in the Johnson administration through February 1967. The focus here is on the Special Group as it operated during these two administrations.

After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy commissioned a postmortem study chaired by General Maxwell Taylor. That report recommended strengthening the management and direction of covert action undertakings. Kennedy acted on that report by introducing a series of changes. One procedural change established criteria for determining which covert action programs required Special Committee approval. In 1963 programs costing over $25,000 and holding significant political risk to the United States and the potential for exposure had to come before the Special Group.

At the organizational level he created two additional NSC subcommittees to complement the work of the Special Group. The first, the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), was charged with supervising large paramilitary operations. It was created on January 18, 1962, when Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum 124. Special Group (Counterinsurgency) was chaired by Maxwell Taylor as the military representative of the president, the attorney general, the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the deputy undersecretary of state for political affairs, the deputy secretary of state, the president's special assistant for national security affairs, and the administrator of the agency for international development. Its mission was to ensure that U.S. resources were being used with maximum effectiveness to deal with subversion, and other forms of indirect aggression against friendly countries. The situations in Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos were specially mentioned as areas of concern in the founding document. Iran and Indonesia were two other countries the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) directed its attention to.

The Special Group (Counterinsurgency) was terminated by National Security Action Memorandum 341, signed by President Lyndon Johnson on March 2, 1966. Johnson took this action in response to a recommendation by Taylor that this unit be made into an agency supporting the secretary of state who should be given responsibility for coordinating interdepartmental countersubversion policies. Accordingly, Johnson set up a Senior Interdepartmental Group chaired by an undersecretary of state for this purpose.

The second group Kennedy created to assist the Special Group was the Special Group (Augmented). It carried over the existing membership of the Special Group (the special assistant to the president for national security, the deputy undersecretary of state for political affairs, the deputy secretary of defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) along with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor as chair. From November 1961 until October 1962 the Special Group (Augmented) was responsible for supervising Operation Mongoose.

Also known as the Cuban Project, Operation Mongoose consisted of a series of covert operations, including assassination designed to remove Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. After the failed Bay of Pigs operation, Robert Kennedy had become a strident force within the administration pushing for such action, hence his inclusion in Special Group (Augmented). Operation Mongoose was led by Air Force General Edward Lansdale and CIA officer William Harvey King. Operation Mongoose was suspended on October 30, 1962, with the advent of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

See also: Bay of Pigs; 5412 Committee; Johnson Administration and Intelligence; Kennedy Administration and Intelligence; Landsale; Edward Geary; Mongoose, Operation

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE (SOE)

After withdrawing from continental Western Europe in the summer of 1940, Britain set out to reorganize irregular warfare tools. The goal of the resulting SOE was, as Churchill put it: "to set Europe ablaze." The SOE became the model for the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and continued to organize resistance movements and conduct clandestine operations behind enemy lines throughout World War II.

On July 19 1940, the autonomous SOE was established from existing organizations like the Military Research Intelligence of the War Office, and Section D of the Secret Intelligence Service under the Foreign Office. Important tasks became smuggling weapons, explosives, and saboteurs behind enemy lines; encourage sedition and intelligence-gathering; and facilitating escape routes for agents and allied POWs. But, just as important, was to bolster moral, both in Britain and the occupied countries.

SOE HQ was located on 64th Bakerstreet, London, and the research department at Aston House. In addition there were various training facilities all over Great Britain. Initially, SOE was also intended as a "stay behind" army—a core from which a resistance movement could be built in case of a German invasion of Britain. Its first chief was Sir Frank Nelson, and from April 2, 1942, Sir Charles Hambro. In August 1943, the latter resigned over a cabinet decision to coordinate the SOE's activities with the army, and was replaced by Major General Colin Gubbins.

The SOE's field organization was divided into geographic sections. The F and RF section dominated operations in France; the latter engaged most available free French agents. Both sections fielded about 600 operatives during the German occupation, whose most notable contribution were preparations for the Normandy landings in 1944. The SOE in the Netherlands was infiltrated by the Germans due to slack security routines but networks were rebuilt towards the end of 1943, and they contributed to the Allied campaign of 1944 and 1945. Section T, operating in neighboring Belgium, saw their country more quickly liberated following the outbreak from Normandy, but it played an important role in enabling the Allies to secure the Antwerpen harbor facilities intact. The SOE found it difficult to build up an organization in Nazi Germany and satellites such as Hungary and Romania. In fellow axis state Italy, few efforts were made to build up assets until Mussolini's regime had collapsed in 1943. In Czechoslovakia, the most famous SOE operation was the assassination of deputy chief of the SS, Reinhard Heydrich, on May 27 1942. Poland was more difficult to access from Britain, but some weapons reached the non-Communist Armia Krajowa (Home army).

The Scandinavian Section covered occupied Demark and Norway, and among its single most important achievements were the evacuation of Danish Jews and the sabotage of heavy water production in Norway which made the development of a German nuclear bomb even more difficult. Agents along the Norwegian coast also tracked German naval movements, an important asset in the battle of the Atlantic. Sabotage activity in general helped nurture Hitler's fear of an invasion in the North, ensuring that many troops and other resources went into defensive preparations. In the Balkans, the SOE not only faced the forces of Axis occupation, but also found themselves entangled in bitter infighting between Nationalist and Communist resistance groups. In Yugoslavia, they chose Jozip Broz "Tito's" partisans as it was the most effective and reliable ally in the country, as was fellow Communist Enver Hoxha in Albania.

In Greece initial cooperation between Communist ELAS and republican EDES resistance movements led to the famous 1942 Operation Harling, blowing up the Gorgopotamos Railway Viaduct. In 1943, open conflict broke out between the groups, followed by an armistice in 1943. Civil war flared up immediately following German withdrawal in 1944, in which the SOE actively participated, securing Athens and Pireus on behalf of the republicans. The SOE also carried out operations in the North African and East Asian theaters of war.

In 1946, the war was over and the Labour government under Prime Minister Clement Atlee saw no reason to continue the service. The SOE was disbanded and the MI-6 absorbed most of its functions.

See also: MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service)

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Frode Lindgjerdet

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

SOF, the acronym for Special Operations Forces, consists of highly versatile military, paramilitary, and/or civilian personnel, all of which specialize in covert tactics and utilize unorthodox methods. These elite units conduct clandestine missions involving infiltration, intelligence gathering, rescue, insurgency, counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism. Referred to as the "silent professionals" because much of their work is classified, SOF troops are often rapidly deployed to troubled spots with little visibility.

In short, SOF engages in special operations (special ops). According to the Department of Defense (DOD), in its official dictionary of military terms (2004), special ops are "operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement."

Both the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. military rely on SOF to conduct special ops. It is estimated that of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) 22,000 full-time employees, approximately 5,000 work for the Directorate of Operations (DO), its SOF wing. The DO's Special Operations Group (SOG), a paramilitary unit, has several hundred members. In 2004 about 2 percent of the American military were serving in SOF units, approximately 34,000 active and 15,000 reserve personnel. SOF military personnel are sometimes assigned to the CIA and vice versa.

The history of modern SOF can be traced back to the Strategic Services Unit of the Pentagon, formed following World War II after President Truman disbanded the Office of Strategic Services. The unit, which was renamed the Office of Special

Operations (OSO), came under the Central Intelligence Group, the predecessor of today's CIA. In June 1948, with the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a special organization committed itself to carrying out political activities, psychological warfare, and paramilitary operations, the latter including sabotage, countersabotage, and guerilla-type missions. In August 1952 the OPC and the OSO merged as the Directorate of Plans (DP), which oversaw the Special Activities Division. In 1973, with the Vietnam War waning, the DP became the DO and was downsized.

The Special Activities Division of the CIA was behind many clandestine activities over the years, including operations in Guatemala (1954), the Far East (1950s–1960s), Cuba (the Bay of Pigs, 1961), Laos and Cambodia (beginning in 1962), South America (1960s–1990s), Central America (1980s), Afghanistan (1980s), and Bosnia and Kosovo (1990s). During the Reagan administration the reputation of CIA covert operations was sullied due to the Iran-Contra scandal, leading to a virtual dismantling of the SOG. After a two-decade decline, however, the SOG began a rebuilding period, which was accelerated following the attacks of September 11. Divided into ground, maritime, and air branches, the SOG is a military separate and apart from the DOD. The first fatality in the war on terrorism was a SOG officer, Johnny "Mike" Spann, who was killed in Afghanistan in November 2001 while on the hunt for Osama bin Laden.

In the American military special ops units are a part of the four service branches and include, among others, Special Forces, Rangers, and Delta Force (U.S. Army); SEALs, Special Boat Squadrons, and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams (U.S. Navy); Force Reconnaissance (U.S. Marines); and the 16th Special Operations Wing and combat control teams (U.S. Air Force).

The military's modern SOF units date back to April 10, 1952, with the founding of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Personnel from the 1st Special Forces Group, activated in Okinawa in 1957, were the first American military advisers sent to Vietnam. In July 1959 12 Special Forces teams, initially maintaining a "civilian" identity, were sent to Laos to train the Laotian army. In 1961 Special Forces were authorized to wear the green beret, thereafter becoming popularly known as the Green Berets. The SEALs (an acronym for SEa, Air, and Land) were commissioned in 1962 and saw much action in the rivers and coastal waterways of Vietnam. SEALs, arguably the most elite of the SOF family, trace their lineage back to the underwater demolition teams of World War II and today are a combination of frogman, paratrooper, and commando. During the 1980s the CIA relied on Special Forces and SEALs for its mission to train the Contras in Nicaragua.

SOF was neglected following the Vietnam War, although two Army Ranger battalions were activated in 1974. Also, on November 19, 1977, the army formed an antiterrorist squad, Special Forces Operational Detachment—Delta, headed by Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith. This latter unit, commonly known as Delta Force, was inspired in part due to the terrorist attacks at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. Despite the creation of these new SOF units, resources were limited, especially since top Pentagon officials maintained a bias preference for conventional forces. Most significantly, Delta Force and the Rangers were not provided with adequate transportation support for infiltration and exfiltration, which became apparent after the breakdown of helicopters during the failed Iran rescue mission of April 1980.

After the fiery debacle in the Iranian desert, DOD began administrative reform. Unfortunately, not enough was done in time for Operation URGENT FURY, the October 1983 invasion of Grenada. Delta Force, the Rangers, and the SEALs were sent in harm's way with inadequate transportation delivery. Finally, on June 1, 1987, the Pentagon activated the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, to give SOF units a unified command and improved support. This revamping was in place in time for Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama (1988–1989), of which 4,500 of the 27,000 U.S. troops were SOF personnel. During the first Gulf War, Operation DESERT STORM (1990–1991), approximately 9,000 SOF personnel were deployed, greater than any previous conflict. Of the deployed SOF units in 2004, 80 percent were in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The trend, following the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report, is for all paramilitary clandestine and covert operations to be placed under USSOCOM. However, since September 11 there has been an expansion of the CIA's special operations, leading to a turf war between the Pentagon and Langley.

See also: Army Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Department Intelligence; Iraq War; Marine Corps Intelligence; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (The 9/11 Commission); Navy Intelligence; Office of Policy Coordination; Office of Special Operations; Persian Gulf War; Spann, Johnny Michael; Strategic Services Unit

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SPETSNAZ

Spetsnaz is a generic Russian term for "troops of special purpose," which has come to mean "Russian special forces" in English. During the cold war, Spetsnaz units were raised by the GRU, the intelligence directorate of the Soviet General Staff. By the 1980s, these special purpose forces numbered approximately 30,000. There was usually one Spetsnaz company (approximately 135 strong) in each army, one Spetsnaz regiment in each of the three Soviet theaters of operation; one Spetsnaz brigade in each of the four Soviet fleets, and an independent Spetsnaz brigade in most military districts of the USSR. There were also special Spetsnaz intelligence detachments in each front and fleet.

The existence of Spetsnaz troops was a closely guarded secret within the Warsaw Pact and individual troops were not allowed to admit membership; army Spetsnaz wore standard airborne uniforms and insignia, whereas naval Spetsnaz wore naval infantry uniforms and insignia.

Spetsnaz troops were deployed in Eastern Europe in order to carry out strategic reconnaissance and sabotage missions against NATO force during the final days prior to war breaking out and in war itself. These wartime tasks would include deep reconnaissance of strategic targets, the destruction of strategically important command-control-and-communications facilities, the destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems, demolition of important bridges and transportation routes, and the snatching or assassination of important military and political leaders. Many of these missions would be carried out before the enemy could react and some even before the war had actually broken out.

During the 1970s and 1980s, special operations troops became increasingly the vogue in various ministries of the then Soviet Union. Therefore, similar bodies with similar missions were set up by different parts of the same ministry, particularly within the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). These special troops went under the generic title of *Spetsgruppe* and were paramilitary forces that received special training and indoctrination for a variety of missions. Many of these units served in a variety of roles in the war in Afghanistan and, more recently, in conflicts within the Russian Federation, particularly in operations against insurgents in Chechnya.

Special Group Alpha was set up by the KGB's Seventh Directorate in 1974 and appears to have been inspired by the British SAS and U.S. 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-D (Delta) as a counterterrorist and hostage-rescue group. It is generally believed that Special Group A was the unit that attacked the presidential palace in Kabul, Afghanistan, on December 28, 1980, and murdered President Hafizullah Amin and his family. This unit is now controlled by the Federal Security Service (FSB), which its equivalent to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is believed that Alpha Group was involved in the Beslan school hostage crisis on September 3, 2004, and was criticized for the use of excessive deadly force, which resulted in hostage casualties.

The First Chief Administration of the KGB established an organization known as *Spetsgruppa Vympel*, whose mission was to fulfill the KGB's wartime role of assassination and snatching. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this group was transferred to the MVD but is now under the FSB with primary responsibility for hostage rescue and countersabotage. In the last mission, they are responsible for defending against possible terrorist attacks involving nuclear plants, hydroelectric dams, and other key industrial facilities.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs also has at least two groups of special troops known as the *Omon* (Black Berets), which were originally raised to provide additional security and (if necessary) hostage rescue at the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Since then they have been used for counterterrorist activities and defeating armed criminals, and are currently involved in campaigns against drug cultivation.

Also included in this category of forces is the *GROM* Security Company, which is a quasi-private organization working under exclusive contract to the federal government.

GROM (the Russian word for "thunder" and with no relationship to the Polish group of the same name) is manned by former troops of the various KGB special forces and provides security for selected government personnel and buildings, as well as for certain trains and aircraft.

The last group that falls within this category is Speznaz UIN, a group of special-purpose troops on assignment with the Ministry of Justice. This group is responsible for the suppression of mass disorders and revolts in prisons, rescue of hostages seized in prisons, and other situations that threaten discipline and order in prisons or other incarceration facilities.

Spetsnaz-like forces can also be found in a few countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia.

See also: KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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SR-71

The SR-71 (Strategic Response-71) was a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft that flew from 1964 to 1998. A total of 32 aircraft were built. Twelve were lost through accidents. None were shot down by the enemy. According to folklore, the SR-71's ability to elude the enemy was due to its invisibility to radar. Nicknamed the "blackbird" for its dark blue coloring, the SR-71 was said to be invisible to radar. In reality the SR-71 was visible on radar for hundreds of miles. What made the SR-71 able to elude the enemy was its great speed. Able to operate at Mach 3, it could accelerate when detected and outrun threats.

The SR-71 was built by Lockheed as a black or secret project at its famous Skunk Works unit. Clarence "Kelly" Johnson, who had played a central role in designing the A-12 Oxcart reconnaissance aircraft for the Central Intelligence Agency, also was instrumental in building the SR-71. The existence of the SR-71 was made public by President Lyndon Johnson during the 1964 presidential campaign. Johnson was under attack from Republican candidate Barry Goldwater for failing to keep pace with Soviet strategic advances. Disclosure of the SR-71 was meant to counter this criticism.

The A-12 first flew in 1962. Design work on the SR-71 began in February 1963. The first test flight took place in December 1964 and the SR-71 became operational in January 1966. Most heavily used in Southeast Asia, SR-71's initially averaged one sortie per week. As the U.S. involvement in Vietnam deepened, so too did the SR-71's flight time. In 1972 they averaged almost one per day.

The SR-71 was retired twice. The first time came in 1989. A combination of cost concerns and shifting air force priorities led to this decision. Satellites were cheaper than reconnaissance aircraft and the air force was more interested in developing the

B-1 Lancer and upgrading the B-52. The SR-71 was reactivated at congressional insistence in 1993 when evidence surfaced that North Korea was pursuing a nuclear bomb and fears rose about the political stability of the Middle East. The air force remained uncommitted to the SR-71 and in 1996 once again proposed its deactivation. Congress continued funding the SR-71 but this money was line item vetoed by President Clinton. The SR-71 was retired for a second and final time in 1998.

See also: Air Force Intelligence; Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Incident

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SS (SCHUTZ STAFFEL)

The SS (Schutz Staffel or protection squad) was a powerful and lethal military and security organization in the Third Reich. The SS's intelligence and security organization, the SD (Sicherheitsdienst or security service), was created in 1932 by Reinhard Heydrich and focused on political intelligence. The SD infiltrated the United States before and during World War II, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) tracked and infiltrated several Nazi spy rings. During the war, agents from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA, also successfully penetrated the SD in Nazi Germany.

The SS was an elite guard first formed to protect Hitler in 1925, but it soon morphed into the Nazis' special security force. In 1929, Heinrich Himmler became the leader of the SS. In need of an intelligence organization, the SD was created in 1931 under Himmler's direct authority and the SD became the SS's official intelligence organization in 1932. After the Nazis took control of Germany in 1933, the SD's overall power created a police state.

In 1936, Himmler was appointed chief of German police. He fused the SS with Germany's police force or the Sipo, composed of the Gestapo (secret police) and the Kripo (criminal police). This gave Himmler legal control of all police forces. In 1939, Himmler merged the SD with the Sipo to create the RSHA, or Reich Security Administration. In 1944, the Abwehr, Germany's military intelligence organization, was placed under the jurisdiction of the RSHA and thus SS-controlled.

In 1934, Heydrich created SD's foreign intelligence branch, or Department VI. This department was ordered to discover actual or potential enemies of the Nazi leadership and defuse any threats. Walter Schellenberg became head of Department VI in 1941. Civilian foreign intelligence gathering fell under the SD Ausland (outside of Germany) department. Department D focused on espionage in the American sphere. In 1937, Himmler ordered the Gestapo to create a spy network in the United States and several agents came. Guenther Rumrich instigated several espionage operations, including one to obtain 50 blank passports. Kurt Frederick Ludwig, aka Joe K., operated a widespread spy ring, delivering classified and secret American information to Berlin.

German-born American citizen William Sebold agreed to spy for the Gestapo in the United States, but became a U.S. counterspy instead. In 1944, German intelligence launched Operation Magpie, a last attempt to infiltrate the United States. This ill-fated mission involved Erich Gimpel and an American-born man named William Curtis Colepaugh.

Despite lack of funding and support by the U.S. Congress, the FBI ruthlessly tracked the Gestapo's presence in the United States, overthrowing several potentially disastrous schemes, including a kidnapping plot in 1938 to abduct an American general and the destruction of several spy rings. In June 1938, the U.S. Justice Department indicted 18 people on charges of espionage, leading to a sensational trial that drew attention to the vast Nazi spy network in the United States.

The OSS was the SD's main adversary during World War II, and they successfully infiltrated the SD in Nazi Germany. The Ruppert Mission involved a White Russian émigré named Youri Vinogradov whose penetration of the inner workings of the SD proved invaluable after the war's end.

In 1942, Himmler declared that RSHA would direct the Final Solution in all aspects and jurisdiction. The SS and the SD oversaw the concentration camp system and committed several atrocities during the Holocaust. At the end of the war, the SS and SD were classified as criminal organizations and their members were tried as criminals at Nuremberg.

See also: Abwehr; American Intelligence, World War II; Duquesne Spy Ring; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Office of Strategic Services; Sebold, William G.

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ST. ALBANS RAID

On October 19, 1864, 21 Confederate soldiers, under the command of Lieutenant Bennet Young, carried out a successful raid on the town of St. Albans, Vermont. The goals of the raid were to secure funds for the Confederate war effort and to draw Union troops away from the South. Launched from Canadian soil, this was the north-ernmost engagement of the Civil War and led to friction between Great Britain and the Union.

Lieutenant Bennett Young had escaped to Canada from a Union prisoner of war camp in the spring of 1864. He received a commission from the Confederate government to attempt the release of other Confederate prisoners. Two such attempts failed, but Young was allowed to lead a raid on a Union town to steal money for the Confederate war effort. He entered Vermont alone and selected St. Albans for the operation. Some Confederates joined him and, together, passing themselves off as travelers, they reconnoitered the town, located its four banks and stables, and planned the robberies and escape routes. The remaining Confederate soldiers arrived in twos and threes by different routes and trains, found rooms in a number of local hotels, and waited.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon on October 19, the 21 men assembled and then entered the four St. Albans' banks and the stable. Shocked residents were forced into the town square. The Confederates garnered $208,000 and then escaped to Canada on stolen horses. The raid was well planned and casualties low, with one St. Albans man killed and a number wounded.

Thirteen of the soldiers, including Young, were apprehended in Canada. American authorities considered entering Canada to retrieve the raiders, but this would have violated British neutrality. Instead, the United States demanded their extradition, but Great Britain allowed the Canadian courts to try the raiders. Young and his men were released by the Canadians on technicalities, and soon journeyed to the Confederacy with the stolen money. Canada, however, agreed to reimburse St. Albans for the lost money and paid the amount equal to that found on the captured raiders, $50,000.

See also: Civil War Intelligence

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Richard M. Mickle

STASI

STASI, the East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, or MfS) was responsible for domestic surveillance, foreign intelligence, and counterespionage. Created February 8, 1950, only months after the foundation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949, the STASI was modeled on the Cheka, the Soviet secret police founded by Felix Dzerzhinsky in 1917. For over four decades, the STASI served as "The Sword and the Shield" of the GDR's ruling Communists' Party, the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED). The STASI was the integral instrument of the SED against its enemies at home and abroad in its global struggle against capitalism. One of the most efficient and pervasive secret services in history, the STASI used a network of personal informers and extensive postal and telephone monitoring to conduct a blanket surveillance of East Germany society. It exercised almost complete control over the population of East Germany. In many regards, the STASI functioned as a state within a state. During its existence, the STASI had three chairmen: Wilhelm Zasser (1950–1953), Ernest Wollheber (1953–1957), and Erich Mielke (1957–1989).

When the Berlin wall fell in 1989, the STASI had over 91,100 full-time staff, half employed in its central apparatus in East Berlin (Normannenstrasse 22 in Lichtenberg) and the rest in the 15 Regional Administrations (Bezirkverwaltungen, or BVs), the 211 District Service Units (Kreisdienststellen, or KDs), and 7 so-called "Objects" (Objekte, or major complexes, such as the nuclear power station in Greifswald and the technical university in Dresden). In addition to the full-time staff, the STASI had over 175,000 informants (known as IMs, for Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, or unofficial collaborators) within the GDR's general population of 16.4 million. Organizationally, the regional administrative units of the STASI corresponded to those of the SED and GDR.

East German espionage was carried out by the STASI'S foreign intelligence wing, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, or HVA. Marcus Wolf was appointed chief of the HVA in 1957, a position he held until 1985. The HVA's reputation was based on its ability to infiltrate the West German government, while at the same time proving almost impervious to Western infiltration. Most infamously, Guenther Guillaume, an East German agent, became the personal assistant to Chancellor Willy Brandt, a situation which eventually forced Brandt to resign in 1977. During the Honecker years (1971–1989), the HVA's first priority was to impede the "imperialistic" role of the United States, and its security service, the Central Intelligence Agency, from endangering the German Democratic Republic and its Warsaw Pact allies. In theory, the HVA operated in all areas of the world where the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies were active. In practice, however, the HVA concentrated its activities against the Federal Republic of Germany, since the FRG was NATO's strategic bridgehead against the Warsaw Pact (and the leading economic power in Europe). One of the HVA's primary concerns was circumventing the scientific and technical embargo employed against the GDR by the United States and its allies.

Counterespionage was the provenance of the department within the MfS known as the Second Main Directorate, headed by Lt. General Guenther Kratsch. This directorate employed 2,350 full-time agents, half of whom were stationed in Berlin in 1989. The STASI viewed every U.S. diplomat as a potential spy, bugging their apartments and often subjecting them to round-the-clock surveillance. Mielke had directed the entire MfS staff to cooperate with the Second Main Directorate when it required assistance. East Germans who had contact with U.S. diplomatic personnel were vetted and also placed under surveillance.

With the opening of the Berlin Wall on the night of November 9, 1989, the SED ceded its monopoly on power, and also its dependence upon its "Sword and Shield." On the evening of January 12, 1990, several thousand protestors stormed STASI headquarters and ransacked the building, looking for personal files. Initially, STASI files remained sealed because the German government feared that they would have a divisive effect on reunification efforts. Under the auspices of the Gauck Authority, the agency responsible for STASI documents, many STASI records were eventually opened.

See also: Gehlen Organization; German Democratic Republic and Intelligence

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<div align="right">*Wendell G. Johnson*</div>

STATE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE

The United Stated Department of State, along with the Treasury Department and the War Department (now Defense), were the first departments created at the beginning of the Republic. The Department of State has the responsibility of conducting diplomacy for the United States. It operates under the authority of the Congress and

U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, shows the Security Council a listening device which he said the Soviet authorities had managed to plant in the office of U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow. The device, a wooden carving of the Great Seal of the United States, was hollow and contained a hidden microphone. (AP/Wide World Photos)

the supervision of the president of the United States through the secretary of the State Department.

Most intelligence work in the United States is done by the military or by special agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency; however, there are several civilian agencies such as the Departments of Transportation, Energy, Commerce, and State that do some intelligence work. The State Department is involved with intelligence in a number of ways. It seeks political intelligence as a matter of course in which it gathers on all countries with which the United States has relations. It also is engaged in counterintelligence to protect the political secrets of the United States on such matters as delicate negations or on the long-range policy goals.

After President Harry Truman abolished the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) at the end of World War II, its research and analysis functions were transferred to the State Department where they were conducted by a unit called the Interim Research and Intelligence Service. Between 1946 and 1957 the unit's name was changed twice and it underwent several reorganizations. Finally the unit was stabilized as the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). With a staff that grew to 360 people, it analyzed intelligence data from open and especially diplomatic sources. It also performed functions that were related to operations, and acted as a liaison between the intelligence community and the goals of American foreign policy.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research is a contributor to the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and to the Special Estimates (SEs). It also prepares a variety of intelligence products. One of these in the secretary of state's Morning Summary, which is a briefing paper that keeps the secretary and others informed of intelligence estimates of current events of importance to American foreign policy. In addition, the INR writes regional and other intelligence summaries. It also prepares single subject Intelligence Research Reports.

The director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research also hold the title of assistant secretary of state for Intelligence and Research. He or she reports directly to the secretary of state.

Supporting the assistant secretary is the principle deputy assistant secretary who handles current intelligence. Also part of the intelligence personnel are the staff associated with the work, and the Office of the Executive Director. There are other units doing intelligence work that report to the principle deputy. These include the head of the Office of Publications, the deputy assistant secretary for Analysis, and the deputy assistant secretary for Intelligence Policy. Subordinate to the latter two officers are over a dozen officers that conduct specific intelligence functions.

The deputy assistant secretary for analysis supervises offices that cover six geographic regions. They are Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Inter-American Affairs, the Near East and South Asia, Russia and Eurasia, and Europe and Canada. These offices keep up with current events in their respective regions. The staff is very knowledgeable about the people, the culture, and all aspects of the politics of their region. The staff might be called upon to give a detailed report on some aspect or upon general conditions and specifics about key political actors in their region.

The deputy assistant secretary for analysis is in charge of developing long-range analytical studies. In addition, the secretary for analysis is the supervisor for the Office of Economic Analysis; the Office of Geographer and Global Issues; the External Research

Staff; and the Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs; and the Office of Analysis for Terrorism, Narcotics and Crime.

The External Research Staff issues contracts for projects that the INR cannot do. The Office of Economic Analysis writes reports on current issues involving economic concerns. The reports may also be on long-term issues of concern to policy makers. The reports may involve the economic policies of foreign countries; trade issues; economic conditions; international economic issues such as the value and flow of currencies, food, population growth and migrations; energy supplies and prices; as well as the economic relations between other countries and the United States.

The Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs studies the nuclear capability and intentions of the Russians, Chinese, Pakistanis, and other nuclear powers. It also issue reports on those countries seeking to develop a nuclear weapons program and those that have already done so but which have kept their success secret and unacknowledged.

The deputy assistant secretary for intelligence policy supervises the Office of Intelligence Coordination, the Office of Intelligence Liaison, the Office of Administrative Liaison, and the Office of Intelligence Resources. It works with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other members of the intelligence community.

The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Counterterrorism Office, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security deal with issues and events in foreign countries that may involve violence. It is also the duty of the State Department to expel persons with diplomatic immunity who have been caught spying inside of the United States. For example, when FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen was arrested on February 18, 2001, four Russians handlers with whom he had worked as a spy were declared persona non grata.

See also: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, U.S. (FBIS); Intelligence Community; Office of Strategic Services

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STAY-BEHIND

Secret anti-Communist NATO networks in Western Europe run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) in cooperation with numerous European military intelligence services, discovered in 1990, were known as stay-behind networks. In case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, an international stay-behind network was designed to fight as secret North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) guerrillas behind enemy lines on Soviet-occupied territory. In order to be able to function independently of regular national armies, the stay-behind network was trained in secret warfare by U.S. and British Special Forces and controlled secret arms caches across Western Europe containing guns, explosives, hand grenades, and other small arms. The top-secret network, discovered only in 1990, operated outside democratic control and in some countries was accused of having been linked to acts of torture, terror, and coup d'états in the absence of a Soviet invasion.

During World War II, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill set up a secret army under the code name "Special Operations Executive" (SOE). Its task was to clandestinely parachute behind enemy lines into German-controlled territory and to cooperate with resistance movements and covert action operatives of various anti-German intelligence services, including the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

After World War II, British and U.S. military strategists feared an invasion and occupation of Western Europe by the Soviet Union and decided that a secret guerrilla and resistance movement should be set up on the model of the SOE. CIA and MI-6 were given the task to secretly contact reliable persons within the military intelligence services of all countries of Western Europe. Within the CIA the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), responsible for covert action operations and headed by Frank Wisner, was given the sensitive task. Former CIA Director William Colby later called it "a major program" of the CIA, designed to have top-secret armed soldiers in Western Europe "ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the time came."

In cooperation with European military secret services, stay-behind armies were set up by the CIA and MI-6 in the NATO countries of Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland, Denmark, and Norway, as well as in the officially neutral countries Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and Austria. U.S. Special Forces, including the Green Berets, and British Special Forces, including the Special Air Services (SAS), trained the stay-behind soldiers in the techniques of secret warfare. NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), together with the U.S. Pentagon, coordinated and supervised the stay-behinds through two secret committees: The Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC), and the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC). International exercises were being held on a regular basis.

In order to limit the potential danger caused to the network through exposure, information was distributed on a strict "need to know basis" within the networks and during international exercises. Different stay-behinds operated under different code names, such as "Gladio" (Italy), "ROC" (Norway), "P26" (Switzerland), "Counter-Guerrilla" (Turkey), or "SDRA8" (Belgium).

In almost all countries national parliaments remained ignorant of the existence of the secret armies throughout the cold war. This led parliamentarians to conclude that the stay-behind networks were illegal and incompatible with national constitutions as they operated beyond checks and balances and with virtually no democratic oversight. In Belgium, Italy and Switzerland parliamentary investigations led to the demobilization of the respective secret armies. The EU parliament passed a resolution on the stay-behind networks on November 22, 1990, sharply criticizing NATO for having set up military structures which for decades operated beyond democratic control.

In some countries elements of the stay-behind networks were accused to have been linked to torture (Turkey), coup d'états (Greece), terror (Italy), assassinations (Spain),

and militant political struggle (France). NATO, according to some interpretations, feared that European Communist Parties, strong above all in France and Italy during the cold war, might weaken the defense alliance from within, and therefore used unorthodox warfare and stay-behind assets to confront that challenge. The CIA, MI-6, and NATO refused to comment.

In 1990, acting Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti for the first time officially confirmed the existence of the international stay-behind network; the European press concluded that the "story seems straight from the pages of a political thriller." Although stay-behind data was hardly covered in the U.S. press, European newspapers argued that the stay-behind networks were "the best-kept, and most damaging, political-military secret since World War II."

Please note: The entry "Operation Gladio" or "Gladio" in the Encyclopaedia should guide the reader directly to the entry "Stay-Behind," because many people know the topic under the keyword "Gladio" only.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Special Operations Forces

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Daniele Ganser

STEPHENSON, SIR WILLIAM SAMUEL (JANUARY 25, 1897–JANUARY 31, 1989)

A Canadian, Sir William Stephenson was instrumental in establishing the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. He did so covertly working for British intelligence under the guise of the British Security Coordination Office in New York City. This office, which he headed, was charged with conducting a propaganda campaign and secret diplomacy in the United States to bring it into the war, as well as engaging in a full range of intelligence operations against Nazi targets in the Western Hemisphere. Stephenson had served with honor in World War I as a fighter pilot. In one encounter Stephenson's plane was shot down and he was imprisoned in a prisoner-of-war camp from which he escaped.

After the war Stephenson became a millionaire from his patenting of a machine that made it possible for the radio transmission of photographs. From there he expanded into a number of other business ventures, including steel mills. When World War II broke out he used this knowledge to help British intelligence and took part in a failed sabotage mission. British intelligence next asked him to serve as a liaison with American officials in order to ferret out German espionage and sabotage programs in the United States. When his efforts to work with Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover produced few positive results, Stephenson

turned his attention to one of President Franklin Roosevelt's many confidants, William "Wild Bill" Donovan.

He accompanied Donovan on a trip to London in 1940. Donovan was evaluating the strategic situation in Europe and the Mediterranean for Roosevelt. Bad weather delayed the flight from Bermuda for eight days and Stephenson used the time to press his case for a centralized civilian intelligence agency that would engage in covert action, espionage, and analysis. Donovan proved to be far more receptive to Stephenson's message than had Hoover and he produced a report for Roosevelt urging the creation of such an organization. Donovan's proposal led to the creation first of the Office of the Coordinator of Information and then the OSS. Stephenson worked closely with these bodies in order to provide them with the necessary skills to carry out their missions and to ensure that their activities were consistent with British objectives. At war's end Stephenson went back into private business. He was knighted in 1945 and also received the U.S. Medal of Merit.

See also: Donovan, Major General William Joseph; Office of Strategic Services

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Glenn P. Hastedt

STRAIGHT, MICHAEL WHITNEY (SEPTEMBER 1, 1916–JANUARY 4, 2004)

Michael Whitney Straight was a member of a wealthy American family. He was to be an American student at Cambridge University in the mid-1930s when he was recruited by Anthony Blunt as an agent for the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). The Cambridge group was composed mainly of homosexuals according to his biography, *After Long Silence* (1983).

On December 28, 1936, John Cornford, a close friend of Straight, was killed while fighting in the Spanish civil war with a Communist unit. Following the instructions of Anthony Burgess, who was relaying KGB orders, Straight broke with the Communists and returned to the United States. He was to later claim that that was the end of his work with the KGB. However, the break is believed to have been a pretense because he returned to the United States to become an agent of influence and an agent provocateur.

In 1963 Straight applied for a job with the federal government. Fearing that a background check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would reveal his secret past, he made a full disclosure of his espionage activities. He named Anthony Blunt and others as members of the Cambridge spy ring.

Straight worked in the Roosevelt and Nixon administrations. He headed various private organizations, and was editor of *The New Republic*. His claim that he was only a agent for the KGB while at Cambridge have been seriously questioned because of files

released in Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the testimony of other KGB agents and by evidence gathered by the FBI.

See also: Blunt, Anthony; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Andrew J. Waskey

STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT

The Strategic Services Unit was the operational arm of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was transferred to the Department of War after World War II. On September 20, 1945, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9621, effective on October 1, disbanding the OSS, the wartime U.S. intelligence, espionage, and sabotage agency. The OSS, except for the Research and Analysis Branch, which was transferred to the Department of State, was placed under the authority of the Department of War and renamed the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Brigadier General John Magruder, deputy director for intelligence of the OSS, was designated as the director of the SSU. Although the SSU cut its personnel and budget for special operations and paramilitary functions that were not necessary in peacetime, it still played a very important role. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy directed Magruder to retain the secret intelligence capability that the OSS had developed during the war.

On January 22, 1946, President Truman issued a directive that created the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) comprising of the secretaries of state, war, and navy and the president's personal representative. He also established under the NIA the post of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the immediate predecessor organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. As the U.S. postwar intelligence system gradually emerged, Magruder insisted that the SSU should be incorporated by the CIG as the basis of clandestine intelligence procurement during peacetime. DCI Sidney William Souers, accepting Magruder's assertion, established a committee, named the Fortier Committee, after its Chairman Colonel Louis J. Fortier, to study the disposition of the SSU. That committee essentially approved Magruders' insistence and recommended that the CIG should take over the SSU.

The NIA authorized DCI Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg, who succeeded Souers on June 10, 1946, to conduct all federal espionage and counterespionage outside the U.S. Vandenberg followed this instruction and established the Office of Special Operations in the CIG on July 11, 1946. The SSU was absorbed by the office and became the nucleus of American secret intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The SSU was officially abolished on October 19, 1946.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Central Intelligence Group; National Intelligence Authority; Office of Special Operations; Office of Strategic Services

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Naoki Ohno

STRONG, MAJOR GENERAL KENNETH W. D. (1900–1982)

Kenneth W. D. Strong was the head of British intelligence working for General Dwight Eisenhower in World War II, later writing his memoirs on how efforts were made to get U.S. and British intelligence to work together during the war.

Kenneth William Dobson Strong was born on September 9, 1900, and educated at Montrose Academy, Glenalmond, and the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. He was commissioned as second lieutenant in the Royal Scots Fusiliers. In 1935 he was a member of the Saar Force and held a number of positions in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, learning to speak German, French, Italian, and Spanish, qualifying as an interpreter in all four languages.

In 1942 Strong was appointed to be head of intelligence of the Home Forces and then attached to the forces of Eisenhower in North Africa in early 1943. At the end of 1943 when Eisenhower became supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe, he asked whether Strong could be seconded as his chief intelligence officer. This request was turned down by General Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, whereupon Eisenhower approached Churchill who agreed. This saw Strong serving in Sicily, Italy, France, and then Germany.

From 1945 until 1947 Strong was director general of the Political Intelligence Department at the British Foreign Office, and from 1948 until 1964 was first director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau at the Ministry of Defence. He was the first director-general of Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence from 1964 until his retirement from the security services two years later, whereupon he became a director of Philip Hill Investment Trust and Eagle Star Insurance.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Justin Corfield

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STUDEMAN, ADMIRAL WILLIAM O. (JANUARY 16, 1940–)

Admiral William O. Studeman served as director of the National Security Agency (NSA) from August 1988 to April 1992, a period that included Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. He assumed this position after having served from 1985 to 1988 as Director of Naval Intelligence. At NSA, Studeman replaced Army Lieutenant General William E. Odom, who had a stormy tenure as director. At NSA Odom is credited with being an innovative manager and as one who took steps to improve bilateral cooperation between NSA and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and cared about community wide management issues.

Upon leaving NSA, Studeman became Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. He held this position from April 9, 1992, to July 3, 1995. Twice during this period he became acting director of Central Intelligence. The first time was from January 21 to February 5, 1993, following the departure of Robert Gates, and the second time from January 11 to May 9, 1995, following the departure of R. James Woolsey.

Studeman was born on January 16, 1940, in Brownsville, Texas. He graduated in 1962 from the University of the South and went on to receive a graduate degree from George Washington University and attended both the Naval War College and National War College. He began his naval career in 1963 when he was commissioned an ensign. He would rise through the ranks and become commanding officer at the Navy Operational Intelligence Center in 1982.

Studeman retired from the navy in 1995. In retirement Studeman entered private business as a consultant and executive. He served as vice president and deputy general manager for intelligence and information superiority of Northrop Grumman Mission Systems. On February 6, 2004, President George W. Bush appointed Studeman to the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

See also: National Security Agency

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Glenn P. Hastedt

STUDIES AND OBSERVATION GROUP

The Studies and Observation Group was a covert joint service (U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) unconventional warfare task force that conducted highly secret operations and covert intelligence gathering throughout Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War.

MACV Special Operations Group (SOG) was established on January 24, 1964, as a subordinate command under the direction of the special assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) at the Pentagon. SOG was charged with conducting covert operations against North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which had formerly been controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The name of the organization, which had been meant to serve as a cover for its covert nature, was changed to Studies and Observation Group in late 1964 because the original name was too close to the unit's actual mission.

As a counterpart to SOG, the South Vietnamese established the Special Exploitation Service in 1964; this was later renamed the Strategic Technical Service early in 1965, and the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) late in 1967.

SOG headquarters was in Saigon, but the organization used bases scattered throughout South Vietnam and, from 1966 onward, at Nakhon Phanom in Thailand.

SOG was commanded by U.S. Army colonels from Special Forces. Colonel Clyde Russell became the first commander of SOG in January 1964. The task force consisted of about 2,000 U.S. personnel, including Special Forces–qualified army personnel, Air Force 90th Special Operations Wing personnel, Navy SEALs, and Marine Corps force recon personnel. The organization also included 8,000 indigenous South Vietnamese and Montagnard troops.

SOG was divided into a number of different groups: (1) Psychological Studies Group, operating out of Hue and Tay Ninh, made false radio broadcasts from powerful transmitters; (2) Air Studies Group, complete with UH-1F "Green Hornet" and H-34 helicopters, a C-130 squadron, and a C-123 squadron, specialized in dropping and recovering special intelligence groups into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam; (3) Maritime Studies Group concentrated its efforts on commando raids along the North Vietnamese coast and in the Mekong Delta; and (4) Ground Studies Group, which carried out the greatest number of missions, including ambushes and raids, monitoring the location of American POWs, assassinations, kidnapping, rescue of airmen downed in enemy territory, long-range reconnaissance patrols, training and dispatching agents into North Vietnam, and harassment and booby-trapping of enemy infiltration routes and ammunition supply facilities along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia.

In 1968, SOG reorganized its ground strike elements into three field commands: Command and Control Central (CCC) in Kontum, Command and Control North (CCN) in Da Nang, and Command and Control South (CCS) in Ban Me Thuot. CCC was responsible for classified unconventional warfare operations throughout the tri-border region of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. CCN was responsible for special unconventional warfare missions into Laos and North Vietnam. CCS was responsible for clandestine unconventional warfare operations inside VC-dominated South Vietnam and throughout Cambodia.

In March 1971, MACV-SOG's CCN, CCC, and CCS were redesignated as Elements 1, 2, and 3, respectively, of MACV Advisory Team 158, charged with advising the South Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate. MACV-SOG was deactivated on April 30, 1972; MACV-SOG personnel earned a total of six Medals of Honor during the fighting in Southeast Asia.

See also: Vietnam War and Intelligence Operations

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James H. Willbanks

SUN-TZU
(544BC–496BC)

Sun Wu tzu is believed to have been a general and the author of *The Art of War*, written during the Period of the Warring States. Recent Chinese archeology has recovered a great many ancient books including a complete copy of *The Art of War* and previously unknown additional chapters.

Sun-tzu describes intelligence work in Chapter 13 of *The Art of War*. For Sun-tzu, intelligence is what wins battles and wars. He identifies five kinds of spies who should be working simultaneously to secure a full knowledge of the enemy. The five kinds of spies are "local spies," "internal spies," "double agents," "expendable spies," and "living spies."

Native agents are spies recruited from among the people of the kingdom being opposed. They spy quite often for money. Internal agents are spies recruited from among the officials of the kingdom being opposed. They are willing to commit treason because they have been passed over for promotion, punished for wrong doing, or have some other kind of grievance. They are usually kept loyal with money. They can provide detailed intelligence on what is happening in the councils of the kingdom. They can also act as agents of influence. Double agents are enemy spies who have agreed to spy against their own country. Turning them into double agents is often easily done by bribery. Expendable agents are sent out as decoys or with disinformation. When caught, they usually give up the false information, believing it to be true and are then executed. Living agents are those who successfully complete their mission and then return alive to report.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; American Intelligence, World War II; Civil War Intelligence; Cold War Intelligence; Early Republic and Espionage; Post–Cold War Intelligence; Spanish-American War; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence; Vietnam War and Intelligence Operations

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Andrew J. Waskey

SURETE GENERALE

Currently, the French intelligence community is divided into two branches: one military and the other civilian. Responsibility for the internal security of France has been assigned to the national gendarmerie and the national police force. The national gendarmerie (military police under the supervision of the Ministry for Defense) is a military police force. It polices about the roughly half of the population of France that lives in the countryside and in small towns. Although administratively a part of the French armed forces, it is operationally attached to the Ministry of the Interior.

Civilian security is the responsibility of the Judicial Police (Direction Centrale Police Judiciaire, DCPJ). The main responsibility of the DCPJ is to combat criminal activity inside of France, including threats to national security.

French police agencies were reorganized in 1966 and even more radically in 1995. One motive for the reorganization was the need to overcome the bitter legacy of mistrust from World War II in which the Vichy cooperated with the Nazis and the Resistance fought against them. The cold war and the war in Algeria had only worsened tensions. Today the goal is to organize to meet the needs of domestic and political intelligence especially to combat terrorism.

The La Sûreté Nationale is the former name of the Direction Générale de la Police Nationale (National Police). It operates under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and exercises general law enforcement in the cities and large towns. Within the National Police, specialized groups engage in security operations. The Central Headquarters for Surveillance of the Territory (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire) gathers intelligence on organizations located outside of France that are potential security risks.

The General Intelligence Central Service (Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généreaux), or RG, is the main counterintelligence agency. It combats threats posed by organizations or individuals located inside of France. The director of the RG reports to the Minister of the Interior. The Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) is a directorate of the French National Police. It conducts both intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Much of its work is economic counterintelligence that seeks to prevent the theft of French technology.

The National Police can trace its history to the Comité De Sûreté Générale, which was created by the National Convention as a tool of French Revolutionary justice in 1792. It was used by the Committee of Public Safety during the Reign of Terror. Napoleon took control of police forces and used them for his own purposes. His successors followed suit. Among their activities were keeping a cabinet B (list of people to be arrested in time of war) and a cabinet noire in the French post office reading private correspondences.

See also: Cold War Intelligence

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SUVOROV, VICTOR
(APRIL 20, 1947–)

Pseudonym of Vladimir Rezun, Victor Suvorov was a major in Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU), prominent defector, and author of several books on Soviet intelligence and World War II. Suvorov received his nickname in the army because of his reputation as a know-it-all; the original, Field Marshal Alexander V. Suvorov (1729–1800) is regarded as one of Russia's greatest military commanders. Suvorov spent most of his career providing support for intelligence operations, although he was occasionally given the opportunity for more serious work such as recruiting agents. In 1978 Suvorov became involved in a scandal at his embassy; fearing that he was to be recalled to Moscow, he defected to Great Britain. Suvorov published *Inside the Aquarium* in 1985; the title refers to the glass and steel headquarters of the GRU called the *aquarium* by its inhabitants, a selective account of his career notable for its relentless championing of the GRU at the expense of the KGB. Suvorov is most famous for his revisionist historical writings such as *Icebreaker*, published in 1990, which reject the traditional viewpoint that the Nazi invasion of Russia caught the Soviet army in a critical state of confusion and disarray. Instead, Suvorov claims that the Red Army was in a high state of preparedness, organized in an offensive posture, and poised to strike into Western Europe. Stalin, Suvorov suggests, hoped to create the conditions for European-wide revolutions, defeat a weakened Germany, and dominate all of continental Europe. Only Hitler's premature invasion, catching the Red Army in an offensive rather than defensive posture, thwarted Stalin's plans. Most historians reject Suvorov's claims, citing the disastrous effects of the purges on the military command structure, the poor moral of the troops, and the inability of the army to properly organize itself as the reasons for the early German victories.

See also: GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate)

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Vernon L. Pedersen

T

TALLMADGE, MAJOR BENJAMIN (FEBRUARY 25, 1754–MARCH 7, 1835)

Major Benjamin Tallmadge was intelligence chief for General George Washington during the War of American Independence. Born on February 25, 1754, in Setauket, Long Island, New York, Tallmadge was educated at Yale College. In 1776 he enlisted as a lieutenant in Colonel John Chester's Connecticut regiment, and rose to the rank of major in the Continental Light Dragoons. General George Washington chose him in 1778 to head American military intelligence services and spy on the British army in New York City and on Long Island.

To affect this service, Tallmadge organized the Culper Spy Ring, recruiting childhood friends from Setauket. Robert Townsend (Culper Junior) a merchant and society reporter for James Rivington's *Royal Gazette* gathered information in the city. Austin Roe carried this unsifted evidence to Abraham Woodhull (Culper Senior) at Setauket. Woodhull digested it and passed it to Caleb Brewster, who conveyed it by whaleboat across Long Island Sound to Tallmadge at Fairfield, Connecticut. Tallmadge then dispatched it by dragoon couriers to Washington's headquarters at New Windsor, New York.

Tallmadge and his spies provided Washington with valuable information on enemy troop movements, numbers, and morale. In 1780 they warned Washington of an impending British attack on Rhode Island, and allowed him to foil it. Also in 1780 Tallmadge helped capture the British spy, John André. He died on March 7, 1835, in Litchfield, Connecticut.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; André, Major John; Rivington, James; Woodhull, Abraham

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Paul David Nelson

TALLEYRAND-PÉRIGORD, CHARLES MAURICE DE (FEBRUARY 2, 1754–MAY 17, 1838)

Talleyrand was a French diplomat who served under Napoleon Bonaparte. Born February 2, 1754, in Paris, France, he pursued a career in religion because a childhood foot injury prevented him from joining the military service. In 1789, Talleyrand was appointed bishop of Autun.

Elected to the Estates-General in 1789, he favored a constitutional monarchy and signed the Declaration of Rights. Three years later, Talleyrand was elected president of the National Assembly, where he gained popular support for proposing that the government take control of church property to pay for the nation's debts. His actions caused Pope Pious VI to excommunicate him from the Catholic Church.

In 1792, Talleyrand traveled to England on a diplomatic mission to avert war between the two nations. While aboard, the French Revolution took a radical turn and he was exiled as a royalist supporter. After remaining in England for two years, he fled to the United States.

In September 1796, Talleyrand returned to France. The following year he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the XYZ Affair, Talleyrand demanded a bribe and a loan from American commissioners Charles C. Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry to open negotiations regarding French privateers seizing American merchant vessels.

Allying himself with Napoleon Bonaparte, Talleyrand assisted in overthrowing the directory and replacing it with the consulate. By 1803, Napoleon had lost interest in establishing an American empire, so Talleyrand negotiated with American diplomats James Monroe and Robert Livingston to sell the entire Louisiana Territory to the United States for $15 million.

In 1807, Talleyrand resigned as foreign minister and came to oppose Napoleon's conquests as injurious to France and European peace. Following the abdication of Napoleon in 1814, Talleyrand was instrumental in the restoration of the Bourbons to the French throne. Serving as one of the chief French negotiators at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, he reestablished France's 1792 boundaries.

After 1815, the Bourbon court excluded Talleyrand from public affairs. By 1830, he supported the establishment of a constitutional monarchy under Louis Philippe. Under the new regime, Talleyrand served as ambassador of Great Britain from 1830 until 1834. Talleyrand died on May 17, 1838.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage; XYZ Affair

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Kevin M. Brady

TAYLOR, CAPTAIN DANIEL M.

Captain Daniel M. Taylor helped pioneer organized military intelligence in the United States. He served as the first effective head of the Military Intelligence Division. In the years after the U.S. Civil War, logistical constraints continued to insulate the United States from any possible European invasion. Nevertheless, Canada (under British control) was a potential springboard for invasion.

In 1885, U.S.-British relations were severely strained over disputes about fishing rights and the position of the Alaskan boundary. Both nations seized vessels of the other nation before the crisis was ended by arbitration. During the crisis, Brigadier General R. C. Drum, adjutant to the secretary of war, wanted information about the potential enemy, but because the United States still lacked a General Staff, little was readily available. The Division of Military Information was organized under Major William Volkmar to collect information on Canada.

Captain Daniel M. Taylor, an ordinance officer, was moved to Drum's office in April 1886 and in August he was selected for a reconnaissance mission of the Canadian border. Traveling in an indirect route from Washington, DC, to Canada through the Great Lakes, he examined the Welland Canal, and the cities of Kingston, Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec. Taylor's report came in October. It recommended that, in the event of war, the United States should capture Canadian canals rather than destroy them and antagonize the local inhabitants. He also urged that more reconnaissance be made, particularly on the Pacific coast.

His report impressed his superiors, and when the War Department established a more autonomous Military Information Division (MID) on April 12, 1889, Taylor was selected to lead it. As the head of MID until 1892, he worked to implement his suggestions.

See also: Army Intelligence; Civil War Intelligence; Early Republic and Espionage

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Nicholas M. Sambaluk

TELEVISION—ESPIONAGE SHOWS ON

In the mid- to late-twentieth century, Americans became fascinated with the secret agent; this is evident by the vast number of television shows and movies depicting espionage and those involved in it. Espionage shows began on television in the early 1950s during the Red Scare and McCarthyism; however, the spy craze actually hit television sets in the early 1960s and held on tightly until the late 1960s to early 1970s. The craze faded in the mid-1970s and 1980s but made a strong reemergence at the very end of twentieth century and into the twenty-first century.

Many of the predecessors to the spy shows of the 1950s and beyond came from radio shows or books. Radio spy shows date back to the 1930s. Espionage found a new media with the advent of the television into Americans' homes. The earliest espionage shows debuted in 1951 with *Doorway to Danger* (also known as *Door with No Name*), *Dangerous Assignment*, and *Foreign Intrigue*. None of those, however, matched the success of *I Led 3 Lives*.

I Led 3 Lives ran from 1953 to 1956 and was based on the life of Herbert Philbrick. Philbrick was a FBI agent who had infiltrated the American Communist Party and was leading essentially three lives: citizen, FBI agent, and Communist. Philbrick's book, by the same title released in 1952, inspired the television show. The FBI supported *I Led 3 Lives* and was even said to be highly regarded by J. Edgar Hoover.

I Led 3 Lives was part of a genre called documentary melodrama which consisted of mixing fact with fiction. This genre describes most early spy shows. *I Led 3 Lives* not only served as anti-Communist propaganda but also reinforced gender roles similar to the other sitcoms of the time that were also set in suburbia.

In the late 1950s spy shows were still visible on television (*Behind Closed Doors* and *World of Giants*) but were unsuccessful at obtaining an audience. It was not until the first James Bond film, *Dr. No*, was released in 1962 that audiences everywhere would be intrigued by the exciting and mysterious lifestyles of spies.

British author Ian Fleming created the first Bond novel in 1953 entitled *Casino Royale*. His novels, and the films that resulted from them, inspired the spy genre that many are familiar with today. This genre started in the 1960s with the first major spy series, *The Man from United Network Command for Law and Enforcement*, or commonly known as *The Man from U.N.C.L.E.*

The Man from U.N.C.L.E., which ran from 1964 to 1968, was about two agents, Napoleon Solo and Illya Kuryakin, trying to stop the organization THRUSH from achieving world domination. It teams a Westerner and a Russian who join forces to stop a common enemy, which was daring considering it was during the cold war. Ian Fleming came up with the title character's name but was later prohibited from further involvement due to legal issues (a villain in *Goldfinger*, a Bond movie in production, was named Solo as well). *The Man from U.N.C.L.E.* was not a big hit from the start but after it took off it become a cultural phenomenon. It even had a spin-off *The Girl from U.N.C.L.E.* *The Girl from U.N.C.L.E.* could not match the success of its predecessor and only lasted one season (1966).

I Spy, which debuted in 1965, was a hip spy show about two undercover agents—one disguised as a tennis player and the other his trainer played by Robert Culp and Bill Cosby, respectively. In the midst of the civil rights movement, *I Spy* showcased an

Don Adams (Maxwell Smart) stars in the popular comedic spy television show *Get Smart*. (Photofest)

African-American in a leading role equal to that of his white costar. This drew such controversy that several markets in the South refused to air the premiere episode. *I Spy* went on to have a three-year run.

Some felt this spy craze was getting too intense and needed some humor. *Get Smart* did just that in 1965. *Get Smart* was a parody of the whole spy genre. It ran from 1965 to 1969 on NBC and was picked up for one last season in 1970 by CBS. The opposite of James Bond, clumsy Agent 86 (also known as Maxwell Smart, played by Don Adams), is paired up with Agent 99 (Barbara Feldon). Both are operatives of "Control," a top-secret counterspy agency located in Washington, DC whose mission it was to stop the evil forces of Kaos, an organization whose goal was to foment worldwide unrest and revolution. This show would feature silly gadgets such as the shoe phone that Agent 86 would use to communicate with the Chief (Ed Platt) to poke fun at the shows that seriously used sophisticated gadgets to achieve their goals. It not only poked fun at the spy genre but even at the government. Some of the plotlines and events of the show became so realistic that they were investigated by government agents. Mel Brooks, a writer for the series, feels that the show was such a success because of the way authority was portrayed; in a very comedic way at a time when authority was being questioned.

Westerns were immensely popular at this time so why not incorporate aspects of both espionage shows and Westerns to make a television show. The result of this combination was *The Wild Wild West* (1965–1969). *The Wild Wild West* featured two Secret Service agents, James West (Robert Conrad) and Artemus Gordon (Ross Martin). They took their orders from Ulysses S. Grant, the president of the United States, and scuffled with villains in the American frontier.

Mission: Impossible (1966–1973) was different from any other show on TV at the time, with its suspenseful intricate plots. It won numerous Emmy Awards and ran for seven seasons on CBS, making it the longest-running spy series on American television. Characters and actors on *Mission: Impossible* were constantly changing and

each mission relied heavily on teamwork (as opposed to the movies by the same released in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century with Tom Cruise as the lead character that focused on individualism, action, and high-tech gadgets).

The very British import *The Avengers* debuted on American television in 1966. It featured two secret agents John Steed (Patrick Macnee), with his trademark bowler hat and umbrella, and Diana Rigg as Emma Peel (1966–1967). Diana Rigg was neither the first nor the last to fulfill the role of Steed's partner; the show went through several costars throughout its run. An attempt was made to revive the success of *The Avengers* in the 1970s with the short-lived *The New Avengers* (1976–1977).

Espionage shows in the 1970s and 1980s were not innovative but rather used old formats and updated the technology or reunited stars from the original shows. In the 1990s, however, there was a shift to the unexplainable. TV science fiction programs became popular and many elements from that genre merged into the spy genre creating spy-fi. An example of this merge would be *The X-Files*.

The X-Files featured Dana Scully (Gillian Anderson) and Fox Mulder (David Duchovny) as two FBI agents investigating cases of phenomena, such as aliens and mutants. *The X-Files* enjoyed a successful nine-year run starting in 1993 and has created a cult following. This illustrates that women were featured in more active roles in 1990s spy shows. Another example could be *La Femme Nikita* (also known as simply *Nikita*), which aired from 1997 to 2001 and featured Peta Wilson as Nikita, secret agent and assassin.

Espionage shows made a strong comeback in the opening of the twenty-first century. In the 2001 fall season three new spy shows appeared on three different networks; *Alias* on ABC, *24* on Fox, and *The Agency* on CBS. This reemergence of spy mania coincided, ironically, with the September 11 attacks on the United States.

Alias centers on Sydney Bristow (Jennifer Garner), a college student turned spy for a "secret" CIA organization. She finds out that the organization is not part of the CIA at all but rather an enemy of the CIA. Sydney then becomes a double agent. *Alias* had a strong following and lasted until May 2006.

As of early 2007, *24* was starting its sixth season. Jack Bauer (Kiefer Sutherland) is part of an elite CIA organization whose mission is to stop terrorism. With an interesting format, each season of *24* covers a 24-hour period. Twenty-four has received numerous nominations and has won countless awards including a Golden Globe in 2003 for Best Television Series-Drama, and an Emmy for Outstanding Drama Series in 2006. *The Agency* (CBS) produced a breakthrough of sorts when for the first time the CIA allowed scenes for the series to be partially filmed on its premises. *The Agency* attempted to deal with CIA agents and terrorism in a realistic way. It was also meant to portray the CIA in a positive light. *The Agency*, despite its potential, could not meet the success of either *Alias* or *24*. The fantasy elements of *Alias* and the unusual format of *24* edged out the realism of *The Agency*, which ended its run in 2003.

Espionage television shows continue to fascinate American audiences. With reruns and the popularity of television series becoming available on DVDs, new generations are now discovering the older spy shows such as *Get Smart* and *I Spy*. Espionage on television continues to evolve with the times. It is clear, however, that spy shows have become embedded in American popular culture.

See also: American Communist Party; Central Intelligence Agency; CHAOS; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Fiction—Spy Novels; Hoover, J. Edgar; Movies, Spies in

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Vanessa de los Reyes

TENENBAUM, DAVID

David Tenenbaum was an engineer employed by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command. From July 1992 to February 1997 he was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on six different allegations of having provided Israel with classified information over a 10-year period. In February 1998 the U.S. Attorney's Office declined to bring charges against Tenenbaum because of insufficient evidence. Nonetheless, based on the results of a polygraph test, Tenenbaum lost access to classified information in 1997 and his security clearance was revoked in February 2000 because of these allegations. In 2003 his personnel security clearance was restored and upgraded.

Tenenbaum maintained that he was singled out for suspicion and unfair treatment, including a fabricated confession and harassment of himself and his family due to his religion. In October 1998 Tenenbaum initiated legal action against the U.S. Army, asserting that he was the subject of irregular and unequal treatment by army and Defense Investigative Service employees. The case was dismissed because the relevant evidence was classified as secret and could not be revealed. In January 2000 Tenenbaum again brought suit against the army, arguing that his civil rights had been violated. This case was also dismissed on the basis of the non-justiciability of security clearance remedies regarding the alleged civil rights violations.

Subsequently, in March 2006 Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) requested an investigation into the handling of Tenenbaum's case by the Office of the Inspector General in the Department of Defense. Its 55-page report produced in July 2008 found that Tenenbaum was the subject of inappropriate treatment by army and Defense Investigative Service officials who failed to follow established policies and procedures for conducting personnel security investigations and counterintelligence allegations. The report also concluded that Tenenbaum's religion was a factor that led to the inappropriate behavior stating that "but for Mr. Tenenbaum's religion, the investigations would likely have

taken a different course." The actions taken by the government were defined as fitting a definition of discrimination. The inspector general's report was limited in scope to reviewing the actions of Defense Department officials and did not examine the actions of FBI or Justice Department officials.

See also: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Post–Cold War Intelligence

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TENET, GEORGE
(JANUARY 5, 1953–)

George Tenet was the 18th Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). He served under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush from July 11, 1997, to July 11, 2004. Prior to that Tenet served as acting director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Director of Intelligence. Tenet was born in Flushing, New York, and graduated with a masters in international affairs from Columbia University in 1978. Upon graduation, he went to work for the American Hellenic Institute in Washington, DC. Both of his parents were Greek immigrants and in a Greek-American lobbying organization. In 1982 Tenet became a legislative aide to Senator John Heinz (R-PA) with responsibility for national security issues, among others. After three years in this position he moved on to become a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and served as staff director from 1988 to 1993. Tenet was a member of President Bill Clinton's national security transition team and held the position of special assistant to the president and Senior Direct for Intelligence Programs, National Security Council in the new administration. It was from this position that he was appointed Deputy Director of Intelligence.

Tenet is described as a Washington insider, someone who throughout his career was capable of working with both Republicans and Democrats. He developed a strong loyalty to those he worked with whether they were senators, intelligence professionals, or the president. He was a member of the "war cabinet" and briefed the president personally almost every day on intelligence matters. His loyalty to the president shown when he took public responsibility for the questionable intelligence used in justifying the Iraq War.

As DCI, Tenet expressed an initial desire to return the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to its core missions. He sought to move away from risky covert operations and paramilitary undertakings. Tenet reemphasized human intelligence collection, increasing by tenfold the number of CIA officers undergoing training to be case officers and work in clandestine collection operations. This does not mean he ignored other areas of intelligence collection. Tenet worked to establish a centralized Measures and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) organization within the Defense Intelligence Agency.

He also merged the Community Open Source Program Office into the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Finally, Tenet wanted the CIA to focus on its warning function and to move away from soft intelligence questions and back to military-oriented ones. Tenet did not ignore other areas of intelligence collection.

Tenet's tenure as DCI was dominated by the events leading up to and following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. A complex and often contradictory pattern emerges here. Tenet began to focus on Osama bin Laden as a serious national security threat to the United States in 1999. Some came to characterize it as an obsession. Yet, the CIA's institutional response never reached that depth of concern or produced an equivalent level of activity directed at terrorism. Tenet was often cautious in presenting intelligence on bin Laden and Iraq, noting on occasion that it came from a "single thread," meaning that there was no collaborative intelligence. Yet as movement toward war with Iraq intensified he would present intelligence as solid, "a slam dunk," that he would later acknowledge was not accurate and that some of his human intelligence sources had fabricated information and that the CIA should have done a better job assessing its accuracy and reliability.

See also; Bin Laden, Osama; Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; Post–Cold War Intelligence; September 11, 2001; Terrorist Groups and Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

TERRORIST GROUPS AND INTELLIGENCE

Terrorist groups present a unique intelligence challenge for many reasons, not the least of which is identifying who is a terrorist. In 2003 the United States had at least six different terrorist lists. They included "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," "State-Sponsors of Terrorism," "Special Designated Terrorists," "Specially Designated Global Terrorists," "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons," and "Terrorist Exclusion List."

Looking beyond their identification, the structure of terrorist groups presents a fundamental intelligence challenge. Unlike states or even international organizations and nongovernmental agencies, terrorist groups lack a clearly defined center of gravity against which to target one's intelligence resources. In place of the clearly defined organizations and routines of governments, one finds a much more fluid structure and modus operandi. This is fully evident in the changes that have taken place in organization and

President George W. Bush is joined by (l–r) Senator Patrick Leahy (with camera), Senator Harry Reid, and Representative James Sensenbrenner as he signs the antiterrorism bill at a White House ceremony on October 26, 2001. (AP/Wide World Photos)

operation of al-Qaeda since 9/11. At the time it was common to equate Osama bin Laden with the head of a hostile government who was directing his country's assets against the United States. Today his role seems far different, more of an enabler and symbolic source of energy than a commanding general. Al-Qaeda is less a central controlling organization than a loosely connected ring of concentric circles. Beyond the core of al-Qaeda central lies a second ring composed of al-Qaeda affiliates who receive training and guidance from the center but operate independently. In a third ring are al-Qaeda locals. Finally in the outermost ring are found homegrown radicals with no direct connection to al-Qaeda but are drawn to it by its ideology and resentment of the West. Each ring presents intelligence with different challenges and opportunities, with the furthest removed rings being the easiest to target for information but also offering the least amount of information on the actions and plans of al-Qaeda per se.

A related challenge for intelligence is identifying the goals of terrorist groups. Terrorism per se is an instrument of policy. It is not limited to any one goal. Knowing that an organization is a terrorist group thus says little about the purposes to which its power will be put. Today's terrorism is the fourth wave of modern global international terrorism. The first, anarchist wave of terrorism began in Russia in the 1880s. A second anti-colonial wave began in the 1920s to be replaced by a third new left wave of terrorism in the 1960s. The current religious wave of terrorism commenced in 1979 and speculation exists that it will run its course by 2025 when still another wave of terrorism will replace it. Thus, unlike most states, terrorist organizations have relatively short lives. They cannot be permanently infiltrated with agents. Monitoring their behavior may allow officials to disrupt their behavior but it will not alert these same officials to the onset of a new wave of terrorism or even the emergence of new groups in an ongoing wave. The situation is complicated even further by the category of state-supported terrorist groups. These groups are seen as allied with states such as Iran and can be viewed as instruments of their foreign policy. As one moves to more self-sufficient and independent terrorist groups this linkage grows weaker. States and terrorist groups now may be allies of convenience but a symmetry of interests cannot be assumed.

The intelligence challenge in dealing with terrorism is heavily dependent on the strategy adopted by policy makers in responding to it. A "war on terrorism" puts intelligence agencies in a context in which the military is the lead instrument of policy. Defining the terrorist threat as a criminal activity moves intelligence into the realm of supporting police work. In each case tactical and strategic intelligence is needed but where the first approach emphasizes intelligence to defeat terrorists, the second definition of the problem stresses intelligence in the context of obeying the rule of law. In a military context everyone is a potential terrorist. In a criminal justice context a clear distinction exists between criminals and others.

The activity of terrorist groups also complicates the intelligence challenge by its blurring of the boundary between domestic and foreign policy. Historically policy makers and citizens have been far more willing to act aggressively to outsiders than they are to their own citizens. Accordingly the techniques used to obtain information abroad have been far more expansive than those used at home. When this distinction is ignored intelligence agencies often become the target of political repercussions when the crisis has passed. This has occurred more than once in the history of U.S. intelligence. In the 1970s revelations about mail openings, electronic surveillance, and the infiltration of antigovernment organizations caused a political outcry and led to passing a series of intelligence reforms. After 9/11 the Bush administration engaged in a warrantless electronic surveillance operation targeted on Americans. Additionally it endorsed the use of a series of harsh interrogation techniques such as waterboarding against non-Americans suspected of being terrorists or supporting terrorism that many held to be acts of torture. As with the 1970s, revelations that the CIA engaged in assassinations these interrogation techniques violated American's image of themselves and produced a backlash.

A final factor complicating intelligence work against terrorist groups is not unique to this particular problem. It lies in the attitude that policy makers have to intelligence. Surprise is not taken as an inherent aspect of international politics. It is something that can be prevented. This view finds expression in the phrase "connecting the dots," implying that if only intelligence had collected the proper information and analyzed it correctly the incident would not have occurred. In doing so they fail to appreciate the extent to which terrorism is a mystery with many possible solutions as opposed to a puzzle with a picture solution known to all before the pieces are assembled into a whole.

See also: Bin Laden, Osama; Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Clinton Administration and Intelligence; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (The 9/11 Commission); Post–Cold War Intelligence; September 11, 2001; Special Operations Forces

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Glenn P. Hastedt

THEREMIN, LEON
(AUGUST 28, 1896–NOVEMBER 3, 1993)

Leon Theremin was born Lev Sergryevich Termen. His studies in electronics led to a pioneering career in music that was overshadowed by Soviet demands for espionage efforts. Drafted into the Russian military during World War I, Theremin was fortunate to be sent to the Petrograd Officers Electro-Technical School as a result of his scientific talents. After the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin noticed these talents. Lenin supported Theremin's invention of the Theremin, a musical instrument named for himself. Most popular in the 1920s, the Theremin helped pioneer electronic music.

Theremin was allowed to leave USSR to travel to the United States, ostensibly a brief visit to demonstrate his new instrument, but actually to also conduct espionage. His stay lasted from 1927 until 1938. Briefly ahead of his competitors in developing television, he was handicapped by Stalin's myopic interest in technology being harnessed as secret weapons. In the 1930s he faced increasing financial worries as his developments failed to garner sufficient investments. Throughout his life, he also pursued a number of romantic interests.

Jan Berzin, his spy contact while outside the USSR, was murdered in Stalin's Purge as a Fascist. Theremin returned to the USSR and was also arrested shortly before the signing of the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact on the same charge. Imprisoned at the Butyrky gold mine manned by slave laborers, he barely survived until being transferred to Central Design Bureau Number 29 (TsKB-29), an NKVD prison for slave labor scientists. He labored at TsKB-29 from 1947 until 1964, first as a slave laborer and later as an employee.

Some of his most notable projects were a bug hidden in the Great Seal in the Spaso House (residence of the American ambassador to USSR). Undetected from 1945 until 1952, the United States announced the existence of the bug in 1960. Under the supervision of the brutal security chief Lavrenti Beria, Theremin also applied a listening system using the reverberations of windows to spy on Josef Stalin. In 1990, Theremin joined the Communist Party.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs)

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TOWNSEND, ROBERT
(NOVEMBER 25, 1753–MARCH 7, 1828)

Member of the Culper Spy Ring in New York and on Long Island during the War of American Independence. Townsend was born on November 25, 1753, at Oyster Bay, Long Island, New York. In 1775, he declared for the patriot cause and three years later was recruited by Major Benjamin Tallmadge into an espionage network being organized at the behest of General George Washington. The spy net was located in New York City and on Long Island, to observe British military operations. Townsend (Culper Junior) was a key member in the city. Acting as a society reporter for James Rivington's newspaper and also the owner of a dry goods store, he had access to information from British officers without rousing suspicion.

Once he had collected intelligence, Townsend inscribed documents in code and passed them to a courier, Austin Roe, who rode with them to Setauket on Long Island. There Roe passed the documents to Abraham Woodhull (Culper Senior), who evaluated the information. Woodhull passed the important evidence to Caleb Brewster, who conveyed it in a whaleboat across Long Island Sound to Fairfield, Connecticut. There the material was collected by Tallmadge, who dispatched it by dragoon couriers to Washington at New Windsor, New York.

Throughout the war, Townsend and his allies lived in peril of being found out and hanged. They never were, and so provided Washington with much valuable information. Townsend died on March 7, 1828, at Oyster Bay.

See also: Culper Ring; Rivington, James; Roe, Austin; Woodhull, Abraham

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Paul David Nelson

TREHOLT, ARNE
(DECEMBER 13, 1942–)

Arne Treholt was a Norwegian government official and Labour party politician arrested in 1984 and sentenced to 20 years for treason and spying on behalf of the Soviet Union and Iraq. Treholt was pardoned in 1992.

Treholt worked as a journalist before he became personal secretary to the Minister of Trade in 1973 and parliamentary secretary from 1976 to 1979. Treholt later served as counsellor for the Norwegian ambassador to the United Nations and at the time of his arrest he was chief of the press section of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Despite the ongoing investigation aided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, he was requested to sign up for courses at the Norwegian National Defense College during this posting.

In the late 1970s, the national security police suspected that Treholt had irregular foreign contacts, later disclosed as being Iraqi and Soviet agents. In 1984 he was arrested en route to Vienna to meet his Committee for State Security (KGB) contact Genadij Titov, carrying a briefcase containing classified documents.

As many social democrats of his generation, his views on the cold war was at odds with that of official North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policy. His stated motive for his actions was to lessen east-west tension through disclosing information that would ease Soviet insecurity. On the other hand, large sums of money were confiscated following his conviction as paybacks for material delivered to the Soviets. In the aftermath, the harshness of his sentence remains contested, as it is disputed how damaging his contacts with the Soviets were and if he ever passed on any sensitive material to the KGB, whose archives remain closed.

See also: KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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Frode Lindgjerdet

TROFIMOFF, COLONEL GEORGE (1927–)

Retired U.S. Army Colonel George Trofimoff, age 74, was arrested for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union on July 14, 2000. He began spying in 1969 and continued until 1994. It is estimated that he received about 90,000 DM (German marks) for the information he provided. Trofimoff was convicted of espionage on June 26, 2001, and was sentenced to life imprisonment on September 27, 2001. He is the highest-ranking military officer charged with espionage. Trofimoff was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by the Soviet Union for his espionage.

Trofimoff was born in Germany in 1927 where his Russian parents had immigrated to. He joined the U.S. Army in 1948 and became a naturalized American citizen in 1951. After leaving active duty, Trofimoff joined the army reserves and retired with the rank of colonel in 1987. From 1959 to 1994 he worked for the army as a civilian in military intelligence. Trofimoff was chief of the Army Element in Nuremburg Joint Interrogation Center from 1968 to 1994. In this position he had access to all classified information and documents produced by the Army Element. These included information provided by East European defectors, lists of current intelligence information required by the United States, intelligence priority rankings, Soviet and Warsaw Pact Order of Battle documents, and Collection Support Briefs which detailed the current chemical and biological warfare threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. Trofimoff would steal these documents and photograph them.

Trofimoff was recruited as a spy in 1969 by a close childhood friend, Igor Susemihl, who was a KGB agent under the cover of a Russian Orthodox priest. During his career, Susemihl served in such positions as archbishop of Vienna, Baden, and Bavaria. He died in 1999. At the time Trofimoff had just recently been promoted to chief of the

Army Element. Among the code names used by Trofimoff were "Antey," "Markiz," and "Konsul."

Trofimoff came under suspicion as a result of information provided by KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhim who defected to the Great Britain in 1992. Both Trofimoff and Susemihl were arrested by German authorities under suspicion of espionage in December 1999 but the case was dropped because of the statute of limitations period within which the alleged spying took place had expired. Trofimoff's arrest and conviction in the U.S. came after a lengthy investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It included a false flag operation in which Trofimoff accepted payment from an FBI agent posing as a Russian agent, and six hours of videotaped conversations between Trofimoff and the FBI agent in which he pledged his loyalty to the Moscow.

See also: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Harry S. Truman was president from 1945 to 1953. It was during his administration that the basic organizational features of the contemporary American intelligence community took shape. In his presidency, Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Roscoe Hillenkoeter, and General Walter Bedell Smith all served as Directors of Central Intelligence.

Truman became president upon the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, with virtually no previous exposure to intelligence and little familiarity with foreign policy. He was not informed about work on the atomic bomb until his first cabinet meeting as president and received his first briefing on Ultra a few days later. In fact, Truman's first major decision involving intelligence dealt with the future signals intelligence (SIGINT). In September 1945 Truman agreed to continue the wartime practice of collaborating with the British on SIGINT and established the Army Security Agency (ASA) to centralize the administration of all military communications and cryptanalysis. Truman did not hold espionage and counterespionage activities in the same high regard he did SIGINT. Shortly after this decision he moved to disband the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Created during World War II, the OSS had little political support in Washington for maintaining its existence. OSS Director William Donovan tried unsuccessfully to plead his case for a permanent postwar intelligence organization to Truman and on September 20, 1945, Truman issued Executive Order 9621 ending its existence and splitting its espionage and counterespionage functions between the State Department and the army.

Truman's lack of experience and interest in intelligence matters was reflected in the manner in which the intelligence bureaucracy operated in his administration.

Truman was not interested in intelligence forecasts or estimates. What he sought was a filtering device to reduce the flow of intelligence to him and present him with a manageable flow of information. The system he set up did not allow for this to happen. Instead, absent a central intelligence organization, old rivalries between intelligence bureaucracies resurfaced. To rectify this situation Truman first supported the creation of a National Intelligence Authority and a Central Intelligence Group. The former was to coordinate all national intelligence activities, whereas the latter was to analyze information collected by others. Soon it was apparent that this organizational structure was also deficient and, as part of the 1947 National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created.

Changes also continued to take place in the organization of SIGINT. Conflict between the army and navy led to the creation in 1949 of an Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) to coordinate military SIGINT and an Armed Forces Security Agency Community (AFSAC) to oversee its operation. This change did not, however, prevent American officials from being caught off guard by North Korea's attack on South Korea. Years of bureaucratic infighting, limited SIGINT resources and an underappreciation of the situation on the Korean peninsula by American officials had taken its toll. A June 13, 1952, report issued by the Brownwell Committee again took up the matter of SIGINT coordination and management. It recommended that AFSAC be abolished with authority for SIGINT going to a new organization, the National Security Agency (NSA), to replace AFSA. Truman signed a secret executive order creating the NSA on November 4, 1952.

Although Truman publicly proclaimed little interest or support for covert action, it was in his administration and with his support that the CIA began to engage in it. The first such operation he authorized came on November 14, 1947, when NSC 1/1 authorized covert action to prevent a Communist victory in the upcoming Italian election. Subsequent NSC directives signed by Truman would expand and solidify the organizational base for CIA covert actions and the range of activity engaged in.

Truman had a complex relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and its head J. Edgar Hoover. Although often critical of Hoover, Truman, nonetheless, relied upon him for information on the personal behavior of critics of his administration and those he suspected of leaking information to the media. Truman also was not particularly responsive to Hoover's warnings about Communist espionage in the United States and he only reluctantly agreed to allow the FBI to conduct loyalty investigations of government employees. Surprisingly, Truman's lack of a vigorous response to the mounting evidence of Soviet espionage and the high-profile investigations by the House Un-American Activities Committee into the activities of Wittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss did not cost him politically as he unexpectedly won the 1948 presidential election.

See also: Armed Forces Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Central Intelligence Group; Chambers, Whittaker; Hillenkoetter, Rear Admiral Roscoe Henry; Hiss, Alger; National Intelligence Authority; National Security Act; National Security Agency; Office of Strategic Services; Smith, General Walter Bedell; Souers, Rear Admiral Sidney William; Ultra; Vandenberg, General Hoyt Sanford

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TSOU, DOUGLAS
(1924–)

Douglas Tsou, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) official, was convicted of espionage on October 4, 1991, and sentenced to a 10-year prison term on January 2, 2002. He was the first person convicted of spying for Taiwan. In his defense Tsou claimed that the information he gave to Taiwan was not secret since his offer to become a spy was declined. At his trial, prosecutors argued that Tsou had in fact given a great deal of information to Taiwan over the years. Loyalty to Taiwan is seen as having been the primary motive behind his act of espionage.

Tsou was born in China in 1924 and fled to Taiwan following the Communist's 1949 victory in the Chinese civil war. He moved to the United States in 1969 and became a naturalized citizen in 1977. He worked as a Chinese translator for the FBI from 1980 to 1986, at which time he was dismissed. While stationed in Houston, Texas, Tsou wrote a handwritten letter to Y. C. Chen, the Houston director of Taiwan's Coordination Council for North American Affairs, identifying an individual who was an intelligence officer for the People's Republic of China. This individual had approached the FBI about becoming a double agent and was in the process of being evaluated for that role. Tsou was arrested on February 11, 1988.

According to the FBI, there was no indication that Taiwan had solicited this particular piece of information from Tsou and that it cooperated in the investigation.

See also: Post–Cold War Intelligence

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TU-20/TU-95 BEAR

The Tupolev Tu-95 "Bear" is the best-known long-range reconnaissance and espionage aircraft of the Soviet Union and later Russia. Although fielded as the Tu-20, the

aircraft is known as the Tu-95, its original designation. The Soviet Union introduced the Tu-95 in 1955 as a strategic bomber. The innovative plane boasted four turboprops at a time when jet engines were emerging as the main propulsion system for military aircraft. Each turboprop engine carried a set of counter-rotating propellers, providing the aircraft with a maximum speed of over 900 kilometers per hour and a cruising speed of over 400 kilometers per hour. Reconnaissance/espionage versions of the Tu-95 could fly over 13,000 kilometers while on missions. Although any Tu-95 could be utilized for visual reconnaissance, the Soviet Union utilized at least four variants of the Tu-95 as specific reconnaissance/espionage aircraft. The Tu-95 Bear C carried two radomes for Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) gathering, whereas the Tu-95 Bear D had a chin radome. The Tu-95 Bear D reconnaissance version, often referred to as the Tu-95RTS, flew its first operational mission in 1966. The aircraft of this variant did not have bomb bays and were utilized strictly for reconnaissance. The Tu-95 Bear E was the photo reconnaissance version of the Bear. This variant was produced by converting Tu-95M bombers and adding a photographic package to the bomb bay area. The Bear F, also known as the Tu-142, is a maritime variant of the aircraft and utilized also for long-range reconnaissance. Throughout the cold war, Tu-95 reconnaissance aircraft operated from bases in the Soviet Union as well as overseas locations including Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, Guinea, Libya, Mozambique, and Vietnam. Bear reconnaissance aircraft regularly flew in the vicinity of the United States, Canada, and NATO countries to gather intelligence, test defensive reaction times, and record radar and radio frequencies. Bears flying from Angola reportedly tracked the British fleet sailing to the Falklands in 1982. The last surviving aircraft of the Tu-95 series are scheduled to remain in service with Russia through 2015.

See also: Aerial Surveillance; Cold War Intelligence

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TUB PLOT CONSPIRACY

At the height of the Quasi-War with France, the Tub Plot was an alleged French scheme to incite a Southern slave revolt and possibly bring down the U.S. government. In January 1799, Secretary of State Pickering, a Federalist, learned that a Danish ship, the *Minerva*, was sailing to Charleston, South Carolina. On board was Matthew Salmon, a mulatto and an alleged agent of the French Executive Directory, who supposedly had been sent with documents that were hidden in tubs with false bottoms. The documents would prove that the French intended to dismantle the U.S. government. Unhappy with Jay's Treaty in 1794 between the United States and Great Britain, France began attacking American ships. France believed the treaty violated the 1778 American alliance with France during the American Revolution. In 1797,

President John Adams sent a diplomatic team to Paris to negotiate peace, but French Minister Talleyrand offered to negotiate only if the United States paid a bribe (now known as the XYZ Affair). This insult nearly caused the United States to declare war with France. Americans were aware of recent French reconnaissance activities in the United States, especially the western exploits of French General Victor Collot along the Mississippi River. Highly suspicious of the French and their supporters in the Republican Party, Federalists in Congress increased military spending and passed new legislation, including the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, in order to protect the nation. Federalists feared the French would seize back control of the Louisiana Territory from the Spanish and perhaps lead U.S. Southern slaves to revolt. When Pickering learned of Matthew Salmon's journey towards the southern US, therefore, he believed the plot to be true and warned South Carolina leaders, who then arrested Salmon and his four companions when their boat arrived in February 1799. Before Federalists could celebrate however, they learned Salmon and his traveling companions were not French spies, but were enemies of the French Directory and were destined for Haiti. The questionable documents proved France's intent to retake the island, not start a U.S. slave revolt. The Tub plot was not the evidence against France for which some Federalists had hoped, but it did illustrate how tensions with France had deeply divided the nation.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage; XYZ Affair

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TUBMAN, HARRIET
(1820/21–MARCH 10, 1913)

Underground Railroad operative during the 1850s, Tubman was also a spy and a scout for the Union army during the American Civil War. Born in Dorchester County, Maryland, Tubman escaped Southern slavery in 1849 but returned repeatedly to secretly bring other slaves north. Once the Civil War began in 1861, Tubman first assisted the Union army at Fort Monroe, Virginia, caring for refugee slaves. In May 1862, the army escorted Tubman to Port Royal, South Carolina, where she nursed soldiers and contraband slaves along the occupied coast. Soon the Union army, aware of her prior work, realized she could glean information from the surrounding countryside. Tubman organized a local spy ring, impressively transmitting information,

by memory, on Confederate strength to her superiors. In June 1863, Tubman led 150 black soldiers in a successful raid up the Combahee River. They rescued 750 slaves, burned stores of cotton and rice, and destroyed several plantations. Colonel James Montgomery praised her, writing, " . . . a most remarkable woman, and invaluable as a scout." Within a few weeks, Tubman nursed soldiers of the 54th Massachusetts regiment after the Battle of Fort Wagner. In 1864 she returned home to Auburn, New York, a hero. Tubman began receiving a military pension in 1899 in recognition of her service. She died March 10, 1913, in Auburn, and was honored with a military funeral.

See also: Civil War Intelligence; Confederate Signal and Secret Service Bureau

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TURNER, ADMIRAL STANSFIELD (DECEMBER 1, 1923–)

Admiral Stansfield Turner was the twelfth Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). He served from February 24, 1977, to January 20, 1981. Born in Highland Park, Illinois, Turner graduated from the Naval Academy in 1946 and went on to become a Rhodes Scholar. Turner assumed the position of DCI with no background in intelligence. Rather, he approached the position from a managerial perspective which reflected his career background. Turner had served as director of the Systems Analysis Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and as commander of the Second Fleet. He had also served as the president of the U.S. Naval War College. Turner achieved the rank of admiral in 1975.

Turner was not President Jimmy Carter's first or second choice for DCI. Theodore Sorensen, an aide to President John Kenney, was nominated for the position but withdrew when it became known that he requested noncombat status as a conscientious objector when he registered for the draft and that in writing Kennedy's biography he had used classified material without permission. Carter then turned to Army Chief of Staff General Bernard Rogers who turned down the position. Carter and Turner had been classmates at the Naval Academy but not close friends.

Turner had a tension-filled relationship with intelligence professionals during his tenure as DCI. He quickly came to be viewed as a political director along the lines of James Schlesinger; that is, he was put into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order to bring it more firmly under White House control. Because he was the most informed DCI yet on technology matters Turner also was somewhat of a threat to the organizational culture of the CIA. He regarded human intelligence as outmoded and saw technology as the key to the future of espionage. Together these perspectives

on intelligence led Turner to take a number of highly controversial initiatives. First, he introduced the concept of National Intelligence Topics. These was a set of 59 prioritized intelligence questions that were to guide collection and analysis. This was not the first time such a system had been put forward. Two earlier attempts were Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ) and Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIOs). It does not appear that this attempt at prioritization worked significantly better than the previous ones. Second, Turner continued and accelerated Schlesinger's purge of the clandestine service. In what is referred to as the Halloween Massacre, Turner abolished 800 positions there and retired approximately 200 covert operators. Third, he sought to gain administrative control over the intelligence community by seeking day-to-day and budgetary control over the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Security Agency, and creating the National Intelligence Tasking Center. Fourth, Turner believed that intelligence on economics and other nonmilitary matters was as important to the president as military intelligence. Finally, he instituted a number of administrative reforms designed to help him achieve his reforms. He surrounded himself with former naval staffers and made heavy use of the polygraph in evaluating employees.

Turner enjoyed only limited as DCI. His initiatives were resisted from within by intelligence professionals. He also never achieved a close working relationship with President Carter. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski insisted on presenting intelligence briefings to the president. Turner became the public scapegoat for such intelligence failures as the seizure of the American embassy in Iran and the "discovery" of a Russian brigade in Cuba.

See also: Carter Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence

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U

U-2 INCIDENT

The U-2 incident centered on the Soviet shootdown of a U-2 spy plane some 1,200 miles into Soviet territory on the eve of a U.S.-Soviet summit conference. Initially the United States denied Soviet charges of espionage only to be confronted with irrefutable evidence in the form of its pilot, Francis Gary Powers. The shootdown occurred on May 1, 1960, two weeks before a scheduled U.S.-Soviet summit conference between Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and President Dwight Eisenhower. The summit was to deal with Berlin which had emerged as the primary point of U.S-Soviet cold war confrontation in Europe. At the summit meeting Khrushchev demanded an apology for the U-2 over flight. When none was forthcoming he left the meeting, returning an element of tension and distrust into U.S.-Soviet relations that both Eisenhower and Khrushchev had hoped to overcome through earlier summit meetings and as symbolized by the Spirit of Camp David.

U-2 overflights over Soviet territory had been going on since 1956. They were valued for the information they provided the Central Intelligence Agency about Soviet military capabilities. Especially valuable was the information about its nuclear missile program. U-2 overflights were also used to obtain information about the 1957 Suez crisis after France and Great Britain stopped providing the United States with information about their activities.

It appears that on this particular flight Francis Gary Powers had engine, parachuted to earth and was captured. The initial story put forward by the Eisenhower administration on June 3 was that a NASA research plane studying weather patterns had crashed over Turkey. On June 5, Khrushchev announced that an American plane had been shot down after violating Russian air space. The State Department now stated that a civilian weather plane had probably strayed over Soviet airspace accidentally. Khrushchev then produced pictures of Gary Francis Powers, photo reconnaissance

Nikita Khruschev examines equipment found among the wreckage of the American U-2 spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers. (Library of Congress)

equipment, and pictures of Soviet military installations. The State Department then acknowledged that the plane "probably" was on an intelligence operation.

Eisenhower then took responsibility for the mission, asserting that the U-2 flight was necessary to avert another Pearl Harbor. Eisenhower's statement appears to have undercut Khrushchev's standing within the Soviet Politburo giving hard-liners who opposed the ongoing thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations an opening to undermine the Paris summit.

See also: Aerial Surveillance; Cold War Intelligence; Eisenhower Administration and Intelligence; Powers, Francis Gary; SR-71

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UKUSA

The United Kingdom-United States of America Communications Intelligence Agreement (UKUSA) remains classified, but it is variously dated from 1947 or 1948. Its still-secret provisions probably extended wartime US-UK intelligence-sharing arrangements which focused on interception of Axis Powers' secret diplomatic and military communications. These World War II-era agreements included the May 1943 bilateral British-United States Communications Intelligence Agreement (BRUSA), which governed US-UK cooperation in signals interception, decryption, and analysis. The postwar UKUSA agreement is likely a series of operational

agreements and memoranda of understanding developed by the United States and Britain since the end of World War II and in the early postwar period, when strategic concerns in both Washington and London shifted from their principle wartime enemies Japan and Germany to the Communist-led Soviet Union, its new allies in Eastern Europe, and their supporters in Asia and Africa.

The original agreements formalized under UKUSA provided for a rough division of labor between the United States and Britain, assigning each primary responsibility for communications intelligence monitoring, deciphering, and analysis in specific geographical regions. It is believed that Britain assumed special responsibility, monitoring communication originating in Eastern Europe, the Near and Middle East, Africa, and parts of South Asia and the Far East, whereas the United States focused upon the Soviet Union, China, and parts of Southeast Asia, as well as North, Central, and South America.

The UKUSA agreement partnered the United Kingdom's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the World War II era British code-breaking agency based at Cheltenham in Gloucestershire, with the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board. This Board operated as a representative of U.S. civilian agencies and the U.S Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) which included relevant wings of the U.S. National Security Agency and the US Air Force. Both the Board and AFSA were absorbed into the US National Security Agency which was formally established in November 1952, and inherited all U.S. responsibilities under UKUSA.

UKUSA provided for the allocation of signals interception resources by the US and Britain, and outlined protocols for the exchange of raw and processed data as well as analyses and interpretive material. The agreement also seems to have included arrangements for sharing technical data on monitoring and decoding systems and for personnel visits, and placements at both agency administrative headquarters and at operational sites worldwide. In the late 1940s Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were admitted into selected parts of UKUSA exchanges and became known as "Second Party" states. Subsequently a new tier of "Third Party" sates was created within the UKUSA structure. Typically providing only operational sites for NSA and/or GCHQ equipment and personnel, and receiving very limited intelligence output from monitoring activities, these "Third Party" countries are thought to include Japan, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Turkey, South Korea, and perhaps others. With changing technologies the UKUSA agreement has doubtless been amended many times since the late 1940s, and evidently remains in force.

The best-known UKUSA intelligence-gathering project is ECHELON which involves that interception of email, fax, telex, and telephone communications. UKUSA enjoyed particular successes in obtaining information from Third World locations where communication security measures were not as advanced as in the Soviet Union.

Controversy has come to surround the UKUSA agreement on a number of counts. One concern is that the United States was using the UKUSA system as a pretext and means of eavesdropping on its own citizens without obtaining warrants. A second concern is that the United States was using the system to spy on its allies. Third, some see it as a vehicle for economic or industrial espionage.

See also: ECHELON

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Laura M. Calkins

ULTRA

The decryption network, employed by British intelligence, headquartered in Bletchley Park, deciphered the German Enigma machines during World War II. Through the infiltration of German cryptography, the Allies gained an advantage over the Nazis that would culminate in their final victory.

The German inventor, Arthur Scherbius, conceived of a cryptographic machine in 1918, which was given the name "Enigma" in 1923 from a promotional pamphlet. Although a commercial failure, Enigma became useful to governments for its ciphering and deciphering capabilities.

Enigma was a most sophisticated cipher system. The commercial version resembled a typewriter with a German keyboard that contained only letters. The secret to Enigma was its cipher drums, or rotor system. Above the keyboard was a panel of "glow-lamps" with the same arrangement of letters. Above the lamp board were five disks, which made up the scrambling unit. Two outside disks were fixed into the machine. The other three disks could be rotated around and be arranged in different sequences. Through the use of these rotors, one letter could be substituted for another. The military version contained a plug board or "commutator," which resembled a telephone switchboard. Thus, if the letter A on the commutator were plugged to "Z," then when the operator typed the letter A, the letter "Z" would be inputted. It took two people to operate an Enigma—one to operate the keyboard and another to operate the radio. A message entered into the Enigma would become coded, based on whatever setting was chosen, as it was sent. When a message was received, it would be fed into the Enigma at the right setting and would be transformed into text. Scherbius's Enigma became a formidable weapon in the field of espionage.

The German government in the 1920s and 1930s realized the potential of Enigma. The Germans saw in Enigma opportunity for secrecy in military operations. The German navy first employed a commercial version of Enigma in 1926, followed by the army in 1928. The military version was introduced in 1930, and by 1934, the Nazis used Enigma as its primary cipher system that was adopted by the military and intelligence operations. By 1939, 40,000 Enigmas were in use in Germany. Throughout the war, the Germans continually updated and refined Enigma, confident that it could never be deciphered.

Work on deciphering the Enigma began with the Poles, although their contribution to the creation of Ultra and the defeat of Nazi Germany would not be known until three decades after the end of World War II. In 1929, the Cipher Bureau of the Polish

A German Enigma cipher machine, used by the German military in World War II to encrypt communications. (Hulton|Getty Images)

government selected Marian Rejewski, Jerzy Rozycki, and Henryk Zygalski who studied cryptology at Poznan University to decipher German cryptograms. By 1932, the Polish government acquired an Enigma from the French, which was stolen by Hans Thilo-Schmidt who worked in the German army's Cipher Center.

After calculating the astronomical number of possible permutations, Rajewski, Rozycki, and Zygalski collaborated toward analyzing the sequences necessary to decipher messages, while keeping abreast with the changes the Germans had made, creating the Polish version, the "Bomba." The Poles shared their information with the French and the British, who would build upon their contribution.

After Britain declared war on Germany, the Government Code and Cypher School, which became the Government Communications Headquarters, commenced at Bletchley Park, located at the midpoint between Oxford and Cambridge Universities, consisting of a diverse group of academics, mathematicians, linguists, and chess players, who were to form an elite group of cryptanalysts, whose numbers were to peak at 10,000 before the end of the war. This group that gathered at Bletchley Park was to be part of a vast intelligence network devoted to intercepting and decryption of German signals transmissions, the analysis and translation of ciphers, and the distribution of information to Allied military commanders. Among this group, mathematicians Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman, who studied the Polish Bomba machine to make Britain catch up in the cryptology war, created the British version in 1940 known as the "Bombe." Although it was one thing to discover the intricacies of Enigma, what was equally important was the analysis of the information deciphered and distributing it to the proper channels.

The task of analyzing and making useful application of the Enigma decryptions fell to Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham, an intelligence officer at Bletchley Park. His experience as a prisoner of war during World War I allowed him to speak German fluently. During the 1930s, he was engaged in espionage activities, taking information on

foreign air forces and extracting information from within the Nazi government itself. When the war with Germany began, Winterbotham realized the importance of not only distributing the Enigma decrypts, but also maintaining their security.

To that end, he proposed combining and consolidating all translation and analysis of the decrypts at Bletchley Park while distributing the processed intelligence through MI-6, through units of trained radio and cryptographical personnel known as special liaison units (SLU). The army, navy, and air force would participate in the intelligence gathering and distribution. The Royal Navy, resisted however, as he expected. Winterbotham dubbed this system of intelligence gathering and distribution "Ultra" because the nature of the work was "ultra-secret." As the war continued, this intelligence network grew and expanded, particularly in the number of German translators. The SLUs were employed at all areas where British and, later, American land and air forces operated.

Ultra was crucial in the European theater of the World War II. Ultra was instrumental during the Battle of Britain by intercepting codes by the German air force. Where Ultra was most valuable was the Battle of the Atlantic. As in World War I, German submarines threatened British communications and supply lines. "Wolf Packs" of German U-boats patrolled the North Atlantic waiting for supply ships to destroy. The cryptographers at Bletchley Park worked feverishly to decode the German naval Enigma ciphers, which differed from those used by the army and air force by using eight rotors instead of five. Their luck changed in May of 1941 when the British captured an Enigma from U-110, which contained an intact Enigma and its accompanying codebook.

Throughout the war, there was a race between the Germans and Bletchley Park in keeping ahead of one another, as the Germans continually made improvements on the Enigma and as Bletchley Park raced to keep abreast of such improvements. After 1943, Bletchley Park gained the upper hand and narrowly neutralized the U-boat threat. The value of Ultra culminated in 1944 as it helped coordinate what would become Operation Overlord, the success of which assured Allied military victory.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Dino E. Buenviaje

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

On March 11, 2003, the first undersecretary of defense for intelligence ever, Stephen Cambone, was put into power. In this rather new post, the undersecretary is

responsible for providing the secretary of defense and his colleagues with advice, new initiatives and policies, and budgeting recommendations. Not only must the undersecretary respond to the intelligence needs and requests of the secretary of defense, but must also coordinate with the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Nation Reconnaissance Office. Additionally, the undersecretary must work closely with the Direction of Central Intelligence in order to meet the demands and needs of his post.

Created in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the resulting reorganizations and reforms, the undersecretary has a staff of over 100 in the office. The office has four major areas of concentration: ensuring intelligence information arrives at the front lines in a timely fashion, preparing for the future of military intelligence, developing military security and counterintelligence, and program budgeting in perspective of military and intelligence benefits. Notably, the undersecretary and his staff are not charged with any type of intelligence collection or analysis. As a result, the office concentrates almost solely on efficient dissemination of the latest intelligence information and working to guarantee that the latest information is sent out in the future.

In order to stay on top of intelligence advances, the office is very forward-looking. One of its concentration areas relates to reforming itself daily in order to best meet its mission. Additionally, one of the office's programs involves directing the military space-based intelligence satellites.

See also: Defense Department Intelligence; Intelligence Community; September 11, 2001

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Arthur Holst

USA PATRIOT ACT

Officially known as the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, the USA Patriot Act was adopted by Congress on October 25, 2001, and signed into law the following day by President George W. Bush.

Three hundred and forty-two pages in length, the USA Patriot Act emerged as the Bush administration's immediate legislative response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Its intent is to provide law enforcement officials with an enhanced ability to investigate and prosecute terrorism. One of its provisions expands the definition of engaged in terrorist activity to include providing support for groups that the individual "knew or should have known were terrorist organization." Among its primary targets are the monetary transactions and electronic communications employed by terrorists. Financial institutions and

President George W. Bush signs the USA Patriot Act during a ceremony at the White House on October 26, 2001. The law was passed in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and gives intelligence and law enforcement agencies unprecedented authority to conduct terror investigations. (White House)

agents must now provide additional verifiable information about their customers. The USA Patriot Act also expands the list of toxins that are classified as dangerous and requires background checks of scientists who work with them. As further evidence of the Act's scope, waste-hauling companies must now provide background checks for divers transporting hazardous material. It permits the attorney general to arrest and detain foreign suspects in the United States for seven days without filing charges.

One of the most important set of provisions in the USA Patriot Act affects the conduct of intelligence in the United States. Intelligence surveillance is now permitted when foreign intelligence is a "significant purpose" rather than "the purpose" of the undertaking. The Act broadens the authority of the government to contract for terrorist information with individuals once placed off limits because of human rights violations or other transgressions. Included in this listing is (1) the ability of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to obtain and review medical, mental health, financial, and educational records without court orders or producing evidence of criminal activity, (2) the ability of the Central Intelligence Agency to designate priority targets in the United States for surveillance thus freeing it from the requirement to operate outside the country, (3) the ability of federal agents to obtain search warrants and search private property without telling the owner and, (4) the ability to use search warrants to read opened voice mail messages and electronic mail from Internet providers rather than obtain a wiretap order. The USA Patriot Act also contains a number of directives intended to promote intelligence sharing and cooperation among intelligence agencies. Included here is the prompt disclosure of information obtained in a criminal investigation and the establishment of a virtual translation center within the intelligence community.

Both many of the provisions of the USA Patriot Act and the speed with which it was passed concern many onlookers. The legislation was passed so quickly that there were no committee reports or votes taken thus denying law enforcement officials and outside experts the opportunity to comment on its provisions. Furthermore, the absence of typical committee hearings deprived implementers and legal officials insight into the congressional intent in passing the USA Patriot Act. Its key provisions were worked out in negotiations between Attorney General John Ashcroft, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). A particularly controversial provision calls for increasing the national DNA database to include not only samples from convicted terrorists but also "any crime of violence." The crimes to be included in this database have been debated since its controversial creation in October 1998. Also

controversial is the extended time that aliens suspected of being involved in acts of terrorism may be detained without having charges filed against them. As noted above the USA Patriot Act permits them to be held for seven days. The Bush administration had sought the power to do so for an indefinite period of time.

Numerous controversies arose in the years following the passage of the USA Patriot Act. One point of contention involved its effectiveness. According to Attorney General John Ashcroft in his 2004 Justice Department report 368 individuals had been criminally charged in terrorism investigations with 195 resulting in guilty pleas or convictions. President George W. Bush placed the number at over 400 in a 2005 speech and claimed over one-half had resulted in convictions or guilty pleas. A 2005 Washington Post study, however, concluded that of 180 people on a Justice Department list only 39 had been convicted or pleaded guilty and many of those did so to relatively minor crimes.

The USA Patriot Act also ran into difficulty in the courts. In 2005 a federal judge ruled against actions taken by the FBI under terms of the Act. At issue was the ability of the FBI to impose an automatic and permanent ban on any public discourse of its investigations. In this case the FBI sought to prevent the names of librarians who had received an FBI demand for records from the becoming public.

Finally, 16 provisions of the USA Patriot Act contained sunset provisions, causing them to expire on December 31, 2005, unless renewed in follow-up legislation. Most of these provisions relate to the ability of intelligence services and the FBI to conduct searches and obtain access to communications without a warrant or public disclosure. In June 2005 the House passed a bill that would have taken away the FBI's power to seize library, bookstore, and hotel records for terrorism investigations. President Bush threatened to veto that bill if it passed. In the aftermath of the London subway attacks the House passed a bill more to the liking of the Bush administration. A Senate committee, however, passed a bill containing such prohibitions.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); September 11, 2001

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Glenn P. Hastedt

V

VAN DEMAN, RALPH
(SEPTEMBER 3, 1865–JANUARY 22, 1952)

Known as the "father of U.S. military intelligence," Ralph Van Deman was born on September 3, 1865, in Delaware, Ohio, and graduated from Ohio Wesleyan University and Harvard University. After attending law school, and enrolling in medical school, Van Deman was commissioned as second lieutenant in the infantry. He then went to Miami University Medical School in Cincinnati, Ohio, graduating in 1893 and entering the army as a surgeon. There he met Arthur Wagner who was appointed head of the Military Information Division of the War Department. Wagner hired him and Ralph Van Deman moved to Washington, DC.

In the U.S. capital, Van Deman had the task of collating information on the military strengths and weaknesses of Spain in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. In charge of the White House war map room, after the war he went to Cuba and Puerto Rico where he collected more information, then being assigned to the Philippines where he was appointed aide to Brigadier-General Robert Patterson Hughes. In 1901 he was promoted to captain and transferred to the Bureau of Insurgent Records in Manila, which he turned into the Philippine Military Information Division, recruiting agents to run a counterintelligence branch.

Returning to the United States in 1902, Van Deman was posted to California and then Minnesota. In 1904 he was one of the four officers selected to form the first class of the Army War College. Graduating in 1906, Van Deman went to China to reconnoiter the new defenses around Beijing, which had been rebuilt after the end of the Boxer Uprising. Back in Washington, he was appointed chief of the Mapping Section in the Second Division of the U.S. General Staff. Returning to the Philippines, he used it as a base for mapping routes of communications in China, leading to Japanese protests.

In 1915 Major Van Deman returned to the War College Division and managed to convince the War Department to establish its own military intelligence section. This was created on May 3, 1917, with Van Deman, promoted to colonel, in charge. This was to play a crucial role in World War I, at the end of which the division employed 282 officers and 1,159 civilians. In spite of this, Van Deman always felt that he did not have enough agents to fully protect the United States from internal sabotage, as well as provide agents for the war effort in Europe.

Going to France in 1918, Van Deman was appointed in charge of security at the Paris Peace Conference held at Versailles. Briefly deputy chief of MID, he returned to the army in 1920, taking up another appointment in the Philippines. He was eventually promoted to brigadier-general and retired in September 1929. In retirement he used his contacts to compile his own files on suspected foreign agents in the United States. Appointed as a consultant on intelligence matters in World War II, he died on January 22, 1952, in San Diego. His wife, Irene (née Kingscombe), flew with Wilbur Wright in 1909, being the first American woman to fly.

See also: Taylor, Captain Daniel M.

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Justin Corfield

VANDENBERG, LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOYT SANFORD (JANUARY 24, 1899–APRIL 2, 1954)

Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg served as the second Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from June 10, 1946, to May 1, 1947. Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, he graduated from West Point in 1923 and was a former head of army intelligence; Vandenberg was ambitious and well connected. He was recommended for the DCI position by outgoing DCI Sidney Souers and he was the nephew of the powerful Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg who sat on the Foreign Relations Committee and had been a staunch isolationist before Pearl Harbor but was now a convert to the internationalist cause. Vandenberg saw the post of DCI as a temporary one. His ultimate career objective was to become chief of staff of the soon-to-be-independent air force. He achieved this goal in 1948 and held this position until 1953.

Like his predecessor, Vandenberg found the established intelligence units resistive to any efforts by the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) to develop its analysis mission of coordinating and disseminating reports on intelligence matters. His major successes in this area were in expanding its analytical staff and the production of current intelligence. In August 1946 the Office of Reports and Estimates was established. It was under Vandenberg's tenure as DCI that the first National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union was produced. These moves were in part a reaction to the June 1946 official expansion of the CIG's mission to include independent analysis. At that time

the National Intelligence Authority that had been established by President Harry Truman through a presidential directive in January 1946 directed it to conduct research and analysis "not being presently performed" by other departments. Vandenberg also followed Souers' precedent of acquiring unwanted parts of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Where Souers had focused on building the CIG's overt collection capabilities, Vandenberg strengthened its covert capabilities through the bureaucratic acquisition of SI (espionage) and X2 (counterespionage) from the army 's Strategic Services Unit. He combined them into an Office of Special Operations. Significantly, there had been no mention of a covert or clandestine collection mission for CIG in any of its founding documents. But when the National Security Act of 1947 was passed and replaced the CIG with the Central Intelligence Agency and authorized it to carry out such missions, an organizational ability to do so already existed.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Central Intelligence Group; Director of Central Intelligence; National Intelligence Estimates; Office of Special Operations; Office of Strategic Services

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Glenn P. Hastedt

VAN LEW, ELIZABETH
(OCTOBER 25, 1818–SEPTEMBER 25, 1900)

Elizabeth "Crazy Bet" Van Lew was a spy for the Union, operating out of Richmond, Virginia. She was the daughter of a prominent family which had a magnificent mansion near the James River in Richmond on Church Hill. Eliza had been educated at a finishing school in Philadelphia. She returned to Richmond as an abolitionist. She continued to maintain an extensive correspondence with friends in the North.

After Eliza's father died she persuaded her mother to free the family slaves. Her outspoken views opposing slavery became widely known. With the start of the war she decided that she would do what she could to help Union prisoners kept on Belle Island located in the middle of the James River and other prison camps. Her aid to Union prisoners was not appreciated by the people of Richmond. However, her aid put her in contact with men who had military intelligence about the Confederacy.

In 1863 Eliza began to send reports to Union General George Henry Sharpe, head of the Bureau of Military Intelligence. At first reluctant to put any credence into her reports he soon saw the value of her intelligence. Constantly watched, she put her reports in code. Boarders in her home were asked by authorities to watch her for suspicious activities. Temperamental by nature, she exaggerated her behavior to appear to be somewhat crazy.

The reports were smuggled out of Richmond by servants or slaves. Her greatest achievement was to plant an agent in the home of Jefferson Davis. She arranged for a former slave, Mary Elizabeth Bowser, who had been educated in Philadelphia at a Quaker school, to be hired as a maid. Pretending to be illiterate, Bowser used her photographic memory to steal numerous battle plans and other information. The intelligence reports that Van Lew sent also included drawings of military interest.

In 1864 Eliza aided the escape of some Union prisoners from Belle Island. After their escape they were provided with civilian clothes to enable them to blend into the local population until they could make a move to reach Union lines. When Richmond fell she was provided protection by the Union army. She was an outcast for the remainder of her life.

See also: Civil War Intelligence

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Andrew J. Waskey

VENONA

VENONA is the code name given to a secret operation to decode wartime communications between the Soviet Union and its diplomatic and military officials in Washington, DC. At first referred to as BRIDE, VENONA existed from 1943 to 1985. It became public in 1995 when three thousand decoded messages were released. Although the original intent of the VENONA transcripts was to obtain insight into Joseph Stalin's World War II intentions toward Nazi Germany, they instead provided U.S. intelligence officials with information on the scope of Soviet espionage activities within the United States and Great Britain as well as the identities of several key agents.

Soviet diplomatic communications to and from the United States were available to U.S. intelligence officials because wartime censorship policies required commercial international cable companies to provide the government with copies of all incoming and outgoing messages. In 1943 the Army Security Agency began to examine these cables in hopes of breaking the Soviet code. Since the Soviet Union used a one-time pad to encrypt its messages this was a daunting task. No two messages would use the same code. The first breakthrough occurred in October 1943 when an analyst examined 10,000 messages and found that Soviet intelligence officials had become careless and rather than use new codes with each message, the same code had been used multiple times. There were at least seven cases of a duplicate key being used. Progress in deciphering Soviet messages was further aided by plain-text versions of messages obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a copy of the NKVD codebook purchased in 1944 by William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services.

By 1946 Meredith Gardner was able to decipher portions of enough messages to confirm that the Soviet Union had placed spies inside of the Manhattan Project and

the Los Alamos labs. Among those Soviet spies operating in the United States whose identities were uncovered as a result of VENONA were Alger Hiss, Klaus Fuchs, David Greenglass, and Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. VENONA transcripts also established that at least eight Russian agents were operating in Great Britain. In time they would be identified as Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Kim Philby, and Anthony Blunt.

Soviet intelligence was aware of VENONA by 1948. Some speculate it knew about VENONA as early as 1945. In 1945 or 1946 Soviet intelligence recruited an Army Security Agency cipher clerk William Weisband as a spy and he informed the Soviet Union of its existence two years later. Weisband's espionage was not discovered until 1950 and by then the damage had been done as the Soviet Union changed its procedures for encrypting communications effectively placing an end point on the period in time where VENONA could be used decipher Soviet communications. Weisband was not the only Soviet spy aware of VENONA. In 1949 Kim Philby, who spied for the Soviet Union in Great Britain, was posted in Washington as the British SIS liaison officer with the Central Intelligence Agency. In this capacity Philby observed first hand as Gardner worked to decipher Soviet wartime communications. It is speculated that armed with this knowledge Philby alerted another Soviet spy British diplomat Donald Maclean of his impending arrest thus allowing him to escape to the Soviet Union.

See also: Blunt, Anthony; Burgess, Guy Francis De Moncy; Central Intelligence Agency; Fuchs, Emil Julius Klaus; Greenglass, David; Hiss, Alger; MacLean, Donald Duart; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); NKVD (Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs); Office of Strategic Services; Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim"; Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel; White, Harry

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VETTERLEIN, KURT E.

A German engineer, Kurt Vetterlein ran a radio intercept station on the Dutch coast and was involved in recording and decrypting telephone communications between Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill during World War II.

Kurt E. Vetterlein was a chief engineer working in the German telephone and telegraph system, and in the summer of 1941 was assigned to see whether he could monitor trans-Atlantic communications which, in the case of many telephone calls, went by wireless. The idea was that of Wilhelm Ohnesorge, head of the German telephone system, and Vetterlein was sent to the Netherlands with machinery to investigate what was feasible. With research and intuition, he managed to replicate the Bell A-3 system. This was the system used for scrambling radio-telephone conversations and involved

changing frequencies regularly, making it hard to decode messages. For this reason it was thought to be possible for the British prime minister and U.S. president to talk confidentially without anybody being able to listen in.

The German interception system, known as the Forschungsstelle ("Research Post"), was set up in a secluded former youth hostel at Eindhoven, in the Netherlands. There, from March 1, 1942, Vetterlein started to rotate the giant antenna. Within a week he had some success and Ohnesorge was able to report to Hitler that he was able to intercept telephone traffic between Britain and the United States, and had "succeeded in rendering conversations, that had been made intelligible, intelligible again at the instant of reception."

It was not long before technicians working under Vetterlein's direction were intercepting up to 60 telephone calls a day between Allied leaders who were all using the A-3 model, and the transcripts were available to Hitler within hours. On July 29, 1943, General Alfred Jodl, chief of military operations, was able to give Hitler a transcript of a conversation between Churchill and Roosevelt about Italy which showed that some Italians had been negotiating with the Allies. This made Hitler send 20 divisions to Italy and when he was given the transcript of Roosevelt and Churchill making military plans for Italy, he was able to redeploy his troops.

Vetterlein also was able to listen in to conversations from General Mark Clark, Anthony Eden, Lord Halifax, Averell Harriman, Harry Hopkins, Lord Keynes, and many others. However, he had to move this listening station from Eindhoven when it appeared that the place could be susceptible to commando attacks. An improvement in the A-3 system in late 1943 made it impossible for Vetterlein to listen in to any more messages.

See also: American Intelligence, World War II

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Justin Corfield

VICTORICA, MARIA VON KRETSCHMANN DE (1878–AUGUST 12, 1920)

Maria von Kretschmann de Victorica was a German spy captured in the United States during World War I. Born in 1878 in Germany, her parents were the Baron Hans von Kretschmann, a Prussian general to whom Marshall Bazaine relinquished his sword at Metz in 1870 and Countess Jennie von Gustedt, daughter of a Prussian diplomat and kinswoman of the Kaiserin.

Like her older sister, Amalie, who is better known as the feminist Socialist Lily Braun, Victorica studied foreign languages and reading and writing from various governesses and tutors. She earned degrees from the University of Heidelberg, the University of Berlin, and the Swiss University at Zurich where she studied political economy

and linguistics. Unusually clever and having a facility for languages, De Victorica was described as blonde, graceful, stately, and having a gracious manner.

Around 1910, Col. Walther Nicolai recruited her to the German High Command where her attributes and intelligence were useful. De Victorica used various aliases including Baroness Maria Kretschmann, Mlle. Marie de Vussiere, Baroness con Retchmann, Miss Clarks, and Frau Maria Kretschmann.

She married three times, first to an Argentinean who died soon after the marriage, leaving her with an Argentinean passport; second, to Professor Otto Eckmann of Heidelberg University; and last to Manuel Gustave de Victorica, a Chilean whom she married in October or November of 1914, in order to procure neutral citizenship.

De Victorica first came to the notice of British intelligence in 1914, most likely after returning from missions to Russia. She spent two years in Great Britain, likely working with Sinn Fein to provoke Irish rebellion and was rumored to be involved in the plot to blow up the HMS *Hampshire*, the vessel British Secretary of War Lord Horatio Kitchener, was aboard off the Orkenys.

She arrived in the United States in January 1917, a few weeks before the United States declared war on Germany, on the Norwegian liner *Bergensfjord* as an agent of the Propaganda Division of the German Foreign Office. She was also on a special mission for the German Admiralty. Soon after her arrival in the United States, she deposited a check for $35,000 at the banking firm of Schulz & Ruckgraber. She stayed at fashionable hotels like the Hotel Knickerbocker, Waldorf-Astoria and worked under the direction of Carl Roediger (aka Herman Wessels), who headed the German spy ring in the United States. His main objective was stirring up Irish sentiment against England in the United States to bring the country more in line with Germany.

De Victorica's duties under Roediger included spreading propaganda among Sinn Fein members in the United States and importing explosives to the country. One of her directives was inducing young Sinn Fein loyalists to enlist in the British navy and place bombs on naval vessels. When her original idea to import explosives inside children's toys did not work out, tetra was packed inside religious statuary imported from Switzerland, which was then distributed to saboteurs in the United States.

Her silk mufflers were not a fashionable accessory, but were saturated with a secret ink chemical. When she soaked them in water and wrung them out, the liquid collected was used to write coded messages back to Germany. Once received, the messages were revealed by using a vinegar and iodine mixture. The Secret Ink Bureau of the U.S. Cipher Bureau (MI-8), better known as the Black Chamber, finally discovered the solution and decoded her messages.

Arrested on April 27, 1918, on a presidential warrant, she was indicted by federal court on June 1918 under the Espionage Acts and accused of conspiring to bomb American and British ships, to destroy docks and piers in this country, to organize a messenger system for the conveyance of information obtained here by German spies, and to interfere with the output and transportation of munitions of war.

In February 1919, she testified in the trial of Jeremiah A. O'Leary. She appeared in court in expensive clothing, described as a coat of sable with a muff to match, two cluster rings of diamonds, and a ring set with a large emerald. She testified to being a drug addict—she took morphine in decreasing doses for the past 20 years—and receiving

treatment from Bellevue Hospital, the Florence Crittendon Home, and Waverly House, all places she was confined after her arrest.

In March 1919 de Victorica was acquitted and was released from custody in September 1919. She lived in a Catholic convent outside New York City until a week before her death, when she petitioned the U.S. District Court to return to Germany.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; Black Chamber

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Rebecca Tolley-Stokes

VIETNAM WAR AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The U.S. involvement in Vietnam spanned the terms of six presidents. The first president to have to deal with Vietnam was Harry Truman. Initially his views on Indochina resembled those held during World War II by Franklin Roosevelt who was sympathetic to Ho Chi Minh's efforts to establish independent states in the region and unsympathetic to French attempts to reestablish their colonial holdings. A founding member of the French Communist Party, Ho Chi Min had established himself as a valuable ally against Japan. As such, in 1947 Truman resisted French requests for aid and urged them to end the war against Ho Chi Minh. His position soon changed and by 1952 the United States was providing France with $30 million in aid to defeat him. Ho was now the enemy. The key factor in Truman's change of heart was the need to secure French participation in a European Defense System, something it would not do without U.S. support in Vietnam.

The Eisenhower administration continued and expanded this policy of financial aid but would go no further. In 1954, with its troops facing defeat at the hands of the Communists at Dien Bien Phu, they called for U.S. military support. Eisenhower refused and the French presence in the region officially ended later that year at the Geneva Peace Talks. It was agreed here that the Communists would withdraw its forces north of the 17th parallel and pro-French forces would move to the South. Elections were to be held in 1956 to determine who would rule a united Vietnam. The United States did not sign this agreement but pledged not to disrupt it. But, in fact it did. The United States created the South East Asia Treaty Organization and extended its security provisions to "the free people of Vietnam." It also supported the South Vietnamese government's decision not to hold an election in 1956. At that point Ho Chi Minh and the Communists announced their determination to reunite Vietnam by force.

Under Eisenhower the U.S. military presence in Vietnam had begun to take form. One thousand military advisors were in the country. Under John Kennedy combat troops began to arrive. The Taylor-Rostow Report had called for introducing 8,000 soldiers to save the South Vietnamese government. The logic of this move directed the

Pham Xan An holds up his press card from 1965 in this photo from 2000. He led a remarkable and perilous double life as a Communist spy and a respected reporter for Western news organizations during the Vietnam War. (AP/Wide World Photos)

United States away from a guerrilla war strategy that sought to gain political control of the population to a military strategy designed to eliminate the enemy. Under Lyndon Johnson this military presence escalated dramatically. The United States retaliated for a February 1965 attack on Pleiku with a massive sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam known as Operation Rolling Thunder. By June 1965, 200,000 U.S. troops were in Vietnam and the military was projecting a need for 600,000 troops by 1967. This buildup was marked by a dramatic extension of presidential war powers through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which followed an attack upon two U.S. intelligence ships of the North Vietnamese coast. Passed overwhelmingly by the Senate, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized the president to take "all necessary measures" to repel an armed attack on U.S. forces. The events behind this incident continue to be debated.

Richard Nixon came to the presidency following the January 1968 Tet Offensive. A nationwide military attack by North Vietnamese forces was defeated by U.S. forces but its political impact was to create a sense of defeat in the U.S. public. Johnson did not seek reelection. Nixon's solution to the Vietnam problem was Vietnamization, a strategy which called for South Vietnam to do the bulk of the fighting, permitting the United States to gradually withdraw. The weakness of this strategy was that it could only succeed if North Vietnam did not engage South Vietnam forces before they were capable of holding their own in battle. To buy time, Nixon expanded the war with

an expanded bombing campaign against North Vietnam and the invading Cambodia and Laos to eliminate sanctuaries.

Peace talks began in earnest in 1969 but made little progress. Once again Nixon stepped up the bombing of North Vietnam. When talks resumed, progress was forthcoming and on January 23, 1973, a peace treaty was signed. Gerald Ford was in office when South Vietnam fell in 1975. What started as a normal military engagement ended in a rout and on April 30, 1975, South Vietnam surrendered unconditionally.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. intelligence community's involvement in Vietnam is just as long as its political and military involvement. In 1945 the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) established a liaison team to work with Ho Chi Minh against the Japanese. In this capacity it trained hundreds of Vietminh guerrillas and nursed Ho back to health after he became seriously ill. After World War II ended, OSS teams reentered Vietnam in search of information and to protect American prisoners of war. By Dien Bien Phu the OSS and Ho Chi Minh were on opposite sides. Although Eisenhower did not send U.S. forces to support the French, he did permit Civil Air Transport, a secretly owned Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) firm, to provide it with air support.

To bolster the new post–Geneva Agreement South Vietnamese government, the United States sent a CIA team to provide it with advice and frustrate North Vietnamese efforts to establish a strong political base in the North by sabotaging its transportation networks. Col. Edward Lansdale, who had already helped the Pilipino government beat back a Communist insurgency, was placed in charge of this mission that operated out of the U.S. embassy under the cover of the Saigon Military Mission. Later, under the leadership of Chief of Station and future Director of Central Intelligence William Colby, U.S. covert operations in South Vietnam would extend to efforts to mobilize the Montagnards and other ethnic minorities against the Vietcong through the creation of Civilian Irregular Defense Groups.

In the late 1960s, under the leadership of Robert Komer and with Colby's support, a new covert initiative was undertaken. Operation Phoenix sought to centralize the different counterintelligence operations being conducted in South Vietnam. It encouraged the South Vietnamese to turn in Communists and their sympathizers who were then interrogated. Although its defenders cite Operation Phoenix as the source of important information, its detractors cite the abuses that occurred in the arrest of South Vietnamese citizens and the interrogation tactics used. It was terminated in 1971. Operation Phoenix was part of a larger program known as the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program that had as its goal the separation of the people from the Viet Minh by providing for better security and living conditions.

Intelligence-gathering activities occurred on land, sea, and air. A prime example of land intelligence was Operation Muscle Shoals. This program involved planting by air drops Unattended Ground Sensors along key passage ways such as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The sensors detected the movement of people and vehicles. This information was picked up by monitoring aircraft that could be used to trigger an air strike or provide contextual information about troop and resupply patterns. Sea intelligence is best represented by the presence of U.S. naval ships such as the USS *Maddux* and *C. Turner Joy* off of the North Vietnamese coast. These were the two vessels attacked by the North Vietnamese that led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Their presence

was compromised by Operation DESOTO, an ongoing U.S. covert program against North Vietnam. Air reconnaissance largely was employed for purposes of identifying potential targets and carrying out post-attack damage assessments. The air force also employed Remotely Piloted Vehicles and high-altitude SR-71s to engage in reconnaissance over North Vietnam.

Intelligence analytical products also became areas of great controversy. Among the most intense disputes was that on the Order of Battle. Two intelligence battles were fought. One was within the CIA where Sam Adams convinced superiors that the Defense Department's numbers greatly underestimated the enemy's true strength and therefore understated the number of U.S. forces that would be needed to defeat it. Once Adams' position triumphed, the second battle began between the CIA and the military led by the Defense Intelligence Agency. In the end the CIA acquiesced to the military's numbers, numbers that the scale of the Tet Offensive proved to be wrong. Adams' charges became the focal point of a CBS news story that accused General William Westmoreland of deliberately falsifying the Order of Battle numbers. Westmoreland unsuccessfully sued CBS for libel.

Finally, the United States was also the target of intelligence-gathering activities by North Vietnam. The most prominent case involves Pham Xan An, who was a Vietnamese journalist. He worked for a number of Western news agencies and publications during the Vietnam War while also in the employ of the Communist Party Central Office for South Vietnam's H.63 military intelligence network. His contacts included Lansdale as well as such well-known authors of books on Vietnam as David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, and Stanley Karnow.

See also: Adams, Sam; Central Intelligence Agency; Colby, William Egan; Defense Intelligence Agency; DESOTO, Operation; Journalists, Espionage and; Lansdale, Edward Geary; Office of Strategic Services; SR-71; Xan An, Pham

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Glenn P. Hastedt

VILLAVERDE, DOMINGO

Domingo Villaverde was a Cuban telegraph operator in the governor-general's palace in Havana, Cuba, during the Spanish-American War. Key West–based U.S. military officer and Western Union employee, Martin Luther Hellings recruited Havana-based Western Union employee Villaverde to intercept communications between Spanish officials in Spain and Cuba. Not realizing that their telegraph office in Havana had been compromised, at the beginning of the war Spanish officials agreed to keep the

telegraph cable linking Key West and the rest of the United States to Cuba and the rest of the Caribbean. Villaverde's intelligence and espionage activities, therefore, contributed significantly to a rapid American victory.

Villaverde's first major contribution to intelligence gathering for the United States took place on the evening of February 15, 1898. Villaverde promptly reported the explosion that sank the battleship Maine. Villaverde's greatest feat, however, occurred on May 18, 1898, when he intercepted a message from Pascual Cevera, the admiral of Spain's Cape Verde fleet that had recently arrived in Santiago, Cuba, to the Spanish governor-general in Havana. Within days, the U.S. Navy, which had been unable to locate Cevera's fleet, was able to blockade Cevera's fleet in the port of Santiago, which led to the destruction of the Cape Verde fleet on July 3, 1898. Within a few weeks, the Spanish government sued for peace and the Spanish-American War was over.

Hellins and Villaverde never received any awards or citations for their actions. Nor did either of the men ever write their memoirs. Throughout the war, Villaverde's identity was a closely guarded secret. After the war, Villaverde left his job at the telegraph office.

See also: Spanish-American War

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Michael R. Hall

VON PAPEN, FRANZ JOSEPH HERMANN MICHAEL MARIA (OCTOBER 29, 1879–MAY 2, 1969)

German politician and diplomat, von Papen was born into a wealthy, minor noble family on October 29, 1879, in Werl, Germany. He started out as a professional soldier, becoming the military attaché at the German embassies in Washington, DC, and Mexico City in 1913.

At the beginning of World War I, he, along with the German naval attaché Karl Boy-Ed, organized an espionage and sabotage network in the United States in an attempt to impede American economic aid to the Entente powers. Von Papen also reported on the shipping of war material to the Entente. Von Papen spent millions of dollars on his espionage activity, including the purchasing of several American businesses as cover for his operations. His plots included the making and planting of bombs on munitions ships, and the unsuccessful attempts to blow up the Canadian Pacific railway bridge linking Vanceboro, Maine, and Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the Canadian Welland Canal connecting lakes Ontario and Erie near Buffalo.

For their spy activities, the U.S. government demanded the recall of von Papen and Boy-Ed on December 1, 1915; both returned to Germany with diplomatic immunity. The British, however, seized von Papen's papers and released details of his missions.

Von Papen then served on the Western Front before being assigned to Palestine on the Turkish front.

After the war, von Papen entered German politics and served as a deputy in the Reichstag. He briefly served as German chancellor in 1932 and vice chancellor under Adolf Hitler before being appointed ambassador to Austria (1934–1938). He actively worked for German annexation of Austria after which he became ambassador to Turkey (1939–1944), where he focused on espionage and attempts to keep it neutral during World War II. After the war, the Allies put him on trial at the Nuremberg War Trials, where he was acquitted. He died on May 2, 1969, in Obersasbach, West Germany.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I

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Gregory C. Ference

VOSKA, EMANUEL VICTOR (NOVEMBER 14, 1875–APRIL 1, 1960)

A Czech nationalist, Voska was born on November 14, 1875, in Kutná Hora, Bohemia. He immigrated to the United States in 1894, becoming a successful businessman.

In June 1914, he traveled to Prague, where he discussed with his friend Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, founder and president of Czechoslovakia, possible Czech national statehood in anticipation of World War I. After returning to the United States Voska unified various Czech-American associations into the Bohemian National Alliance while organizing its anti-Austro-Hungarian activity. He also created a secret courier service between the foreign and domestic elements of the Czecho-Slovak independence movement, informing American government officials about it, and acted as a go-between for Masaryk and President Woodrow Wilson. In 1915, Voska established a spy network in the United States consisting of émigré Czechs and Slovaks to uncover espionage and other activity by German and Austro-Hungarian agents and diplomats against American neutrality and the Entente powers.

After the United States entered the war, he joined the U.S. Army as a captain, becoming the liaison between it and the Czecho-Slovak Legions, a military unit consisting of noncitizen Czechs and Slovaks. From 1918 to 1919, he directed the Central European press section for the American general staff, and acted as an advisor to the American delegation to the Versailles peace conference.

In 1919, he moved to Czechoslovakia, leaving in 1939 for the United States after the Nazis annexed the country. From 1941 to 1945, he was an American press officer in Turkey where he worked on espionage and for the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia.

After World War II, Voska returned to Czechoslovakia where the Communists imprisoned him from 1950 to 1960, releasing him shortly before he died in Prague on April 1, 1960.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I

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Gregory C. Ference

W

WAGNER, MAJOR ARTHUR L.
(MARCH 16, 1853–1905)

The head of the Military Intelligence Division during the Spanish-American War, Arthur Wagner was the author of the first serious U.S. work on intelligence. Arthur Lockwood Wagner was born on March 16, 1853, in Ottawa, Illinois, the son of Joseph H. Wagner and Matilda (née Hapeman), and graduated from West Point in 1875, gaining a commission as second lieutenant. He served in the fighting against the Sioux in 1876 and 1877 and in the Ute campaigns of 1880 and 1881, becoming a professor of military science and tactics in Gainesville, Florida. He served as an instructor at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from November 1886 until 1897, after which he was appointed to be in charge of the newly formed Military Information Division of the War Department in Washington, DC. He served on the staff of Major General Nelson A. Miles during the Spanish-American War, in Cuba with Major-General Henry Lawton until the surrender of Santiago, and then returning to serve with Miles in Puerto Rico. He was then posted to the Philippines where he remained until 1902. He was a colonel in the adjutant general's department in Chicago when he died in 1905.

In 1884 Wagner had written an essay on "The Military Necessities of the United States and the Best Provisions for Meeting Them," which won him the Gold Medal of the Military Service Institution of the United States. His other books included *The Campaign of Königgrätz* (1889), his acclaimed *The Service of Security and Information* (1893), *Organization and Tactics* (1895), and *A Catechism of Outpost Duty* (1896).

See also: Spanish-American War

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Justin Corfield

WALKER SPY RING

Exposed in 1985, the Walker Spy Ring gained the infamous title of being the most damaging espionage ring in recent U.S. history. It was initiated and run by John Anthony Walker for 18 years.

John A. Walker (chief warrant officer, retired) had recruited his son, Michael Lance Walker (yeoman third class, serving); his brother, Arthur James Walker (lieutenant commander, retired working for a defense contractor); and friend, Jerry Alfred Whitworth (senior chief radioman, retired) to supply classified documents to sell to the Soviets.

John started supplying documents to the Soviets in 1967, at a time when he was facing financial ruin (used family savings on a bar venture). At the time he was a watch officer in the communications section at Operations Headquarters of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. He had special access to secret communications and the keylists and manuals to cryptographic machines, which were the backbone of the National Security Agency's communication system, used to decipher naval communiqué.

John often wondered how easy it would be to steal documents and sell them. In late 1967, he walked into the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC, and offered his services for payment. He was to receive between $2,000 and $4,000 a month with "bonuses" if he could supply specifically asked for material. Procedures were explained as to where they would meet (mainly Vienna) and how the dead drops were to be conducted.

John's main source of information to the Soviets was the keylists and technical manuals of cryptographic machines, allowing the Soviets to monitor the U.S. Navy and its operations. He also passed on information on the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), which incorporated the laying of communication cables on the Continental Shelf to monitor the movements of Soviet submarines.

John started living the high life, but was never questioned as to where he got the extra cash. His work began to suffer and a performance review stated it was unsatisfactory. He decided to transfer and in 1968, was assigned to the Radioman School at The Naval Training Center in San Diego. The documents supplied from here were situation summaries of naval operations worldwide. It was here in 1970 that he met Jerry Whitworth who was a new instructor at the center.

In 1971, John was assigned to the USS *Niagara Falls* where he was the Classified Material System (CMS) custodian, with top-secret communiqué access and in charge of cryptographic machines. John also stole documents on how the navy tracked Soviet submarines and was reportedly paid $30,000 for this.

Retiring in 1976 John was concerned that the Soviets would not consider him useful anymore without direct access to classified material. He set about recruiting for his spy ring, knowing those he was going to "target" would find the money irresistible. Hence he was convinced that all he approached would gladly join. This was not the case when he asked his daughters, Laura and Cynthia, and his half-brother, Gary Walker.

During subsequent years, John joined and operated several businesses, notably the two investigative firms that dealt with industrial espionage and insurance fraud, which were used as a means of laundering his spy money. Meanwhile, Jerry started having financial difficulties after leaving the navy in 1974 for the third time. While on holiday he met with John who talked him into reenlisting with the promise he would make a lot of money spying for a foreign power (convinced Jerry that it was an ally—Israel). Jerry reenlisted and trained in satellite communications at a time when the U.S. Navy was upgrading its communication systems to include the launch of "spy-proof" satellites. Jerry was supplying information on the latest technology.

Jerry was assigned as the senior radioman and the CMS custodian in 1975 and 1976 at the new communications station on Diego Garcia that would house the important cryptographic machines. He supplied film containing images of classified messages and keylists. He was then assigned, in 1976, to the USS *Constellation*, with access to classified communiqué.

In 1978 Jerry decided to transfer to the USS *Niagara Falls* and become the CMS custodian and the information gathered gave the Soviets the "complete" set of technical manuals for the cryptographic machines. When the ship was decommissioned he was assigned to the Telecommunications Center at Alameda, California, as the CMS custodian. Jerry was becoming bored, and scared of being caught. He wanted to retire both from the navy and the spy ring but was persuaded to continue for at least three months for an extra one off payment ($50,000). By 1980 the documents were delivered. Jerry actually remained in the navy and was assigned to the USS *Enterprise* at the time when war games were being played off the Soviet coast and was able to provide operational plans and progress reports on them.

Arthur retired from the navy in 1973 and, in and out of employment, opened up a business with John as the financial backer in 1975. The company installed radios and stereo equipment into new cars. Before long Arthur was in financial difficulties, and the business went bankrupt. Arthur then secured a position with VSE Corporation, a defense contractor and it wasn't long before John was insisting that he supply documents for the Soviets. Arthur, feeling obliged to John, complied with his wishes, and by 1980 he was providing information on the amphibious fleet that the U.S. Navy was working on as well as documents outlining the procedures for "damage control" of the command ship USS *Blue Ridge*.

Michael in the meantime was in and out of trouble with the law, drinking heavily, and using drugs (especially after the divorce of his parents). Barbara couldn't handle him anymore, so he went to live with John in 1980. Michael went out with John on a few insurance investigations and learned how to use antisurveillance techniques. John saw the potential and encouraged Michael to join the navy. Michael, always after his father's approval, agreed and enlisted in 1982.

When Michael returned from his first posting aboard USS *America* he told John that he had clearance to view classified information. John indicated that payment would be made if Michael supplied top-secret information to him. Michael's second assignment was in the operations room on USS *Nimitz*, and thus began Michaels' stealing of mission documents, including those dealing with the missile defense system being used. He would hide the documents in his quarters before giving them to John when on shore leave. When arrested in 1985 he had a cache of stolen documents in his quarters.

It was not until late 1984/early 1985 that the FBI was aware that such a group existed. It was a combination of two events that led to its downfall. Jerry, who wanted to retire, and knowing that John would disapprove, decided to anonymously write to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stating his involvement in a spy ring and that they should investigate. After requesting immunity and having limited correspondence, he decided not to continue and go against John. At the same time, Barbara, John's bitter ex-wife (he refused to pay money that was owed) contacted the FBI and turned John in. Laura also gave evidence and the FBI began surveillance in late 1984. Barbara was questioned several times, even undergoing a polygraph. She spoke of the other members; therefore, the agents working on the case were able to connect Jerry to the letters received.

It was not until May 1985 that the FBI arrested John, after he left documents at a dead drop just outside of Rockville, Maryland. The 129 documents found at the drop were from Michael. When the agents searched John's motel room they found documents and personal correspondence that implicated the other members.

Michael was placed in custody on board the USS *Nimitz* and, after confessing, flown back to the United States and arrested for espionage. Arthur was questioned at his home but it was not until he implicated himself in front of a grand jury that he was arrested. Jerry was also questioned at his home but, after searching it, there was nothing substantial to hold him, so he was placed under surveillance. It was a fingerprint on secret documents and John implicating him that led to his arrest.

John was sentenced to two life sentences plus 100 years, to be served concurrently. Jerry received 365 years plus a fine of $410,000 for tax avoidance on his spy earnings. His sentence was the most severe because it was judged that the material he supplied was the most damaging to the security of the United States. Arthur was fined $250,000 and sentenced to life in prison. Michael received a 25-year sentence.

It was estimated that the Walker Spy Ring handed over more than one million pieces of classified documents to the Soviets, making it the most traitorous organization in the history of the U.S. Navy.

See also: Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI); Year of the Spy, 1985

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Shelley Allsop

WATERBOARDING

Waterboarding is an interrogation technique in which an individual is strapped down and water poured over their cloth-covered face, creating the sensation of drowning. Dating back to at least the Spanish inquisition, waterboarding was been a reoccurring phenomenon during international and domestic wars. The CIA has acknowledged that it engaged in waterboarding in 2002 and 2003 but no longer does so. Three suspected

members of al-Qaeda were identified as the targets of this interrogation tactic: Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Additionally, one CIA contract employee, David Passaro, was convicted for his role in the death of a detainee that he was questioning in Afghanistan. Passaro was sentenced to eight years and four months in jail.

Experts disagree about both the value of the information obtained in this manner and its legality. The U.S. military in the past defined it as illegal. During the Spanish-American War, President Theodore Roosevelt court-martialed a general for permitting his troops to use it. After the conclusion of World War II, the United States sentenced a Japanese officer to 15 years of hard labor for waterboarding a U.S. civilian. During Vietnam a soldier was court-martialed for waterboarding.

In late April and early May 2004 CBS News and the *New Yorker* magazine published reports of torture at Abu Ghraib prison. Subsequent newspaper stories indicated that allegations of torture were not restricted to Iraq, Abu Ghraib, or the conduct of Iraqi interrogators and may have originated at Guantanamo Bay. The interrogation stories revealed that CIA interrogators had "used graduated levels of force" against Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, "including a technique known as "water boarding." The article noted that such techniques were controversial but had been authorized by a "secret set of rules adopted by the Bush administration shortly after the 9/11 attacks and endorsed by the Justice Department."

Evidence suggests that the officials within the CIA had early doubts about the legality of waterboarding as an interrogation technique, as did officials in the State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation. In spring 2004 the CIA's inspector general issued a warning that the interrogation procedures approved in 2002 might violate international agreements on torture. Further controversy arose when in December 2007 it was revealed that the CIA had begun taping interrogations of al-Qaeda members in 2002 and destroyed those tapes 2005.

In its public comments Bush administration officials insisted that the United States did not engage in torture, referring to waterboarding and other techniques as "enhanced interrogation" tools. They also asserted that the president had the power to authorize its use because of his commander-in-chief powers and that the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War did not apply to these detainees. In December 2007 and February 2008 the House and Senate passed the 2008 Intelligence Authorization Bill prohibiting the use of waterboarding. President Bush vetoed the bill in March 2008 and the House failed to override the veto.

See also: Bush, George W., Administration and Intelligence; Post–Cold War Intelligence; Renditions; September 11, 2001

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Glenn P. Hastedt

WATERGATE

Encompassing a time period spanning from 1972 to 1975, the "Watergate scandal" consumed the political energies of the Nixon administration, led to the voting of articles of impeachment against President Richard Nixon, and ultimately his resignation. Watergate had multiple dimensions. It was the site of an illegal break-in, the focus of congressional impeachment hearings, and a presidential cover-up. Although never involved in the Watergate scandal, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was indirectly linked to its origins and played a more direct role in its critical end game.

The Watergate break-in occurred on June 17, 1972, when five individuals were arrested for breaking into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee which was located in the Watergate hotel in Washington, DC. Arrested were Bernard Barker, Virgilio Gonzalez, Eugenio Martinez, James W. McCord, Jr., and Frank Sturgis. This was actually their third break-in attempt into these offices. They had broken in three weeks earlier and left wiretaps and other listening devices that were not working properly. This break-in was to fix them as well as photograph additional documents.

Many of the individuals involved in the plot had ties to the CIA or other intelligence agencies. L. Gordon Liddy, once employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had proposed the operation in February. He was supported by E. Howard Hunt, who earlier had worked for the CIA. Among those caught at the Watergate with intelligence ties were James W. McCord, Jr., an ex-CIA who worked for the Committee to Re-elect the President and was put in charge of installing the electronic listening devices, and Bernard Barker who had been recruited by the CIA when he was a Cuban policemen.

This was not the first burglary engineered by Liddy and Hunt. Earlier they had been recruited by Egil "Bud" Krogh who worked for John Ehrlichman, Nixon's assistant to the president for domestic affairs, to be part of a "plumbers" unit that would break in to Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. Ellsberg was a Defense Department official who was responsible for leaking the "Pentagon Papers" and was a principal target of Nixon's anger over perceived disloyalty within the government. That operation had accomplished little and after the plumbers were terminated Liddy and Hunt had gone to work for the Committee to Re-elect the President that was chaired by Attorney General John Mitchell who approved Liddy's Watergate break-in plan.

After the break-in, Nixon approved a cover-up plan put forward by his Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to hide the White House's involvement in the Watergate break-in. At its core was a CIA request to the FBI to halt its investigation into the Watergate break-in because of national security concerns. The CIA was seen as likely to respond positively to this request because of its desire to avoid the negative publicity that would come to it due to Hunt's previous ties to the CIA and as well as the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Haldeman met with Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms and his assistant General Vernon Walters. Walters would later testify that he was to go to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray and cite an ongoing CIA operation in Mexico as the national security operation to be protected. Helms and Walters showed little interest in the plan and in the end refused to block the FBI's investigation into Watergate when Gray made a formal request for such a statement.

Richard Nixon boards a helicopter after resigning the presidency on August 9, 1974. Oddly, he flashes his trademark "V for Victory" sign at this moment of disgrace. (National Archives)

For his decision Helms was removed as DCI and replaced by James Schlesinger. Helms became ambassador to Iran.

Nixon's June 23 conversation with Haldeman had been recorded on tape, along with many others in the president's office. It would become the "smoking gun" that documented Nixon's personal involvement in the cover-up. The tape became public in August 1974. The previous month the House Judiciary Committee voted three articles of impeachment against the president for obstruction of justice, abuse of power, and contempt of Congress. With the release of this tape, the ten congresspeople who had voted against all three articles of impeachment now indicated they would switch their vote when the matter went to the full House. Evidence also pointed to sufficient votes in the Senate to convict him. Armed with this information, President Nixon announced on August 8, 1974, that he would resign as president the following day.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Ellsberg, Daniel; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Gray, L. Patrick, III; Nixon Administration and Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

WEBSTER, TIMOTHY
(MARCH 12, 1822–APRIL 29, 1862)

One of the greatest of the Pinkerton agents, Timothy Webster completed several important undercover assignments, including the thwarting of a plot to assassinate Abraham Lincoln in 1861. He was captured in Richmond, Virginia, in 1862 and executed.

In 1853, Webster left the New York City police to work for the Pinkerton Agency. At the outset of the Civil War, Webster accompanied Pinkerton to Washington, DC. He helped to scout the route used by Lincoln to enter the city for his inauguration, and then infiltrated a militia group in Baltimore that planned to assassinate Lincoln before he was sworn in.

In the summer of 1861, Webster was dispatched to Louisville to judge the level of secessionist activity in Kentucky. He gathered a great deal of information and came under Confederate surveillance. Webster evaded his pursuers and returned north. He was then sent to Baltimore. He was recognized as a Pinkerton agent, but bluffed his way out of it. In September, he was sworn into a secessionist conspiracy and used his contacts to arrest the entire group. The next month, he went undercover with a group of Maryland volunteers into the South and surveyed Richmond. Over the next few months, he reported the smuggling ring that moved him south, stole papers intended for the Confederate Secretary of War Judah Benjamin, and met Benjamin himself. In January of 1862, he came down with a severe attack of rheumatism and was stranded in Richmond.

When Webster failed to report, Pinkerton sent agents to find him. They aroused suspicion immediately—they were recognized by someone whose house they'd searched in Washington. The two Pinkerton agents were arrested, but escaped. Recaptured, one of them betrayed Webster in return for a pardon. Webster was sentenced to death. Despite appeals from Pinkerton and the U.S. Army, Webster was executed on April 29, 1862, barely able to walk to the scaffold.

See also: Pinkerton, Allan

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James L. Erwin

WEBSTER, WILLIAM HEDGECOCK
(MARCH 6, 1924–)

William Webster served as the 14th Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from March 6, 1987, to August 31, 1991. Born in St. Louis, Missouri, Webster received his law degree from Washington University (St. Louis) in 1949. He served in the navy in World War II and the Korean War. In between stints in private law practice, Webster was U.S. attorney for Missouri's Eastern District from 1960 to 1961. He was first appointed to the judiciary in 1970 as a judge for the U.S. District Court in that same region. From there he went on to serve on the U.S. District Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit).

President Jimmy Carter selected Webster from that position to become director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1978. At the time the FBI was still reeling from revelations of wrongdoing during J. Edgar Hoover's long tenure as director.

Hoover's successor, Clarence Kelly, had been unable to restore public confidence in the FBI and Carter turned to Webster on the recommendation of Attorney General Griffin Bell. At the FBI, Webster quickly established a reputation as a skilled administrator. He made the training program more sophisticated and increased the diversity of the FBI. Webster also reoriented the FBI's activities in the direction of prosecuting spies in an effort to deter espionage. Among the high-profile spies caught while he served as director were John Walker, Jonathan Jay Pollard, and Ronald Pelton.

On March 3, 1987, President Ronald Reagan nominated Webster to become DCI. Just as with his nomination to serve as director of the FBI, Webster was brought in to restore the image of an organization tarnished by scandal. Under DCI William Casey the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) engaged in a number of controversial quasi-covert actions in support of the Contras in Nicaragua. Details of the Iran-Contra deal had recently come to light, forcing the administration to establish an independent commission, the Tower Commission, to assess responsibility for the arms-for-hostages exchange that lay at the heart of the Iran-Contra deal. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates was too closely linked to this undertaking to take over the position of DCI after Casey's death. After three others turned down the post, Reagan turned to Webster.

Webster maintained his reputation as an able administrator as DCI. His lack of background in intelligence and foreign policy, however, hampered his effectiveness. Also, unlike Casey he did not have cabinet rank. Webster became the target of criticism for the CIA's failure to produce intelligence on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the George H. W. Bush administration's failed effort to oust Panama's Manuel Noriega. He took steps to increase the FBI's counterterrorism capability following the kidnapping of Italian Prime Minster Aldo Moro by instructing the FBI training academy to place added emphasis on this terrorism. Webster returned to private law practice after resigning. In 2001 he served on a special commission to investigate security problems in the United States. The commission was established after Philip Hanssen was arrested for espionage. It concluded that a widespread inattention to security matters existed within the FBI.

See also: Carter Administration and Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Reagan Administration and Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

WELCH, RICHARD
(1929–DECEMBER 23, 1975)

Richard Skeffington Welch was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) clandestine officer who was killed by a leftist Greek group known as the Revolutionary Organization of November 17 in Athens, Greece, outside of his residence on

December 23, 1975. His death became the focal point of a major controversy over what limits, if any, should be placed on the growing body of anti-CIA literature that was prevalent at the time, much of it written by CIA officials who left the agency in protest over U.S. foreign policy.

Particular attention focused on Phillip Agee who had written several anti-CIA tracks in which he revealed the identities of numerous CIA officials, including Welch's. The best known of these was *Counterspy*. Others argue that although it was true that Welch's position as station chief had been compromised by such revelations, poor trade craft was also responsible. Welch lived in the same residence as had previous station chiefs and a review of the credentials held by U.S. diplomats made it relatively easy to identify CIA personnel. So commonplace was knowledge of his real identity that bus tours would point out his residence.

Welch had joined the CIA after graduating from Harvard in 1951 and was the 32nd officer to be assassinated. His killers were later convicted of a number of politically motivated assassinations, although they were not charged with Welch's death due to the statute of limitations in the case. Welch's death led Congress to pass the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

See also: Agee, Philip; Central Intelligence Agency; Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982; Plame, Valerie Elise

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Glenn P. Hastedt

WELLINGTON HOUSE

Officially established as the War Propaganda Bureau, Wellington House got its name from the apartment block in which it was headquartered. Its efforts were directed toward neutral nations, especially the United States. It operated from 1914 until American involvement in 1917. Wellington House worked with material given to it by the British government, but efforts were to conceal the fact that official sources had originated its material. Canadian author Sir Gilbert Parker steered British propaganda in the United States.

C. F. G. Masterman led its operations. Wellington House concentrated on publicizing accounts which were believed at the time to be true rather than to spread sensationalized rumors. John Buchan succeeded Masterman, and their mutual respect for one another averted tumult which might have emerged from the change in leadership. Nevertheless, Buchan's view of human nature was darker than that of his predecessor, and he worked for greater utilization of mass propaganda.

Although Wellington House primarily used pamphlets, diverse other types of material included free copy offered to American newspapers, picture postcards, maps,

cartoons, and illustrations. It also produced a number of propaganda films. Notable was *Britain Prepared*, released in December 1915, and *The Battle of the Somme*, released in August 1916. *Britain Prepared* was a creation of Wellington House. It garnered success and publicity and sparked naval interest in creating films.

Most of *The Battle of the Somme* consisted of genuine battle footage, but some segments were simulated, and this was not reported to the viewers. The film was a success, garnering 30,000 pounds for military charities. It showed the dead (both real and reenacted), and the film's success has been attributed to the fact that this flouted contemporary conventions in photography.

Efforts for Wellington House to coordinate propaganda efforts with the British Foreign Office and War Office were hampered by rivalries between the departments. The presence of multiple propaganda bodies detracted from the overall ability to coordinate Britain's propaganda effort. Between January 1916 and February 1917, Wellington House was brought under the Foreign Office.

Under Buchan, Wellington House's staff grew, and so its output. At the close of 1917, British propaganda was transformed. Wellington House's work focused on building sympathy in the neutral United States toward Britain, but by this time the United States was in the war on Britain's side. A paper shortage contributed to a dramatic fall in the output of pamphlets. British propaganda was directed to begin targeting German civilians as well as German troops.

Secret during American neutrality, Wellington House was replaced by the British Bureau of Information upon U.S. entry into the war. After the war ended in 1918, Britain dismantled the propaganda machine which it had constructed.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I

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Nicholas M. Sambaluk

WENTWORTH, PAUL
(?–NOVEMBER 1793)

American loyalist spy for Britain during the War of American Independence. Wentworth was born probably on the island of Barbados; his birth date is unknown. He inherited a rich sugar plantation in Surinam and in 1764 employed Dr. Edward Bancroft as his plantation physician. He moved to London, speculated in stocks, and entertained Benjamin Franklin. In 1770, he joined the New Hampshire council and two years later became a British spy, with a salary of 500 pounds. He resigned from

the council in 1774 and, during the War of American Independence, began reporting to William Eden, undersecretary of state and head of the British secret service.

Wentworth was assigned to Paris, with the duty of spying on Americans Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane, who were seeking French recognition and a treaty of alliance. He recruited Bancroft, who was employed by Deane as an agent and clerk, to become a double agent. Throughout 1777, Wentworth worked mightily to thwart a French-American alliance. He believed that American leaders such as Franklin could be bribed with titles and money, but Franklin spurned his enticements. The French, aware of his activities, worked quickly to affect the French-American treaty of 1778.

Wentworth continued his espionage efforts until the end of the war, but with decreasing effectiveness. In 1780, he was elected to Parliament, and he continued to speculate in stocks. Ten years later he retired to his plantation in Surinam; he died in November 1793.

See also: American Revolution and Intelligence; Bancroft, Dr. Edward; Deane, Silas; Eden, William; Franklin, Benjamin

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Paul David Nelson

WEST, NIGEL
(NOVEMBER 8, 1951–)

Nigel West is the pen name of spy novel writer Rupert William Simon Allason. His spy novels weave tales of espionage that are so credible that many of his readers believe that he is the unofficial historian of the British Secret Service. He is also the author of numerous nonfiction military history books that examine security and intelligence issues. In addition to being an author, West was also the Conservative Party member of Parliament for Torbay in Devon from 1987 to 1997. In 1997, he lost his seat to Liberal Democrat Adrian Sanders by a margin of 12 votes.

West was born on November 8, 1951, in London, England. He was raised a Roman Catholic by his Irish mother and went to school at the Benedictine Academy. West worked as a researcher for authors Ronald Seth (1935–1975) and Richard Deacon (1951–), who had been the foreign editor of *The Sunday Times*. West eventually joined the BBC and contributed to the *Spy!* and *Escape* series. His first book, co-authored with Deacon in 1980, was the basis of *Spy!* British counterintelligence expert Arthur Martin of the British Security Service (MI-5), West's mentor, allowed West to publish numerous works of fiction and nonfiction that have helped many to understand espionage history. His books include: *The Third Secret: The CIA, Solidarity, and the KGB*; *VENONA: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War*; *Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives*; *MI5: British Security Service Operations, 1909–1945*;

The Secret War for the Falklands; and *Molehunt: The Hunt for the Soviet Spy inside MI5.* He is also the European editor of the *World Intelligence Report* and the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.* In addition, West has been a frequent (and popular) guest lecturer on Queen Elizabeth II.

See also: Fiction—Spy Novels

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Michael R. Hall

WHALEN, LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM H.

William H. Whalen, a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, served as an advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1959 and betrayed the United States for approximately $400,000. Whalen joined the army in October 1940 and after World War II began to receive intelligence assignments. He was assigned to the executive officer in the army's Executive Office Staff, Intelligence (OACSI) in 1948. From 1951 to 1952, Whalen served as a plans and policy officer with the Army Security Agency. The importance of his intelligence assignments continued to grow and by 1959 he was assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) as first deputy chief and subsequently chief. In March 1959, Whalen met Colonel Sergei A. Edemski, the Soviet military attaché in Washington, and agreed to trade classified documents for cash.

Whalen supplied the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) through Edemski and later Mikahil A. Shumaev, a Soviet intelligence officer, with details on nuclear weapons capabilities and potential targets. He also supplied 17 manuals that contained operational plans for U.S. Air Force units in both war and peace. Most importantly, Whalen provided American intelligence estimates of Soviet military capabilities. On July 4, 1960, Whalen suffered a heart attack, which forced him into retirement in February 1960. His retirement did not end his attempts at espionage in 1962 and 1963, but prevented him from attaining any more vital information. Dimitri Polyakov, one of the CIA's greatest spies during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, whose code name was "Top Hat," revealed Whalen as a spy. He claimed that Whalen had given the Soviets enough vital to information to allow them a victory in the event of an outright conflict. Whalen was indicted on charges of conspiracy as an agent of the Soviet Union on July 12, 1966. Whalen was given a 15-year sentence and died in prison.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate)

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Lazarus F. O'Sako

WHITE, HARRY DEXTER (OCTOBER 9, 1892–AUGUST 16, 1948)

Born in Boston on October 9, 1892, to Lithuanian Jewish immigrants, Harry Dexter White became the highest-ranking government official accused of espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. White, who held a PhD in economics from Harvard University, pursued an academic career until 1934 when he went to work for the Treasury Department. White's progressive, anti-Fascist political views brought him to the attention of Harold Ware, a veteran member of the Communist Party, who recruited White as a member of a group of government employees dedicated to advancing the cause of socialism and adding the Soviet Union. Unlike most of the members of the Ware Group, White never joined the Communist Party but his sympathy for the Soviet Union allowed him to easily step from influencing government to practicing espionage when Josef Peters, the Hungarian-born director of the Communist Party's underground apparatus, took charge of the group after Ware's death in an auto accident. White rose rapidly in the Treasury Department, eventually becoming assistant to Secretary Henry Morgenthau and one of the architects of the Bretton Woods agreements on postwar economic policy.

Although formally a part of the espionage apparatus overseen by close friend Gregory Silvermaster, White often met directly with Soviet intelligence officers. They remembered him as a nervous agent, fearing political scandal, who once proposed having meetings while driving around in his car. White actively promoted the careers of other Soviet agents and made his most valuable contributions to the Soviets during the 1940s by passing along information on American monetary policy and plans for postwar Germany. He derailed loans to the Nationalist government in China while promoting generous loans to the Soviet Union and cost the United States billions in inflation when he arranged for the Soviets to receive their own copies of the plates for printing German occupation currency. Named by both Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley as a Soviet agent, White was summoned before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1948 where he defended himself in dramatic speech claiming that a man holding the views he held could never be a Communist. White died of a heart attack on August 16, just days after his testimony. Regarded for years as an innocent victim of anticommunism, White's role as a Soviet source was confirmed by the release of the VENONA files where he appears, under the code name "Jurist," in over a dozen messages.

See also: VENONA

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Vernon L. Pedersen

WHITNEY, LIEUTENANT HENRY H. (1866–1949)

Henry H. Whitney was a lieutenant in the Military Intelligence Division during the Spanish-American War. Whitney surveyed Puerto Rico before the American invasion of that island in 1898.

Philip C. Hanna served as consul at San Juan before the Spanish-American War. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, Hanna urged that Puerto Rico be invaded. He suggested that the Puerto Ricans would rise up and assist the United States. Hanna urged this again, but nothing was done before the destruction of the Spanish fleet.

After the Spanish fleet's defeat at the hands of the U.S. Caribbean Squadron, Lt. Henry H. Whitney of the U.S. Army's Military Intelligence Division was ordered in May of 1898 to go to Puerto Rico and survey the island in preparation for its invasion. Somehow, word of his mission was leaked to the newspapers, and Spanish authorities were waiting to arrest him at Ponce. Whitney eluded capture; he had signed on as a stoker for the trip to Puerto Rico and was covered in coal dust. Once ashore, Whitney presented himself as H. W. Elias, an officer in the British Merchant Marine.

Whitney reconnoitered much of the island, assuming various disguises and identities as he switched ships. His fluency in six languages was a vital part of these disguises. Whitney returned to the United States in June and presented a number of maps and careful notes. His intelligence was vital to the American landing in Puerto Rico. Whitney was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and served in the U.S. Army for another three decades before retiring as a brigadier general.

See also: Spanish-American War

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James L. Erwin

WILLOUGHBY, MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES A. (MARCH 8, 1892–OCTOBER 15, 1972)

Major General Charles Willoughby was General Douglas MacArthur's Intelligence Chief from 1941 to 1951. Born March 8, 1892, in Heidelberg, Germany, Karl Weidenbach moved to the United States, became an American citizen, and changed

his name to Charles Willoughby. He enlisted in the U.S. Army and was commissioned in 1916. He transferred to the Army Air Corps in 1917 and commanded the American Aviation School. In 1923 he was assigned to the Military Intelligence Division, serving as attaché in Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador.

General Douglas MacArthur named him assistant chief of staff for intelligence of U.S. forces in the Far East on October 17, 1941. In June 1942 he was promoted to brigadier general and named assistant chief of staff for intelligence for the entire Southwest Pacific Area. Willoughby controlled American Army Intelligence in the Pacific, largely excluding the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He created the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) to use indigenous resources to collect intelligence and carry out sabotage. This group included the famous "coastwatchers," and the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS, which translated captured and decrypted Japanese documents).

With the end of World War II, Willoughby shifted his attentions to gathering information about domestic and foreign Communists. His primary targets included Canadian diplomat Herbert Norman and American journalist Agnes Smedley, whom Willoughby accused of being a critical link in Richard Sorge's Soviet spy chain. Critics charged that this infatuation with Soviet spies led him to neglect his primary responsibilities for military intelligence, resulting in American failure to anticipate neither the North Korean invasion of the South nor the Chinese Communist intervention.

With MacArthur's dismissal on April 10, 1951, Willoughby retired. He continued to play a prominent role in anti-Communist activities in the United States until his death in 1972.

See also: Central Bureau; Coastwatchers; Office of Strategic Services; Smedley, Agnes; Sorge, Richard

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Peter F. Coogan

WILSON, EDWIN P.
(1928–)

Edwin P. Wilson was a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer who was convicted of illegally selling weapons to Libya in 1983. During his career with the CIA and later with naval intelligence, Wilson operated a number of dummy companies that dealt in arms sales, served as a conduit for information to the CIA, and a vehicle for CIA covert operations. As a result of these business activities Wilson amassed $21.8 million from arms sales to Libya alone. Wilson appealed the verdict, arguing that the CIA had lied about the extent of its involvement with Wilson after his retirement.

In 2003 a judge vacated the decision and he was released from Allenwood Federal Prison Camp on September 14, 2004.

Wilson was born in 1928 and joined the marines in 1953. In 1956 he was discharged and he started working for the CIA, remaining with them for 15 years. His primary assignment with the CIA was to establish front companies through which the CIA could conduct business. Former CIA agents were key partners in many of these firms. One of the most successful was Consultants International. After he left the CIA, Wilson began to operate in a similar capacity and using the same firms for a secret naval intelligence unit, Task Force 157. He continued in this capacity until 1976.

In September 1976 a former CIA employee alerted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the likelihood that a U.S. firm operated by Wilson was engaging in arms sales with Libya. Such dealings were illegal at the time because of economic sanctions placed on Libya by the United States. The following year the *Washington Post* ran a story about how Wilson had smuggled 500,000 explosive timers in Libya in summer 1976. The CIA's inspector general's office began an investigation into Wilson's activities two days after the article appeared. The CIA suspended its investigation at the request of the FBI. During its internal investigation Wilson was supported by Ted Shackley and Thomas Clines, CIA officials and business partners in his front companies.

In 1980 a grand jury indicted Wilson for shipping explosives to Libya. He was not convicted but went into self-imposed exile in Libya which would not extradite him. He did, however, meet with a U.S. official in Italy in 1981 where he provided them with information on Libya's nuclear program, assassination teams, and Americans assisting or taking bribes from the Libyan government. Unhappy and fearing for his safety in Libya, Wilson was convinced in June 1982 to leave Libya and go to the Dominican Republic. When he arrived he was captured and sent to New York where he was arrested. On July 19, 1982, he was indicted for conspiring to ship plastic explosives to Libya, falsifying a ships export declaration, exporting explosives without a license, and transporting explosives by aircraft. On February 5, 1983, Wilson was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 17 years in jail and fined $145,000.

During the trial Wilson argued in his defense that he was at least implicitly acting under the direction and authority of the CIA and that he had engaged in eight other projects for the CIA since his official retirement in 1976, including gathering intelligence on Soviet military operations in Libya. The CIA denied that with one exception it had had any contact with him. Wilson unsuccessfully appealed the verdict. Years later his lawyer, a former CIA official, was able to document some 80 contacts between Wilson and the CIA and the decision was overturned.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Glenn P. Hastedt

WISEMAN, SIR WILLIAM
(FEBRUARY 1, 1885–JUNE 17, 1962)

Sir William Wiseman, a British intelligence officer, had the task of liaising with the United States during World War I, becoming a confidant of Colonel Edward M. House, the close adviser to Woodrow Wilson.

William George Eden Wiseman was born on February 1, 1885, the eldest son of Sir William Wiseman, 9th Baronet, who had annexed the Pacific island of Tongareva in 1888. A month before his eight birthday, at the death of his father, William inherited the baronetcy that was created in 1628. He was educated at Winchester College and Jesus College, Cambridge, where he was a member of the university boxing team. He tried his hand as a journalist and then traveled in Canada and the United States where he built up some business interests. Just before the outbreak of World War I, Wiseman joined the artillery, and when war started, he served as a captain in the 6th (Service) Battalion.

After being injured in a gas attack, Wiseman was appointed intelligence officer attached to the British embassy in Washington, DC. In 1916 he was asked by the British ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, to communicate with Colonel House and he soon became an intermediary between House and the British government. *The intimate papers of Colonel House*, published from 1926 to 1928, make many references to him, showing his importance at the time. The British politician Lord Reading commented that "Wiseman is well named."

One of the operations run by Wiseman concerned an attempt to support the Kerensky government in Russia in May 1917. To this end Wiseman contacted a family friend, the writer W. Somerset Maugham, and persuaded him to go to Petrograd with $150,000—half provided by Colonel House, and the other half from British sources. Many of the adventures that Maugham had during this venture appeared in his Ashenden short stories, with one of the people who worked with him, Tomas Masaryk, ending up as president of Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1935. During the Peace Conference at Versailles at the end of World War I, Wiseman, by then a lieutenant colonel, was placed on the staff of military intelligence, and chief adviser on American affairs to the British delegation.

After the Treaty of Versailles, Wiseman moved to the United States and became a partner in the New York banking house of Kuhn, Loeb and Company. He became chairman of the committee in the United States of the Dollar Exports Council, and was described as having been, for many years, one of the most prominent British residents in the United States. He died on June 17, 1962, at a New York Hospital.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I

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Justin Corfield

WISNER, FRANK GARDINER
(1910–OCTOBER 29, 1965)

Frank G. Wisner oversaw the early development of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) covert action capabilities. Born in Laurel, Mississippi, in 1910, Wisner was educated at Woodberry Forest School in Orange and the University of Virginia. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy six months prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. After working in the navy's censor's office, Wisner obtained a transfer to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

In June 1944, the OSS sent Wisner to Turkey on his first assignment. In August, he was transferred to Romania, where his principal responsibility was to spy on the Soviet Union. Although most U.S. officials still considered Stalin an ally during World War II, Wisner's experiences in Romania convinced him that conflict with the Soviet Union was imminent. Henceforth, he became increasingly involved in anti-Soviet policy initiatives.

In 1947, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson recruited Wisner into the State Department's Office of Occupied Territories. On June 18, 1948, National Security Council Directive 10/2 established the Office of Special Projects and Wisner was appointed its first director. Soon renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), this organization became the covert operations branch of the CIA.

In August 1952, the OPC was merged with the CIA's espionage branch to form the Directorate of Plans (DPP). Wisner was appointed to head the DPP. As deputy director for plans, Wisner oversaw operations that resulted in the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. In December 1956, Wisner suffered a mental breakdown and was diagnosed as a manic depressive. He was institutionalized at the Sheppard-Pratt Institute in Baltimore, Maryland, where he was subjected to electroshock therapy, until 1958.

Too ill to return to the DPP, Wisner was appointed CIA chief of station in London in 1959. In April 1962, the CIA recalled Wisner to Washington. Soon afterward he agreed to retire from the agency. On October 29, 1965, Wisner committed suicide using one of his son's shotguns. He was buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

See also: AJAX, Operation; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War Intelligence; Office of Strategic Services

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Derek A. Bentley

WITZKE, LOTHAR
(1895–)

A German agent and saboteur in the United States during World War I, Lothar Wotzke was the only German spy sentenced to death in the United States during the war. Born in Posen, Germany, both of Lothar Witzke's parents were born in Russian Poland. Lothar joined the Germany navy and served on the *Dresden*, surviving the sinking of the ship in the Pacific, and being interned in Valparaiso, Chile. He escaped in 1916 and went to the United States where he was involved in an attempt to destroy munitions at Black Tom Island, New York, on July 30, 1916. He then worked in Mexico and was sent back into the United States in 1918. Leaving Mexico in civilian clothes and assuming the identity of Pablo Waberski, a Russian Pole, he was arrested by the customs officials after he left the Central Hotel at Nogales, Mexico, and entered into Arizona. A cipher message in his luggage, decoded by U.S. military intelligence, confirmed him as a spy.

The U.S. Army put Witzke on trial at a secret court-martial on the charge of spying at the American Army encampment where he was held after his arrest, and he was found guilty and sentenced to be executed. There were stays of execution and on January, 5, 1920, the U.S. Census records Witzke living at the Fort San Antonio Army Post, Texas. Later that year President Woodrow Wilson commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. This was partly because the case, according to commentators, should have been held before civilian authorities. Three years later, Witzke rescued several fellow prisoners in a fire which broke out after a boiler exploded, and was freed. He returned to Germany and was awarded two Iron Cross medals. He later moved to Venezuela where he worked for an oil company, and then worked for the Hamburg-America steamship line in China.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I

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Justin Corfield

WOLF, MARKUS JOHANNES
(JANUARY 19, 1923–NOVEMBER 9, 2006)

Johannes Markus Wolf was an East German spymaster. Wolf was born on January 19, 1923, in Hechingen, Germany. The Jewish background and Communist Party membership of Wolf's father forced the family to flee first to Switzerland, and then to the Soviet Union after Hitler's rise to power. In Moscow, he attended the German Karl Liebknecht School before graduating at a Russian high school. He started studying aeronautical engineering when the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. Evacuated to central Asia, he joined the Comintern in Bashkiria, where he learned how to use various weapons, explosive devices, propaganda techniques, and other espionage methods.

After the war Wolf worked in a Berlin radio station in the Soviet Zone, and covered the Nuremberg War Trials. In 1951, he helped to establish the East German foreign intelligence network, later called die Hauptverwaltung Aufkläung (HVA), a branch of the secret police or STASI. The following year he became its head, personally supervising many of his 4,000 agents in various activities such as disguises, forgeries, safe houses, surveillance, blackmail, planting listening devices, stealing secrets, and clandestine meetings. He also served as a link between East Germany and various terrorist organizations worldwide, including the PLO.

Known as the "man without a face" since he was rarely photographed, he perfected using sex as an espionage tool. His "Romeo spies," East German males using identities of people killed during wartime bombings on Dresden, seduced secretaries who had access to classified information, including Dagmar Kahlig-Schheffler, who later worked in the office of West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. He also established brothels in East Berlin to trap unsuspecting Westerners to work for him. He succeeded in infiltrating NATO headquarters and the highest levels of politics, business, and government of West Germany by planting moles with the most famous being Güter Guillaume, a top aide to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, upon whose unmasking caused Brandt to resign in 1974.

Wolf retired in 1986, but as a supporter of the policies of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, he advocated change in East Germany along the lines of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union. In 1993, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990, Wolf was arrested and convicted of treason and spying charges, receiving a six-year sentence. It was later overturned, but in 1997, he received a two-year suspended sentence for lesser crimes.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; German Democratic Republic—and U.S. Intelligence; STASI

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Gregory C. Ference

WOOD, WILLIAM P.
(MARCH 11, 1820–MARCH 20, 1903)

William P. Wood was the first person appointed to run the United States Secret Service. The Department came in to being on July 5, 1865, with Wood being appointed by Treasury Secretary Hugh McCulloch. William Wood had served in the army during the Mexican American War and prior to his appointment as head of the Secret Service he had been commandant of the old Capital Prison. The Old Capital Prison was on the site that is the U.S. Supreme Court's home today.

Wood served as a cavalry officer in the Mexican American War; during the U.S. Civil War, Wood once again served in the cavalry. Wood collected intelligence for the Union army, including missions that took him behind enemy lines; he was also credited with rescuing prisoners. Wood's exploits earned him a reputation in the South as a daring soldier. Wood was also recruited during the war to help the Treasury Department to track down Peter McCartney and other notorious counterfeiters and forgers that were operating in the United States at the time.

The Secret Service had 10 agents when the office was created in 1865. Part of the staff that Wood hired was former forgers and counterfeiters to help Wood and his agents learn to identify counterfeit currency and other financial documents. Once the Secret Service was established, Wood and his agents relentlessly pursued counterfeiters. Under Wood's leadership, the Secret Service captured over 200 counterfeiters between 1865 and 1869. Wood resigned his post as chief of the Secret Service after he tracked down William E. Brock and tried to collect the reward offered for Brock's capture. Wood received $5,000 of the $20,000 reward and spent the rest of his life trying to get the remaining reward from the Treasury Department.

See also: Sanford, Henry; Secret Service

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Steven F. Marin

WOODHULL, ABRAHAM
(OCTOBER 7, 1750–JANUARY 23, 1826)

Abraham Woodhull was a member of the Culper Spy Ring in New York and on Long Island during the War of American Independence. Woodhull was born on October 7, 1750, in Setauket, Long Island, New York. When the Culper Spy Ring was organized in 1778 by Major Benjamin Tallmadge at the behest of General George Washington, Woodhull (Culper Senior) was put in charge of day-to-day operations. Additionally, he risked his life many times by collecting information in New York City and on western Long Island.

As a rule, the Culper Ring operated by an agreed-upon set of procedures. Robert Townsend (Culper Junior) gathered intelligence in the city, which he transcribed in encoded documents. Austin Roe conveyed these to Setauket, where he leased a pasture and barn from Woodhull and kept cattle as a pretense for being in the vicinity. He deposited his dispatches in a secret box, tended his cattle, and departed. Woodhull then collected the documents, evaluated them, and determined which needed to be sent forward to Washington's headquarters. These he gave to Caleb Brewster, who carried them by whaleboat across Long Island Sound to Tallmadge in Connecticut. Finally, Tallmadge dispatched the information by a series of mounted dragoons to Washington in New Windsor, New York.

Woodhull's health was precarious and not improved by his constant fear of being discovered. But he, and his spy colleagues, survived the war without mishap. In later

years Woodhull became judge of Suffolk County and died on January 23, 1826, at Setauket.

See also: Brewster, Caleb; Culper Ring; Roe, Austin; Tallmadge, Major Benjamin; Townsend, Robert

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Paul David Nelson

WOOLSEY, R. JAMES, JR.
(SEPTEMBER 21, 1941–)

R. James Woolsey was the 16th Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). He held that position from February 5, 1993, to January 10, 1995. Woolsey was born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and received his law degree from Yale University. Prior to obtaining that degree, he was a Rhodes Scholar. Prior to becoming DCI Woolsey served as a captain in the army and as a program analyst in the office of the secretary of defense. From there he went on to serve on the National Security Council Staff and as a member of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT I) delegation. Later he was Delegate-at-Large to the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (START) and ambassador and U.S. representative to the negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In addition to these positions, Woolsey served as undersecretary of the navy and on several presidential commissions, most notably the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (1983–1984) and the President's Commission on Defense Management (1985–1986). In 1993 Woolsey chaired a panel that investigated the state of American imagery intelligence. Complaints had risen about its performance during the recently concluded Persian Gulf War. A consensus had developed that the National Reconnaissance Office was too decentralized and that its different units often worked at cross purposes. Woolsey's panel was charged with finding ways to consolidate and streamline its performance. Published reports suggest that his report was well received by the White House and the intelligence community.

Woolsey's tenure as DCI coincided with the ending of the cold war and budget cuts for the intelligence community. This is in spite of the fact that he told senators during his confirmation hearing that although the cold war dragon [the Soviet Union] had been slain, the United States now faced a world populated by a jungle filled with dangerous poisonous snakes. Woolsey also labored under the handicap of serving a president, Bill Clinton, who had little interest in foreign policy matters or intelligence. Their relationship is described as having been distant, with Woolsey unable to gain regular access to the president. He did not have a private meeting with Clinton during the president's first year in office. At the CIA, Woolsey alienated many with his combative style, his penchant for viewing his role as DCI through the lens of domestic politics rather than as a presidential advisor, and his emphasis on technical means of

collecting intelligence over human intelligence. Ultimately, Woolsey's effectiveness as DCI was undermined and his resignation all but forced by revelations that Aldrich Ames, who began working in the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations in 1968, had been spying for the Soviet Union since 1985. He was not arrested until 1994. Upon his retirement, Woolsey returned to the law firm of Shea and Gardner for whom he began working in 1973.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence

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Glenn P. Hastedt

WRIGHT, PETER
(AUGUST 9, 1916–APRIL 27, 1995)

Peter Wright, a former British Security Service (MI-5) intelligence agent and author, was born on August 9, 1916, in Chesterfield, England. His father was one of the innovators of signals intelligence which was an important part of the Allied victory in World War I. Like his father, Wright excelled in the intelligence field, although he did not break into the sector until after the Great Depression.

The start of World War II marked Wright's transition from working as an agricultural laborer to being hired by the Admiralty's Research Laboratory. While there, according to his own account, he worked with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Following his work with the CIA, he was hired by the British MI5.

Most of what is known about Wright's intelligence work comes from his highly controversial autobiography and novel, *Spycatcher*. Since the book contained what many within the UK government considered confidential information, it was delayed in its publication starting in 1985. Ultimately, the British government could delay the publication at home, but could not prevent it abroad. *Spycatcher* was finally printed on October 13, 1988, in the United Kingdom, only after having been a best seller in the United States and Australia.

According to his account, Wright worked with the CIA to investigate a strange listening device which had been discovered on a gift from the Kremlin to the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952. He solved the mystery, discovering that the device could be read if targeted by a microwave beam which would reflect back information.

Thanks to his discovery, he was then promoted to the MI-5, where he worked on Egyptian ciphering machines in 1956, remote detection technology in 1958, and French ciphering machines in 1960. His most controversial claim is his book relates to a supposed mole hunt within MI-5, during which he claims that his boss, Sir Roger Hillis, was a traitor. Additionally, he claimed that Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) had actually attempted to assassinate Egyptian leader Abdel Nasser during the Suez Canal crisis.

Wright retired as Senior Director from MI-5 in 1976, using his acquired fortune to buy a ranch in Tanzania. He died there on April 27, 1995.

See also: MI-5 (The Security Service)

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Arthur Holst

WYNNE, GREVILLE MAYNARD
(MARCH 19, 1919–FEBRUARY 28, 1990)

Greville Maynard Wynne was a British intelligence officer, working with Soviet double agents. Arrested by the Soviets in 1961 and exchanged in 1964. Trained as an engineer at Nottingham University, he set up a business as a machinery salesman after the war. In 1959 he assisted in the defection of Soviet intelligence officer Major Kuznov.

In 1960, Soviet officer Oleg Penkovsky decided to offer his services to the Western powers of the cold war. The Americans rejected him, fearing a trap. The British, however, accepted his offer. Penkovsky's work with scientific exchanges with the West, and Wynne's business selling electrical machinery in Eastern Europe, provided a perfect cover. During their cooperation, which lasted from April 1961 to October 1962, Western intelligence required data on Soviet missile development, troop movements, locations of military headquarters; identities of Committee for State Security (KGB) officers, as well as confidential economic and political information.

Moscow suspected a mole, and Soviet double agents, William H. Whalen, Jack Dunlap, and George Blake, assisted in exposing Penkovsky, as well as their Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) contacts with the British embassy in Moscow. Upon questioning, Penkovsky revealed Wynne's name, and the latter were subsequently arrested in Budapest and taken to Moscow where he stood trial in May 1963. Wynne denied being any more than a courier, lured into service by British intelligence. Whereas Penkovsky was shot for treason, Wynne got sentenced to eight years, parts to be served in labor camps.

In 1964, Wynne was exchanged for Soviet agent Gordon A. Lonesdale, and came out from detention in the infamous Lubljanka Prison emaciated and mentally distressed. Wynne later went on to publish memoirs, much to his former superiors' dismay and also figured in BBC television documentaries on espionage.

See also: Lonsdale, Gordon Arnold; MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service); Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich

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Frode Lindgjerdet

X

XUAN AN, PHAM
(SEPTEMBER 12, 1927–SEPTEMBER 20, 2006)

Pham Xuan An was a Vietnamese journalist who worked for a number of Western news agencies and publications during the Vietnam War, including Reuters and *Time*, while simultaneously serving as a spy in the Communist Party Central Office for South Vietnam's H.63 military intelligence network. Born September 12, 1927, in Binh Hoa, Dong Nai province, Vietnam, An joined the Communist Party in 1953. He was selected by his party superior, Mai Chi Tho, brother of Le Duc Tho, who later negotiated the Paris Peace Accords with Henry Kissinger, for intelligence work and given the alias "Tran Van Trung."

After a brief service as a noncommissioned officer in the South Vietnamese army, An's proficiency in English helped him to obtain positions with the operations staff of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), predecessor of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), which was building up the new military. His position enabled him to begin building what would become an extensive network among both the future leaders of the Saigon regime and their American advisors from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including Major General Edward Lansdale and Lieutenant Colonel Lucien Conein. Lansdale arranged for an Asia Foundation scholarship that enabled An to study journalism at Orange Coast College in Costa Mesa, California, from 1957 to 1959, and interned with the *Sacramento Bee*.

Returning to Vietnam, An worked for number of publications, primarily Reuters (1960–1964) and *Time* (1964–1975), becoming at the latter the first Vietnamese to be full-time staff correspondent for any major American publication. Among the leading foreign journalists covering the expanding conflict for whom he became a trusted source were David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan of the *New York Times*, Stanley Karnow and Frank McCulloch of *Time*, Morley Safer of CBS News, and Bob Shaplen of the *New Yorker*. (The extent to which An's role as a Communist agent influenced

the reporting of the journalists who relied on his briefings for their understanding of Vietnamese culture and politics remains much disputed.)

Because his American education and contacts presumably vouched for his loyalty, he was brought in to advise Tran Kim Tuyen when the latter began setting up South Vietnam's Central Intelligence Office (CIO) under the tutelage of then CIA Station Chief William Colby in 1960.

Although his broad network of contacts and wide access to American and South Vietnamese military and political officials enabled him to supply the Vietnamese Communist leadership with a steady stream of documents which he copied. His most significant contribution is deemed to have been the extensive strategic assessments which he wrote in invisible ink and had smuggled out of Saigon through the Cu Chi tunnel network and then dispatched north via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Although An considered himself above all a strategic intelligence analyst, he has been described as the "greatest spy" of the Vietnam War—in fact, he delivered to his handlers almost every important military and civilian operational plan during the conflict.

After the unification of Vietnam in 1975, An was named a "Hero of the People's Armed Forces" and publicly assumed his military rank of lieutenant colonel, eventually rising to the rank of major general, one of only two Vietnamese intelligence officers to ever achieve that distinction. It was also revealed that during the Vietnam War, An had been secretly awarded the coveted Liberation Exploit Medal no less than four times: for his contributions to the Communist victory at the Battle of Ap Bac (1963), for his warning to Hanoi that the United States would introduce ground troops along with suggested tactical countermeasures (1964–1965), for his role in planning the Tet Offensive (1968), and for his contributions to the final campaign against South Vietnam (1974–1975).

An continued working as a senior analyst for Vietnam's General Department of Intelligence until shortly before his death on September 20, 2006, in Ho Chi Minh City, the former Saigon.

See also: Cold War Intelligence; Vietnam War and Intelligence Operations

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J. Peter Pham

XYZ AFFAIR

The XYZ affair refers to a French attempt to secure bribes from the U.S. government in order to resolve maritime disputes. The scandal stemmed from the French government's reaction to Jay's Treaty, a 1794 commercial agreement between Great Britain and the United States. Believing that the United States had conceded too much to the British, and also that the treaty's terms betrayed the Franco-American

alliance of 1778, the French government began to attack American commercial vessels at sea. The Directory, France's governmental body, also refused to acknowledge the appointment of Charles Pinckney, the new American ambassador, thus setting the two nations on the verge of war.

In a speech to a special session of Congress on May 16, 1797, President John Adams addressed the French crisis. He stated that the Directory's actions treated the United States "neither as allies nor as friends, nor as a sovereign state." Adams declared his intention to expand the military in preparation for a potential conflict with France. He also promised further negotiations with the provoking nation.

To begin peace negotiations with the Directory, Adams sent John Marshall and Elbridge Gerry to join Charles Pinckney in France. In October 1797 an agent working for Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, the French foreign minister, approached the envoy. This agent, Monsieur Hottinguer, told them that Adams' May speech had offended the Directory, and that the Americans would not be formally received until they met the minister's demands. These included disavowing Adams' offensive comments, making a loan to France, and paying a bribe of approximately $250,000 to Talleyrand.

The envoy's refusal to assuage the French minister brought a second agent, Monsieur Bellamy, to inform them that a meeting with the directors would lead to a fair treaty. Any meeting however would have to be preceded by a bribe to Talleyrand; as another agent, Monsieur Hubbard, informed the Americans: bribes were indispensable in Paris. For a lesser bribe, the French later offered Marshall and Pinckney safe passage home for further instructions. They ultimately refused it though when a fourth agent, Monsieur Hauteval, told them that the French would not cease their attacks on American shipping vessels in the interval.

Talleyrand had been vainly attempting to prolong the negotiations, believing that inaction would delay any potential intervention by the American military. In January 1798, the commissioners wrote to Adams that there was no hope of being officially received, and that their mission had failed. The president denounced the arrogance of the Directory, and believed that its conduct required an immediate declaration of war from Congress. Until that time however, the country would remain in a state of undeclared war.

In April 1798, the House voted that before any further discussion of war could continue, the envoy's original dispatches had to be released. Having assured the French agents of their anonymity, the commissioners named them only as Messrs. W, X, Y, and Z in the original dispatches. The resulting congressional debate over American retaliation never led to a formal declaration of war, and thus the XYZ Affair set the United States in a state of "Quasi-War" with France.

See also: Early Republic and Espionage; Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de

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Matthew C. Cain

Y

YARDLEY, HERBERT
(APRIL 13, 1889–AUGUST 7, 1958)

Herbert Osborne Yardley was a cryptanalyst who organized and directed the United States' first code-breaking efforts. Yardley was born in Worthington, Indiana, in 1889 to Mary Emma and Robert Kirkbride Yardley. After graduating from high school in 1907, Yardley worked with his father, who was the stationmaster and telegrapher for the local railroad. In 1912, he passed the civil service exam and was hired as a government telegrapher. Yardley began his career in code-breaking as a code clerk in the U.S. State Department. In addition, he accepted a Signal Corps Reserve commission and served as a cryptanalysis officer with the American Expeditionary Forces in France during World War II.

Concerned over the U.S. government's weak codes, Yardley responded by writing a hundred-page "Solution of American Diplomatic Codes," thus initiating a complete change in the U.S. code system. Yardley convinced the head of military intelligence that he could also break other country's codes and in 1912 he initiated a code-breaking operation within the U.S. State Department that came to be known as Black Chamber. In June 1917, Yardley became head of the newly created eighth section of military intelligence (MI-8). Although MI-8 had no real successes in World War I, the U.S. Army and the State Department continued to jointly fund MI-8 after the war.

Code-named "The Cipher Bureau" and disguised as a commercial code company that produced codes for businesses, MI-8 had the mission of breaking the diplomatic codes of several foreign countries. In 1921, Yardley and his staff decrypted the codes used by Japanese negotiators at the Washington Naval Conference. The information the Cipher Bureau provided the American delegation was instrumental in getting the Japanese to agree to a 5:3 ratio of battle ships instead of the 10:7 ratio the Japanese wanted.

In 1929, the State Department stopped operation of MI-8 due to Secretary of State Henry Stimson's absolute dislike for the covert operation of breaking other nation's codes. In 1931, Yardley published his memoirs, *The American Black Chamber*, which revealed the work of MI-8. It became an international bestseller. As a result of Yardley's publication, both the U.S. and Japanese governments completely changed their code systems. Due to the vague wording of espionage laws at that time, the government was unable to ever prosecute Yardley. During World War II, Yardley helped the Nationalists in China break Japanese codes and helped the Canadian government establish an office for cryptanalysis. Despite never being trusted by the U.S. government again, Yardley obtained a place in the National Security Agency Hall of Honor in 1999. Yardley died on August 7, 1958, of a stroke. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I; American Intelligence, World War II; Black Chamber

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Charlene T. Overturf

YEAR OF THE SPY, 1985

The year 1985, coined by the U.S. media as the "Year of the Spy," saw three major cases that commanded the attention of the public—Edward Lee Howard, Ronald W. Pelton, and the Walker Family Spy Ring.

Edward Lee Howard had a colorful career path before joining the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). After graduating from university, Howard worked for a while with Exxon Corporation in Ireland before joining the Peace Corps working in Columbia. He left the Peace Corp in 1975 to join the U.S. Agency for International Development in Peru as an analyst with top-security clearance. The year 1979 saw Howard back in the United States working with an environmental firm while waiting to hear the results of his application to join the CIA.

The CIA was aware of Howard's heavy drinking and drug use; they were still willing to accept him because of his level of education, extensive overseas experience, and the fact he was trilingual. Howard began his trainee year in 1980 and on completion was assigned as an intelligence officer in the Directorate of Operations which runs the CIA's secret services. Excelling in countersurveillance tactics, he was assigned in 1982 to the East German/Soviet Union section of the European division. Soon after, Howard and his wife (trained in counterintelligence as well), were asked to fill a vacancy in the Soviet Union division. They trained in all the techniques and procedures pertaining to the Soviet Union, including information on the CIA agents situated in Moscow.

As part of CIA security, Howard had to pass a polygraph and unfortunately it was found that he had been less than honest concerning his addictions, therefore deemed unsuitable for the service and in May 1983 he was dismissed from the CIA.

Extremely angry and devastated by his dismissal, he moved his family to New Mexico where he found work as an economic analyst. Howard decided to contact the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC, where it was arranged for him to fly to Vienna and meet with KGB agents. Trips were made between 1984 and 1985 where Howard received payments for information on the identification of the CIA operatives working in Moscow.

Howard was identified indirectly by the Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko, who knew that an agent by the code name "Robert" had trained and was assigned to Moscow before being suddenly dumped. This gelled with setbacks in Moscow at the time for example; Howard was attributed with a major operation being uncovered, American diplomats being expelled, and a Russian stealth technology researcher, Adolf Tolkachev, being convicted of espionage and sentenced to death.

Howard was placed under FBI surveillance but because of his training he evaded and avoided capture. He left the United States and moved from country to country across Europe, just ahead of the agents, before walking into the Soviet embassy in Budapest to defect. He was granted political asylum in 1986 and given Soviet citizenship. Living in Moscow, he worked as a consultant until his death in 2002.

Howard was given the infamous title of being the first American spy to defect to the Soviet Union.

Ronald W. Pelton, fluent in Russian, joined the U.S. Air Force in 1960 and trained as a signals intelligence officer, before being assigned to Pakistan to eavesdrop on the Soviets. Discharged in 1964, he joined the National Security Agency (NSA) in 1965 as a communications and intelligence analyst, with access to top-secret information. Facing bankruptcy and fearing this would jeopardize his security clearance he resigned in 1979.

In and out of employment, with finances at rock bottom, he walked into the Soviet embassy in 1980 and offered his services. During routine surveillance of the embassy, the FBI noticed a figure enter but not exit, and the report amounted to nothing.

Pelton sold highly classified material, including a program coded "Ivy Bells," which outlined the usage of U.S. submarines to tap into an underwater communications cable linking Soviet naval bases; this included technical and command procedures on the exact locations of the listening devices. This was especially relevant to the KGB as at the time the U.S. intelligence community was undergoing an extensive and expensive upgrade. He was allegedly paid over $35,000 between the years 1980 and 1983.

Like Howard, Pelton was exposed by the Soviet defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, who described a former NSA employee who had met with the KGB. The FBI then remembered the surveillance of 1980 and made the connection to Pelton. Surveillance was ordered but no incriminating evidence was turned up until he was asked to view the tape. Boasting of a photographic memory, and thinking they were going to enlist him as double agent, Pelton told of the secrets he had sold for payment.

He was arrested and put on trial but due to the sensitive nature of the information divulged to the Soviets, none of it was referred to by name. It was deemed too high a

risk for the security of the United States. He was found guilty of espionage and sentenced to three concurrent life sentences.

The Walker Family Spy Ring was headed by John Anthony Walker (chief warrant officer, retired). It included his son, Michael Lance Walker (yeoman third class); his brother, Arthur James Walker (lieutenant commander, retired, working for a defense contractor); and his friend, Jerry Alfred Whitworth (senior chief radioman, retired). The men were lured into spying with promises of financial security and safety from detection as John would act as the courier (he no longer had access to classified material).

Arthur provided information on defense plans and control manuals relating to navy amphibious craft. Michael provided information on signal communiqué and missile defense. When he was arrested on the USS *Nimitz*, a hidden cache of documents was found. Whitworth however, provided the most damaging information on satellite and cryptographic communications.

The FBI only realized there were others involved when John was arrested in 1985, following a tip-off from his former wife. Documents in his procession contained personal letters which implicated the involvement of the others. It was estimated that John A. Walker and the spy ring had sold over one million pieces of top-secret information between the years 1967 and 1985.

John was sentenced to life imprisonment, and Michael was given a 25-year sentence. Arthur was given life in prison and fined $250,000 and Jerry Whitworth was sentenced to 365 years in prison and fined $410,000 for not declaring his spy money.

The Walker Family Spy Ring caused damage to the security of the U.S. naval intelligence structure. The uncovering of the spy ring caused the intelligence community to investigate its security procedures, which in turn led to further arrests for espionage against the United States.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Howard, Edward Lee; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); Pelton, Ronald W.; Walker Spy Ring

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Shelley Allsop

YOSHIKAWA, TAKEO
(MARCH 7, 1912–FEBRUARY 20, 1993)

Takeo Yoshikawa was a Japanese spy in Hawaii before the Pearl Harbor attack. Born on March 7, 1912, in Ehime Prefecture, Takeo Yoshikawa graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1933. He then became ensign on reserve for health reasons and worked as a temporary employee at the Naval General Staff.

In March 1941, Yoshikawa, under the alias Tadashi Morimura, was sent to the Japanese Consulate-General in Honolulu. He was ostensibly a first secretary. His duty was, in fact, to watch the weather conditions of Pearl Harbor, to spy on the U.S. military facilities, and the movements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. His reports were sent to Tokyo and used for the planning of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Although there is a divergence of views as to what degree the United States knew about Yoshikawa's activities, the United States broke the code of Japanese diplomatic communications and got hold of the instructions Tokyo sent to Honolulu. They, however, were not enough for the United States to be assured of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. After the attack, Yoshikawa was interned in Arizona by the U.S. authorities. He was repatriated in 1942. After the war, he returned to Ehime and lived as a private citizen. He died on February 20, 1993.

See also: Pearl Harbor

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Naoki Ohno

YURCHENKO, VITALY SERGEYEVICH (MAY 2, 1936–)

Vitaly Yurchenko was a 25-year KGB veteran who defected to the United States in September 1985 and provided it with valuable intelligence about Soviet spies operating in the United States and threats to key American agents operating in the Soviet Union. That same year, in November, he redefected to the Soviet Union. Debate continues as to whether Yurchenko was a legitimate defector or a Soviet provocateur.

After serving in the Soviet navy, Yurchenko joined the KGB's Armed Forces Counterintelligence Directorate in 1960. He rose quickly through the ranks, becoming a prominent and well-placed KGB official. From 1975 to 1980 he was in charge of clandestine operations in the United States and Canada. Following that he became chief of the KGB's counterintelligence directorate for five years where his primary responsibility was finding foreign agents operating inside the KGB. After this tour ended in 1985 he was put in charge of KGB officials operating under legal cover in the United States and Canada.

In July 1985 Yurchenko attended a conference of scientists in Rome and in August U.S. intelligence knew of his interest in defecting. His reasons for defecting appear to have consisted of a generalized sense of frustration with the Soviet system and to be reunited with a former mistress, the wife of a Soviet government official now stationed in Canada.

Yurchenko immediately provided the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with critical information. He told them that Oleg Gordievsky, a key British agent inside the KGB, was about to be arrested. The British acted quickly and were able to get Gordievsky out of the Soviet Union. Yurchenko also provided information that led to the identification of Edward Lee Howard, a former CIA employee, and Ronald Pelton, a National Security Agency official, as Soviet spies. Howard managed to flee to the Soviet Union before he was caught. Pelton was arrested for espionage. After providing the CIA with his information, Yurchenko became less cooperative and offered little additional information. He appears to have become increasingly dissatisfied with his life even though the CIA had offered him a furnished home, $1 million, and an annual salary of $60,000. The CIA arranged a meeting with his mistress that did not go well. She refused his suggestion that she should also defect and join him.

On November 2, 1985, at dinner in a Georgetown restaurant with his CIA protector, Yurchenko excused himself to go to the bathroom. He proceeded to climb out the window and walk to the Soviet embassy. Two days later he held a press conference claiming that he had been kidnapped by the CIA in Rome and heavily drugged during his interrogations. On November 6, he returned to Moscow.

Two general theories exist on his defection and redefection and the fact that the Soviet Union allowed him to live. One holds that his first defection was a rouse designed to protect a valuable Soviet mole within the American intelligence community by sacrificing Howard and Pelton. A second holds that he was a legitimate defector and that his case was mishandled by the CIA. Like many defectors, Yurchenko had second doubts. The CIA did little to reassure him. His defection was leaked to the press and became public knowledge, making him feel as if he were a pawn in a bigger game of espionage rather than important in his own right. The CIA severely limited his ability to interact with others, keeping him largely isolated. And, the CIA treated him with little respect. The protector sent to have dinner with him the night he defected did not speak Russian and had no knowledge to speak of about the Soviet Union.

See also: Central Intelligence Agency; Gordievsky, Oleg; Howard, Edward Lee; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti); National Security Agency; Pelton, Ronald W.

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Glenn P. Hastedt

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ZARUBIN, VASSILIY MIKHAILOVICH
(1894–1972)

Vassiliy Mikhailovich Zarubin was a Soviet intelligence director in the United States during World War II, and one of the most important spies ever to reside on American soil.

Vassiliy Zarubin was born in Podolsk, near Moscow, in 1894. He had only two years of formal education, then worked as a sales clerk and continued to read. He fought in World War I, was wounded in 1917, and received treatment in Voronezh. During the Russian Civil War, Zarubin served the Red Army in Siberia and East Asia. By 1923 he headed the economic section of the OGPU (State Political Directorate and predecessor to the Committee for State Security—KGB) in Vladivostok.

Zarubin moved to the organization's foreign section in 1925, assigned to China for a year. Before returning to that country, he did illegal work in Finland, Denmark, Germany, and France. In the spring of 1941 he was back in China, near a ranking German advisor to Chiang Kai-shek. There he learned of Germany's impending attack on the USSR.

After an audience with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, Zarubin was dispatched to the embassy in the United States, nominally as Vassiliy Zubilin, its third secretary. In reality however, Zarubin was deputy head of the People's Commissariat for State Security's (NKVD) Foreign Intelligence Directorate (Upravlenie). The network he oversaw stole atomic research secrets, which greatly aided the Soviet Union during the cold war.

On August 7, 1943, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover received a Russian-language letter from a disgruntled rival who revealed Zarubin's existence, his real name and that his wife, Elizabeth, was also running an American network. The anonymous writer also named nine more ranking agents in the United States and Canada, and revealed that Zarubin had had some role in the 1940 massacre

of thousands of Poles in the Katyn forest. By 1944 the U.S. government had confirmed enough to declare Zarubin and his wife persona non grata.

He returned to the Soviet Union and was appointed a vice chief of foreign intelligence. He received the regime's highest awards: two Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, and one Order of the Red Star. Zarubin resigned for "health" reasons in 1948—when anti-Semitic purges resumed late in Stalin's life.

See also, American Intelligence, World War II; Federal Bureau of Investigation; KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)

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James G. Ryan

ZASLAVSKY, ALEXANDER AND ILYA

Brothers Alexander and Ilya Zaslavsky, who held dual U.S. and Russian citizenship, were charged by Russian officials with industrial espionage in March 2008 after they allegedly sought to obtain classified information for foreign energy companies. They were arrested after meeting with a representative from a major Russian energy company. Ilya Zaslavsky worked in Russia for a joint venture between three Russian billionaires and the British energy firm BP. Alexander Zaslavsky was employed by the British Council a culture and arts organization that is financed by the British government and whose Russian offices were recently closed as a result of allegations that it operated illegally and was a front for spies.

In conducting its investigations the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) stated that it found material evidence of espionage including copied reports and analytical documents, along with business cards from foreign defense officials and Central Intelligence Agency officials. BP denied allegations that it was involved in espionage. Speculation existed that the arrests were part of a move by the Russian government to force the Russian partners in the joint venture to sell its share in a major gas file to Gazprom which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev once ran.

See also: Industrial Espionage

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Glenn P. Hastedt

ZENIT SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

From August 1960 to May 1972 the United States conducted a series of highly successful photoreconnaissance satellite missions under the code name "Corona." They provided detailed pictures of Chinese and Soviet military developments as well as intelligence on the June 1967 Six Day War in the Middle East, the construction of the Berlin Wall, and Sino-Soviet border clashes.

The Soviet Union's response to Corona was the Zenit satellite reconnaissance program, which had its genesis in a January 30, 1956 governmental decree authorizing the development of an artificial satellite called Object D. After several years of trial and error the Soviets finally achieved successful space imagery photos from the Zenit 2-Kosmos 7 mission for August 8, 1962. On March 10, 1964, the Soviet Ministry of Defense declared Zenit 2's space reconnaissance capability operational, although this capability was not limited to the satellite itself. Zenit satellites were initially launched from Tyuratam or Baikonaur in what is now Kazakhstan, but beginning in 1966 the rockets carrying these satellites were launched from Plesetsk in northern Russia.

These satellites initially remained in orbit for 8 to 12 days, although their orbital lifetimes would gradually increase. Consequently, the Soviets needed to launch many more of these satellites than the United States did, and they averaged 30 to 35 launches per year during the early 1970s, whereas the United States was averaging 6 to 10 launches annually. A key reason for the short lifespan of the Zenit satellites was their inability to eject individual film rolls to aircraft anywhere on Earth, in contrast with Corona. Zenit satellites and imagery had to be brought down within Soviet territory.

Zenit's data was used by numerous organizations within the Soviet military, including its military intelligence service, the GRU, whose Satellite Intelligence Directorate interpreted and analyzed space photos. Additional Soviet photoreconnaissance users during this period included the Topographical Directorate of the Armed Forces General Staff and the Strategic Rocket Forces Commanding Staff. Topographical Directorate responsibilities included military mapping, and Intelligence Department responsibilities included using Zenit information for precision ICBM targeting. The Soviets also sought to disguise their military space missions by mixing military and civilian satellites and failed probes as part of the Kosmos program, which constituted approximately 95 percent of Soviet space missions at this time.

The Zenit program did not have a clear end in the early 1970s like Corona but has probably evolved into current Russian military space satellite programs such as the Kobalt, Yenisey, Strela–3, and GLONASS systems.

See also: CORONA

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ZEPPELIN, OPERATION

This operation was a deception plan drawn up by the Allies and was to have been an amphibious landing in the eastern Mediterranean, particularly on the Mediterranean island of Crete, on the coast of Western Greece, or the Black Sea coast of Romania. Drawn up in the period just before the Normandy Invasion, its purpose was to confuse and distract the Germans.

The planning of Operation Zeppelin involved the Americans, the British, and the Russians with hints that the Allies might be involved in an operation on any of seven spots, the main three being Crete, the western coast of Greece from the Ionian islands, or the Black Sea coast of Romania, or even Bulgaria, involving a joint operation between the British and the Red Army. Other possible landing sites were identified as the Peloponese peninsula, the southernmost part of mainland Greece; Albania; the Dalmatian coast of Yugoslavia; or the Pola and Istrian peninsula at the head of the Adriatic. Information was leaked that this might take place in mid-March 1944, at the same time as a renewed Soviet land offensive.

In February 1944 the plan was formalized with the idea of it taking place on the full moon, which was on March 23. It would involve a series of landings on Crete, the Peloponese peninsula, in Albania and Dalmatia (then part of the pro-German Republic of Croatia). However, as the date approached, planners came up with some technical problems, postponing the operation until late May. These were then modified again with attacks on Albania, Dalmatia, and parts of Greece scheduled for mid-June.

The planning involved the Polish III Corps in southern Italy being prepared for an amphibious landing at the strategic Albanian port of Durrës, from where they would try to take Tirana. It would coincide with attacks on Dalmatia and Istria, coordinated with the partisans of Marshal Tito, the British having ended their support for the Royalist Chetniks of Mihailovic. Tito was against the involvement of Polish soldiers, as he saw that a postwar Poland might try to exert its power in the Balkans. The British, however, were unable to pretend to use other troops and were also not able to tell Tito that Zeppelin was merely a deception to prevent the Axis redeploying their forces to France. With D-Day, Zeppelin was seen to have been bogus, and on October 17, 1944, Albanian partisans, without help from the Allies, captured Tirana.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I

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ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM

The Zimmermann Telegram represented a secret effort by the German government to recruit Mexico, and indirectly Japan, as allies in any future war between the United States and Germany. When war began in Europe in August 1914, Germany searched for ways to provoke a military conflict between the United States and Mexico, which was experiencing revolution and civil war at the time. A U.S.-Mexican conflict would interrupt the movement of war supplies and make U.S. intervention in the European war more difficult.

Germany had cultivated ties with revolutionary leader Francisco "Pancho" Villa but had to switch to his revolutionary rival, Venustiano Carranza, who by 1916 represented the only viable German hope for interrupting the flow of U.S. arms to Europe. To offset U.S. influence, Carranza sought closer commercial relations with Germany and German assistance in upgrading the Mexican armed forces. He even offered to let German submarines operate out of Mexican bases.

It was in this context that the Zimmermann Telegram appeared. Arthur Zimmermann, Germany's foreign secretary, assumed that the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare would probably lead to U.S. entry into the war. In order to limit the U.S. contribution to the European war effort, Zimmermann hoped to spark a military conflict between Mexico and the United States.

On January 16, 1917, Zimmermann outlined his plan in a coded telegram to the German ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt. In the telegram Zimmermann indicated that Germany would renew unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917. The ambassador was to propose a military alliance with Mexico in the event of U.S. entry into the war. Germany would provide "generous financial support" and aid Mexico in recovering the "lost territory" of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Eckardt was also directed to suggest to President Carranza that Mexico encourage Japan to join in the military alliance against the United States.

Officials in the German Foreign Office worried about the impact on U.S. neutrality if the contents of the telegram became known. Their concerns proved justified. British intelligence had broken the German code and had intercepted the telegram in Mexico. The British did not immediately turn over the telegram to U.S. officials or publicize it because they did not want it known that they had broken the German code. The British also hoped that the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare would be enough to bring the United States into the war. When the United States broke relations with Germany but did not declare war, the British turned the decoded telegram over to U.S. officials on February 24. President Wilson later authorized the release of the telegram to the U.S. press, which published it under sensational headlines on March 1.

When the telegram was released, the Carranza administration denied that it had ever been offered an alliance by Germany and also refused to break relations with Germany, despite U.S. pressure. Later, in a secret meeting with Ambassador Eckardt, Carranza officially turned down the offer of an alliance but held open an alliance as a future possibility.

U.S. officials at the time and historians since have attributed considerable significance to the Zimmermann Telegram in the U.S. decision to enter the war in April 1917. Despite the diplomatic uproar over the telegram, the telegram did not produce a change

in Mexico's proclaimed policy of neutrality. Even after the telegram fiasco, Germany made another secret offer of a military alliance with Mexico which Carranza turned down in August 1917. The German secret service moved its North American headquarters to Mexico after U.S. entry into the war. Germany even prepared—but never used—a base for submarines on Mexico's gulf coast. Although the Zimmermann Telegram shocked the U.S. public, it in fact represented the latest in a series of covert German attempts to embroil Mexico and the United States in a military conflict.

See also: American Intelligence, World War I

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Don M. Coerver

Glossary

A-2: The intelligence staff section of the U.S. Army Air Corps.

acoustic intelligence: (ACINT) is intelligence gathered from auditory phenomena. It is generally collected undersea by ships, submarines, or sensors. It is a subcategory of Measurements and Signals Intelligence (MASINT).

agent: This term has two different meanings. When used to refer to the FBI, an agent is a professional law enforcement official. When it is used in the context of CIA clandestine operations, an agent refers to the person recruited by the CIA to engage in spying. It does not refer to the CIA official.

Agent 711: The code name given to George Washington during the American Revolution.

Agent Tom: The Soviet code name assigned to Kim Philby.

analytical intelligence: Information becomes intelligence only after it has been analyzed, subjected to systematic examination, and evaluated. Analytical intelligence may take several forms including basic intelligence, current intelligence, and estimative intelligence.

aquarium: The nickname for the main military intelligence (GRU) headquarters in Moscow. It takes its name from its basic structure as a glass-encased nine-story tower.

ARGON: The code name given to a series of mapping satellites that included CORONA and LANYARD.

aunt minnies: Refers to commercial photographs or photos taken by tourists and journalists that are used by intelligence agencies to fill in gaps in existing photographic coverage.

basic intelligence: This is factual and fundamental intelligence about another state. It is relatively unchanging and constitutes a type of encyclopedic background picture that can be built upon by intelligence analysts.

BfV: The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution was the West German counterintelligence organization set up with the help of the United States and Great Britain. It continues to operate in Germany today.

Big Bird: The code name given to a series of low-orbit KH-9 satellite launches from 1971 to 1986. It was also known as HEXAGON.

Black Bag Job: A covert entry operation that generally involved illegally breaking and entering into a location in order to obtain information. It was practiced by the FBI from 1942 to 1967. J. Edgar Hoover ordered its termination the previous year.

Black Chamber: Exists as a generic term that applies to code-breaking operations. It dates back at least to the late sixteenth century when King Henry IV of France employed agents to secretly read correspondence.

BLUEBELL: Human intelligence collection plan during the Korean War in which North Korean families and refugees were sent back to North Korea in order to provide the United States with information.

BND: The West German Federal Intelligence Agency, formed with American and British help, that was built on the network of spies run by Richard Gehlen for the Nazi Germany government against the Soviet Union.

BODYGUARD: The code name given to the overall deception plan for the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944.

Cambridge Five: One of many phrases used to describe the Soviet spy ring operating in Great Britain during World War II and the early 1950s. Its members were Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross. It is also commonly referred to as the Cambridge Spy Ring.

Camp Swampy: Slang phrase used to identify Camp Peary, the CIA training center.

CARNIVORE: A commercially available software system used by the FBI to monitor e-mails that was established during the Clinton administration.

CHALET: Also known as CHALET/VORTEX this is the code name given to a series of signals intelligence earth orbit satellites. The first and only known CHALET flight was in 1978. VORTEX flights took place in 1979, 1981, 1984, 1988, and 1989.

CHAOS: A domestic spying operation run by the CIA. Authorized by President Lyndon Johnson, it was expanded under President Richard Nixon. A primary target was the antiwar movement especially student groups, radical Black Power organizations, and women's groups for peace.

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency.

CIO: Central Imagery Office.

ciphers: A cipher is a system of secret writing that utilizes a prearranged scheme to prevent its detection and comprehension.

clandestine collection: A secret collection of intelligence. It is contrasted with the overt collection of intelligence whereby intelligence is collected through publicly available means.

coastwatchers: Refers to Australian and New Zealand agents who observed Japanese military movements in the Southwest Pacific during World War II.

code talkers: Refers to Native Americans who used native languages as codes for voice transmissions on tactical intelligence matters for the marines during World War I and World War II. It is generally associated with Navajos but this was not exclusively the case.

codes: Codes refer to symbols that have a predetermined meaning and are used for secrecy in transmitting a message.

COINTELPRO: Stands for Counter Intelligence Program. It was run by the FBI between 1956 and 1971. In theory directed at infiltrating and disrupting subversive groups, but it came to be used against a wide range of groups that had no connections with foreign powers and whose only crimes were opposition to existing governmental policies.

COLDFEET: Intelligence collection project designed to acquire Soviet acoustic intelligence from abandoned drift stations in the Arctic.

collection: The acquisition of information in any manner. Information may be collected through direct observation, liaison with official agencies, public sources, or through clandestine means.

combat intelligence: Consists of knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations.

Committee of Secret Correspondence: Identified by some as the United States' first intelligence agency. It was established by the Continental Congress to, among other things, hire secret agents, conduct covert operations, create a code and cipher system, and acquire foreign intelligence.

communications intelligence: Also referred to as COMINT, it is a subcategory of signals intelligence that focuses on the acquisition of intelligence by intercepting voice communications from foreign states.

CORONA: The first U.S. photo reconnaissance satellite, also identified as Discoverer, it possessed both a mapping and intelligence-gathering capability. It operated from August 1960 to May 1972. Its existence was declassified in 1995.

COS: Chief of Station.

counterespionage: More broadly this is often referred to as counterintelligence. Two tasks are involved. First, the protection of one's own secrets. Second, the neutralization and apprehension of spies who are employed by foreign powers.

counterintelligence: This is an overarching category of activity that includes counterespionage. Counterintelligence is intelligence gathered against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassination conducted by a hostile foreign power or group.

covert action: This is clandestine activity designed to affect a situation in another country. The key to success is that the identity of the sponsoring country or organization is not revealed. Covert action is different from clandestine collection which seeks to acquire information but not to influence events in the target state.

cryptanalysis: This is the science of translating secret messages into plain text. It may operate either deductively or inductively. In the former, the analysis hinges on the detection of patterns that allow analysts to move from reoccurring combinations to more unique ones. Inductive analysis is based on hunches as to possible words in the

message that produce leads as to the meaning of the message. Cryptanalysis generally is treated as an applied science where cryptography is abstract and theoretical in nature.

cryptography: This is the abstract science of secret writing. Mathematical equations are often used for establishing its basic parameters and translation rules.

current intelligence: A category of analytical intelligence that stresses up to date information that is of immediate interest to policy makers.

cyber espionage: A new and growing concern to intelligence officials, cyber espionage is the act of obtaining secrets from individuals, groups, organizations, and governments by exploiting weaknesses in the Internet, software, or computers.

damage assessment: This refers to an evaluation of the impact of a compromise in security that results in the loss of secret information. The assessment includes both a judgment regarding the benefits gained by an adversary and the impact on one's own collection capabilities, and ways to prevent its reoccurrence.

data mining: The process of trying to uncover otherwise hidden patterns and relationships among large quantities of data that are otherwise not readily apparent.

dead drops: This is a method of exchanging intelligence, instructions, and money between a spy and his or her handler. Dead drops are exchanges that do not involve actual physical contact between the two. Rather, a location is chosen for the exchange and a signal used to indicate that material has been put in place to be picked up. Dead drops are seen as the safest way of making an exchange.

defector: A defector is an individual in the employ of a foreign government who is either induced to come over to one's side or does so voluntarily.

DESOTO: A long-standing naval patrol operation conducted in international waters off the coast of North Vietnam designed to acquire electronic intelligence. Two ships involved in it, the *C. Turner Joy* and *Maddox* became entangled in the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

DHS: Department of Homeland Security.

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency.

Director of Central Intelligence: From its inception until the creation of the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence was simultaneously the head of the CIA and the intelligence community was a whole.

Director of National Intelligence: The statutory head of the intelligence community. Frequently proposed in studies of the intelligence community, the political impetus for creating it was the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

directorates: Administrative units. They form the main organizational subdivisions with the CIA.

dirty tricks: A catch-all phrase used to describe activities undertaken as part of a covert action plan. Dirty tricks are designed to disrupt a target's ability to perform some important function. Espionage is important to dirty tricks because it may provide information about a target's vulnerabilities.

disinformation: Also known as Black Propaganda, it is deliberately spread false or misleading information designed to weaken an adversary's defensive capabilities.

DOD: Department of Defense.

Double-Cross System: Also known as the XX system. It was the British military intelligence's antiespionage, deception, and counterintelligence operation directed with great effect at Nazi Germany.

ECHELON: Refers to a signals intelligence collection operation that was run by the National Security Agency (NSA) with the cooperation of British, Canadian, and Australian officials as part of the UKUSA agreement. It had the effect of allowing the NSA to circumvent bans on spying on Americans.

economic espionage: This refers to espionage directed at acquiring foreign economic intelligence. It targets both governments and private businesses. Of interest are such items as production methods, financial and taxation systems, research and development projects, dual-use technologies, and government contracts.

electronic intelligence: Often identified as intelligence that is obtained from communications between machines as opposed to humans. More exactly it is technical and geolocational intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from sources other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.

electronic surveillance: Refers to activities to obtain information through electronic means without the individual targeted being aware of the collection effort. Common techniques include wiretapping, bugging, use of a pen register, closed circuit and photographic taping, and the use of wired agents and informers.

electro-optical intelligence: Involves the collection of data from the portion of the electromagnetic spectrum of wavelengths that contains ultraviolet radiation, visible light, and infrared radiation. When analyzed, such information can reveal the location and movements of humans and heat-generating machinery as well as distinguish between the exhaust of a missile and that of a commercial aircraft.

espionage: Also referred to as spying, it is the secret collection of information; often referred today under the heading of clandestine collection. It may be carried out either through technical means or by agents who infiltrate key organizations in order to acquire documents, photographs, or other material of value.

executive action: A colloquial term used by the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s when referring to assassination attempts.

false flag: Refers to a situation in which a government, individual, group, or organization adopts a false identity in order to shield the true purpose behind its actions. Used by intelligence organizations to obtain information that would otherwise be denied it.

Family Jewels: A list of illegal and questionable CIA activities produced by the CIA itself at the request of Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger as he sought to determine the extent of CIA involvement in these types of activities. The list of 300 entries became the centerpiece for congressional investigations of the CIA n the 1970s.

Farm, the: Slang phrase used for Camp Peary, the CIA's longtime training center.

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation.

ferret: Electronic intelligence satellites whose primary function was to gather information from microwave, radar, radio, and voice transmissions.

fifth man: All accounts agree on the first four members of the Cambridge Spy Ring (Philby, Maclean, Blunt, and Burgess). Disagreement exists on the identity and even existence of the fifth member. Cairncross now is generally considered to be the fifth man.

Firm, the: Slang term used to identify the CIA.

FISA: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence: Also referred to as FISINT, it is technical information obtained through the intercept of electromagnetic emissions that accompany the testing and operational use of military systems.

FORTITUDE: The deception operation used to misguide German forces as to the location of the British landing that took place at Normandy. It was divided into Fortitude North (Norway) and Fortitude South (Pais de Calle).

FSB: Russian Federal Security Service is the current-day successor to the KGB, Cheka, and NKVD.

FSK: Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service was the immediate successor to the KGB, which was disbanded in 1991 following the coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev. It existed from 1991 to 1995 and was replaced by the FSB.

G-2: U.S. Army General Staff Intelligence Division.

GAMBIT: A U.S. photoreconnaissance KH-7 system used from July 1963 to June 1967. The program remains classified but many of its photos were released to the public in 2002.

GENETRIX: A 1950s U.S. intelligence that sent balloons over the Soviet Union in an attempt to obtain photographic intelligence.

GOLD: U.S. code name for the operation to obtain information from a tunnel under Berlin that gave access to Soviet communication lines. It was compromised from the start by the involvement of Soviet spy George Blake. Known by the British as Operation Stopwatch.

GRU: The Foreign Military Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Formerly the main military intelligence directorate of the Red Army.

Halloween Massacre: The mass firing of some 820 CIA employees in 1977 carried out by DCI Stansfield Turner who argued that budget cuts and a need to change the organizational culture of the CIA away from covert action to intelligence analysis was needed.

handler: This refers to the intelligence official who manages a spy. The handler is the spy's point of contact with the intelligence organization he or she is working for.

HTLINGUAL: A clandestine operation intercepting mail destined for the Soviet Union and China that was in place from 1952 until 1973.

human intelligence: Also referred to as HUMINT, intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. These sources may be friendly or hostile. They may or may not know the purpose of the interpersonal communications taking place.

imagery intelligence: Formerly identified as photo intelligence imagery intelligence (IMINT), it is intelligence gathered from photography, infrared sensors, and synthetic aperture radar. It may be collected by planes or satellites.

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information: Also referred to as raw intelligence. It is unanalyzed data that has been collected but has not yet been evaluated for its reliability, validity, and meaning.

information security: Protecting information and information systems from unauthorized modification, destruction, disruption, or use. Often equated with protection of computer systems.

intelligence: Intelligence is evaluated information. Until information has been assessed for its reliability and validity and then evaluated for its significance, it remains raw data. One of the major fallacies of intelligence is that facts are self-interpreting or "speak for themselves."

intelligence community: The intelligence community consists of those national security bureaucracies in the United States that are involved in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. It is headed by the Director of National Intelligence. The most prominent members of the intelligence community include the CIA, National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research within the State Department. One of the major problems facing the intelligence community is the effective coordination of action. Each of these organizations has its own bureaucratic culture and set of values as well as a unique sense of mission and purpose.

intelligence cycle: This refers to the functional stages by which information is acquired, turned into intelligence, and made available to policy makers. Typically the steps involved are described as tasking, collection, processing and evaluation, reporting, and feedback.

intelligence estimates: Formal and informal documents produced by the intelligence analysts that provide policy makers with insights needed to understand situations, anticipate the actions of the others, and formulate their own policy. The most formal of these documents is the National Intelligence Estimate.

intelligence oversight: The process of ensuring the accountability of intelligence agencies. It may be exercised internally through inspector general offices, in the executive branch through presidential review and advisory boards, in Congress through congressional committees, and by special review groups.

Intrepid: The code name for Sir William Stephenson, a Canadian businessman who was the senior British intelligence operative in the United States during World War II and worked closely with Col. William Donovan in setting up the Office of Strategic Services.

IVY BELLS: A joint operation by the U.S. Navy and the National Security Agency to tap into a submerged Soviet communications cable in the Sea of Okhotsk.

JEDBURGH: World War II intelligence operation that air-dropped teams into occupied Nazi territory in order to help local resistance forces as well as engage in sabotage and guerrilla warfare. It was run by the British Special Operations Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services.

JENNIFER: The code name for a largely failed 1974 project undertaken by the CIA to raise a sunken Soviet submarine, Project (E-20th) Glomar Explorer.

JICs: Joint Intelligence Centers.

JMWAVE: The code name for the U.S. intelligence operation center in Miami that from 1961 to 1962 was responsible for directing intelligence gathering and covert action plans against Cuba.

KEYHOLE: A digital-imaging satellite the size of a school bus that operates in an egg-shaped elliptical orbit of the earth. It delivers high-resolution pictures in real time to ground stations and has infrared heat sensors. Keyhole 1 (KH -1) was known as CORONA. During the Iraq War, three KH-11 satellites helped provide hourly coverage.

KGB: The Committee for State Security was the premier Soviet intelligence agency during the Cold War. It broke off from the Ministry for State Security (MGB) in 1954 and was terminated in 1991. Most recently it was replaced by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).

KMSOURDOUGH: A CIA mail intercept operation run from 1969 to 1971.

MAGIC: The code name for information obtained by breaking the Japanese Purple cipher during World War II that allowed the United States to read Japan's most important diplomatic messages.

materials intelligence: Also known as MASINT, it is intelligence collected from the analysis of gas, liquid, or solid samples. It is important for evaluating nuclear, chemical, and biological threats as well as assessing environmental and public health conditions

measurement and signature intelligence: Also identified as MASINT, it constitutes an umbrella category of collection means that fall outside of the other major collection disciplines of human intelligence, signals intelligence, technological intelligence, open source intelligence, and imagery intelligence.

medical intelligence: Also identified as MEDINT, it is intelligence obtained from foreign medical, bioscientific, and environmental information that is important for purposes of strategic planning and assessing the foreign medical capabilities of military and civilian sectors.

MI: Military Intelligence.

MI-5: British Security Service responsible for counterintelligence operations.

MI-6: British Secret Intelligence Service that serves as its foreign intelligence agency.

MI-8: The cryptographic section of the Military Intelligence Division. Later popularized and equated with the Black Chamber.

MICE: Acronym for the four primary recruitment tools used to get someone to engage in espionage: money, ideology, compromise, and ego.

MINARET: An electronic communications intercept program operated by the National Security Agency between 1967 and 1973. Working off of a watch list of foreign individuals and organizations, over 3,900 reports on Americans were issued.

MKULTRA: CIA Technical Services Division program for mind-control drugs from 1953 to 1964.

MOCKINGBIRD: A clandestine CIA operation to enlist journalists in promoting the image of the CIA and protecting it from criticism. Journalists were also used as sources of information and as covers for CIA operatives abroad.

mole: A spy who has been secretly placed within an adversary's intelligence service or other important national security organization. The mole may be quiet or inactive for a long period of time before becoming active and providing intelligence.

MSIC: Missile and Space Intelligence Center.

National Clandestine Service: Today serves as the principal U.S. agency for conducting human intelligence. It was created by absorbing the CIA's Directorate of Operations and coordinates the human intelligence collection activities of other members of the intelligence community.

NCTC: National Counter Terrorism Center.

NFIB: National Foreign Intelligence Board.

NGA: National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.

NIE: National Intelligence Estimate.

NIMA: National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

NIO: National Intelligence Officer.

NKVD: Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs. It was the Soviet secret police during the Stalinst period. It ran the gulag system and the main directorate for state security which became the KGB.

NMIC: National Maritime Intelligence Center.

NRO: National Reconnaissance Office.

NSA: National Security Agency.

NSC: National Security Council.

noise: In gathering information, intelligence agencies must distinguish between signals and noise. Signals are valid indicators of an adversary's intentions or capabilities. Noise is the clutter of irrelevant background information that surrounds any activity. It can be seen as similar to the "static" one encounters in trying to tune in a distant radio station.

ONI: Office of Naval Intelligence.

open-source intelligence: Information may be collected from a variety of sources. Open-source information refers to information that is obtained from public sources. Its collection requires no deception or espionage. Open sources include the Internet, newspapers, journals, speeches, and government documents. Clandestine collection is the other broadly defined means of collecting information.

operational intelligence: This is intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations.

OSS: Office of Strategic Services.

OTA: Office of Terrorism Analysis.

photographic intelligence: The analyzed and evaluated product of photographic products.

polygraph test: This is commonly referred to as a lie detector test. It is used to establish the truthfulness, loyalty, and reliability of an individual. Polygraph tests are not used uniformly throughout the national security bureaucracies and, when used,

successful spies are known to have passed polygraph tests. Many consider the most useful way to look at a polygraph is as a deterrent to spying rather than a device that can catch spies.

proprietary: Front companies that appear to be legitimate business enterprises but are owned and operated by an intelligence organization and used as cover for espionage or to service ongoing covert operations. Air America is a frequently cited CIA example and Amtorg is an often-cited Russian example.

PURPLE: The code name given to the Japanese cipher machine used during World War II to transmit sensitive Japanese diplomatic messages. Broken by U.S. cryptanalysts, the information obtained from it was designed as MAGIC.

radar intelligence: Also known as RADINT, it is intelligence obtained from the collection of radar which uses electromagnetic waves to identify the range, direction, altitude, and, if relevant, the speed of moving and stationary objects. Radar is an acronym for radio detection and ranging.

reconnaissance: The act of scouting or actively seeking out information.

secret information: This is a security designation given to information that if disclosed could reasonably be expected to cause serious harm to national security.

SHAMROCK: Carried out by the Armed Forces Security Agency and then the National Security Agency, Operation Shamrock examined incoming and outgoing communications handled by Western Union. At its height 150,000 messages a month were looked at.

signals intelligence: This is often referred to as SIGINT. Signals intelligence is intelligence derived from signal intercepts coming from communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence regardless of how it is transmitted.

skunk works: A generic phrase that refers to a small group of individuals assigned to work on a special project with a great deal of autonomy. It was the term used to describe Lockheed Martin's Advanced Development Programs unit that was responsible for developing a number of reconnaissance aircraft such as the U-2 and SR -71.

spy ring: A spy ring is a group of spies that are organized around a central individual or work closely with one another in obtaining secret information.

strategic intelligence: This is a category of analytical intelligence that focuses on information related to an adversary's strategic forces. Typically, this involves forces with a nuclear capability. Strategic intelligence encompasses both information about weapons systems and military doctrine.

surveillance: Surveillance is the process of shadowing, observing, and monitoring the actions of an individual who is suspected of being engaged in espionage. Surveillance may take place through human or technical means.

tasking: The first stage in the intelligence cycle. Tasking is the process by which intelligence needs are identified.

technical intelligence: This is intelligence about the military weapons and equipment used by other states.

technological espionage: This form of espionage involves the collection of information through scientific and technical means such as by monitoring or intercepting foreign commercial or military communications, satellite transmissions, and weapons telemetry. It is contrasted with human espionage or spying.

telemetry intelligence: Also known as TELINT, it is a subcategory of Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence. It is the process of capturing the continuous set of signals sent back by remotely monitored devices. The most important of these have been missiles and the telemetry can be used to its throw weight and performance capabilities.

UKUSA: A post–World War II signals intelligence-sharing agreement between the United States and Great Britain that includes participation by Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.

Ultra: Code name for the British breaking of the Axis codes in World War II. The principle source of this information came from being able to read communications sent on the German cipher machine code-named Enigma.

VENONA: A secret cooperative project begun in 1943 between U.S. and British intelligence to cryptoanalyze messages sent by Soviet intelligence agencies during World War II. Details of the project were not officially released until 1995, although the program was ended in 1980. Information obtained through VENONA has shed light on a number of controversial espionage cases.

walk-in: This refers to a spy who volunteers his or her services to an adversary's intelligence organization. This is the opposite of a spy who is singled out and recruited by an intelligence organization.

X-2: The counterespionage branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). It was absorbed by the War Department when the OSS was disbanded after World War II and later came to be housed in the CIA.

Year of Intelligence: Term used to refer to 1975 when the Rockefeller Commission as well as the Church and Pike Congressional Committees investigated the CIA for abuses and failures.

Year of the Spy: Term used to refer to 1985 when several spy cases made headlines, most famously those involving the Pelton, Pollard, Howard, and Walker families.

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National Counterterrorism Center: http://www.nctc.gov/.

National Security Agency: www.nsa.gov.

National Security Archive: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/.

National Security Council: http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/.

National Strategy Information Center: www.strategycenter.org/.

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